Laurel vs misa Facts: the Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus

filed by petitioner anastacio laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that 1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and 2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine republic .Issues: Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspended and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands. Held: No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby the occupier. Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US as well as against the sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt from commonwealth to republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the commonwealth, bec it is an offense against the same govt and the same sovereign people.

PEOPLE v GOZO Facts: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction.

Issue/s: Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval base leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces.

Held: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing

another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."

REAGAN v CIR Facts: William Reagan imported a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car withaccessories valued at US $ 6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges. After acquiring a permit to sell the car from the base commander of Clark Air Base, Reagan sold the car to a certainWillie Johnson Jr. of the US Marine Corps stationed in Sangley Point, Cavite for US$ 6,600. Johnson sold the same, on the same day to Fred Meneses, a Filipino. As a result of the transaction, the Commissioner rendered Reagan liable for income tax in the sum of P2,970. Reagan claimed that he was exempt as the transactionoccurred in Clark Air Base, which as he contends is a base outside the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Reagan was covered by the tax exemption. Held: The court ruled in the negative. The Philippines, as an independent and sovereign country, exercises its authority over its entire domain. Any state may, however, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. It may allow another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. By doing so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. The areas retain their status as native soil. Clark Air Base is within Philippine territorial jurisdiction to tax, and thus, Reagan was liable for the income tax arising from the sale of his automobile in Clark. The law does not look with favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. Reagan has not done so, and cannot do so.

REAGAN v CIR Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force. In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson Jr for $6600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at P17912.34 and that his income tax would be P2797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in foreign soil since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation. ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax? HELD: The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagans assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This countrys jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable.

HOLY SEE v ROSARIO FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana

petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.

the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio. ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity RULING: The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the

immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis

If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.