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ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
This paper will explore the ways in which constructions of ‘legitimate’ and
‘illegitimate’ political violence through the designation of certain acts and groups as
‘terrorist’ serves very particular functions useful to dominant societal groups, through
framed by both the Colombian and United States governments as a part of the larger
critique’, as used by scholars of the ‘Welsh School’ of Critical Security Studies and
Critical Terrorism Studies (Jackson, 2008; McDonald, 2009; Booth, 2007) which
‘terrorism’, in this case) with a view to revealing the political functions which these
monopolising the mainstream position of who defines ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorists’, and the
appropriate response to the ‘terrorist threat’ in a manner which precludes the
continuance of a brutal armed campaign not only against guerrilla insurgencies, but
also against progressive elements of civil society whom oppose human rights abuses
conflict, which aim to expose state terrorism and espouse non-violent solutions, is
After introducing the present-day situation in Colombia and the literary context and
details of the theoretical approach of the paper, I will analyse the definitions of
terrorism upon which the U.S and Colombian governments base their framing of the
immanent critique.
Colombia has been torn apart by conflict since the late 1940s. What began as a war
between rival liberal and conservative elites evolved, in the 1950s, into class conflict
between those same elites on the one hand and peasant colonisers who would go on to
Nacional (ELN – National Liberation Army), the FARC would engage in what
became an archetypal Cold-War conflict against the Colombian armed forces, aided
by right-wing paramilitary groups, and with the training, equipment and tuition of the
United States1. During the 1980s all sides, particularly the paramilitaries2, deepened
1
Stokes, 2005:71-79
2
ibid p102
The support of the United States to the Colombian military effort against the FARC
and ELN has been nothing short of integral; it was US counter-insurgency doctrine
which guided the army and paramilitaries in their fight against ‘communists’ during
the cold war, and which has continued since under the auspices of a ‘war on drugs’
and, in recent years’ a ‘war on terrorism’; Colombia remains one of the biggest
After decades of armed conflict, the situation in Colombia today is particularly grave.
The FARC and ELN continue to be responsible for grievous human rights abuses;
out regular and brutal attacks against progressive elements of civil society such as
indigenous organisations, journalists, and human rights groups, and have made
Colombia the most dangerous country in the world for trade unionists. These same
officials, whom reject their criticisms of the conduct of the conflict or the continued
imposition of neoliberal reform and accuse them of working in the service of the
‘terrorists’.
The real price for the decades of conflict is paid by the civilian population, whom are
subject to constant violence and the threat thereof by all sides. Colombia now enjoys
Analyses of the conflict in Colombia in the aftermath of the Cold War have, by and
large, remained innocent of post-positivist analysis, much less so the literature which
Since 2001, the issue of ‘terrorism’ in Colombia has received comparatively little
attention by contrast to that which has been lavished upon ‘terrorist’ groups which are
3
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2008
more religious in their ideological orientation or disposed towards suicide attacks in
their strategies. Nonetheless, there does exist a literature which for the most part could
studies’ which tend to adhere to what Stokes4 calls a ‘discontinuity thesis’, which
claims that US policy in Colombia has shifted from a focus on communism during the
cold war to drugs in the 1990s and now ‘terrorism’. Such approaches thus typically
Recent years have seen the emergence of something of a bifurcation within the field
of ‘terrorism studies’ generally, a field which had not previously been known for its
in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 attacks in the United States as a result of
‘terrorism’ coming to dominate the foreign and internal policy agendas of the U.S and
several other states. Until recently, much of the scholarly work on ‘terrorism’
‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’10. A sub-field of Policy Studies with its roots in Security
Studies, this dominant ‘orthodox’ literature has tended to take a positivist, rational,
4
Stokes, 2005, 1-18
5
see for example Hutchinson & O’Malley, 2007
6
see for Example Bjornehed, 2004
7
ibid; Vaicius and Isacson, 2003
8
Stokes, 2005, 2006
9
see Jackson, 2007
10
‘Orthodox’ literature is, however, not quite as homogenous as the label may imply: see Horgan and
Boyle (2008)
and ‘problem-solving’ orientation towards the issue of ‘terrorism’ and tends to be
literature that, in the last few years, the new research agenda of ‘Critical Terrorism
predominant ‘orthodox’ approach. Some of the strongest criticisms stem from the fact
parties and ministers”11; links between governments, research institutes and think
tanks – such as those which have existed between the RAND Corporation and
charged with cementing the state-centric bias of research, and this state-centrism has
dynamics”13; what’s more, research associated with this “embedded expertise”, such
as the propagation of the ‘new terrorism’ concept, is charged with serving specific
A major problem – not just confined to ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’, but perhaps to
the entire ‘terrorism’ discourse, both governmental and scholarly – is the lack of a
widely accepted definition of terrorism. Research which tends to look at the ‘problem’
of the ‘terrorist-other’ from within state-centric paradigms, then, would tend naturally
to focus upon non-state actors acting against the state; the net result of this is a severe
11
Burke, 2008:37
12
Burnett and Whyte, 2005
13
Blakely 2007:229
14
Burnett and Whyte, 2005:13-15
lack of research into the issue of state terrorism which as Ruth Blakely points out, has
More generally, the very category of ‘terrorist’ now presents itself as something which
McDonald points out the importance of inquiring as to which voices are privileged
over others in defining what is ‘terrorism’, who are ‘terrorists’, and what the best
response to the ‘terrorist threat’ is, with a view to locating the functions this serves
and the voices espousing potentially emancipatory non-violent solutions which are
contexts, which this paper will concern itself, through employing a methodology of
Theoretical Approach
This paper will hope to explore the ways in which the definition of what constitutes
‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ groups and activities affects the legitimacy of the
15
see Blakely 2008; see also Jackson 2008
16
Herring, 2008:206
17
ibid p207
18
McDonald, 2009:114-116
identifying the ways in which some voices are amplified over others in this process,
and thus the ways in which it reflects the interests of particular groups. The approach
will broadly follow the ‘immanent critique’ method popular within the ‘Welsh school’
Following from this, our task in this paper is to explore whose voices are privileged
(and what perspectives are silenced?) in determining what constitutes ‘terrorism’; who
are ‘terrorists’; and what are the appropriate actions to be taken against them. Thus, in
this case, the texts to be analysed will be the legal definitions of ‘terrorism’ and what
States and Colombia which consequently lay the legal foundations for various forms
(etc) in question “in order to criticise it on its own terms and expose the events and
A second-order critique, then, steps back from the discourse itself in order to reflect
upon the “broader political and ethical consequences” of the naturalisation of one
19
ibid
20
ibid p113
21
Jackson, 2008:379
particular representation and the silencing of others; in particular, the ways in which it
commonsense and legitimate policy responses to the actors and events being
particular political and social order; and construct and sustain a hegemonic regime of
truth”22 .
Through engagement with this technique I will argue that the choice of a particular
Successive Colombian and United States’ administrations have reiterated that the
connections to the narcotrafficking industry; the power of the word ‘terrorism’ being
what it is, this is a strategy which deliberately and with great ease places the conflict
in terms of a ‘good’ state and ‘bad’ terrorists. With the extent of U.S hegemony
nowadays, such presentations of the conflict can become so easily naturalised that we
may lose track of the fact that this is the viewpoint presented not by neutral observers
present ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ as an objective category with criteria which must be
met. This section will outline these criteria with a view to denaturalising them through
The two main left-wing armed insurgent groups in Colombia - the FARC and ELN -
have been on the United States’ Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) since 1997,
22
ibid
whilst the right-wing umbrella group for paramilitaries, the Autodefensas Unidas de
Three criteria must be fulfilled before an organisation may be placed on the FTO list:
as defined in Section 213 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (INA) or
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, or “retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist
activity or terrorism”23. The INA gives an extensive list of actions which qualify as
terrorist activity:
“[A]ny activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is
under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any
of the following:
detained.
in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of
such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or
damage to property.
To engage in terrorist activity, then, is defined as to carry out, prepare or plan, solicit
any individual for involvement in, knowingly afford material support for, or gather
information for potential targets of the above actions. The Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 defines terrorism as:
The third and final criterion is that “[t]he organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism
must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense,
rhetoric are built) refers to ‘terrorism’ and ‘acts of terrorism’ as defined in Articles
144 and 343 of the Colombian Penal Code (legislación penal). Article 144 states:
24
US State Department Archive: Immigration and Nationality Act
25
US State Department Archive: Foreign Relations Authorization Act 1988 and 1989
26
US State Department, 2009
acts or threats of violence whose final purpose is to terrorise [the civil
population] 27
the population or a sector thereof, through acts which endanger the life,
The two United States’ definitions can be seen to vary greatly in both content and
orientation: the first focuses entirely on methods and means and makes practically no
mention of the agency or intent, whereas the second explicitly states that the groups
combatant targets’. Whilst the first does not explicitly state that the actors involved
are non-state, it is implied somewhat by the criteria that the action be considered
illegal in the state in which it takes place. The Colombian definitions, by virtue of
being official state documents, can be assumed to exclude official actions of the State.
Both States, based upon these definitions, have designated the FARC, ELN and AUC
as terrorist organisations. Since it is the States that dominate the agenda in defining
what and whom constitutes ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’, they also clearly dominate the
solution combined with destruction of illicit crops in order to drain revenue, and the
V. First-Order Critique
27
Congress of Colombia: Colombian Penal Code, available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/colombia/doc/penal.html [in Spanish; this and all translations by the
author]
28
ibid
29
Stokes, 2005, 105-122
A first-order critique will engage with these definitions on their own terms in order to
expose inconsistencies, practical problems and hypocrisies. First of all, the implicit
(and in the case of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, explicit) notion present in
the States’ definitions that terrorism can only be carried out by sub-national groups
(ergo not the state itself) is, as Richard Jackson states, absurd 30. As we shall explore
below, despite governmental denials and claims to the contrary, actions taken by
representatives of the Colombian state, even in recent years, easily satisfy the criteria
We shall begin by looking at the actions of the Colombian security forces themselves.
With the partial demobilisation of paramilitary groups in recent years, the number of
extrajudicial killings carried out by the Colombian armed forces has increased
were reportedly subjected to extrajudicial killings by the security forces; victims, who
are often campesinos or community organisers, are “typically taken from their home
or place of work in front of witnesses and taken to another location to be killed. The
body is presented wearing army fatigues by the security forces…[and] often show
signs of torture”32; the victims are generally later alleged by the security forces to be
drawn into either side of the conflict – in 2005. The security forces, who still claim
30
Jackson, 2008:383
31
Amnesty 2008:25
32
ibid
that the community is subversive, have been implicated in the killings 33. Communities
such as these, particularly in the Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó River Basins, are under
constant threat of attack from all sides, who are competing for control of palm oil
Aside from their own activities, and despite supposed efforts by the government to
between elements of the armed forces and right-wing paramilitaries, who remain
responsible for the majority of human rights abuses in Colombia. A UN report from
2005 noted a character of military operations whereby areas are taken by regular
captured territory with at least the acquiescence of the armed forces34. Furthermore,
according to Amnesty, members of the security forces have occasionally made explicit
threats to civilian populations that, once they had moved on, they would be replaced
by paramilitaries35. The full extent of collusion between state and military officials has
been evidenced, at least in part, by the ‘para-politics’ scandal of recent years, wherein
it was revealed that some 60 parliamentarians – most of whom were part of Uribe’s
governing coalition – and over 100 other public officials had alleged links to
the ground tell an alarmingly different story, as perhaps best summed up by the
33
Indymedia, 2005; Amnesty, 2009
34
Stokes, 2005:113
35
Amnesty 2008:35-36
36
ibid p19
37
Stokes, 2005:112
paramilitaries within the Colombian military, with quite obvious political motives,
which easily satisfy the criteria for ‘terrorism’ as set out by the US State Department
and Colombian Penal Laws – if, that is, they did not preclude the classification of
as one between a ‘legitimate’ state and the ‘illegitimate’ FARC, ELN and the very
paramilitaries which appear not only to be closely related to state and government
officials at all levels, but appear to some large extent to act in their interests.
that other ways of ‘knowing’ are possible38. In this case, I have attempted to
the United States. It is my contention that this particular representation serves specific
political and ideological purposes beneficial to both the Colombian ruling elites and
Since 2001 the U.S has shifted its rhetoric regarding its involvement in Colombia
responsible for less human rights atrocities than the AUC and other paramilitaries –
was designated the ‘most dangerous terrorist group in the Western Hemisphere’ by
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Senator John McCain asserted that the U.S had
‘dispensed with the illusion’ that a qualitative difference existed between drug
Beers, even went so far as to allege that FARC members had received training in ‘Al
Qaeda terrorist camps’, a statement which he later withdrew40. Through situating the
Terrorism’, the US has been able to greatly increase police and military assistance
under the Andean Regional Assistance in the years 2003-2008 to between $597
million and $632 million, compared to around $398 million in 2002, compared to
economic and social aid ranging from around $132 million to $139 million in the
same period41.
Framing the conflict in terms of ‘terrorism’, complete with recognition thereof by the
United States, has been an indispensable political tool for the Uribe governments, and
has been utilised extensively to demonise sections of civil society whom question
The policy of the Uribe administrations has been to consistently deny – despite the
last 40 years of conflict - that what exists in Colombia is an internal armed conflict;
according to the President, “in Colombia there is no war. War contains elements of
legitimacy between contenders. In Colombia there are not legitimate contenders, there
39
Stokes, 2006:378
40
Stokes, 2005:106
41
Center for International Policy, 2008
42
Uribe, as quoted by the Colombian Ministry of Defence (2004)
a sentiment has been echoed by other government officials43. Defining the conflict in
the service of the military, and negates the need to respect the norms of Humanitarian
Law which would otherwise apply to an internal armed conflict. Uribe’s primary
Security Policy’, which has been promoted since 2002, takes as its objective “to
reinforce and ensure the rule of law in the entire territory, through the strengthening of
democratic authority: the free exercise of the authority of the institutions, of the rule
Thus, a clear bifurcation in terms of legitimacy is created and reinforced through the
implication that citizens must become involved in the fight against ‘terrorism’:
essentially, you are either with the government, or with the ‘terrorists’. In practice,
this policy has been utilised to crack down on internal dissent and systematically
policies, particularly human rights organisations, trade unions, and media outlets. As
early as 2002 the policy was invoked in order to temporarily suspend public rallies
subjected to vitriolic attacks and claims that they are supporters or accomplices of the
unsurprisingly, precisely the same accusations are made by the paramilitaries, whom
continue to regularly attack the same trade unionists, media outlets, human rights
activists, community organisers, and so forth which the government claims work in
43
International Commission of Jurists, 2006:4
44
República De Colombia, 2003:12
45
see for example Amnesty, 2008b
favour of the ‘terrorists’. Whilst the government supposedly opposes paramilitaries, in
practice, little is done to protect progressive elements of civil society. ‘Good citizens’,
by contrast, are those who join the fight against the terrorists by joining one of the
local part-time army brigades, or the paid informant network set up under the
The maintenance of the dominant neoliberal order through state terrorism and
paramilitary attacks against progressive elements of Colombian civil society has been
tied the need for the deepening of neoliberal market reform with the fight against
socioeconomic relations and the continued and unhindered access to Latin American
Indeed, U.S access to oil in the region has become vital in recent years, as perhaps
evidenced by the $98 million included in the ARI in 2003 dedicated to the formation
and training of a military unit which would be dedicated solely to defend the Caño
Limón oil pipeline, owned by American company Occidental, which perhaps speaks
We can see, then, that the representation of the conflict by the U.S and Colombian
governments as one between a ‘legitimate’ state and ‘illegitimate’ ‘terrorists’ and their
supporters in the human rights, trade union, anti-war and other organisations serves
very specific ends; the alternative representations of, and non-violent solutions to the
46
Stokes, 2006:379
47
ibid p378
(MOVICE)48, or the Peace Community of San José must, along with traditional
groups, such as trade unions, whom oppose the continued imposition of a disciplinary
VII. Conclusions
This paper has examined the ways in which the definitions of terrorism used by the
United States and Colombia, which preclude designation of the Colombian military or
its actions as ‘terrorist’, serve to frame the Colombian conflict in a particular way
which is advantageous to both the Colombian ruling elite and the United States as it
facilitates the silencing of internal dissent and the continuation of conflict in defence
of economic interests. This comes at a cost to elements of civil society who espouse a
non-violent solution to the conflict and those whom oppose neoliberal economic
above those for whom the conflict has become profitable. Furthermore, the ‘terrorist’
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Legal Texts