POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW: 2011 VOL 9, 309322

doi: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2011.00235.x

Is Consociational Theory the Answer to Global Conict? From the Netherlands to Northern Ireland and Iraq
psr_235 309..322

Paul Dixon
Kingston University Neo-conservatives and liberal interventionists subscribe to the idealistic belief that external powers can successfully re-engineer states into Western capitalist democracies. Consociationalism is a prominent or even dominant theory for managing conict in ethnonationally divided societies. The consociational model is based on the Dutch experience of managing plural conict from 1917 to 1967. This article argues that consociationalism has become increasingly vague, ambiguous and even contradictory as the theory has been stretched in an attempt to claim relevance to both the Northern Ireland and Iraq conicts. Although this has eroded the coherence of the consociational theory this is more than compensated for by the exibility this gives consociationalists in marketing their concept as all things to all people. By contrast post-structuralist radical democrats are critical of the reductionism of consociational theorising and emphasise the limits of human reason to grasp adequately the complexity of diverse conict situations. Taylor, R. (2009) Consociational Theory: McGarry and OLeary and the Northern Ireland Conict. London: Routledge. OLeary, B. (2009) How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity. Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Little, A. (2008) Democratic Piety: Complexity, Conict and Violence. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Little, A. and Lloyd, M. (eds) (2009) The Politics of Radical Democracy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Keywords: consociationalism; post-structuralism; Netherlands; Northern Ireland; Iraq The rst and most important element [of consociational democracy] is government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all signicant segments of the plural society (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25). [Consociationalism] denotes the participation of representatives of all signicant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level (Lijphart, 2004, p. 97). Although Lijphart originally identied a grand coalition in which all communities are represented as the key indicator for consociation, what matters is some element of jointness in executive government across all the most signicant communities. Consociation does not require every community to be represented in government (McGarry et al., 2008, p. 58).

Neo-conservatives and liberal interventionists subscribe to the idealistic belief that external powers can successfully re-engineer states into Western capitalist democracies. Consociationalism is a prominent or even dominant theory for managing conict in
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ethnonationally divided societies. The world-renowned Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart is the most prominent advocate of consociationalism, which is based on the Dutch experience of managing plural conict in the Netherlands from 1917 to 1967. His seminal book Democracy in Plural Societies (Lijphart, 1977) was originally comparable to realism because it was so pessimistic about the possibility of maintaining the unity of plural societies. The choice was between a limited consociational democracy and no democracy at all. John McGarry and Brendan OLeary (hereafter MOL) applied Lijpharts consociationalism to the conict in Northern Ireland and have claimed the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 (GFA) as a consociational triumph (Taylor, 2009). By 2003 MOL had replaced their pessimistic, consociationalist realism with a consociationalist idealism that supported the invasion of Iraq and was optimistic that consociational engineering, manifested in the Iraq constitution of 2005, would prevent the break-up of Iraq and establish a stable democracy.This optimism has not lasted and consociationalists now argue that their theory is compatible with partition and have even advocated protectorates (OLeary, 2005a, p. 34; 2005b, p. xxxi). This article will argue that consociationalism is increasingly vague, ambiguous and even contradictory as it seeks to make itself relevant to conicts in Northern Ireland and Iraq. Although the coherence of consociational theory has become eroded this has been more than compensated for by its marketing success and adaptability to the political commitments of political elites who seek to use the theory to legitimate their claims in conict situations. OLeary has advised Irish nationalists on Northern Ireland and the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. McGarry and OLeary are both currently members of the Standby Team of the Mediation Support Unit at the Department of Political Affairs in the United Nations. Post-structuralist radical democrats represent a fundamental challenge to consociationalism (see the books by Little, and Little and Lloyd). They are refreshingly and appropriately modest about the limits of human reason to grasp adequately the complexity of diverse conict situations. They are, therefore, critical of consociationalisms over-simplied categorisation of a range of conicts as ethnic and its universal institutional prescriptions.

Consociationalism: A Kind of Voluntary Apartheid

Lijphart based consociational theory on his interpretation of how the Netherlands managed plural conict between 1917 and 1967. In Democracy in Plural Societies (Lijphart, 1977) he argued that the Dutch experience was a model for the global management of conict. Consociational theory was originally built on a primordialist view of national identity and this explains its preference for the segregation of the ethnic or communal pillars and domination of those pillars by the communal elites (Dixon, 1997). It is this segregation-oriented theoretical disposition that inuences consociationalists interpretation of its four prescriptions: (1) grand coalition; (2) proportional representation;
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(3) mutual veto; (4) autonomy. Consociationalism has drawn criticism because these prescriptions are interpreted in a way to reinforce precisely those antagonistic communal identities that policy makers are supposed to be managing into less antagonistic forms. Defenders of consociationalism continue to insist that it is not based on a primordial interpretation of identity.This is somewhat undermined by Lijpharts statement in Democracy in Plural Societies that primordial loyalties have extremely deep and strong roots (Lijphart, 1977, p. 227) and his admission in 2001 that During the rst phase of my work on powersharing, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the primordial view of ethnicity was still widely accepted in the social sciences, and I, too, accepted it without giving it much critical thought (Lijphart, 2001, p. 11; Lustick, 1997, p. 110). Primordialists argue that ethnic and national identities are natural and unchangeable aspects of human nature which exert a very powerful inuence on action. Accordingly people favour their own ethnic group over others and this makes plural societies highly unstable and unnatural. Extreme nationalists have used primordialism to provide intellectual legitimacy for murderous ethnic chauvinism, arguing that a state for every nation is the natural and inevitable outcome of natural, primordial attachments (Jenkins, 1997, p. 44). Consociationalists seek to avoid conict between primordial actors from different groups by reducing contact between them and this leads to a preference for segregation. Consociational theory differs from other theories of integration not only in its refutation of the thesis that cultural fragmentation necessarily leads to conict, but also in its insistence that distinct lines of cleavage among subcultures may actually help rather than hinder peaceful relations among them. Because good social fences may make good political neighbours, a kind of voluntary apartheid policy may be the most appropriate solution for a divided society. Political autonomy for the different subcultures is a crucially important element of a Consociational system, because it reduces contacts, and hence strain and hostility, among the subcultures at the mass level (Lijphart, 1971, p. 11, emphasis added; on consociationalism as voluntary apartheid see also Lijphart, 1969, p. 219; on segregation see McGarry and OLeary, 1995, p. 210, p. 307). In the 1980s the South African apartheid regime, with its preference for enforced segregation, became interested in consociationalisms voluntary apartheid as a more legitimate way of preserving white minority rule. In the Netherlands, Lijphart identied four blocs or pillars (Catholic, Calvinist, liberal, socialist) which had their own media, education, cultural organisations, trade unions and political parties. They lived side by side as distinctly separate sub-cultural communities, each with its own political and social institutions and with interaction and communication across bloc boundaries kept to a minimum. Is this one nation or, to paraphrase Disraeli, several nations inhabiting the same country? (Lijphart, 1975, p. 58) The image of pillars suggests strong but completely separate columns: Consociational democracy results
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in the division of society into more homogeneous and self-contained elements (Lijphart, 1977, p. 48). On top of these four primordial pillars were political elites who negotiated the politics of accommodation: government by elite cartel (Lijphart, 1969, p. 216). The primary instrument of consociationalism is an elite cartel involving government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all signicant segments of the plural society (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25).While consensus did not exist at a mass level, it was achieved at the elite level and could be imposed on a deferential population. Paradoxically, Lijphart cites Clifford Geertz as a primordialist when a close reading of Geertz suggests that he could be better understood as a constructivist because he emphasised perceptions of identity (Jenkins, 1997). In 2001, Lijphart embraced constructivism even though this position undermines the foundation on which consociationalism is built (Lijphart, 2001). Voluntary apartheid may not be necessary if identities can be reconstructed into less antagonistic forms and other measures taken to ameliorate conict.

Interpreting Consociationalism: From Full to Minimal Denitions

Lijpharts primordial interpretation of conict leads to the advocacy of segregation and rule by elite cartel. This is the theoretical framework in which his four key institutional prescriptions (grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, autonomy) are implemented (there were seven favourable factors or conditions but these have now been dropped). Consociationalisms four prescriptions do not mark it out as particularly distinctive from other approaches to conict management, such as integrationist power sharing. What is distinctive about consociationalism is the theoretical framework in which these prescriptions are interpreted. The four prescriptions can be used to achieve either integrationist (mixing) or consociational (segregationist) ends. For example, an integrationist will interpret these four prescriptions to maximise the prospects for an integrated peace by challenging hostile communal identities and remaking them into less antagonistic forms through the promotion, where appropriate, of increasing contact between groups. An integrationist advocate of power sharing, for example, may favour a grand coalition as, they would hope, a short-term measure to manage conict while social, economic, security and political reforms are introduced to deal with the underlying roots of the conict, such as the reproduction of antagonistic communalism. Integrationists may also support a minority veto; this is implied by power sharing and proportionality, and the explicit recognition of cultural differences may be an important tool for righting historical injustices.The issue of group autonomy is a complex one and is not helped by simplistic dichotomies of segregation and integration. But the combination of autonomy and mixing that is appropriate will vary depending on the particular circumstances of that society. The objection to consociationalism, then, is not so much its four prescriptions but consociationalisms theoretical framework primordialist, segregationist, elitist in which these prescriptions are to be interpreted. The vague and ambiguous way in which consociationalism has become reinterpreted and revised by consociationalists (see below) has made criticism of consociationalism difcult because it has become so amorphous that it can be reinterpreted to
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appease or refute criticism. This elusiveness has also served to disguise the primordialist, segregationist and elitist roots that continue to inform the consociational model. In particular, critics question the wisdom of consociationalism in consolidating and reinforcing hostile ethnic pillars as a way of managing ethnic conict. This seems to be a recipe for consolidating hostile communal ideologies and antagonisms rather than a strategy for their amelioration through, for example, greater contact between groups. Critics also argue that the communalisation of a society is not the most desirable way for people to live. Consociationalists have become evangelists (Lustick, 1997) or academic entrepreneurs seeking simultaneously to build academic support for consociationalism and inuence among policy makers. In marketing their concept, consociationalists uctuate between a minimalist and full denition of their concept. A full and more accurate denition of consociationalism includes both a primordial description of ethnic or plural conict and, following from this diagnosis, consociationalisms segregation-oriented and elitist interpretation of its prescriptions for conict management. The full denition of consociationalism has dened itself, for example, against integrationists who are usually conated with assimilationists. The full denition of consociationalism limits the theorys appeal by being clearer about its interpretation of conict and normative implications. The full denition also limits the number of cases that can be claimed by consociationalists because fewer case studies are likely to meet the criteria of the full denition. While sometimes consociationalism is dened against power-sharing integrationists, the minimalist big tent denition equates consociationalism with power sharing and therefore incorporates integrationist, power-sharing critics. More recently,complex consociationalism has been invented and this claims that consociationalism can be considered integrationist. MOL argue that integrationists should not be allowed to monopolize a concept with positive connotations (McGarry and OLeary, 2009, p. 378). The minimalist denition, therefore, fails to distinguish consociationalism from other approaches to managing conict and makes it difcult to know: what consociationalism is; whether it has been applied to a particular conict; and therefore, whether or not consociationalism is a successful theory. The advantage of the proliferation of vague, ambiguous and even contradictory denitions of consociationalism to the academic entrepreneurs who are selling consociational theory is that this allows consociationalists to claim success and reject failure by reinterpreting their theory to suit the particular market that they want to capture. Ian Lustick, following the insights of Imre Lakatos, has argued that consociational theorys academic success does not depend on its value as a coherent theory but is attributable to the relative abilities of scientist-protagonists to mobilize economic, reputational and institutional resources, both inside and outside the academy (Lustick, 1997, p. 89).

McGarry and OLeary: Revising Consociationalism for Northern Ireland

From 1975 until 1995 Lijphart was pessimistic about the prospects for consociationalism in Northern Ireland. This view was supported by MOL who attempted systematically to
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apply the consociational model to the conict. In keeping with consociationalisms segregationist orientation MOL irted with the partition of Northern Ireland into more homogeneous entities, even though consociation is supposed to maintain the unity of plural societies. The elitist orientation of consociationalism is apparent in MOLs subsequent support for joint authority, which involves the British and Irish governments jointly running Northern Ireland but with no input from the local population. Consociationalisms primordialism led MOL to be pessimistic about the prospects of an accommodation and in 1993 they concluded that there was strong evidence that ethnic antagonisms were being reforged rather than resolved (OLeary and McGarry, 1993, p. 325). In 1995 they argued that the problem with consociationalism is that it has not worked (McGarry and OLeary, 1995, p. 338). In the period after the IRAs 1994 ceasere there was a dramatic reappraisal of Northern Ireland by consociationalists; they now argued that it was the British governments conversion to consociationalism that had brought about a much more optimistic situation in which the conict was moving to resolution. The Belfast, or Good Friday Agreement, 1998, was claimed as a triumph of consociational theory. Key critics of consociationalism have strengthened this perception by criticising some aspects of the deal because they reinforced communal identities. These critics are welcomed to the debate by consociationalists because they bolster consociationalisms claim to the relatively successful Irish case and this boosts the credibility of consociational theory. By contrast this sceptical supporter of the peace process has emphasised the conservative nationalist ideological underpinnings of consociationalism (Dixon, 1997) and argued that the GFA is not consociational because it is much more wide-ranging, integrationist and democratic than consociational theory predicted or prescribed. The GFA does not full either full or minimalist denitions of consociationalism and is not a consociational success (Dixon, 2005). This is implied by MOLs writings; they have argued not only that the GFA is unarguably consociational but later that it was more complex than consociationalism and had it been limited to consociational institutions there would have been no settlement (McGarry and OLeary, 2004, p. 403, emphasis added). MOL have combined consociationalism with a neo-nationalist analysis of the conict which led them to advocate joint authority (favoured more by nationalists) and led to an uncompromising, anti-unionist interpretation of the GFA (Dixon, 2008, pp. 2824). At times MOL have almost admitted their political partisanship on Northern Ireland (OLeary, 2005b, p. xvii). They argue that consociationalism solved the Northern Ireland conict and that the triumph of the extremes the political dominance of Sinn Fin and the Democratic Unionist party (DUP) is unproblematic and consociations can be left to biodegrade naturally (McGarry and OLeary, 2009, p. 68). This contrasts with MOLs earlier position where they argue that Consociationalists also realize that communal or ethnic divisions are resilient rather than rapidly biodegradable, and that they must be recognized rather than wished away (McGarry and OLeary, 1995, p. 338). Consociationalists seek to reinforce and consolidate ethnic pillars; merely to hope that these pillars and consociational arrangements will biodegrade naturally without specifying the natural processes by which this will be achieved is a big aw in consociational theory.
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Sceptical supporters of the peace process argue that MOLs position is somewhat complacent and that the peace process is still precarious for several reasons: it has failed to address economic and social divisions; there is a lack of grass-roots reconciliation; the executive has been deadlocked; the devolved institutions are relatively ineffective; and there is a continuing and growing threat from republican dissidents. In particular, there has been an alienation of unionism since the GFA and this was compounded by the rapid U-turn by the DUP on power sharing. This has resulted in a worrying challenge to the DUP from the ultra-loyalist, anti-power-sharing Traditional Unionist Voice, although this received a setback at the 2010 British general election. In consociational Belgium, Lebanon and Bosnia communal divisions do not seem to have biodegraded naturally in the way that consociationalists predict for Northern Ireland. While these divisions may have biodegraded in the Netherlands, it is not clear that the nature and depth of those divisions are comparable to the more violent conicts over the existence of the state in Northern Ireland and Iraq. Revisionist consociationalism was invented after the GFA and it represents a break with Lijpharts orthodox consociationalism. This revisionism was aimed at bringing consociationalism into line with developments in Northern Ireland, allowing its adherents to make a more credible claim to an apparently successful case study. Northern Ireland is the key, relatively successful case which promises to revive the prospects of consociational theory. Lijpharts attempt to claim multi-communal India as a key supporting case was questionable (Lustick, 1997) and rejected by MOL, who also rejected Lijpharts claims regarding South Africa. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, necessitated further revisions to consociational theory as MOL offered it as a solution to Iraqs violent conict.

Consociationalism and Iraq

The attempt to stretch consociational theory from the Netherlands to Northern Ireland and then Iraq, it is argued, has placed a considerable strain on the coherence of consociational theory. On Iraq, OLeary was part of a constitutional advisory team, along with Peter Galbraith and Khaled Salih, which assisted the Kurdish Regional Governments and the Kurdistan National Assembly. OLeary has been a strong proponent of the Kurdish cause, declaring that he is not neutral but a friend of the Kurds.The problem is that the uncompromising positions adopted by MOL on behalf of nationalists/republicans in Northern Ireland and the Kurdistan Democratic party/Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (KDP/PUK) in Iraq threaten to undermine peace processes which need to take into account the interests of all actors in order to maximise the chances of a successfully negotiated, power-sharing accommodation. MOL continue to support the Iraq invasion on the grounds that the ends have justied the means but these seem to be the ends pursued by the Kurdish political elite rather than the various interests of the people of Iraq as a whole (OLeary, 2009). Consociationalisms primordialist assumptions should have made the descent into violence in Iraq following the invasion highly predictable given their view of the articiality of the Iraqi state.The chaos that followed the invasion led OLeary and other consociationalists to irt with the idea of Consociational protec 2011 The Author. Political Studies Review 2011 Political Studies Association Political Studies Review: 2011, 9(3)

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torates: viable consociations that address ethno-national disputes may have to be the de-facto or de jure protectorates of external powers (OLeary, 2005b, p. xxxi). MOL claim that the Iraqi constitution of 2005 is consociational because it holds out the possibility of the devolution of power to three ethno-federal regions dominated by Sunnis, Shias and Kurds with minimal powers at the centre.The degree of intermixing makes the achievement of this homogeneity problematic. Less signicant minorities must accept their place within these ethno-regions as consociationalism is not recommended at the regional level. As MOL rightly point out, most commentators agree that the Kurds require a special degree of self-government because of their history of persecution and genocide; the debate is over whether the constitution does enough to reconcile Sunnis to the state and whether the 2005 constitution will further consolidate and reinforce hostile communal identities leading to the violent break-up of Iraq. Consociationalism has traditionally been interpreted to guarantee the rights of minorities because of its requirement of a grand coalition and minority veto. In Iraq the Sunni Arab minority constitute approximately 20 per cent of the population and are, therefore, a signicant minority. Nonetheless, they were excluded from the negotiations of the 2005 Iraqi constitutions by a powerful KurdishISCI (Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council) alliance (Galbraith, 2006, pp. 2034; Stanseld, 2007, pp. 1847, ch. 7). While MOL acknowledge that the constitution was negotiated by a KurdishISCI alliance they favour little or no concession on the constitution to reconcile the excluded Sunnis (OLeary, 2009, p. 90, pp. 912, p. 115). This contrasts with MOLs position on Northern Ireland, where they argued for the inclusion of all groups, including militants, as the key to a peaceful transition and were uncompromising in their attitudes towards even pro-Agreement unionists (Dixon, 2008; McGarry, 2001, p. 24; McGarry and OLeary, 2009, p. 361). Consociationalists have a groupist analysis (Brubaker, 2006) of the Iraq conict in which all Sunnis are held collectively responsible for the crimes perpetrated by the Baathists. OLeary describes his understanding of the Sunni Arab mentality: It is important to be frank about the political psychology and emotions of the Sunni Arabs. Many still openly express contempt toward their presumed racial inferiors (the Kurds) and their presumed religious inferiors (the Shia). They are not just motivated by resentment and fear ... but also by supremacist hatred and contempt (OLeary, 2009, p. 19, p. 81). OLeary has argued that there could have been no successful negotiations if Sunni Arabs had been included in the making of the 2005 constitution and, because it is not possible to appease Sunnis, it makes sense to exclude them. Sunni compliance, rather than voluntary consent, is sought for the federal constitution but if this is not forthcoming it is not necessary. OLeary argues that 80 per cent of Iraqis (Kurds and Shia) are happy with the constitution so why should just 20 per cent of the population (the Sunnis) be appeased? (OLeary, 2007, pp. 56) The Sunni insurgents dont want to be and cannot be part of the new constitution. The success of the constitution must [therefore] be measured by their eventual defeat (OLeary, 2005c).
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This groupist analysis obscures the diversity among Sunnis by constructing them as a single, monolithic pillar in which all Sunnis are held responsible for the crimes of the Baathists. Jonathan Steele, among others, has drawn attention to the suffering of some Sunnis under the Baathist regime and the problem of de-Baathication being used as a sectarian weapon of de-Sunnication (Steele, 2007, ch. 8). In MOLs interpretation, the collective guilt borne by the Sunnis is in tension with consociationalisms claims to defend the rights of minorities. As Lijphart tells us, a grand coalition of all the signicant segments is at the heart of consociational theory (Lijphart, 1977) and until at least 2001, before the invasion of Iraq, this was true also of MOL (McGarry, 2001 p. 15). The Iraq constitution of 2005, however, does permit government without the inclusion of all signicant segments. As MOL point out, there is no requirement that the political leaders of all signicant segments (Lijphart, 1977, p. 31) will be included in either the Presidential Council or the Council of Ministers. It may be likely that these bodies will be broadly representative but the constitution does not require it. The executive arrangements do not ... offer guarantees of inclusiveness ... Iraqs Constitution allows for the possibility of a federal cabinet drawn entirely from its Arab majority, or even its Shia majority (McGarry and OLeary, 2007, pp. 245). MOL have redened consociationalism so that it is compatible with claiming the Iraq constitution of 2005. The denition has been loosened so that it is asserted that consociationalism can exist without the participation of one or more signicant ethnic segments (OLeary, 2005a, p. 14), allowing for the Iraqi constitution to be described as consociational while excluding a signicant segment: the Sunnis. The following year, MOL conclude: Importantly, consociations do not as a matter of conceptual precision require grand coalitions; what is important is joint consent across all signicant communities (McGarry and OLeary, 2006, p. 62, p. 63). By 2009 in place of grand coalition is the more ambiguous denition of a federal executive with cross-community support (OLeary, 2009, p. 108).The Sunnis are a signicant community in Iraq; they do not seem to have voluntarily consented to the 2005 constitution (Galbraith, 2006, pp. 2034; Stanseld, 2007, ch. 7) and this prompts the question whether, even by MOLs new denition, the Iraq constitution is consociational.

Is Revisionist Consociationalism Consociational?

MOLs revisions of consociational theory are a response to some devastating critiques. There appears to have been a retreat from primordialist to ethnonationalist assumptions; its segregationist orientation has been softened by new integrationist claims; and its narrow constitutional focus has been widened. MOL are less ambitious in their claims for consociationalism than Lijphart: they appear to reject Lijpharts claims regarding South Africa and India. In order to claim case studies as diverse as the Netherlands, Northern Ireland and Iraq, MOL have reinvented the denition of consociationalism to such an extent that it is questionable whether their theory is any longer meaningfully described as consociational.
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Grand coalition has been and still is central to Lijpharts consociationalism (Lijphart, 2007, p. 4), but by 2008 MOL had rejected the inclusiveness of consociationalism and its primary instrument of grand coalition; instead they were arguing that consociationalism was compatible with the exclusion of some political leaders and communal groups. Consociationalists have dened their segregationist theory against integration but now they claim that it is compatible with integration. The proliferation of consociationalisms adds to the confusion about what consociationalism is and what it is not. This allows its advocates to claim success and reject failure. Consociationalism, according to MOL, can be non-ethnic, democratic, non-democratic, regional, central, weak, ambivalent, complete, pluritarian, traditional, revisionist, corporate, liberal, rigid, concurrent, complete, semi, quasi, formal, informal and exible. Complex consociation allows the combination of consociationalism with one other additional strategy such as integration or partition (OLeary, 2005a, p. 34).This conceptual confusion obscures the primordialist, segregationist and elitist theoretical framework that has informed Lijpharts and MOLs approaches to managing conict. In Northern Ireland consociationalism was interpreted by MOL in a more orthodox and inclusive way to support power sharing and the claims of the minority nationalist and later republican positions. In Iraq, on the other hand, consociationalism was interpreted to defend the dominant KDP/PUK narrative to the exclusion of the minority Sunni community. Revisionist consociationalism appears directed more at retrospectively capturing apparently successful case studies and using them to bolster consociationalisms credibility in an attempt to inuence policy makers rather than providing a set of principles and prescriptions which should guide attempts to manage conict. In revising consociationalism MOL risk falling between two stools: (1) Attempting to revise consociationalism to claim key case studies. Lijpharts consociationalism was revised by MOL rst to support the claims of Irish nationalists and to claim the Northern Ireland peace process and, second, revised again to provide support to the KDP/PUK and to claim the 2005 constitution of Iraq to the exclusion of the Sunni Arab minority. (2) Revising consociationalism so far that it is no longer consociational. The advantage of Lijpharts original formulation of consociationalism is that it provides a reasonably coherent theory (primordialist, segregationist, elitist) for managing conict. Whether or not one agrees with its analysis of conict or its normative approach, it can be usefully compared and contrasted with rival approaches. Revisionist consociationalism, on the other hand, seems to be whatever its advocates currently decide it is, even though this leads to the growing incoherence of the concept and contradicts its original denitions. Consociationalism needs to be identiable so that we can decide where it has been implemented and whether or not it has had a benecial impact on conict or not. MOL may not have rejected consociationalism perhaps because in the academic market it is a powerful brand with which to be associated. The incoherence of revisionist consociationalism may also be a marketing advantage, allowing the observer to see what
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they want to see in the theory and for the product to be presented as all things to all people (integrationist to integrationists, conservative to conservatives) while at the same time denigrating (as well as simultaneously incorporating) rival integrationist and other brands. The result is that people can buy into the consociational product without being aware of exactly what the product is and how unsuccessful it has been. Consociationalisms academic entrepreneurs have succeeded in marketing and selling the product to consumers without demonstrating that the product does what it claims to do.The danger is that policy makers may buy and use the product (without clear guidelines) and by doing so make conict situations worse. The denition of consociationalism has become so vague and ambiguous that the concept may now be more of a hindrance than a help in debating the prospects for managing conict and, intriguingly, the concept is barely used in OLearys latest book (OLeary, 2009).

The Post-structuralist Radical Democratic Alternative?

Post-structuralist radical democrats pose a fundamental challenge to consociationalism and other consensual approaches to democracy. While post-structuralists are a diverse school there are certain common themes that are apparent in two superb new books, Democratic Piety and The Politics of Radical Democracy, which set out the post-structuralist challenge in a lucid and stimulating way. What is disarming and (highly) unusual about the post-structuralists is their awareness of complexity and contingency and, therefore, their modesty about our ability to know and have an impact on the world. Adrian Little advocates complexity theory in an attempt to overcome the reductionism of those who identify grand theories by reducing the complexity of the world to a simplied calculus which then enables the process of making decisions to take place in a supposedly more straightforward fashion (Little, 2008, p. 21). For example, complexity theory, because it recognises that components are constantly changing, challenges the view that a complex item can be understood by reducing it to its constituent parts (Little, 2008, p. 24). Little argues: The point about complexity, then, is not to render social phenomena inexplicable and thereby avoid attempting to understand situations and improve political relations, but to highlight the contingent nature of much of what is taken for granted or presupposed in the terms of political debate (Little, 2008, p. 23). Complexity theorists think the world is intelligible but that it is difcult to track down singular answers to social problems. Post-structuralists, therefore, would tend to reject the reductionist ethnic conict analysis of consociationalists and their universal, four-step institutional x to conict situations; radical democrats are highly critical of institutional blueprints given their demands for deep contextualisation and the primacy of dynamic change (Little and Lloyd, 2009, p. 202).They also have an analytical and normative openness to the failure of human reason to grasp the world without some remainder or excess (Martin, in Little and Lloyd, 2009, p. 98). At the heart of post-structuralist thinking is an acceptance of the incommensurability of values irreconcilable values which lack a common basis on which they can be compared
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and, therefore, the inevitability of conict between people. Conict is not only inevitable, it is also desirable; democracy thrives on conict and dissent. Since different and irreconcilable values are inevitable, only the appearance of consensus is possible.Those who seek a rational consensus can only achieve this through the imposition of their rationality on others, rather than the rational outcome of deliberation among equals.Those outliers with rival rationalities who oppose the rational consensus are silenced or marginalised and the result is the danger of a repressive homogeneity in which conict is delegitimised and, therefore, the appearance of conict disappears. The post-structuralist approach acknowledges the inevitability of a multiplicity of rational viewpoints as the starting point of politics, while liberalism claims to achieve an objective and rational consensus, seeking the utopia of a harmony of interests. The danger to democracy is the denial of division and conict. Post-structuralists are more comfortable with conict; debates are not nally resolved but never ending: they want to bring into the debate the marginalised and silenced. Post-structuralists argue that we need to embrace conict as the lifeblood of democracy and address the issue of violence. Chantal Mouffe has distinguished between antagonistic and agonistic conict: antagonistic conict is the struggle between enemies and this cannot be eradicated but it can be reduced; agonistic conict is the struggle between adversaries, or friendly enemies this may be erce but the right of the adversary to defend those ideas is not questioned. The aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism. This transformation is not necessarily easy to achieve. Post-structuralists recognise that liberal democracies will exclude some from participation and they want these decisions to be taken on political grounds rather than in an arbitrary way, with the implication that those excluded, paramilitary organisations for example, may not be permanently excluded. Adrian Littles Democratic Piety takes aim at the evangelical advocates of democracy abroad Blair, Bush and the neo-conservatives who turn a blind eye to the erosion of democracy within their own countries (Little, 2008, p. 61). While consociationalists are content with the constitutional appearance of democracy, radical democrats prefer to look beyond the surface and probe the extent to which pious democracy masks a more undemocratic reality. Post-structuralists do not advocate an alternative to liberal democracy, although this does not stop them favouring democracy, and particularly a radicalised version, over undemocratic forms of government. What post-structuralists do argue for is the inevitable failure of democracy; by this they mean that equality and emancipation can never be fully realised and that the system called democracy can never be fully democratic (Little, 2008, p. 168). Where democratic piety expresses faith in democracy to simplify complex political contexts, the constitutive failure of democracy recognises the inability of political systems to resolve political complexity. It relinquishes the idea that democracy should be directed towards the resolution of political disagreement and dispute in the name of reason or consensus. In the place of these prevalent ideas in pious democratic discourse, the constitutive failure of democracy
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identies the inevitability of political contestation and the ever present possibility of violence as part of the democratic condition (Little, 2008, p. 177). Consociational theory is too crude to do justice to the complexity and contingencies of diverse conicts. This explains the constant reinvention of the concept to catch up with and capture supporting cases in the real world. Increasingly, consociational theory is vague, ambiguous and contradictory. Post-structuralists do not claim to have simple formulations for resolving world conict and that is precisely their advantage over consociational theory and why it makes their insights a more realistic and democratic basis for tackling the diversity of conict situations. (Accepted: 29 August 2010) About the Author
Paul Dixon is Reader in Politics and International Studies at Kingston University, having taught previously at the universities of Ulster, Leeds and Luton. He is the author of Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace (Palgrave, second edition, 2008), Northern Ireland Since 1969 (Pearson, 2011, with Eamonn OKane) and numerous articles on the Northern Ireland conict and conict resolution theory in Political Science Quarterly, Political Studies, Journal of Peace Research, Political Quarterly and Democratization. He is currently completing a book on the Northern Ireland peace process and editing a book on The British Way of Counterinsurgency: From Malaya to Afghanistan (Palgrave, forthcoming). Paul Dixon, Department of Politics and International Studies, School of Social Sciences, Kingston University, Penrhyn Road, Kingston Upon Thames, Surrey KT1 2EE, UK; email: P.Dixon@kingston.ac.uk

Note
I am very grateful for the comments of Eamonn OKane and the two anonymous reviewers.

References
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