Carnap on Questions of Existence Introduction

Hunan Rostomyan / September 26, 2012

Ontological questions (e.g. are there propositions?, are there numbers?, are there properties?, etc.) are, Carnap here argues, ambiguous. Under one disambiguation (1 Internal), such questions have a yes/no answer. Under another disambiguation (2 External), they admit of no such binary determination. 1 Internal Questions The yes/no ontological questions, Carnap argues, are questions internal or relative to some conceptual schema (linguistic framework in his terminology). Internal Particular So, for example, the question is there a prime number less than three? understood as an (internal) question asked within the framework of number theory can be answered armatively by showing that number 2 exists, that it is prime, and that it is less than three. Internal Universal Not all internal questions are so easy to answer. So, for example, the question are there innitely many prime numbers? requires a certain amount of eort to be settled in the armative. In such dicult cases, the answer to an internal question is decided by employing the tools that the particular framework accepts as an adequate method of determination of truth. In number theory, as in the rest of mathematics, the toolbox has very powerful methods of proof. So one uses the method of proof by contradiction to settle the question about the innity of primes in the armative. Once that is done, as it can easily be done, we can then make the general claim that there are innitely many prime numbers and this claim would be just as well grounded as the earlier claim that there is a particular prime number that is less than three. The contrast between is there a prime number less than three? and are there innitely many primes? is supposed to highlight that there are two kinds of internal existence questions: particular (asking about the existence of particular entities) and general (asking about the existence of a whole class of entities). 2 External Questions The second kind of ontological questions, i.e., the one that doesnt admit of binary determination, Carnap argues, is a lot more problematic. Such questions are external to or about a conceptual schema (or a linguistic framework). So, if we take the same number theory as our conceptual schema or framework, alongside the internal questions such as the ones in (1), we can ask external questions such as: are there prime numbers? or more generally, are there numbers? External Practical The important thing about such external questions, Carnap argues, is that they are not

theoretical questions, that is, ones that admit of a yes/no determination. Instead, these are practical questions that can only be motivated to a degree by considerations of simplicity, elegance, eectiveness, and so on. So, the external question are there numbers? is in disguise really asking do we want a conceptual schema that deals with numbers? And this, although a yes/no question, can have no theoretically justied answer. If we like talking about numbers, then we answer it armatively, if not then we avoid talking of numbers in our conceptual schema. That such questions have no theoretical justication doesnt of course mean that they can have no pragmatic justication. The key here is a notion central to Carnaps philosophy: tolerance. External Theoretical The entire debate between realists/nominalists over the existence of such abstract entities as numbers, properties, etc., is based on the assumption that external questions can have theoretical justication. The question are there numbers?, they would say in contradistinction to Carnap, is not about whether we should allow numbers into our conceptual schemata or not, but is about the reality of numbers. The question is really

Carnap on Questions of Existence

Hunan Rostomyan / September 26, 2012

asking whether numbers are real in some sense. This question, Carnap thinks, is a crazy one. He doesnt see any way that it can be settled either by the realist or the nominalist. What would it take, Carnap asks, for one of these camps to come out as a winner? How could we test the reality of numbers? Convinced that no such method is tenable, Carnap dubs these questions metaphysical pseudo-questions and dismisses them. Conclusion In sum, Carnap dissolves pretty much all of the traditional ontological disputes that arent over (i) internal particular (is there a number that when squared equals two?), or (ii) internal general (are there irrational numbers?), or (iii) external practical (should we admit irrational numbers into our number theory?) questions. Again, what gets left out is the fourth, pseudo-question, (iv) are there irrational numbers? that is to be understood in some sense other than of (i-iii).

Further Reading If you nd this topic interesting, youre in luck because there is a lot of literature discussing dierent aspects of it. Among the primary readings, you have now (hopefully) read Carnap [C3]. Among Carnaps other so far published writings, especially relevant are, among others, [C5], [C6], [C2]:48-51, [C1]:18-22. Quine has been in much agreement but also in much debate with Carnap over the years. Among Quines writings that are more with Carnaps [C3] rather than against it is his [Q1]. Among his anti-Carnap essays we nd his [Q3], as well as one of the most famous papers in early analytic philosophy: [Q2]. The conversation of course neither started with Carnap and Quine nor ended with them. Important contributions to the problem include important analytic gures like Russell, G odel, Sellars, Parsons, and so on. I have focused here on mentioning Carnaps and Quines works because those are the ones Im most familiar with. Bibliography [C1] Carnap, R. (1935) Philosophy and Logical Syntax. [C2] (1939) Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, in Foundations of the Unity of Science, 1:3. [C3] (1950) Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, in [C4]: 205-221. [C4] (1956) Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, 2nd Edition. [C5] (1963) My Views on Ontological problems of Existence, in [C7]:868-73. [C6] (1963) Pseudo Problems in Philosophy, in [C7]:44-6. [C7] Schilpp, P. A. ed., (1963) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. [Q1] Quine, W. V. O. (1948) On What There Is, in [Q4]:1-20. [Q2] (1951) Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in [Q4]:20-47. [Q3] (1951) On Carnaps Views on Ontology, in [Q5]:249-59. [Q4] (1953) From a Logical Point of View. [Q5] (2004) Quintessence.

Thank you Arden, Chris, David S., Lucy, and Nick B. for your help in preparing this presentation. 2