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Agabon vs NLRC Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc.

is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.

*Constitutional due process vs Statutory due process Due process under the labor code like constitutional due process has two aspects; Substantive, the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the labor code and procedural, the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the implementing rules of PD 442 otherwise known as the labor code. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the labor code. Therefore, statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process. Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings while statutory due process found in the labor code and implementing rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. & ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. vs. ANTITERRORISM COUNCIL, et. al. FACTS: Petitioner organizations argue the Act as being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find

no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. HELD: The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The application of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. *what the law penalizes is the conduct and not the speech CASES WHERE THE COURT BROUGHT THE DOCTRINE INTO PLAY: 1. In analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds 2. The crime of illegal recruitment punishable under the labor code 3. Vagrancy under the RPC

Lucas vs Lucas Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse narrated his mothers account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and attached several copies of his personal documents. Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent. Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.

After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father. Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba. This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case. ISSUE: Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. HELD: Court order for blood testing equivalent to search under the Constitution. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

*Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.

MTRCB

v.

ABS-CBN

and

Loren

Legarda

An episode of The Inside Story entitled Prosti-tuition, produced by Loren Legarda was aired by ABSCBN depicting female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students invo lved. MTRCB alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and respondents did not submit The Inside Story to MTRCB for review and exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7 of PD 1986, Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations. MTRCB declared that all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Ch. 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. On appeal, RTC ruled that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional for violating the freedom of expression and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution

WON the MTRCB has the power/authority to review the The Inside Story prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television.

YES. MTRCB/SG: (1) all tv programs including public affairs programs, news documentaries or sociopolitical editorials are subject to MTRCBs power of review, (2) tv programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus liberal regulation cannot apply, (3) power to review tv programs does not amount to prior restraint, (4) Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986 does not violate respondents constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.SC: Rule in statutory construction: When the law says all television programs, the word all covers all tv programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. Since The Inside Story is a tv program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review. There also has been no declaration by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status. If the SC did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom

Pleasant Grove City vs Summum Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove." Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a "public" forum, not a non-public

forum as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the public interest. Whether a city's refusal to place a religious organization's monument in a public park violate that organization's First Amendment free speech rights? No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is a form of government speech and therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that since Pleasant Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments were displayed, the monuments represented an expression of the city's viewpoints and thus government speech.

K2. HLI vs PARC FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion to clarify and reconsider resolution of November 22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 and the MR filed by private respondents. July 5, 2011 Decision, the Court denied the petition for review filed by HLI and affirmed the assailed Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006 with the modification that the original 6,296 qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. Upon separate motions of the parties for reconsideration, the Court, by Resolution of November 22, 2011, recalled and set aside the option thus granted to the original FWBs to remain as stockholders of HLI, while maintaining that all the benefits and homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them. ISSUE: Whether in determining the just compensation, the date of taking s Nov. 21, 1989 when PARC approved HLIs stock distribution plan. HELD: Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that the taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program of the government is conditioned on the payment of just compensation. As stated: Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that the time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic. It should be noted, however, that taking does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLIs submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of taking as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands. It is the official act by the government, that is, the PARCs approval of the SDP, which should be considered as the reckoning point for the taking of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita. Although the transfer of ownership over the agricultural lands was made prior to the SDPs approval, it is this Courts consistent view that these lands officially became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. And as We have mentioned in Our November 22, 2011 Resolution, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. *Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. In determining just compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the government takes possession of the land before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. K10. NAPOCOR vs TIANGCO FACTS: Respondents are owners of a parcel of land with an area of 152,187 s q u a r e m e t e r s a t Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal. NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPCs Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents land. Within the portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing trees such as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones and coconut trees. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations, NPC filed an expropriation complaint against the land of the respondent in the RTC of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of NPC after paying the deposit requirement. The trial court rendered its decision on the value of the property using the 1 9 8 4 t a x declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in the decision of the supreme court) The respondents filed a motion for recon. but it was denied by RTC. So they filed an appeal and the CA gave merit to the contention of the respondents and made its revised valuation using the 1993 tax declaration (increasing the value of the property). The case went up to the SC.

ISSSUE: Whether or not the property should be valued using the 1984 or the 1993 tax declarations. HELD: In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just compensation due the respondents. Normally, the time of taking coincides with the filing of complaint for expropriation as ruled in the case of Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. The expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such month and year should lay the basis for the proper determination of just compensation

N4. PEOPLE vs MALNGAN FACTS : January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, respondent with intent to cause damage set a fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire and that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, her employers family were killed. The RTC convicted the respondent by reason of circumstantial evidence narrated by the Barangay Tanods and Chairman as witnesses of the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether the circumstial evidence is sufficient to convict the accused? RULING: Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. x x x x (3) Any confession or admissio n obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence. The court held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation when the investigation is no lo nger a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. Said

constitutional guarantee has also been extended to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning. To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements: (1) (2) (3) (4) it must be voluntary; it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent co unsel; it must be express; and it must be in writing.

Arguably , the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3 ), of the Constitution. When accused appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the o nly one , in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custo dial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have alread y been observed or applied to her. Accused appellants confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in respo nse to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted witho ut first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Co nstitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused -appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.

O7. GO vs PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.

Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC. On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. ISSUE: Whether the taking of deposition infringes the constitutional right of the petitioners? HELD: Yes. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts as it enables the judge to test the witness credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case against the accused The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris that the constitutional requirement insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.

P8. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs LIM FACTS: Lim is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company. On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.[1] Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. Petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa. Respondent appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court. By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission. By Decision of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required. The trial court ruled that recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person. ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof? RULING: Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.

S4. PEOPLE vs ATIENZA June 19, 2001, respondents were charged before the Sandiganbayan violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Duly arraigned, respondents entered their respective pleas of not guilty to the crime charged against them. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Meanwhile, on September 22, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, which was opposed by Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong. On August 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. Mayor Atienza then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which petitioner opposed. Thereafter, on October 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Acquit by Way of Demurrer to Evidence, which petitioner opposed. On December 6, 2005, the court a quo issued a Resolution which granted the motion. Whether the grant of demurrer is tantamount to acquittal? In criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. The above elements are all attendant in the present case: (1) the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26678 against respondents were sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 26678; (3) respondents were arraigned and entered their respective pleas of not guilty; and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 on a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that not all the elements of the offense as charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.