25 Roxas vs.

Vasquez [GR 114944, 19 June 2001]

First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur Facts: Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil were Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP. Sometime in September 1990, the PC-INP invited bids for the supply purchase of 65 units of fire trucks, and accordingly, the public bidding was held on 14 September 1990. The lowest bidder, Aeolus Philippines, was disqualified since its fire trucks had a water tank capacity of only 1,800 liters, far below the required 3,785 liter capacity. After ocular inspections made by a A Technical Evaluation Committee, two fire trucks, namely Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino, were recommended. The Bids and Awards Committee, however, voted to award the contract in favor of the Korean company CISC, which offered Ssangyong fire trucks. To avoid the possibility of failure to bid, the Bids and Awards Committee reviewed its recommendations, and thus limited its choice to the two brands recommended by Gen. Tanchanco and, by majority vote, elected Nikki-Hino of the Tahei Co., Ltd. as the lower bidder. Thereafter, the Contract of Purchase and Sale of 65 units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno,on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding Purchase Order was then prepared. Pursuant to a disbursement voucher, the PNP paid Tahei Co., Ltd. the mount of P167,335,177.24, representing marginal deposit for the 65 units of fire truck. The Disbursement Voucher showed that, while the bid price of Tahei Co. was only 2,292,784.00 per unit, the price appearing on the Purchase Order was P2,585,562.00 per unit. Hence, there was a discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of fire truck, or a total of P19,030,570.00 for all 65 fire trucks. The Commission on Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding and purchase of the 65 fire trucks, thus prompting then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III to file a complaint on 12 February 1993 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 before the Ombudsman, against (1) Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP, (2) Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP, (3) Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco, (4) Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.), (5) P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP, (6) P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP, (7) Insp. Reynaldo Osea, PNP, (8) Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP, (9) Dir. Nicasio Custodio, PNP, (10) Supt. Obedio Espea, PNP, (11) Former DILG Secretary Luis Santos, and (12) s. Generosa Ramirez. The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a preliminary investigation where the accused submitted their respective counter-affidavits. On 19 March 1993, it recommended the indictment of all, except Generosa Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Review Committee recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. This latter recommendation was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a Memorandum dated 15 April 1993. Accordingly, the appropriate Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 18956), against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osea, Espena and Santos. Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez were not included among the accused. However, upon motion of Generals Flores and Tanchanco, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. On 19 October 1993, without any notice to or participation of Roxas and Nacpil, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued an Order, dismissing the charges against Flores and Tanchanco, and recommending that Roxas, Nacpil, and Kairan be likewise indicted. Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted for the approval of the recommendation, while Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto dissented. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the recommendation. Roxas and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion for reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the Special Prosecutor commended that the Motion be granted and the charge against the movants be dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the recommendation in the second assailed Order dated 10 February 1994. Thus, on 27 March 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information with respondent Sandiganbayan, impleading Roxas and Nacpil as additional accused. Roxas and Nacpil filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the lack of notice to Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the issuance of Office of the Ombudsman null and void. Held: It is not material either that no new matter or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor, or in this case the Office of the Ombudsman, to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, Roxas and Nacpil at the reinvestigation render the questioned

issuances of Office of the Ombudsman null and void. At any rate, Roxas and Nacpil cannot argue that they have been deprived of due process. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Herein, the record clearly shows that petitioners not only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during the preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the 19 October 1993 Order of the Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case 18956

32 Montemayor v. Araneta University [GR L-44251, 31 May 1977] . Facts: Felix Montemayor was a full-time professor of Araneta University Foundation (AUF), serving as head of its Humanities and Psychology Department. On 17 April 1974, a complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the AUF for alleged immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo, Jr., created a committee to investigate such charge. The ccusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances committed against the person of Leonardo de Lara. The first hearing, which took place on 4 April 1974, was attended by Montemayor as well as the complainant with his two witnesses. Montemayor sought the postponement of the investigation to 3 May 1974, which was granted. On 28 May 1974, he filed a motion to dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance, and on 17 June 1974, he filed an affidavit to sustain his defense. On 8 July 1974, the report and recommendation of the investigating committee came, and was adverse to Montemayor. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one degree. On 5 August 1974, Salcedo adopted such recommendation and thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of the AUF for appropriate action. On 8 November 1974, new charges were filed by Professor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castaeda, and Jesus Martinez against Montemayor for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. Another committee was appointed. Montemayor moved to postpone the hearing set for 18 and 19 November 1974, but was denied. The hearing proceeded in his absence. On 5 December 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the President and the Board of Trustees of the AUF his separation from the University, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of the University. On 10 December 1974, his dismissal was ordered effective 15 November 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. On 12 December 1974, the University filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a report of his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1974, Montemayor in turn lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AUF for reinstatement and payment of back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendant thereto. There was a motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter and the NLRC found in favor of Montemayor. He was ordered reinstated to his former position with back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges. Montemayor's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. AUF appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on 14 July 1976, set aside the Commission's order for his reinstatement, finding Montemayor's dismissal justified. The AUF was, however, required to pay Montemayor the amount of P14,480.00 representing the latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily offered to extend him. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, Montemayor filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his dismissal from AUF. Held: In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. Academic due process, a term coined, is a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible judgment when an adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a conclusion. Every university or college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to present evidence. Herein, the procedure followed in the first investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process requisite. The second investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion for

postponement therein was denied, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Montemayor, and the committee lost no time in submitting its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was remedied, as Montemayor was able to present his case before the Labor Commission. Denial of due process happened only in the proceeding he had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case, the latter being the subject matter of the petition for certiorari. Montemayor was afforded his day in court. 33 Meralco vs. PSC [GR L-13638-40, 30 June 1964] Facts: On 10 March 1955, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) filed two applications with the Public Service Commission (PSC), one, for revision and reduction of its rates for commercial and other non- residential customers for general lighting, heating and/or power purposes (PSC Case 85889) and the other for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate, schedule RM-3 (PSC Case 85890). These applications were approved by the PSC in a decision rendered on 24 September 1955. On 24 August 1955, the Meralco filed another application for revision and reduction of its general power rate, Schedule GP-2 (PSC Case 89293), which was provisionally approved on 31 August 1955. Previous to these pplications, Meralco filed 7 other applications for revision and reduction rates. On 9 June 1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of Meralco's books of accounts. The General Auditing Office (GAO) examined and audited the books and under date of 11 May 1956, it presented a report which was submitted to the Commission on 28 May 1956. On 30 May 1956, the PSC, thru Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, reset the hearing of the cases for 22 June 1956 "for the purpose of considering such further revision of applicant's rates as may be found reasonable." On said date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta, Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of the PSC, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing". Dr. Pedro Gil submitted the 3 cases on the report of the GAO dated 11 May 1956 and on a letter dated 7 June 1956 he sent to the Commission, in which he asked the Commission, inter alia, to allow the Meralco "a rate of return of only 8% on its invested capital.". The Solicitor General submitted the case on the same report and letter of Dr. Gil and on a letterreport addressed by the Deputy Auditor General to the Commission on 21 November 1955. Other parties made common cause with Dr. Gil. Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of the GAO. On 31 July 1956, the Meralco filed its answer to the GAO's report, specifying its objection, and prayed that the cases be reset for hearing to enable the parties to present their proofs. Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and controverted by Meralco, on 27 December 1957, the PSC handed down a decision, granting the petition for the reduction of rates. The motion for reconsideration and to set aside decision, filed on 14 January 1958 by Meralco, was denied by the Commission on a 2 to 1 vote, on 3 March 1958. Meralco filed the petition for review with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the informal hearing held 22 June 1956 serves the purpose of proper notice and hearing in administrative cases. Held: The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of 27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing", as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for requiring the

Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law, which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. Due process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.

34 Ateneo v. CA [GR L-56180, 16 October 1986]

Second Division, Gutierrez (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 12 December 1967, Juan Ramon Guanzon (from Bacolod, son of Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado), first year student of AdMU Loyola Heights, and boarder at the Cervini Hall) struck at the left temple of Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the Cervini Hall cafeteria. Other boarders held him from striking again, but the boarders hid the incident from Fr. Campbell. The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals, proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline so indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning. After due trial, the lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1. Hence, the University filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the absence of notice to the dismissed students parents negates the compliance of the requirements of administrative due process. Held: Besides the administrative body undertaking a fair and objective investigation of the incident, due process in administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the decision. Herein, the original Court of Appeals decision (penned by Justice Gancayco) showed that the procedures in the expulsion case were fair, open, exhaustive, and adequate. There were nothing in the records to reverse the findings in the reconsideration. Clearly, there was absolutely no indication of malice, fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the Ateneo de Manila University. Juan Ramon was given notice of the proceedings. He actually appeared to present his side. The investigating board acted fairly and objectively. All requisites of administrative due process were met. It cannot be negated by the fact that the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any notice of the proceedings. Juan Ramon, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. He was fully cognizant of the gravity of the offense he committed as he asked if he could be expelled for what he did. When informed about the 19 December 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case, not even when he went home to Bacolod City for his Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the University

35 Alcuaz v. PSBA [GR 76353, 2 May 1988] Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction. Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them. Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time

36 Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990] Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that they waivedtheir privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, he affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them relates to possible breaches of discipline. Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been refused readmission or reenrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between the students and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle.