Chine ese Soft Power and a Imp plication ns for Global Go overnan nce

Conf fucius Goes s Glob bal:

Sam muel Tsoi i Master rs Capstone 16 May M 2012 2

Chinas histor C ric return to prominence is increasingly manag ged via pub blic diplomacy, a revival of f Confuciani ism, and soft power proj jection to as ssure the res st of the wor rld of its pea aceful rise. Desp pite its imperfect assets of attraction, the Peop ples Republic c (PRC) is st till winning fr riends abroad through cu ultural exch hanges, an enviable developmen d nt model and a South-S South assistanc ce. Given it ts embrace of soft pow wer as a ke ey strategy, in what wa ays will the PRCs P internatio onal influenc ce, demand ds and aspira ations lead to t a new ba alance of po ower or re-w writing of rules? This paper addresses the t question n by assessing how Ch hinas soft power curren ncy is converte ed into influence in tar rgeted regio ons and int ternational arenas, a such as Africa, the contesta ation over hu uman rights norms, n and multilateral m c cooperation n. It conclud des that as China C increases s its soft po ower, it also learns inter rnational no orms and ta akes on mor re responsib bilities. However r, world gove ernance willl still require US leadership in the fore eseeable fut ture, even with w a more glo obally-oriente ed China. No on-governm mental organ nizations and d civil society y will also pla ay an increasing role in cra afting effectiv ve institution ns and keepiing states ac ccountable. In the conte ext of a more diffused d pow wer dynamic c among sta ates and bey yond states, China will continue c to assert a its policy preference es, selectively y contribute e to multilate eral coopera ation, and project p its cu ultural values and governa ance ideals that could potentially re-prioritize global prob blem-solving over consensu us around un niversal norm ms.

A Abstract

Mas ster of Scie ence in Public Affairs s In nternational Relation ns Track J John W. Mc cCormack k Graduate e School of o Policy an nd Global Studies Univ versity of Massachus M setts Boston n

Tsoi, Samuel

Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2 Soft Power Discourse ............................................................................................................ 5 Definitions ........................................................................................................................................... 5 Theoretical Underpinnings ............................................................................................................. 8 Chinese Characteristics ................................................................................................................ 13 Assets & Liabilities .............................................................................................................. 20 Governor Confucius: The China Model............................................................................... 21 Director Confucius: Cultural, Educational and Public Diplomacy ................................ 31 Diplomat Confucius: Multilateralism and Foreign Aid ........................................................ 39 Impact on Global Governance ........................................................................................ 49 Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................. 57 China ................................................................................................................................................. 57 United States .................................................................................................................................... 58 NGOs/Civil Society ......................................................................................................................... 59 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 60 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 62

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Introduction
DukeYeaskedaboutgovernance.Confuciussaid:Thosewhoareclosetoyouare pleased,thosewhoarefarawayareattractedbyyourreputation."Analects16:13 Itwasthebiggestpartytheworldhaseverseen.Whentheclockstruck8:08PMonAugust 8,2008,theBeijingOlympicsopeningceremonyfulfilledamilestoneinmodernChinesehistory, anddisplayedthePeoplesRepublicasanoptimistic,attractiveandrejuvenatedforcetobe reckonedwith.Themomentwasmarkednotonlywiththenumericalsymbolismofgoodfortunein Chinese,butanorchestratedshowcaseofsoftpower,anancientandrefashionedconceptof achievingoutcomesthroughattractionthatalsoparallelsmodernChinasreemergenceontothe worldstage. Itisglorioustoreceivefriendsfromafar,chantedtheceremonyperformers,quotingthe ConfuciussAnalects.TheworldwatchedBeijingsspectacleofanunprecedentednational aesthetic1throughatourofChinesecultureviaboththetraditionsofmusic,martialartsanddance andthetechnologicalexecutionofdigitaldisplays,fireworksandarchitecturetodemonstrate Chinasrichhistoryandmodernachievements.The2008OlympicGames,indeed,servesasbotha momentousoccasionformanyChineseandalensintoChineseCommunistPartysembraceofsoft powerprojection.Chinascharmoffensiveisalsolaunchedtoassuagefearsofitseconomicand militaryambitionsandtoassertitspreferencesinanevermorecomplexinternational environment. AfterwhattheChinesecallahundredyearsofhumiliation,throughtumultuousperiodsof famine,foreigninvasion,andpoliticalupheavals,theeconomicreformsinthelastthreedecades catapultedtheworldsmostpopulousnationtoanunprecedentedcomeback.Theopeningup policyliftedtheequivalentoftheUSpopulationoutofabjectpoverty,achievedunprecedented scalesofurbanization,andcreatedaburgeoningmiddleclass.Chinasmeteoricascentalsobegsa
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Callahan 2010: pg. 2

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significantgeopoliticalquestion:howisChinasglobalinfluenceaffectingthenormsofinternational developmentandglobalcooperationprocesses? Thetraditionalanalyticalframeworksofcontemporaryinternationalpoliticshavecentered aroundhardpowerassetssuchaseconomicinducementsandmilitaryforce,bothofwhichhave spawnedaseriesofdebatesaboutChinasloomingthreattoitsregion,theinternationalsystemand theWest,particularlytheUnitedStates.AnothersalientparadigmforunderstandingwhatChinas developmentmeansfortheworldissoftpower,whichistheabilityforonetoshapethe preferencesandopinionsofatargettoachievetheoutcomesonedesires.2Byassessingand evaluatingtheusesoftpowerinrelationstohardpower,thecombinationofbothintheapproachof smartpowerwillbethekeytosuccessinanevermorecomplexinternationalarena,especiallyfor theChinastrajectoryvisvistheWest. EmployingasoftpoweranalysisenablesanalyststoobserveBeijingsstrategytomaintain legitimacy,bothdomesticallyandabroad,andtoinfluenceinternationalagendasettingtofitits interests.Softpoweranalysiswillalsoinformtheevolutionofglobalnormsandglobalgovernance asChinaassertsitsinterestsandgoalsthroughpublicdiplomacy,foreignaid,culturalexports, educationalexchangesanditsmodelofcombiningmarketeconomicswithautocraticpolitics.There isagrowingperceptionthattheconventionalwisdomoftheendofhistory,thatcapitalismbegets democracy,hasfadedifnotputonholdasChinastressesstatesovereigntyandnoninterferenceof domesticaffairs.Atthesametime,Chinahasreorientateditsforeignpolicytobecome increasinglycooperativetowardthemultilateralinstitutionsandnormsoftheinternationalsystem. Forexample,Chinahasincreaseditsmembershipininternationalgovernmental organizationsfromjustover30in1986to53in2009,withentryintotheWTOin2001beingthe mostprominent.Ithasalsodoubledthenumberofinternationalarmscontrol,disarmament,and nonproliferationtreatiesthatithasjoinedbetween1990and2008,andincreaseditsUN
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Nye 2004: pg. 6

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Peacekeepingforcesfrom5toover2,000between1990and2010. 3Basedonthistrend,some analystshavesuggestedthatChinaisnotarevisionistpower,butrather,itsdiplomatic engagementsaretransformedbythesocializationeffectsofinternationalorganizationsheavily influencedbyAmericasstickypowertheliberaleconomicworldorderledbyWesternled institutionsandbusinessinterestsandunderscoredbyAmericanmilitarypower.4 However,therearealsosignsthatanembeddedChinacouldestablishcounternormsby workingthroughthesystemtochangeinternationalrulesandinstitutionstosuititsinterests. Chinassoftpoweraffectsarangeofareassuchashumanitarianassistance,foreignaid,and ecologicalconservation.Ontheculturalandideationalrealm,Chinaisrelentlesslyrevivingits classicalthinkersandreveredvalues,byexpoundingonvirtuessuchasharmony.Chinasees cultureasitsbiggesttoolsetinitssoftpowerarsenal,aswellasthedrivingforcebehinditsagenda settingambitions.ItisonamissiontorebranditsancientsageConfucius,teachingMandarin,and welcomingstudentsanddignitariesfromthedevelopingworld.Thesetypesofeffortsarehow BeijinghopestocountertheChinathreattheory. Thispaperexaminesexaminethethreemainsourcesofsoftpower,namelycultural attraction,politicalmodel,andforeignpolicy.ThemainbodyofthepaperwillassessBeijingsuse ofcultureandothertoolsetssuchasdiplomacyandgovernance,andtheirstrengthsand weaknesses.ThecentralrolethatthePRCgovernmentplaysinconstructingsoftpowerwillalsobe critiqued.Itwillespeciallyhomeinontheefficacyofcultureasaninherentsoftpowerresource, butalsoasabrandingofitsdomesticandforeignpolicies,embodiedintherejuvenationof Confucianism. Aliteraturereviewofsoftpowerdiscourse,bothintheoriginsofJosephNyesdefinition andtheusagebyChinesepolicymakersandscholars,coupledwiththeplacingofsoftpowerinthe contextofinternationalrelationstheoriesandthepracticeofpublicdiplomacy,willprecedethe
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Cho, H. 2011 Mead 2004

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analysis.ByexaminingthetrajectoryofChinesesoftpower,thispaperwillbegintoilluminateon whetherChinasrisewillposepotentialchallengestointernationalnormsandglobalgovernance. Lastly,asetofpolicyrecommendationsforChina,theU.S.andnongovernmentalorganizationswill bepresented.Finally,thispaperselectsseveralscenariosfromtheanalysistoofferoptionsfor stakeholderstorespondtothesechallengesandidentifyproblemsolvingopportunitieswithChina.

Soft Power Discourse: Definitions

JosephNyefirstcoinedthetermsoftpowerastheabilitytoinfluenceotherstogetthemto dowhatyouwant.Asadeparturefromconventionalframeworkofpowerinhardterms,Nye positssoftpowerasanalternativewaytoachieveobjectivesthatisattimessuperiortousing militaryforceoreconomicsanctions(sticks)tothreatentheother,ortousepaymentsoreven bribestocoercetheother(carrots).SoftpowerisalsopresentedbyNyeastheabilitytostructurea situationsothatothernationsdeveloppreferencesordefinetheirinterestsinwaysconsistentwith onesownnation.Theattractionorcooptingcanoccurthroughculture,politicalvalues,and diplomacy.Inaninformationalage,withpowermorediffusedamongnationsandactors,Nye believesthatachievingobjectivesviasoftpowerisamorecosteffectiveandpeacefulapproachto internationalpolitics.5 Thepowerviaattractionapproachhasseveralmanifestations,includingnormativevalues, publicdiplomacy,culturaloutput,education,newsmedia,andbusinesspractices.Nyealsooffersa spectrumofbehaviorthatdifferentiateshardpoweratoneendandsoftpowerattheother.The spectrumrunsfromcommandandcoercion,throughinducements,agendasetting,andattraction, toendwithasuccessfuldeploymentofsoftpower:cooptation.Whenthisisaccomplished,the targetofsoftpowerdoesnotfeelthreatenedorpersuadedintosupportinganagenda.Instead,the

Nye 2004: pg. 6

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targetedactorcouldbecomeareliableallyandsupporteroftheexponentofsoftpower,becauseit feelsasenseofsharedoutlook.6 Softpower,therefore,isoftenmoredifficultthanhardpowertomeasure,andsuccessis dependentonthetargetsresponse.Usingsoftpowertoaccomplishgoalsisoftenalongerterm investment,andmanypoliticiansandcitizensareunabletograsptheefficacyofusingsoftpower. Lastly,Nyebelievessoftpowerinstrumentsarenotpossessedsolelybythegovernment.Infact,it ismostrobustwhenattractivenessisembeddedinthepeople,civilsocietyandinnovative environments.ThisisacriticalaspectforanalyzingtheroletheChinesegovernmentplaysin growingitsnationssoftpower,whichisofteninatopdowncentralplanningapproach,muchlike itsgriponkeyindustriesandinstitutions. Thus,nationsmightdeployavarietyofotherresourcestoachievethesamegoals,andsome willnotinvolvestrictlygovernmentalresourcesorpoliciesatall.Forexample,hardpoweris accomplishedmainlybymilitaryforce,oratleastcrediblethreatofit;othercoercivetechniques mightbepaymentsorinstitutionalpressures;andsoftpowerisdevelopedbypromotingcultural valuesandsympathy.7ExamplesthatNyegivesofUSsoftpowerincludeglobalbrands,filmsandTV shows,universities,technologicalinnovationandfreemarkets.WithAmericaastheexample,Nye alsonotesthenegativerelationshipbetweenhardpowerandsoftpowerthatoccurswhenAmerica squandereditssoftpowerafter9/11becauseofitsaggressivemilitaryexcursionsfortheWaron Terror.8 Nyesdefinitionsarebuiltupon,tweakedandalsocontextualizedinvariouswaysbyother theoristsofpower.StevenLukesseeshardpowerasthechangingoftheincentivestructuresof actorswhoseinterestaretakenasgivenandsoftpowerastheshapingofthoseveryinterests.He alsonotesthatNyedoesnotmakethedistinctionbetweendifferentwaysinwhichsoftpowercan
Nye 2004: pg. 8 Nye 2004: pg. 9 8 Nye 2010: pg. 25
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coopt,attractandenticethosesubjecttoit. 9Lukesalsoarguesthatsincepowershapesthe formationshapestheformationofactorsconsciousness,nointerestformationcanbeobjective; definingwhatanactorsrealinterestsareisnotfreeofpowerrelations.10Thus,Lukesexpands thesoftpoweranalysistoexplainandunpackthesourcesbehindhowactorAgetsactorBtodo whatitwants,mainlybyconstitutingthefieldofknowledgethroughwhichBrealizesits subjectivity.AlexanderVuving,whoalsoexpandsNyesdefinitionbysharpenthedistinction betweensoftpowerresourcesandsoftpowercurrencies,sincehardpowerresources(economic andmilitary)canalsoproducesoftpowerindifferencecontexts.VuvingrefinesNyessoftpower resourcesbyofferingthreegenericpowercurrencies,whichhetermsbeauty,theresonanceof sharenormsandgoals;brilliance,theshineofcapabilitiesandsuccesses;andbenignity,the kindnessofbehaviorandattitude.11 DavidLamptonalsoexpandsNyesdefinitionofsoftpowerintheThreeFacesofChinese Power,oneofthemostcomprehensiveanalysesofcontemporaryChinesepowertodate.Insteadof softpower,Lamptoncallstheabilityideationalpower,whichderivesfromtheintellectual, cultural,spiritual,leadership,andlegitimacyresourcesthatenhanceanationscapacityto efficientlydefineandachievenationalobjectives.Lampton,inhisparticularinvestigationofChina, putstheemphasisonpoliticalanddiplomaticleadership,innovationandhumanresources,beyond Nyessourcesofculture,politicalsystemandforeignpolicies.12BothNyeandLamptonassumes thatsoftpowerisoftenthemorecosteffectivewaytonudgeanothercountryintocomplianceby instillingawishtobehaveinadesiredfashionorthebeliefthatsuchbehaviorisrightthanby usingforceorbribes. IwillgenerallybeusingNyesdefinitionandsourcesfortheassessmentofChinassoft powerprojection,withthediscussiononChinesecharacteristicsofpoliticalvaluesandthe
Lukes 2005: pg.90-92 Bilgin & Elis 2008: pg. 15 11 Vuving 2009: pg. 8 12 Lampton 2008: pg. 118
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investigationonChinasincreasinglyinternationallytraineddiplomatsandcosmopolitanscholars willspeaktoLamptonsemphasisonhumanresourcesasasourceofsoftpower.Thesharpened distinctionsbyVuvingandLukeswillalsobediscussedintheassessmentofChinassoftpower assetsandliabilities,especiallyinhowtheirsoftpowercurrenciesareconvertedinvarioustarget states.Beyonddefinitions,thestudyofsoftpowerwillrequiretheexplorationonhowthese realitiesandrelationshipsareframedandexplainedthroughinternationalrelationstheory.

Soft Power Discourse: Theoretical Underpinnings

Realismhasprevailedamonginternationalrelationstheoristsastheenduringandmost explanatoryvisiononpower.Contemporaryrealistsareoftenorientedaroundtheideaofnations usingmaterialresourcestoinfluenceothernations,andnoamountofcharmorpersuasioncanbe strongerthanmilitarypoweroreconomicsanctions.TheprominentrealistJohnMearsheimersees powerisbasedontheparticularmaterialcapabilitiesthatastatepossesses.Thesematerial capabilitiesareessentiallytangibleassetsthatdetermineanationsmilitarystrength.13Another leadingrealisttheoristKennethWaltzshowsasimilarharddispositionindefiningpower.Poweris definedintermsofcapabilities,whichinturnconsistofsizeofpopulationandterritory,resource endowment,economiccapability, militarystrength,politicalstabilityandcompetence.14 Therefore,manyrealistscontendthatnationalinfluenceisultimatelydependentonanindustrial militarycomplexthatcanbeusedtothreatenormarshalforce.Theemphasisfallsonthetangible powerlexiconthatdeterminesanationscapacitiestoemploymuscleinpursuitofitsgoals. Thisprimaryfixationontangiblepoweremanatesfromthepurityofrealismsemphasison anarchyamongstatesaccordingtoHobbesiannatureofhumanrelations.Thesacredcatechismof realisttenetsaboutthebehaviorofnationsthatfollowfromtheconditionofanarchy,definedasno
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Mearsheimer 2001: pg. 55 Waltz 1979: pg. 131

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commonpoweraboveactorstokeeptheminawe,leadsactorstooptimizehardpowerresources onlybecausesuchresourcesaremorecertaintoprovideprotection(whetheritbedefensiveor offensiveinnature).Whileevenperceptionsofpowermayreducethevulnerabilityofanactor,they arenoguaranteeagainstvictimizationbyforce,noraretheyguaranteedtobeabletodeterand/or compelactorstobehaveinwaysthatmakeonelessvulnerable.Tangiblepowerresources,bothin theirmanifestandsymbolic(i.e.,threat)use,canbeemployedtorepelactsofforce,andtheycanbe usedtocompelactorsintosubmission.Allintangiblesourcesofpower,suchasgoodwill,attraction, valuesandculturecarrynosuchassurances.Therefore,softpowercarriesnoguaranteesthatan actofaggressioncan,eitherbeconfrontedorperpetratedtoeliminateamenacingactor.Thus, manyskepticsofsoftpowerportraytheconceptasmerelyoneendofaspectrumbetweenrealism andidealism.Atbest,theyseesoftpowerasaloftyandimpracticalparaphraseofliberal institutionalistvisionandpolicies.15Althoughmanysoftpowerinstrumentsaretakenmore seriouslyinconstructivistsandliberalframeworks,classicalrealistthinkershavealso acknowledgedthesalienceofattractionandideationalpersuasion.EvenclassicalrealistthinkerE. H.Carrcategorizedinternationalpowerasmilitary,economicandpoweroveropinion.16 Broadlyspeaking,softpowerissimplyaformofpower,andtheconceptcrossestheoretical boundarieswhenitcomestoanalyzingstatebehaviorandinternationalpolitics;althoughitis temptingtoeitherunderstateitintheageofweaponsofmassdestruction,oroverstateitinan informationalage.Nyehimselfdoesnotdismissrealismsfundamentalconcernfortangible sourcesofpower,howeverheclaimsthatthestageofworldpoliticsisbecomingmorecrowded withadditionalactors,thedistinctionbetweendomesticandinternationalisnotsoneat,andthe politicsoftransnationalrelationsandcomplexinterdependenceneedanunderstandingofliberal andconstructivistapproachesaswellasclassicalrealism.17Moreover,Nyebelievestheanalysis
Layne 2010: pg. 73 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.120. 17 Nye 2008
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andutilizationofsoftpowerisnotnecessarilyincompatiblewithrealism,butinfactembeddedin classicalrealistthought.ClassicalrealistslikeMachiavelliandMorgenthauunderstood[soft power],butinitssearchforparsimony,structuralrealismsettledonatruncatedandimpoverished materialistviewofpower.18NyeandfellowneoliberalthinkerRobertKeohaneexploreddifferent modelsofpowerandinterdependenceincludingthemixedcoalitionstypicaloftheidealtypethey labeledcomplexinterdependence.ItcomplicatestraditionalWestphaliandynamicsofstateto staterelationsandconflict,towardamorediffusedsetofactorsthatrequiresdiplomacyon multiplelevels;fromonegovernmenttoanotherstatespopulation,fromnonstateactorssuchas transnationalcorporationsandcivilsocietyorganizationstogovernment,andsoforth.This mixtureofaWestphalianstatecentricworldofhardpowerpoliticsandtheemergingrealityof morediffusedpowerbetweenstatesandamongothernonstateactors,thesalienceofnormsand theglobalgovernance,allofwhichdilutesrealistnotionsofstatesovereigntyandanarchy.Itisin thiscontextthatChinasoftpowerisoperationalized.InareasoftheworldwhereChinasinfluence ismostdramaticallyfelt,suchasAfrica,therearenongovernmentalactorssuchasdevelopment andhumanitarianorganizations.Chinasfriendlyrelationswithsomeofthemoretroubledregimes willincreasinglyalterthepoliticalwatersinwhichNGOsandothercivilsocietygroupsoperate, fromthepermissiontooperateforinternationalNGOs,tograssrootsorganizationsrolein representingtheinterestsofcommunitiesandtheenvironmentaffectedbylargescale infrastructureextractiveprojectsthatChinaisfunding. Withthegrowthofinformationaltechnology,globalizationsculturalandideational dimensionshavealsousheredanewageinworldpoliticswhichelevatedtheimportanceofsoft powerrelativetohardpower.Inthecurrentinternationalsystem,softpowerwillbeacrucial elementinenhancinginfluenceoverinternationaloutcomesbecauseithasbecomemoredifficultto compelnationsandnonstateactorsthroughtheweaponsofhardpower.Furthermore,the
18

Nye 2008

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spreadofideas,projectioncultureandpromotionofglobalnormsareopeninguptheoreticalspace forthesalienceofconstructivisminsoftpoweranalysis.Inthisnewarrangement,NGOswillalso playarolebeyondthegovernmentsinbothbuildingsoftpowerandcounteringpublicrelations campaignsbystatesbyexposingshortcomingsofgovernmentsorinfluencingthepublics perceptionoftheinfluenceofstates. Optimally,softpowerismostinfluentialwhentargetnationsvoluntarilydowhatsoft powerwieldingnationsprefer,asincooptinginsteadofcoercing.Thestructureofpowerrelations andnegotiationsisembeddedwithinsomegreaterconstellationofsocialrelationsthatinfluence thoserelationsandtherebyinfluencefinaloutcomesthatderivefromtheinteractionsamong actors.19 Anothersubconceptofsoftpowerthathasbecomefertilegroundforconstructivismis agendasettingandagendacontrol,whicharecrucialelementsinglobalgovernance.Nyerefersto softpowerasacontroloverthepoliticalagenda.20Withinacollectivenegotiationprocess,bein regionalorinternationalforums,therearesaidandunsaidideasandvaluesthatformaguiding agenda,outcomesarecircumscribedbytherangeofissuesandstrategicpossibilitiesconfiguredby theagendasetter,inthecaseofmanyglobalgovernanceendeavors,Westernpowers.Theagenda hasinfluenceoverwhichissuesareprioritized,discussedandworkedonwhichhasfundamental implicationsonhowpolicyisshapedandbyhowactorsassertsoftpower.21 Constructivismsemphasisonidentityandthesociallyconstructednatureofinterstate relationsprovidesalensintohowChinassoftpower,especiallyinitsrecentrevitalizationin theorizingonworldorderbaseonConfucianism.22Constructivismquestionstheassumedstructure ofpowerthatdeterminestheadversarialpostureofstates,especiallyrisingpowerssuchasChina

Gallarotti 2011: pg. 11 Nye 2004: pg. 9 21 Gallarotti 2011: pg. 12 22 Bell 2008: pg. 27
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visvisthehegemonicpower,theUnitedStates. 23Intermsofglobalgovernance,whichisthe increasinglynecessaryendeavortosolvetransnationalproblems,itisstilldeeplyhamperedbythe rigidnationstatesystemgovernedbynationstatelevelinterestsandgreatpowerpolitics.A constructivistframeworkhasthepotentialtomakesenseofaglobaldynamicinwhichChinasrise isnotnecessarilygoingtobeattheexpenseofexistinggreatpowers,andhowChinasidentityasa fragilesuperpower24(anascentnationstatewithtremendouseconomicandmilitarypower)will affectthecommunityofstatesandtheabilityforinternationalinstitutionstosolveglobalproblems. ThePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC),beingarelativelynewWestphalianentity,carries paradoxicalidentitiesofbeingacivilizationandanationstate,arichandapoorcountry,andan economicallyliberalyetpoliticallyautocraticsystem.ThisismanifestedinChinasprojectionofsoft power,anditsideasarereassertingtheemphasisonbothsovereigntyandnoninterference, therebyhaltingthetrendtowardsglobalnormsandhumanitarianlaw.Ontheotherhand,thePRC hasreformeditsdomesticpoliciesincompliancewithglobalinstitutionsandagendas.Theanalysis sectionofthispaperwilldelvefurtherintothisdynamic.Onatheoreticallevel,understandinghow ChinautilizessoftpowerwillinformhowChineseideasandpoliticalvaluesspread,andhowits influenceonmultilateralbodies,whereconstructivismwillshedlightintotheprospectsofChinas agendasettingcapabilitiesandnormsentrepreneurship.Thesocializationdynamicsof internationalrelationsandnationalidentitywillalsobeusefulinthatastate'sbehaviorisinparta productoftheinteractionbetweennationstates.25Thus,currentChinesenotionsofpowerand nationalidentityaredeeplyinfluencedbyinteractionsbetweenChinaandtheoutsideworld whicharehistoricalgeopoliticalprocessesaswellasongoingsocialandculturalinteractivities. TheseprocesseswillbediscussedfollowingtheanalysisofChinassoftpowerresources.

Wend 1992: pg.396 Shirk 2007 25 Cheung 2008: pg. 6

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InNyeslatestiteration,smartpowerastheidealmixtureofhardandsoftpower,he articulatesthatanalyzingUnitedStatesgrandstrategynecessitatealiberalrealistapproach.26 ForChina,thefollowingsectionswillilluminateChinasmotivationforutilizingsoftpower resources,fromteachingMandarintotheworldtotrainingsavvydiplomatstoparticipate assertivelyininternationalforums,groundedinarealpolitikposture.Tobeginunderstanding Chinasmotivations,interestsandpreferences,aviewfromtheChinesemindsetonpower, internationalrelationsandglobalgovernanceisinorder.

Soft Power Discourse: Chinese Characteristics

Aleaderisbestnotwhenpeopleobeyhiscommands,butwhentheybarelyknowheexists. LaoTzu Thebehaviorofleadersandstatesthatdenotesoftpowerisasoldashumanhistory,andit isfilledinclassicalChinesetextssuchasmilitarystrategistSunTzuandsagesConfuciusandLao Tzu.However,theconceptofsoftpowerinAsiaisrecentlyrevived,andnotextensivelyresearched byWesternscholars.ArecentpaperbyGillandHuanghighlightsimportantaspectsofChinas recentdiplomacyinthewidersense,includingitseducation,developmentalmodel,andgrowing participationininternationalinstitutions.JoshuaKurlantzicksCharmOffensive:howChinasSoft PowerIsTransformingtheWorldisfirstofitskindEnglishlanguageattemptatmappingChinese notionsandengagementinsoftpowertowinfriendsandbuildalliancesthrougheducationand culturalexports.KurlantzickseesChinasrelativesuccessusingsoftpowerassetsinthegeopolitical chessboardasdirectlyrelatedtotheUnitedStatesunilateralforeignpolicy,politicalgridlockand domesticinequalities.27TherearealsoneoConfucianscholarsbothwithintheChinesespeaking world,andfromoutside,thathavedescribedhowtherenaissanceinConfucianthoughtis
26 27

Nye 2011: pg. 231 Kurlantzick 2007

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contributingtoChinesepoliticallifeandapproachtoglobalaffairs,suchasthelateKangYouwei, andcontemporaryanalystssuchasDanielBell,JosephChan,andRogerAmes. Chinesetraditionshaveinfactbeenupdatedtoinformcontemporaryrelations,andthe conceptofsoftpowerisunderstoodtobefundamentallypartofsociety,politicsandthemilitary thinkingover2000years.Infact,becauseofitsdurability,anditspopularityinWestern managementliterature,thegovernmenthasactivelypromotedtheoneoftheoriginalproponents ofsoftpower,SunTzu.InSunsseminalwork,ArtofWar,writtenoverathousandyearsago,the stratagemsformedakeyelementofstatecraftbeyondmilitarytactics,suchas:acarefullycrafted strategytoconfuseputativerivals,throwthemoffbalance,andhopefullywinvictorieswithout strikingablow.Indeed,sopopulararemanyofthemaximsthattheyhavebecomepartofChinese folkloreandpopularnarrative,enshrinedinliteraryepicssuchastheTaleoftheThreeKingdoms akintowhatMachiavellisPrincescontributiontoWesternpoliticalphilosophy.28 SunTzuarguesthatmilitaryactionisonlyimportantaspartofanintegratedapproachto security;oneinwhichdiplomaticalliances,withemphasisonsuchstratagemsasdeceivingenemies andunderminingtheirhomefronts;secretlogisticalpreparations;winningoverenemycivilians, soldiers,andleaders;avoidingdefeatsandcasualties;maximizingvictories;andpredictingthe aftermathofwarbeforeengagement,aremorecrucialthanmerefighting.ManyofSunTzus phrasesmadetheirwayintodailylanguage;forexamplebingyizhali(warisbasedondeception); yiruokegang(usegentlemeanstoovercomethehardandstrong);andbishijixu(avoidtheenemys strengthsandstrikeathisweakpoint).29 MoralleadershipbyexemplarisanothercomponentofsoftpowerintheConfucianmindset. Evenifclaimstomoralintegrityhavelittlebasisinfact,theycanneverthelessbeexpressedvia propaganda,asintheColdWarrhetoricalassertionsthatAmericawasabeaconoffreedomand democracy;orthattheSovietUnionwasaparadiseofequalityandpublicgoods.Again,thisconcept
28 29

Hunter 2009: pg. 378-379 Ibid.

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resonatesinChinesetradition.ConfucianismisamainparadigmofChinesegovernancewhich althoughhierarchical,isideallyreciprocalandethicsbased.Therulerisexpectedtodemonstrate moralexcellence,takingwisedecisionsonbehalfofhissubjectstokeepthestatesecureand prosperous.Aslongashedoesso,heholdsaheavenlymandateandshouldbesupportedbyall.If heshoulddeviatesignificantlyfrommoralnorms,hewillsoonerorlaterlosethemandate.

30Widespreadandjustifiedpopularoppositionandachangeofrulerwillfollow.Oneoftenfinds,

evenatordinarylevelsofChineseinstitutionallife,astrongsenseofobligationonthepartof seniorstorespecttheinterestsoftheirsubordinates,towardswhomtheyareexpectedtoactfairly andgenerously.Theyexpectinreturnloyaltyandhardwork. WiththatrichintellectualhistoryinconceptualizingpowerandtheConfucianheritageof relationalharmony,itwasonlyamatteroftimethatChinaevolvesitssoftpowerdiscourse.When NyesbookBoundtoLeadwaspublishedinChinesein1992,thenPresidentJiangZeminschief foreignpolicyadvisorWangHuningpublishedanarticleintheFudanUniversityJournal,stressing theneedforChinatostrengthenitssoftpower.31AChineseresearcheralsofoundthatinterestin softpowerhasincreaseddramaticallyamongscholarsandpolicymakersinChinasince,even towardafeverpitchoffascinationthatexceededinterestamongUSscholars.InAugust2002,the ChinaInstituteofInternationalStudiesheldaconferenceonTheImportanceandInfluenceofSoft PowerinU.S.ForeignPolicy.Recently,criticismsofNyestheoryhavesurfaced,assertingthat NyessoftpowerpertainsmainlytotheAmericanexperienceandarguingforasoftpowertheory moreacclimatedtoChinassituation.32Thisisoneofthemostdiscursiveaspectsofanalyzing Chinassoftpower,sinceNye,asanAmericanstressescivilsocietyasthecoreresourcefora nationssoftpowerandhasarguedthatChinaisweakonsoftpowerbecauseofapolitical

Chan 2007: pg. 179 Wang 2008 32 Ibid.

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 environmentthatstiflesmanyaspectsofmedia,religion,innovation,andselfcriticism.33

Tsoi, Samuel

Nevertheless,asNyewouldsuggest,successofsoftpowerprojectiondependsonthetargetstate,of whichChinahasmanyfans,ifnotwiththeAmericanelite.Furthermore,Chinasinvestmentinto softpowerinstrumentsisasignificantpartofitsforeignpolicystrategyandthetrajectoryofits rise. ContemporarydiscourseinChinaisgenerallytwofold:softpowerasnationbuildingand softpowerasforeignpolicy.Asgrandstrategy,softpowerisrelevantfortheChinesegovernment inbothinternalandexternalaffairs.ThroughoutHuJintaostenureaspresidentinthe2000s,the politicaleliteintheChineseCommunistParty(CCP)havealsostartedtotakegreaterinterestin strengtheningChinassoftpower.InMay2004,theCCPPolitburoheldits13thcollectiveseminar onDevelopmentandProsperityofChinesePhilosophyandSocialScience.Thiswasheldshortly afterAmericananalystJoshuaRamosCoopercoinedthetermBeijingConsensus,whichsparked aninternationaldebateabouttheChinesedevelopmentmodelthatcountersthedominantformsof promotedbytheWashingtonD.C.basedneoliberalorderanchoredbytheWhiteHouse,Treasury DepartmentandtheIMFandWorldBank,dubbedtheWashingtonConsensus. TheChineseneverexactlyembracedtheBeijingConsensus,butratherprefertheterm

ChinaModel,sincetheCCPclaimsithasnointentionsofpromotingthemodelwidelyaroundthe world,butthatitssuccessesmightbeanexampleforotherdevelopingnationsthatthereare alternativestoneoliberalism.Infact,thistopdowneconomicreformthatstressesgradualismhas becomeanimportantsoftpowerresourcesforwinninginfluenceabroad,particularlythosewith authoritarianregimesorthosedisillusionedbytheWashingtonConsensus.Nevertheless,China seestheneedtocomplementitsexpansionwithapeacefuldevelopmentdiscourseaspartofits grandstrategy.InternationalopiniononChinaalsoimprovedattheoutsetofitssoftpower strategy,withChinasrenminbi(RMB)actedasafixedcurrencytostabilizefundsforafflicted

33

Nye 2011

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Tsoi, Samuel

countriesthroughoutthe199798Asianeconomiccrises.Today,itisflirtingwithapplyingthe samelogicintheEurozone. Unlikeinthepast,mainstreammediainChinabeganreportingextensivelyonglobalissues inthelastdecade.Asaresult,activediscussionsofdevelopmentissuesandonforeignpolicy occurrednotonlyonthegovernmentlevel,butalsowithincivilsociety.Atthesametime,the ConfuciuslensisemployedasthenewpatrioticviewpointfromwhichChinasidentityand approachtoglobalaffairsisbased.Forexample,commentatorYuDandrewrecordviewershipto theLectureRoomshowonChinesetelevisionthatdiscussedhowConfucianphilosophyresonates withcontemporaryChinesepolicies.34Thisincreaseddiscoursepatternsinfluencedtheself consciousnessofChinesepeopleandinthewaytheChinesegovernmentconductedself evaluations.35 OneofthemostsignificantcontributiontosoftpowerdiscoursebyChinesethoughtleaders istheconceptofcomprehensivenationalpower(zongheguoli ),whichemergedalongside theinterpretationandadaptationofNyessoftpower.Assoftpowerbecomeevermoresalient, ChinesescholarsregardedthestrengtheningofChinassoftpowerasatopnationalobjective.Inhis landmarkbookTheoryonComprehensiveNationalPower,HuangShuofengdescribes comprehensivenationalpowerascomprisinghardpower,softpowerandcoordinatingpower, whichincludespoliticalstructures,governmentleadership,organizationaldecisionmakingpower, managementcapabilities,andreformcoordinationcapabilitiescomponentsofwhichhighlight someofthemorepragmaticstepsofutilizingsoftpower.(Figure1)36
Callahan 2011: pg. 10 Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 255 36 Callahan 2011: Figure 4.7
34 35

17

 Figure1:ComprehensiveNationalPower

Tsoi, Samuel

HardPower SoftPower Comprehensivenationalpower=(militarypower+economicpower+culturalpower)xpoliticalpower MaterialPower OperationalPower

Fordomesticpoliticalissues,someChinesescholarsstressthestrengtheningofsoftpower aswell.Asacomprehensiveapproachtonationaldevelopmentbeyondtheonedimensional fixationoneconomicgrowthinrecentdecades,theyreflectonthelessonoftheSovietUnions collapse.TheKremlinsdramaticfallwasattributabletoitsrapiddecreaseininternational influencedespitehavingmilitarymightonparwiththeU.S.37Thus,Chinesescholarscalledfora plantoincreasetheircountryssoftpowerthroughinstitutionaladvancementinculture,education andgovernance.Otherswithreformistimpulseshavealsoweighedinonsoftpowertoadvocate forprotectionofprivatepropertyandstrengtheningtheruleoflaw,forexample.38 Asnoted,thediscourseonsoftpowerhasreinvigoratedsomeareasofpolicyandpolitical debatesaboutChinasinternalgovernance.However,thereisaneagernesstoapplyitexternally,as theChinathreatmountsamongstitsAsiaPacificneighbors,viaitsexpansiveinvestmentsinAfrica andLatinAmerica,andastheideologicalchallengetoWesternneoliberalism.UnderHuJintaoand WenJiabaosleadership,themostdeliberatedevelopmentofsoftpowerasforeignpolicystrategy includethenewconceptofinternationalpoliticoeconomicorder,withlanguageborrowedfrom theFivePrinciplesofPeacefulCoexistenceduringtheMaoera,whichresistedtheAmericanled internationalorder,whichwillbeexaminedfurtherintheanalysis.Inespousingnowubiquitous termssuchasharmoniousworldandpeacefuldevelopment,Huandothersattemptedtostrikea balancebetweenassuringtheworldthatChinassuccessesarenotzerosumgains.TheChinese
37 38

Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 458 Men & Barton 2011: pg.179

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Tsoi, Samuel

leadershipismindfuloftheimportanceofmitigatingthefearsofChinaasasecuritythreat, neocolonialpowerorunsustainablebubble.Otherexamplesincludethenewsecurityconcept, whichcriticizedtraditionalsecuritymeasures(e.g.,NATOandtheU.S.Japanalliance),andthe responsiblepowertheory,whicharguedagainsttheviewthatChinawasdestructivetothe internationalsystemandclaimedthatChinawasaresponsiblepoweraccountableforitsactionsin internationalsociety.39 Beyondtheimagetheywantstoproject,strategistsinChinaseesoftpowerdevelopmentas bothadefensiveresponsetoAmericansoftpowerandasaproactivepathtowardbecomingagreat power.ManyChineseanalystsregardAmericassoftpowerstrategyasinstrumentalinthe disintegrationoftheSovietUnionviapublicdiplomacy,broadcast,culturalexportsandalienating theSovietsinmultilateralforums.ThesescholarssawthisasAmericasattemptatpeaceful evolution(hepingyanbian ),andcastsChinaasavulnerablevictimoftheheavyhandof Americanculturalhegemony.AsimilarimpulseisexhibitedmostrecentlyintheeventsoftheArab Spring,duringwhichtheChineseCommunistPartyratchetedupcensors,clampeddownon dissidents,andcriticizedWesternculture.40Asacountermeasure,theyurgetheChinese governmenttostrengtheneducationinsocialistideologyandtoprotectChinastraditionalculture. ThisdefensivepostureiscommonamongmanyChineseintellectuals,especiallythosewith

nationalisttendencies.IntheresponsetoNyesopinionarticlepublishedintheWallStreetJournal in2005,ChinesecriticsseeNyeasperpetuatingasoftpowerversionoftheChinathreat,and justifiesChinasinvolvementinmultilateralinstitutionsandinfluenceabroadiscommensurate withitsdevelopmenttrajectory,andithastheresponsibilityandrighttomakeglobalpoliticsmore democraticandlessWesterncentric.41

Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 459 Wong, New York Times 3-Jan-2012 41Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 460
39 40

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Tsoi, Samuel

Sinceitsinceptioninthe1990sinpoliticaldiscourse,softpowerisnowsquarelyembedded inChinasgrandstrategy.First,thePRCsleadersareactivelydemonstratingtoitsneighborsand theinternationalcommunitythatChinashistoricalcomebackisnottobefeared,butevendesired. Secondly,itscadreofgloballysavvyleadersanddiplomatsarebeginningtoassertitsvoiceinall majorareas(SecurityCouncil,WTO,IMF),evenshoulderingsomeresponsibilities(peacekeeping, mediation,N.Koreanonproliferation),andtochallengetheWesternledworldorderso internationalcommunityacceptsChineseinfluenceinglobalgovernance.Inthiscontext,the ChineseelitehasreachedconsensusondevelopingsoftpowerasChinareachestobecomeaglobal power.HowfarwillthattakeChina?Theassets,liabilitiesandimpactonworldpoliticsare examinedahead.

Soft Power Assets & Liabilities

Ofthethreegeneralsourcesofsoftpowerfornationstates,culture,politicalsystemand

values,andforeignpolicies,mostmainstreamintellectualsandleadersinChinaregardscultureas itsfocalpoint.42TheChineseseeculturebothasthecoreofitscharmoffensiveviathepromotion ofitslanguage,artandcivilizationaltraditions,aswellasawaytovalidateitspoliticallegitimacyat homeanddetertheChinathreattheoriesabroad.Thisissynthesizedinthenotionofharmonious societychampionedbycurrentPresidentHuJintaowhichispregnantwithromanticizedConfucius overtones.Thissectionwillexaminethethreesourcesinsequence,fromthemostpassively attractive(internalpoliticalsystemandvalues),totheculturalpromotionthathasbothpassiveand assertiveelements,tothemostoutwardlyfocusedovertures(foreignpoliciesandcooperation).At eachturn,thestatesmotivationsandactionsinexertingsoftpoweryieldassetsandliabilities.For thefirstsource,politicalsystem,anoverviewofChinaseconomicdevelopment,authoritarian governanceandpragmatismwillshowhowChinasmodelhasbecomeincreasinglyattractiveas
42

Men & Barton 2011: pg. 178

20

Tsoi, Samuel S

wellasco ontradictory, ,withanemp phasisonho owclassicalp politicalthou ughtinformscontemporary Chinesev viewsonauth horityandde emocracy.It twillfollowb byhowcultu uralassetsar repackaged, exportedandbroadca astedaround dtheworldv viaabuildup pofpublicdiplomacytoo olssuchas education nalexchange esandmedia a.Finally,Chi inasgrowingengagemen ntinmultilat teralinstitutions, bilateralr relationsand dforeignassistancewilli illuminateth heoftenmuddledanalysis softhe interactiv vitybetween nhardpower r(economici inducement) )andsoftpow wer. Figure2:Sou urcesofSoftP Power

Politicalvalues v &inter rnal governa ance system m

Cultural, educational& public d diplomacy

Foreign npolicies &inter rnational coope eration

Passi iveattractionforceDirectengag gement/ Creating gfavorableco onditions

rnor Confucius: T The Chin na Mode el Gover

D DengXiaoping g,thepragmaticleaderw whoopenedu upChinatotheworldint the1980s,on nce remarked d:Itdoesn't tmatterwhet theracatisw whiteorblac ck,aslongas sitcatchesm mice.Hisdict tum servedas sacommand dtoembarko onafranticr rushtogetric chandanim mplicitconsen nttoleavebe ehind Marxista andMaoistid deologies.Th hefollowingdecadeswer refullofpolicyexperimentsofvariou us kinds,oft tenmarketre eforms,with hunpreceden ntedresultsingrowth,po overtyallevia ationand infrastruc cturedevelopmentallt thewhilecon nsolidatingth heCommuni istPartyspo oweratthe expenseo ofdemocrati izationthatm manyWester rntheoristsp positaccomp paniesmoder rnization.Itis thisadap ptabilityandf flexibilitytha atsetsitapartfromitsso ocialistbreth hren,suchastheformer

21

 SovietUnion,NorthKoreaandCuba,andwhichothersocialiststatessuchasVietnamare emulating.

Tsoi, Samuel

ThePRCsstatedrivencapitalisticmodel,withlimitedcivilliberties,politicalrightsand pressfreedomhasemergedasanalternativetotheneoliberalmodelinstitutionalizedinthe BrettonWoodssystem,especiallyamongotherautocraticgovernments.However,Chineseleaders neverassertedthatthereisanexportableChinaModelbecauseofinternaldebatesandmassive challengesstillahead.Regardless,itsresultsineconomicdevelopmentandregimestabilitythusfar haveundoubtedlycharmedmanypolicymakersinotherdevelopingnations.Thisgrowthatall costmodernizationpathwayhasledtoacontemporarysocietyandpolitythatisinsearchofa unifyingideologyintheabsenceofanyconventionalformofsocialismoranythingcloseto democraticliberalism.ThispostideologicalvacuumopenedupforChineseintellectualsand policymakersaliketoconstructaNeoConfucianismasonewaytolegitimateitslackof democratization.43JustasthePartyonceattemptedtopurgeallancientthoughtduringtheCultural RevolutiontoseducethepopulaceintoMaoism,itisnowusingConfucianismlargelyforpolitical purposes.Thereis,however,seriousscholarshipandanalysisonhowclassicalChinesethought doesexplainthecountrystrajectoryingovernance,withoutmakingnormativeclaims. Nevertheless,anycomprehensionofaChinamodelisstilllargelyaworkinprogress,associety itselfgrappleswithidentityissues,andthegovernmentisstillfindingwaystoutilizecultureasa unifierevenasitscorruption,censorshipandcorporatismstiflemanysociallydrivensoftpower sourcessuchascivilsociety,artandinnovation. Chinaseconomicrenaissanceisalsoaneyecatchingexemplarformanycountries,

especiallythosewhohavefailedtoovercomedeepseatedbarrierstowarddevelopmentunderthe Westerncentriceconomicsystem.Asnotedpreviously,formerTIMEeditorJoshuaCooperRamo claimsthatChinaseconomicmarveloffersthedevelopingworldablueprintforsuccess,andcoined

43

Bell 2008: pg.24

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Tsoi, Samuel

thetermBeijingConsensus,asthealternativeifnottheantithesistotheWashingtonConsensus. Insteadofapostcolonialpatternofinternationaldevelopmentwhichfavorsastandardizedshock therapyapproachtoimplementcapitalisticpoliciessuchasmarketreform,austerityandfreetrade, thecompellingachievementsofChinashowthatoperatingoutsideoftheWashingtonConsensusis possibleifnotpreferable.TheBeijingConsensusachievessuccessthroughexperimentation, maintainingpoliticalstability,andexercisingselfdeterminationindomesticandforeignaffairs.44 Measuringhowthisattractivenesstranslatesonthegroundiselusive.Globalattitudes pollingonlyrevealsaglimpseofthepopularityoftheBeijingConsensusoftheChinaModel, althoughpublicopinionplusstatementsbyleadersandpublicintellectualscanbetelling.More notably,theChinesegovernmentneverofficiallyembracedthisterm,insteademphasizes developmentbasedonacountrysowncharacteristicsandwillingnesstoinnovateandexperiment, graduallyintegratingwiththeglobalsystemwhilekeepingforeigninterferenceatbay. Nevertheless,itisclearthatChinasastonishingprogressinthepastdecadesisleadingtoa rethinkingofbothdevelopmenteconomicsandtherelationshipbetweeneconomicandpolitical freedoms.45 TheChinesedevelopmentalrecipeofcombiningexportledgrowth,stateledindustrial planning,massiveinvestmentininfrastructureandmonetaryandfiscalselfdetermination,has cultivatedlegitimacyfortheCommunistParty.Thecrackdownonthe1989TiananmenSquare proteststhatlefthundredsdeadatthehandsofChinasownmilitary,whichwasalowpointinthe governmentssoftpowerathomeandabroad,isamemorythatisnowburied,revisedand forgotteninofficialrhetoricandpropaganda.Instead,thegovernmentremindspeoplethatthepast threedecadesofreformhasliftedmorethanhalfabillionpeopleoutofpoverty,improvedlife expectancyrates,healthandeducationaloutcomes.Literacyrateshaveimprovedfrom66percent

44 45

Ramo 2004, pg.3-4 Halper 2010: pg. 7

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Tsoi, Samuel

to94percentbetween1982and2008.46Infantmortalityfellfrom80deathsper1,000birthsto17 deathsinacomparableperiod.47Inthelastfewyears,Chinahasbecomethelargestmarketfor mobilephonesandcars,andalsothecountrywiththemostinternetusers.Thisremarkablechange inonegenerationhasgiventheChinesemodeltremendousattractionabroadandrelativestability athome.However,theequationisshiftingandthemodelitselfisatacrossroadwhichcouldundo itsgainsandrequireseriouspoliticalreforms. TheBeijingConsensus,assomeanalystshavenoted,isneitheruniquetoChinanordoesit enjoyunanimousagreementamongallofitspoliticalandintellectualelite,albeitacentralizedand highlyconformistleadership.ItisalsovulnerableassomeoftheconditionsforChinaseconomic miraclewane,suchasawellspringoflowskilledlaborandaninsatiableglobalconsumermarket.48 WhenDengXiaopingusheredintheopeningandreformerain1978,Chinawasnotthe firstmoverinadoptingastrategyofprioritizingstateledeconomicgrowthovercorresponding democraticreforms.Infact,itwastheAsianTigersofJapan,SouthKorea,TaiwanandSingapore whohadliberalizedtheirmarketswithoutimmediatelyorsimultaneousundergoing democratization.Infact,inaconversationwithJerryRawlings,aformerGhanaianpresident,Deng sated,Pleasedonotcopyourmodel.Ifwehaveanyexperiencetointroduce,thatisthatwemake policesaccordingtoourownconditions.49Furthermore,theAsianTigersgovernmentsplayeda centralroleinkeyindustriesandpickedwhichsectorstogrowandprotect.Onecancertainly identifymultipartyelectionsinplacessuchasJapan,SouthKoreaandTaiwanasvindicationforthe Westernmodernizationtheoryofdemocratizationandeconomicdevelopment,buttherewere significantperiodsofstatecontrolofinfantindustriesthatcameattheexpenseoffreemarketsand civilsocietydevelopment.PerhapsChina,withitssheersize,diversityandscale,explainsitsslower pathrelativewithitssmallerandmorehomogenousAsianneighborsintermsofdemocratic
China.org.cn 9/14/2009 CIA World Factbook 48 The Economist 1/21/2012 49 Men & Barton 2011: pg. 180
46 47

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Tsoi, Samuel

reform,butitisindeednotuniqueinitsapproachsofarrelativetothecrucialearlyyearsof developmentintheAsianTigersnations.Perhapsmostinterestingly,thisalsospawnedaheated debateovertheexceptionalityofAsianValues,ledbyleaderssuchasSingaporesLeeKuanYew (whosethnicallyChinese),whoarguedthattheregionpossessesauniquesetofinstitutionsand politicalideologieswhichreflectedConfuciancultureofhierarchyandtopdowngovernance.In otherwords,theChinamodelappearedindiscourseoutsideofChinabeforetheBeijingConsensus becamerelevant.Despitenotbeingthefirstmover,thetransformationofasocietyofabillionplus peoplewithsuchcontinuityinhistoryandgeopoliticalimportancemakesChinauniqueinscaleif notinsubstance. WithinChina,theexceptionalityofitsdevelopmentmodelisalsodebated.WhentheBeijing Consensusfirstemergedasasalientdiscussion,itgarneredwidespreadmediacoverageand academicinvestigationsinChina.Overall,amainstreamopinionemergedthatwelcomedthenotion ofaBeijingConsensusasacomplementtoChinasachievementsanditspossibilityofinternational applicability.Chinesescholarshavetendedtoregardthesereceptiveevaluationsasasignof Chinasincreasingsoftpower.50Somealsopointtothefactthattherelativelyhighapprovalratings ofthecentralgovernmentbodeswellforChinasincreasinglymoralauthorityviaitspolitical leadership. Lately,ChinesescholarsareattemptingtodistancetheChinamodelfromtheAsianTigers byhighlightingnuancessuchasChinasactivepursuitofforeigndirectinvestment,initialpublic offeringsofChinesecompaniesandsignificantmarketliberalizationsaspreconditionsforjoining theWTO.IncontrasttoitsfearofaffirmingaChinathreattheoryabroad,someelitesinChinaare motivatedtoembracetheBeijingConsensustopacifytheclaimsofChinasinevitablepathway towarddemocratization,similartoSouthKorea,Japanandmostcontroversially,itsbreakaway provinceTaiwan.Moreover,theaftermathoftheAsianFinancialCrisisduring19971998spurred
50

Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 463

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Tsoi, Samuel

severecriticismsovertheEastAsianstateledcapitalismmodel.ItistheChinesegovernments interesttodrumuptheadaptabilityofChinasdevelopmentmodeltopreempttheclaimsthat Chinastrajectoryisunsustainable. Ontheotherhand,asBeijingamasseshardpowerbasedonthecurrentpolitical arrangement,thecollateraldamageinsocietysuchasthecrushingofdissidentsisincreasingly recognizedbythegrassroots,especiallyproliferatedviatheinternetdespiteheavycensorship.A growingnumberofgrievancesagainstcorruptionoflocalofficials,jailingofwellknownactivists andpublicinterestlawyers,andcensorshipofpoliticallysensitivetopicsarereachingaboiling point.Thereisevenadebatewithinthepoliticalelitethatischallengingthenotionofaunified consentofonepartydominance.Shortlyafterthe2010NobelPeacePrizewasawardedtothefirst everChineserecipient,LiuXiaobo,whowasalreadyjailedbythegovernment,arareshowof defianceeruptedinthepublicdialog.Twentythreeformerseniorofficialswithreformist reputationssignedanopenlettershamingthePartyssuppressionofdissentandfiercecensorship asdisrespecttotheChineseConstitutionandthefreedomofspeech.51Inthiscontextofsubstantial discontent,theConfucianidealofattractionviamoralauthorityandpoliticalleadershiphasmixed resultsinternally,althoughaswewillsee,yetcontinuestoattractssomesocietiesandgovernments abroad. Still,therearesomewhobelieveinChinaspotentialasagreatpowerbyexemplar.This ideal,inspiredbyancientChinesethought,ispromotedbytheinfluentialscholar,YanXuetongof TsinghuaUniversity.Yan,alsoawellregardedpoliticalcommentatorinChinaandtheWest,argues thatpoliticalleadershipisthekeytonationalpowerandthatmoralityisanessentialpartof politicalleadership.52DrawingfromgroundbreakingresearchonChinesephilosophyofancient thinkerssuchasMencius,ConfuciusandSunTzu,Yanbelievesthatwhileeconomicandmilitary poweriswhatmakesanationstrong,dominanceisachievedmainlybymorallyinformedpolitical
51 52

Barr 2011, pg. 14 Yan 2010: pg. 2

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Tsoi, Samuel

leadership.TheselfproclaimedrealistcombinestheChineseemphasisonmoralityinpolitical leadershipoverinstitutionalvirtuesorideologicaltenets.EchoingConfuciusandSunTzu,Yan arguesthathumaneauthority(asopposedtohegemonyortyranny)beginsbycreatingadesirable modelathomethatinspirespeopleabroad.53HedoesnotspelloutwhetherChinashould democratize,buturgesbothChinaandtheU.S.toexercisemoralleadershipinaddressing materialism,inequalityandcorruption.InsteadofcompetingwiththeU.S.oneconomicormilitary terms,whereYanacknowledgesChinaisfarbehindon,hebelievesChinacanbecompetitivewith theU.S.onmoralleadership.Essentially,thiscontestisaracetothetop,butonlywithonewinner ofhumanitysheartsandmindsthatcanexhibitthehighestqualityofhumanauthority.Again,Yan doesnotfavordemocracyorautocraticsystems,butstressesthatleadersshouldbechosen accordingtovirtueorwisdom.Thisisaseriouschallengeforanysystem,butYanalsodoesnot dismissdemocracyasunChinese. AsrevealedthroughtheanalysisofChineseclassics,democracyisnotcategorically discredited,butneitherisitacorevirtue.Thelegitimacyofthegoverningelite,whethertheyare electedviaaonemanonevotesystem,oraselectionprocessbyafew,stilldependsonthe relationshipbetweenrulersandtheruledmarkedbymutualcommitmentandtrust.54Political authority,therefore,mustbejustifiedbyitsservicetothewellbeingofpeople.Chinesegovernance ideals,asseenthroughancientlenses,doesnotaddresstherelationshipbetweentheindividualand publicinstitutionssuchasgovernmentanddemocracy,butitmakesaveryimportantdistinction apartfromWesternnotionofrights.Therecruitmentofleaders,whetherthroughgrassroots electionortopdownselection,mustrecruitthemostvirtuouspeople,somethingChina,theU.S. andvirtuallyeverynationwillbecompetingforalongtime.
53 54

Yan 2011 Chan J. 2007

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 Figure3:LevelofRegimeSupport,byEducationalLevel AsianBarometerSurvey2008PeoplesRepublicofChina:N=5098

Tsoi, Samuel

Whateveritsfaultsmaybe,ourpoliticalsystemisstillthebestforcountryscurrentcondition.

OnewaytoexploretheattractivenessoftheChinaModelistolookatpolicyactionsofother statesandcommentators.Indeed,besidesotherauthoritariangovernmentsandotherswithdeep seatedresentmentfortheWashingtonConsensus,therearevoicesfromtheWestthathave expressedfondnessoftheChinaModel,suggestingthateconomicfreedomisnotnecessary jeopardizedbythelackofpoliticalfreedom.NewYorkTimescolumnistThomasFriedmanwasmet withseverecriticismfromfellowAmericanswhenheadmittedthathehascastanenviouseyeon theauthoritarianChinesepoliticalsystem,whereleaderscan,anddo,justorderthatproblemsbe solved.55 Deviatingfromorthodoxmodernizationmodelappearstobeinfluencingthedevelopment pathsofmanycountries,signsthattheChinaModelisasourceofsoftpower,atleastincertain contexts.Onegeneralindicatorisglobalattitudespolling,manyofwhichareconductedbyWestern institutions.A2010BBCpollshowsattitudestowardChinaremaindivided,whiletheUShas slightlyrecovereditspopularityundertheObamapresidency.Someofthecountrieswithmainly
55

Friedman

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Tsoi, Samuel

positiveviewsofChinaareKenya,Nigeria,Egypt,GhanaandPakistan.TheUnitedStateswas amongthosewithmostlynegativeviewstowardChinawhilesomeinEurope,AsiaandLatin Americahadmixedviews. Figure4:2010BBCPoll:GlobalViews Anecdotally,someleadersinothercountriesaretakingactionsakintoChinas,whileothers havepraisedorcriticizedtheChinaModel.RussianPresidentPutinseemstobefollowingthe Chinesepathbycensoringjournalists,harassingactivistsandunderminingdemocracywhilegiving thestateincreasedpoweroverkeyindustries.OtherformerSovietrepublics,suchasKazakhstan, UzbekistanandTurkmenistan,areinspiredbyChina,andincreasinglyrejectingeconomic developingideasfromtheWorldBankandIMF.56ThisaffinitytowardtheChinaModelbysomeof itsmostimmediateneighborshasshapedafavorableconditionforChinatoleadamultilateral

56

French, New York Times, 3/24/2004

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Tsoi, Samuel

organization,theShanghaiCooperationOrganization,oneofthefewinAsiawithoutsignificantUS participation,atrendtobeexaminedinsectiononforeignpolicy. TheChinaModelhasitsappealaswellinSouthAsia.IndianPrimeMinisterManmohan SinghsaidthatIndiashouldlooktoChinaasarolemodelforeconomicgrowthandglobaltrade.57 Furtheroverseas,policymakersinLatinAmericaarealsocaptivatedbytheChinaModel.Former BrazilianPresidentLuladaSilvasentstudyteamstoBeijingtolearnfromtheChinesestates implementationofeconomicpolicies,urbanplanningandinfrastructureprojects.InAfrica, authoritarianleadersseektomaintaintheircontrolthroughmarketmechanismstoalleviate poverty.58 IntheMiddleEast,theChinesemodelhasbeenembracedbyIranianleaders,even becomingoneofthemainthemesofamajorcandidate,formerpresidentAkbarHashemi Rafsanjani,inthe2005presidentialelections.EvenNorthKoreahascautiouslyadoptedcertain reformsofChina,oneofitsfewallies.In2002,KimJongilintroducedlimitedmarketstyle incentivesintoitsplannedeconomythatallowedexportprocessingzonesatitsborders.Perhaps oneofthemostevidentcasesoftheattractivenessoftheChinaModelislocatedacrossthePRCs southeasternborders.LaosandVietnamarefulladoptingtheBeijingConsensus.WhileLaos movestowardtheChinesemodelofmarketbasedauthoritarianism,Vietnaminsistsonplacing stabilitybeforepoliticalreformafteritsadoptionofChinesestyleeconomicreform. ThereisevidencethattheChinaModel,althoughnotunique,isattractiveenoughtobe consideredanalternativeformanydevelopingcountries,ascapturedinglobalopinionpollsanda cursorylookatpolicydecisionsofnationsthathaveimplicitlyorexplicitlycreditedtheChinaModel asaninspiration.Ofcourse,opinionpollsandtheanecdotesarealsoinfluencedbysoftandhard powervariablessuchasculturalexports,educationalexchanges,militaryassistanceorbusiness ties.Itisalsodependentoncriticalvariablessuchastheothercountryspoliticalsystemor
57 58

India Daily 1/23/2005 McLaughlin & Truscott 2005

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Tsoi, Samuel

relationshipwiththeWest.TheneteffectoftheattractionforceoftheChinaModelisdifficultto capture,anditisatbestpositivelydistributedincertainregions,withpredictablerepulsions elsewhere.JosephNye,forexample,recentlycontendedthatChinaisweakonsoftpower,mainly callingoutitsinsecuritiesaboutWesternculturalhegemony,dismissingitsattractioninautocratic orcorruptstatesaswellaspointingtoChinasstrangleholdonitscivilsocietyasthebiggest liability.59TheChinaModelhasobviousadmirablecomponents,andtheyaregarneringsupport andbusinessdealsfromplaceswhereAmericasstandingisnegative,whichinturnfuelsChinas economicengine.However,thissetofinfluencesareincreasinglybeingunderminedor overshadowedbydeficitsandinternalcontradictionsoftheChinaModel.TheChineseleadership understandsthesustainabilityoftheChinaModelandthatthesoftpowerassetsitgainedare hanginginthebalance.MoralauthorityandpoliticalleadershipwilldependonhowtheParty restructuresitsmonopolyonpowerandbegintoletcivilsocietycreateorconvertthoseassetsinto persuasiveinfluence,muchakintotheUSsocialmovementsandculturethatgenerateglobal admirationandimitationdespiteallofitsflawsandcontradictionsinitspolity.

Director Confucius: Culture, Education and Public Diplomacy

"Culturehasbecomeamoreandmoreimportantsourceofnationalcohesionandcreativity andafactorofgrowingsignificanceinthecompetitioninoverallnationalstrengthWemust enhancecultureaspartofthesoftpowerofourcountrytobetterguaranteethepeople'sbasic culturalrightsandinterests. PresidentHuJintaoatthe16thChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee AsweseeinthesoftpowerassessmentofChinasgovernance,themixedresultsshowthe

needforBeijingtojustifytheChinaModelviaculturalvalues,pacifyfearsforeigncountrieshaveof China,ortoutilizeculturetocompensateforthedeficitsofitsinherentsystemandbuildnew sources.SincecultureisatthecoreofChineseconceptionofsoftpower,publicdiplomacybecomes

59

Nye 2012

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Tsoi, Samuel S

partofitsgra andstrategytobuildsoftpowerasset tsandconver rtthemintousefultools. amajorp Publicdip plomacy,acc cordingtoon neacceptedd definition,ist thecultivati ionbygover rnmentsofpu ublic opinionin nothernatio ons;bycultiv vatingthispu ublicopinion nabroad,stat tescanmore eeffectively pursueth heirnationalinterests.60JosephNyeseesthisasc convertingso oftpowerassetsintoacti ions, anddescr ribespublicd diplomacyas sakeycomp ponentofany ynationsgra andstrategythatincludes force,dip plomacyandcommunicat tions.Nyealsodescribes spowerasev vermorediffu usedamong othernon nstateactors,andaglobalinformatio onalagefacil litatesociety ytosocietyc communicati ions aswellas sNGOsociet tycommunicationsbeyon ndthegovern nmenttogov vernmentdip plomacy,as illustratedinthebar rversusstar diagram.(F Figure5) elsofDiplom macy61 Figure5:TwoMode CabinetDiplomacy PublicDiplomacy s IOs s/NGOs/nonstateactors s IOs/nonstateactors A GovtA G GovtB tAGovt tB Govt

Society yA SocietyB

SocietyASociety yB Thelogicofpu ublicdiplom macyisthatw whenacountr rysculturei isappealing,citizensof anotherc countrywillp pressurethe eirgovernme enttoactintheinterestsofthepopula arnation, exhibiting gthesoftpow weroftheso ourcecountr ry.ForChina a,thestatest tillplaysacentralrolein driving,c controllingan ndfacilitatin ngtheseexchangesacross ssocietiesth hroughthede epartmentso of publicity, ,culture,and deducation.Thispresent tsbothsoftp powerassets sandliabilitiesinhow involvedthegovernm mentisindriv vingculture.Ononehan nd,Chinaispouringfundi ingintopubl lic diplomac cyeffortsand dlearningthe ewaysofglo obalcommun nications.On ntheotherhand,itisalso o
60 61

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ultrasensitiveaboutthemessageitwantstosend,whichsometimesbackfiresandstiflesthesoft powerpotentialofselfcriticism,civilsocietyandordinarycitizens. TheveryconceptofpublicdiplomacyhasonlybeenrecentlyembracedbytheChinese governmentfromwhatwasknownaswaixuan(),orexternalpropaganda.ChinasPublicity Department,knownthroughouttheColdWarasthePropagandaDepartment,seeksfivemain objectives:publicizingChinasassertionstotheoutsideworld,formingadesirableimageofthe state,issuingrebuttalstodistortedoverseasreportsaboutChina,improvingtheinternational environmentsurroundingChina,andexertinginfluenceonthepolicydecisionsofforeigncountries. TopromoteChineseculture,thePRCalsofacilitatedculturalexchanges,especiallyinthe developingworld.Chineseofficialsarepullingouttheredcarpetforofficialsfromacrosstheworld, andhostingeventstogatherpeoplefromotherwalksoflifetobestunderstandtheinnerworkings ofeachotherscountries.Thailandprovidesanexampleofthispublicdiplomaticstrategy.Chinahas illustrateditsunderstandingofThailandbyinvitingartists,educators,businessmenfromThai societytoChinatofostercontinualrelationships.BeijinghascreateditsversionofthePeaceCorps, knownastheChinaAssociationofYouthVolunteers,sendingtheseyoungambassadorstoplaces suchasLaos,Ethiopia,Burma,andmanyotherstospreadtheattractionoftheChineseculture.62 EducationalExchanges ChinahasbeenaggressiveinpromotingthestudyofChineseallovertheworld.Withan annualbudgetof$200million,theChinaNationalOfficeforTeachingChineseasaForeign LanguagecommonlyknownasHanban()haslaunchedalanguagepromotionnetworkto dramaticallyincreasethenumberofforeignersstudyingChinese.

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ThecenterpieceofspreadingculturethrougheducationistheproliferationofConfucius Institutes.Departingfromitspredecessor,theConfuciusFoundation,whichtargetselitesinother countries,theConfuciusInstitutespromoteChineselanguageandcultureatapopularlevel Bytheendof2010,therehavebeen322ConfuciusInstitutesand369ConfuciusClassrooms establishedin96countries.TheConfuciusInstitutesprovideChineselanguageandcultural resourceslearning,althoughoftennotinconjunctiontohostinstitutionscurriculum.Modeledafter theBritishCouncil,theGoetheInstituteofGermanyandtheAllianceFrancaise,thenewnetworkof ConfuciusInstitutesoperateviaawiderangeofarrangementswithothergovernmentsorhost universities(privateorpublic),andhasconsiderableamountsoffinancialindependenceafterthe initialperiodfundedbytheHanbanorjointfundedwithforeignagencies.AlthoughtheInstitutes havethesincerepurposeofteachingChineselanguageandculture,theyhavebeenaccusedof implementingapoliticalagenda.Certainly,beinglargelyfundedthroughtheCommunistParty, theseinstitutesareoftenseenasthePRCscharmoffensivetopresentakinderandgentlerimageof Chinatotheoutsideworld.ByteachingtheMainlandssimplifiedcharacters,usingBeijings preferredaccentofMandarinChineseandutilizingtextbooksfromaproBeijingperspective,rather thanthetraditionalChinesecharactersusedinTaiwan,HongKongorotherDiasporacommunities, theinstitutesservetoexpandtheideaofoneChinaandBeijingscentrality. Foreignstudentenrolmenthasalsoseendramaticgrowth,withthehelpofstrategicand generousscholarshipsofferedbytheChinesegovernment,totaling$800RMB,or$122USD. Studentscamefrom194countriescametostudyinChina's620universities,researchinstitutes andeducationalinstitutionsinChina,hittingarecordhighofmorethan260,000in2010(excluding thosefromHongKong,TaiwanandMacau).Over75%ofstudentsarefromAsia,withSouthKorea andJapanconsistentlysendingthemost.63Agrowingnumberofstudents,though,arefrom SoutheastAsia,aregionthataccommodatesthemajorityofoverseasChineseandhasacenturies
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oldhistoryofChineselanguageeducation.StudentsfromVietnam,forexample,haveincreased dramatically.WhileamajorinfluxofinternationalstudentsinChinaisdrivenbythecountrys boomingeconomy,thisdramaticgrowthinforeignenrolmentsalsoreflectsChinasroleasthe culturalepicenterofAsia.AccordingtotheMinistryofEducation,overthreequartersofforeign studentswenttoChinatostudyacademicdisciplinesofgeneralculturalconcern(Chineselanguage, arts,history,philosophyandtraditionalChinesemedicine).64 Itistooearlytogaugetheinfluenceofthisacademictrainingonfuturegenerationsof foreignelites,buttheirexperienceinChinawilllikelyopentheirmindstoChineseworldviewsand interests,justasUSuniversitieshavetrainedcountlessforeignheadsofstateandarestillthe preferreddestinationforchildrenofforeigndignitaries,especiallyinacademicprestigeobsessed China.Asof2005,therewere30formerinternationalstudentsinChinawhonowholdminister levelpositionsintheirhomecountries,withmorethan10servingasambassadorstoChina.In addition,morethan120areseniorfacultymembersatuniversitiesintheirhomecountries.While thosewhoenterofficialdomareexpectedtohaveabetterunderstandingofChineseinterests, seniorscholarsaremorelikelytonurturetheinterestoftheirstudentsinChina.65 TheHanbanhasinthepastyearslaunchedrelentlesscampaignstopropagateitsgreat

achievementsinreachingouttotheworldthroughculturalexchanges.Ithasbeenclaimedthat throughitsConfuciusInstitutesandpartnershipwithforeignuniversities,overonemillionpeople arelearningChinese;inmanyAsiancountries,Chinesehasbecomethesecondlargestforeign languagenexttoEnglish.AninternetbasedConfuciusInstitutehasalsolaunchedrecently,andthe Hanbanisdispatchingadelegationofhighprofileacademicstotourtheworldgivinglecturesabout Chineseculture.

64 65

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OneofthechargesofWesternculturalintrusioninChinawastheVoiceofAmericaradio station,upsettingmanyofficialsthatprocapitalistandproAmericanagendasarebeingpushed throughtheairwaves.Inthebackdropofthatsuspicion,theChinesearenowlaunchingtheirown newsmediaandbroadcastingcampaigntocompetewiththelikesofCNN,BBCandAlJazeera.The governmentisinvestinginthismediasystemtospreadtheChinesecultureandpointsofviewinan interconnectedworld.StartingwiththeXinhuanewsagency,whichprovidesnewsfeedstomultiple print,onlineandbroadcastoutlets,thestateownedoutfithasexpandeditsinternationalcoverage. ThePeoplesDailyalsoprintsoverseaseditionsinmultiplelanguages,andtheMinistryofForeign AffairshasexpandedandmadetheappealofChinesestatetelevisionCCTVmoresophisticated,and ChinaRadioInternationalhasincreaseditsbroadcastinginEnglishto24hoursaday.Thismedia diplomacyapparatus,althoughwellfunded,willfacechallengesinwinningsignificantaudiences abroadbecauseofstrictgovernmentrestrictions.Forthosewhoaretuningin,Chinesemediahas beenusefulforthePRCgovernmenttointroduceChinesedevelopmentandpoliciestotheworld, andexplaintootherstheChinaModelofmodernizationanditsclaimsofapeacefulrise.Itisalso valuableinhelpingintroducenewaudiencestothevirtuesofChinesecivilization.Perhapsthemost dauntingchallengeforChinesemediasglobalambitions,whichalsospeakstoitsvulnerabilities andliabilities,isthatthemessageishardtosellevenwhenthereisanarmyofmessengers.Being inacompetitiveenvironment,withothernationsengaginginthesameefforttocontrolnarratives, anynegativeeventsinChinawillalsobemagnifiedviaoutletsoutsideofChinesecontrol. Moreover,ChinafacesanEnglishdominatedframeworkanddiscoursethatfocusesmoreon controversiesandlessonlongtermachievements.Leadinguptothe2008Olympics,thetorchrelay thatattractedproTibetprotestors,activistsforDarfurandotherswaswidelycoveredinthe Westernpress,whichgalvanizedacallforboycottingthegameshostedinBeijing.Similarly, coverageofChinasengagementwiththenotoriousregimeofRobertMugabeinZimbabwealso

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generatedsignificantforeigncriticism.ThelatestattentionovertheCommunistPartyspoliticalin fightingthatresultedinapurgingofatopofficial,BoXilai,andtheescapeofthemuchrespected activistChenGuangchengshowsChinasinabilitytocontrolglobalpublicopinion.66 Art,ArchitectureandCinema Aswithnewsbroadcasts,theChinesepostureinusingmediatoprimarilypromotea

positiveimageandprotectthePartysinterests.Ittriestobalanceboththeambitiontocreatehigh qualityproductionsandthenecessitytocontrolthemessage.Incinema,Chineselanguagefilms haveachievedprominenceandrecognitionabroad.However,successfulfilmsabroadoftendonot translatetosuccessathome,orevenacceptance.Manyprominentfilmmakershaveeither producedfilmsthatwerecensoredathomebutpraisedabroad,orhavebeencollaboratingwith artistsoutsideofChina.Chinesefilms,especiallythosedepictingancientChina,haveopenedup Chineseculturetoabroadbaseofaudiences,mostnotablythesuccessofCrouchingTiger,Hidden Dragon,whichisthehighestgrossingnonEnglishfilm.However,thefilmpresentedatellinglens intothesoftpowerdilemmasofChina.ThefilmwasdirectedbyAngLeefromTaiwan,withactors andproducersfromHongKong,andhasaperfectblendofmartialartstheatrics,ancientcivilization andnoncontroversialnarrative.Besidesthatblockbustersuccess,thereweremanyarthousehits withhardhittingportrayalsofsocialissuesthatwereimmediatelycensored(butavailableinthe domesticundergroundmarket)andoftenrecognizedinforeignfilmfestivals.Meanwhile,many filmmakersarepushingtheboundarybycreatingfilmsthathavehiddenpoliticalmeaningbut circumventcensors.ExamplesincludeZhangYimou,whodirectedcriticallyacclaimedfilmsthat werecensored,butalsowasinvitedtodirecttheOlympicsopeningceremonies. Thestructurethatenclosedtheceremonies,dubbedtheBirdsNest,wascodesignedby

AiWeiwei,byfarChinasmostfamousandvivaciousartist.Aialsoproducesedgyphotographs,
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Tsoi, Samuel

consequencesofChinasmaddashtowardmodernization.Perhapshisbestknownactivitiesarehis runinwithauthorities,prolificblogging,andactivismafterthe2008SichuanEarthquake.His writings,tweetsandphotographicrantsareoftenfiercelycriticalofgovernmentmismanagement andindifferencetohumanrights.Inastuntafterastudioopeningwashaltedabruptlyby authorities,Aistagedabanquetservingrivercrabs,whichisahomonyminChinesefortheterm hexie,orharmony().ItwasanintentionalreferencetothebuzzwordusedbyPresidentHu JintaoandtheestablishmenttobrandChinaspoliticalgoalsofstability,whichwascooptedby netizensasaeuphemismforcensorship:meaningwhensomethinghasbeenharmonized,itis censored. ItisinthisspacethatChinascreativeclasshaswalkedthetightropebetweennationalism andfreedomofexpression,andwhichrevealsthestatesfranticorchestratingofhowChinais perceived.ManyofChinasculturaleliteshavebeendeployedatonepointbythestatetopresenta successfulandpositiveChina,presentedinadsandshort filmslaunchedinconjunctionwiththeBeijingOlympics. Itisdifficulttomeasurethesuccessofthesesoft powertools,butaggregatemetricsinmeasuringcultural andeducationaleffortsshowhowChinasprojectionofits cultureisperceivedabroad.AccordingtotheChicago CouncilonGlobalAffairs,perhapsoneofthemostlarge scalestudiestodateonsoftpowerrevealshowChinese cultureisperceivedinothercountries.Respondents showadeeprespectforChinasculturalheritage,but generallyratetheinfluenceofChinesepopularculture includingmusic,clothing,andcuisineasmiddlingona0 Figure6:InfluenceofChineseCulture
AsiaSoftPowerSurvey2008,ChicagoCouncil onGlobalAffairs

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to10scale(Americansrateitatameanscoreof4.6,Japaneseat5.1,SouthKoreansat4.8, Indonesiansat6.5,andVietnameseat7.6).AnothermeasurebytheInstituteofGovernmentinthe U.K.showsthatChinasinvestmentinculturalandpublicdiplomacyhaspositivereturns,albeit relativelylagsbehindJapanandU.S.Thisstudyaggregatesthefinalscore(2highest,0lowest) basedonarangeofindicatorssuchasnumberoftourists,sportingsuccessinworldcompetitions, numberoflistenersofstatesponsoredmediaandthenumberofspeakersofitslanguage.The studyfindsChinasrecentsoftpowercampaigncorrelateswithanuptickofculturalinfluence. Figure7:NetIndexofSoftPowerResults

TheNewPersuaders,InstituteofGovernment/Monocle,2010

Diplomat Confucius: Multilateralism and Foreign Aid

Sixhundredyearsago,ZhengHe,afamedChinesenavigatoroftheMingDynasty,headeda largeconvoywhichsailedacrosstheoceanandreachedtheeastcoastofAfricafourtimes. TheybroughttotheAfricanpeopleamessageofpeaceandgoodwill,notswords,guns, plunderorslavery.FormorethanonehundredyearsinChinasmodernhistory,theChinese peopleweresubjectedtocolonialaggressionandoppressionbyforeignpowersandwent throughsimilarsufferingandagonythatthemajorityofAfricancountriesendured. PresidentHuJintao,UniversityofPretoria,SouthAfrica,2007

AsChinacontinuestodrumupthenotionofharmonioussocietyastheidealindomestic

affairs,peacefulriseorpeacefuldevelopmenthasbecomethecatchallmantraforChinas foreignpolicy,theoppositefaceofthesamenationalinterestcoin.Together,theprojectionof virtuesofharmonyandpeacearewhatcharacterizesChinassoftpowerstrategy.However,Chinas

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directdiplomaticengagementwiththeworldisbyfarthemostdeliberateandcontroversialuseof softpower,whichoftenmuddleswithhardpowerassetssuchaseconomicinducementinsteadof cooptationandideationalinfluence.Similarly,theupwardspendingofChinasmilitaryandits permanentseatontheUNSecurityCouncilhavealsocomplicateshowdifficultitistodisaggregate influencebasedonhardorsoftpowerwhenitcomestoChinasforeignpolicies. Overall,consistentwiththeclassicalChinesenotionofpower,foreignpoliciescan contributetosoftpowerwhentheyareseenaslegitimateandhavingmoralauthority,andwhen theyenhancetheabilitytosetagendasinamannerthatisconducivetosolvingtheworldsmost pressingproblems.UnderMaoZedong,Chineseforeignpolicywasoftenframedincontroversial andunappealingtermsinanattempttoexportrevolutiontotheThirdWorld,italsoseesitselfasa victimofWesternimperialismandanagenttooverturnWesterndominance.Infact,muchofthe affinitytowardChina,especiallyinpartsofAfricaandLatinAmerica,wasbasedonthepost colonialnotionofThirdWorldsolidarity,ofwhichmanyseeChinaasanideologicalbeacon.This radicalforeignpolicyculminatedinthe1960s,whenRedGuardsburneddowntheBritishEmbassy andhumiliatedSovietdiplomatsinBeijing,whilemanyofChinasAsianneighborsbrutallycrushed Beijingsupportedmovements.Suchradicalizedforeignpolicyconfirmedtheimageofan ideologicallythreateningChina.ThisforeignpolicyradicalismwasreversedsinceDengXiaoping tookthehelm.UnderthesecondgenerationofCommunistleaderssuchasDengandJiangZemin,a lowprofilestrategymadewayforthecurrentcadreofmoresophisticatedandconfidentleaders anddiplomatswhobringsavvytotheinternationalmultilateraldiplomacyandamoreconstructive approachtowardregionalandglobalaffairs.Recently,ithasalsorevivedthestoryoffourteenth centuryadmiralZhengHe,whoexploredmoreforeignlandsthanChristopherColumbuswithout thetaintofcolonialambitions.TheChinesenavalfleetmadejourneystoEastAfricaand throughouttheAsiaPacific,andestablishedculturalanddiplomaticrelationshipswiththosefar awaysocieties.ThisaccountstrikesattheheartofEuropeancolonialguiltandplacesChinaona

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moralhighgroundtothwarttheChinathreattheoriesandchargesofbeingtheneocolonialist,as describedinHuJintaosspeechinSouthAfricaquotedattheoutsetofthissection. Armedwiththosenarrativesandclaimsofgoodintentions,Beijingnowseeksastable externalenvironmentsotheCommunistPartycanfocusonitsdomesticsocioeconomic development,reassuringChinasneighborsaboutthecountrysgrowingstrength,andpromoting generallyconstructiverelationswiththeworldsmajorpowers,especiallytheU.S.67Oneofthemost interestingresultsofthispeacefulriseparadigmisBeijingswillingnesstosettleoralleviatelong standingterritorialdisputeswithnearlyallofitsneighbors.Inhisextensivestudyonthisquestion, TaylorFraveldemonstratesthatChinahasfrequentlyusedcooperativemeanstomanageits territorialconflicts,revealingapatternofbehaviorfarmorecomplexthanmanyportray. AccordingtoFravelsstudy,Chinasettled17ofthe23territorialdisputeswithother governmentsasof2005,includingsettlementsoverthepastdecadewithRussia,Kazakhstan, KyrgyzstanandTajikistan.Moreover,ithasofferedsubstantialcompromisesinmostofthese settlements,usuallyreceivinglessthan50%ofthecontestedland.68However,ithasrecentlybeen criticizedasabullyintheSouthChinaSea,squanderinggoodwillithadgeneratedwithVietnam, MalaysiaandthePhilippinesafteritsignedagreementsonseveraljointoilexplorationprojects.69 ChinaisalsoengagedincontinualspatewithJapanoverislandsthathasbeenpartofahistorical rivalry. PerhapsthemostremarkabledevelopmentisthedramaticincreaseinChinasmembership ininternationalinstitutionsandorganizations.Since1994,Chinahasdepartedfromitslowprofile postureanddistrustofmultilateralorganizations,andincreaseditsparticipationinregional multilateralarrangements.Beingfullyawareoftheanxietiesitsneighborspossessbasedonits economicprowess,BeijingproposedaChinaASEAN(AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations)free
Gill & Huang 2004 Fravel 2005: pg. 46 69 Gill & Huang 2004
67 68

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tradearea,whichhasbecomethebasisofstrategictrustamongChinasclosetsneighborsinthe AsiaPacificregion.InOctober2003,ChinajoinedtheSoutheastAsiaTreatyofAmityand Cooperation,thefirsttimeChinahassignedontothiskindofregionalnonaggressionpact,and takingoverrolespreviouslyplayedbytheU.S.inregionalsecuritydialoguessuchastheASEAN RegionalForum,layingdownsomeconcretecommitmentstobackupitsrhetoric. ThePRChasalsobolstereditspledgetoUNpeacekeepingmissions.Fromrejectingthe entireconceptin1971attheSecurityCouncil,tonowhavingmorethan2000troopsontheground intenoperations,andmorethan10,000from19902008,morethananyoftheotherpermanent fivemembersoftheUNSecurityCouncilandmembersofNATO.70 Chinaisalsoplayingaleadingroleinregionalorganizations,asmentionedearlier.In attractinggoodwillfromfellowautocraticleadersinCentralAsiawiththeBeijingConsensus,the PRCinitiatedtheShanghaiFivemechanismin1996,whichlaterdevelopedintotheShanghai CooperationOrganization(SCO),amultilateralbodyfocusingoncommonpolitical,economicand securityissuesamongChina,Russia,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,TajikistanandUzbekistan.Chinaalso actedasthecatalystbehindthecreationoftheEastAsiaSummit.71 InlinewiththeBeijingConsensusobjectivesoffiscalindependence,Chinasabilitytopayits ownbillswithoutaidpackagesthatcomewithpoliticalconditionsanditsfastgrowingeconomyvia globaltradeandallowedittoaccumulateanimpressiveamountofforeigncurrencyreserves.Its sovereignwealthfunds,suchastheChinaInvestmentCorporation,anditsinternationalinvestment armtheChinaEximbanknowtotalover$200billion,andhasalsobecomingamajordonorof foreignaidandimportantcontributortoworldeconomicrecovery.72In2002,Beijingpledged $150minaidtoAfghanistanforitsreconstructionefforts,andin2005offered$83mtothe countrieshitbythe2004IndianOceantsunami.AfterHurricaneKatrinahitthesouthernUnited
International Crisis Group 2009 Men & Barton 2011: pg. 184 72Men & Barton 2011: pg. 181
70 71

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States,theChinesegovernmentoffered$5.1minaidtotheUnitedStates.In2005,theWorldFood ProgramunloadeditslastshipmenttoChina,afteraquarterdecadeofassistance,markinga milestoneforChinastransitionfromrecipienttodonor.Itisnowastakeholderinofficial developmentassistancefunds,promising$10billioninlowinterestloanstoAfricancountries whilegivingawaytensofbillionsofaideachyear,accordingonemeasurementbyNewYork University.73 GrowingevidencesuggeststhatChinaseekstoplayamoremultifacetedifnotresponsible roleininternationalaffairs.Ithasmadeamoreseriousefforttocooperateininternationalissues suchasfreetrade,nuclearnonproliferationandmitigatingclimatechange.Theimpactonglobal governancewillbefurtheranalyzedinthenextsection. EffectivenessinexercisingChinassoftpowerresourceswillnotautomaticallytranslate intodesiredpolicyoutcomes.IsthereevidencethatChinassoftpowerhasinfluencedpolicy choicesinothercountries?Evaluatingacountryseffectivenessinwieldingsuchinfluence,of course,mustbedoneinthecontextofitsforeignpolicyobjectives.Thepeacefuldevelopment paradigmdictatesontheonehandtheneedtobuildupChinasregionalandglobalpowerand influence,andontheother,reassureothercountriesabouthowitwillusethisrisingpowerand influence.InanefforttoremovethedistrustandsenseofinsecurityamongChinasneighbors, Chineseleadershaveproposedtheguidelineofdogoodtoourneighbors,treatourneighborsas partners(yulinweishan,yilinweiban)andthepolicyofmaintainfriendlyrelationswithour neighbors,makethemfeelsecure,andhelptomakethemrich(mulin,anlin,fulin).74 AseludedtoearlierintheassessmentoftheChinaModel,onewayofassessingChinassoft powergoalsistolookatpollingdatameasuringChinaspopularity.AccordingtoNye,popularityis agoodfirstapproximationofbothhowattractiveacountryappearsandthecoststhatare

73 74

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incurredbyunpopularpolicies.75LookingbackattheBBCWorldServicepollin2005,Americawas sufferingfromalowpointinglobalpopularityastheWaronTerrordraggedontoaquagmire. Meanwhile,Chinahadmadegainsviaforeignaid,multilateralcooperation,andsteadyeconomic growth.Basedonthissnapshot,Chinasinfluenceontheworldisviewedaspositivebyamajority orpluralityofcitizensin14ofthe22surveyedcountries.Intotal,almosthalfseeChinasinfluence aspositive,10%higherthanthosewhosaythesamefortheUnitedStates.Innocountrydida majorityofthepeoplehaveanegativeviewofChina.Amongyoungpeople(1829),ahigher average(58%)viewedChinaasbenign.TheBBCsurveyreflectedtrendsthatarecongruentwith Chinasgoodneighborpoliciesandpeacefulrisenarrative.Innearbycountrieswhichhistorically showedsubstantialsuspicionofChinaafterdecadesofborderdisputesandconflicts,countriessuch asIndiaappearstobereassuredthatChinawillrisepeacefully.Thisisdemonstratedbythestrong positiveviewoftheincreasedChineseeconomicclout(68%)andmilitarypower(56%).Inanother majorneighboringstate,Russia,aplurality(42%)expressedpositiveviewsofChinasinfluence, withonly16%sayingthesameabouttheUnitedStates. ComparedtothemixedviewsofChinainJapanandSouthKorea,Chinaispopularinmany SoutheastAsiancountries,withstrongmajoritiesexpressingpositiveviewsinthePhilippines (70%)andIndonesia(68%).DavidShambaugh,sinologistandobserverofChinasinternational image,creditedthisperiodspopularitygainstoChinascharmoffensive.76 Fartherabroad,BeijingssoftpowerinfluenceisfeltintheMiddleEast,LatinAmericaand Africa.TheBBCpollfoundthatofsevencountriesintheseregions,sixhaveeitheramajority (Lebanon,SouthAfrica,ChileandBrazil)oraplurality(ArgentinaandMexico)favoringChinese influenceintheworld.Despitefacingcompetitioninmanufacturing,54%ofMexicanssurveyedsee Chinasinfluenceasanetpositive,andonly18%haveanegativeview.Theexistenceoflikeminded statesintheseregionsandtheattractivenessofChinasdevelopmentmodelhavefacilitated
75 76

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Beijingsquestformarkets,naturalresourcesandpoliticalinfluence.UnderPresidentLula,Brazil hasagreedtorecognizeChinaasamarketeconomy,whichwouldmakeithardertoimpose penaltiesonChinafordumpingexports.Ideologicalsympathieswerereportedtoplayanimportant roleinforgingBrazilspolicytowardChina.77InIran,twoofSupremeLeaderAyatollahAli KhameneisforeignpolicyadvisersareBeijingConsensusenthusiasts.Withtheirblessings,Iran lookstosteadilyincreaseitscommercialanddiplomaticlinkageswithChina.78However,this particulartrend,aswithotherhighprofileregimes,doesnotimproveChinesesoftpowerin Westerncountries. InAfrica,theEthiopiancaseisillustrative.Untilthemid1990s,Chinastieswiththis countrywerelimited.WhenEthiopiawenttowaragainstneighboringEritreainthelate1990s,the UnitedStatesrespondedbyreducingitsdiplomaticpresence.YetChinareactedbydispatchingeven morediplomats,engineers,businessmenandteacherstoEthiopia.Today,Chinaisabletoexercise increasinginfluenceinAddisAbaba:itsembassyhostsmorehighlevelvisitsthananyWestern mission,anditscompanieshavebecomeadominantforceinthecountry.79 Fromthe2005snapshot,ChinassoftpowerisalsofeltinWesterndemocracies.Noneofthe WesterncountriesintheBBCsurveyhadamajorityofthepublicholdinganegativeviewofChinas influence.Australia(56%)andFrance(49%)leadtheliberaldemocraciesinfavoringChinese influence.EvenintheUnitedStates,where47%(thehighestamongallsurveyednations)have negativeviewofChinasinfluence,39%expresspositiveviews.TheimprovementofChinasimage inpartexplainswhysomeWesterndemocraciesseemlesswillingtogetmixedupinUSChina tensions,suchasoverTaiwan. Asseeninthe2010poll(Figure8shows0510average),thegainsChinahasmadehave steadilydeclinedrelativetotheU.S.Duringthisperiod,Chinascrackdownonitsdissidents,
Rohter, New York Times 11/20/2004 Shuja 2004: pg. 10 79 Leggett, Wall Street Journal 3/25/2005
77 78

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increasedconcernsofChinasrise,especiallyinavulnerableWestamidstafinancialcrisis,and largescaleprotestsfromChinesefactoriestotheTibetanplateauhaveallbehighlypublicized. Comparedto2005,Chinaspopularityhassignificantlywaned,raisingquestionsaboutwhether Chinahasreachedaninstitutionalceilingsinceithasratchetedupitssoftpowerpromotionsince 2005. Figure8:BBCWorldOpinionSurvey,20052010Countrybycountrycomparison

AsNyehaspointedout,statesmostlikelytoprojectsoftpowerinaninformationageare thosewhosedominantideasareclosertoglobalnorms,whichnowemphasizeliberalism,pluralism andautonomy.Beijingseemstoexpressfewqualmsaboutcuttingpoliticalandeconomicdealswith

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corruptandevenbrutal,dictators.Beijingscloseeconomicandpoliticaltieswithsuchregimeshelp keepdictatorshipsafloatandbluntinternationalpressuresforanymeaningfuleconomicand politicalchange.ChinascloseeconomicandpoliticalrelationswithIranwillalsocomeunder greaterscrutinyasWesternpowersseektostemTehransnuclearambitions. InjustifyingitsactivitiesinAfrica,theChinesegovernmentinsiststheseinvestmentsare justbusinessanditallowsagivencountrytostilldevelopinitsownterms.Yetcoddlingdictators canantagonizemanyWesternnationsandthereforecontributingtoBeijingsrelativeweakeningin influenceandimageinWesternsocieties.IntheWest,Chinasfriendlinessandcommercial overturesarenowtargetsofoppositionalmovements,andChinaisatriskofbeinginthewrong sideofdemocraticstruggles,especiallyinlightoftheArabSpring.TheoppositionMovementfor DemocraticChangeinZimbabwe,forexample,hasmadeitclearthatifitcametopoweritwould nothonoranyloanrepaymentsordealssignedbyMugabe. ZambiasrecentelectionsmadeChinaacentraltargetinpoliticalcampaigns.Infact,the electionwasseenasareferendumonChinassupportofagovernmentthatisincreasinglyvoidof democraticchecksandbalances.ZambiahasbeenexhibitAinChinasactivitiesinChina,becoming thefirstcountryoffercurrencyintherenminbi,ortheChineseyuan.Chinapouredasignificant amountofinvestmentininfrastructureandtradeinoneoftheworldstopcopperproducers.Inthe last10years,thetwocountrystradehasgrownfromjust$100min2000to$2.8bn.80Thetwenty yearincumbentRupiahBandaconsolidatedtremendouspowerbyfavoringcertainindustries, manyoftherevenuenottricklingdownaspromised,andbyopeningupitsextractivesindustries forChina.However,concernsoverChinasdominance,harshworkconditions,andtheaWorld Bankreportstatingthat"economicgrowthhasnottranslatedintosignificantpovertyreduction"81 werejustsomeinasetofconditionsthatopenedupachallengetothegovernmentanda substantialpoliticalchallengetoChinasactivitiesinAfrica.Theoppositionalparty,PatrioticFront,
80 81

Redvers, Time 2011 Palitza, BBC 2011

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ledmyMichaelSatasuccessfullyunseatedBandainanunprecedentedelectiononSeptember23, 2011,seenasacontestbetweenproChinaandantiChinacampsthatsymbolizesthedilemma manyAfricannationsfaces.Xenophobicrhetoricandantiforeignerpoliticsnotwithstanding,the ZambiaelectionsshowsthatChinasinfluence,albeitseenasawelcomedalternativetodecadesof WashingtonConsensus,isnowbeingreconsideredamongAfricanleaderswhoareleveraging Chinasthirstfornaturalresourcesanditsaccesstofunding,infrastructureexpertiseandmarkets. Asseenintheseanecdotalexamples,softpowerultimatelyrestsonlegitimacy,whicheven highamountsofinvestmentscannotguarantee.EspeciallyinAfrica,Chinascommitmenttohuman rightsabroadwillhavetobeseriouslyembeddeditssoftpowerstrategy,orelseundermineits internationalstandingatatimewhenitistryingtoportrayamorebenignimage.Moreover, legitimacyconcernsundermineChinasclaimtomoralhighgroundevenatatimeofrelative declineinUSimageandinfluence. Ina2005PewGlobalAttitudesSurvey,morethan12%ofthosesurveyedinWestEuropean countriesseetheUnitedStatesasthemajorpowermostlikelytocometotheaidofpeople threatenedbygenocide.Nomorethan3%saidtheywouldturntoChina.ThelegitimacyofChinas diplomacycanbefurtherweakenedbydynamicsofglobalization,whichallowmanynonstate actorstoattractcoalitionsthatcutacrossnationalbordersbutoperateatverylostcost.Even thoughChinesesoftpowerwillgeneratecloserrelationshipswithgovernments,democraticand otherwise,therewillcontinuetobenonstateactors(Chinasinternaldissidentsandgrieving citizens,humanrightsgroups,laborunions,exiledTibetans,andWesternjournalists)thatcan crumbleChinascarefullycraftedfaadebyfocusingworldattentiononChinasmisuseofhard powerathomeandabroad. Lastly,asdemonstratedinthegovernmentsattemptatcontrollingcultureorsuppressing politicaldissent,Chinasrisehasalsobroughttobearaggressivenationalismthathasboth undermineditsstatedgoalofpeacefuldevelopmentandchallengeditsownintentionstobea

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benignpower.AnincreasinglyinfluentialChina,whetheritisperceivedpositivelyinothernations ornot,isaccompaniedbycallsforgreateraggressivenesstowardJapan,overstatingits victimizationbyWesternpowers,suggestionsofracialsuperiorityoftheHanChineseethnicity,and claimsofhistoricalracialunanimitywithotherEastAsianneighborssuchasVietnamandKorea.

82Moreover,somehavealsoseenanincreaseinrhetoricofgettingevenwiththeWest,and

emphasizingChinesecivilizationsgrandeur.ThedegreetowhichChinaalsotonesdownthose sentimentswillhelpsteadyitssoftpowerinfluenceasitbalancesitsconfidencewithitsidealof moralleadershipasitsroleintheinternationalsystemevolve.

Impact on Global Governance

TheassessmentofChinassoftpowerresourcesdemonstratesthatwhileitssystemhas

contradictionsanditsidentityanditsapproachtoglobalaffairscontinuallyevolve,theBeijing ConsensushasbecomearealalternativeasWesterninstitutionscontinuetostruggle.Chinas revivalofancientthoughttojustifyitssystemthatvaluesorderoverfreedom,ethicsoverlawand relationshipsoverindividualrightshaspotentialtoalterthestatusquooftheneoliberalworld order.AsmorepeoplearoundtheworldlearnMandarinChinese,watchChinesemoviesandview worldeventsthroughaChineselens,wouldMandarinbecomeanalternativelinguafrancato English,andwillmorepeopleunderstandandidentifywiththeChineseoutlookandnarrative?Will Chinasdiplomaticskillsandmaturinginterstaterelationsleadtomoreresourceextractionor problemsolving?HowdoesChinasclingtosovereigntyaffectthefragilebutincreasinglynecessary endeavorofglobalgovernance? AmainthreadofChinesesoftpowerprojectionistheimpactontheglobalgovernanceover

theissuesofhumanrightsandhumanitarianintervention.Thesethornyissueshavebecomea centralcritiquebytheWestoftheBeijingConsensusandaflashingpointinbothdomesticand
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foreignaffairs,allofwhichChinaiskeenlyawareasitgraduatestobecomingaworldpowerand keyactorinmultilateralbodies.Thecompetitionovernarrativesandideologieshasalsocallinto questionwhetherChinawillbecomearevisionist(modifyglobalnorms),reformist(tweakthe ChinaModel),oracomplexbalancingofboth. DrawingontheworkofRobertCox,theformationofglobalgovernanceorgovernance withoutaworldgovernmentcanbeseenasatransnationalprocessofconsensusformationamong themajorstakeholdersoftheglobalcommunitythatregulatesandmanagesglobalissues effectively.Takingplacethroughformalinternationalorganizationsorinformalforums,this multilateral,interactiveprocessofconsensusbuildinggeneratesconsensualguidelines,rulesand normsthataresubsequentlytransmittedintothepolicymakingprocessesofstatesandnonstate actors.83Inotherwords,globalgovernanceispremisedonthetakingofcollectiveandconsensual actionsbyanarrayofactors,especiallythemorepowerfulones,withtheaimofregulatingand tacklingproblemsofglobalconcernsinvariousissueareas. Justasinthepublicdiplomacyparadigm,thestakeholdersingovernancearemany, includingstatesandnonstateactorssuchasinterestgroups,internationalorganizations,andeven individuals,althoughitisoftenacknowledgedthatpowerfulstatesareinstrumentalinshapingthe wayinwhichworldaffairsareconducted.Theseactorsexerciseinfluenceatmanydifferentlevels, andengageonmultipleissuessuchastrade,armscontrol,environmentalprotection,globalhealth, humanrights,etc. Similartothefactthatglobalizationishistoricallyuniqueyetnotnew,sotooisthenotionof globalgovernance.However,globalizationhasfacilitated,complicatedandacceleratedtheprocess ofgovernance.InthecaseofChina,astheprevioussectionshaveillustrated,itssoftpower projectionaspartofitsgrandstrategyreliesonforeignpolicies,ideationalpersuasionandcultural valuesthathavetakenonaglobalstageinrecentyears.Alltheseinvolvementsinworldaffairsare
83

Cox 1996: pg. 296-313

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reflectedinelitediscoursesofthecountry'sengagementwithglobalgovernance.Asurveyofa ChinesedatasetcalledChinaJournalNet:Economics,Politics,andLawrevealsthattherewere noarticlescitingquanqiuzhili()orglobalgovernancebefore1994,androsesharply fromovertencitingsin2000tooversixtyin2006. 84Drawingfromitshistoricalnarrativeasa victimofWesterndominatedsystemthatusedviolence,Chinaseestheexistingstructureofthe internationalsystemandthenatureofitsgovernanceasunequal,undemocratic,andtherefore unjust.Themessageembeddedinthislineofthinkingisthatthissystemofgovernance,dominated bytheWestingeneral,andtheU.S.inparticular,needstobechanged.85 ThereisalsoacampoftheoristsinChinawhohaveusedconstructivistframeworksto imagineagreaterroleforChinainglobalgovernance.ScholarssuchasQinYaqinghave emphasizedChinasmembershipofinternationalsociety,whichallowedChinatobenefitmaterially fromintegratinginworldcommerce,andacceptinternationalnormsandinstitutions.Here,they arguethatChinasidentityhasevolvedfromasetofpurelynationalisticandmilitaryinteresttoa morecooperativeandglobalone.86Thisschoolofthought,whichareconsideredanemerging Chineseschoolininternationalrelationstheory,employconstructivismtoargueforChinas peacefulriseandamoreconstructiveandcollectiveidentitywiththeUStodealwithcommon threatsinaglobalizingworld.ThishasalsomaderoomforChinesephilosophersandother theoristsofthetraditionalstrandtoutilizetheConfuciannotionoftianxia(),orallunder heaveninimaginingafutureworldorderwhereapaxsinicawithChinabeingtheinstitutional anchorinworldgovernance.ScholarssuchasZhaoTingyangarguesthatworldgovernedbythe statesysteminsanonworld,sinceastatebasedsystemofinstitutionscannottranscendtheir narrowintereststoresolvefundamentallyglobalproblems.87ZhaofurtherarguesthatChinese
Chan 2008: pg. 84 Ibid. 86 Qin 2011: pg. 248 87 Zhao 2005
84 85

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culturemustgoglobalinordertoexcelinknowledgeproductionthatexploitsitsindigenous resourcesoftraditionalthoughtandadaptsthebestideasoftheworld.88HenryKissinger,the formerSecretaryofStatewhowascreditedforrestartingdiplomaticrelationswiththePRCinthe 1970s,talksaboutthesingularityofChina.HeseesChineseexceptionalismasitsstanceofletting otherscometoseekitswisdomandpower,aposturethatharkensbacktoimperialtimes:China enteredthemodernageasingularkindofempire:astateclaiminguniversalrelevanceforits cultureandinstitutionsbutmakingfeweffortstoproselytize.89However,thecontemporaryeffort isstillverymuchinprogress,andrevitalizingChinassingularitywillhavetremendousimplications forChinaspoliticalsystemandglobalgovernance.DanielBelldiscusseshowthecurrentuseof Confucianismtojustifyauthoritarianruleisactuallybasedonanarrowerandlegalistsubsetof Confucianthinking,andthatConfucianismsgrandideaof tianxiastressesglobalharmonyover statesovereignty,andthatthisidealformofConfucianismcanprovidemoralresourcesforsocial criticsthatexposetheinevitablegapbetweenrealityandtheideal,justasAmericanscriticsof foreignpolicyexposethegapbetweendemocraticidealsoftheFoundingFathersandtheU.S. governmentsactualdeeds.90 ThetheorizingofChinaandglobalgovernanceunderconstructivism,justasthetheoryhas beenintheWest,ishotlydebatedinscholarlycirclesinrecentyears.Thepoliticalelitehasalso evolvedinthedirectiontowardnorms,nationalidentityandtheroleofideas,butstillfallsbackon realpolitikimpulses,whichforeignactorssuchasKissingerknowverywellinthecriticaldecades leadinguptoChinasreform.HedescribestheChinesestrategicmodeoffindinglongtermstrategic advantageandrelativepowerthatisgroundedinthinkingsuchasSunTzusArtofWarbutalso verymuchpracticedbymodernleaders.91DistancingfromtherevolutionarynatureoftheMaoist era,andevolvingfromlowprofileandinternallyfocusederaofDeng,thepushforchangehasnow
Callahan 2011: pg. 5 Kissinger 2011: pg. 32 90 Bell 2008: pg. 23 91 Kissinger 2011: pg. 25
88 89

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graduatedtodirectandpublicdiplomacy,withincreasingtactandprincipledidealslargelyin pursuitofitsnationalinterestandpreservingitssovereignty,evenasitalludestotheConfucian idealsofharmonizingtheworld.92 Harmony,infact,isstillelusivewithinChina,asweseeinthecontentiousrelationshipthe statehaswithitsartistsandinnovatorsintheassessmentsectionofChinasculturalsoftpower. ThegovernmentisstillfullofanxietyaboutsovereigntybecauseofWesternmediastendencyto amplifytensionssuchasTaiwan,TibetandTiananmen.Infact,itsGreatFirewallisconsistently blockinginternetsearchesonthosetopics,andmostrecently,censoringsearchesforthedisgraced politicianBoXilaiandblindactivistChenGuangchen,casesthatilluminateChinasweakspotsand senseofparanoiaoverinstability.93TheChinesegovernmentalsorefusedtorenewpress credentialsforAlJazeera,afteritbroadcastedanexposeonChineselaborcamps.Toexpressits fearoverWesternculturaldominanceandforeigncriticismfurthermore,PresidentHupublishedan articleinSeekingTruth,ajournalfoundedbyMaoZedong,lambastingWesternculture.Wemust clearlyseethatinternationalhostileforcesareintensifyingthestrategicplotofWesternizingand dividingChina,andideologicalandculturalfieldsarethefocalareasoftheirlongterm infiltration,PresidentHuwrote.94 Thus,whenitcomestoglobalengagement,sovereigntyandnationalinterestarestill paramountbeforeotheraltruisticormissionaryimpulses,whicharethemarkeddifference betweentheUnitedStatesinternationalistandliberalpostures,andChinasdecidedlyrealist approach.Atthesametime,Chinassoftpowerstrategyhaspushedsomeofitsmoreambitious goalstoharmonizetheworldtotheforefrontasitsstatusasagreatpowerisincreasingly solidified.InordertoengagetheU.S.onarelativelyevenposition,theoptionforChinawouldmean

Men & Barton 2011: pg. 187 Beech, Time 5/12/2012 94 Wong, New York Times, 1/3/2011
92 93

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toplaytheU.S.game,sotospeak.95Asitbecomesmoreandmoreembeddedintotheinternational system,evenasittriestoprotectsovereigntyanditsreputationinthedevelopingworld,ithas deliveredpromisingcontributionstotheamultilateralstructurewhileactingasacheckand balancetoU.S.dominanceinagendasettingorunilateraldemands.EngagingtheUnitedNations systemasacentralforeignpolicyapproach,Chinacanwinfriendsandexerciseitsdiplomatic capabilitiesacrossthedevelopingworldandbuildallianceswithotheremergingpowers. Chinahasalreadydemonstratedthisfinesse,asithastakenseriousstepstogiveupsome levelofsovereigntyinordertojointheWTO,italsotookfulladvantageasagreatpowertoside withthedevelopingworldled,byIndiaandBrazil,intheDohaRoundinnegotiatingtheissueof agriculturalsubsidieshandedoutbygovernmentsintherichdevelopedcountriestotheirown farmers.96ChinasidedtoowiththedevelopingworldintheBaliconferenceinDecember2007to discusswaystotackleclimatechangewhentheKyotoProtocolexpiresin2012.97Anotherevidence ofChina'spragmaticapproachisitsadoptionofapragmaticwinwinstrategy,whichaimsto achievemutualbenefitsratherthanonesidedgainsorideologicalzeal.Asdiscussedearlier,Chinas involvementinDarfurbecameanimportantmomentforthePRCtoeitherboldlyjustifyitsimplicit andnotsoimplicitsupportofamurderousregime,ortojeopardizetheglobalgovernanceconcept oftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)promotedbysomecountriesintheWest.98Withsuch insistenceofnoninterferenceandsovereignty,R2Parguesthattheinternationalcommunity shouldintervenetoprovidethenecessaryprotectiontolocalresidentsifgovernmentsareunable orunwillingtodosoorifthesegovernmentscommitgenocide,warcrimes,ethniccleansing,or crimesagainsthumanity.ChinasembraceofR2Pislimitedatbest,arguingthatthescopeshouldbe narrowedandanydecisiontointervenebeauthorizedbytheSecurityCouncil.Chinasrecent vetoesoninterventioninSyriademonstrateitsreluctance,anditsapproachtoR2Pdemonstrate
Steinfeld 2010 Beattie & Williams, Financial Times 7/24/2006 97 Chan 2008: pg. 86 98 Men & Barton 2011: pg 189
95 96

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thatitisreinterpretingWesternbasedprinciplesthroughaConfucianlensofgovernancethat stressesstabilityandunitybetweengoverningpowersandthegoverned,separatingtheWestern nonnegotiableofindividuallibertyandinalienablerightsfromstatesovereignty.Thosereceiving ChineseaidorlockedintobusinessdealingswithChinaarecaughtinabind:somewelcomeChina's involvement,whichprovidesanalternativesourceofhelpandanalternativetothedevelopment modelunderpinnedbytheBrettonWoodsystem;othersmayfeelthatChinaisnodifferentfrom previouscolonialpowerswhoexploitedtheirnaturalresourcesandlabor.99 Fromanalysisofitspostureatinternationalinstitutionsanditsexercisesoftpower,it becomesclearthatthemaincharacteristicofChina'sglobalgovernanceisitsrealpolitikpositionin dealingwithworldaffairs.Chinaschiefobjectiveofsecuringrawmaterials,politicalstability,and playbytherulestotheextentitbenefitsfromtheglobaleconomy,enhancesitsnationalinterests. Itiscoupledwithpragmatisminthedefenseofsovereignty,andstrongemphasisonnon interference.Asidefromitsrealistobjectivesineconomicgrowthandpoliticalstability,Chinas revivalofancientthought,itsidentityevolutionfromalowprofileactortoagreatpowerspeaksto theconstructivistimaginationonhowtheworldwillbeorderedinthefuture,especiallytheeffects ofChinassocializationintoinstitutionsthatwouldspuritselftowardmoreresponsibilitiesto cooperate,exerciseethicalleadershipandunderpinaneffectiveglobalgovernancesystem. DespiteChina'sincreasinginvolvementinworldaffairsandglobalgovernance,its internationalprofileisstilllargelyalowkeyone,anditisstillfarfromtakingonsignificant leadershiproles.ThisChinesestylecanpartlybeexplainedbyitslongtraditionofbeinga conservativeandinwardlookingcivilization,andpartlybyitslackofinternationalexperience, giventhefactthatithasreluctantlyandselectivelyjoinedtheinternationalsystem,theverysystem ithadbeentryingunsuccessfullytoshunsincethemidnineteenthcentury.100Itisinthisconflicted psychologyofhistoricalgloryandmodernanxiety,conservatismandflexibility,revisionistand
99 100Jacques

Thompson 2007 2009: 207

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 reformistthatChinaisbothparticipatinginthesociallearningprocessofinternational

Tsoi, Samuel

organizationsandnorms,andfindingtactfulwaystonudgetheagendatowardfavorableconditions foritsnationalinterests. Chinaslearningofinternationalnormsdependsoncircumstances,theissuesinvolved,and timing.Inacertaininstances,Chinatriestoharmonizeitselfwithoutsidedemands,whetherthey comefromotherstatesorinternationalorganizationsoroutofitsownrealizationoftheneedtodo so.ItschangeofprincipleinsupportofpeacekeepingtroopsinDarfurshortlybeforeBeijinghosts theOlympicsexemplifiesthisharmonization. Fromasoftpowerstandpoint,itisclearthatChina'sriseembodiesbothreformistand revisionistanddimensions.Withsuchacomplexhistorywiththecurrentglobalorder,Chinawants toregainitspastgloryandgainrespectfromothergreatpowers.Itrecognizesthatastableand peacefulenvironmentisneededforitscontinualdevelopment,whileglobalsecurityis underwrittenlargelybytheU.S,anditisnotreadytoshoulderthatresponsibility,evenitisown region.However,itisimpossibletoknowhowChinawillbehaveonceithitsthetippingpointof optimalwealth,powerandattractionforgingahegemonicposition,orpushedbyinternaland externalforcestoembarkonseriouspoliticalreformsinordertoconformtoglobalnormsandgain legitimacy. Fornow,theU.S.wantstoseeChinaasaresponsiblestakeholderoftheinternational community,inwhichChinaconstructivelywielditsinfluenceandcomplywiththeexistingrules andnormsthataredesignedandmaintainedbytheWest.101China,ontheotherhand,desiresto maintainagoodimageandconstructivelyengagetheWestwithoutcompromisingitsnational interestsorsovereignty.Furthermore,Chinastronglybelievesthattheexistingnormsandrulesare favorstheWestandthedistributionofdecisionmakingpoweringlobalinstitutionsandthecosts andbenefitsofglobalizationarebiasedagainstthedevelopingworld.ThereforeChinastrajectory
101

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inexercisingitspowerrevealsitstactfulaspirationstoreshapetheexistingnormsandrulessothat theycansetafairerwayoftreatingChinaandotherdevelopingcountries.HowChinawillengagein adancewithothergreatpowers,especiallytheU.S.,remainstobeseen,althoughitisunlikelyitcan takealeadingroleinmostissues,ifseenasadesirablepartneratall.ThenextmovesbyChina,U.S., andNGOswilldeterminetherhythm,partners,andintensityofthisintriguinggeopoliticaldance thatwillguidehowtheworldsgreatestproblemswillbesolved.

Policy Recommendations
China Asweseeintheanalysis,thegainsthatChinahasmadeebbandflow,andtheyarealso dependentontheirattractivenesstotheWest.Inmanyways,theChinaModelisstillinitsnascent stage,andtherearestillmanychallengesfacingthegovernmentinsolvingitsdomesticproblems, letaloneglobalones.However,itisimperativeforChinatobemoreintentionalinbuilding legitimacyabroadthroughcooperationininternationaldevelopmentandsharingburdenswith othergreatpowers.Thefollowingarerecommendationsforthegovernmentsaiminexpanding softpower. o Enactmeaningfulreforminthedomesticruleoflawandfreedomofexpression,so grievancescanbeadequatelyaddressedandintellectualpropertycanbeprotectedtospur innovationandcreativity Investinsocialsafetynets,affordableeducation,healthcareandhousing Investinregionaldevelopmentbanksorothermultilateraldevelopmentschemesinsteadof reliantonbilateraldealswithregimeswithcorruptreputationsandhumanrightsrecords Ensureworkerssafetyandfairtreatmentinoverseasproject,particularlyinAfrica CooperatewithU.S.onnontraditionalsecurityissuessuchaspiracy,terrorism,and pandemics

o o o o

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ItisimperativefortheUnitedStatestoavoidoverstatingChinasthreat,butrecognizethe

realgainsinideationalandpoliticalinfluencethePRChasmadeindifferentregionsoftheworld. Ontheculturalside,justasitsmilitary,Americanculturaldominancewillbeunmatchedindecades tocome,evenasChinapoursinextraordinaryinvestment.TheUnitedStatesforemostvalueof liberty,itsmagnetismtotalentedandfreedomseekingimmigrants,andstronglegalprotectionsfor intellectualpropertyalsofostersanenvironmentofinnovationthatisunsurpassed.However,with anoverstretchedmilitary,afiscalcrisis,andpoliticaldeadlock,theUSwillhavetoproveitssystem isstillabletobeadmiredandfollowed.Evenwithallitsflawsbeingexposed,inlightofa counteringChinaModel,theglobalcommunityisstillheavilyreliantonthesolesuperpowertolead institutionstowardgreatercooperation.InlightofChinesesoftpower,aUnitedStatesthatdoes nottakeitsstatusquopowerforgrantedandisstillwillingtocalloutChinaspoliticalrepression, whilepreparedtorewardChinasresponsibleandconstructivebehaviorswillfurthersupport internationalnormsandpracticesofgoodgovernance.Furthermore,itmustdomoretoregainits softpowerinlightofadecadeofunilateralismandengagemultilateralorganizations,Chinaand Russiaincriticalsecurityissues.HerearesomerecommendationsfortheU.S.inresponseto Chinesesoftpower: o o ContinuetoengageChinaininternationalarenasandinstitutionsonurgentproblem solvingareassuchashumanitarianassistance,disasterrelief,andpublichealth EngageRussia,NATOandtheShanghaiOperationalOrganizationinsolvingsecurityissues inCentralAsia Continuetoencourageandrewardpoliticalliberalization,especiallyamongChinas neighborssuchasMyanmarandVietnam Increaseeducationalexchanges,esp.withAfricansocieties Streamlineandexpandimmigrationpathwaysfortalentedindividuals,refugees,political asyleesandeconomicmigrants

o o o

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 InternationalNGOs/CivilSociety Intheinformationage,wherestatessuchastheUSandChinawillberelentlessly

Tsoi, Samuel

scrutinized,theidentityofthesenations,universalideasandvalues,andtheimaginationofamore cooperativeworldwillincreasinglyrequirearobustcivilsocietyandeffectivenongovernmental sector.Forinternationalnongovernmentalandnotforprofitdevelopmentorganizations,Chinas foreignaidandpoliticalmodelhasposedachallengeforNGOsnavigatingthroughthepolitical waterswheredevelopingnationgovernmentshavelargelywelcomeddevelopmentoperationsbut shunnedhumanrightsactivists.Chinascozyrelationshipswithautocraticregimesandtheir massiveinfrastructureprojectsthatbringinChineseworkers,customsandwaysofdoingbusiness furthercomplicatestherelationshipsandprojectsontheground.Hereareasetof recommendationsforNGOsandcivilsocietygroupsthatareconcernedwithhumanand environmentalconcernsindevelopingnations: o o o o DevelopexpertiseindealingwithChinesediplomats,businessmencontractors IdentifyoverlappinginterestsandleverageChineseinvestmenttowardsustainableand humancentereddevelopment LaunchstrategiccorporatesocialresponsibilityeffortsandcampaignstopressureChinese operationstowardsustainableandequitabledevelopment ContinuetoworkwithforeignjournaliststouncovertheimpactofChineseinvestmentin AfricaandLatinAmerica Empowerlocalcommunitiestonegotiateconditionsforinfrastructureprojectsthatnot onlybenefittheelite

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Conclusion
Despiteanexpansionofsoftpowerinitsgrandstrategy,Chinahasnotyetdevelopedan idealmixofresourcestoachievedesiredforeignpolicyobjectives.Thegrowingdichotomyofan increasinglysophisticatedandassertiveforeignpolicyandafragileandrigiddomesticpolitical systemexplainsmuchofthecontradictionsbetweenitssoftpowerassetsandliabilities.Thecentral roleofthegovernmentandsevereconcernsaroundcorruptionalsolimitscivilsociety,oneofthe mostimportantsourcesofsoftpower,andhasretardedthepotentialofChinesecivilizations returntoinnovativeexcellence. ThislackofbalancedresourcesalsoaccountsforBeijingslegitimacyandcoherence problemsintheexerciseofsoftpower.Inthiscontext,Chinastillhasalongwaytogobeforeitcan seriouslyrewriteexistingrulesinglobalgovernance.Nevertheless,Chinassoftpowerresources havetremendousgrowthpotentialinthenearandmediumterm,inlightoftheglobalrecession,a lessconfidentWest,andanemergingstatecapitalistmodel. AsChinassoftpowergrows,evidentinitsrelativedominantpositioninEastAsia, Beijingsgrowingmilitary,economicdealings,engagementinregionalforumsandexportingof culturewillforcemanyAsiaPacificstatestochoosebetweentheUSandChinaastheirstrategic ally.Atthesametime,manyaspectsofChinasforeignpolicywhichsubstantiateitssoftpower greateracceptanceofnormsgoverninginternationalrelations,peacefulsettlementofdisputes, mutuallybeneficialeconomicties,recognitionoftheneedtoaddressnontraditionaland transnationalsecurityproblemssuchasterrorism,internationalcrimeandproliferationare increasinglyconvergentwithapproachesadvocatedbythevastmajorityoftheinternational community.Softpowergrowthforonecountryisnotzerosum,andtherearetremendous opportunitiestocooperatewithChinaontheseissuesandnudgethePRCtoliveuptobeinga responsiblestakeholderandsteerthediscourseawayfromtheeconomiccompetitionandmilitary clashaspectswhenitcomestoglobalgovernance.

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UnderstandingChinassoftpowerwillallowconcernedmajorpowersandothersinthe internationalcommunitytoworkwiththePRCtodeepenitscommitmentswhereBeijingsforeign policy,universalisticaspectsofConfucianworldviewanddevelopmentpracticesconvergewith globalnorms.ThismightmeantheWestshumanrightsanddemocracymegaphonewillbe somewhatmuffled.However,asproblemsolvingwithChinamatures,theopportunitiesfor influencingitspopulationtowarddemandingjusticeandrights,andthegovernmentitselftoward goodgovernancewillexpand.Theincreasinglymultipolarworldwherepowerismorediffused amongstates,institutionsandsociety,softpowerengagementwillopenuplearningopportunities forgreatpowerstocompetebasedongoodgovernance,proactivelyengageinareasofcommon interestandmitigatepotentialareasofconflict.

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