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International Phenomenological Society

Max Scheler's Phenomenology of Shame Author(s): Parvis Emad Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Mar., 1972), pp. 361-370 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2105567 . Accessed: 19/11/2013 06:10
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MAX SCHELER'SPHENOMENOLOGYOF SHAME Among the numerousworks of Scheler, there are many essays which descriptionof the witness of certain phepresent a phenomenological nomena. These essays, beyond doubt, are outstandingcases of applied To such essays belong, for instance,those dealing with phenomenology. phenomenahumility, resentment,repentance,' the sphere 'of the absolute in consciousnessand freedom. The phenomenonof shame also belongs to the group of these essays. These shorter essays of Scheler are of his phenomenology, highly revelatoryof the foremost characteristics namely, its desymbolizingquality and its interest in intuitively experienced life. What Scheler intuited and wrote regarding "Scham und uniquely reveals these two characteristicsof his phenoSchamgeftihl" menology. Moreover, this essay immediatelyrelates to Scheler's most eminent metaphysicalengagement,viz., the question of man. Thus it is highly rewardingto see Scheler'sachievementsfor what they really are, insightswhich he sharplydistinguishesfrom psyi.e., phenomenological chological description.Scheler draws our attention to this crucial distinctionwhen he says:
The phenomenology of the psychic is totally and absolutely different from all explicative (erkldrende) and descriptive psychology. There is no description without observation of single processes (einzelner Vorgiinge). In the phenomenological attitude, however, what is-mneant (Gemeintes) is intuited. It is not
observed.2

It is precisely because of this intuitive source of phenomenologythat attitude at its best as Scheler regardsthe discursiveand argumentative insufficient,and at its worst as misleadingand irrelevant.It takes little reading in Scheler'swork to see that his thoroughgoingdissatisfaction with definitions and prefixed conceptions compels him to approach nearly every phenomenonin a negativefashion. This is even true td the extent that he sometimesgoes so far as to comparethe phenomenological method with the method of so-called negative theology.3
1 For a thoroughgoing discussion of these phenomena, cf. M. S. Frings "Person und Dasein." in Phaenomenologica, Vol. 32, p. 62, 1969, Nijhoff, The Hague. 2 Max Scheler. Schriften aus dem Nachlass (hereafter Nachlass), Vol. 10 of the Collected Edition, p. 388. 3 Cf. Max Scheler: Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Vol. 5 of the Collected Edition, 1954, p. 167.

361

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362
I.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Shame and Related Feelings.

The above characterizationof Schelerian phenomenology may be helpful in understanding why he places a critical evaluationof related feelings before his own definitivearticulation of the intuitedphenomenon of shame. This may, in fact, give an argumentative tone to his treatment of this question. Yet his objective is not to persuadebut to help prepareone to intuit. First a close examinationof the whole range of life is necessary in order to trace the genesis of shame. Can shame be consideredan evolutionary necessity? Supported by the biological and anthropological resourcesof his time, it seemed certainto Schelerthat shame cannot be encounteredat every stage in the developmentof life. The organic condition for the originationof the feeling of shame is, according to Scheler, the increase in the degrees of individualization of living beings (Masse
der Individualisierung lebendiger Einheiten). Whenever a new biological

of an indifferenttransmission(Durchentity is merely the manifestation gangspunkt) of life, the organic conditionsfor the appearanceof shame are not presentat all. The gradualincreaseof the individualization is to be seen in the slow but determinatepreferenceof the quality of reproduction over its mere quantity.What at the lowest level of life seems to be a totally nonselectiveprocess - almost similar to the combination of two chemical elements - is replaced in higher levels of life by the preferenceof quality of propagationto its mere quantity.It is in man alone that the phenomenonof shame taking advantageof the hitherto achieved preparatoryorganic phases -is clearly and distinctly manifested as a feeling.4But what kind Zf feeling is shame?It is obvious that Scheler, in answeringthis question, aims at a careful and precise articulation of his central intuition. However, before making any statement as to the positive sense of the feeling of shame, we are told that shame is neither a sexual feeling nor a social feeling, because in the absence of all social realities (sexual partner included) we can be ashamed of
ourselves (Scham vor sich selbst). Shame belongs to- the group of those

feelings throughwhich we can feel our own selves.5 This point brings Scheler a decisive step closer to a positive determination of the feeling of shame inasmuchas he refers to the specific act which takes place in this feeling:
4 Cf., Nachlass, p. 74.
5 For questions concerning German Geffihl and English feeling, as well as vitalfeelings, feeling-states, etc., cf. M. S. Frings, Max Scheler, A Concise Introduction in to the World of a Great Thinker, Duquesne University Press, 1965, pp. 50-51.

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In all the experiences of shame there takes place an act which I would like to call (the act of) turning back to a self (-Rfickwendungauf ein selbst).6

This "turningback" seems to be accompaniedby a sense of opposition (Widerstreit) which results from a contact of higher levels of consciousness with the lower biophysical centers. The significationaland intentional aspects of this act of turningback to a self are the occasion for Scheler to delve deeper into the problem of shame. Whenever the direction of intentionalityoscillates (schwankt) towards something in us generallyshared by all and something purelyindividual (henceshared by none), then the sense of shame is present.The fact that intentionality may thus remain undecided and hesitant as to its choice can best be observed in the insufficiency of concepts in expressing an entirely unique lived experience (Erlebnis). The concepts are almost like the "public"(rffentlichkeit) of our consciousness,where the unique experience of the individualis as out of place as our private life would be in newspapers.7This is why sexual life, its extreme sensibility toward shame notwithstanding, is not the origin of the sense of shame but just one occasion of its applicability.Sex then, far from being something individual,is that which we have in common with all brutes and living organisms as the most common generality of all (Alleraligemeinste). Seen in its significationalaspect, the sense of shame is revealed as an individualfeeling for protection (Schutzgefjihldes Individuums)which preventsthe uniquenessof individualvalues from being absorbedby the sphere of generality. The considerationof phenomenaassociatedwith "to be ashamed of oneself," brought into focus the sense of shame as a feeling of protection directed toward the owned self. Yet there is also a feeling of shame for someone else, and this feeling is as original and authentican experienceas to be ashamedof oneself. In this way shame may be taken to be like a feeling of guilt directedtoward a self, whether my own or that of someone else. This leads to the insight that shame - unlike
sorrow (Trauer) and wistfulness (Wehmut)
-

is not a feeling adhesive

to the ego, i.e., it is not a quality of the ego (Ichqualitdt)at all. Shame is an independentemotion which cannot be empathicallyfelt the way sorrow and sadness can. This is why a differentiationof shame from related emotions is required. The sense of shame stands in a unique relationshipto pride (Stolz) and to humility (Demut). It seems as if shame contains qualities from both of them. With pride it shares the awarenessof one's own value, and with humility, the tendency toward
6 7

Cf., Nachlass, p. 78. Ibid., p. 80.

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devotion and loyalty. Furthermore,shame is very close to repentance (Reue) and to the feeling of honor (EhrgefUhl).In repenting, one is also ashamed of oneself. A sense of shame is ordinarilyparalleled by a sense of honor, while shamelessnessis accompaniedby an absence of the feeling of honor. Moreover, shame dynamically opposes and restricts ambition (Ehrgeiz), vanity (Eitelkeit), and thirst for fame (Ruhmbegierde). Scheler declares that these psychic forces (seelische Mdchte) would have driven man to the point where he would have lost his true self to the world, were it not for the sense of shame to save and justify man's most intimate self. The analogical relations of shame to nausea (Ekel) and aversion are an opportunityfor Scheler to uncover the essential structureof these feelings. Nausea, aversion,and shame possess a vital on absorptionof food and sexual inhibitory effect (Hemrnungseffekt) drive. In a sense, the feeling of shame may be taken to be the mental protectivityof the totality of our sexual life, insofar as sexual maturity is possible under the dominance of shame. Finally, fear, dread, and shame are closely studied in their relationshipand dependence.Shame seems to have little to adowith dread; rather, it seems closer to fear (Angst). Not only are the expressionalforms (Ausdruckserscheinungen) of tremblingfor fear and tremblingfor shame identical, but the whole emotional position in "shame"and fear are also similar. The sense of shamefulfills a protectivefunctionprior to sexual intercourse,and here is how fear and shame seem to be blended together. II. Basic Forms of Shame. The essence of shame appearedthroughoutthe foregoing analysis in a twofold manner.It appearedas the sense of the act of turning-backand then as a subjectivelylived (erlebt) tension to-a-self (Riickwendung) (Spannung)of higher and lower levels of consciousness.Based on this twofold mode of appearanceof the essence of shame, Scheler now distinguishes between spiritual feeling of shame (geistiges Schamgefuihl) and a bodily shame (Leibesscham). These basic forms of shame are not reducibleto each other. Both of them representthe index of tension (Spannung)which exists between love and drive.Withbody, love appearsas vital love (vitale Liebe) whose concentrationis reached in sexual love. With spirit, love appears as spirituallove (geistige Liebe) which is directedtoward spiritualpersonality. With body, drive appearsas drive-impulse (Triebimpuls) which in its sexual form is condensedin an erotic sensationof tinglingdesire (Kitzel der Wollust).With spirit, drive appearsas vital drive (vitaler Grund-

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trieb), involved merely in increasingthe power of life (Lebensmacht). The connectednessof bodily shame and drive as well as the relatedness of spiritualshame and vital drive (both lived as a tension) reveal the phenomenonof shame as belongingto the constitutionof consciousness.
Thus, shame is an individual essence (Wesenheit). Its whatness (essential

should not be confused with its thatness (existentia). The inexcusable mistakeof all theoriesof shamelies in this confusion.Supported by these phenomenologicalinsights Scheler is now prepared to examine these erroneous theories. They represent in turn the educational and the ecclesiasticalinterpretations of shame. First, Scheler critically scrutinizesthe theory (originatingin the 18th Century)which regardsshame as the outcome of trainingand education (Erziehung). Leaving the questionuntouched,as to how educatorsthemselves might have acquiredthe notion of shame, Scheler points to the three types of confusion(Verwechslungen) upon which this theory seems to rest. First, this theory mistakesthe expressionalform (Form des Ausdrucks)of shame for its factual expression.Next, it confuses the natural expressionof shame (e.g., blushing) with its artificial expression (e.g., bathing suit). Finally, this theory mistakes shame for its expressionsin general. Closely related to these misconceptionsis also the one which substitutesmoral interpretations for shame. Regardingthe expressionalforms of shame, Scheler denies education any determinabilityof these forms. Instead, he credits tradition with determiningrole by pointing to the existing differencesin expressional forms of shame among various ethnic groups. (What seems shamefulto us regardingbathingis not shamefulto the Japaneseand vice versa). It is-from his criticaltreatmentof the role of educationand traditionthat Scheler examines prudery,cynicism, obscenity, flirtation, coquetry and frivolity.The limited space of this paper does not allow for a thorough discussion of the latter which, while associated with shame, are not identical with the genuine feeling itself. Suffice it only to indicate that prudery,for instance,seems to Schelerto be the outcome of the control of education over the external expressions of shame. On the whole, Scheler concedes that educationhas only a negative role which consists in letting the feeling of shame develop and maturefreely, by preventing its violations (Verletzung)and deformations. Educationdoes not appear to Scheleras a positive generativeforce in the developmentof shame.8 In view of the intimaterelatednessof the sense of shame to sexuality, a special ecclesiasticalinterpretation (kirchlicheDeutung)of shame now comes underScheler'sscrutiny.This ecclesiasticalinterpretation has been
8

Ibid., p. 98.

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expressedas a demand for chastity. This demand for chastity, understood as a volitional repression of sexual impulse, is based on false assumptions.The assumptionsare false because the sense of shame usually associated with sexuality is nourishedby sexual impulse itself, so that shamecan never repressthis impulse.At most, shame may divert attentionfrom the sexual impulseand preventits consciousacknowledgement. Once a repression (UnterdrUckung) of this kind has been intended; it may result in a twofold disturbance. It can lead to an unusualincrease of sexual sensitivity (Ubersteigerung der geschlechtlichenEmpfindlichkeit) with regardto everythingwhich is distantlyand vaguely related to sex.9 It may also distract the genuine sense of shame associated with sexualityfrom fulfillingits positive function in sexual life. Lastly, Scheler deals with those cases in which a reception (Tduschung) in the feeling of shame is present. Self-deceptionregarding shame is presentprimarilywheneverit appearsto the individualthat he feels shame, yet does not actually experienceit. In these circumstances, a certain socionoral code may be responsible for either exalting the sense of shame, praisingmodesty (Schamhaftigkeit) or reproaching their absence. It is Ressentimentwhich explains and clarifies the complexity of deceptionregardingthe authenticfeeling of shame, for here as in all cases of Ressentiment, the positive value of the imaginedsense of shame covers the negative value of deficiency (der negative Wert des Mangels) 10 like a layer. III. Shameand Sex The unreflectiveassociation of shame and sex necessitates Scheler's returnto the theme of bodily shame (Leibesscham)in order to seek the essential structuresinvolved in this association. The feeling of shame associatedwith body, with sexual impulses and with vitality (leibliches The Schamgefiihl) belongs to the group of vital feelings (Lebensgefiihle). states of vital feelings like weakness, illness, health, etc., are not the same as feel-sensations(Geffihlsempfindungen) like itching, pleasantness The states of (Annehmlichkeit)or unpleasantness(Unannehmlichkeit). vital feelings are also not the same as spiritualfeelings like woe (Wehmut0, sorrow and joy. By belonging to the group of vital feelings, the impulse toward shame also belongs to the group of vital impulses.Like vital impulses,they are not localized in certainparts of the body. More9 In this connection Scheler notes: "It is told of Saint Alphons Liguori that he would not give hand to greet any woman and it is told of Saint Aloysius that he even refused to see his own mother." Cf., Ibid., p. 98. 10 Cf., Ibid., p. 100.

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over, they are capableof checkingand stoppingthe naturalflow of drives and urges. The mere presenceof an impulse towardshame is enough to check and stop the strongestdrive of libido. The impulsestowardshame, like vital impulses, are altogether beyond our volition, choice and selection. What does man attain throughthe sense of shame associatedwith his sexuality?Scheler'sanswer develops in three stages which distinguisha threefoldgoal attainable by the sense of shame.Bodily shameis primarily designedto divert attentionfrom variousforces of drive (Trieb) in order to preventtheir outrightexpression.In this respect, the sense of shame felt in sexual matterspreventsand excludes the chancesof autoeroticism. This could be also designated as the altruistic effect of the sense of shame. Further,the sexually associated sense of shame fulfills a sympatheticfunctiontowardsthe opposite sex insofaras it contributesto the developmentand shapingof sexual drive. The second goal achievableby the sense of shame (felt in sexuality)is the postponement (Verschiebung) of the satisfactionof sexual drive. To postpone the appeasementof the sexual drive until a time of adequatesexual maturityand simultaneously to regulatethe frequencyof the coitus are works of the feeling of shame. The third goal accessible to shame is its unique performanceduring (innerhalb)sexual intercourseitself. Thus, the sense of shame associated with intercourseis differentiatedby Scheler according to its presence before, during,and after coitus. Within sexual intercourse,the sense of shame fulfills the following functions:1. It preventscoitus from striving after consciousintentionor purpose;2. It preventsattentionbeing drawn to the anatomyand mechanismof intercourse;3. It preventsthe apperceptive isolationof sexually sensitiveparts of the body from the entirety of the person;4. Under the influence of shame, the sexual parts of the body are taken solely for expressionalsymbols of the initial affectation of the psyche (seelischeBewegung). Within the space given to the study of "shame"and "sex," Scheler's critical discussion of Freud's views occupies considerablespace. From the foregoing account it is evident that Scheler stands diametrically opposed to Freud'snotion of libido. In the first place, Schelermaintains that the actual sexual drive is not identical with libido. (It should be noted that by libido he understandsonly those impulses which are directedtowarderotic sensationof tinglingdesire (Kitzelgefiihlder Wollust). On the contrarythe sexual driveis an edifice (Bauwerk)constructed with the aid of three independentlyexisting powers, namely, libido, shame and sympathy." Thus, shame fulfills a constructivefunction in
l Cf., Ibid., p. 111.

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the genesisof sexual drive and is not reducibleto it. The priorityof the
sense of shame over sexual drive appears to be the central phenomeno-

logical insight thus far. It is precisely from the vantage point of this prioritythat Schelerdeals with Freud'sviews on shame. Schelerdeclares
that "shame"
-

according to Freud

appears to be nothing but one

means toward the achievementof the ongoing process of repression (Verdringung). The technique of psychoanalysis should attempt to elucidate this repression by neutralisingthe effect of shame, i.e., by revealingthe masks with which "shame"disguisesour factual life. This of "shame,"Scheler concludes, is the inevitableoutcome interpretation of Freud's assumptionthat libido comprises the actual and real substance of human life.12 But things stand differently for Scheler. The sense of shame,remarksScheler,mighthave a twofold functionregarding sensual images and sexual representations.It can prevent the initial originationof these images and fantasies, or else it can try to repress those which have alreadybeen originated.In the first instance
shame is no repressive force as Freud mistakenly assumes.... Shame thus spares repression. It is not that the original and pure function of shame consisits in a reacting with feeling versus something presently given. (vorhanden Gegebenes). Rather it consists in the prefeeling (VorgefUhl) of something
oncoming ... What in the second case ... is used to lead to a repression
...

is not at all the genuine sense of shame (echte Scham), but only fear and dread with regard to possible social consequences... 3

At the end of his study,Schelerbrieflyconsidersthe intensityof shame in man and in woman.Man, with respectto sexual or nonsexualmatters, seems to possess a more refinedmentalsense of shame(seelischesSchamgefuhl). However, Scheler emphasizes that women seem to possess a refinedsense of bodily shame. The reason for these differencesmay be soughtin Scheler'sstatementthat
... woman is ... an actual genius of life (Genie des Lebens) while man (is) a genius of spirit (Genie des Geistes)...14
12 Regarding libido and human life, Scheler,maintains: "What we ordinarily call our 'consciousness' and its content, is indeed a mere sign (Zeichen), symptom and epiphenomenon, but not a sign of our subconscious life or drive. It is rather a sign of a deep and ongoing fight (Kampf) which our higher spiritual self ... is fighting with the life of sensations (Empfindungsleben). The deceptive ... force (Kraft) stems from that changing multiplicity of sensuous affectations (sinnliche Regungen). Insofar as shame obscures (verdunkelt) these affectations and keeps them at a distance from consciousness, it decreases their deceptive force at the same time as it elucidates our deeper Being and Life ... Shame is not a form of self-deception but merely a faculty (Kraft) to eliminate it." Cf. Ibid., p. 114. 13 Ibid., pp. 115-116. 14 Ibid., p. 147.

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Significanceof Shame IV. The Metaphysical To better appreciatewhat &heler has accomplishedin his study of implicationsof his the feeling of shame,we might note the metaphysical phenomenologicalfindings. It should be noted, for instance, that the phenomenologicalinsights into "shame" are quite in keeping with a new element Scheler'sviews on Spiritand Person.Far from introducing and confirmshis central into his thought,his study of shame strengthens notions of Spirit and Person.' What does Spiritmean to Scheler?Spiritis that which
possesses anything which belongs to the essence of act-being, and intentionality and manifestation of meaning.15

It is the quintessence(Inbegriff) of acts nonexistent in the realm of animallife.16 One may ask what, then, is act? Act (and its performance) is that which makes objectificationpossible. While everythingcan become an object for an act, act itself can never become an object. In the reachessuch an intensityand clarphenomenonof shame,objectification of man ity, that it can be taken to be the criterionfor the differentiation not only from brutes but from the divine as well. It is an evident pheinsightthat the essence of animalityis not compatiblewith nomenological the essence of the feeling of shame.By the same token, it is nonsenseto ascribe shame to the divine. Thus, Scheler designatesthe locus of the feeling of shame as the living contact which takes place between Spirit of all process and animality.That is to say, the climax of objectification of Spiritin Nature and Life. of life is the awarenessof the entanglement Scheler,like Nietzsche,uses the metaphorsof "bridge"(die Briicke) and "transition" (Ubergang)to portray'his central intuition of man. Man is a bridgeso stretchedbetween divinityand animalitythat he cannot give up (preisgeben)either without simultaneouslygiving up his manhood. Shame is alien to whateverexists "beyond"and "under"man. But it is manifestby essentialnecessityin man himself, or it is he who:
has to feel shame. It is not because of this or that reason that he must do so, and it is not that he feels shame because of his relations to an "other". He feels shame as being this transition itself, conceived as an incessant movement.17

Scheler'sstudy of shame is an excellent example of applied phenomenology. It is instructivenot only in the subtletiesof phenomenological
'5 Max Scheler. Der Formalismus in der Ethik and die material Wertethik, Vol. 2 of the Collected Edition, 1954, pp. 399-400. 16 Cf., Nachlass, p. 67. 17 Ibid., p. 69.

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enterprisein general but also in Scheler'sparticularconception of phenomenology.In additionto these merits, it also has special significance for our understanding of Scheler'sthought in its entirety, for here, as elsewhere, the unity and inner consistency of Scheler's thought come clearly to the fore. The conceptionof man, for instance, in the light of the duality of Spiritand Life is as plainly presentedhere as it is, say, in Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. What is done in this study on shame as a fundamentalphenomenological insight, suffices in itself to free us from the misleading and unphilosophicalidea of a "break" (Bruch)in Scheler'sthought. Here a few wordsmay be said about the interestexpressedin "shame" by recent Germanphilosophers.Schelerwas not the first philosopherto have taken "shame"seriously.Nietzsche, not to mention Schopenhauer, has profoundinsightinto "shame,"especiallyin the period following his Zarathustra. Yet the profundityof his insights is only representative of mere glimpses into the phenomenonof shame and is by no means an adequateand exhaustiveaccountof this feeling. His outlook seems to be conditionedby his psychologyof unmasking: he sees in shame mainly an inventivemight.18What attractshis attentionis not shame qua shame, but rather the modes of conscious equilibriumbrought about by this feeling. Thus, properlyspeaking,he cannot be accused of having a basic misconception of shame, since he did not study shame as such but elaborated on shame's relevance to man's central concern with self esteem. Scheler,on the contrary,is not concernedwith shame for this or that reason.His motive in studyingshameis to disclose its essentialstructure and hence to work out its phenomenological foundation. PARVIS EMAD.
DE PAUL UNIVERSITY.

ACKN

OWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank Miss Carol Sikora for her stylistic suggestions.

18 Cf., F. Nietzsche, Werke in Drei Binden, K. Schlechta, Edition of 1960, Vol. 2, p. 603.

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