INTRODUCTION: This list was first developed for the members of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Since members of Congress have other committees and other countries to research, we thought it would be expedient for them to have detailed, researched questions provided. Congresspersons and their staff rarely have time for extensive analysis whereas, in contrast, we have studied developments daily. Members of Congress, their staff, members of the media, other publications, and even the State Department, are welcome to use our materials as stated here. QUESTIONS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY ON IRAN: 1. The Joint Plan of Action mentions the facilities at Arak, Natanz and Fordow. Does it name any other facilities? (Source A) 2. In your interview with Margaret Brennan on CBSs Face The Nation on November 23, you said We will be inside the Fordow enrichment facility thats built into a mountain, a secret facility. Were going to g et into that. Are you telling me, were not better off being able to get in and see whats happening? Of course we are. (Source B) Why is the Joint Action Plan limited to only two of Irans underground enrichment facilities? Do the words, Qom, Parchin or Isfahan appear in the Joint Plan of Action? The new location at Ardakin? 3. The UNs IAEA published a list of Irreducible Elements to an Interim Agree ment with Iran, which stated Iran must permit inspection at all enrichment sites, not just two of them. Why did you disregard the IAEAs advice? (Source X) 4. According to Reports by the UNs IAEA, Iran repeatedly refused access to IAEA officials to inspection at Parchin. (Source C) Do you have any information to show that Parchin has been inspected since January 2012? Where does this agreement address Irans refusal to allow IAEA Inspectors to inspect Parchin? 5. Is the US absolutely certain that Iran does not already possess a nuclear weapon? What about a dirty bomb? 6. Does the US know how much of 20% UF6 has, and where it is located? How can we know if Iran has kept their agreement to dilute all uranium 20% and over, if we dont know how much and where it is located? 7. It was reported that Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, on February 3, 2007. (Source D) When was the last time the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility was inspected by the IAEA? When was Isfahan inspected by the IAEA? 8. Where in the Joint Plan of Action has Iran has specifically agreed to allow IAEA access to Isfahan and Parchin? David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security stated on the PBS Newshour that the site at Parchin has not been inspected since 2005. Since the IAEA was denied access to inspect Parchin, why doesnt this agreement set deadline for inspections? Isnt this agreement to inspections meaningless without any time table and deadlines? What about Ardakan? (Source E) 9. Cameras are already fixed at the location of Natanz and Fordow without the agreement. Why does the interim agreement disregard the recommendation by the IAEA to add cameras at the facilities at Isfahan, Qom, Parchin and new facilities into this agreement? (Source G and Source X) 10. The most recent IAEA Report, under the heading Possible Military Dimensions, stated that Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence about the possibility of existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related organization, including activities related to the development of a payload of a missile. (Source G) Where in this agreement does it address discovery and determining whether a location is an undisclosed nuclear facility? Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 1

11. In the past, problems in foreign policy have occurred due to the difficulty in obtaining information. On April 9, 2013. Mohammad Davari of Agence-France Presse reported that US intelligence was surprised when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines. (Source F) (The mines in Saghand city operate 350 meters underground and are within 120 kilometers (75 miles) of the new yellowcake production facility at Ardakan, in the central province of Yazd, Iranian state television said.) How would the Administration improve surveillance of Iran to ensure compliance in the region? 12. The Iranian TV report on April 2013, said the Ardakan facility had an estimated output of 60 tons of yellowcake, which is an impure state of uranium oxide later fed into centrifuges for enrichment. (Source E) Where in the Joint Plan of Action does it state that the IAEA will inspect the mining facilities? 13. Without inspectors at the mining facilities, how could you be 100% certain that yellow cake was not diverted to a non-disclosed location for enrichment? 14. On 7/13/2013, The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) said it had documents proving the existence of a previously unknown underground nuclear facility in Iran, is under construction for nuclear research and development. MKO said the new facility, near the town of Damavand, is part of an extensive network of underground tunnels and facilities Iran has been working on since 2006. (Source E) Where in the Joint Plan of Action does Iran agree to permit inspection of suspected new facilities? Who decides which new facilities are inspected? How will new facilities added be determined? 15. Mark Fitzpatrick, a former non-proliferation expert at the US State Department who directs the NonProliferation and Disarmament Program, has commented that this Joint Plan of Action does not increase the frequency of IAEA inspections. Is that correct? Is it correct to say that the Joint Plan of Action does not contain an agreement on how frequently the IAEA inspectors will inspect the facilities? Does it contain any deadlines or a time table for inspection? (Source H & I) 16. The Joint Plan of Action needs substantial inspection and verification to be a successful deterrent of nuclear weapons in Iran. What additional resources are needed for additional inspection and verification? a. Would the IAEA add an additional inspection team? Would any Americans be a member on the IAEA team to ensure we receive correct information? b. How many staff members are on the Iran Desk at the State Department? How many speak Farsi? How many speak Arabic? What is your plan to meet the needs caused by this agreement and how many Farsi-speaking staff wiIl be added at the State Department? c. In general, how will US intelligence increase their surveillance? Defense and the CIA have stated in the past that they have difficulty recruiting staff which is fluent in Arabic or Farsi. Will this staffing be increased? Will electronic surveillance increase? 17. Iran is the only country operating a nuclear power plant that does not belong to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, negotiated after the 1986 nuclear disaster in Chernobyl which contaminated wide areas and made 160,000 Ukrainians homeless. (Source L) Why doesnt the Joint Action Plan require Iran adhere to the Convention on Nuclear Safety? 18. According to Prince Turki al Kabeer Saudi the undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia is concerned about the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. He stated, A leakage from a plant at that location could bring an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi shores, across open water." (Source M) Doesnt the location of the Bushehr pose extra risk? 19. Since the U.S. military has 35,000 troops and numerous allies in the Persian Gulf Region, who are within 15 to 40 minutes downwind from the Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr, should safety of that plant be a greater consideration than usual? Since 35,000 Americans could be killed by an accident at the Bushehr Nuclear Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 2

Plant, why doesnt this Joint Action Plan at least require an initial safety inspection of new power plants? Why dont we insist they adhere to the Convention on Nuclear Safety? (Source J) 20. The IAEA is also concerned with the safety of nuclear plants. For example, they are currently monitoring safety in Fukishima, Japan. The current Bushehr Nuclear Plant sits within a few miles of an earthquake fault, and since the Joint Action Plan, Iranian President Rouhani announced adding a second plan at Bushehr. Should additional IEAE inspections be required after earthquakes, seismic activities, explosions and fires at nuclear facilities? (Source K) 21. On April 9, 2013, 39 Iranians in Bushehr were killed by an earthquake. Considering how earthquake prone the area is, for the safety of our American troops and Persian Gulf states, isnt the least we could do is to insist they build their nuclear power plants in a less earthquake prone part of Iran? (Source L) 22. Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, told the a nuclear-armed Iran or a conflict over its program would both destabilize the region. (Source M) U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, A nuclear armed Iran with a deliverable weapons system is going to spark an arms race in the Middle East and the greater region. (Source N) Since this agreement permits Iran to continue enriching uranium, is stopping a nuclear arms race in the Middle East still a high priority to the US State Department? 23. If this agreement fails and Iran develops break out capacity, which other countries or groups would likely obtain nuclear weapons or a dirty bomb? Hezbollah? Syria? Iraq? 24. Will the International Ban on the Export of Weapons to Iran be enforced? Will Russia guarantee they will not deliver the S-300 Missile Systems and the related mobile land-based system designed to track multiple aircraft to Iran, or any additional missile systems with a range greater than 1,000 miles? Do we have the written assurance from China that they will not sell similar missile systems. (Source Z) 25. In 2011, analysts at the State Department concluded the continuation of Irans nuclear program would cause Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt to seek nuclear weapons. (Source O) Is this still the opinion of the US State Department? 26. Previously, former national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, told the U. S. House of Representatives that permitting Iran to continue nuclear weapons development could lead to as many as 20 countries in the region with nuclear weapons. (Source O) Are there other countries, in addition to Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt , which your analysis indicates would likely enter a nuclear arms race in the Middle East? 27. What weapons will the US furnish U.S. allies to re-assure them of their safety in these circumstances? In 2007 Bush told then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel that he would order the bomb transfer in 2009 or 2010. When will the US honor its prior commitment to transfer the bunker busters to Israel? Doesnt the six year wait prove that no country in the Middle East should ever rely on a promise by the US? 28. State Department cables posted by Wikileaks state that It is logical for the Saudis to step in as the physical 'protector'" of the Arab world by seeking nuclear weapons. Do you agree that is a possibility? (Source R) 29. Are you aware that since 2009, when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned visiting US special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross that if Iran crossed the threshold, "we will get nuclear weapons"? (Source R) 30. On 6 November 2013, BBC News reported that a senior NATO decision maker told Mark Urban that he had seen intelligence reporting that nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi Arabia are now sitting ready for delivery. (Source R) Is this possible? Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 3

31. In the early 1990s, unbeknownst to the United States, Saudi Arabia purchased36 CSS2 surface-to-surface missiles from China, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads up to 3,000 kilometers. (Source P) Is it possible that Pakistan has actually delivered Shaheen mobile ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, minus warheads? 32. Israeli information to the BBC has stated - that Saudi Arabia is now ready to take delivery of finished warheads for its long-range missiles - that informs some recent US and NATO intelligence reporting. Israel, of course, shares Saudi Arabia's motive in wanting to worry the US into containing Iran. (Source R) Can you absolutely ensure this agreement with not increase nuclear proliferation in the Middle East? 33. Is it possible that instead of stopping Armageddon, your agreement with Iran is creating it? 34. In 2009, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official claimed that once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey will be forced to arm itself with a nuclear bomb. In a public opinion poll of Turkish citizens, only 8 percent claimed that NATO could be depended on if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. (Source P) Is Turkey still dependent on NATO to defend itself with nuclear weapons against a threat of nuclear war by Iran? 35. Ramazan Tas, a leading Turkish analyst , stated Turkeys decision to purchase the HQ-9, a Chinese ballistic missile defense system, is a departure from Turkey being fully dependenct on NATO for defense systems, (Source T) Does the State Department concure that Turkey may develop more independent defenses? 36. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) says that Turkeys substantial infrastructure use to develop nuclear power plants gives it a head start toward developing nuclear weapons. Would it be fair to say that Turkey may enter a nuclear arms race between countries in the Middle East? (Source P) 37. The Joint Action Plan calls for the end of U.S. and E.U. sanctions on all exports of Iranian Petrochemicals. Isnt it true the Obama Administration has granted exemptions to 10 European Union countries and Japan, since September 2012, without Congressional approval? (Source U) Then, on November 30, 2013, didnt you announce immunity for China, India, South Korea and Turkey for their "additional significant reductions," as well as for Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore and Sri Lanka from those sanctions also? (Source V). 38. Under the Plan of Action, under Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Irans domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad, who will maintain all documents for humanitarian transactions? Who will audit these transactions to ensure the expenses are for humanitarian trade? 39. What is the priority of the funds used? Funds held by which countries? Are the funds held by the same country that is selling them goods for their domestic needs the ones used? 40. Who has the authority to settle disputes on which goods and services are a humanitarian trade and which funds are used? 41. Will Iran be allowed to use those previously frozen funds for other countries? On December 13, 2012, Syria's General Foreign Trade Organisation sought to buy 150,000 metric tons of sugar, 50,000 metric tons of rice, 25,000 metric tons of flour and a range of other food using a credit line from Iran. (Source W)
(Source Documents follow)

SOURCE DOCUMENTS
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/iran-deal-text/index.html Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 4

A. Joint Plan of Action

Preamble The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Irans nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Irans nuclear program. There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Councils consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern. Elements of a first step: The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith. Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures: * From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion line. * Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months. * Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (1), Fordow (2), or the Arak reactor (3), designated by the IAEA as IR-40. * Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA. * No new locations for the enrichment. * Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium. * No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing. * Enhanced monitoring: Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 5

- Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Irans plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures. - Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA. - Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. - Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz. - IAEA inspector managed access to: centrifuge assembly workshops4; centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and, .uranium mines and mills.

In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures: Pause efforts to further reduce Irans crude oil sales, enabling Irans current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services. Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on: . Irans petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services. (5) . Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.

Suspend U.S. sanctions on Irans auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services. License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services. (6) No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions. No new EU nuclear-related sanctions. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Irans domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel. * This channel could also enable: Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran

transactions required to pay Irans UN obligations; and, direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.

Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount. Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution* The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would: Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon. Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements. Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear -related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon. Involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon. Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR -40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing. Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament). Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices. Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(Footnotes) (1) Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. (2) At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. (3) Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components. Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 7

(4) Consistent with its plans, Irans centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines. (5) Sanctions on associated services means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities. (6) Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air. * With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed applies. __________________________________________________________________________________________

B. Kerrys Interview on Iran Agreement with CBSs Margaret Brennan

24 November 2013 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesperson November 24, 2013 Interview with Margaret Brennan of CBS's Face the Nation John Kerry, Secretary of State Geneva, Switzerland November 24, 2013 QUESTION: What does this actually do to prevent building a bomb? SECRETARY KERRY: Well, a whole bunch of things. Number one, they dont have enough enriched material to be able to build a bomb. QUESTION: Yet. SECRETARY KERRY: They will destroy correct, as of now. They will have to destroy the higher-enriched uranium they have, which is critical to being able to build a bomb. Once theyve destroyed that, they only have a lower -enriched uranium. They are not allowed under this agreement to build additional enrichment facilities. We will have restrictions on the centrifuges, which are critical for enrichment. QUESTION: President Obama said Israel and Saudi Arabia have a right to be skeptical. Are you skeptical that Iran will actually comply with the deal theyve just signed? SECRETARY KERRY: I think everybody has a right to be skeptical because there are indications that there are people in Iran who have wanted to pursue a weapons program, that there have been secret facilities building some of those efforts towards that program. And so theres lots of reason. Thats why we dont take anything at face value. Thats why you dont take it for gra nted. QUESTION: But you dont believe those are the people who you just signed a deal with, those people who were seeking a weapon? SECRETARY KERRY: We did arms control agreements with the great enemy, the Soviet Union. Weve done arms control agreements in other parts of the world. You dont trust. Its not based on trust. Its based on verification. Its based on your ability to know what is happening. So you dont have to trust the people youre dealing with; you have to have a mechanism pu t in place whereby you know exactly what youre getting and you know exactly what theyre doing. And we believe we are at the beginning of putting that in place with Iran.

Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran

QUESTION: Irans Foreign Minister stood up there at the podium and said this takes the threat of force, military force, off t he table. Does it? SECRETARY KERRY: No, thats just not accurate. But he also said that they have a right to enrich, which is also not accurate. Now, thats one of the reasons why we need to verify in this process. The fact is the President maintains, as Commander -in-Chief, and he has said specifically he has not taken that threat off the table. QUESTION: You dont see actual dismantling of some of the facilities either. SECRETARY KERRY: Not yet. Thats accurate. Not yet. But you cant get everything in the first step. You have to go down the process here. The fact is that what weve done is lock components of their program in place and actually roll some of them backwards. The result of that is by destroying their 20 percent uranium stock, by limiting their 3.5 percent stock, by limiting the centrifuges that can be constructed and where they go, by having intrusive inspection of a number of facilities weve never b een in before. And we believe it now opens the door to our going into the larger, more comprehensive arrangement by which Iran will have to prove that its program is really peaceful. QUESTION: Well, Israels cabinet is already out there saying this is a deal based on deceit. I mean, how do you tell Bibi Net anyahu that youre defused the threat when this is a wait-and-see period? SECRETARY KERRY: Well, its not its based on facts and its based on specific steps people have to take. Its based on an intrusiveness into their program that we dont have today. Its based on a destruction of their uranium. Its based on a limi tation on their stock. Its based on all kinds of things weve never had before. Even with the small amount of money being released to them, Iran is going to lose $15 to $20 billion over the next months. This is an enormous price for Iran to continue to pay if they dont live up to their word and prove to us that the program is peaceful. So theres nothing built on trust. Were not sitting here pretending that Iran is going to suddenly turn over a new leaf. We have to prove it. And our structure in this agreement, I believe, will adequately prove it. QUESTION: Well, you say thats a small amount of financial relief, and thats just about $7 billion. But this is to a country that the U.S. still considers to be the top sponsor of terrorism in the world. SECRETARY KERRY: But -QUESTION: So how do you control how they spend that money? Are you confident that its not going to go to the wrong places? SECRETARY KERRY: What you have to do here is begin a process by which you can actually dismantle their program and prove what it is or isnt doing. Were beginning in a place that will lock in their program where it is today with respect to criti cal facilities. At the plutonium heavy-water reactor, they will not be able to commission it. And we will know that because we can inspect it. Today we cant. That makes everybody safer. We will be inside the Fordow enrichment facility thats built into a mountain, a secret facility. Were going to get into that. Are you telling me were not better off being able to get in and see whats happening? Of course we are. In each case where they have been able to enrich without our knowing exactly what theyre doing, we will now be able to have greater inspection, greater knowledge, greater restraint. And that will expand the amount of time it would take for them to break out and create a nuclear weapon. That makes Israel safer. That makes the region safer. And we believe it is the right thing to do to put to test whether or not they will actually show the world they have a peaceful nuclear program. QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY KERRY: Thank you.
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__________________________________________________________________________________________ Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 9

C. U.S. "disappointed" by Iran-IAEA atom talks failure

VIENNA Sat Jun 9, 2012 1:37pm EDT (Reuters) - Lack of progress in talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency is disappointing and it shows Tehran's continued failure to abide by its commitment to the U.N. nuclear watchdog, a U.S. envoy said on Saturday. The IAEA and Iran failed at talks on Friday to unblock an investigation into suspected atom bomb research by the Islamic state, a setback dimming any chances for success in higher-level negotiations between Tehran and major powers later this month. The IAEA, a Vienna-based U.N. agency, said no progress had been made in the meeting aimed at sealing a framework deal on resuming its long-stalled investigation. Six world powers were scrutinizing the IAEA-Iran meeting to judge whether the Iranians were ready to make concessions before a resumption of wider-ranging negotiations with them in Moscow on June 18-19 on the decade-old nuclear dispute. "We're disappointed," Robert Wood, the acting U.S. envoy to the IAEA, told Reuters in an emailed comment. "Yesterday's outcome highlights Iran's continued failure to abide by its commitment to the IAEA, and further underscores the need for it to work with the IAEA to address international community's real concerns," he said. The IAEA had been pressing Tehran for an accord that would give its inspectors immediate access to the Parchin military complex, where it believes explosives tests relevant for the development of nuclear arms have taken place, and suspects Iran may now be cleaning the site of any incriminating evidence.

D.

Iran unveils new uranium mines, production facility Agence-France Presse By by Mohammad Davari | Agence-France Presse Tue, Apr 9, 2013 9:02 PM NZST .Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, on February 3, 2007. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock View Photo . Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan Uranium .Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili speaks to the press after talks on Iran's nuclear programme in the Kazakh city of Almaty, on April 6, 2013. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock View Photo . Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili speaks to the press after talks on Iran's .Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects centrifuges during a visit to the Natanz uranium enrichment facility on April 8, 2008. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock . Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects centrifuges during a visit to the . Iran unveiled on Tuesday a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock. Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 10

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hailed the advances and boasted of mastery over "the entire chain of nuclear energy," while demanding that the work be accelerated. The announcements come after talks between sanctions-hit Iran and six world powers on Tehran's nuclear drive failed to produce a breakthrough in the Kazakh city of Almaty on Friday and Saturday last week. The mines in Saghand city operate 350 metres (yards) underground and are within 120 kilometres (75 miles) of the new yellowcake production facility at Ardakan, a city in the central province of Yazd, state television said. The report gave few details about the Ardakan facility but said it had an estimated output of 60 tonnes of yellowcake, which is an impure state of uranium oxide later fed into centrifuges for enrichment. Iran says its enrichment activities are aimed at feeding a peaceful energy programme. That work, in defiance of repeated UN Security Council demands, is at the heart of international worries, with Western powers and Israel fearing the Islamic state is developing a capacity to build an atom bomb. Diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution to the standoff have been under way for years, but to no avail. Iran's latest meeting in Almaty with the P5+1 group of powers -- the Security Council's five permanent members plus Germany -- failed to coax it into curbing its programme in exchange for the easing of some sanctions. Ahmadinejad, under whose presidency the atomic programme has expanded rapidly, on Tuesday praised the advances and urged nuclear scientists to step up their work. "I demand you to speed up your work and without any interruption," he said, while claiming mastery over "the entire chain of nuclear energy, one that no one can take it away". "In the past, we depended on others to provide us with yellowcake but with the grace of God, (uranium) mines were inaugurated one after another," he said referring to Iran's all but depleted 600 tonnes of yellowcake acquired from South Africa in the 1970s. Iran says it has now managed to replenish the stockpile from its raw uranium reserve of 4,400 tonnes, according to official figures. In December 2010 it announced the delivery of a domestically produced yellowcake batch from the Gachin uranium mine, near the Gulf port of Bandar Abbas. The discovery of the uranium mines in Saghand was announced almost a decade ago. But Western experts believe they contain poor mineral deposits. Iran enriches uranium to both 3.5 and 20 percent levels in its Natanz and Fordo facilities. Uranium purified at high levels can be used in a nuclear weapon. On Tuesday, the state television also reported an electron accelerator was inaugurated on the occasion of Iran's national Atomic Energy Technology day. The Islamic republic is under a number of UN sanctions, reinforced by international punitive measures targeting its vital oil income and access to global banking system. The United States along with Israel, the sole but undeclared nuclear armed state in the Middle East, have refused to rule out a military option to Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 11

Yellowcake is used to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at Iran's Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility, on February 3, 2007. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock. Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili speaks to the press after talks on Iran's nuclear programme in the Kazakh city of Almaty, on April 6, 2013. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inspects centrifuges during a visit to the Natanz uranium enrichment facility on April 8, 2008. Iran has unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme again ended in deadlock __________________________________________________________________________________________

E. Iran Denies Building New Nuclear Facility

Iran's Foreign Ministry rejects a claim by an Iranian dissident group that an underground nuclear facility is currently being built. By Elad Benari, Canada First Publish: 7/13/2013, 2:05 AM The Iranian Foreign Ministry rejected on Friday a claim by an Iranian dissident group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), which said a day earlier that it had documentation proving the existence of a previously unknown underground nuclear facility in Iran. The ministrys spokesman, Seyyed Abbas Araqchi, dismissed the claim as mere lies by the desperate group. This report is by no means true and is denied [by the Islamic Republic of Iran], Araqchi was quoted by the Iranian based PressTV as having said. The terrorist MKO has been so discredited that the publication of such stories by them is not worth a response, he added. MKO, whose members are in exile in Paris, said Thursday the secret facility is currently under construction, and will be used for nuclear research and development, the group said, although it is not clear what specific work will be done there. The group said the new facility was about 50 kilometers northeast of Tehran, near the town of Damavand, and is part of an extensive network of underground tunnels and facilities Iran has been working on since 2006. The group also released satellite images of the site. Western analysts who have seen the images told news agencies that while it was possible the facility could be used for nuclear work, there was no direct evidence from the images that it would be used thusly. Iran has held several rounds of talks with six major powers -- the U.S., China, Russia, Britain, France and Germany, known collectively as the P5+1, about its nuclear program. Each round has ended without results. The P5+1 is particularly concerned about Iran's enrichment to levels of up to 20 percent and wants it to shut the Fordow fortified bunker where the sensitive activity is conducted. The group also wants Iran to ship out its existing stockpile of 20-percent enriched material. Iran recently elected moderate Hassan Rowhani as the countrys new president, but he stressed soon after his election that Tehran would not consider halting the countrys uranium enrichment activities entirely. Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 12

Irans Supreme Leader has blamed the West for the standoff over the Islamic Republics nuclear program. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said the standoff can be solved easily if the Western states stop their stubborn attitude. (Arutz Shevas North American Desk is keeping you updated until the start of Shabbat in New York. The time posted automatically on all Arutz Sheva articles, however, is Israeli time.) _____________________________________________________________________________________________

F. US Not 'Blindsided' By Iran's New Uranium Mines?

US concerned after Iran unveiled new uranium production facility and two extraction mines; maintains officials were not "blindsided". By Arutz Sheva staff First Publish: 4/10/2013, 10:24 PM The United States reacted with concern Wednesday after Iran unveiled a new uranium production facility and two extraction mines, maintaining, however, that it has not been "blindsided" by the news. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hailed the advances on Tuesday and boasted of mastery over "the entire chain of nuclear energy" only days after talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear program ended in deadlock. "They have continued to move forward, we are very concerned about what they are doing," a senior State Department official told the AFP news agency on condition of anonymity. The official acknowledged that despite intensive and "substantive" discussions in Almaty, Kazakhstan last week, Iran had given no hint of the news. "We weren't blindsided about it, because we are rarely blindsided about the things that they are considering. But they did not specify that they were going to do this," the official said. "They did specify that they were going to proceed forward and do everything they could to fulfill what they see as their inalienable right," the official told reporters traveling with US Secretary of State John Kerry. Kerry on Tuesday denounced the Iranian news as "provocative." "To make any step that increases the rapidity with which you move towards enriched fissile material raises the potential of questions, if not even threat," he told reporters at the end of a visit to Israel. ___________________________________________________________________________________________

G.

Seven loopholes favoring a nuclear Iran in deal signed by the world powers DEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis November 24, 2013, 4:51 PM (IDT) http://www.debka.com/article/23472/ The first preliminary nuclear deal the six world powers (US, Russia, China, UK, France and German) signed with Iran before dawn Sunday, Nov. 24, at the end of a four-day marathon, failed to address the most questionable aspects of Irans nuclear program, i.e. its clandestine military dimensions. The accord confined itself to aspects of uranium enrichment and stockpiles. UN inspections were expanded but not applied, for instance, to Irans concealed nuclear sites - or even the Parchin military base where Iran is suspected of having tested nuclear-related explosions.

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Israel, the Gulf States and others are therefore highly dubious of the deals capacity for freezing Irans nuclear program where it stands today, least of all roll it back, as President Barack Obama claimed. Debkafiles intelligence and military sources list seven of the most glaring loopholes in the first-step accord: 1. Parchin: This long-suspected facility remains out of UN oversight. President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry boasted after the signing that daily IAEA inspections will take place at Fordo and Natanz. However, cameras are already fixed at both those facilities without an agreement, whereas Tehrans consistent denial of IAEA access to Parchin is not addrfessed. 2. Secret nuclear locations: Under the heading "Possible Military Dimensions," the last IAEA report noted: "Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related organizations, including activities related to the development of a payload for a missile. The watchdog has received information indicating activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device." This was further corroborated by new information obtained since November 2011. Tehrans non-cooperation for investigating these findings is not mentioned in the Geneva interim accord, nor was it addressed in the negotiations. 3. Dirty bombs: Iran doesnt need a full-scale nuclear bomb or missile warhead for attacking Israel. For decades, Tehran has been working on perfecting hundreds of dirty bombs as part of its nuclear program, by adding plutonium or enriched uranium to conventional bombs. These weapons are easy to make and easy to use. In the hands of Hizballah or other Shiite terrorist organizations in Syria or Iraq, for instance, they could be used to strike Israel without leaving a trail to Tehran. This peril too was ignored by the six powers in Geneva. 4. Rollback. While President Obama has presented the deal as a first step toward freezing or even rolling back key aspects of Irans nuclear program. The fact remains that, so long as Iran is permitted to enrich uranium, even though this is restricted to a low 5 percent grade, it is free to produce as much fissile material as it wants, whenever it wants. This seems more like roll forward than roll back. 5. Enrichment. Obama and Kerry said the new deal does not recognize Irans right to enrich uranium. They were contradicted by the Iranian president and senior negotiator as well as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. So what is the truth? If Iran won recognition for this right, it blows the bottom out of the Non-Proliferating Treaty because, in no time, all the signatories may start enriching uranium with permission from the big powers. Neither is there any point in making Iran join the NPTs Additional Protocol for snap inspections. 6. Centrifuges. Iran has undertaken not to add new centrifuges to its enrichment facilities, according to President Obama, but there is nothing to stop it from keeping up their production. In the six-month interregnum for negotiating a comprehensive nuclear deal, Tehran wins time to turn out enough centrifuges to substantially expand its production of enriched uranium. 9. A leap to breakout: Far from being static or in freeze, as the Americans claim, Iran is free to step up centrifuge production and boost its stock of 3.5 percent enriched uranium, thereby accumulating enough material to enhance its capacity for producing enough weapons-grade uranium to break through to a nuclear bomb rapidly enough to defy detection by the IAEA or Western intelligence until it is too late. The first loophole appeared hours after the new accord was signed: Irans lead negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi, announced that his countrys enrichment rights had been recognized in the negotiations, after which Iranian President Hassan Rouhani praised the supreme leaders guidelines for achieving world power recognition of Tehran's nuclear rights. Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 14

However, Secretary of State John Kerry in his first appearance after the signing denied this concession had been made. He said: The first step, let me be clear, does not say that Iran has a right to enrich uranium." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov lined up solidly behind the Iranian version of the accord, confirming world recognition had been extended for Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy, including the right for enrichment. Out of step with the celebratory mood in Geneva and Washington, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned that the deal would not impede Irans capacity to gain a nuclear weapon. He challenged President Obamas words that the deal was a historic achievement and called it a historic mistake, which would not obligate Israel. Israel, he said stood by its right to self defense against a regime dedicated to its destruction. As prime minister, Netanyahu pledged not to allow Iran to procure a nuclear weapon. President Obama also announced that key aspects of Irans nuclear program will be rolled back against limited sanctions relief and the release of deposits (nettng Iran $6-7 billion in revenue.) He said that no new centrifuges would be activated for the enrichment process, work would stop at the Arak heavy water reactor and UN inspections expanded to daily visits at the Natanz and Fordo enrichment plants to ensure that uranium is not enriched above the 5 percent permitted by the accord. The core sanctions architecture will remain in place, Obama promised, pending a comprehensive solution to be negotiated in the next six months, but no new sanctions would be imposed. Lavrov summed up the four-day conference by saying: "Considering the whole body of circumstance, there are no losers [in the Geneva deal], all sides are winners - a view seriously challenged by Israel, Saudi Arabia and most other Middle East governments.

H.

Mark Fitzpatrick, a former non-proliferation expert at the US State Department who directs the NonProliferation and Disarmament Program of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, told AlMonitor in an email, We should be thankful to Albright and Walrond for dissecting the technology and doing the math to show how Iran's continued advancements in centrifuge numbers and capacity bring them closer to being able quickly to produce a nuclear weapon. However, their analysis, Fitzpatrick said, assumes that the inspection frequency will not be changed if Iran gets closer to 240 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/iran-nuclear-capacity-iaea-inspectionscentrifuges-enriched.html##ixzz2n5SAjonC

I.

U.N. watchdog to press Iran for access in nuclear probe

By Fredrik Dahl VIENNA Fri Jun 8, 2012 7:52am EDT (Reuters) - Iran and the United Nations nuclear watchdog began a new round of talks on Friday in an attempt to seal a deal to resume a long-stalled probe into suspected atomic weapon research in the Islamic state. The United States, European powers and Israel want to curb Iranian atomic activities they suspect are intended to produce bombs. Tehran says the aims of its nuclear program are purely civilian. World powers will be watching the IAEA-Iran meeting in Vienna closely to judge whether Tehran is ready to make concessions before its broader talks with them later this month in Moscow on their decade-old nuclear dispute.

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The International Atomic Energy Agency will press Iran for an agreement that would give its inspectors immediate access to the Parchin military complex, where it believes explosives tests relevant for the development of nuclear bombs have taken place. Iran has said it will work with the U.N. agency to prove that such allegations are "forged and fabricated". Iranian envoy Ali Asghar Soltanieh smiled but declined to comment to reporters as he entered the IAEA's headquarters in the Austrian capital for his meeting with senior agency officials. Both Iran and the IAEA say significant progress has been made on the so-called "structured approach" document that would set the overall terms for the IAEA's investigation. But differences remain on how the IAEA should conduct its probe, and the United States said this week it doubted whether Iran would give the U.N. agency the kind of access to sites, documents and officials it needs. "I'm not optimistic," Robert Wood, the acting U.S. envoy to the IAEA, told reporters on the sidelines of a meeting of the U.N. agency's governing board. "I certainly hope that an agreement will be reached but I'm not certain Iran is ready." Mark Hibbs, a nuclear proliferation expert of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said he "strongly doubted" there would be a final agreement on Friday. "There are a number of issues that have not been resolved," he said. Western skepticism was reinforced by defiant remarks by Soltanieh, who accused the U.N. body on Wednesday of acting like a Western-manipulated spy service and said Iran's military activities were none of its business. The Iranian envoy said Iran would "not permit our national security to be jeopardized", suggesting it might limit the scope of the U.N. inspectors' investigation. A European diplomat said Soltanieh's remarks signaled Iran would be in no mood to compromise in Friday's Vienna talks. Western officials, who suspect Iran is dragging out the two sets of talks to buy time for its nuclear program, say the value of any deal will depend on how it is implemented. POSITION OF STRENGTH? The European Union said the IAEA should be free to conduct its probe in an open way and not be forced to close areas of inquiry prematurely, suggesting this may still be a bone of contention. "The Agency must be able to revisit areas as their work progresses and as new information becomes available," the 27-nation EU said in a statement to the IAEA's 35-nation board. The IAEA's immediate priority is gaining access to the Parchin military complex southeast of Tehran, where it believes Iran built a steel vessel in 2000 for high explosives tests and may now be cleaning the site of any incriminating evidence. Iran says Parchin is a conventional military facility and has dismissed such suggestions as "ridiculous." Diplomats and analysts say Iran may offer the IAEA increased cooperation as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with world powers, which resumed in April after a 15-month hiatus and are to continue in the Russian capital on June 1819.

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Those talks are aimed at defusing tension over Iran's nuclear program that has led to increasingly tough Western sanctions on Iran, including an EU oil embargo from July 1, and created fears of a war in the region. Full transparency and cooperation with the IAEA is one of the elements the world powers - the United States, Russia, France, Britain, China and Germany - are seeking from Iran. But they also want Iran to halt its higher-grade uranium enrichment, which Tehran says it needs for a research reactor but which also takes it closer to potential bomb material. For its part, Iran wants sanctions relief and international recognition of what it says is its right to refine uranium. "Parchin access is not among the key concessions that the six powers are seeking from Iran in Moscow," said nuclear proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank in London. "They are focused on confidence-building measures that would limit Iran's ability to make a sprint for a nuclear weapon." (Editing by Andrew Heavens) __________________________________________________________________________________________

J. US to Maintain 35,000 Troops in Persian Gulf Region

TASNIM NEWS AGENCY News ID: 213511 Date: 2013/December/07 15:52 TEHRAN (Tasnim) The United States is committed to maintaining a 35,000-strong force in the Persian Gulf region regardless of a nuclear deal with Iran, Pentagon chief Chuck Hagel said Saturday in Bahrain. The United States has an armada of ships and aircraft in place and "will not make any adjustments to its forces in the region -- or to its military planning-- as a result of the interim agreement with Iran," said Hagel, according to a prepared text of a speech. In a trip meant to reassure Persian Gulf Arab allies worried about America's diplomatic opening with Iran, Hagel enumerated a list of US weaponry and resources that will remain deployed in the region. "We have a ground, air, and naval presence of more than 35,000 military personnel in and immediately around the Persian Gulf," he said, according to the text released in advance of his speech in Manama, AFP reported. The military footprint includes 10,000 US Army troops with tanks and Apache helicopters, roughly 40 ships at sea including an aircraft carrier battle group, missile defense systems, advanced radar, surveillance drones and warplanes that can strike at short notice, he said. "We have deployed our most advanced fighter aircraft throughout the region, including F-22s, to ensure that we can quickly respond to contingencies," Hagel said. Speaking at an annual security conference in Manama organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Hagel also noted investments in minesweeper ships and a $580 million construction project for the US Fifth Fleet headquarters, the naval command in Bahrain that oversees vessels across the Middle East.
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K.

Rouhani: Iran to start building 2nd nuclear plant in Bushehr

Iranian president says "there will be nuclear reactors in most parts of" Gulf coast province.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said construction will soon start construction on a second nuclear power plant in the country's southwest Bushehr province, Iranian Tasnim news agency reported. The first nuclear power plant is in operation in Bushehr province, and the construction of the second one will soon kick off ; development of new atomic power plants in the country will start in earnest and there will be nuclear reactors in most parts of Bushehr province, Tasnim quoted him as saying. In reference to the recently-signed deal in Geneva with world powers on the Islamic Republic's disputed nuclear program, Rouhani said the airs in the international arena were less tense. However, the Iranian president stressed that "our enemies and rivals will not give up their hostility and rivalry." Under the Nov. 24 interim accord, Iran agreed to curb its nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The agreement - reached after more than four days of negotiations between Iran and the United States, France, Russia, China, Britain and Germany - was designed to buy time for negotiations on a final settlement of the decade-old nuclear dispute. Amid the third round of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers in November, senior Iranian nuclear officials spoke of plans in Tehran to construct two new nuclear power plants in the near future, Iran's semi-official Fars news agency reported. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has put construction of the second and third (nuclear) power stations on its agenda due to the governments programs and the emphasis laid by the President (Hassan Rouhani), Fars quoted AEOI Deputy Chief Hossein Khalfi as saying. The Bushehr site is located in a highly seismic area on Iran's Gulf coast and began operations in 2011 after decades of delays. The site is capable of holding six power reactors and Tehran has identified 16 sites elsewhere in the country suitable for other atomic plants. The Russian-built plant is estimated to cost some $11 billion over four decades, making it one of the world's most expensive plants. Reuters contributed to this report.

L. Quake hits near Iran's nuclear city Bushehr, 37 dead

By Yeganeh Torbati and Marcus George DUBAI Tue Apr 9, 2013 6:40pm EDT Damaged houses are seen in the earthquake stricken town of Bushehr in Iran April 9, 2013. A powerful earthquake struck close to Iran's only nuclear power station on Tuesday, killing 30 people and injuring 800 as it devastated small villages, state media reported. REUTERS-Mehr News Agency (Reuters) - A powerful earthquake struck close to Iran's only nuclear power station on Tuesday, killing 37 people and injuring 850 as it destroyed homes and devastated two small villages, Iranian media reported. The 6.3 magnitude quake totally destroyed one village, a Red Crescent official told the Iranian Students' News Agency (ISNA), but the nearby Bushehr nuclear plant was undamaged, according to Iranian officials and the Russian company that built it. "Due to the intensity of this earthquake, this tragedy has deepened and we have seen the destruction of many homes in the region, the deaths of 37 people and more than 850 injured," the governor of Bushehr province, Fereydoun Hassanvand, told Mehr news agency. Many houses in rural parts of the province are made of mud bricks, which have been known to crumble easily in quake-prone Iran. Some 700 homes were destroyed, Hassanvand said.

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Across the Gulf, offices in Qatar and Bahrain were evacuated after the quake, whose epicenter was 89 km (55 miles) southeast of the port of Bushehr, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. The early afternoon shock was also felt in financial hub Dubai. The Russian company that built the nuclear power station, 18 km (11 miles) south of Bushehr, said the plant was unaffected. "Personnel continue to work in the normal regime and radiation levels are fully within the norm," Russian state news agency RIA quoted an official at Atomstroyexport as saying. Iran informed the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency that there was "no damage to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant and no radioactive release from the installation", an agency statement said. One Bushehr resident said the quake shook her home and the homes of her neighbors but they were not damaged. "We could clearly feel the earthquake," Nikoo, who asked to be identified only by her first name, said. "The windows and chandeliers all shook." While initial fears about nuclear fallout receded, nearer the epicenter the rescue efforts ramped up into the night in search of survivors and to feed and house hundreds of residents who were traumatized by at least 16 aftershocks. A Red Crescent official told ISNA that 20 people had been saved by rescue teams searching through the rubble. Reports in Iranian media spoke of landslides destroying buildings and crowds gathering in the town of Dashti from outlying areas in search of help. Military officials said army and police units had been deployed to maintain order. Water and electricity lines were severed and communities stayed in the streets because of the threat from aftershocks. Iran's most powerful authority, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, offered his condolences to the victims and urged authorities to extend all efforts to save lives and help the afflicted. Tuesday's quake was much smaller than the 9.0 magnitude one that hit Japan two years ago, triggering a tsunami that destroyed back-up generators and disabled the Fukushima nuclear plant's cooling system. Three of the reactors melted down. Iran is the only country operating a nuclear power plant that does not belong to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, negotiated after the 1986 nuclear disaster in Chernobyl which contaminated wide areas and made 160,000 Ukrainians homeless. Western officials and the United Nations have urged Iran to join the safety forum. REPEATED WARNINGS Tehran has repeatedly rejected safety concerns about Bushehr - built in a highly seismic area - that began operations in September 2011 after decades of delays. Iran sits on major fault lines and has suffered several devastating earthquakes in recent years, including a 6.6 magnitude quake in 2003 which flattened the southeastern city of Bam and killed more than 25,000 people. In August more than 300 people were killed when two quakes struck the northwest. A report published last week by U.S. think-tanks Carnegie Endowment and the Federation of American Scientists said that "ominously" the Bushehr reactor sits at the intersection of three tectonic plates. "Iran's sole nuclear power plant is not at risk of a tsunami similar in size to the one that knocked out the electricity and emergency cooling Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 19

systems at Fukushima. But, repeated warnings about the threat of earthquakes for the Bushehr nuclear plant appear to have fallen on deaf ears," the report said. The quake happened on National Nuclear Technology Day when Iran's leaders celebrate the technological advances they say will reduce the country's reliance on fossil fuels, leaving more of its abundant oil for export. Israel, Gulf Arab states and many Western countries fear Tehran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability and the Islamic Republic is under international sanctions aimed at forcing it to curb some of its atomic work. Iran denies it wants nuclear arms and says its atomic work is for electricity generation and other peaceful uses. (Additional reporting by Fredrik Dahl in Vienna, Regan Doherty in Doha, Steve Gutterman in Moscow; Writing by Robin Pomeroy; Editing by Michael Roddy and Jon Hemming)

M.

Iranian Nuclear ambitions are evil

During a meeting with Dutch and Russian Ambassadors in Riyadh, Prince Turki al Kabeer Saudi Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that "if Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians."[12] Prince Turki also raised concerns that "the United States will negotiate a grand bargain with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a concern we have heard often in recent weeks. Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi shores, across open water." The Russian Ambassador Gibinvish, responded that Iran's wants to enrich uranium as it fears being attacked by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran's desire to establish its "supremacy" in the region. Prince Turki interjected: "And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and desalination, but not with enrichment." He said that the prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions about their motivations for doing so: "they do not need it!"[12]
"US embassy cables: Saudi official warns Gulf states may go nuclear". The Guardian (London). 28 November 2010. ____________________________________________________________________________________________

N.

UK Telegraph 8:40AM BST 04 Apr 2012

Hillary Clinton warns nuclear-armed Iran would be 'destabilising' Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned Tuesday that a nuclear-armed Iran or a conflict over its programme would both destabilise the region as she pressed Tehran for clear commitments in forthcoming talks. Hillary Clinton warns nuclear-armed Iran would be 'destabilising' Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton speaks at the NATO Allied Command Transformation headquarters in Norfolk, Va. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton speaks at the NATO Allied Command Transformation headquarters in Norfolk, Va. Photo: AP Photo/Steve Helber As Israel voiced growing impatience over Iran, Clinton credited US sanctions with inflicting pressure on the Islamic republic but she warned of a tough road ahead as Tehran prepares to meet with six major powers.

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"There is no clear path. We know that a nuclear-armed Iran would be incredibly destabilising to the region and beyond. A conflict arising out of their program would also be very destabilising," Clinton said. "There is no way to balance this. You have two very difficult paths here," Clinton told a dinner in Norfolk, Virginia, where she was on a day trip to visit the only Nato command in the United States. Clinton, who travelled over the weekend to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, voiced concern that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger an arms race in the region. "We're going to be looking for a way to try to convey the legitimate fears that people in the region have about what comes next. Because if Iran were ever to get a nuclear weapon, the countries in the region are going to buy their way to one as well," Clinton said.

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O.

In 2009, Brent Scowcroft, the former national security adviser to presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, If Iran is allowed to go forward, in self-defense or for a variety of reasons we could have half a dozen countries in the region and 20 or 30 more around the world doing the same thing just in case.1 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, A nuclear armed Iran with a deliverable weapons system is going to spark an arms race in the Middle East and the greater region . Former Bush administration official John Bolton told the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, then almost certainly Saudi Arabia will do the same, as will Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others in the region, and we risk this widespread proliferation even if it is a democratic Iran that possesses nuclear weapons. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/15/turkey-and-bomb

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P.A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race?

By Avner Golov and Amos Yadlin for Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 5 April 2013
After describing Tehrans strategic rationale for developing a nuclear program and assessing its ability t o bring it to fruition, Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov then explore one of the many alarming scenarios that could result from a nuclear capable Iran i.e., a regional arms race. One of the main arguments for stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, beyond the direct danger of its using them or transferring them to terrorist elements, is that Irans possession of a nuclear military capability will undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime and spur the nuclearization of other states in the Middle East. The Obama administration has voiced this argument to justify its opposition to Irans nuclear program. [1] Other analysts, however, contend that Irans development of a nuclear bomb will not lead to a regional arms race, [2] as Irans three chief rivals in the region, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, lack the economic and technological capabilities and the necessary motivation to develop nuclear weapons. This argument, which lessens the gravity of the Iranian threat to the region, implies that statements by senior Saudi, Turkish, and Egyptian officials, whereby an Iranian bomb would propel their governments to achieve a balance of power among the states, should be ignored. In our assessment, the conclusion that a nuclear Iran would not lead to an arms race is based on an inadequate analysis of the relevant countries and their motivation and ability to acquire nuclear weapons once Iran has obtained them. This flawed analysis results from an approach suited to the old Middle East before Iran acquired a nuclear bomb, before the rise of Sunni political Islam as a result of the upheaval in the Arab world, and before the United States lost some of its regional influence, a trend that will only intensify if Iran succeeds in acquiring military nuclear capabilities in spite of the US policy of prevention. An examination of Middle East states that are likely to develop a military nuclear program requires a look at four key factors: motivation and strategic rationale; the states ability to bear the economic burden of a military nuclear program; the infrastructure and technological capability required for developing nuclear weapons; and the political constraints

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that would influence and perhaps dissuade them from acquiring military nuclear weapons mainly relations with the United States and commitments to the nonproliferation regime. A look at these four factors with respect to three regional powers reveals that the possibility of a regional arms race is not low at all. Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabias leaders state openly and explicitly that a nuclear Iran will force them to act to maintain the balance of power. Turki al-Faisal, who served as head of Saudi intelligence and as Saudi Arabias ambassador to Washington, claimed that the Gulf states must acquire nuclear power if the efforts fail to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear program.[3] Dennis Ross, President Obamas former envoy to the Middle East, even quoted the threat he heard from the Saudi king during a meeting in April 2009: If they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons.[4] Documents published by WikiLeaks reinforce this statement. Strategic Rationale Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are based on rivalry and hatred that has existed for many years between the Shiites and the Sunnis and between the Arabs and the Persians. The suppression by the Saudi Wahhabi regime of the Shiite minority, which lives in the countrys eastern oil region, is emblematic of relations between the Wahhabi stream of Islam and the Shiites. This religious and ideological rivalry compounds the conflict of interests between the two states, which seek to expand their influence in the region and export their respective ideologies: the Shiite revolution for Iran, and Wahhabism for Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Iran has long threatened Arab aspirations to expand Arab control in the Middle East and south central Asia. Therefore, Saudi Arabia, which aspires to lead the Sunni Arab bloc, sees Shiite Iran as a major threat to its interests in the region. Irans entry into the nuclear club will force the Saudi royal house to attain a strate gic balance of power. Indeed, Saudi officials have of late deviated from former practice and begun to work overtly to foil the Iranian nuclear program by pressuring Western countries to act against Iran and by increasing their oil output as an alternative to Iranian oil, in order to tighten the sanctions on Tehran. Economics and Resources Saudi Arabia is a regional and even world economic and financial power. It is the largest oil exporter in the world, it is third in the world in foreign currency reserves, and it has the largest economy of the Arab states. In April 2010, the Saudi king ordered establishment of a nuclear city at a cost of over $100 billion. The declared goal of the project is to examine all aspects of nuclear development. [5] The scope of this project illustrates that the economy of oil-rich Saudi Arabia would enable it to build a nuclear program if it wished. Furthermore, the resources that the royal house could allocate for such a venture, if deemed necessary, could greatly shorten the process of advancing the project. Technological Infrastructure Saudi Arabias capabilities in the nuclear realm are not clear, and there are some hints that Saudi Arabia has attempted to develop an independent nuclear program for military purposes. After his defection to the United States, for example, the first secretary of the Saudi Arabian mission to the United Nations claimed that in the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia established a military nuclear program.[6] While Saudi Arabia cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it is not a signatory to the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which mandates rigorous and frequent testing of non-nuclear states or states whose nuclear activity is limited. In addition, Saudi Arabia has never relinquished its right to enrich uranium independently. However, Saudi Arabia also has alternatives to its own technological capabilities. If the Saudi regime decides to achieve military nuclear capability, it can simply purchase it. The royal houses close connections with the regime in Pakistan have prompted a number of reports on Saudi involvement in funding Pakistans nuclear program. Saudi Arabia can take advantage of these connections in order to purchase ready-made weapons. [7] Aharon Zeevi Farkash, former head of IDF Military Intelligence, addressed this possibility already in 2003 in the Knessets Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee: The Saudis are conducting negotiations with Pakistan over buying nuclear warheads for their surface-to-surface missilesThey have decided that they will tip the balance of fear in light of Irans armament, and intend to station the Pakistani warheads on Saudi soil.[8] That same year, the Guardian reported on an official Saudi document showing that the kingdom was considering acquiring nuclear weapons in order to deter threats from Iran .[9] The document likewise revealed a fear of dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. There are also reports that the issue arose in meetings between Saudi and Pakistani leaders.[10] Those who claim that Iranian nuclear weapons will not bring about an arms race do not address these considerations with the requisite seriousness.

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In the early 1990s, unbeknownst to the United States, Saudi Arabia purchased36 CSS2 surface-to-surface missiles from China, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads up to 3,000 kilometers. Just as it purchased these missiles, Saudi Arabia can also acquire nuclear technologies in any of three ways: purchase of operational nuclear weapons; purchase of technological support that would significantly reduce the time required to produce a bomb; or purchase of services by the Pakistani military, which would deploy nuclear weapons in the kingdom for purposes of deterrence. Since Pakistan is a Muslim country, such a move would help deflect criticism leveled at the regime for its dependence on US support and criticism of the international pressure, and in turn could lead to a Saudi violation of the NPT. Political Constraints Iranian military nuclear capability would pose a dilemma for Saudi Arabia, namely, reconciling the Saudi interest in maintaining ties with Washington with the interest in maintaining a strategic balance of power with Tehran. The document revealed by the Guardian shows that the Saudis fear dependence on decisions by the White House. Indeed, a widely accepted theory assumes that extended deterrence by means of a third party significantly harms threat credibility.[11] Furthermore, any attempt to adopt models of extended deterrence for the Middle East will encounter two main problems: the guarantees lack credibility among the recipient countries, and there is a limited willingness on the part of the providers of the guarantees to realize the threat.[12] In theory, two models of extended deterrence are relevant to the Saudi case: a bilateral US commitment to the Saudi regime and the establishment of a Gulf security system. However, various analysts point out that a regional system is not relevant in the Saudi case because of the need for increased integration among Gulf states; at the same time, it is difficult to see how the bilateral model can offer a credible guarantee. [13] There is very little willingness on the part of the American people to go to war in order to defend an ally. US policy, with its declared focus on East Asia rather than the Middle East, also dilutes the guarantees that the United States can provide to the Saudi regime. American policy in connection with the so-called Arab Spring, and in particular, President Obamas abandonment of Mubarak and Ben Ali and their pro-Western regimes, has further undermined the reliability of the American umbrella in Riyadhs eyes. In addition, there is much opposition in Saudi society to the regimes willingness to rely on Western f orces when it comes to maintaining Saudi interests. These shortcomings indicate that even if Washington proposes expanding its bilateral nuclear umbrella, Riyadh is liable to limit its dependence on the United States. Unlike various analysts who propose an American umbrella as a solution to an Iranian nuclear bomb, Riyadh does not consider an American umbrella to be reliable. An international failure to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb is likely to reduce American opposition to possession of nuclear weapons by US allies in the region. This does not mean that the United States will seek to promote such a move, but US opposition is likely to diminish, as is the price that the Saudi regime will be asked to pay for its policy. In any case, in the past Saudi Arabia has proven its determination to promote its interests even in the face of US pressure, for example toward operations against global terror, in its ties with China, and in suppressing the uprising in Bahrain. The Saudi regime reportedly made clear in private talks with US and British officials that it was prepared to harness all its economic, diplomatic, and security resources for an international campaign to confront Iranian regional aspirations, and if the campaign failed, for an independent effort. [14] Given the importance that the Saudis attribute to their regional interests, it would appear that the Western threat to Saudi Arabia is secondary in the kingdoms considerations. If Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, even though it is a party to the NPT, Riyadh is likely to consider the treaty superfluous. If Iran obtains nuclear weapons in spite of the international campaign against it, Saudi Arabia will contend that it has the right to maintain its security and a balance of power with Tehran and might no longer consider itself committed to the NPT. Saudi Arabias sense of its legitimate right to purchase military nuclear capability would increase, and international deterrence of violations of the nonproliferation regime would ebb. Moreover, frustration with the international community and the erosion of the motivation and ability of Western states, headed by the United States, to stop such a move, are likely to enhance the Saudi drive to a nuclear weapon.[15] Overall, then, the attempts to minimize the proliferation that might occur in connection with an Iranian military nuclear capability are not persuasive. There is no satisfactory explanation why the Saudis would act differently and against their declared interests in a scenario in which they face such a significant threat, precisely when the political constraints are of themselves shrinking: the American leverage for preventing regional proliferation of weapons is weaker, and the future of a weakened nonproliferation regime hangs in the balance. Saudi Arabia also has the resources to purchase the technology or the nuclear weapons themselves within a short time. Therefore, it appears that for the Saudis, a nuclear weapon in Tehrans hands would realize the scenario described by Mitchell Reiss, who warns that the nonproliferation regime in the Middle East might collapse as a result of a single state arming itself.[16]

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Turkey Strategic Rationale Turkey, a rising state whose leadership openly aims to restore Turkey to a regional power with global influence, will likely be a principal rival of Iran for leadership, hegemony, and influence in the Middle East and the entire Muslim world. Seeking to disseminate the Turkish model as a framework that allows the proper integration of Western values and the values of moderate Islam, Turkey proposes a model of political Islam that brings East and West closer, thereby strengthening both its own stability and the stability of the region. Turkeys aspiration challenges the Iranian drive to disseminate the Shiite revolutionary model, which advocates the undermining of existing regimes in most Middle East states because of their secular or Sunni character; Iranian support for the rule of clerics; and opposition to Western values and influence in the Middle East. At a time when the so-called Arab Spring has demonstrated the failure of the existing models in the Middle East and undermined attitudes toward the West and its values, competition over which ideology will be the dominant successor has become more acute than in the past. Compounding this ideological clash are the rivalry between Sunna (Turkey) and Shia (Iran), and the conflict of interests between the states regarding energy markets and trade routes in the Middle East and the Caspian Sea basin. Differing attitudes toward the slaughter by Bashar Assad in Syria, and toward the governments of Iraq, Armenia, and Azerbaijan embody other conflicts of interests that fuel the rivalry between the two regional powers. An Iranian nuclear bomb will likely both lead to Iranian strategic superiority and harm Turkish interests in the region. Predictably, therefore, Turkish government officials have publicly opposed the Iranian military nuclear program. [17] In December 2010 the Turkish Foreign Minister underscored that if Iran withdrew from its international commitments as set out in the NPT, Turkey would oppose it even before the United States would.[18] In private, some Turkish officials even threatened that Iranian nuclear weapons would force Turkey to launch its own military nuclear program : in 2009, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official claimed that once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey will be forced to arm itself with a nuclear bomb. [19] Although this was not an official statement by the Turkish government, it is consistent with the results of a survey by a Turkish research institute in late March 2012, which revealed that 54 percent of Turks believe that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey must develop them as well, rather than relying on NATO.[20] This sense in the government and on the Turkish street indicates that Irans possession of nuclear weapons would force Turkey to consider developing its own capabilities. Economics and Resources The Turkish economy can undoubtedly shoulder the costs of a nuclear program, as have states in a much worse economic situation, such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Iraq. Turkeys economy is among the twenty strongest in the world, and the largest in the Middle East. It is expected to continue to grow because of its large work force, which is cheap and young, relative to Europe, and because of its central location between Asia and Europe. [21] Technological Infrastructure While cooperation between NATO and the Turkish military has provided Turkey with nuclear weapons experience relating to storage, equipment, and military training, Turkey lacks nuclear experience and the necessary technological infrastructures to develop its own nuclear program. It launched a civilian nuclear program in 2010 after signing an agreement with Russia to construct a nuclear reactor in southern Turkey. Today the Turkish government is conducting negotiations to build its second nuclear reactor to produce electricity. After negotiations with South Korea and Japan were unsuccessful, the Turkish Minister of Energy announced at the April 2012 G-20 summit in Seoul that a Canadian company is interested in the project. [22] He added that Turkey is planning to promote nuclear energy cooperation with China. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan has declared that Turkey will invest over $100 billion in the coming decade to build nuclear reactors (Turkeys GNP is over $1 trillion) in order to reduce the import of energy from Iran and Russia. In recent years Turkey has also strengthened its ties with Pakistan. The two Islamic states maintained good relations when the Turkish army was the main political force in the country. Erdoans visit to Pakistan last month and the significant increase in trade between the countries in the past five years [23] are an indication of these close ties between Ankara and Islamabad, which could be used by Turkey if it seeks to take advantage of Pakistani knowhow or weapons in order to convert its civilian nuclear program into a military program. Political Constraints The Turkish political dilemma regarding a nuclear program will mainly involve the question of relations with NATO in general and the United States in particular. According to assessments, there are some ninety US-NATO nuclear

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weapons stored today in Turkey. [24] Many claim that if the Turkish government proves to have a military nuclear program, Turkey will be deprived of this privilege. Therefore, Turkey will seek to avoid harming its relations with NATO, and especially the United States, and will choose not to develop a military nuclear program.[25] The Turkish response will be closer relations with NATO and increasing the US commitment to the security of Turkish interests.[26] However, development of independent Turkish nuclear capabilities would reduce the Turkish governments dependence on US policy in the region and prevent significant damage to Turkeys regional prestige if the US government decided to withdraw its weapons from the country. Such a decision is not expected to be made before Irans military nuclearization. Nonetheless, a heated debate is underway on this issue in both Washington and Istanbul, [27] and there is liable to be a reversal in certain scenarios, especially if policy differences between Washington and Ankara are sharpened. Turkey is highly suspicious of the Western and NATO commitment; it has even criticized NATOs attitude to Turkish interests a num ber of times in the context of deployment of defensive systems for Turkey and Kurdish terrorist activity in the country. In a public opinion poll, only 8 percent claimed that NATO could be depended on if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. As in the Saudi case, suspicions among Turkeys decision makers, academics, military leaders, and the civilian populations are liable to constitute a significant obstacle to a US attempt to implement extended deterrence. However, Turkey is a signatory to the NPT and the Additional Protocol. Its relations with the United States and Europe and its policy supporting the use of soft power will also be major considerations for the Turkish government when it confronts an Iranian nuclear bomb. In other words, this constraint will hav e greater significance in Turkeys case than in Saudi Arabias, and any decision regarding nuclear ambitions will be shaped by the relationship between Turkey and the West, and in particular, the United States; by the deterrent power of the nonproliferation regime on the day after the Iranian bomb; and by Turkeys perception of its interests in the region. Even so, in certain scenarios the Turkish aspiration to independence and regional hegemony would be a significant impetus to develop nuclear capabilities, while taking controlled risks. The competition with Iran for hegemony and influence in the Middle East and the Muslim world, Turkeys impressive economic capabilities, its alienation from Europe, and its suspicion toward Washingtons policy, along with the loss of the rationale of cooperation with NATO vs. the Soviet Union, will allow Turkey to overcome its lack of a nuclear infrastructure with relative ease and consider the strategic benefit of building a nuclear force against its adversary, Tehran. Egypt In 2010, the Egyptian foreign minister warned that a nuclear bomb would drag the Middle East into an arms race, and that Egypt would like to prevent Iran from forcing the Arabs to engage in a [nuclear arms] race with it. [28] The following analysis of the Egyptian case is based primarily on the Egyptian approach during the old regime, given that the military is still a central player in Egypts strategic considerations and its national defense policy, and the new regime has not yet stabilized and formulated an updated policy on the issue. The Egyptian government is expected to deal mainly with domestic challenges, not foreign challenges. However, the caustic speech by Egyptian President Morsi at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Tehran, and the clarification by his spokesman that Egypt does not intend to renew ties with Iran, which were cut in 1979, [29] indicate that relations between Cairo and Tehran cannot be expected to warm significantly in the near future, in spite of Egyptian declarations calling for renewed relations with Tehran. When required to confront the Iranian issue, the new regime will likely base its position on strategic assessments deeply ingrained in Egypt from past decades. Strategic Rationale In 1992, the Egyptian Defense Minister claimed that the Iranian nuclear threat was worse than the threat from Israel. In 2010, according to WikiLeaks, Egyptian Deputy Defense Minister Mohamed al-Assar stated that Egypt views Iran as a threat to the region. [30] Why did Egypt under Mubarak consider the Iranian nuclear program to be a serious strategic threat? As in the Saudi and Turkish cases, the answer to this question involves a mix of diplomatic-political and ideological historical considerations. First, the interests of Egypt, which considers itself a leading Sunni Arab country with regional influence, have not infrequently clashed with the interests of Shiite Iran, with is own aspirations to regional hegemony. Like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Egypt fears that nuclear weapons in Tehrans possession would mean the loss of its leadership position within the Arab world, the loss of seniority within the Muslim world, and a risk to Egyptian interests in the Middle East. The competition for regional hegemony between Egypt and Iran has resulted in a bad relationship between the two, to put it mildly. Egypt was troubled not only by Iranian influence in the Arab world, but even more so by Irans influence near Egypts borders. In 2009, Abu al-Gheit, Mubaraks Foreign Minister, declared publicly that Egypt was disturbed by Irans increased influence in the region. [31] For this reason, Egypt under Mubarak worked against Hizbollah and Hamas,

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which were seen as subversive Iranian proxies in a region under Egyptian influence, and even in Egypt itself. Likewise since the fall of the Mubarak regime, Egypt has not freed itself of its suspicions toward organizations financed and directed by Iran. The rise of radical Islam after Mubaraks fall is not expected to improve relations between the two countries. On the contrary: the increased political power of the radical Islamic parties is expected to strengthen religious identity in Sunni Egypt. The hard line taken by some representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt against Tehran is a sign of this trend. [32] Therefore, the continued strengthening of religious identity in Egypt will further highlight the gaps between the Sunni character of the Egyptian government and Iranian ambitions to export the Shiite revolution. When asked in an interview about his position on the Iranian nuclear program, Egypts President responded that the problem can be solved, and not through war. [33] In other words, Egypt under Morsi is still opposed to the Iranian nuclear program. Morsis willingness to speak out publicly against Iranian policy in Syria on the podium in Tehran last month could be a sign of things to come in relations between Cairo and Tehran. Economics and Resources If Egypts development of a military nuclear program depended on its economic situation, the prospects would seemingly be slim. Egypts economy has experienced an ongoing crisis since the change in government, which has caused foreign investors to flee and led to large government expenditures. Unemployment in Egypt is currently over 25 percent (in a country in which 60 percent of the citizens are under the age of 30), the tourism industry has been severely damaged by the events in the country, the national debt has skyrocketed, and foreign currency reserves are low. [34] Nonetheless, it was recently reported that President Morsi, in meetings with the Egyptian community in China, announced[35] his intention to revive the plan to build nuclear reactors in Egypt and even asked for Chinese assistance in building four reactors by 2025.[36] Indeed, in 2006 the Muslim Brotherhood spokesman stated that the Egyptian people are prepared to die of hunger in order to obtain nuclear weapons.[37] North Korea has proven that a regime that adheres to its goal and impoverishes an entire population can obtain nuclear weapons even if international sanctions are imposed on it. Technological Infrastructure The Egyptian nuclear program was launched in 1954 after President Gamal Abdel Nasser signed a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union to build a number of reactors in the country. During the 1960s, Nasser invested significant resources in developing nuclear technological knowhow and attempted to build advanced infrastructures for a nuclear industry. Over these years, Egypt also developed ballistic capabilities for carrying weapons. However, after its defeat in the 1967 Six Day War, Egypt began to promote a policy of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, a policy that gained full expression in the early 1980s and continues to this day. As part of this policy, Egypt signed the NPT and reduced its investment in its existing infrastructures. [38] Anwar Sadat sought to promote a limited civilian nuclear program together with his new allies, the Americans, but he encountered many obstacles. Mubarak also failed to advance the Egyptian nuclear program, and after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, he froze the program entirely. As a result, advisors and nuclear experts left Egypt for Iraq and Canada. In 2004, the IAEA declared that after examining the nuclear research in Egypt, it concluded that Egypt had not carried out nuclear testing. In 2006, the Mubarak government announced that it wished to revive the nuclear program for peaceful purposes. However, the program did not progress, in spite of declarations to that effect by Mubaraks son Gamal from the podium at the party conference.[39] Nevertheless, in 2007, Jordans King Abdullah claimed that he feared a nuclear Iran would cause Egypt to develop its nuclear program.[40] Of the three states discussed here, Egypt has the most advanced infrastructure for a civilian and military nuclear program. Egypt today has two research nuclear reactors and possesses considerable nuclear knowledge and experience. Experts believe that it is one of the most advanced countries in the region in its nuclear knowledge. For this reason, already a decade ago it was argued that if Egypt were to make the political decision to go nuclear, it would find the means of overcoming these obstacles [technological and economic], as other proliferators have done. [41] Therefore, if Morsi does in fact revive the Egyptian nuclear program, as he declared he would last month, he will find a better infrastructure than in Saudi Arabia or Turkey. Political Constraints The changes Egypt is currently undergoing are liable to undermine the three factors that have prevented it from choosing the nuclear path thus far: relations with the United States, the peace treaty with Israel, and its power in the region. First, US pressure since the signing of the Camp David accords has served as an impetus for the Egyptian regime to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Leaders of the protest in Egypt opposed and continue to oppose not only the Mubarak regime, but also its allies and its pro-American policy. The negative attitude of the Egyptian street and the Islamist elites toward Washington is reflected in pictures of the American flag burned in Cairo and harsh statements by Egyptian members of parliament on the regimes relationship with Washington. A poll conducted in Egypt in late March

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2012 revealed that 56 percent of the Egyptian public opposes improved relations with the United States.[42] The deterioration in bilateral relations was reflected in the temporary freeze on US aid to Egypt, and the United States fears that a continued deterioration in relations will lead to reduced US influence over Egyptian foreign policy. Limited US influence will harm the ability of the United States to prevent Egypt from engaging in an arms race if its Iranian adversary achieves superiority in this area. Second, the rise of radical Islam has also damaged Egypts relations with Israel, and those who advocate annulling the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty are gaining power. For decades, Egypt has coped with the strategic assumption that Israel possesses nuclear capabilities. However, the peace treaty and the responsible behavior of Israel, which maintains a non-threatening policy of ambiguity, allowed Egypt to avoid a nuclear arms race. If the peace treaty is annulled, or even if it is watered down and there is renewed hostility and suspicion between Cairo and Jerusalem, this could encourage the Egyptian government to work to acquire military nuclear capabilities in order to maintain a balance of power with Israel and with Iran, Egypts main rivals in the region. Ultimately, one of the main factors in Egyptian policy under the Mubarak regime was the fear of risks that would threaten Egypts economy and its regional power. However, the events of the past year and a half have already led to serious damage to Egypts economy, status, and power in the region. Analysts who claim that Egypt will not abandon its current nuclear policy argue that in light of this difficult situation, Egypt will not incur further risks by deciding to develop military nuclear weapons. However, it is precisely when the power of the Egyptian regime has been undermined both in Egypt and abroad, and its relations with its allies are unstable, that it is more likely than in the past to take risks because it currently has less to lose. Furthermore, military nuclear capability is likely to be seen as an element that could restore Egypts prestige, as an Egyptian Foreign Ministry official suggested during the discussion of the need for Mubaraks nuclear initiativ e in 2006.[43] In other words, it is because of its weakness that Egypt is likely to see a nuclear Iran as an unprecedented threat that requires a decisive strategic move. One expert on the history of the Egyptian nuclear program has pointed to the connection between the future of Egypts nuclear program and the head of the government.[44] The argument reasons that just as it was mainly Mubaraks decision to adhere to the non-nuclear track that shaped Egypts nuclear policy, the identity of Egypts next leader will be a major factor in shaping Egyptian policy. Therefore, although it still appears unlikely that Egypt will decide to develop nuclear capabilities for military purposes, changes in the unstable Egyptian system that undermine the current military approach guiding Egypts decision makers are liable to increase the likelihood that this will occur in the short term, notwithstanding Egypts difficult economic situation. Conclusion Daniel Pipes has argued that public statements by Arab leaders in the Middle East must be analyzed in order to predict their policies. [45] A similar approach is reflected in the analysis presented here, leading to conclusions shared by Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton[46] on the chances of a regional nuclear arms race (table 1). Thus the clear Saudi threats of an arms race in response to the development of Iranian nuclear weapons were found to be credible, with the most likely scenario being the purchase of outside nuclear technology. The Turkish opposition to Irans military nuclear program is consistent with the conclusion that Turkey will face a strategic dilemma, that its decision will be influenced mainly by its relations with Washington, and that there is a reasonable threat that it will become a proliferator in the short term. Egypts vacillation shows that there is a reasonable threat that it too will become a proliferator if the current trends continue: a regime weakened internally and regionally, undermined relations between Cairo and Washington, and increased hostility between Egypt and Israel. Since the situation in Egypt is still not stable, this threat can certainly not be dismissed. Saudi Arabia Motivation Very high Turkey Medium (subject to relations with the United States) No problem Under construction Major influence on relations with United States Egypt High (vis--vis Israel as well as Iran) Problem Existing Erosion of inhibiting factors

Resources Technology Political Constraints

No problem Apparently external Some influence

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Bottom Line

Immediate threat

Probable threat, subject to the nature of relations with the United States

Today, low level of threat, but significant threat if there is an extremist Islamic regime

Those who seek to minimize the threat of an Iran with military nuclear capability are mistaken in their assessment that the nonproliferation regime in the region will likely not be undermined. It would appear that they are hostage to the old approach antedating a nuclear Iran, the upheavals in the Arab world, the tectonic changes that have occurred in the Middle East, and the weakened regional United States stature. The United States will be further weakened if its government fails to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, in spite of its public statements. The race could also encourage other countries that were not discussed in this article but that have taken steps toward military nuclearization in the past to arm themselves, such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya. The ramifications of Irans military nuclearization extend beyond the Middle East, increasing the likelihood that the global nonproliferation regime will be undermined and that an unplanned, uncontrolled, and uncontrollable nuclear confrontation will take place. The gravity of a regional arms race in response to Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons makes it necessary for the relevant decision makers to devote serious attention to the issue, even if there were little likelihood of its realization. However, as indicated by this analysis, it is not at all unlikely that this scenario will take place. Therefore, those who deal with confronting the Iranian military nuclear threat must include the grave consequences of a regional arms race in their considerations. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid=1454238763

-----------[1] 1 For example, the testimony of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton before the Senate on May 20, 2009. See Clinton: Middle East May Start Arms Race if Iran Gets Nukes, Voice of America, May 20, 2009. [2] See for example Yair Evron, Theyre Not Running to Acquire Nuclear Capabilities, Haaretz, August 22, 2012; Steve Chapman, The Arms Race that Wont Happen: Iran and the Phony Proliferation Scare, Chicago Tribune, July 8, 2012; Steven A. Cook, Dont Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, April 2, 2012. [3] Ran Dagoni, Saudi Arabia vs. Iran: Well Use the Oil Weapon because of the Nuclear Program, Globes, June 22, 2012. [4] Chemi Shalev, Dennis Ross: Saudi King Vowed to Obtain Nuclear Bomb after Iran, Haaretz, May 30, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/ diplomacy-defense/dennis-ross-saudi-king-vowed-to-obtain-nuclear-bombafter- iran1.433294. [5] Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profile, Saudi Arabia, http://www.nti.org/country -profiles/saudi-arabia/nuclear/. [6] Yoel Guzansky, Nuclear Programs in the Gulf, in Uzi Rabi and Yoel Guzansky, eds., The Gulf States: Between Iran and the West (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2012), p. 34. [7] Yoel Guzansky details the nature of relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, including the Pakistani commitment to assist Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in confronting the uprisings in their countries in the spring of 2011. See Yoel Guzansky, Saudi Arabias Nuclear Options, in Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz, eds., Arms Control Dilemmas: Focus on the Middle East, Memorandum 122 (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, September 2012), pp. 7390, http://www.inss.org.il/ upload/%28FILE%291346905935.pdf. [8] Ibid., p. 86. [9] Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, Saudis Consider Nuclear Bomb, Guardian, September 18, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/ sep/18/nuclear.saudiarabia. [10] Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profile, Saudi Arabia. [11] Various reserachers address the problem of extended deterrence credibility. See P. K. Huth, Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate, Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 25-48; Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2003), p

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[12] Carlo Masala, Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: A Fuzzy Concept that Might Work? Strategic Assessment 14, no. 4 (2012): 115-22, http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291329721373.pdf. [13] Masala, Extended Deterrence, pp. 121-22; Zachary K. Goldman and Mira Rapp-Hooper, Can a New NATO Deter Iran? The Diplomat, July 31, 2012. [14] Turki al-Faisal conveyed this message in private meetings with British and American military officials. See Dagoni, Saudi Arabia vs. Iran. [15] Mustafa Alani, How Iran Nuclear Standoff Looks from Saudi Arabia, Bloomberg, February 16, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/ how-iran-nuclear-standoff-looks-from-saudi-arabia-mustafa-alani.html. [16] Reiss warns that there are scenarios in which a single state arming itself is liable to bring about the collapse of the nonproliferation regime in areas that are not stable, including the Middle East, as a result of technological development and the increased motivation of regimes in these areas to take risks in order to promote military nuclear programs. Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States, in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004), pp. 34. [17] While in most instances Turkish officials have Iran in mind in calling for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, even though their declared focus is the threat from Israeli nuclear weapons, the Turks have also made clear their opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons when asked to address the issue in detail. [18] Yoel Guzansky and Gallia Lindenstrauss, Turkey and Iran: The Politics of Strange Bedfellows, in Strategic Assessment 14, no. 1 (2011): 95-108, p. 98, http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291304500911.pdf. [19] This statement appears in Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, The Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 23, 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/features/thestatus-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey. [20] Eight percent of the Turks wished to rely on NATO, while some 35 percent argued that Turkey should not develop nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Conditional Support for Nuclear Armament, Edam Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, Public Opinion Surveys of Turkish Foreign Policy 2012/1, http://edam.org.tr/document/ Edam2012Survey1.pdf. [21] An analysis by Goldman Sachs predicts Turkey will be the fourteenth largest economy in the world in 2025. [22] Comments by the Turkish Foreign Minister as reported in Hurriyet Daily News. Anatolia News Agency, Candu Also up for Nuclear Plant Deal, Hurriyet Daily News, April 21, 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ candu-also-upfor-nuclear-plant-deal.aspx?pageID=238&nID=18921&NewsCatID=348. [23] In 2006-7, annual trade between the countries was $543 million, while in 2011, it rose to $899 million, according to the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Pakistan-Turkey Bilateral Trade Stands at $899m, Daily Times, April 20, 2012, [24] According to Greenpeace statistics. See An Overview of Nuclear Facilities in Iran, Israel and Turkey: A Greenpeace Briefing, February 2007, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet -2/ report/2007/2/nuclear-facilities-iran-israel-turkey.pdf. [25] See for example Graham Allison, Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats, Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (2010): 74-85. [26] Gallia Lindenstrauss argues that strengthening NATO and US government guarantees to Turkey should be sufficient to persuade the Turkish government not to develop an independent military nuclear program and pay the price that Iran has paid in promoting its independent program. Gallia Lindenstrauss, Towards Turkeys Own Bomb? Not Yet, in Arms Control Dilemmas, pp. 91102, http://www.inss.org.il/upload/%28FILE%291346905935.pdf. [27] One of the operational arguments raised by the United States is that the weapons in Turkey lack effectiveness because they are stored in a way that does not allow an immediate response in the event of a nuclear attack on

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NATO forces. See for example Bell and Loehrke, The Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey. On the Turkish side, questions have been raised concerning how essential it is to have an independent foreign policy. See for example the comprehensive study by the Edam Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studi es in Istanbul, The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Power, 2011, http://www.edam.org.tr/edamnukleer/edamreport.pdf. [28] Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Gheit Warns that a Nuclear Iran would Force the Arabs to Join the Nuclear Race, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch No. 2929, April 30, 2010, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/121/4124.htm. [29] News Agencies, Mursi Slams Syrian Regime in Iran Speech, Daily Star, August 31, 2012; News Agencies, Egypt: No Intention of Strengthening Ties with Tehran, Maariv, September 2, 2012. [30] Herb Keinon, Analysis: Burying Linkage between Peace Process, Iran, Jerusalem Post, November 30, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/ OpinionAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=197286. [31] Video: AP Archive: Egypt U.S. Iran 2, May 5, 2009. [32] For example, the Vice Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhoods Justice and Freedom Party and Chairman of the Egyptian parliaments Foreign Relations Committee called for a reexamination of Cairos ties with Tehran. See Anissa Haddadi, Egypts Muslim Brotherhood Snubs Iran over Syria Support, International Business Times, February 20, 2012, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/301560/20120220/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-attacks-iran-pledges.htm. [33] Morsi: Israel Has Nothing to Fear in the Wake of the Military Operation in the Sinai, Maariv, August 28, 2012, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/399/045.html. [34] A New York Times editorial of January 20, 2012 analyzes Egypts economic situation. See Egypts Economic Crisis, January 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/opinion/egypts-economic-crisis.html. [35] Morsi: Egypt will Revive its Nuclear Plan, Yediot Ahronot, August 30, 2012. [36] Shaul Shay, Will Egypt Go Nuclear? BESA Center Perspectives Paper no.182, September 13, 2012. [37] Ibid. At a world conference of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2009, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi called on Muslims to develop nuclear weapons in order to fight their enemies. See al-Jazeera TV, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Muslim Nations Must Acquire Nuclear Weapons in order to Strike Terror in Our Enemies, January 23-28, 2009. [38] Egypt ratified the treaty in 1981, and since then it has openly used the policy of promoting a Middle East free of nuclear weapons against Israel. [39] Michael Slackman and Mona El-Naggar, Mubaraks Son Proposes Nuclear Program, New York Times, September 20, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/world/africa/20egypt.html. [40] Dalia Dassa Kaye and Fredric M. Wehrey, A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 49, no. 2 (2007): 113. [41] Emily B. Landau, Egypts Nuclear Dilemma, in Strategic Assessment 5, no. 3 (2002): 22-26, http://www.inss.org.il/publications php?cat=21&incat=&read=660. [42] In the Gallup poll, 28 percent of the respondents wished to improve relations with the United States. Susan Jones, Poll: Egyptian Negativity toward U.S. Surges, as U.S. Prepares to Send Egypt $1.5 Billion, NSNews.com, March 23, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/poll-egyptian-negativity-towardus- surges-us-prepares-send-egypt-15-billion. [43] Kaye and Wehrey, A Nuclear Iran, pp. 111-28. [44] Maria Rost Rublee, Succession and Nuclear Future in Egypt and Libya, in The Nuclear Question in the Middle East: Summary Report No. 4, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2012, pp. 6-8, http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/ qatar/cirs/NuclearQuestionSummaryReport.pdf. [45] Daniel Pipes, Both Sides of their Mouths: Arab Leaders Private vs. Public Statements, Jerusalem Post, August 4, 1993.

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[46] Barak discussed the issue of the Iranian threat during his visit to Tokyo on February 18, 2012. Gili Cohen, Barak: If Iran Goes Nuclear, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt Are Likely to Join It, Haaretz, February 18, 2012, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1644626. Hillary Clinton warned that the Iranian nuclear program would lead to an arms race in the region. News Agencies, Clinton: A Nuclear Iran Would Ignite an Arms Race, Maariv, May 20, 2009, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/893/456.html. Avner Golov is a research assistant at the INSS. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin is the Director of INSS. __________________________________________________________________________________________

Q.

Rift widens on Iranian nuclear deal as Israel, Arabs warn against allowing enrichment By Joby Warrick, Published: October 23 Updated: Thursday, October 24, 7:53 AM E-mail the writer The Obama administration on Wednesday acknowledged a widening gulf with key Middle Eastern allies over nuclear talks with Iran, as Israeli and Persian Gulf Arab leaders pressed for drastic cuts to Irans atomic infrastructure that Tehran has insisted it will never accept. The differences came into stark relief as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared to lecture Secretary of State John F. Kerry at a joint news conference, warning against a bad deal that would allow Iran to retain any capability to make enriched uranium. Iran, which last week began a new round of nuclear talks with the United States and five other world powers, says it will never agree to give up its right to make uranium fuel for peaceful nuclear energy. Iran must not have a nuclear weapons capability, which means that they shouldnt have centrifuges for enrichment, Netanyahu told reporters after a private meeting with Kerry in Rome. ... I think a partial deal that leaves Iran with these capabilities is a bad deal. Administration officials say any agreement with Iran must include a combination of strict curbs on its nuclear activities and aggressive monitoring to ensure that Iran cannot use its nuclear facilities to make weapons. A report released Wednesday by independent nuclear experts said Irans ability to achieve a nuclear weapons breakout could be significantly impeded by imposing restrictions limiting the size of its uranium stockpile and the number and type of centrifuges it operates. Still, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf monarchies have joined Israelis in expressing growing dismay over U.S. suggestions that Iran could be allowed to retain a limited capability to enrich uranium as part of a comprehensive agreement ending the decade-old nuclear dispute. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/rift-widens-on-iranian-nuclear-deal-as-israel-arabs-warnagainst-allowing-enrichment/2013/10/23/3b6ee676-3c23-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html _____________________________________________________________________________________________

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BBC NEWS Mark Urban Diplomatic and defence editor, Mark Urban, Newsnight 6 November 2013 Last updated at 16:57 ET How serious is the 'rift' in US-Saudi relations? Saudi Arabia has invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects, and believes it could obtain atomic bombs at will, a variety of sources have told BBC Newsnight. While the kingdom's quest has often been set in the context of countering Iran's atomic programme, it is now possible that the Saudis might be able to deploy such devices more quickly than the Islamic republic. Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 31

Earlier this year, a senior NATO decision maker told me that he had seen intelligence reporting that nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi Arabia are now sitting ready for delivery. Last month Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, told a conference in Sweden that if Iran got the bomb, "the Saudis will not wait one month. They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring." Since 2009, when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned visiting US special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross that if Iran crossed the threshold, "we will get nuclear weapons", the kingdom has sent the Americans numerous signals of its intentions. Gary Samore, until March 2013 President Barack Obama's counter-proliferation adviser, has told Newsnight: "I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan." What did we think the Saudis were giving us all that money for? It wasn't charity - Senior Pakistani official The story of Saudi Arabia's project - including the acquisition of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads over long ranges - goes back decades. In the late 1980s they secretly bought dozens of CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. These rockets, considered by many experts too inaccurate for use as conventional weapons, were deployed 20 years ago. This summer experts at defence publishers IHS Jane's reported the completion of a new Saudi CSS-2 base with missile launch rails aligned with Israel and Iran. It has also been clear for many years that Saudi Arabia has given generous financial assistance to Pakistan's defence sector, including, western experts allege, to its missile and nuclear labs. Visits by the then Saudi defence minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz al Saud to the Pakistani nuclear research centre in 1999 and 2002 underlined the closeness of the defence relationship. Saudi Arabias undisclosed missile site Defence and security intelligence provider IHS Janes revealed the existence of Saudi Arabias third and undisclosed intermediate-range ballistic missile site, approximately 200 km southwest of Riyadh . In its quest for a strategic deterrent against India, Pakistan co-operated closely with China which sold them missiles and provided the design for a nuclear warhead. The Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan was accused by western intelligence agencies of selling atomic know-how and uranium enrichment centrifuges to Libya and North Korea. AQ Khan is also believed to have passed the Chinese nuclear weapon design to those countries. This blueprint was for a device engineered to fit on the CSS-2 missile, i.e the same type sold to Saudi Arabia. Because of this circumstantial evidence, allegations of a Saudi-Pakistani nuclear deal started to circulate even in the 1990s, but were denied by Saudi officials. They noted that their country had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and called for a nuclear-free Middle East, pointing to Israel's possession of such weapons. The fact that handing over atom bombs to a foreign government could create huge political difficulties for Pakistan, not least with the World Bank and other donors, added to scepticism about those early claims. Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 32

Simon Henderson: The Saudis speak about Iran and nuclear matters very seriously. They don't bluff on this iss ue Director of Global Gulf and Energy Policy Program, Washington Institute In Eating the Grass, his semi-official history of the Pakistani nuclear program, Major General Feroz Hassan Khan wrote that Prince Sultan's visits to Pakistan's atomic labs were not proof of an agreement between the two countries. But he acknowledged, "Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue." Whatever understandings did or did not exist between the two countries in the 1990s, it was around 2003 that the kingdom started serious strategic thinking about its changing security environment and the prospect of nuclear proliferation. A paper leaked that year by senior Saudi officials mapped out three possible responses - to acquire their own nuclear weapons, to enter into an arrangement with another nuclear power to protect the kingdom, or to rely on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. It was around the same time, following the US invasion of Iraq, that serious strains in the US/Saudi relationship began to show themselves, says Gary Samore. The Saudis resented the removal of Saddam Hussein, had long been unhappy about US policy on Israel, and were growing increasingly concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. In the years that followed, diplomatic chatter about Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation began to increase. In 2007, the US mission in Riyadh noted they were being asked questions by Pakistani diplomats about US knowledge of "Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation". The unnamed Pakistanis opined that "it is logical for the Saudis to step in as the physical 'protector'" of the Arab world by seeking nuclear weapons, according to one of the State Department cables posted by Wikileaks. By the end of that decade Saudi princes and officials were giving explicit warnings of their intention to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran did. Having warned the Americans in private for years, last year Saudi officials in Riyadh escalated it to a public warning, telling a journalist from the Times "it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom". But were these statements bluster, aimed at forcing a stronger US line on Iran, or were they evidence of a deliberate, long-term plan for a Saudi bomb? Both, is the answer I have received from former key officials. One senior Pakistani, speaking on background terms, confirmed the broad nature of the deal - probably unwritten his country had reached with the kingdom and asked rhetorically "what did we think the Saudis were giving us all that money for? It wasn't charity." Another, a one-time intelligence officer from the same country, said he believed "the Pakistanis certainly maintain a certain number of warheads on the basis that if the Saudis were to ask for them at any given time they would immediately be transferred." As for the seriousness of the Saudi threat to make good on the deal, Simon Henderson, Director of the Global Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told BBC Newsnight "the Saudis speak about Iran and nuclear matters very seriously. They don't bluff on this issue." Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 33

Talking to many serving and former officials about this over the past few months, the only real debate I have found is about how exactly the Saudi Arabians would redeem the bargain with Pakistan. Some think it is a cash-and-carry deal for warheads, the first of those options sketched out by the Saudis back in 2003; others that it is the second, an arrangement under which Pakistani nuclear forces could be deployed in the kingdom. Gary Samore, considering these questions at the centre of the US intelligence and policy web, at the White House until earlier this year, thinks that what he calls, "the NATO model", is more likely. "I think just giving Saudi Arabia a handful of nuclear weapons would be a very provocative action ", says Gary Samore. He adds: "I've always thought it was much more likely - the most likely option if Pakistan were to honour any agreement would be for be for Pakistan to send its own forces, its own troops armed with nuclear weapons and with delivery systems to be deployed in Saudi Arabia". This would give a big political advantage to Pakistan since it would allow them to deny that they had simply handed over the weapons, but implies a dual key system in which they would need to agree in order for 'Saudi Arabian' "nukes" to be launched. Others I have spoken to think this is not credible, since Saudi Arabia, which regards itself as the leader of the broader Sunni Islamic 'ummah' or community, would want complete control of its nuclear deterrent, particularly at this time of worsening sectarian confrontation with Shia Iran. And it is Israeli information - that Saudi Arabia is now ready to take delivery of finished warheads for its long-range missiles - that informs some recent US and Nato intelligence reporting. Israel of course shares Saudi Arabia's motive in wanting to worry the US into containing Iran. Amos Yadlin declined to be interviewed for our BBC Newsnight report, but told me by email that "unlike other potential regional threats, the Saudi one is very credible and imminent." Even if this view is accurate there are many good reasons for Saudi Arabia to leave its nuclear warheads in Pakistan for the time being. Doing so allows the kingdom to deny there are any on its soil. It avoids challenging Iran to cross the nuclear threshold in response, and it insulates Pakistan from the international opprobrium of being seen to operate an atomic cash-and-carry. These assumptions though may not be safe for much longer. The US diplomatic thaw with Iran has touched deep insecurities in Riyadh, which fears that any deal to constrain the Islamic republic's nuclear program would be ineffective. Earlier this month the Saudi intelligence chief and former ambassador to Washington Prince Bandar announced that the kingdom would be distancing itself more from the US. While investigating this, I have heard rumors on the diplomatic grapevine, that Pakistan has recently actually delivered Shaheen mobile ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, minus warheads. These reports, still unconfirmed, would suggest an ability to deploy nuclear weapons in the kingdom, and mount them on an effective, modern, missile system more quickly than some analysts had previously imagined. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia showed itself ready to step in with large-scale backing following the military overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi's government. Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran

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There is a message here for Pakistan, of Riyadh being ready to replace US military assistance or World Bank loans, if standing with Saudi Arabia causes a country to lose them. Newsnight contacted both the Pakistani and Saudi governments. The Pakistan Foreign Ministry has described our story as "speculative, mischievous and baseless". It adds: "Pakistan is a responsible nuclear weapon state with robust command and control structures and comprehensive export controls." The Saudi embassy in London has also issued a statement pointing out that the Kingdom is a signatory to the NonProliferation Treaty and has worked for a nuclear free Middle East. But it also points out that the UN's "failure to make the Middle East a nuclear free zone is one of the reasons the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rejected the offer of a seat on the UN Security Council". It says the Saudi Foreign Minister has stressed that this lack of international action "has put the region under the threat of a time bomb that cannot easily be defused by maneuvering around it". http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24823846 ____________________________________________________________________________________________ If Iran gets nuclear weapons, so will Turkey: Israeli Defense Minister Hurriyet
October/31/2012`

ISTANBUL Israel's Defence Minister Ehud Barak attends the weekly cabinet meeting in Jerusalem October 14, 2012. Israel's cabinet announced on Sunday a January 22 date for a national election, a ballot that opinion polls predict Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will win. Israel's Defence Minister Ehud Barak attends the weekly cabinet meeting in Jerusalem October 14, 2012. Israel's cabinet announced on Sunday a January 22 date for a national election, a ballot that opinion polls predict Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will win. If Iran starts to build nuclear weapons Turkey would soon follow, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said during an interview with UK's Telegraph. "Saudi Arabia will turn nuclear within weeks according to them. Turkey will turn nuclear in several years," Barak was quoted as saying. Egypt will follow as well, causing a "nightmare" as "nuclear material ends up in [the] hands of terrorist groups," according to Barak. Barak also said Israel had the right to act alone in any intervention in Iraq, even though America and Europe agreed sided with Israel on the nuclear capabilities of Iran. "We all agree that the Iranians are determined to turn into a military nuclear power and we all share the declaration that we are determined to prevent Iran from turning nuclear and all options are on the table, Barak told Telegraph.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ifirangetsnuclear-weapons-so-will-turkey-israeli-defenseminister.aspx?pageID=238&nid=33634&NewsCatID=352
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S. This article was originally published by Global Research in February 2010 under the title Europe's Five "Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States"
Questions for Secretary of State John Kerry on the Bad Deal with Iran 35

According to a recent report, former NATO Secretary-General George Robertson confirmed that Turkey possesses 40-90 Made in America nuclear weapons at the Incirlik military base.(en.trend.az/) Nuclear bombs are stored on air-force bases in Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands and planes from each of those countries are capable of delivering them. (What to Do About Europes Secret Nukes.Time Magazine, December 2, 2009) The Official Nuclear Weapons States Five countries, the US, UK, France, China and Russia are considered to be nuclear weapons states (NWS), an internationally recognized status conferred by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Three other Non NPT countries (i.e. non-signatory states of the NPT) including India, Pakistan and North Korea, have recognized possessing nuclear weapons. Israel: Undeclared Nuclear State Israel is identified as an undeclared nuclear state. It produces and deploys nuclear warheads directed against military and civilian targets in the Middle East including Tehran. Iran There has been much hype, supported by scanty evidence, that Iran might at some future date become a nuclear weapons state. And, therefore, a pre-emptive defensive nuclear attack on Iran to annihilate its non-existent nuclear weapons program should be seriously contemplated to make the World a safer place. The mainstream media abounds with makeshift opinion on the Iran nuclear threat. But what about the five European undeclared nuclear states including Belgium, Germany, Turkey, the Netherlands and Italy. Do they constitute a threat? Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy and Turkey: Undeclared Nuclear Weapons States While Irans nuclear weapons capabilities are unconfirmed, the nuclear weapons capabilities of these five countries including delivery procedures are formally acknowledged. The US has supplied some 480 B61 thermonuclear bombs to five so-called non-nuclear states, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Casually disregarded by the Vienna based UN Nuclear Watchdog (IAEA), the US has actively contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. As part of this European stockpiling, Turkey, which is a partner of the US-led coalition against Iran along with Israel, possesses some 90 thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs at the Incirlik nuclear air base. (National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005) By the recognised definition, these five countries are undeclared nuclear weapons states. The stockpiling and deployment of tactical B61 in these five non-nuclear states are intended for targets in the Middle East. Moreover, in accordance with NATO strike plans, these thermonuclear B61 bunker buster bombs (stockpiled by the non-nuclear States) could be launched against targets in Russia or countries in the Middle East such as Syria and Iran (Quoted in National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005) Does this mean that Iran or Russia, which are potential targets of a nuclear attack originating from one or other of these five so-called non-nuclear states should contemplate defensive preemptive nuclear attacks against Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey? The answer is no, by any stretch of the imagination. While these undeclared nuclear states casually accuse Tehran of developing nuclear weapons, without documentary evidence, they themselves have capabilities of delivering nuclear warheads, which are targeted at Iran. To say that this is a clear case of double standards by the IAEA and the international community is a understatement.

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The stockpiled weapons are B61 thermonuclear bombs. All the weapons are gravity bombs of the B61-3, -4, and -10 types.2 . Those estimates were based on private and public statements by a number of government sources and assumptions about the weapon storage capacity at each base. (National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons in Europe , February 2005) Germany: Nuclear Weapons Producer The rest of this article is not about Middle East countries. ___________________________________________________________________________________________

T. Turkey seen distancing itself from NATO with China missile deal
Special to WorldTribune.com Geostrategy-Direct.com ANKARA Turkey has been seen as withdrawing from NATO. Turkish analysts said the decision by Ankara to select a Chinese ballistic missile defense system marked a major step away from the Western alliance. They said Prime Minister Recep Erdogan was instead promoting Turkish relations with China and the Gulf Cooperation Council. In economic terms, the decision shows that Turkey is breaking its full dependency on NATO for defense systems, Ramazan Tas, a leading Turkish analyst said. Tas, a professor at Turgut Ozal University, asserted that the selection of China HQ -9 by the Defense Industry Executive Committee marked what he termed a strong message to NATO. He said Turkeys program to coproduce a BMD with Beijing represented an alternative

COMMENTARY, May 1, 2013

Turkey Augments Iran Trade
Michael Rubin | @mrubin1971 05.01.2013 - 12:30 PM Its hard to believe that anyoneoutside the White Housetakes President Obama seriously anymore. Its crystal clear that foreign leaders think that the U.S. president is a paper tiger. Enemies calculate that the former senator leading a team of former senators is heavy on rhetoric but light on action. And friends, too, understand that at best Obama is a nice prop around which to take a photo, but when push comes to shove they need not listen to him. Put aside Obamas willful abandonment of his Syria chemical weapons red line, an I told you so moment for hardliners from Pyongyang to Tehran to Caracas and perhaps Buenos Aires, who are likely now chastising any handwringing moderates who worried what crossing Washington might have cost. Friends, too, are getting in on the game. In just a couple weeks, Obama will be hosting Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan at the White House, never mind that Erdoan snubbed the U.S. request that he cancel a planned trip to the Gaza Strip to meet with Hamas leaders, a group which Erdoan has long supported. Key to Obamas strategy on Iran is to simultaneously reach out to Iran and sanction the Islamic Republics nuclear program, never mind that the most effective sanctions for which Obama now takes credit were passed against his objection. Turkey has long been the biggest leak in the sanctions regime, helping Iran bypass restrictions by exchanging gold (and ships) for oil. Despite this, Obama has consistently issued Turkey waivers, despite the fact that such waivers are only meant for governments making goodfaith efforts to extricate themselves from dependence on Iranian crude. While Turkish gold transfers to Iran declined slightly in January something to which proponents in the White House of businessas-usual could pointthe latest reports from Turkey suggest that the gold trade is again thriving. Reports Hrriyet Daily News: Turkeys gold exports Iran has rose more than twofold through March during a time its overall gold trade receded, suggesting the two countries trade of gold for natural gas has been continuing increasingly after a one -month halt in January. Turkey exported almost $381 million worth of gold to Iran in March, Turkish Statistics Institute (TK) data showed , while the overall Turkish gold exports declined by 15 percent to $467.6 million. The exports to Iran and United Arab Emirates (UAE) have undertaken 92 percent of the countrys overall exports.

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Erdoan is visiting the White House later this month, a visit that Turks interpret as Obama endorsement of Turkeys policies. Perhaps it is time for Congress to stand up where the White House wont and offer the Turkish leader some pointed criticism s o that he understands just what damage he does to the Middle East with his tacit support for terrorist groups and Iranian proliferation. Obama may shirk his responsibility to restore American credibility, but that is no reason for Marco Rubio, Rand Paul, Hillary Clinton, and other potential candidates for president in 2016 to do so. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________

U.

RADIO FREE EUROPE

U.S. Exempts 11 Countries From Iran Oil Sanctions

The State Department says 10 countries have qualified for six-month sanctions exemptions and may now restart imports of Iranian crude. September 07, 2013 T he United States has granted exemptions from sanctions to 11 countries that have curbed imports of Iranian oil. The State Department said the European Union had not purchased Iranian oil since July 2012. Because of that reduction, it said 10 countries had qualified for six-month sanctions exemptions and may now restart imports of Iranian crude. They are: Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Britain. Japan also received an exemption because it has significantly reduced Iranian oil imports. The U.S. sanctions are aimed at damaging Iran's economy, as part of moves to force Iran to halt nuclear work that Washington suspects is designed to make nuclear weapons. Iran denies having a nuclear weapons program. The sanctions would block countries from some business transactions with the United States.
Based on reporting by AP and Reuters _____________________________________________________________________________

V.

U.S. renews exemption from Iran sanctions for Asian, African Economies

2013-11-30 10:44:41 WASHINGTON, Nov. 29 (Xinhua) -- The Obama administration on Friday renewed the exemption from sanctions on Iran for a number of economies in Asia and Africa, citing their continued reductions in purchases of Iranian oil. Secretary of State John Kerry announced the immunity for China, India, South Korea and Turkey for their "additional significant reductions," as well as for Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore and Sri Lanka as the four have stopped buying crude oil from Iran. "These additional reductions were determined based on an analysis of these economies' purchasing activity over the previous six months," the top U.S. envoy said in a statement. He said he will notify the Congress of the administration's decision to exempt the financial institutions based in these economies from sanctions relating to Iran for a renewable period of 180 days, the fourth time the nine economies have qualified for this exception. The United States and the European Union have targeted Iran's oil exports, the country's lifeline, and its financial institutions since late 2011 in their efforts to force the Islamic republic to stop its uranium enrichment, an activity they suspect is being used to produce nuclear weapons. Iran reached a first-step agreement in Geneva on Sunday with the P5+1 group of Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States and Germany, under which Tehran agreed to curb its nuclear activities in exchange for eased sanctions by the six powers. The two sides are aiming for a comprehensive deal through negotiations within the next six months.

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Syria tender for food calls for payment from Iran

By Michael Hogan and Jonathan Saul

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HAMBURG/LONDON (Reuters) - Syria tendered to import food on Friday using a credit line from Iran's export bank in what could be a test of last month's landmark deal to ease Western financial sanctions on Tehran. Sanctions also imposed on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government do not cover food but those on banking, asset freezes and the country's two-year-old civil war have made tenders difficult. "This is the first time I have seen a tender from Syria specifically offering payment by Iran," one European trader said. "The tender document is very specific about payment." Syria's General Foreign Trade Organisation is seeking to buy 150,000 metric tons of sugar, 50,000 metric tons of rice, 25,000 metric tons of flour and a range of other food using a credit line from Iran, traders said. "The tender says there must be a written declaration by the bidder to say they are fully briefed on the Iranian credit line agreement between Syria and Iran and that they accept all the contents of the terms and conditions," another European trader said. The agreement between Tehran and major powers appeared to face its first major difficulty on Friday with Russia warning that a new U.S. sanctions move could "seriously" complicate its implementation. "If Syria is indeed able to buy food staples using Iranian funds, concerns that the net benefit to Iran will end up being far greater than the $7 billion outlined in the nuclear agreement are also likely to increase," said Torbjorn Soltvedt of risk consultancy Maplecroft. "The threshold for potential sellers to engage with Iran is now much lower," Soltvedt said. A former U.S. Treasury official said it was feasible that Syria could set up a payment mechanism using Iranian funds held in bank accounts abroad. Such funds have been used by Tehran to pay for its own food deals in recent months. "Iran has so much money outside of the country held in accounts. That I suspect can be used to finance purchases and keep the money flowing to Assad," said the former official, who advises companies on sanctions. CREDIT LINES FROM IRAN The tender specified that funds would come from the Export Development Bank of Iran, a trader said. EU and U.S. officials dealing with sanctions could not be immediately reached for comment. Relaxed banking sanctions on Iran could allow the country to undertake more normal financial transactions with ally Syria, where the United Nations has said evidence implicates Assad in war crimes against his own people. Syria has struggled in recent months to buy food through tenders for rice, sugar, flour and wheat, although some deals have been struck outside of that process using middlemen. Prospects for an especially hard winter have made Syria's plight even more urgent with the U.N. planning its first food airlift into the country. Syria in the past has asked to pay for its food purchases through an unlocking of funds frozen in international bank accounts. Industry observers said its new approach using the Export Development Bank of Iran could encourage more large trading houses to bid in Syrian tenders. "This is pretty clean-cut," said James Dunsterville, an analyst at Geneva-based AgFlow. "You've got tender terms, you've got payment terms, the question is can you do it? If the answer is yes, and if you have time, then it will be done." If the Iranian funding works well, this may be the way Syria undertakes food imports while the current political upheaval continues, he said. Another trader said: "Given there is yet to be complete clarity on this, one way they could make this work is Iran may opt to use their locked funds in various accounts that can be used for food payments. The feeling is this may work as it is humanitarian business." A spokeswoman for global commodities group Cargill declined to comment on individual trades, saying: "Cargill, like a variety of other multinational companies with a global agricultural footprint, does sell agricultural commodities to Iran and Syria as food is specifically excluded from the sanctions." (Additional reporting Sybille de La Hamaide in Paris and Maha El Dahan in Abu Dhabi; Editing by Jason Neely and Dale Hudson)

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X.ISIS Iran Report

November 5, 2013

Determining the Irreducible Elements of an Interim Agreement with Iran: A Freeze Plus
Iran and the P5+1 are set to resume talks on Irans nuclear program on Thursday, November 7 in Geneva. ISIS has developed a list of irreducible elements that should be goal achievements of a negotiated interim agreement. These irreducible elements would accomplish the following goals: Stopping the advance of Irans centrifuge and Arak reactor programs; Extending breakout times; Capping the Iranian centrifuge program and ensuring that it will not expand beyond this cap (in terms of enrichment output) during the next 5-15 years; and Increasing the chance of finding a secret centrifuge or plutonium separation plant. Other, vital questions not addressed here: How to establish adequate transparency in general, including Iran addressing the IAEAs concerns about Irans past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons efforts? How to trade Iranian concessions for sanctions relief? In the longer term, what incentives package is appropriate and how to increase Irans supply of medical isotopes and nuclear electricity? The Freeze Plus interim agreement should seek the following elements: Freezing the Iranian centrifuge program and extending breakout times: Stopping production of near 20 percent LEU; mothballing or disabling the six cascades involved in making near 20 percent LEU at Natanz and Fordow; Reducing stocks of near 20 percent LEU, focusing initially on a time table to eliminate all stocks in hexafluoride form through shipping out of country, blending down, or converting into oxide form. (A longerterm agreement would need to eliminate all stocks of near 20 percent LEU, other than those that are irradiated or about to be loaded into a reactor); Achieving the principle that Irans centrifuge program would be capped to below a certain size, taken initially as about 9,000 enriching IR-1 centrifuges in only three modules at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, a slight decrease from the current level of enriching centrifuges. Other modules at Natanz and those at Fordow would be disabled, so as to increase the time needed for restart; Halting the installation of any more centrifuges. The issue of whether the IR-2m centrifuges, or other advanced centrifuges, would enrich uranium would be addressed later, although in a way that is consistent in terms of maintaining the cap in enrichment output in the third sub-bullet; Spares for broken IR-1 centrifuges could come from the large inventory of IR-1 centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow but not yet enriching (about 8,000 as of August 2013). As a result, Iran would have no need to manufacture more IR-1 centrifuges for years, allowing for the freezing of centrifuge manufacturing immediately; and Establishing remote camera monitoring of all centrifuge plants. Alternatively, inspectors could visit the enrichment sites daily, or near daily, although this step would require substantial IAEA inspector resources, which could be better applied to other tasks in Iran. Preliminary steps aimed at helping ensure Iran is not building another centrifuge plant and increasing the chance of detecting a secret centrifuge plant: Implementation of early notification of construction of new facilities (code 3.1 of comprehensive safeguards agreement); Developing a baseline of information about Irans gas centrifuge program, including a detailed declaration of any centrifuge plants under construction or planned for construction; a declaration of its centrifuge research, development, assembly and manufacturing complex; and a declaration of Irans total inventory of centrifuges; and Other verification measures, such as the Additional Protocol and the monitoring of uranium mines and mills and of the centrifuge complex, would be implemented later. Halting further construction of the Arak reactor, including the manufacture of its fuel. Ensuring that Iran agrees that future sanctions relief requires that Iran address fully and cooperatively the IAEAs concerns about Irans alleged past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons.

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In essence, these conditions amount to a freeze plus a few reductions in the scale of the centrifuge program, a few modest declarations, and a few additional transparency and disablement steps. A longer term agreement would need to include far more detailed conditions on the scope and timing of Irans nuclear program, far more intrusive .
http://www.isisnucleariran.org/reports/detail/determining-the-irreducible-elements-of-an-interim-agreement-with-iran-a-fr/

Y. ISIS Report Getting to the Core: United States Charges Iranian with Missile Export Violations
By Andrea Stricker November 4, 2013

(Excerpt Page Two) Notably, sales of the Russian-made S-300 air defense system to Iran have been delayed due to concern that the sale violates United Nations sanctions against Iran and, in practical terms, the system could be used to render Irans nuclear sites more hardened against aerial attack. The IGLA-S missile system, according to the complaint, is a handheld, portable infrared homing missile system; it can be carried and fired by a single person. The IGLA-S is designed for use against visible targets, such as aircraft and helicopters. Following the May 2012 meeting, the DEA source and Olangian allegedly continued to discuss by e-mail and telephone the specifics of various potential orders. They discussed delivery of the goods to Iran via Herat, Afghanistan, which is near Irans border. Olangian preferred to have aircraft, parts, and missile systems delivered directly to Iran. On August 17, 2012, Olangian working from Iran, allegedly participated in a video conference with the DEA source to examine missile systems. The source again purported to be a weapons and aircraft broker and they discussed the sale of IGLA-S missile systems. The DEA source told Olangian that 10 IGLA-S and 60 cylinders had been shipped to him. Olangian allegedly stated he would eventually want to buy a minimum of 200 IGLA-S systems. http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Olangian-Getting_to_core_4Nov2013-final_1.pdf _______________________________________________________________________________________________

Z. Tuesday, October 29th, 2013 | Posted by WorldTribune.com

Iran and Russia agree: Their missile deal does not defy sanctions
By Miles Yu, Geostrategy-Direct.com Irans government insists Russian-made S-300 missiles are defensive weapons, therefore not subject to the international ban on weapons exports to Iran. The Russians apparently agree, and are thus in open defiance of the U.S.-led effort to isolate Iran that is developing its own nuclear and long range missile programs which are the basis for President Obamas argument for a missile defense system across Central and Eastern Europe. The first installment of the U.S. missile defense system will be implemented with the ongoing deployment of U.S. SM3 missile interceptors in Southern Romania by the Black Sea.

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