Fundamentalism

HOW FAR CAN THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 1989-
2009 BE ATTRIBUTED TO 'FUNDAMENTALIST'

RELIGIOUS EMPOWERMENT?
By
Gurtej Singh
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Strategic Studies at
School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington.
June 2009
Abstract
The Kashmir conflict 1989-2009 is a representation of ‘fundamentalist’ religious
empowerment. This conflict is not a stand-alone phenomenon. The origins of this
South Asian conflict could be traced back to the fundamentalist Hindutva
mindset that preceded the two-nation theory of Pakistan and subsequent
Islamisation by decades, especially the way Hindu institutions were protected
and flourished during the colonial period. This study develops a framework of
understanding how India and Pakistan are constantly perched on the precipice of
war since 1947, caught in “a paired-minority conflict”, engaging occasionally in
the battleground but increasingly in games of stealth and intelligence. Indian
strategic culture does not accept the legitimacy of Pakistan while the latter is
entangled in the mindset of strategic inferiority and displaying a lack of
professionalism. The nuclear tests of 1998 transformed India into a winner and an
emerging power, whereas Pakistan is on the verge of a collapse and struggling for
foreign aid. This study develops an argument on how this fundamentalist conflict
gradually progressed to an insurgency in Kashmir with implications beyond
South Asia.
MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh ii

Acknowledgements
There are many people I need to thank for their contribution to this dissertation.
They have all contributed in their own way, making me see the bigger picture
while I spent my formative years in Punjab in the 1970s and 1980s and later when
work took me to Kashmir in the 1990s.
My dissertation supervisor Professor Jim Veitch deserves much credit for
inspiring me to marry my life experiences with academic training in strategic
studies. During this process, Professor Veitch shared his extensive expertise on
conflict and religion, particularly in South East Asia, South Asia and the Middle
East, in counter terrorism, intelligence, transnational crime and religion, and
diplomacy. I am also thankful to Negar Partow who as a course lecturer for some
of the strategic studies papers enhanced my knowledge about Islamisation, the
Middle East and terrorism. The library staff of the university deserves all the
praise for helping me whenever I faced a problem with referencing software or
with interloan requests for books
Finally, I would like to thank those who have kept me sane while I wrote this
dissertation. My wife, Amarjit Kaur, who has been wonderful and supportive and
my children who gave me a quiet space to write. My colleagues at work; Michael
Flett, Foreman Foto, and Stephen Collins who accommodated me all the while,
when I would take a day off at short notice for research purposes. Stephen
deserves a special mention as he not only took a keen interest in various events
related to this dissertation but also read the draft for me and offered valuable
suggestions.
MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh iii

It is a standard academic convention to state that while these people have
provided help and information, all faults are my own. The facts presented in this
dissertation are, to the best of my knowledge, indeed the truth and properly
referenced. Any mistakes are regretted and accidental.
MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh iv

Table of contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ ii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................iii
Table of contents ............................................................................................................. v
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Statement of the problem and research question .............................................. 5
1.2 Purpose and significance of the study ................................................................. 9
1.3 Structure of this study ......................................................................................... 10
1.4 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 12
Chapter 2: Revivalism ................................................................................................... 14
2.1 Fundamentalism .................................................................................................. 14
2.2 Hindutva .............................................................................................................. 16
2.2.1 Hindutva as an ideology............................................................................... 17
2.2.2 Origin of Hindutva ....................................................................................... 19
2.2.3 Hindutva on the front .................................................................................. 23
2.3 Two-nation theory and Islamic fundamentalism ............................................ 25
2.3.1 Background .................................................................................................... 27
2.3.2 Birth of Pakistan ........................................................................................... 28
2.3.3 End of a secular era ...................................................................................... 31
2.3.4 Islamisation ................................................................................................... 34
2.3.5 Conceptual analysis...................................................................................... 37
Chapter 3: Paired-minority conflict ............................................................................ 40
3.1 Strategic oversight ............................................................................................... 45
3.2 Staying ahead ....................................................................................................... 47
3.3 Enticing Pakistan ................................................................................................. 50
3.3.1 The Kargil war ............................................................................................... 50
3.3.2 Ganga hijacking ............................................................................................ 51
3.3.3 Operation Topac ........................................................................................... 53
3.3.4 Track Two Diplomacy .................................................................................. 55
3.4 Punjab conundrum ............................................................................................. 57
3.5 Indian federalism ................................................................................................ 65
Chapter 4: Kashmir and the strategic issues .............................................................. 71
4.1 Genesis of the current phase of insurgency ...................................................... 71
4.2 Between the lines ................................................................................................ 74
4.3 Strategic cultures of India and Pakistan ........................................................... 78
4.4 Kashmir: Nuclear flashpoint .............................................................................. 83
Chapter 5: Conclusion and strategic implications .................................................... 87
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 87
5.2 Findings ................................................................................................................ 88
5.3 Strategic implications ......................................................................................... 90
Bibliography................................................................................................................... 94
MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh v

Chapter 1: Introduction
Kashmir is widely known as a disputed region since 1947 when India became
independent while Muslim majority areas of India were carved out as Pakistan—
East Pakistan and West Pakistan.1 However, during the two wars between India
and Pakistan in 1947-8 and 1965 over Kashmir, Kashmiris did not participate in
the wars as a populace. Kashmiris rather, were responsible for “unravelling a
carefully knit Pakistani strategy of infiltration” that aimed at capturing the Indian
Kashmir in 1965.2
The 1947-8 war, as mentioned before, ended up in the formation of a cease-fire
line in Kashmir dividing it between India and Pakistan on 1 January 1949.3 After
the cease-fire, a United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
was stationed in the divided Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line.4
Another India-Pakistan war in 1971 ended with the birth of Bangladesh—a
separate country—from what was previously known as East Pakistan. India and
Pakistan have remained actively hostile since 1971 and at least on four occasions
they were on the brink of yet another war.5 According to Chari and others, these
four occasions included: India’s “Brasstacks” military manoeuvres (1986-87), the
Kashmir insurgency (1990), Kargil (1999), and border confrontation (2001-02). It
is however, not clear why they chose to omit the Siachen Glacier event that
1
Sumit Ganguly, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass,
2003), Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947-1966 (London,: Routledge & K. Paul, 1966), Victoria
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999).
2
Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge; New York:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 3.
3
Robert Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 61-62.
4
For details about this Observer Group, visit:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/index.html
5
P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American
Engagement in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). See Chapter 1.
MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh 1

occurred in 1984 from this list, despite the fact Chari and others cover this event
covered in detail in the second chapter of their book.
After the 1971 war, India, enjoying a dominant position, entered into a bilateral
agreement with Pakistan in 1972, settling all the disputes, including Kashmir.
Named after the Indian hill station of Simla, where the Indian and Pakistani
prime ministers met, the Simla Agreement was approached by India as an end to
the UN resolution on Kashmir, whereas Pakistan considered this agreement a
supplement to the ongoing efforts for resolving the disputes. Nevertheless, the
Simla Agreement was successful in pushing Kashmir out of international
attention for some time.6
Subsequently, in Pakistan during the 1980s, the army dictator General Zia-ul-Haq
started his Islamisation campaign in an effort to legitimise his rule rather than
anything else.7 Fuller adds that the Zia regime was a watershed event for the
Islamisation of Pakistani politics. He spells out some additional developments
supporting this change brought around by Zia that include; tacit public support
for making Pakistan an Islamic state; the need to show a different face of Islam
from what was earlier introduced by Bhutto in the 1970s; nine political parties
that campaigned against Bhutto in the past adopted “Order of the Prophet, as the
basis for future Pakistani policy”; global Islamic movement affecting Pakistan;
Zia’s personal pursuit of an Islamist ideology; and the use of Islam for legitimising
6
———, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2003), pp. 41-42.
7
Graham E. Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan: Its Character and Prospects", no. Rand/R-
3964-USDP (1991)., pp. 8-12

Zia’s regime while shaping Pakistani foreign policy on Afghanistan inter alia
confrontation with the erstwhile Soviet Union.8
On the other hand, the 1980s were also a defining moment in Indian politics.
During the 1980s, a Hindu nationalist movement emerged as a powerful
phenomenon that totally changed the religious and political scenario in India.
This movement was led by “the militant organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS)”.9 Hindu nationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth-century
Hindu revivalism that was also closely linked to India’s freedom moment.10 Malik
and Vajpeyi state that the current version of Hindu nationalism gained currency
when it was adopted by “India's Westernized middle classes” asserting the
preponderance of Hindu cultural traditions as the national mainstream.11
Ollapally identifies Hindu nationalism as Hindutva, which became a formidable
force in the 1980s at the cost of secularism in India, eclipsing “Nehruvian”
secularism.12 Ollapally identifies the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the
champion of Hindutva, which espouses the Savarkar and Golwalkar branding of
India as a land of Hindus. Chapter two discusses the concept of Hindutva in
detail.
Compared to the Hindu and Islamic religious movements in India and in
Pakistan, the insurgency in Kashmir surfaced as late as in 1989. This is despite the
8
Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, p. 9
9
Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 3.
10
Yogendra K. Malik and Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi, "The Rise of Hindu Militancy: India's Secular
Democracy at Risk," Asian Survey 29, no. 3 (1989): pp. 311-12.
11
ibid.: p. 313.
12
Deepa Mary Ollapally, The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge, UK; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 48.

fact that Kashmir remained a disputed region since 1947, as mentioned before.
Nonetheless, this insurgency has added a new strategic perspective to the India
Pakistan conflict due to Kashmir’s proximity to Afghanistan, central Asian states
and China.13 Harshe claims that Kashmir has become a conduit for the flow of
drugs, arms, and cross-border terrorism. He further claims that events in Kashmir
have implications for the wider region around it—beyond India and Pakistan. On
the other hand, while elaborating the trend of the spread of religious
fundamentalism for his clash of civilisations theory, Huntington visualises that
Kashmir and the military balance in South Asia will perpetuate the India Pakistan
conflict, paving the way for a clash of Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism.14
Huntington further states that with the end of the Cold War, the world order has
changed, where many countries are discovering new friends and foes, where
armament and territories are adding to the already rising number of conflicts.
Swami has gone to the extent of calling this Kashmiri insurgency a “nuclear
jihad”.15 He elaborates that with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and
Pakistan, the chances of using the nuclear option in order to bring an end to the
otherwise endless war in Kashmir have increased, which has now taken this
conflict to a disastrous level. In the same way, the Kashmir dispute in its current
status has also been termed as the nuclear flash point of South Asia with a likely
13
Rajen Harshe, "India-Pakistan Conflict over Kashmir: Peace through Development Cooperation," South
Asian Survey 12, no. 1 (2005): p. 52.
14
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York;
London: Free, 2002), p. 127.
15
Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, 1st ed.
(London; New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 172.

scenario of a nuclear war becoming a reality.16 The nuclear factor has wider
implications and it has actually increased the chances of a war between India and
Pakistan where a nuclear deterrence has “no reliable antidote to the Kashmir
dispute”.17 Wirsing asserts that the India Pakistan conflict is not Kashmir
dependent, while the latter is being used as a pretext.
Since 1989, Kashmir has lost more than 30,000 lives while the economy has
suffered a great deal.18 Burki adds that with a slow economic growth rate,
Kashmir is now one of the poorest states of India. Kashmir’s two areas of
commerce—handicrafts and tourism—have badly suffered during the past
decades.
1.1 Statement of the problem and research question
In the July-August 2003 issue of the Atlantic, ten Rand analysts identified ten
international-security developments that were not getting the attention they
deserved.19 Among them, according to Rollie Lal of Rand, is the commitment to
secularism that India has emphasised since its independence in 1947, which is
under threat from an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism that equates Indian
national identity with Hindu religious identity. This factor of Hindu nationalism
is totally absent from literature on the Kashmir conflict.
16
http://www.cdi.org/adm/1214/index.html and Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion
into International Relations, 1st ed., Culture and Religion in International Relations (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004), p. 71.
17
Robert Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (ME Sharpe,
2003), p. 8.
18
S. J. Burki, Kashmir: A Problem in Search of a Solution (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace,
2007), p. 5.
19
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200307/rand

During a panel discussion of South Asian experts on Navnita Chadha Behera’s
book, Demystifying Kashmir on 25 January 2007, Ashley Tellis pointed to a
“psychological status quo” while discussing the relationship between India and
Pakistan.20 What does this status quo mean and why it is psychological? Tellis did
not go into the historical aspect of this status quo as it was beyond the scope of
the 25 January 2007 discussion. However, for the purpose of this study, Tellis’
remark points to and stimulates a link to religious empowerment that is already
being debated as identity-politics from the perspective of reinventing religious
identities of various ethnicities in India.21
In addition to identity-politics, Pakistan is deeply rooted in an Indian frame of
mind, which Cohen terms as “Indian insecurity” while he discusses generations
and traditions.22 Cohen’s coined term “a paired-minority conflict”, which
deliberates on perceptions of identity, gradually flows on to the unsettled dispute
of Kashmir. Cohen states that minority in this context does not necessarily mean
small numbers but a feeling of being threatened. In spite of a decisive war
between India and Pakistan in 1971, relations between India and Pakistan did not
improve. The background situation kept on changing with the ever evolving
thinking, response and actions of political leadership, both in India and
Pakistan— especially the role of Pakistani army dictators.
20
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/0125india/20070125.pdf
21
Bidyut Chakrabarty, Communal Identity in India: Its Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth
Century (New Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
22
Stephen P. Cohen, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir," Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 4 (2002): pp. 32-
33.

Map 1. Jammu and Kashmir Area.23
The Kashmir dispute has existed since 1947, but local peace in Kashmir was never
a matter of concern until 1989. This leads us to a question of whether Kashmir is
the cause of the India Pakistan conflict or if it is a symptom of this conflict.
23
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kashmir.pdf

Researchers like Wirsing are convinced—as mentioned before—that Kashmir is
not the reason for the India Pakistan conflict. As such, there is a need to
understand this phenomenon with a constructivist theory lens. This theory puts
emphasis on norms, rules, identities and institutions “for actors with a given
identity”.24 Not to mention, some researchers have also examined the Kashmir
dispute from a realist and revisionist perspective.25 Discussing from a realist
point of view, Frey is unable to pinpoint if Indian nuclear tests were actually a
reaction to the growing power of China. Frey also mentions the Indian nuclear
tests were a strategic loss in relation to Pakistan, as India would never be able to
win a nuclear war with Pakistan. Meanwhile, Mitra looks at India Pakistan
relations to all intents and purposes as a Hindu-Muslim conflict emphasising
democratisation when he constructs his case against the standard “structural
realist” perception of India.26 But Mitra stops short of making it clear if this
democratisation would ultimately lead to self-determination for Kashmiris and
other ethnicities of India or not.
Apparently, Cohen’s term “paired-minority conflict” sits well within the sphere of
the India Pakistan conflict and will be tested as a theory with a constructivist lens
in this study. Therefore, the research question is:
How far can the Kashmir conflict 1989-2009 be attributed to
'fundamentalist' religious empowerment?
24
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," in
Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane,
and Stephen D. Krasner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), p. 251.
25
K. Frey, "State Interests and Symbolism in India's Nuclear Build-Up", Heidelberg Papers in South
Asian and Comparative Politics, http://archiv, ub. uni-heidelberg.
de/volltextserver/volltexte/2003/4104/pdf/hpsacp8. pdf (2002).
26
S. K. Mitra, "War and Peace in South Asia: A Revisionist View of India-Pakistan Relations",
Contemporary South Asia 10, no. 3 (2001): p. 363.

1.2 Purpose and significance of the study
The goal of this study is to explore whether or not Kashmir is a deadlock in the
India Pakistan conflict. Secondly, is the violence in other parts of India
attributable to Kashmir? In the case of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks,
Bruce Hoffman clearly found the Mumbai attacks “of a completely different
magnitude and intensity”.27 Even Christine Fair was sceptical about the pattern
of Mumbai attacks, “Did you see any suicide bombers? And there are no
fingerprints of Lashkar. They don’t do hostage-taking and they don’t do
grenades”.28 However, in her 11 March 2009 testimony before the Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection, United States House of Representatives, Fair remarked, “November
2008 attack bares many hallmarks of previous LeT attacks……….. Like previous
LeT attacks in Mumbai and elsewhere, this assault involved exclusively soft
targets with little or no defenses”.29 LeT or Lashkar-e-Taiba is a terrorist outfit
that has lost 1,106 of its cadres in Kashmir.30 As such, it is important to position
Kashmir within the larger India Pakistan conflict where a researcher like Kaye
believes that the Islamic view of seeing conflict as a jihad is “energizing an
already-growing Hindu nationalist movement in India”.31 Kaye states that the
peace efforts in the last 60 years have not been able to extract India and Pakistan
out of the Kashmir dispute. Noticeably, Kaye’s observation is limited to the last
60 years and Kaye has not tried to explore what happened before that. Whereas
27
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20308
28
http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/lets_not_jump_the_gun.php?
29
Christine Fair, "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-E-Taiba (Let) Attack
Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai," RAND CT320 (2009): p. 12.
30
Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006),
p. 161.
31
Dalia Dassa Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007), p. 76.

there is a need to examine the period before 1947 to better understand the
conflict. Therefore, in order to study "How far can the Kashmir conflict 1989-2009
be attributed to 'fundamentalist' religious empowerment?" this study will go
beyond the period mentioned before for a strategic investigation, otherwise this
study will be reduced to a mere symptomatic counterterrorism study focussing
on the tactics of terrorists and the operational response of the authorities.
Terrorists are, of course, a nuisance but “they hardly pose threats to the fabric of
a society or the security of the state”.32 Therefore, this strategic investigation will
be done with a view to finding the cause of the problem, the growth of
fundamentalism and understanding the strategic implications of this conflict in
the longer run.
1.3 Structure of this study
In addition to this introductory chapter, this study will have four more chapters.
Chapter two will provide the key facts and an historical view on the emergence of
religious revivalist movements in India under the British Raj, with the subsequent
development of a two-nation theory that led to Indian independence and the
birth of Pakistan on the basis of religion in 1947. Gradually this discussion will
flow into the post-1947 period. This assessment will help in understanding
whether the aforementioned religious revivalist movements were akin to
fundamentalism. Going back to the British Raj is important, as Hindu revivalism
started in the eighteenth century as mentioned before on page three. This
enquiry is important, as the current identity-politics debates in India, as
mentioned before, are claiming that different religious identities were
32
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Continuity of International Politics," in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the
Future of Global Order, ed. Ken Booth and Timothy Dunne (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 349.

unnaturally reinvented under colonial rule. Blaming colonialism for the
reinvention of identities is very much contestable as available literature points to
a post-1947 radicalisation of Hinduism, which is trying to re-write history.33
The thrust of chapter three will be on Cohen’s “paired-minority conflict” and an
assessment of events by sequencing them with a constructivist lens. This chapter
will first discuss the strategic oversight and how various events unfolded after the
1971 India Pakistan war. While introducing intelligence related issues, the chapter
will also discuss the militancy era of Punjab—often mentioned as a forerunner of
insurgency in Kashmir. Finally, aspects of Indian federalism will be discussed in
this chapter to understand the centre-state relation in India.
Chapter four will examine the strategic aspects of the rise of Kashmir insurgency
in 1989 and how the military exercises of India and Pakistan affected it. In order
to see the bigger picture, strategic cultures of India and Pakistan will also be
discussed. Finally, this chapter will look at the 1998 nuclear tests and their impact
on the Kashmir issue. This chapter will also explore whether the nuclear stand-off
in the region is linked to an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism or whether it
is a defence against the nuclear aspirations of Pakistan. On the whole, this
chapter will examine the evidence and generalisations to provide alternative
33
The literature for a detailed discussion will include: Dipesh Chakrabarty et al., From the Colonial to the
Postcolonial: India and Pakistan in Transition (New Delhi ; New York [N.Y.]: Oxford University Press,
2007), Vasudha Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harishchandra and
Nineteenth-Century Banaras (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), Hansen, The Saffron Wave:
Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot, The
BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), David E. Ludden,
Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, 2nd ed. (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2005), John Zavos, The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India (Delhi;
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

explanations for the thrust areas: identity and religious empowerment and
paired-minority conflict.
The current identity-politics in India and the historical involvement of the army
in the governance of Pakistan have strengthened “orthodoxy and dogmatism” for
a “heightened nationalism, unity and consensus” by artificially inventing enemy
images.34 India and Pakistan want more than what was decided for them in 1947.
A majority Hindu Indian frame of mind still does not accept the two-nation
theory within South Asia while Pakistan wants to champion the cause of Muslims
of South Asia. A paired-minority conflict mind-set in this situation artificially
invents enemy images for whipping up religious empowerment. A disputed area
like Kashmir becomes a natural choice as a conflict arena for India and Pakistan.
The fifth and final chapter will present the findings and implications of the India
Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and suggest recommendations for long term peace
in the region.
1.4 Methodology
This study will test Stephen Cohen’s term “paired-minority conflict” with a
constructivist lens as mentioned before. The two main traditions of international
politics are realism, which begins and ends everything with a state and its
interaction—war and use of force—with other states while the second tradition,
liberalism, projects various states working with each other in harmony.35
34
Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 25.
35
Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 5th ed.
(New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005), p. 5.

However, there are certain situations which are difficult to understand with
either of the two traditions mentioned before. Constructivism gained currency
after the end of the Cold War when the traditional realism and liberalism
theories failed to explain its abrupt end.36 Similarly, it is also difficult to explain
with the help of traditional theories, how solid the alliance made by some former
Soviet states with Western countries is on the basis of democracy and free
economy.37 For a dispute like Kashmir, it is important to decide whether it is a
territorial issue or a positional issue where India is looking at maintaining
hegemony in South Asia.38 Nye suggests that constructivism is able to fill this
empty space but he considers constructivism more an approach rather than a
theory.39 According to Chatterjee, constructivists are able to explicate conflicts at
all levels.40 In view of the methodology discussion so far, this study will remain
research question driven (as mentioned in section 1.1). Constructivism will only
be employed to augment the discussion as and when required.
36
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999), p. 4.
37
Virginia Q. Tilley, "The Role of State in Ethnic Conflict: A Constructivist Reassessment," in
Constructivism and Comparative Politics, ed. Daniel M. Green (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p.
167.
38
Michael P. Colaresi, Karen A. Rasler, and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics:
Position, Space and Conflict Escalation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 171.
39
Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, p. 8.
40
Shibashis Chatterjee, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: A Constructivist Reading", South Asian Survey
12, no. 1 (2005): p. 87.

Chapter 2: Revivalism
This chapter will focus on the literature that discusses the growth of
fundamentalism in South Asia. This chapter will start by exploring the religious
revivalism movement during the British Raj and the continuation of such a
movement in post-1947 India and Pakistan. This chapter will also examine why
religious revivalism that took place during the British Raj continued to flourish
later on. This chapter will also explore how this dispute made India and Pakistan
fight wars, how it became part of the cause in the rise of insurgency in Kashmir
and the subsequent nuclear stalemate. This chapter will emphasise direct quotes
in order to bring forth the essence for putting things in a proper perspective.
2.1 Fundamentalism
The dictionary meaning of fundamentalism is as follows:
1. A usually religious movement or point of view characterized by a return to

fundamental principles, by rigid adherence to those principles, and often by
intolerance of other views and opposition to secularism.
2.
a. Fundamentalism: An organised, militant Evangelical movement
originating in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century in
opposition to Protestant Liberalism and secularism, insisting on the
inerrancy of Scripture.
b. Adherence to the theology of this movement.41
This study will focus on part one of the above definition as part two is beyond the
scope of this study. Part two of the definition that deals with the Evangelical
movement is not comparable—for the purpose of this study—to the context of
fundamentalism in South Asia.42
41
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary/entry/fundamentalism
42
―fundamentalism.‖ Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Encyclopædia Britannica Online Library Edition.
31 March 2009 <http://www.library.ebonline.co.nz/eb/article-252670>.

Altemeyer and Hunsberger define religious fundamentalism as an idea that
“there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental,
basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this
essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be
vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the
fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and
follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity.”43
Similarly, fundamentalism “is one of the most significant political phenomena of
our time. Since the Iranian Revolution, purported fundamentalist movements
have risen to the highest levels of power in five countries—in Iran in 1979, in the
Sudan in 1993, in Turkey, Afghanistan, and India in 1996, and in India again in
1998 and 1999. There have been even more frequent penetrations by
fundamentalist movements into the parliaments, assemblies, and political parties
of such countries as Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and the United
States”.44 Almond and others have pointed out that fundamentalism rose three
times during the 1990s in India. They have also explored the origins of
fundamentalism in India, which will be discussed in the other sections of this
chapter.
Nevertheless, Emerson and Hartman propound that it is modernisation and
secularism that have paved the way for fundamentalism. 45 They discuss Max
43
B. Altemeyer and B. Hunsberger, "Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice,"
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 2, no. 2 (1992): p. 118.
44
Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of
Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 1.
45
M. O. Emerson and D. Hartman, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism," Annual Review of Sociology
32 (2006): pp. 127-30.

Weber’s premise that secularisation gradually transforms into demystification
where the role that religion plays in the lives of people and organisations would
be reduced to the minimum. In this situation, religion would be individualised
and become redundant where people and societies would operate without a
reference to religion. Evaluating this secularisation theory, Emerson and
Hartman observe that the demystification process actually sowed the seeds for
remystification thereby refusing to accept the process of demystification. This
remystification is fundamentalism degenerating into confusion, chaos and
catastrophe when mixed with violence, Emerson and Hartman conclude.
2.2 Hindutva
During the 1980s, the Hindu nationalist movement emerged as a powerful
phenomenon that totally changed the religious and political scenario in India.
This movement was led by “the militant organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS)”.46 This was not a spontaneous development. In post-1947 India,
Hindutva oriented researchers are revisiting the British Raj period with a view to
present an alternative view of Indian history. Reasons for such a development
become evident from tabulated information provided by Huntington where
territory under Hindu civilisation grew from 54,000 square miles in 1920 to
1,316,000 square miles in 1971.47
46
Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, p. 3.
47
See Table 4.1 in Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 84.

2.2.1 Hindutva as an ideology
Hindu right wing leaders have always asserted Indian identity as a common
organic culture and India as a unitary state.48 Behera cites a book, We, or the
Nationhood Defined, written in 1938 by Golwalkar to underline what is meant by
Hindutva:
[T]he non-Hindu people in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and
language, must learn to respect and revere Hindu religion, must entertain no idea
but the glorification of the Hindu nation, i.e. they must not only give up their
attitude of intolerance and ingratitude towards this land and its age-long
traditions, but must also cultivate the positive attitude of love and devotion
instead; in one word they must cease to be foreigners or [they] may stay in the
country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving
no privileges, far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen's rights.49
The scope of Golwalkar’s writings is not limited to Hindu nation alone. His view
point on Germany is equally alarming:
To keep up the purity of the Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world by
her purging the country of the Semitic Races—the Jews. Race pride at its highest
has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is
for Races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimiliated
[sic] into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and
profit by.50
Exploring the origins of the Hindutva, Behera states that “Hindu Nationalism was
first articulated in V.D. Savarkar's 1923 book, Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?” that put
forward the idea of nationality, race, and civilisation as “three pillars” of it.51
While discussing communities belonging to other religions, Savarkar has an
ambivalent stance about Muslims of Kashmiri origin and from other parts of
48
Navnita Chadha Behera, "Kashmir: A Testing Ground," South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 25,
no. 3 (2002): p. 344.
49
ibid.
50
Nandini Sundar, "Teaching to Hate: The Hindu Right‘s Pedagogical Program," in Revolution and
Pedagogy :Interdisciplinary and Transnational Perspectives on Educational Foundations, ed. E. Thomas
Ewing (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 201.
51
Behera, "Kashmir: A Testing Ground," p. 343.

India and for Christians of South India.52 Savarkar states that although by
following the caste system in their lives, those Muslims and Christians prove they
have Hindu blood running in their veins but still they couldn’t be called Hindus
because of their lack of love for the common fatherland. For Savarkar, Muslims
and Christians are also placed outside his pillar—as mentioned before—of race.
The Hindu civilisation, as claimed by Savarkar, predated Egyptian and
Bablylonian times and was established when Aryans started settling on the banks
of the river Indus. Savarkar is not sure about the origin of Aryans.53
The term Aryan did not recently originate in India with the spread of the East
India Company’s Oriental education, as it is claimed by many.54 According to
Ballantyne, Aryanism is an integral part of Indian Vedic literature where the Rig
Veda composed around 1500 BC points to Aryans as pastoral tribes from Central
Asia who came down to settle in northern India and identified themselves as
Arya, meaning noble. He adds that gradual Arya settlement and conflict with
indigenous population further marked out the religious, political, and cultural
lines. Despite this conflict and differences, statements are still made in the
literature which claims that India has remained undefeated throughout the
ages.55 LP Singh claims that only parts of India faced the onslaught in the past,
when it was invaded by foreigners; and since Indians collectively never fought the
52
Essentials of Hindutva by V.D. Savarkar, p. 33. This electronic book (original version claimed to have
been written sometime in 1921-22) is available for download from:
http://www.savarkar.org/content/pdfs/en/essentials_of_hindutva.v001.pdf
53
ibid., p. 4.
54
Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 4-6.
55
L P Singh, "Learning the Lessons of History," in Securing India's Future in the New Millennium, ed.
Brahma Chellaney (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p. 4.

invaders together, India was never defeated. The next sub-section further
explores similar supremacist claims.
2.2.2 Origin of Hindutva
Hindutva did not simply begin in the 1920s with the arrival of the likes of
Savarkar as differences amongst the adherents of the various religions in India are
well archived. Gyandera Pandey contrasts colonialist and nationalist viewpoints
wherein he claims that communalism in India is age-old while nationalists call it
a “problem of recent origins,” which is a handiwork of “elite” colonialists and
natives.56 Pandey attempts to distance himself from the Oriental view of the
communalism of the Europeans by claiming that there was historically no
conspicuous tension amongst people of different religions in India. To drive
home his point about an impeccable India, Pandey quotes an American
newspaper correspondent:
Twenty-five centuries ago before Babylon was struggling with Nineveh for
supremacy, before Rome was founded by Romulus, or Tyre was planting her
colonies; before Greece had contended with Persia, or Cyrus had added luster to
the Persian Monarchy, Bénares had risen to greatness, if not glory. And even
now when most or all of these cities are obliterated by the ravages of time or
sunk in the dust of ages, her temple and stately shrines remain, and it would be
little less than a shame to Britain if those ancient relics should fall by the ruthless
hand of the modern vandal and the utilitarian. An American correspondent in a
Chicago paper, June 1891 cited in Navayuga, 18 June 1891, in Report on Native
Newspapers (hereafter RNP), Bengal 1891, week ending 27 June 1891, p.674.57
Pandey does not divulge his viewpoint on the Mughal (Muslim) rulers of India
before the arrival of the East India Company. The “vandalism” he points to would
mean that all the temples and shrines probably remained intact during the
Mughal period before the arrival of the British. If this is the case, then why did
56
Gyanendra Pandey and American Council of Learned Societies., The Construction of Communalism in
Colonial North India (Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 11.
57
ibid., p. 23.

Hindu mobs destroy Babri mosque in Ayodhaya on 6 December 1992, which was
claimed to have been built on the birthplace temple of Rama during the Mughal
period? Rama is an important god of Hindu mythology and it is a bit surprising
how this American correspondent could have missed out such a significant event.
On the other hand, by claiming a hierarchical distinction, Pandey is trying to
establish an overarching hegemony of the Hindu spiritual centre Banaras.58
Pandey claims that “colonialists historiography” not only limited the scope of
Indian history by narrowing it down as a section of Oriental history but also
started recording Hindu-Muslim riots in an effort to substantiate their claims
about communalism.59 Pandey presents a table on page 25 of his book that starts
with 1809 Banaras riots, which destroyed 50 mosques. Pandey devotes the
remaining chapter of his book to the events of 1809. He provides another table on
pages 30-31 with conflicting accounts of the 1809 riots. He is successful in finding
a few errors about the location of a mosque and a temple within a common
precinct but could not refute the account of even a single riot. Conversely, if the
British started recording riots then chances are there that riots started only when
the British rule brought an end to the Mughal rule with the result that Hindus
felt empowered enough to challenge Muslims in their daily lives.
Elaborating the cow protection factor, Pandey adds that Hindu crowds would
confiscate cows from Muslims and would also get an undertaking from Muslims
58
For a discussion on hierarchical distinction, see: Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for
Research in Constructivist International Relations (Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 33-34.
59
Pandey and American Council of Learned Societies, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial
North India, p. 21.

to not sacrifice cows in future.60 This cow protection was enforced with support
from colonial officials. This development clearly shows that colonialism
empowered the Hindus where they started going to the extreme of interfering
with the practice of other religions. There is no example available if followers of
other religions during the colonial rule ever tried to stop Hindu practices. This is
a clear sign that cow protection gradually grew and became established in British
India. A similar claim comes from another researcher. According to Freitag, the
cow protection movement was a late nineteenth century phenomenon that
flourished in British India.61
This is an important observation, especially when, before the arrival of the East
India Company in India, there was a common maxim amongst the Hindus where
they would refer to Mughal rule as “Ishwaro va Dillishwro va” (The emperor of
Delhi is as great as God).62 Under those circumstances how could the Hindus
have rioted against the people who were of the same religion as the rulers?
Therefore, if the British started recording the instances of riots, the latter
occurred only when the Hindus felt empowered enough under the British rule to
challenge followers of other religions. Dalmia elaborates how Hindu traditions in
Banaras were created out of the blue by the kings of Banaras during the transition
period between the Mughal and the British rule.63
60
ibid., p. 165.
61
S. Freitag, "Contesting in Public: Colonial Legacies and Contemporary Communalism," in Making
India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, ed. David E. Ludden (2005),
pp. 216-19.
62
Gokul Chand Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 4th ed. (New Delhi,: New Book Society of India,
1956), p. 98.
63
Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harishchandra and Nineteenth-Century
Banaras, pp. 64-94.

Similarly, the current political state of affairs of India is a rear-view mirror
presentation of how the political thought and policy evolved during the past
couple of centuries:
Under the British brand of imperialism—indirect rule—the Hindu intellectual

elites were encouraged to codify and render coherent their complex and
variegated Hindu cultural heritage and to view it as a world religion on the same
level with Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Temples, other
cultural centres, and monuments were made subject to the protection of the
state, and temple officials and priests acquired a quasi-bureaucratic status.64
This clearly shows that Hindutva is not a new or elite phenomenon that emerged
during the 1980s. It was always there and surfaced at appropriate times as
mentioned before. Even in the post-1947 India, political leaders never accepted
the division of the country. Khan quotes the first President of India, Rajendra
Prasad declaring that, “I have not lost faith in an undivided India, I believe no
man can divide what God has created as one”.65 After Indian independence, the
thought of Pakistan merging with India sooner than later was not limited to the
first Indian President alone, as mentioned before. Bhartiya Jan Sangh (BJS), a
predecessor of RSS, included the merger of Pakistan with India in its manifesto
during the 1952 elections. However, BJS could never pose a serious political
challenge. Apparently, when a decisive victory for India during the 1971 war with
Pakistan could not satisfy the aspirations of RSS, despite carving out a new nation
out of Pakistan, Hindutva woke from slumber.
Ludden states that Hindutva or Hindu nationalism promotes a Hindu
majoritarianism and cultural nationalism, which includes more than one
64
Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World, p. 174.
65
Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven [Conn.]; London:
Yale University Press, 2007), p. 95.

community. This type of nationalism clearly tries to assimilate and absorb
everyone into this majoritarianism. Ludden adds that within thirty five years of
Indian independence, communalism became a major issue.66 Leading this
Hindutva in India is the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).67 The BJP originates from the
BJS, founded in 1951 by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. BJS was then considered the
political wing of the RSS. It was the BJS that had in its political manifesto in 1952,
as mentioned before, a concept of Akhand Bharat (Undivided India) that looked
at reclaiming Pakistan. Behera propounds that in the post-1947 India, the Hindu
right forced the religious minorities of India to “owe allegiance to Hindu
symbols” as, for the Hindu right, those symbols reflected the Indian identity.68
2.2.3 Hindutva on the front
Mookherjee was jailed in Kashmir in 1953 by the then Indian Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru. Mookherjee soon died in custody and BJS never seriously
challenged the power of Indian National Congress, the only well-structured
political party since India's independence. However, political leaders like Atal
Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani were nurtured within the realm of BJS,
with a low profile. When Indira Gandhi imposed a state of emergency in 1975,
postponing elections and making contested use of major centre government
powers granted to her by the Constitution, the BJS joined a coalition of parties in
active protest. In the 1977 elections, the BJS merged with the new Janata Party, a
unified opposition party. A mixture of socialists, regionalists, and former
Congressmen, the Janata Party was united in its opposition to the Emergency and
Indira Gandhi. The Janata Party defeated Indira Gandhi's Congress Party in a
66
Ludden, Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, pp. 15-16.
67
Hansen and Jaffrelot, The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India, pp. 7-8.
68
Behera, "Kashmir: A Testing Ground," p. 344.

landslide victory and formed a government under Morarji Desai's leadership.
Vajpayee, the most senior BJS leader, became Minister for External Affairs, while
Lal Krishna Advani became the Minister for Information and Broadcasting. The
Janata Party government lasted for only two years, and following its collapse,
Indira Gandhi's Congress came back to power. With the collapse of the Janata
Party, the merged cadre from the BJS re-organised themselves under the banner
of BJP.
In conclusion, Hindu nationalism has successfully “recruited and subsumed
religious sentiments and public rituals into a larger discourse of national culture
(Bhartiya culture) and the Hindu nation, Hindu rashtra”.69 This phenomenon is
capable of keeping India fundamentally Hindu as a civilisation claiming linkages
going back thousands of years, Hansen adds.
BJP gained a momentum with an undercurrent of the 1980s that brought with it
the expansion of coloured television and the telecast of Hindu epics—Ramayana
and Mahabharata. The power of television penetrated the religious message right
into the lounges and bedrooms of the masses.70 Whereas currently, the RSS is
looking at social change through education by infiltrating India’s National
Curriculum Framework for School Education aiming at “indoctrination,
hierarchy, and exclusion”.71
69
Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, p. 10.
70
V. L. Farmer, "Mass Media: Images, Mobilization, and Communalism," Making India Hindu: Religion,
Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India (2005): p. 100.
71
Sundar, "Teaching to Hate: The Hindu Right‘s Pedagogical Program," p. 211.

2.3 Two-nation theory and Islamic fundamentalism
Pakistan as a 60 year old country is still searching for a national identity. Since its
birth in 1947, Pakistan has grappled with factors like ethnic uniqueness, religious
identity, and fledgling democracy.72 The complexity of Pakistani identity becomes
evident with the statement of Pashtun leader Wali Khan who claimed in the mid-
1980s that he had been a Pashtun for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years, and a
Pakistani for 40 years.73 Some researchers, like Talbot and Ernst, state that birth
as a country for Pakistan was hardly a remarkable thing due to the upheavals that
Pakistan suffered in the later part of the twentieth century.
Pakistan was not created as a country with one geographical entity. When
created, Pakistan had two distinct East and West regions. East Pakistan was a
Bengali majority area that could never come to terms with West Pakistan in spite
of having Islam in common.74 East Pakistan ultimately emerged as an
independent Bangladesh in 1971 that brought an end to the bitter chapter of
relations between two Muslim majority regions of Pakistan where Bengali
Muslims were distinctly proud of their regional and lingual identity. Bangladesh
is now a closed chapter of Pakistan history, treated differently by Indian and
Pakistani historians, as Bangladesh was a result of the 1971 war between India and
Pakistan. The war ended when Pakistan troops surrendered to a combined force
72
Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (London: C. Hurst, 1998), p. 1.
73
Carl W. Ernst, "Local Cultural Nationalism as Anti-Fundamentalist Strategy in Pakistan," Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 16 (1996),
www.unc.edu/~cernst/articles/AITZAZ.DOC. This fact has also been highlighted by Ian Talbot on page 1
in his book mentioned before.
74
Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1999), p. 11.

of Indian Army and Bengali separatist organisation Mukti Bahini.75 It is clear that
the concept of nationalism for East Pakistan was different from that for West
Pakistan when the dictionary meaning of nationalism is as follows: “extreme
pride in the history, culture and successes, etc. of one's nation; loyalty to one's
nation; patriotism”.76
Talbot adds that Punjabi domination of Pakistan has always distanced the
Pashtuns away from the common identity of Pakistan.77 Apart from Pashtuns and
Punjabis, there are large Sindhi and Baluch ethnic groups in Pakistan in addition
to tribal groups located close to Afghanistan’s border. One of the main premises
that run in the writings of both Ernst and Talbot is an effort by Pakistan to link
itself to great civilisations of the bygone eras of history—to confront India as a
nation—and still come up with a strong Islamic identity. An argument is offered
by the proponents of Islamic identity that in its absence, Pakistan is not left with
a reason to exist separately from India.
It was the consequence of the 1971 war that Pakistan rulers like Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq tried to strengthen an Islamic identity of the country,
albeit with a variation, as Bhutto was a Sindhi feudal whereas Zia-ul-Haq was an
army General of Punjabi background. However, neither was able to foster an all
inclusive Islamic identity of Pakistan during their respective regimes. Talbot
explores this aspect further and comes up with an elucidation based on three key
points: “the tendency to regard all dissent as a law and order rather than political
issue; the manipulation and repression of popular forces by successive
75
Shahid Javed Burki, p. xvii.
76
The Chambers Dictionary, New 9th ed. (Edinburgh: Chambers, 2003).
77
Ian Talbot, pp. 14-15.

authoritarian regimes; and the uneven relationship between the Punjab and other
regions in the conduct of national affairs”.78 This is the nub of Pakistani identity
and, how it oscillates between nationalism and religious fundamentalism, is
discussed in the next sections.
2.3.1 Background
Pakistan is located in an area that goes back long into the chapters of history.
Ernst describes it as the Indus Basin that is distinct from the Indian sub-
continent and Arab terrain. He adds that inhabitants of this region look to their
Central Asian links and descent rather than accepting any Indian or Arab
influence.79 The Indus Valley civilisation is one of the oldest in the world, which
dates back at least 5,000 years, spread over much of what is currently Pakistan.
During the years 3,000 to 2,000 BC, remnants of Indus Valley culture
amalgamated with the migrating Indo-Aryan peoples. This region underwent
consecutive invasions in later centuries from the Persians, Greeks, Scythians,
Arabs (who brought Islam), Afghans, and Turks. The Mughal Empire of Mongol
and Central Asian mix ruled this area in the 16th and 17th centuries. The British
dominated the region next, in the 18th century, before the independence of India
and birth of Pakistan in 1947. The rivalries between India and Pakistan have not
ended and are currently teetering on the testing of nuclear weapons, with
Kashmir now dominating the centre stage.80
78
Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 1.
79
Ernst, "Local Cultural Nationalism as Anti-Fundamentalist Strategy in Pakistan."
80
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html

2.3.2 Birth of Pakistan
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the campaigner for and the first Governor General of
Pakistan was a man of secular ideology. As a leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah
wanted a state where Muslims could flourish politically, socially, and
economically.81 During the course of his political activities, Jinnah realised that
the Congress Party was conceited and looked down at minorities.82 During the
early 1930s it was the haughty attitude of Mohandas Gandhi that led Jinnah to
give up politics for a while, Blinkenberg adds. However, at the start of the 1940s
Jinnah came up with an idea of two countries when he emphasised that Hindus
and Muslims were two different identities that would never stay together. His
proposal was to safeguard the interests of Muslims who would otherwise be
discriminated against and would never flourish in a Hindu dominated country.
This was formally adopted as a resolution and passed by the Muslim League.
Yasmin Khan quotes a letter of a 23 year-old Muslim bachelor, having completed
a law and a Masters degree, who was still without a proper job because of the
discrimination that he faced. This man was supporting his joint family with the
money left behind by his dead father and was soon going to run out of money if
he were unable to find a job.83
Khan further adds that even as the partition of India became a reality, the
majority of the politicians were of the opinion that India and Pakistan would
merge to become a single country again.84 Although Khan has not delved into
81
Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 5-6.
82
Lars Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan. The History of Unsolved Conflicts, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Instituts
Skrifter, 4 (Kobenhavn,: Munksgaard, 1972), p. 36.
83
Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, p. 101.
84
Yasmin Khan, p. 95.

more details on this point, this type of hegemonic framework of mind spells out
the fears of minorities living in India, especially when the literature clearly shows
that India never existed as a single country with reference to the continuous
migrations and attacks on the inhabitants of the Indus Basin.
Correspondingly, the idea of Pakistan was not a half-baked decision either. As
early as 1930, Muhammad Iqbal generated the idea of a separate state for Muslims
in the area we have described as the Indus Basin. His rationale was two-fold: first,
he wanted to give the Muslims a sense of responsibility where otherwise they
were being wasted in the country they were living in. Secondly, he wanted
Muslims to get rid of the Arab style Islam and bring the masses closer to the true
spirit of Islam.85 What is evident from the view of Iqbal is that he was for a
Muslim majority state ruled by Muslims rather than an Islamic state.
On the other hand, Jamaat-i Islami leader Sayyid Mawdudi was against the idea
of a Muslim country within the wider perspective of Umma. He, however,
changed his tone and opted to settle in the newly created Pakistan. He arrived in
the Lahore refugee camp in a truck from Delhi and lived in poor conditions
before he fully grasped the acute situation and gave a call to Jamaat-i Islami
cadres to volunteer for relief work that included burying unclaimed dead
bodies.86
On the political front, things did not develop ideally in Pakistan. Jinnah died in
September 1948 and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan was
85
Nasim A. Jawed, Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Pre-divided Pakistan, 1st ed.
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), pp. 55-56.
86
Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, p. 176, Ernst, "Local Cultural
Nationalism as Anti-Fundamentalist Strategy in Pakistan."

assassinated in October 1951. This short period of time in Pakistan history is
notable for political dismissals by Jinnah, as the latter would not merely remain a
constitutional head of the State and rather sought a direct political control over
the country.87 Talbot’s inference is supported by Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr that after
Jinnah even the tribal leaders and feudal lords were able to override the Muslim
League and brought down constituent assemblies that clearly reflected Pakistan
as a politically weak nation.88
The fragile political system in Pakistan, Nasr adds, could not survive the nexus of
military, bureaucracy, and feudal lords and eventually crumbled in 1958 when
General Ayub Khan declared martial law in the country and vowed to correct the
anomalies that crippled the country since its birth. Ayub went one step further
and, supported by the President of Pakistan Iskander Mirza, he informed the
then US ambassador in Pakistan that dictatorship was the best system for ruling
Pakistan.89 Ayub assumed the position of Prime Minister and a young Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto was picked up for the post of Commerce Minister. The charm of Ayub-
Mirza duo was short-lived as Ayub set his eyes on the post of President, Talbot
adds. Charges were laid against Mirza that he was planning a counter-coup to
oust Ayub. A delegation of three army Generals summoned Mirza in his dressing-
gown and wanted him to leave Pakistan immediately. Mirza was given less than
an hour to pack as he, accompanied by his Iranian wife Khanum Naheed, had to
buy tickets to London and travel documents from their own pocket. Soon
87
88
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, Religion and Global
Politics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 57-65.
89
Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 146-47.

afterwards, Ayub became the President and he abolished the post of Prime
Minister.
It is evident from these developments in Pakistan’s history that democracy could
never fully develop in Pakistan. The constituent assemblies were dismissed and
individual politicians were toppled at whim. The nexus of army, bureaucrats and
feudal lords were gaining more control of the country and yet there was no proud
nationalistic Pakistan spirit, which is evident from the way Mirza was deposed as
President and exiled in his dressing-gown.
2.3.3 End of a secular era
The Ayub regime from 1958 to 1969 was not without an incident. On one hand
Ayub was obliterating all types of democratic institutions while on the other
hand he also wanted Pakistan to progress economically.90 His economic initiative
brought haphazard industrial development which increased ethnic tensions as
some areas made gains while others remained deprived. The process of crushing
democratic institutions finally targeted Jamaat-i Islami in 1963 when Sayyid
Mawdudi was jailed.91
The first major set-back for Ayub came with the 1965 war with India.92 This war
ended in a stalemate after the Tashkent Declaration where the leaders of Pakistan
and India met due to the Soviet Union intervention. Pakistan, though, did not
lose this war and also successfully repulsed many Indian army advances, yet the
90
Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, pp. 74-77.
91
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan,
Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 41-42.
92
Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood, p. 33.

Indian air attacks on the industrial belt of Pakistan had a devastating effect on
the economy of the country. Zulfiqar Bhutto was the first person to criticise Ayub
on having agreed to the Tashkent Declaration. The problem was compounded by
the deteriorating health of Ayub that took him to the US for an open-heart
surgery in 1966. By this time the political atmosphere in Pakistan was charged
and there were all types of political activities going on.93 There were demands for
an Islamic state by the Jamaat-i Islami while left-wing politicians were
demanding social justice, and Bengali and Sindhis were unyielding on the issue of
autonomy, Nasr adds.
During this period, in the background, Jamaat-i Islami was able to improve its
network and was growing stronger.94 What Mawdudi failed to realise during this
time was that members of Jamaat-i Islami were getting politicised and the
organisation was on the drift of transforming into a political party from a purely
religious group. As a result, according to Nasr, Mawdudi faced revolt from within
the Jammat on a number of occasions where his religious oriented ideas were
challenged by Jamaat members demanding a volatile political action. Mawdudi
was ultimately out-classed from the Jamaat in 1972 where, by this time, Jamaat
had become a formidable challenge in Pakistan politics.
In the meantime, the year 1969 brought a regime change in Pakistan when
General Yahya Khan took the charge of martial law administrator from Ayub. By
this time the existence of Pakistan as a nation was already threatened to the hilt,
Nasr states. Left-wing political elements demanding social justice were
93
Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, p. 74.
94
———, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan, p. 43.

dominating the political circles by challenging the martial law regime.95 Likewise,
Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan was unabated. This enabled Yahya to use
Islam as an instrument that could ensure the survival of Pakistan. Yahya did not
realise that whipping up the Islamic theme would indirectly benefit Jamaat.
Annoyed at the ascent of Jamaat, even the feudal chiefs in Pakistan came up with
an idea of establishing their own political party: Tehrik-i-Istiqlal.96 Tehrik was
established to counter the Jamaat that was rapidly gaining ultra-right ground. At
one stage of this tug-of-war between Jamaat and Tehrik, the army became the
neutral manipulator. But with the ultra-right becoming stronger in the ranks of
the army, Tehrik was soon pushed into oblivion, Ahmed concludes.
Confident of his Islamic strategy, Yahya held general elections in December 1970.
97
The election results were clearly demarcated. East Pakistan Awami League won
the majority and Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was a distant second.
Jamaat did not get more than five per cent of the votes. Awami League, Talbot
states, was all set to form the government that would also rule West Pakistan. At
this stage, Bhutto joined Yahya in denying Awami League a chance of forming the
government. Yahya was baffled at the results as he was assured of hung election
results where he would be able to play the power brokering role among the
political parties while still maintaining his dominant position as martial law
administrator. According to Talbot, efforts to resolve this political situation were
not successful. Neither the Awami League nor Yahya were ready to move an inch
towards resolving the situation. As a result, the Bengali uprising in East Pakistan
95
———, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power, p. 75.
96
Aijaz Ahmed, "Democracy and Dictatorship," in Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship: The Political
Economy of a Praetorian State, ed. Hassan Nawaz Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (London and Totowa, NJ):
Zed Press, 1983), pp. 120-23.
97

gained momentum and after the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, East
Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan to emerge as an independent Bangladesh.
Talbot discloses that during the brief two-week 1971 war between India and
Pakistan, the latter lost half of its navy, a third of its army, and a quarter of its air
force. Indian cease-fire terms saw a surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops in
Dhaka. This defeat made Yahya too frail to continue in office. There was
widespread resentment in Pakistan and unrest among the junior officers of the
army. Talbot adds that Bhutto, who was at the United Nations, was called back to
take over the reins from Yahya as the President and Chief Martial Law
Administrator of Pakistan.
These events from 1958 to 1971, as mentioned before, highlight how the nexus of
army, feudal, and bureaucrats completely crushed the fledgling democracy in
Pakistan. This oligarchy regime fanned Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan while
the West Pakistan ethnicities were yet to embrace Pakistani nationalistic pride
with Sindh demanding more autonomy while Pashtuns and Baluch maintained
their tribal pride. The Islamic strategy of Yayha failed to curb the Bengali uprising
while pushing Jamaat to gain a strong position within the echelons of the army.
Although Yahya was replaced by a politician (Bhutto), it was significant to
observe further developments in Pakistan army having the seeds of Islamisation
had already been sown within its echelons.
2.3.4 Islamisation
Within few days of Bhutto’s rule, a number of army generals were removed and
junior officers were promoted. Bhutto could not keep himself aloof from the

army as he was keen on settling his political rivalries with the help of the army. It
was during 1973-77 that Bhutto used the army to ruthlessly crush the tribal
aspirations of Pashtuns and Baluchs.98 The Afghan king Zahir Shah and the
subsequent Afghan government of Sardar Muhammad Daud was also a
troublemaker element in this tribal rivalry that made the role of the army all the
more important, Talbot adds. It was during this period that Bhutto hand-picked
Zia-ul-Haq and made him Chief of Army Staff. According to Talbot, there were
other reasons for Bhutto to actively engage the army. He was on the re-building
course after the severe loss of Pakistan during the 1971 war with India. This
initiative of Bhutto, according to Talbot, was to keep the new leadership of the
army engaged in political pursuits.
The hand-picked General Zia was not without Islamic colours.99 Zia was a Jamaat
sympathiser and was immensely impressed with the writings of Mawdudi. As
soon as Zia became the Chief of Army Staff, he used his official position to
promote circulation of Jamaat literature among the officers and ranks of the
army, adds Nasr. Not happy at this development, Bhutto was powerless to take
any further action. With the subsequent growing tribal unrest, in July 1977, Zia
ordered the army to arrest the tribal and political leaders including Bhutto, Nasr
reveals.
After assuming power, Zia planned to undo the populism of Bhutto and his
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).100 Two events in the neighbourhood of Pakistan
brought Zia to global prominence. According to Talbot, one was removal of the
98
Talbot, Pakistan: A modern history, pp. 222-27.
99
100
Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, p. 246.

Shah of Iran and the second was the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. These two
events left no option for the US but to embrace Zia as its frontline collaborator.
Before these two events, Zia was not able to progress with his political and
economic reforms.101 To fight communism in Afghanistan there could have been
no better tool than Islam. According to Nasr, during this crucial period not only
the US aid grew from $900 million a year during 1976-79 to $4.1 billion during
1987-93 but also the labour remittance from Gulf countries back to Pakistan grew
from an average $365 million a year in 1975 to $2.4 billion a year in 1988. This
economic flow was enough to generate a feel good factor for Islam in Pakistan.
During this period, Zia was also keen to bring around a permanent and lasting
political change in Pakistan. Zia was aware of the power of army, bureaucrats,
and the feudal lords, Nasr adds. The only dimension that he could add was to
challenge the feudal lords who were the stronghold of the PPP. Zia, in the early
1980s, was able to motivate Nawaz Sharif, a business tycoon to join the Muslim
League and pursue active politics. This Nawaz Sharif ultimately became Prime
Minister of Pakistan in the 1990s. This way Zia was successful in pitting industrial
families against the feudal families, Nasr elaborates.
Similarly, there was a conflict that indirectly gave impetus to Islamisation in
Pakistan. After the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the Shia community in
Pakistan became active and well organised. It was also during this period that the
Islamic push in Pakistan brought Sunni Islam to the fore. Thus a clash of ideology
was all but natural. Inspired by the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, the Pakistani Shia
community refused to pay zakat. Researchers like Talbot and Nasr have discussed
101

this development in detail. A strong Shia procession brought Islamabad, capital
of Pakistan to a halt. Zia gave in and exempted the Shia community from paying
zakat.102 This Shia victory alerted the Sunnis to be more vigilant with their own
institutions and to also match the enthusiasm of the Shias. Subsequently, a lot of
aid was given to Sunni institutions so that they were not overwhelmed by the
Shias.
Later on, Pakistan acted as the launching pad for the jihad (religious war) against
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This aspect maintained the Islamic
momentum taking place in Pakistan. A full discussion of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this study.
2.3.5 Conceptual analysis
So far we have discussed the origin and the formative years of Pakistan as a
nation. It was promoted by leaders who had a secular view but were fearful about
the economic, political and social growth of Muslims in a Hindu majority India.
They did not visualise Pakistan becoming an Islamic state in the later years. We
have also come across several reasons that led to this transformation. Pakistan is
still experimenting with nationhood since its inception. The Indian leaders were
also keen to see Pakistan merging back into India as discussed in sub-section
2.3.2.
On the other hand, Pakistan came into existence with a stronger feudal system
than democracy. On top of that, Pakistan inherited two strong institutions from
102
Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, pp. 270-71. Also see Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the
Making of State Power, pp. 147-48.

colonial rulers: army and bureaucracy. Without a clear national Pakistani
identity, democracy in Pakistan was no match for the nexus of feudal system,
army and bureaucracy. Compared to West Pakistan and its tribal and other
vicissitudes, erstwhile East Pakistan enjoyed Bengali lingual and cultural
homogeneity that ultimately seceded from Pakistan, in spite of a common
religion.
It is clear that Pakistan has not learnt anything from the ethnic lesson of East
Pakistan. For all the problems in Pakistan throughout the 1970s and today,
Islamisation is being projected as the panacea whereas the reality is otherwise.
During the discussion we have seen how economic factors and control over
economic factors make nationalism the first casualty. This leads to confusing
nationality with religious fundamentalism. With the example of Pakistan we have
seen that in the absence of a clear national pride it is relatively easy to fall prey to
religious fundamentalism.
However, Adeel Khan comes up with an explanation of nationalism that he
examines in the context of Pakistan.103 According to Adeel Khan, only the mobile
and modernised sections of a society are concerned with their national and
ethnic identity. During this course, such sections of society gain economic
privileges. Khan claims that it is the threat to economic privilege that translates
into regional, religious or ethnic threats and conflicts. He further elaborates that
nationalist movements are culture based rather than class based. If we change
class with Islam and culture with any of the regions: Punjab, Sindh, Baluch or
103
Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan (Thousand Oaks, Calif.;
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 38-40.

Pashtun, in the Pakistan context, we understand how difficult it would be to sum
up a Pakistani identity that would also smudge their link to the Indus Valley
civilisation era.
In conclusion we can say that literature on the Islamisation of Pakistan draws a
clear line between nationalism and religious fundamentalism. Religion cannot be
the sole foundation of nationalism; otherwise East Pakistan would have never
seceded from West Pakistan with Islam as a common religion of the two.
Similarly, within Pakistan, fissures have developed due to their differences as
Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchas, and Pashtuns despite the fact that they are all
Muslims. Accordingly, in the case of Pakistan, religious fundamentalism is trying
to forge a spirit of nationalism which is yet to accomplish anything. Conversely,
in India, as discussed in the previous section, nationalism and religious
fundamentalism are not mutually exclusive in the realm of BJP.

Chapter 3: Paired-minority conflict
This chapter will enlarge upon Cohen’s term of a paired-minority conflict as
postulated in Chapter 1. Cohen discusses this aspect in detail when he looks at
“the origins of war and the conditions for peace in South Asia”.104 Cohen proposes
two assumptions about the conflict in South Asia. One assumption deals with the
origins of conflict where Cohen adds that Indians and Pakistanis generally proffer
the conflict as a corollary of British policy of divide and rule.105 Cohen’s second
assumption explores condition for peace. Here again he explains that Indians and
Pakistanis have numerous theories providing details of the conflict. Cohen asks
why peace is so elusive when there is such an abundance of theories and ideas
about the conflict on both sides of the India Pakistan border.
For a better understanding of wars, Cohen is inspired by the Einstein-Freud
Correspondence (1931-1932). 106 However, Cohen does not discuss this
correspondence in detail. In this correspondence, Einstein asks Freud if there is a
possibility of controlling the human mind in such a way where hatred and
destruction for other human beings is completely avoided. Freud replies that
under the primitive conditions, violence was the only way out where one of those
involved was either dead or was left in such a condition where a renewal of
violence would not be possible. While commenting on modern conditions,
although Freud expounds a long treatise about human development and other
104
Stephen P. Cohen, "South Asia: The Origins of War and the Conditions for Peace," South Asian
Survey 4, no. 1 (1997): p. 25.
105
ibid, see n. 3: pp. 44-5.
106
ibid, see n. 1: p. 44.

improvements made over the centuries yet he is unable to totally rule out the
possibility of violence and destruction.107
In order to pinpoint to the nub of this predominance of destruction and violence,
Cohen enumerates what he calls “three theoretical puzzles” about the India
Pakistan conflict.108 He states that the India Pakistan conflict is moving against
the tide especially when peace is becoming a reality to other regional conflicts
around the globe. More so, Cohen finds the trends in whole South Asia to be
different from other regions of the world—without actually identifying any
regions that he is comparing South Asia with. Secondly, Cohen is puzzled at the
democratic status of India and Pakistan where a similar simmering conflict
between the two democracies is not noticeable elsewhere in the world. Thirdly,
he is amazed why two liberalised economies are more concentrated on pursuing
the conflict instead of making a progress on the path of economic development.
While looking for an answer to the aforementioned three puzzles, Cohen cites
Sumit Ganguly’s “model based on irredentism” where Ganguly asserts that such
conflicts are difficult to resolve.109
Cohen does not find a fault with Ganguly’s model, but Cohen is convinced that if
this model based on irredentism is accepted as such, then there would be no end
to India Pakistan conflict. Kashmir as a territory was never a settled issue
between India and Pakistan ever since 1947. Unless both these countries come to
107
Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg, The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, Weimar and
Now (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 25-34.
108
Cohen, "South Asia: The Origins of War and the Conditions for Peace," pp. 25-26.
109
Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947, 2nd ed.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). Cited in Stephen P. Cohen, South Asia: The Origins of War and the
Conditions for Peace: p. 26.

an agreement on Kashmir, theory of irredentism would keep India and Pakistan
perpetually engaged over Kashmir. This is the reason, which makes Ganguly’s
model incomplete, Cohen claims. He adds that South Asian neighbours are
caught in a situation of paired-minority where each finds itself as weak,
vulnerable, defenceless, and exposed regardless of the size of its population or
geographical area. This process puts such nations in a continuous chase for
justice while developing hatred for each other. Pakistan feels threatened from
India’s size and population whereas the situation for India becomes complex by
looking at the alliances that Pakistan could manage, especially with the Western
nations and China. In addition, Cohen states, India is looking at regaining past
glories while guided by its Kautilya statecraft theory where anyone sharing
borders with you is an antagonist. In this situation of distrust, making a progress
towards peaceful resolution becomes difficult as a sign of accommodation and
agreement would translate into weakness and surrender, Cohen adds.
By normalising relations with Pakistan, India will reap benefits.110 But Cohen
observes that in spite of recent multiple events taking place in Pakistan like coup,
war, summit, and Afghanistan war support, India has not come to terms with the
reality. Rather India is pursuing its old strategy of encircling Pakistan by
improving relations with the Afghanistan government and the US This
domination strategy of India will increase distrust with Pakistan. Cohen’s
observation is also supported by other researchers.111 Evans states that improved
diplomatic relations with the US are not being translated into progress on
Kashmir by India. Rather, India is likely to take a stance of teaching Pakistan a
110
Cohen, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir," p. 57.
111
A. Evans, "Reducing Tension Is Not Enough," The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2001): p. 189.

lesson. Evans concludes such a stance would not help India gain a justifiable
position in Kashmir.
The discussion so far is complemented by Weber, who claims that in
international relations, constructivists ‘make’ their own world not necessarily
able to ‘make’ what they aspire for.112 Weber further explains that the context of
events and the institutions in such a political sphere are conditioned to follow a
set path under given situations that may also link to the past. This historical
behaviour, Weber concludes, is decisive groundwork for political ends.
Meanwhile, researchers on the Indian side lament that Pakistan’s attitude is not
helping relations to improve with India.113 Bahadur asserts that the army, the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and jihadis in Pakistan will not improve their
relations with India as they have not realised yet that Pakistan cannot take away
Kashmir from India through a proxy war. Bahadur blames the Pakistani army as a
roadblock on the path of peace. He adds that recent democratic governments in
Pakistan would keep the army aloof by denying the army any control over policy
matters whereas Pakistan army and ISI would not tolerate negation of their
position of decision makers with regards to Pakistani relations with India and this
power struggle would hardly contribute towards improving relations.
Correspondingly, Pakistan has always believed that it cannot bring the Kashmir
112
Martin Weber, "Constructivism and Critical Theory," in Introduction to International Relations:
Australian Perspectives, ed. Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke, and Jim George (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 97-98.
113
Kalim Bahadur, "India-Pakistan Relations: Road Map to Nowhere?," South Asian Survey 10, no. 2
(2003): p. 255.

dispute to an end without attaining arms superiority over India.114 Vasquez states
that such a stance also affected India in a comparable manner. He adds that in
1965 just the thought of matching the Indian defence forces after skirmishes in
Rann of Kutch area, made Ayub Khan attack India with a hope of having an
advantageous position at the negotiations table, when required later on. This
posture of imposing an upper-hand on each other has remained an integral part
of the India Pakistan conflict.
Conversely, Pakistan has developed new thoughts on Kashmir.115 Hussain claims
that the Pakistani stance on Kashmir changed the day Pakistan President Pervez
Musharraf met All Parties Hurriyat Conference leaders in New Delhi on 14 July
2001. Hussain quotes Noorani to state that Musharraf told Hurriyat leaders “we
all should be ready for some accommodation”.116 Hussain further points to
Musharraf’s four-point proposal repeated at India Today Conclave 2004 via
satellite from Islamabad on 13 March 2004:
1. Centrality of the Kashmir dispute should be accepted by India and

Pakistan.
2. Talks should commence to resolve the dispute.
3. All solutions not acceptable to any of the three parties are to be taken off
the table.
4. The most feasible and acceptable option be chosen.117
Apart from Musharraf’s initiative, Hussain states there are other factors too that
prompted a change in Pakistani stance on Kashmir. These factors include; India
114
John A. Vasquez, "India-Pakistan Conflict in Light of General Theories of War, Rivalry and
Deterrence " in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), pp. 70-71.
115
Syed Rifaat Hussain, "Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir," South Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (2007):
pp. 196-97.
116
Noorani, A.G. 2001. ‗Summits, from 1995 to 2001‘, Frontline 18 (16), 4–17 August, accessed from
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl18160990.htm cited in Syed Rifaat Hussain, ―Pakistan's Changing
Outlook on Kashmir‖.
117
Hussain, "Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir," p. 197.

activating world opinion against Pakistan, US pressure on Pakistan for improving
relations with India, pressure for maintaining peace in general after acquiring
nuclear capability, and finally change in Pakistani jihad strategy that focussed on
Kashmir once Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan.
Clearly, these two researchers from India and Pakistan fall into Cohen’s paired-
minority conflict theory. As it is evident in the preceding paragraphs, Bahadur
claims that Pakistan has not changed its stance on Kashmir whereas Hussain has
presented a total change in Pakistan’s approach on its Kashmir policy. It is
difficult to decide who out of these two is positioned on firm ground while
making such claims. Constructivism looks at events in three ways. 118 Guzzini
states it is a level of understanding of the action, the level of observation, and
level of understanding the relation between the two. Guzzini puts his level of
observation through double hermeneutics to understand the action. He gives the
example of red lights at a crossing that would have different meanings for
different actors affected by the control mechanism of red lights. Unless individual
actors are properly situated, the understanding of the relationship between the
action and your observation would not be complete.119 Accordingly, the various
sections of this chapter will bring forth different events and control mechanisms
for a better view of actions and observations.
3.1 Strategic oversight
The literature discussed so far in this study does project some levels of
understanding that may include Kashmir is less a cause of India Pakistan conflict
118
S. Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," European Journal of
International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000): p. 156.
119
ibid.: 160-63.

and more an effect of it. Secondly, Kashmir enjoyed freedom for the first time in
centuries when Abdullah wanted to have a new constitution for his new Kashmir.
Accordingly, hereafter this study will revisit the post 1971 events that took place
with reference to India Pakistan conflict. Was the 1971 war that broke Pakistan
into two a conclusive event? Physically and politically it may be conclusive but
not strategically as the closing outcome of a war is never considered to be final. 120
According to Clausewitz, a defeated side will always look for opportunities in the
future for an appropriate political situation and time to avenge the previous
outcome of the war. However, Clausewitz does not mention a future course of
action for the victorious side. If the outcome of war is not final for the defeated
side, it cannot be final for the winners either as the latter would know that the
defeated side would plan a comeback later. Clausewitz adds that in the realm of
strategy “there is no such thing as victory”.121 Strategically, on the other hand,
success means utilising victory as a future advantage by maintaining surprise.
This standpoint is supported by Sun Tzu.122 According to Sun Tzu, a smart
fighting side will always impose itself on the enemy side. Therefore the smart side
regardless of its recent victories would always stay ahead in the battlefield. Sun
Tzu adds that staying ahead by maintaining secrecy would always frustrate the
opponent side. This could be a situation where you may even opt not to fight
while pulling the enemy into rigmarole. Sun Tzu suggests that maintaining
invisibility will lead to divisions in the enemy side where you are at liberty to start
decimating the weaker divisions first, as a limited action. Sun Tzu equates such
120
Carl von Clausewitz et al., On War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 19.
121
ibid., pp. 162-63.
122
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2002), pp. 58-63.

tactics to the fluidity of water that adapts to and changes with decimation of the
enemy sides. This strategy of engaging a part of the enemy side is discussed in
detail by Clausewitz.123 This engagement could be offensive or defensive that
neutralises to the minimum, if not completely, the contradictions of and
incompatibility between human nature and war, Clausewitz recommends. Liddell
Hart also considered limited war to be the greatest input into the strategic
thought process.124 Larson elaborates it is not defeat of the enemy that is
important but devastating the enemy in such a way that it is left with no moral
and physical will to strike back. The discussion so far makes it quite clear that in
the scenario of India Pakistan conflict, strategic thought would guide India to
remain pro-active and stay ahead by enticing Pakistan into the dilemma of
limited war. The available literature indicates that the presence of nuclear
weapons enforces a limited war option, as a nuclear war is much more
devastating than conventional warfare.125 Nuclear aspirations and limited war do
not necessarily translate into armed conflict and are often fought stealthily as
games of intelligence.
3.2 Staying ahead
On 18 May 1974, India exploded a 12-kiloton plutonium bomb at Pokhran
codenamed as “Smiling Buddha”.126 According to Diehl and Moltz, India’s Bhabha
123
Clausewitz et al., On War, pp. 248-65.
124
Robert H. Larson, "B. H. Liddell Hart: Apostle of Limited War," Military Affairs 44, no. 2 (1980): p.
71.
125
For a detailed discussion on this aspect see Bernard Brodie and Rand Corporation., Strategy in the
Missile Age (Princeton, NJ,: Princeton University Press, 1959), Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and
American Defense Policy; Building and Using Military Power in a World at War, 2d , rev. ed.
(Cambridge,: MIT. Press, 1969), Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, [1st ] ed. (New
York,: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1957).
126
Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation : A Reference
Handbook, 2nd ed., Contemporary World Issues (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2007), pp. 123-24.

Atomic Research Centre made this bomb on a Canadian supplied reactor and a
US supplied heavy water moderator. India claimed this explosion was a purely
peaceful experiment and in no way violated the international nuclear regimes.
Chellany reveals that even as Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told the Indian
Parliament in 1972 about the likely nuclear explosions to be carried out in future,
to bring economic benefit to India, US intelligence could not develop further
information about it.127 Chellany claims that India’s nuclear programme is “one of
the world’s oldest” as Nehru who set up India’s Atomic Energy Commission in
1948 wanted “all the basic materials” and was aware of the nuclear power’s
“strategic nature”.128 Chellany also puts forward various other aspects revolving
around Pokhran nuclear tests. He attributes this test to India’s insecurity, which
evolved after its 1962 defeat in a war with China, and the Pakistan attempt to
carry out the likes of secret Operation Gibraltar in 1965. But Chellany is not
justified in making this claim where situations are not comparable. While India
lost war the with China, the case was not so with Pakistan as not only Operation
Gibraltar failed, it also could not start a Kashmiri uprising in India (see Chapter
1). Moreover, claims were initially made claiming that the Pokhran explosions
were peaceful experiments for economic benefits without referring to feelings of
insecurity. Nevertheless, a justification for developing a nuclear bomb specifically
against China cannot hold ground, as literature points to limited war in a nuclear
situation, and India has never engaged China in a limited war since 1962. On the
other hand, Chinese aggression is more associated with Mao, who wanted to
127
Brahma Chellaney, ed., Nuclear-Deterrent Posture, Securing India's Future in the New Millennium
(New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), pp. 158-63.
128
ibid., p. 158.

open more battlefronts, which was the hallmark of his Cultural Revolution.129
Therefore, the 1962 war was based on multiple factors and discussing them in
detail is beyond the scope of this study.
Chellany, further adds two reasons that stopped India from carrying out further
nuclear explosions.130 He states one reason was a meeting between Indira Gandhi
and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in New Delhi soon after the
explosion while the second reason was a lack of missile capacity. The missile
argument is on thin ice as Chellany himself mentions that India ultimately
developed a missile capability in 1994 yet it took India another four years to carry
out more nuclear explosions at Pokharn in 1998. One aspect is quite clear, that
Indian nuclear ambitions are not at all aimed at China but Pakistan inter alia
pursuit of the Sun Tzu doctrine, as mentioned before, to keep disputes in the
loop of a never ending process while the enemy is devastated. Masood puts
forward his argument stating that India would always walk away from any peace
negotiations at the first opportunity.131 He adds, when in 2006, India and Pakistan
were to go through the fourth round of talks; India blamed Pakistan for the July
2006 terrorist attack on a Mumbai train and suspended the dialogue. Masood
claims Pakistan wants to cooperate and engage in a peace process which is not
reciprocated by India, as the latter, with its emerging economic status, was able
to influence the powerful countries of the world.
129
Matthew J. Flynn, First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern History (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.
174.
130
Chellaney, ed., Nuclear-Deterrent Posture, 160-61.
131
Talat Masood, "Pakistan‘s Kashmir Policy," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2006): pp.
46-47.

3.3 Enticing Pakistan
3.3.1 The Kargil war
The Kargil war of 1999 has been widely covered in the literature. However, Kargil
incursions were proposed many times before, especially during the regime of Zia
ul-Haq.132 Abbas discloses that a Kargil operation was suggested to Zia twice, to
be rejected on both occasions, while Zia asked convincing counter questions
about the value of this type of operation, no answers were made available. A
similar proposal was also made to Benazir Bhutto without success in 1989 and
1996.133 Abbas adds that for a third time, a suggestion for a Kargil operation was
recommended by Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz Khan who was himself a
Kashmiri. What is perplexing here is why a Kashmiri mind would recommend
something that could, at the most, block a road connection to Leh, which is
otherwise also connected by an alternative route through the Indian state of
Himachal Pradesh, while Leh is also served by two Indian Air Force facilities in
Leh and Thoise. Abbas further reveals that the Kargil operational preparation was
also a best kept secret where many from the Pakistani Cabinet and the army
senior officials were not fully aware of the logistics and other requirements for
the Kargil operation.134 It is surprising why nobody is questioning the real intent
behind the Kargil operation, regardless of the fact it was suggested by a Kashmiri,
especially when the sentiment in Indian Kashmir itself was that the Kargil was
not their war.135
132
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror
(Armonk, NY; London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 169-75.
133
S. Paul Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia," International Security 33, no. 2
(2008): p. 75.
134
Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, p. 172.
135
Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2003). See the last endnote to Chapter 1 of this book on page 272 where attention is drawn to a

Noticeably, when Operation Gibraltar, aimed directly at Kashmir valley, could
not bear fruit, how could the Kargil operation, outside the parameters of the
Kashmir valley and outside the thinking of Kashmiris like Jaleel, be an original
Kashmiri or Pakistani strategy, or was it walking into an enticement? There is
another observation, which is relevant here. Kapur quotes Jalil Jilani, a former
director-general for South Asia in Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs, claiming
that Siachen Glacier was the main factor for the Kargil war.136 However, Abbas’
argument as mentioned before does not mention Siachen as a major factor when
this plan was proposed to Zia.
3.3.2 Ganga hijacking
Walking into a trap is not a new phenomenon for Pakistan. Earlier in 1971, the
hijacking of an Indian plane named Ganga to Lahore in Pakistan led to the
severing of air-links within Pakistan—East and West.137 No wonder, Ahmed called
the then Pakistani leadership mediocre, drunks and paper tigers that fell into the
trap of an Indian organised, as claimed, hijacking of a plane. Another researcher,
Schofield also discusses this incident where she states that, initially, Pakistan was
euphoric over this incident, only to realise later that this was the work of Indian
intelligence agencies.138
book section titled ―It Was Not Our War‖ by Muzamil Jaleel in Sankarshan Thakur et al., Guns and
Yellow Roses: Essays on Kargil War.
136
Kapur, "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia," p. 76.
137
Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (New York:
Routledge, 1997), p. 262.
138
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, p. 116.

Similarly, Widmalm states that a Pakistani Commission of Inquiry found in April
1971 that Pakistan had no role in the hijacking of the plane which, essentially, was
a handiwork of Indian intelligence agencies as the benefit of cutting air-links
between East and West Pakistan was exploited by India as a part of its grand
strategy of supporting a “separatist movement in East Pakistan”.139 The
researchers mentioned so far who covered the Ganga hijacking have dealt with
the topic only briefly. However, Praveen Swami, in his recent book has devoted a
substantial section to covering the Ganga hijacking.140 Swami first gives an
account of the incident and then carefully picks up words like “conspiracy theory”
to counter any fingers pointed at Indian intelligence. In his account, he does
mention some instances that are coincidental to him but offers no explanation
for those incidents that include meeting of Hashim Qureshi with Maqbool Butt.
Maqbool Butt was a leader of the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front
(NLF) and Qureshi was a Kashmiri who went to Peshawar in Pakistan for
arranging the marriage of his sister. Swami also mentions the “spectacular”
escape of Maqbool Butt from a Kashmir jail but does not go into detail to find out
how this “spectacular” jailbreak took place.
The rise of NLF was also spectacular, which is covered in detail separately by
Swami in his book. NLF was formed on the pattern of the Algerian Front de
Liberation Nationale to “compete with the official jihad being run by Pakistan’s
covert services or risk marginalization”.141 With the emergence of NLF in
Kashmir, the local Plebiscite Front lost ground. Swami also reveals that NLF not
139
Sten Widmalm, Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India
(London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 53.
140
Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, pp. 112-18.
141
ibid., p. 107.

only recruited bureaucrats in its cadre from the Pakistan side of Kashmir but also
developed differences with the Plebiscite Front that still existed on the Pakistan
side of Kashmir. The first casualty of NLF consolidation was loss of an
organisation that raised its voice for a plebiscite in Kashmir.
3.3.3 Operation Topac
The Indian Defence Review (IDR) website reproduced an article in November
2007 which was originally published in its July 1989 print edition titled “OP
TOPAC”.142 Editor of IDR claims this article “anticipated” Pakistani plans for
Kashmir in 1989 that deteriorated the situation in Kashmir in the subsequent
years. The editor also suggests that New Delhi did not take notice of this article.
According to the article, a three-phased Operation Topac was conceived by Zia in
April 1988. It also claims that during Phase I, support would also be sought from
Sikh extremists—an aspect that will be discussed separately, later in this chapter.
This article also claims that Operation Topac was a comprehensive plan, which
included a “Plan-X” prepared in response to Indian Brasstacks exercise, which
was shared with India by an intelligence agency of a third country.
Conversely, Noorani’s book review of Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru for the
February 2007 issue of Frontline magazine of India reveals that Operation Topac,
which was used as evidence by Indian writers in general for proving Pakistan’s
involvement in Kashmir, was accepted as an anomaly by at least one writer—K
Subrahmanyam.143 Noorani adds that plans about Kashmir were not new and
Nehru knew of similar plans back in 1957 when one pamphlet written by a
142
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2007/11/op-topac-the-kashmir-imbroglio.html
143
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2404/stories/20070309001207800.htm

Pakistani army officer claimed that India would not concede an inch of its soil
and as such instead of military action in Kashmir, sabotage inside Kashmir valley
would impact on India a great deal. How effective Pakistan’s sabotage action in
Kashmir would be is evident from the fact that even a full-fledged Operation
Gibraltar failed to stir a thing in Kashmir in 1965, as mentioned before.
Operation Topac has also been discussed by other writers.144 Schofield suggests
Pakistan’s involvement in the early days of militancy in Kashmir was exaggerated
by the Indian government itself.145 She adds that the existence of Operation
Topac was always denied by Pakistani officials claiming it was an armchair
exercise of the Indian intelligence agency—Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).
Schofield concludes this fact has also been subsequently acknowledged by
Subrahmanyam.
Schofield wrote her book in 1999, which raises a question why IDR chose to
reprint Operation Topac article in November 2007. In general, it was a period
after the Indian negotiations for a nuclear pact with the US were finalised in
August 2007 waiting for an approval from the US Congress and clearance from
the Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries.146
144
Lowell Dittmer, South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China (Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 2005), Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, Wirsing,
Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age.
145
146
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6919552.stm

3.3.4 Track Two Diplomacy
When the normal communication channels through diplomats falls short of its
objectives, rival countries sometimes engage in a process of dialogue through
other channels to overcome this limitation.147 Kaye states the other channels
include foundations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics, and
governments of other countries—Western, in the instance of the Middle East and
South Asia. During the 1990s, a lot of track two activities took place between
India and Pakistan including: Neemrana, Balusa, Kashmir Study Group, Shanghai
Process, Stimson Center, CSIS Nuclear Risk Reduction Project, Cooperative
Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, and Confidence and
Cooperation in South Asian Waters Project.148 Kaye propounds that track two
diplomacy has not delivered the indicators of success, but is convinced this
process facilitated dialogue at the least, where a military to military dialogue is
capable of achieving results, as Indian and Pakistani armies share a similar
organisational culture heritage to the British army.149
This organisational culture heritage claim is a bit far-fetched, as Stephen Cohen is
not convinced about the aptitude of Indian army generals, an observation he
made during a talk at International Development Research Centre, Ottawa,
Canada on 9 April 2009.150 Cohen states that such generals want America to take
away the nuclear capability of Pakistan, in which case India would annihilate
Pakistan, settling all disputes once and for all.
147
Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia, p. 1.
148
ibid., pp. 89-90.
149
ibid., p. 118.
150
http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0409_pakistan_cohen.aspx?p=1

Another track two initiative is the Livingston Plan of the Kashmir Study Group,
as listed before, finalised in consultation with both Indians and Pakistanis.151 This
plan seeking more autonomy for Kashmir is named after the Livingston
farmhouse of Farooq Kathwari, founder and chairman of the Kashmir Study
Group.152 Abbas adds that the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee proposed this
plan to Pakistani representative Niaz Naik in early 1999 when the latter wanted
Indian views on the Chenab option for a solution to the Kashmir problem. Abbas
further adds that the Chenab option was not rejected by Vajpayee, while Wirsing
too is of a similar opinion that Indians took the Chenab option seriously.153
While the meetings between India and Pakistan were becoming friendlier,
Pakistani army generals were not too positive about this approach.154 One such
event was Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore on the inaugural bus service between Lahore
and Delhi. Iype states General Parvez Musharraf and other service chiefs not only
declined to attend the official meetings but also refused to salute the visiting
prime minister of an “enemy nation”. Musharraf later revived the old Kargil
plan,155 which derailed the peace process built upon track two diplomacy.
Without going into the details of the Kargil war discussed before, it is pertinent
to mention here that Musharraf, who did not want to attend meetings with and
151
http://www.kashmirstudygroup.net/awayforward/proposal.html
152
Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, p. 169.
153
Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age, pp. 25-30.
154
George Iype, "Pak Military Chiefs Boycott Wagah Welcome,"
http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/feb/20bus2.htm. For more details about Indian Prime Minister
Vajpayee‘s Lahore bus visit and Lahore declaration see
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/ip/ip_lahore19990221.html
155
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 476.

had no intentions of saluting the prime minister of an “enemy nation”, was
travelling through the streets of New Delhi two years later, visiting his ancestral
home as a part of the Agra summit in July 2001.156 The Hindu newspaper of India
later reported, citing Brahma Challaney’s comments on Indian Zee TV, that
Musharraf was also involved in training “Sikh terrorists for subversive activities in
Punjab”.157 The next section discusses the insurgency in Punjab during the 1980s
in brief.
3.4 Punjab conundrum
During the partition of India, the state of Punjab was also divided into two with
two thirds of its area allocated to Pakistan and one third remaining with India.
The three main communities of the undivided Punjab were Muslims, Hindus and
Sikhs. With Muslims having crossed over to the Pakistani side in 1947, Hindu
leadership of Punjab was adamant on not accepting Punjabi language as the state
language and wanted Hindi to be promulgated instead, which subsequently led
to Sikh agitation and the reorganisation of—an even smaller—Indian Punjab in
1966.158 Historically, Punjabi Muslims have preferred Urdu, Punjabi Hindus
favoured Hindi and Punjabi Sikhs opted for Punjabi.159 To explore the reasons for
this division is beyond the scope of this study. However, this section will discuss
the militancy in Indian Punjab that started in the late 1970s.
156
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1430367.stm
157
A. Umakantha Sarma, "The Agra Summit & Thereafter "
http://www.hindu.com/2001/07/31/stories/13310611.htm. Also see
http://www.hindu.com/2001/01/05/stories/05052523.htm
158
J. S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, The New Cambridge History of India (Cambridge [England];
New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See Chapter 9: Towards the ‗Punjabi Province‘
159
Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2005), p. 326.
Also see Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850
(New York: Routlege, 2000), p. 103.

Militancy in Punjab, as it is understood, started in 1978 when the political
leadership moved from moderates to “religious zealots” like Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale (JSB hereafter).160 Arora adds that JSB became prominent after the
1978 Nirankari killings and JSB was subsequently supported by the Congress (I)
party of India. The then Chief Minister of Punjab, Darbara Singh and India’s
Union Home Minister Giani Zail Singh, Arora discloses, both nurtured JSB
through their contacts. Darbara Singh used a rival Akali party leader Sukhjinder
Singh while Giani maintained a connection through Santokh Singh, President of
the managing committee of Sikh shrines in New Delhi. According to Arora, with
this arrangement, Congress (I) was able to make inroads into the traditionally
Sikh-supported Akali Dal party. The information revealed by Arora about the
official patronage to JSB is corroborated by another researcher who states JSB was
“initially encouraged by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to weaken the Akali Dal,
the Sikh political party that posed a threat to her Congress (I) party”.161 Gradually,
with growing influence, JSB established himself inside the Darbar Sahib Complex
in Amritsar. Darbar Sahib, also known as the Golden Temple, is an important
shrine of the Sikhs. Amritsar city was founded by the fourth Sikh Guru Ram Das,
hence Darbar Sahib Amritsar has a unique status for Sikhs. As such, Darbar Sahib
Amritsar is the centre of Sikh political activities.
These political machinations led to an unusual event in June 1984 when “Punjab
was cut off from the rest of the country” and the Indian army carried out a full-
160
Subhash Chander Arora, Strategies to Combat Terrorism: A Study of Punjab (New Delhi: Har-Anand
Publications, 1999), p. 134-35.
161
Anne Noronha Dos Santos, Military Intervention and Secession in South Asia: The Cases of
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab, PSI Reports (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security
International, 2007), p. 96.

fledged attack on Darbar Sahib, codenamed Operation Blue Star, killing a large
number of pilgrims “with their hands tied at their backs with their own
turbans”.162 JSB was also killed in this attack. Leading up to Operation Blue Star,
Indira Gandhi had maintained a contact with JSB through the President of the
Punjab Congress party Raghunandan Lal Bhatia.163 Tully and Jacob state this
contact was further maintained through Amrik Singh, a confidant of JSB. Tully
and Jacob add that Bhatia would always send his car to Darbar Sahib to fetch
Amrik Singh when required. This practice elevated the status of JSB, thus
avoiding a direct confrontation between the local authorities and JSB.
After Operation Blue Star, the Government of India (GOI) published a White
Paper on the Punjab Agitation.164 Gurharpal Singh states this White Paper
attributed the problem in Punjab to the secessionist nature of the movement
(demanding Khalistan, a separate state for the Sikhs) that eclipsed the Akali Dal’s
political demands agitation. He further adds that the White Paper, without
naming a country, blamed external forces which wanted India to be
dismembered and it was claimed that since this challenge was beyond the control
of normal state agencies, the army was called in. The White Paper stopped just
short of calling the moderate Akali Dal leaders as secessionists, which further
outraged the Sikhs.165 Tully, who was BBC’s India correspondent at the time, adds
the White Paper was not only rejected by the Sikhs but also by the journalists
who did not buy the justification for Operation Blue Star. Rejection of the White
Paper led to further spin doctoring by the GOI who blamed Pakistan and,
162
Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, PP. 226-27.
163
Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1985), p.
118.
164
Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of Punjab (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1999), p. 115.
165
Tully and Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle, pp. 209-10.

occasionally, the CIA and Britain for the problem in Punjab, Tully and Jacob add.
The White Paper listed only 57 Chinese rifles as foreign weapons among the cache
of weapons. However, Tully and Jacob state that by this time India’s Congress (I)
party had come up with its own pamphlet “Conspiracy Exposed” that increased
the number of foreign weapons recovered during Operation Blue Star to include
“Chinese-made AK-47 gas-operated assault rifles capable of firing 600 rounds a
minute at a range of 300 metres; the Chinese made RPG-7 anti-tank grenade
launchers capable of penetrating armour up to a thickness of 320 mm; the
German G-2 automatic rifles generally used by NATO countries; Israeli-
manufactured bullet-proof vests; anti-tank weapons of Pakistani origin”.166
On the other hand, after Operation Blue Star, Lieutenant-General Sunderji
(General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command of India at that time)
told Tully that it was a “failure of intelligence”, as the army did not have enough
information about the Darbar Sahib complex, something that a junior army
officer also shared with Tully’s fellow journalist Jacob.167 This information
surprised Tully as the GOI had issued statements in the past on not sending the
army into the Darbar Sahib complex while commandoes were doing exercises for
this operation at the Special Frontier Forces Himalayan base, Chakrata.168 Tully
elaborates there was no restriction on movement in and out of the Darbar Sahib
complex and intelligence operatives could have moved around unrestricted for
collecting information.169
166
ibid., p. 209.
167
ibid., p. 186.
168
ibid., p. 118.
169
ibid., p. 186.

These political machinations of the GOI did not end in 1984, as the problem of
Punjab continued. In the following years through to Operation Black Thunder at
Darbar Sahib in 1988, a nephew of JSB, Jasbir Singh Rode, was used as an asset by
the government for interfering in Sikh affairs.170 Sarab Jit Singh reveals that, not
being able to stand up to such manipulations, the Inspector General of Border
(Punjab) Chaman Lal, an upright officer, managed to get himself transferred out
of there. Rode was subsequently used for Operation Black Thunder;171 which not
only served the political interests of the government but also provided the
planners with a text-book style operation that reversed the mismanagement of
Operation Blue Star on one hand while setting an example for the future use of
such an operation under similar conditions. This was a time when police officers
and bureaucrats of Punjab were also having a tug-of-war between themselves
over pay, perks and prominence.172
The origin of the tragic events of 1984 could be traced back to the time of Indian
independence, as the promises made by Gandhi and Nehru were never fulfilled.173
Kaur states the Sikhs were continuously ignored during the reorganisation of
Indian states in the 1950s as the Indian government was in no mood to accord
Punjabi language its due status. She adds that Indira Gandhi arbitrarily created a
stalemate of settling the Punjab capital city transfer issue by awarding the cotton
belt of Punjab to the neighbouring state of Haryana. During the reorganisation of
Punjab, the latter was ignored for its riparian share in the water sources from the
170
Sarab Jit Singh, Operation Black Thunder: An Eyewitness Account of Terrorism in Punjab (New
Delhi; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 122-32. Also see pp. 187-96.
171
Joyce J. M. Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence,
Politics in Contemporary Asia (London; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1995), p. 83.
172
Julio Ribeiro, Bullet for Bullet: My Life as a Police Officer (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998), pp. 288-90.
173
Harminder Kaur, Blue Star over Amritsar: The Real Story of June 1984 (New Delhi: Corporate Vision,
2006), pp. 114-18.

area that it lost, while the adjoining states were given full access to the water
sources of Punjab.174 Conversely, there are authors like Khushwant Singh who
maintain that Punjab always got more than it asked for while the generosity of
the Indian government was always reciprocated with cries of “discrimination and
injustice”.175
It was for these reasons embittered Sikhs resorted to political agitations in
Independent India and a strategy for controlling Sikh institutes through ploys
like JSB is quite obvious. The main Sikh demands were presented as the
Anandpur Sahib Resolution, covering political, economic and social issues. Many
authors have presented the Anandpur Sahib Resolution either as an appendix to
or as a full chapter of their books.176 However, none of these authors could point
to even a single word in the Resolution that was secessionist in nature. Therefore,
what could have been the gains for Pakistan and other “foreign powers” as alleged
if the demands of Sikhs were met instead by the Indian government? The system
of governance in India and the centre-state relations, which will be discussed
later in this chapter, would put into perspective the demands for political
autonomy in India—one of the thrust areas of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.
On the other hand, there is also a need to understand why demands for political
autonomy in India that are not even secessionist in nature, are repugnant to the
Indian government.
174
Pritam Singh, Political Economy of the Punjab: An Insider's Account (New Delhi: MD Publications,
1997), p. 37.
175
Khushwant Singh, My Bleeding Punjab (New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributors, 1992), pp. 38-39.
176
Arora, Strategies to Combat Terrorism: A Study of Punjab, Dos Santos, Military Intervention and
Secession in South Asia: The Cases of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab, Kaur, Blue Star over
Amritsar: The Real Story of June 1984.

Jagjit Singh Chauhan who raised the bogey of Khalistan was actually sacked from
Akali Dal earlier and many Akali Dal leaders feared that the “theory of Khalistan”
was “engineered by the government” to destabilise Akali Dal. 177 According to
Pannun, the main thrust of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was for autonomy
and not for a separate Sikh state named Khalistan.
For many readers in the Western world, it could be hard to understand the
nuances of autonomy and human rights in South Asia. One example could be the
Bill of Rights, whose principles are virtually non-existent in the Indian
constitution.178 Without actually giving the definition of who is a Hindu, Indian
constitution has lumped persons of Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religions with Hindus.
“The year 1984 taught the Sikh community a valuable lesson—they exist within
India at the sufferance of the majority”. 179 Grewal articulates that the widows of
the 1984 pogroms in New Delhi—after the assassination of Indira Gandhi—are
still waiting for justice more than 23 years and nine inquiry commissions later.
Some authors call this pogrom a genocide, where Sikhs were systematically
identified, disarmed, targeted and killed.180
One aspect of Operation Blue Star that has not been widely discussed in the
literature is the destruction and confiscation of the Darbar Sahib Library books.181
Whereas, Dhillon, citing some news reports, claims that 13,000 books and rare
177
Diljit Singh Pannun, Cannon Unto Canon: The Sikh Psyche: An Analytical Study, 1st ed. (Amritsar:
Singh Brothers, 2006), p. 122.
178
http://www.sikhspectrum.com/052007/constitution.htm
179
Jyoti Grewal, Betrayed by the State: The Anti-Sikh Pogrom of 1984 (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), p.
216.
180
Manoj Mitta and H. S. Phoolka, When a Tree Shook Delhi: The 1984 Carnage and Its Aftermath (New
Delhi: Lotus Collection, an imprint of Roli Books, 2007), pp. 25-30. See also pp. 211-14.
181
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030607/windows/note.htm

manuscripts were removed from the library shelves and burnt by the army, while
more books were dumped in 150 gunny bags that were taken away by the army.182
In the words of Knuth, “The systematic destruction of books and libraries
illustrates the reality that barbarism and the threat of civilization’s breakdown
cannot be consigned to history books—a realization that only compounds the
trauma for contemporary societies”.183
Similarly, another unique aspect of the Punjab problem that has not been
discussed widely in the literature is the crime statistics.184 According to Johal, by
the mid 1980s in Punjab, due to “clubbing of news,” all types of murders were
ascribed to terrorism related killings. Johal compared the annual murder figures
of 1985 in the border districts of Amritsar and Gurdaspur with the figures of 1977.
This figure increased from 258 to 287. Johal adds that in 1977 while most of the
murders were related to blood feuds, farming related feuds, armed robberies and
love triangles whereas by 1985 all murders were categorised as terrorism related
crimes. It is not possible that feuds and love triangles simply vanished from the
society. Johal’s conference paper is not a comprehensive study of crime statistics,
nevertheless, this aspect of crime statistics warrants future research where it
needs to be explored further to determine how the classification of crime
metamorphoses into a convenient all encompassing account of terrorism related
crimes.
182
K. S. Dhillon, Identity and Survival: Sikh Militancy in India, 1978-1993 (New Delhi: Penguin Books,
2006), p. 195.
183
Rebecca Knuth, Libricide: The Regime-Sponsored Destruction of Books and Libraries in the Twentieth
Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), p. 3.
184
Navjit Johal, "Punjabi Journalism and Punjab Problem," in Seventh Punjabi Vikas Conference (Punjabi
University, Patiala: 1988).

3.5 Indian federalism
In many post-colonial countries there is a struggle between contesting identities,
where one dominant identity would project its own identity as the true
nationalistic identity while trying to subordinate other identities.185
Sathyamurthy calls it a conflict of fusion and fission where, in the case of
Pakistan, this conflict led to an independent Bangladesh. In the independent
India, Sathyamurthy elaborates, one instance of this conflict is Hindi language
imperialism where the Sikh demand for Punjabi language was totally ignored.186
When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, her first priority was to deny
autonomous powers to the states, which otherwise is a hallmark of the federal
system, Sathyamurthy adds.
In the independent India, there were not many who were positive about the
survival of democracy in India.187 Mathur adds that commentators like Harrison
were not even hopeful about the survival of India as a nation.188 Mathur explains
that India has survived as a nation but not without being coercive and by
increasing violence in the country. Mathur defines coercion as dominating and
suppressing challenges to state authority, which does not come without eroding
the base of legitimacy of any authority. Although he further adds that all states
exist by balancing coercion and legitimacy, but in view of the previous discussion,
it is clear that India’s perennial tilt is towards coercion without any legislative
185
T. V. Sathyamurthy, "Indian Nationalism and the 'National Question'," Millennium - Journal of
International Studies 14, no. 2 (1985): p. 172.
186
ibid.: p. 180.
187
Kuldeep Mathur, "The State and the Use of Coercive Power in India," Asian Survey 32, no. 4 (1992):
p. 337.
188
Selig S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Madras: OUP, 1960). Cited in Mathur, "The
State and the Use of Coercive Power in India."

relief. This point is corroborated by Mathur himself later on when he says that
while the Indian constitution was being finalised, “ensuring of individual rights
and their implications were not considered seriously”.189 Mathur also
acknowledges that civil liberties in India are not only violated often, but also, civil
liberty activists have repeatedly pointed to the undemocratic aspects of the
Indian constitution.
The imbalance of power between the central government of India and its states is
being manipulated as a power tool despite the federal political structure in
India.190 Datta traces a demand for reviewing the Indian federal structure to the
1967 manifesto of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). This manifesto
claimed, according to Datta, Congress government was denying autonomy to the
states by turning India into a unitary state and by undermining its federal
structure. The party also demanded changes to be made to the Indian
constitution for structuring it on federal principals and also replacing the
reference to India as a Union with the words Federation. Datta adds that in the
name of economic liberalisation of India since 1991, all the discussions about
federalism have been done away with. After the economic liberalisation, the
states are rather busy in using remnants of federal structures for securing foreign
direct investment.191
189
Mathur, "The State and the Use of Coercive Power in India," p. 340.
190
Polly Datta, "The Issue of Discrimination in Indian Federalism in the Post-1977 Politics of West
Bengal," Comparative Studies of South Asia Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 2 (2005): p. 450.
191
Kripa Sridharan, "Federalism and Foreign Relations: The Nascent Role of the Indian States," Asian
Studies Review 27, no. 4 (2003): pp. 474-75.

Article 370 of the Indian constitution that gives special status to Jammu and
Kashmir is not to be confused with asymmetrical federalism, a concept is being
discussed in Canada and Spain.192 According to Tillin, Article 370 was introduced
in the constitution due to the special circumstances of the time and was never
accepted as a permanent article. Tillin’s argument is not convincing, as it is only
the BJP, pushing the agenda of Hindutva, which wants Article 370 of the Indian
constitution, giving special status to Jammu and Kashmir, to be scrapped.
A government system that could override the state government could still be
called a federal system, claims Rajashekara, naming it prefectorial federal
system.193 To argue his point, Rajashekra enumerates various features of Indian
constitution where India as a Union is indestructible, while the shape of the
states of India could be changed or completely wiped-off from the map. At any
given time, central government can dismiss the elected government of the state
by replacing it with a governor who is always there as a nominee of the centre.
This governor, when not in power, could still delay the approval of bills passed by
state legislature if so desired by the central government. Articles 249 and 249 of
the Indian constitution give the central government power to interfere in the
state legislature proceedings at will so that a bill is delayed indefinitely. Article
254 (1) empowers the centre to pre-empt and stall any state proceedings. Articles
256 and 257 make the states compliant to the centre, a feature which is
unprecedented in the federal structure, adds Rajashekara. Article 355 empowers
the centre to bring in armed forces even as the armed forces were not requested
192
L. Tillin, "United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism
37, no. 1 (2006): pp. 52-55.
193
H. M. Rajashekara, "The Nature of Indian Federalism: A Critique," Asian Survey 37, no. 3 (1997):
246-51.

by the state. Articles 352, 356 and 360 facilitate turning a federal system into a
unitary one at will. Under article 312, the centre can employ people and appoint
them to various states. The centre has full authority over state high courts. States
can retain only 33 per cent of the taxes collected while the centre gets 67 per cent
of all taxes but corporation tax. Despite this disparity, states cannot raise loans
independently and have to channel everything through the centre. The Financial
Commission established under article 280 of the constitution is not binding on
the centre while the National Planning Commission of the Prime Minister’s
office, with no constitutional authority, controls all the financial institutions.
Finally, Rajashekara states that under article 368, states have no role in
constitutional amendments and the sole role in this regard is with the centre.
Rajashekara states that although under pressure from the state governments, the
centre appointed the Sarkaria Commission in 1983 to review the Indian federal
system, but the Commission did not come up with substantive suggestions for
improvements and all recommendations were ignored by the centre. What Guha
presented as unequal relationships between domination and subordination in
colonial India based on factors like coercion, persuasion, collaboration and
resistance is equally applicable in modern India.194
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed how India is caught in a paired-minority
conflict, both externally and domestically. Externally, India has been playing
games of intelligence since 1947, in general, and since 1971, in particular. Pakistan
has always walked into the traps of Indian manoeuvrings as is evident from the
Kargil war, the Ganga hijacking, Operation Topac and track two diplomacy.
194
Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 20-21.

Domestically, India hauled the Punjab state over the cinders of intelligence
games before an abrupt end to the militancy in 1993. The game of controlling
religious institutions and the “theory of Khalistan” was imposed on Sikhs. Naive
Sikhs who believed that JSB was a messiah and the “theory of Khalistan” is real
are caught in the paired-minority conflict too. Clearly, India has drubbed its
adversaries both in its neighbourhood and at home.195 When Maloy Krishna
Dhar, a former Joint Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau wrote the book “Open
Secrets”. He did not call it an autobiography but “the first open confession of an
intelligence operative”.196 One would not expect big revelations from this book
but there is a fair insight available as to how the Indian intelligence agencies
operate and how they manage buy-ins from Pakistan and the Sikhs, in this
particular instance, while these agencies are also expert in playing around with
RSS. Nonetheless, the intelligence games and events discussed in this chapter do
indicate a slow but tamed progress was made before the eruption of insurgency
in Kashmir in 1989.
On the strategic side, Clausewitz recommends that to make your adversaries
defenceless you have to overcome their physical and psychological capacity to
resist.197 Measuring your opponent’s physical capabilities, Echevarria explains
Clausewitz’s premise further, is feasible through intelligence but to fathom your
195
Some works of literature have not been discussed in this chapter due to unavailability of cross-
references. One such aspect is ―Operation Chanakya‖ where Indian intelligence agencies infiltrated the
Kashmir insurgency groups. Further research is needed on pro-India armed groups in Kashmir and
internecine killings in pro-Kashmir groups. However, an article pointing to ―Operation Chanakya‖ can be
accessed at: http://www.defencejournal.com/feb-mar99/raw-at-war.htm Secondly, this chapter also
precluded citing a book for obvious reasons: Zuhair Kashmeri and Brian McAndrew, Soft Target: The
Real Story Behind the Air India Disaster, 2nd ed. (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 2005).
196
Maloy Krishna Dhar, Open Secrets: India's Intelligence Unveiled (New Delhi: Manas Publications,
2005), p. 7.
197
Antulio Joseph Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), p. 65.

opponent’s psychological capabilities you have to put them in a never-ending
loop. This chapter has highlighted how India is winning the game of intelligence
by thrusting Pakistan (externally) and the Sikhs (internally) through a never-
ending loop where Pakistan is inching towards a failed state and Sikhs have learnt
to “exist within India at the sufferance of the majority”, as mentioned before.198
All the while, the constitution of India is a weapon of mass dominance for the
central government for keeping state governments under its boot as the
democracy is reduced to coercion.
198
Due to the scope of this chapter, reference to a failed state would be limited to this web page:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4964934.stm

Chapter 4: Kashmir and the strategic issues
This chapter will discuss the Kashmir conflict and explore the level of
understanding of the action, the level of observation, and the level of
understanding of the relation between the two as it has been done in the previous
chapter. It is also pertinent to discuss the impact of religious revivalism (Chapter
two) on India and Pakistan before exploring the Kashmir conflict for a better
perspective.
4.1 Genesis of the current phase of insurgency
The year 1989 was witness to a rising violence in Kashmir that saw bombs
exploding, security forces ambushed, police stations attacked and incidents of
acid-throwing on the faces of young girls.199 On 8 December 1989, with the
kidnapping of Rubiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Home Minister of India by the
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and her subsequent release when the
government of India ceded to kidnappers’ demands, Kashmir witnessed the
emergence of a variety of insurgent groups that crumpled the local
administration.200
Before this incident, India and Pakistan’s prime ministers and their foreign office
staff would always discuss Punjab during their meetings but Kashmir was never
on the agenda.201 This observation was made by the former US Ambassador to
Pakistan, Robert Oakley, at a confidence-building project meeting organised by
199
Turkkaya Ataov, Kashmir and Neighbours: Tale, Terror, Truce (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 127-
30.
200
Sumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay,"
International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): p. 76.
201
M. Krepon, M. Faruqee, and HLS. Center, Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in
South Asia: The 1990 Crisis (Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994), p. 5.

the Henry L. Stimson Center on 16 February 1994. Ambassador Oakley goes to
the extent of claiming that Indian intelligence agencies were unaware of what
was fomenting in Kashmir while the aforementioned meetings always discussed
the neighbouring state Punjab.
Was Kashmir really ignored as claimed by Ambassador Oakley or was it simply
too big an issue for meetings that discussed Punjab? Kashmir was considered to
be a solution in sight with India and Pakistan having a bilateral approach as a
part of the Simla process.202 This is the first explanation that Chari and others
give while explaining the Kashmir crisis. They claim that Pakistan became active
over the Kashmir issue due to the ennui emanating from the Simla process. The
second explanation, according to Chari and others, was the rising social and
economic aspirations that were dawning on Kashmiris in the wake of the spread
of education aided by the growth of communication technology. The third
explanation they give is about mismanagement of Kashmir and interference in
Kashmiri politics since 1947. A posture that Chari and others acknowledge as a
too soft stance of India on Kashmir by some Indians with an uncompromising
attitude. They further add that while these explanations offer a variety of reasons,
such explanations are still not conclusive as they look for other combinations
that come up with different accounts of events including, but not limited to, the
effects of the Cold War. But it is their concluding remark that says it all:
The Kashmiris themselves, exemplified by Sheikh Abdullah, have often tried to
play off the two countries against each other in order to ensure autonomy; a
202
Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of
1990, pp. 57-60.

strategy that backfired for the sheikh when he was kept in custody almost
continuously for over twenty years.203
This remark is not out of place as Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir in 1947 did not
join either India or Pakistan during partition. However, when he decided to join
India, the document of accession contained two clauses that insisted Srinagar
would retain the status of being a sovereign state.204 Akbar cites both the clauses
wherein it is clear that clause 7 does not accept the Constitution of India and
clause 8 maintains Hari Singh as the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. Akbar adds
that Both Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah while agreeing to the terms and
references of accession, Hari Singh wanted the maintenance of the Jammu and
Kashmir Constitution Act of 1939, whereas Abdullah wanted a “modern
constitution for his New Kashmir”.
When the Indian constitution was being finalised, the two clauses mentioned
before were incorporated into it and became Article 370. There was no opposition
to Article 370 even as no other erstwhile princely state of India was accorded the
status similar to that given to Jammu and Kashmir. There was no opposition to
Article 370, which was also endorsed by politicians in 1949, including Shyama
Prasad Mookerjee. However, it was the Mookerjee volte-face when he launched
Jan Sangha in 1951 which caused the special status accorded to Jammu and
Kashmir under Article 370 to become one of his targets, Akbar propounds.
203
ibid., p. 64.
204
M. J. Akbar, Kashmir, Behind the Vale (New Delhi: Roli, 2002). See chapter 16 for a detailed
discussion on this aspect: pp. 135-55.

On the other hand, there was no reason for Kashmiris in 1947 to start an
uprising.205 According to Blinkenberg, 1947 was an epoch making year when
Kashmiris finally saw the end of the centuries old vicious rule of Afghans, Sikhs
and Dogras, in that order, to be replaced by a Kashmiri leader who was one of
them. Kashmiris heaved a sigh of relief when they got their own Muslim leader
Sheikh Abdullah.
Raza claims that with the death of Sheikh Abdullah on 8 September 1982 the
stage was set for an insurgency in Kashmir.206 He adds that Abdullah was
instrumental in developing a unique Kashmiri identity and his death put a
damper on it. Other researchers also believe that the Kashmiri insurgency is a
complex factor with an indigenous religious identity factor attached to it.207
Similarly, Blank observes that Sufi Islam, practised by Kashmiris, generates an
identity of Kashmiriyat, which has a “unique cultural sensibility shared by the
region’s Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and even some Buddhists”.208 However, during
1990 the majority of Hindus in the Kashmir valley known as Kashmiri Pandits left
Kashmir for other parts of India and became internally displaced persons (IDP).
Currently, the number of IDP Kashmiri Pandits is 300,000.209
4.2 Between the lines
Operation Brasstacks of 1986-87 precipitated a crisis in November 1986 that
lasted three months.210 Chari and others add that Operation Brasstacks did not
205
Blinkenberg, India-Pakistan. The History of Unsolved Conflicts, p. 420.
206
M. Maroof Raza, Wars and No Peace over Kashmir (New Delhi: Lancer, 1996), p. 68.
207
Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, p. 145.
208
J. Blank, "Kashmir: Fundamentalism Takes Root," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 6 (1999): p. 41.
209
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/IN.html
210
Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia, p.
39.

end in war but was able to hasten the India Pakistan nuclear programmes.
However, Swami has a different take on Operation Brasstacks and states this pure
military exercise began in July 1986 when India mobilised 160,000 troops.211
Swami, nonetheless, suggests that Pakistan had already realised this offensive was
to draw Pakistan’s attention from something elsewhere. Regardless of the views
of authors mentioned before, Pakistan would not have walked into this trap
during the regime of Zia as “war was the last thing General Zia wanted”.212 Tully
and Jacob maintain Zia did not want to give India a pretext to attack Pakistan. It
was for these reasons, they add, Zia never supported the Sikhs. Rather Zia
maintained a pro-active peace initiative that frustrated warmongering efforts of
its adversaries, if there were any, Tully and Jacob conclude.
Meanwhile, citing Ravi Rikhye, Chari and others reveal that Brasstacks was
indeed a “deception and misdirection” plan to lure Pakistan.213 They add that with
this plan, India was looking at gaining several advantages like dismembering
Sindh from Pakistan, destroying Pakistan’s nuclear programme, improving India’s
nuclear position in the Saichen Glacier, rearranging the line of control in Jammu
and Kashmir and wiping out terrorist training camps in Pakistan. They conclude
that it was the nervousness of Indian political leaders that failed to take
advantage of the aim of Operation Brasstacks.
This situation was nearly repeated in 1989 when in response to troop movements
in India due to the situation of Punjab and Kashmir, Pakistan launched the Zarb-
211
Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, pp. 151-52.
212
Tully and Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle, p. 212.
213
46.

i-Momin military exercise.214 They add that the new Chief of Army Staff in
Pakistan, General Mirza Aslam Beg was quite ambitious to achieve something
remarkable. The situation deteriorated as Pakistani troops did not return to
barracks after the exercise and with the Indian response both armies were within
striking range of each other for quite a while. This stand-off came to end,
according to Swami, after the India visit of the US National Security Advisor,
Robert Gates in May 1990.215 Gates made it clear to India, Swami adds, even if
India wins a war against Pakistan, the eventual cost of victory could be
overwhelming.
The observation made by Tully and Jacob is corroborated by the fact that General
Sunderji later revealed it “was India’s last chance to defeat Pakistan by
conventional arms before the latter acquired a nuclear deterrent”.216 Brasstacks
was a manoeuvre that deployed enough of India’s strike force within fifty miles of
its border with Pakistan in such a way that it halved the time required for
mobilisation of its troops during an impending war to a week.217
Apparently, nuclear deterrence wasn’t the only reason in Sunderji’s mind as he
was commanding the Indian army when it was going through the throes of
reorganisation.218 The nuclear deterrence would have reduced the eminence of
armoured regiments. But the terrain, regardless of the nuclear deterrent, would
214
———, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990, pp. 80-95.
215
Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, p. 174.
216
67.
217
Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of
Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), p. 93.
218
Sunil Dasgupta, "The Indian Army and the Problem of Military Change," in Security and South Asia:
Ideas, Institutions and Initiatives, ed. Swarna Rajagopalan (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 102-06.

still direct India to maintain such regiments at huge cost, even as the capabilities
of armoured regiments and their tanks had not been tested since the 1971 war.
Dasgupta adds this was not the only reason plaguing the reorganisation of the
Indian army. He states that recruitment for the Indian army is facing a real
challenge, with a severe shortage of junior officers due to reasons of caste and
class. Also the army is getting older, not for professional reasons, but for those
seeking eligibility for a better pension with a longer service. Dasgupta suggests
the upper-class officers of the Indian army are uncomfortable socialising with
lower-class or lower-caste soldiers if they become officers. Traditional practices
make it harder for the Indian army to change rules overnight. There are
professional reasons too that pose a big challenge for the Indian army. The Indian
army has “suffered from an identity crisis from doing dual service in constabulary
and external defence functions”.219 Dasgupta reveals twelve out of nineteen army
campaigns during the period 1947-1998 were internal-security related. The
inference this researcher draws from the subsequent discussion of Dasgupta is
that regular civil-army engagements made the politicians keep army in such a
posture that civil and political supremacy in the country is never challenged by
the army even if it is at the cost of ignoring officer material for recruitment
purposes.
On the other hand, the Pakistan army is not getting accolades either. Although
the Pakistan army will maintain a commanding role in developing national
identity, it is failing to attract persons from affluent families and from those who
219
ibid., p. 88.

are placed in the higher echelons of the society like its Indian counterpart.220
Cohen is not impressed with the professionalism of the Pakistan army due to the
weaknesses it exhibited during the Kargil war, where in addition to its weak
technological base, it failed to muster well-coordinated joint services operations.
Cohen suggests the acquisition of nuclear capability will not mask the strategic
inferiority of Pakistan that could only be overcome by gaining knowledge and
wisdom while reaching a par with India’s strategic dominance.
4.3 Strategic cultures of India and Pakistan
In March 1982, a three-day seminar on India’s strategic environment was
organised in New Delhi where India’s top politicians, academics and service
officers deliberated on various issues.221 It is not clear whether the participants
were clear about what is meant by strategic environment. Bajpai states religious
fundamentalism, even if it becomes a problem in future, is of no relevance as “it is
always there, just beneath the top layers of consciousness”.222 Paying tributes to
Gandhi’s unrelenting struggle, Bajpai states it is erroneous to call Gandhi a
pacifist, which could not be farther from truth as “Gandhi preferred violence to
cowardice”.223 On the issue of threat from Pakistan, Bajapi adds, five discussion
areas were identified during the seminar: ideological threat, conventional nuclear
military threat, intervention threat, threat of diplomatic containment, and
threats arising out of internal stabilities. The seminar focussed more on scenarios
220
Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 1st pbk. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2006), pp. 97-130.
221
U. S. Bajpai et al., India's Security: The Politico-Strategic Environment, 1st ed. ([New Delhi]: Lancers
Publishers, 1983), p. 1.
222
ibid., p. 37.
223
ibid., p. 61.

about what Pakistan could potentially do without linking them to what actually
was happening out there.
It was not until recently that we came across serious study about India’s strategic
culture.224 Jones has tabulated this culture on philosophical and mythological
foundations and has extensively drawn linkages to Hindu epics calling it
Omniscient Patrician Culture where India wants its traditional and civilisational
aspects respected. Jones clearly outlines that the shapers of Indian strategic
culture are politicians, bureaucrats, notable academics, think tanks, the press and
not the army officers. While on the other hand, Kanti Bajpai (different from U S
Bajpai discussed before) considers three paradigms: Nehruvianism,
Neoliberalism, and Hyperrealism.225 Borrowing from Johnston, Bajpai is looking
at answers for three questions:
1. What is the role of war in international relations?
2. What is the nature of the adversary and the threats it poses?
3. What is the utility of the force?226
Bajpai’s general discussion settles the questions by summing up Nehruvianism
for peace and talks, Neoliberalism for trade and economic interaction, and
Hyperrealism for a permanent solution by means of war. Nevertheless, Bajpai
focuses further on Pakistan next and revisits all three paradigms again.
Elaborating Nehruvianism, Bajpai states that a state based on Islamic ideology
and having differences with India cannot survive. Citing Nehruvian scholars like
224
Kanti Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan," in Security and South Asia:
Ideas, Institutions and Initiatives, ed. Swarna Rajagopalan (London: Routledge, 2006), R. W. Jones,
"India‘s Strategic Culture," Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office,
http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/comparitive_strategic_cultures_curriculum/case%20stu
dies/India%20(Jones)%20final%2031%20Oct.pdf.
225
Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan," pp. 54-79.
226
ibid., p. 60.

Dhar and Khan, Bajpai state that according to Nehruvian view, Pakistan is the
result of an invalid two-nation theory therefore it lacks the ideals of a nation.
However, Nehruvians recommend efforts should be made to restrain the support
to Pakistan from other external supporters and Pakistan should be engaged in
talks directly or through international institutions. Explaining the Neoliberal
approach to Pakistan, Bajpai adds that Neoliberals. while not discounting the role
of international institutions, want a flexible approach during discussions.
Secondly, Neoliberals are not averse to the presence of other powers in the
mediation role, which is rather pragmatic and paves the way for stronger
economic ties. Finally, citing hyperrealist scholars like Chellany and Karnad,
Bajpai states that hyperrealists do not believe in talks and negotiations, as the
only solution to the Pakistan problem, according to them, is an all-out war.
According to Bajpai, hyperrealists contemplate total surrender by or collapse of
Pakistan. Hyperrealists, according to Bajpai, also want India to equip itself for
ultimate challenges that would later come from China and the US. Identifying the
actual Indian approach to Pakistan, Bajpai says that traditionally Nehruvians
dominated the Indian strategic culture in the past, while this approach has
shifted to neoliberals and hyperrealists after the end of the cold war. Bajpai, while
enumerating the shortcomings like threats, coercion, and regular troop
manoeuvrings of neoliberal and hyperrealist paradigms wants to choose the
traditional way of Nehruvianism for finding everlasting peace with Pakistan.
However, it is not understood when Nehruvians do not accept the legitimacy of
Pakistan in the first place, no matter how many sessions of talks they hold with
Pakistan they would always end in a stalemate.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s strategic culture has the insecurity of a newly
created state ingrained into it, which is still trying to establish its identity. 227
Having a war with India, Rizvi adds, is a part of Pakistan’s strategic culture where
Pakistan is also aware of the economic constraints of a prolonged war. Rizvi
states that by creating “nuclear ambiguity”, Pakistan was keeping an equal
pressure on India by declaring a capability for making a bomb while not making
one.228 When India carried out nuclear explosions in May 1998, Pakistan lost the
edge, which this ambiguity had created, Rizvi adds. But by carrying out reactive
nuclear explosions, although Pakistan matched the Indian threat, especially the
war in Kashmir, Pakistan still supports a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons
and does not support the “no first use” policy of India, which disadvantages small
countries like Pakistan, Rizvi says. Islam is also a part of Pakistan’s strategic
culture, according to Rizvi, which dates back to the British period when Muslim
rights were threatened due to the numerical majority of Hindus.
Lavoy agrees with Rizvi that Pakistan’s strategic culture is based on insecurity.229
Lavoy adds that the Kashmir dispute is the main component of Pakistan’s
strategic culture and Pakistan calling it the Kashmir insurgency freedom
movement and India calling it insurgency state-sponsored terrorism are both
correct in their own right. He further suggests both countries have a hard-line
approach on Kashmir and talks so far are an effort in futility. Lavoy is afraid that
227
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Strategic Culture," in South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances
and Alliances, ed. M. R. Chambers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,
2002), pp. 308-09.
228
ibid., p. 318.
229
Peter R. Lavoy, "Pakistan‘s Strategic Culture," Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems
and Concepts Office,
http://www.dtra.mil/documents/asco/publications/comparitive_strategic_cultures_curriculum/case%20stu
dies/Pakistan%20(Lavoy)%20final%202%20Nov%2006.pdf.

the Kashmir conflict could become a nuclear flashpoint. He adds that although
Pakistan is ready to involve a third party for any talks on Kashmir. India is
adamant on not having a third party. India also wants Kashmiri insurgents to give
up violence first so that talks could be held on condition of staying within the
context of integrity of India. In contrast, Lavoy also offers that Pakistan is
involved in the process of strategic myth making, developing myth makers, and
carrying out the process of legitimising and institutionalising the myths. To
argue his point Lavoy gives the example of nuclear weapons where the strategic
myth making is about nuclear security and nuclear influence. Nuclear ambiguity,
as discussed before, actually fits well into Lavoy’s framework. Similarly, fighting
the Taliban will put Pakistan through the strategic myth process.
Conversely, Khan presents a succinct view of the strategic choices of Pakistan.230
He outlines two choice making areas. Pakistan is not going to join a bandwagon
that undermines its sovereignty. While Pakistan is fully aware of India’s emerging
status, it would not be reduced to a “West Bangladesh”. Secondly, citing Cohen,
Khan compares the similar circumstances, which Pakistan shares with Israel—
persecution, powerful enemies, hostile neighbours, similar strategic policies and
similar circumstances for developing nuclear weapons. The second choice
mentioned by Khan clearly counters Lavoy’s argument about myth making for
nuclear security and nuclear influence.
230
Feroz Hassan Khan, "Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan," Strategic Insights IV, no.
10 (2005). http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/khan2Oct05.asp

4.4 Kashmir: Nuclear flashpoint
In the South Asian region, Kashmir and nuclear weapons are the two
“inextricably and irretrievably bound together” issues.231 As the insurgency started
gaining momentum in Kashmir in 1990, according to Ganguly and Hagerty, there
emerged a possibility of a likely nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan.
They claim that during 1990s the Kashmir issues metamorphosed the conflict
between the two neighbours. They cite the then Indian Prime Minister VP Singh
claiming India would reciprocate if Pakistan were to position nuclear weapons.
However, Ganguly and Hagerty do not point to a Pakistani nuclear provocation in
their discussion before citing Singh. Their discussion revolves around Kashmir
and the mention of a “thousand-year war” that Benazir Bhutto, the then Pakistan
Prime Minister promised.232 Clearly, a thousand-year war could not be nuclear in
nature. Therefore, it is quite evident here that India played the nuclear card in
1990 to warn Pakistan for keeping its hands off Kashmir. Nevertheless, Ganguly
and Hagerty later add that while the US ambassador in Pakistan never observed a
nuclear ambition, the US ambassador in Delhi was already hearing about a likely
explosion in the spring of 1990.233 In their subsequent discussion, Ganguly and
Hagerty remain inconclusive, citing conflicting reports about the 1990 crisis
whether Pakistan already possessed a nuclear warhead or whether this crisis was
a catalyst for developing a nuclear weapon by Pakistan.
231
Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, p.
82.
232
ibid., p. 92.
233
ibid., pp. 98-99.

Ten years after the 1998 India Pakistan nuclear tests, researchers examine the
events that unfolded after the tests and the related stability issue in South Asia.234
But nobody has tried to explore why India initiated the tests. Although, Ganguly
mentions Brasstacks and 1990 crisis but he does not offer a fresh insight. On the
other hand, Ganguly and Hagerty attribute the 1998 nuclear tests to India’s
“nuclear aspirations and domestic political compulsions”.235 However, while
narrowing down their argument, Ganguly and Hagerty shift the political onus on
India’s Bharatiya Janata Party alone while mentioning the factor of the China
threat to India and comparing China to India from a historical, civilisational,
colonial, and emergent economic aspirations viewpoint. However, discussing
India’s nuclear parity with China is misplaced in view of the limited war theory,
as India and China never engaged in limited war before or after the Indian
nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 (also discussed in chapter 3).
Conversely, India’s hegemonic aspirations were unleashed in the early 1980s with
Soviet assistance, massive borrowings and a chase for seats on international
councils.236 Munro adds that by the mid-1980s, India realised that in spite of
having a high growth defence budget and huge arms imports, it was mostly
ignored on the world stage. This prompted India towards military adventurism,
which was not limited to Siachen and rather took the Indian military down south
into Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Munro further states that India, at the same
234
Sumit Ganguly, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia," International Security 33, no. 2 (2008), Kapur,
"Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia."
235
Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons, p.
117. For details see Chapter 6: Out of the Closet, pp. 116-42.
236
Ross H. Munro, "The Loser: India in the Nineties," The National Interest, no. n32 (1993),
http://find.galegroup.com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/itx/start.do?prodId=ITOF

time, was also busy organising Festivals of India across the capitals of various
countries. Munro observes that by 1993 India was not getting the due returns for
its efforts and even the morale of Indian army was at the lowest ebb with its
humiliating retreat from Sri Lanka. Munro further compares India with China
where India is unable to match “China's superior record in such basics as literacy,
nutrition, and rural development”. Subsequently, Munro also mentions the
growing Chinese influence in South-east Asia and China developing its relations
with Iran. Munro concludes emphasising that India should be forced into
denuclearisation with a bleak future outline for India. It is here where Munro
goes wrong.
Munro is unable to fathom the ascendance of China and other factors that would
be an eventual challenge to the US.237 It would be under these circumstances that
India, looking for one stroke capable of getting the attention it wanted, projected
it as a potential and compatibly armed rival of China, able to extend ramifications
westwards while liberalising its economy. This one stroke initiated the nuclear
tests in 1998. The nuclear tests enhanced “India’s prestige and status”.238 Cohen
states there will be keen interest to watch India’s crisis management capacity and
its ability to get hold of a seat on a council as a spinoff of the nuclear tests. With
the gradual economic development of India, Cohen projects “India might be able
to develop and deploy a theatre missile defense against another nuclear
power”.239 Visualising its growing importance in non-Western world, Cohen sees
237
For a detailed discussion on factors in favour of India and India‘s geo-strategic position, see Sandy
Gordon, "South Asia after the Cold War: Winners and Losers," Asian Survey 35, no. 10 (1995), Pervez
Hoodbhoy, "Myth-Building: The "Islamic" Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49, no. 5 (1993).
238
Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p.
304.
239
ibid., p. 305.

India as counter-measure against a “threatening or expansionist China”, should a
situation so warrant while recommending a “qualified” US support for India’s
candidacy for the United Nations Security Council.240
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the insurgency in Kashmir when it
started in 1989 and the factors that led to it while enumerating the peculiarity of
Article 370 of the Indian constitution and accession of Kashmir. Operation
Brasstacks, which was the deception plan of India, was not able to yield the
desired results while Pakistan’s ambitious Zarb-i-Momin was rather exploited by
India for moving more troops into Kashmir and Punjab. Strategic cultures of
India and Pakistan are clearly caught in a paired-minority conflict where Indians
do not accept the two-nation theory while Pakistan is mostly involved in myth
making for security and influence as a reactive measure. Finally, although
Kashmir is the nuclear flashpoint of South Asia, India gained a strategic
advantage from the nuclear tests it carried out in 1998, giving it a wider role in
the affairs of South Asia and improving its position as a future counter measure
against China.
240
ibid., p. 311.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and strategic implications
5.1 Introduction
“There is no instance in the history of a state becoming wealthy without military
power or security”.241 To argue his point, Chellany offers the example of
colonialism and claims that spending on military power is no waste of money.
Chellany also points to the fact that economic prosperity is also linked to an
independent nuclear arsenal and he wants India to become more assertive in
global affairs.242 India, in the recent past, has undergone an adjustment of its
position in the global hierarchy of states.243 Looking historically at India, Cohen
states, India will be measured against its reputational power, its economic and
military power, and as a rising and emerging power capable of throwing up many
surprises. However, India’s global ambitions are seriously affected by the
domestic and regional challenges that it faces.
On the other hand, Pakistan, projected as a “next major middle-income country”
twenty five years ago, is dangerously moving towards becoming a failed state in
the current environment.244 Compared to India’s economic and military
emergence as mentioned before, Cohen finds that Pakistan is mired with a
booming birth rate, no scope for economic development and a failed education
system. Cohen adds that drifting away from the ideal Pakistan visualised by its
241
Brahma Chellaney, "Challenges to India's National Security in the New Millenium," in Securing
India's Future in the New Millennium, ed. Brahma Chellaney and Centre for Policy Research (New Delhi
India) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999), p. 531.
242
See http://www.hindu.com/2004/12/19/stories/2004121907600100.htm
243
Cohen, India: Emerging Power, p. 25.
244
———, The Idea of Pakistan, p. 296.

founders, the present dissimilitude in Pakistan today is only temporarily masked
by opposing India on various fronts.
In contrast, peacemaking in Kashmir remains intangible due to the “vested
interests in continued bloodshed”.245 Krepon explains that with no stakeholder
willing to accept compromise, the progress on Kashmir crawls back to square
one, politically. What Krepon hoped from the Bush administration in 2001 for
peacemaking in the region is still relevant for Obama today.
Kashmir is such a knotted issue for India and Pakistan that despite having fought
wars and having organised numerous meetings for a resolution of this issue,
Ganguly questions if it will potentially stop India’s rise.246
5.2 Findings
The massive demonstrations and hoisting of Pakistani flags inside the Kashmir
valley on India’s Republic Day on 26 January 1990 gave a clear indication that the
longstanding Kashmir dispute increased the chances of yet another India
Pakistan war.247 The origins of this war could be traced back to the
fundamentalist Hindutva mindset that preceded the two-nation theory by
decades, especially the way Hindu institutions were protected and flourished
during the colonial period. It is unique that the civilisational superiority, which is
claimed by the proponents of Hindutva that the Indus Valley civilisation was
245
Michael Krepon, "A Ray of Hope," The Washington Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2001): p. 175.
246
Sumit Ganguly, "Will Kashmir Stop India's Rise," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (2006). See also:
Arundhati Roy‘s article on Kashmir at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/22/kashmir.india
247
Iftikhar H. Malik, "The Kashmir Dispute: A Cul-De-Sac in Indo-Pakistan Relations?," in Perspectives
on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Boulder: Westview Press,
1992), p. 310.

spread over much of what is currently Pakistan. However, Islamisation has
brought such a paradigm shift in the Pakistani psyche that they are unable to
think outside the square of enmity with India with no recollection of or a desire
to link with Indus Valley civilisation.
On the other hand, India has checkmated Pakistan by staying ahead in the games
of intelligence since 1947, be it the Ganga hijacking, Operation Topac, Track Two
diplomacy, or the Kargil war. Domestically, India has been able to scuttle the
demands for a true federal structure and in the case of Punjab; it pro-actively
launched the strategy of coercion for controlling the religious institutions of the
Sikhs and to teach them a lesson that reminded them that their existence is on
sufferance of the majority.
India’s strategic culture does not accept the legitimacy of Pakistan while the
latter’s strategic culture is more into myth making. To consider the question
whether Kashmir is the cause or consequence of the India Pakistan conflict is
fallacious as Kashmir predates Pakistan. This issue becomes complex especially
when the Pakistani mindset does not connect with the civilisation which India is
proud of. This aspect is beyond the scope of this study and warrants further
research.
Nuclear power transformed a loser India of 1993 into a winner and an emerging
power whereas Pakistan is a tamed follower on the verge of a collapse. Swami
who concludes that the Kashmir conflict is a “nuclear jihad” is totally misplaced
in his observation, as available literature clearly indicates that Pakistan is meekly

buying peace from a stronger India. This is corroborated by the fact that after
Operation Brasstacks when Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan mediated between
India and Pakistan, the latter compliantly handed over the Sikh soldiers who
sought refuge in Pakistan after the mutiny which followed Operation Blue Star.248
Commanding a hegemonic control domestically while rubbing shoulders with
China internationally, India is now looking for global alliances and seats on
councils while on the contrary, it is near impossible for Pakistan to survive
without foreign aid. In view of the above, it is evident that India and Pakistan,
trapped in a paired-minority conflict while aggravating the Kashmir issue, are
unable to resolve it bilaterally as fundamentalist Hindutva and Islamisation have
hit a dead end there.
5.3 Strategic implications
To consider the Kashmir dispute within the ambit of the India Pakistan conflict
will be myopic as literature has pointed to its fallout beyond the region. Outside
the South Asian region, the hyperrealists in India are clearly looking at China.249
While, in the long run, these hyperrealists see a strategic challenge emanating
from the US too.250 Mention of Kashmir then by Barack Obama as a candidate for
the Democratic presidential nomination was widely criticised in India.251 Raja
Mohan finds Obama’s argument simple where the US accomplishment in
Afghanistan is linked to Pakistan and the latter is further linked to India through
Kashmir. Raja Mohan further advises the US administration that instead of
248
Praveen Swami, "Open Doors " Frontline 21, no. 13 (2004),
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2113/stories/20040702003503400.htm.
249
Chellaney, "Challenges to India's National Security in the New Millenium," p. 541.
250
Bajpai, "Indian Strategic Culture and the Problem of Pakistan."
251
C. Raja Mohan, "How Obama Can Get South Asia Right," The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2
(2009): p. 175.

focussing on India it should ask Pakistan to mend its ways based on the bilateral
negotiations between India and Pakistan. He is not shy of further suggesting a
powerful role for India to play in Afghanistan. It is hard to understand the logic of
Raja Mohan’s advice when Nehruvian negotiators do not recognise the two-
nation theory while hyperrealists want Pakistan to collapse. How then, is the
latter going to gain anything out of negotiations. Raja Mohan finds Obama’s
argument simple, yet his advice obliterates the links of Obama’s argument. On
the other hand, a weaker Pakistan will set hurdles for a US success in
Afghanistan, including a strategic disadvantage in dealing with the Central Asian
“-stan” states. Further discussion on this aspect is beyond the scope of this study.
Indian strategy that looks into the future is evident from an example given by
Schofield, where she quotes Gautam Sen who, while speaking at a seminar in
London, dismissed redrawing the India Pakistan boundaries as an effort in
futility.252 Sen claims that the Kashmir dispute would automatically be resolved in
fifty years as India would be so strong by then all such challenges would cease to
exist. Sen’s argument is not different from the hegemonic Indian strategic culture
that considers whole of South Asia as “one” and “natural” paving the way for
Indian dominance.253 Sathasivam takes a microscopic look at all types of
doctrines and policies of the India Pakistan conflict but stops short of clearly
outlining a suggestion for resolution. Similarly, Koithara offers a long treatise on
creating peace in Kashmir but does not offer a solution.254
252
253
For a detailed study of this aspect, see: Kanishkan Sathasivam, Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan,
and US Foreign Policy, US Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World (Aldershot, England ;
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 142-49.
254
Verghese Koithara, Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through a Realist Lens (New Delhi, India; Thousand
Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 265-97.

Schofield offers theoretical scenarios for a future where all such scenarios are
unworkable within the standpoints of India and Pakistan.255 A similar set of
scenarios is available on the BBC web site as an enhanced visual
representation.256 The seven scenarios on the BBC web site are namely; the status
quo, Kashmir joins Pakistan, Kashmir joins India, Independent Kashmir, a
smaller independent Kashmir, Independent Kashmir Valley, and the Chenab
formula. These seven scenarios on the BBC web site are discussed with their
merits and demerits. There is also the model-based approach of Wirsing which is
not very different from the scenarios mentioned before.257 However, what makes
Wirsing stand out is his recommendation for US involvement in Kashmir and his
suggestions on how to break the India Pakistan deadlock. Developing his
argument, Wirsing states how the US position on Kashmir during the years has
moved from support for a Kashmiri plebiscite to support for a bilateral agreement
between India and Pakistan. Wirsing, however, in his argument, still maintains
the importance of a plebiscite. In addition, he further outlines in detail four focus
areas, a three-pronged strategy, and objectives for a bilateral solution. But his
outline would work only if bilateral talks between India and Pakistan are ever
going to be successful.
Conversely, this study has clearly established that India Pakistan bilateral talks
are not capable of reaching a resolution. Therefore, the only solution to the
Kashmir problem is an internationally supervised plebiscite, which comes from
255
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, pp. 232-36.
256
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/03/kashmir_future/html/default.stm
257
Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, pp. 217-
33.

the mandate of the extant presence of the United Nations Military Observer
Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The existence of UNMOGIP for 60
years is a clear indication that India and Pakistan are unable to settle their
disputes bilaterally. As such, it is the responsibility of the international
community to save the ordinary citizens from the hassles of enduring the clashes
between pro-authority and anti-authority terrorists and their internecine killings
and also saving ordinary human beings from the trauma of living in the theatre of
games of intelligence.

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HOW FAR CAN THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 1989-

2009 BE ATTRIBUTED TO 'FUNDAMENTALIST'

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the degree of Master of Strategic Studies at

School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington.

The Kashmir conflict 1989-2009 is a representation of ‘fundamentalist’ religious

empowerment. This conflict is not a stand-alone phenomenon. The origins of this

South Asian conflict could be traced back to the fundamentalist Hindutva

mindset that preceded the two-nation theory of Pakistan and subsequent

Islamisation by decades, especially the way Hindu institutions were protected

war since 1947, caught in “a paired-minority conflict”, engaging occasionally in

the battleground but increasingly in games of stealth and intelligence. Indian

entangled in the mindset of strategic inferiority and displaying a lack of

gradually progressed to an insurgency in Kashmir with implications beyond

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh ii

work took me to Kashmir in the 1990s.

My dissertation supervisor Professor Jim Veitch deserves much credit for

inspiring me to marry my life experiences with academic training in strategic

East, in counter terrorism, intelligence, transnational crime and religion, and

of the strategic studies papers enhanced my knowledge about Islamisation, the

praise for helping me whenever I faced a problem with referencing software or

with interloan requests for books

my children who gave me a quiet space to write. My colleagues at work; Michael

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh iii

referenced. Any mistakes are regretted and accidental.

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh iv

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh v

the wars as a populace. Kashmiris rather, were responsible for “unravelling a

The 1947-8 war, as mentioned before, ended up in the formation of a cease-fire

Another India-Pakistan war in 1971 ended with the birth of Bangladesh—a

four occasions included: India’s “Brasstacks” military manoeuvres (1986-87), the

Kashmir insurgency (1990), Kargil (1999), and border confrontation (2001-02). It

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh 1

covered in detail in the second chapter of their book.

the UN resolution on Kashmir, whereas Pakistan considered this agreement a

Simla Agreement was successful in pushing Kashmir out of international

attention for some time.6

Islamisation of Pakistani politics. He spells out some additional developments

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh 2

confrontation with the erstwhile Soviet Union.8

During the 1980s, a Hindu nationalist movement emerged as a powerful

This movement was led by “the militant organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak

Sangh (RSS)”.9 Hindu nationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth-century

when it was adopted by “India's Westernized middle classes” asserting the

preponderance of Hindu cultural traditions as the national mainstream.11

Ollapally identifies Hindu nationalism as Hindutva, which became a formidable

force in the 1980s at the cost of secularism in India, eclipsing “Nehruvian”

secularism.12 Ollapally identifies the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the

champion of Hindutva, which espouses the Savarkar and Golwalkar branding of

India as a land of Hindus. Chapter two discusses the concept of Hindutva in

Compared to the Hindu and Islamic religious movements in India and in

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh 3

Pakistan conflict due to Kashmir’s proximity to Afghanistan, central Asian states

fundamentalism for his clash of civilisations theory, Huntington visualises that

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh 4

dependent, while the latter is being used as a pretext.

commerce—handicrafts and tourism—have badly suffered during the past

1.1 Statement of the problem and research question

international-security developments that were not getting the attention they

deserved.19 Among them, according to Rollie Lal of Rand, is the commitment to

is totally absent from literature on the Kashmir conflict.

MSS Dissertation: Gurtej Singh 5

book, Demystifying Kashmir on 25 January 2007, Ashley Tellis pointed to a

remark points to and stimulates a link to religious empowerment that is already