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, DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, TWIN RIVERS PLANTATION, INC. and MARSMAN & CO., INC., for themselves and inbehalf of other persons and entities similarly situated, petitioners,vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS Because of the difficulty in determining the peso-dollarexchange rate, Congress passed RA 6125 which imposed a stabilizationtax on exports, which gradually decreases over four years. The lawenumerated covered products such as logs, copra, centrifugal sugar and copper. Under Section 1, as a last provision, Any export product theaggregate annual F.O.B. value of which shall exceed five million United States dollars in any one calendar year during the effectivity of this Act shall likewise be subject to the rates of tax in force during the fiscal years following its reaching the said aggregate value . During the first 9 months of 1971, the total banana export exceeded the USD5m limit in RA 6125. Thus, the Central Bank issued aMonetary Board Resolution imposing a stabilization tax on exports of bananas. The resolution provided a rate of 6% for the first half of 1971 and 4% from July 1971 to last until June 1972. The petitioner corporations were all engaged in productionand exportation of bananas who paid the stabilization taxes in protest and now assail the said resolution.Central Bank contends that the stabilization tax should beimposed starting July 1971, the fiscal year following the calendar yearwhere the industry reached USD 5m limit. ISSUE WON the Central Bank exceeded its powers in issuing the saidResolution HELD YES. There is no question that the export of bananas alreadyreached the limit, bringing it under the coverage of RA 6125, and thusmaking the petitioners liable.However, the Central Bank, in issuing the resolution, acted inoverzealous desire to carry out the provisions of RA 6125. It actedbeyond its authority under the said law. Thus, where there is adiscrepancy between the basic law and the regulation issued toimplement the said law, the basic law prevails and the regulationcannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
Francisco I. Chavez vs. National Housing Authority G.R. No 164527. August 15, 2007. Velasco, Jr., J. Doctrine: There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Facts: Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the NHA and R-II Builders Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional

and invalid, and to enjoin respondents particularly respondent NHA from implementing and/or enforcing the said project and other agreements related thereto. On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161 (MO 161) approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects. Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies which resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the Plan was submitted to President Aquino for her approval. On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415, approving and directing the implementation of the SMDRP through a private sector joint venture. Said MO stipulated that the land area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee (EXECOM) to oversee the implementation of the Plan and an inter-agency technical committee (TECHCOM) was created composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM. Based on the evaluation of the pre-qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, Inc. and RBI as top two contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted its recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the RBI proposal which garnered the highest score. On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI. Afterwards, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square meters covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite. The land reclamation was completed in August 1996. Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598 conveying in favor of NHA an additional 390,000 square meter area. After some time, the JVA was terminated. RBI demanded the payment of just compensation for all accomplishments and costs incurred in developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of return. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by NHA and RBI, both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and other subsequent agreements, which stipulated, among others, that unpaid balance may be paid in cash, bonds or through the conveyance of properties or any combination thereof.

Issues: 1. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged land areas because they are allegedly inalienable lands of the public domain 2. Whether RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use. 3. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred from the Constitution to acquire lands of the public domain. Held: 1. Yes. The reclaimed lands across R-10 were classified alienable and disposable lands of public domain of the State. First, there were three presidential proclamations classifying the reclaimed lands across R-10 as alienable or disposable hence open to disposition or concession. These were MO 415 issued by President Aquino, Proclamation No. 39 and Proclamation No. 465 both issued by President Ramos. Secondly, Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 issued by the DENR classified the reclaimed areas as alienable and disposable. Admittedly, it cannot be said that MO 415, Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the lands to be reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that such conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries. In line with the ruling in Chavez v. PEA, the court held that MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that [t]here must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. 2. Yes. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public service. President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project. Also, President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no longer required for public use or service. In addition, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the area to be reclaimed from forty (40) hectares to seventy-nine (79) hectares, elucidating that said lands are undoubtedly set aside for the beneficiaries of SMDRP and not the public. MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the

SMDRP cannot be successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service. 3. Yes. When Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 were issued, inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. When the titles to the reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State because the NHA is an agency NOT tasked to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The only way it can transfer the reclaimed land in conjunction with its projects and to attain its goals is when it is automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State. Being patrimonial or private properties of the State, then it has the power to sell the same to any qualified personunder the Constitution, Filipino citizens as private corporations, 60% of which is owned by Filipino citizens like RBI.

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission 14SCRA62 0 (1965) FACTS: The SEC in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc permission to operate astock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities alreadylisted in the Manila Stock Exchange.Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. Contends that theCommission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory andunjust. The Commission s order or resolution would make impossible, for all practicalpurposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, such that its permission amounted to prohibition . Issue: Does the Commission have the authority to promulgate the rule in question? Held: None.1. Test for determining the existence of authority The commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule againstdouble listing. It suggests that the power is necessary for the execution of thefunctions vested in it. It argues that said rule was approved by the Department Headbefore the war and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. Theapproval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in judicial litigation.The test is not whether the Act forbids Commission from imposing a prohibition butwhether it empowers the Commission to prohibit.2. Commission without power to impose prohibition The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule whichresults in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental thatan administrative officer has such powers as

are expressly granted to him by statute,and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against double listing. Masangkay v. COMELECG.R. No. L-13827. Sept.28, 1962 Facts: Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the COMELEC in itsresolution to among others, take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots,election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the differentmunicipalities of the province. He and several others were charged before the COMELECwith contempt for having opened three boxes containing official and sample ballots for themunicipalities of the province of Aklan without the presence of the division superintendentof schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, in violation of the instructionsof said Commission and which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Codeand Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. He was subsequently convicted by the COMELEC asguilty and sentenced to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, withsubsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. Masangkay contended that, even if he can be held guilty of the act of contemptcharged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commissionto impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers. Issue: W/N COMELEC can exercise the power to punish contempt. Held: NO. The COMELEC, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaningof the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, mayhowever exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provisionlaw come under its jurisdiction. However, when the Commission exercises a ministerialfunction it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforceand for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcaymerely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merelyconcern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. Thus, the COMELEC cannot exercise its power to punish contempt.


[G.R. No. 112965. January 30, 1997.] PHILIPPINES TODAY, INC., BETTY GO-BELMONTE, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ARTURO A. BORJAL, and ISAAC G. BELMONTE, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR., respondents. FACTS Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed by PTI as a senior investigative reporter of the Philippine Star. He later became chief investigative writer and then assistant to the publisher. On October 20, 1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a thirty-day leave of absence effective on the same date, citing the advice of his personal physician for him to undergo further medical consultations abroad. Four days later, he wrote a "Memorandum for File" addressed to Petitioner Betty Go-Belmonte with copies furnished to members of the board of directors of PTI, which expressed respondents negative feelings towards the company. On December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from Petitioner Belmonte a letter, informing the former that the Board has accepted his resignation. The following day, Respondent Alegre wrote Petitioner Belmonte expressing surprise over the acceptance of his "resignation", since he did not resign. Unheeded, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against herein petitioners. ISSUE 1. 2. HELD IN # 1 The SC held that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation. Alegre's choice of words and way of expression betray his allegation that the memorandum was simply an "opportunity to open the eyes of Belmonte to the work environment in petitioners' newspaper with the end in view of persuading her to take a hand at improving said environment." Apprising his employer of his frustrations in his job and differences with his immediate superior is certainly not done in an abrasive, offensive and disrespectful manner. A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to one's superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being the "proverbial hen that lays the golden egg," so to speak. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes his employer professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a baleful pen. Here, respondent Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. His memorandum is too affrontive, Whether or not the Memorandum for File constitutes voluntary resignation. Whether or not a resignation be unilaterally withdrawn.

combative and confrontational. It certainly causes resentment, even when read by an objective reader. His incendiary words and sarcastic remarks negate any desire to improve work relations with petitioners. Such strongly worded letter constituted an act of burning his bridges with the officers of the company. Further, the actions of respondent, such as clearing his work desk of personal belongings, not reporting back to work after his leave, and his immediate employment with another employer, confirm his intention to terminate his employment with petitioner. HELD IN # 2 The SC held that resignations, once accepted, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. If the employer accepts the withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them. Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment. A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. Consistent with our ruling in Intertrod, the resignation of respondent Alegre after its acceptance by petitioners can no longer be withdrawn without the consent of the latter. In fairness to the employer, an employee cannot backtrack on his resignation at his whim and without the conformity of the former. Petition is granted.


October 26, 2012 Leave a Comment

FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional; Held: YES under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
PNOC v. CA (Ysan)

Facts: In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).

Private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel.

Issue: Whether the actual damages were adequately established by the evidence presented

Held: No. In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. The testimony of the general manager as to the valuation of the ship is not reliable because

he is an interested party and because it was not within his competence to determine the value of the property.

A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.

Realty Exchange Venture Corp. vs. Sendino | Kapunan (1994)

FACTS - Private respondent Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a house and lot in a subdivision. She paid a partial reservation fee and paid the full down payment. - However, for alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents, REVI, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract. - Sendino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). - The HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by REVI, rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered REVI to continue with the sale of the house and lot. - An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President, herein public respondent. Appeal dismissed.


RATIONALE - While E.O. 85 abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is patently clear from a reading of its provisions that the said executive order did not abolish the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which continued to exercise its powers and functions. In spite of the Aquino Government's stated intention of eradicating what it considered the vestiges of the previous regime, it was not its intention to create a vacuum by abolishing those juridical agencies which performed vital administrative functions. - The President subsequently issued Executive Order No. 90, series of 1986, recognizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the principal housing agencies of the government. - Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981 transferred all the functions of the National Housing Authority to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions relating to land use and housing development in a single entity. - Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB, would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition. - Moreover, this Court, in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, has had the occasion to definitively rule that the HLURB could exercise the same quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers possessed by the HSRC under the MHS in the exercise of its regulatory functions. - Section 1 of PD 1344: the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. - This is reinforced by section 8 of EO 648: Transfer of Functions. The Regulatory functions of the NHA are hereby transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. . . . Among the regulatory functions are . . . (11) Hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices, claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen and cases of specific performance. - There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. - In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. - Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc, instead of by a division of three: - Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." - Nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division.

- We cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions. - After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been withheld."

Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations


The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or

adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90 775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.