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CONFEDERATE CAVALRY AT CHICKAMAUGA-W H A T W E N T W R O N G ?

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e requirements f o r t h e degree MASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

LAWYN C. EDWARDS, MAJ, USA B.S., U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y Academy, 1975 M.S., A i r F o r c e I n s t i t u t e o f Technology, 1987

F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 1990

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e r d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u n l i m i t e d

MASTERS O F MILITAKY ART A N D SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate: T i t l e of Thesis: Went Wrona? Approved by: M A J L a m C. Edwar-

Confederate Cavalrv a t C.hickamauaa

--

What

-----, Thesis
W i 11iam G . Robertson, Ph. D.

Committee Chairman

Accepted t h i s 1 s t day of June 1990 by:

The opinions and conclusions expressed h e r e i n a r e those of t h e student author and do not n e c e s s a r i l y represent t h e views of t h e U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College or any other governmental agency. (References t o t h i s study should i n c l u d e t h e foregoing statement. )

CONFEDERATE CAVALRY A T CHICKAMAUGA W H A T W E N T W R O N G ? by NAJ Lawyn C. Edwards, USA, 206 pages. T h i s s t u d y i n v e s t i g a t e s General B r a x t o n B r a g g ' s use o f c a v a l r y d u r i n g t h e p i v o t a l Tul lahoma and Chi ckamauga Campaigns. A 5 army commander, Bragg was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r o r g a n i z i n g u n i t s , s e l e c t i n g commanders, and a s s i g n i n g missions. H i s d e c i s i o n s had s i g n i f i c a n t impact upon t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l f o r t u n e s o f t h e firmy o f Tennessee and on Conf e d e r a t e s t r a t e g y . F i r s t , t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n d e f i n e s t h e unique h e r i t a g e o f American c a v a l r y . Second, i t addresses t h e a c t u a l employment o f c a v a l r y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America. Did t h e s e r o l e s c o i n c i d e w i t h t h o s e o f European c a v a l r y ? D i d a v a i l a b l e army and c a v a l r y l e a d e r s h i p p l a y a c r u c i a l p a r t i n t h e successes and f a i l u r e s o f Confederate p l a n s ? Do t h e c a r e e r s o f Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and F o r r e s t o f f e r c l u e s t o t h e i r e f f o r t s a t Chickamauga? A l s o , how d i d t h e elements o f n a t i o n a l power ( p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , economic, geographic, and n a t i o n a l w i l l ) , c o n t r i b u t e t o Confederate c a v a l r y performance? T h i s s t u d y concludes t h a t blame i s t o be shared between t h e commanders i n v o l v e d and t h e system w i t h i n which 'hey fought. T h i s s t u d y p r e s e n t s an i n depth view o f t h e performance o f C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y i n t h i s ' ' v i c t o r y ' ' a t t h e " R i v e r o f DeathN.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Title Page..............

...............i

Thesis Approval Page..................ii

Table of Contents.....................iv List of Maps......................,., List of T a b l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i List of Figures.. ..v

....................vi i

D e d i c a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i i
Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter

................................................. 1 -- American Cavalry Tradition and Tactics .......8


-- Confederate Cavalry

-- Tullahoma Campaign 4 -- Chickamauga Campaign ........................99


-- Summary -- Summary
of Principal Events, Tullahoma

......................... ..........................69
29

Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Appendix A

-- Battle of Chickamauga ......................140 -- Conclusions ................................167

....194
2UU
CI

Appendix B

of Principal Events, Chickamauga ..I96

Bibliography......

.......................................

Initial Distribution L i s t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . &

L I S T OF M A P S

F'aye Map 1. Theater of Map 2. Map 3. Map 4. Area of

O p e r a t i o n s ...................

Interest................................

..75

Chickamauga Campaign.... B a t t l e o f Chickamauqa..

.........................lml ..........................14.2

H V Boynt on , Theb!aat_it_io!=n_alM+LFf-a.lr~YYPPa.~kk:L. Chickarnac~oa-Chatt~n~~g An a . H i s t o r i c a l Guide ( C i n c i n n a t t i : Robert C l a r k e Co., 1895), p. 22.

Nap 3:

..

LIST O F TABLES

Page Table 1. A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n of 10 J ~ t n e1863.. Table 2.

............................... .'7rl.

Army o f Tennessee,

A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n o f Ar-my o f Tennessee, 20 J u l y 1863.................................102 A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n o f Rrmy o f 'Tennessee, 8 6 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . % l m 31 J u l y 1 Confederate C a v a l r y Order o f B a t t l e , 31 J ~ t l y 1863, Army o f Tennessee.......................lll

Table 15.

T a b l e 4.

T a b l e 5 . A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n and C a v a l r y Order o f B a t t l e , 31 J ~ t l y1863, Department o f East Tennessee...ll2 T a b l e 6. A b s t r a c t f r o m R e t u r n o f Army o f ~ e n n e s s e eand Department of East Tennessee, 10 August 1863.114 Confederate C a v a l r y Order o f B a t t l e , 10 A~1gus.t 1863, Army of Tennessee......................115 A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n o f Army o f Tennessee, 20 August 1863

T a b l e 7.

T a b l e 8.

............................... 116

T a b l e 9.

C o n f e d e r a t e Rrmy o f Tennessee Order o f B a t t l e , 19-20 September 1863.....................143-150

SOURCES

L I S T OF FIGURES

Page F i g u r e 1. F i g u r e 2. R e g i m e n t a l Armored C a v a l r y Squadrons.. Divisional Cavalry

. ... . . ...18'7 Squadrons ................... 188

SOURCES D.C.:

U.S. Army, FM 17-95, C a v a l r y O p e r a t i o n s (Washington, Department o f t h e Army, 1986)

DEDICATION Ia m d e d i c a t i n g t h i s work t o t h e American s o l d i e r . Not o n l y t o t h e s o l d i e r o f today, o r t h e b l u e o r t h e gray, b u t t o a l l o f them. My f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n i n t h i s work does n o t l a y any g u i l t upon t h e p r i v a t e s o l d i e r o f t h e Army of I t r u l y b e l i e v e i t i s up t o t h e l e a d e r s h i p t o Tennessee. a s s i s t and a l l o w t h e American f i g h t i n g man t o win t h i s m n a t i o n ' s wars. As a member o f t h a t l e a d e r s h i p element, I a always reminded o f a quote from a p a s t p r e s i d e n t o f Lee. He s a i d , "Do your d u t y i n a l l Washington C o l l e g e , R.E. things. You cannot do more. You s h o u l d never w i s h t o do less. " I a l s o w i l l a l l o w myself t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e armies o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e Confederate S t a t e s i n t h e f i e l d d u r i n g t h e S p r i n g and Summer o f 1863, Americans a l l , were good enough t o have walked a c r o s s t h e f a c e o f Europe i f t h e y had been o f a mind t o do so. No m a t t e r what General von M o l t k e t h o u g h t about t h e s e b e i n g , t w o armed mobs r a t h e r t h a n armies, t h e y would have knocked h i s P r u s s i a n s o f f t h e f i e l d . S i n c e t h i s i s m e r e l y a p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g , I need n o t defend i t here. I hope t o do b e t t e r i n t h e t h e s i s on i t s s u b j e c t . . I thank m y w i f e f o r t h e u n t o l d a s s i s t a n c e i n t h i s work and t h e p a t i e n c e t o p u t up w i t h me. She m o t i v a t e d m e I a l s o w i l l now go p l a y b a l l w i t h my t w i n s , s e v e r a l times. j u s t l i k e I promised them. I thank m y mother and f a t h e r f o r t h e h e l p t h e y rendered also. The f i n a l work was w o r t h t h e hassle.

Introdu -. c t i o-n T h i s t h e s i s has deep r o o t s i n a l i f e - l o n g t h i r s t f o r knowledge on t h e War Between t h e S t a t e s , War. For m y family, t h e American C i v i l No one

t h i s was n o t a C i v i l War.

f o u g h t o r s i d e d w i t h t h e N o r t h i n any o f m y four ancestral lineages. t h e same. I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, m y w i f e ' s f a m i l y can say

These p e o p l e l i v e d so f a r back i n t h e Georqia and

Alabama woods t h a t t h e y p r o b a b l y d i d n o t even know any "Yankees", much l e s s understand Yankee i d e a s and ways. grandfather Louis Trawick's family, One came home; ten In

m y great-great

b r o t h e r s went o f f t o war. Also,

i t was n o t L o u i s .
having

i n t o d a y ' s modern army,

Ia m a cavalryman,

served b o t h i n t h e a i r and on t h e ground. c a r e e r l e a r n i n g t h e employment o f l i g h t ,

I have spent my
fast-moving,

h a r d - h i t t i n g c a v a l r y f o r c e s whether t h e y c o n s i s t o f M 5 5 1 Sheridan A s s a u l t v e h i c l e s , Vehicles,


M 3 Bradley Cavalry F i g h t i n g

OH-58 Scout h e l i c o p t e r s , o r AH-1 Cobra a t t a c k Though a s m a l l p a r t o f t h e US Army's f o r c e s ,

helicopters.

c a v a l r y u n i t s guard t h e f o r w a r d deployed f o r c e s and w i l l most l i k e l y be t h e f i r s t t o f i g h t i n a f u l l - s c a l e Whether o r n o t t h e y a r e p r o p e r l y manned, organized, equipped, war.

and l e d w i l l c e r t a i n l y p l a y a l a r g e p a r t i n US Learning from o p e r a t i o n s o f Certainly

Army success i n any such war.

t h e p a s t may p r e p a r e m e f o r those of t h e future.

a t t h e l e v e l where c a v a l r y p l a y s i t s l a r g e s t r o l e , . t h e US Corps, t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t of b a t t l e i s i n effect.

C a v a l r y u n i t s have h i s t o r i c a l l y been, and s t i l l a r e , almost always v a s t l y outnumbered. Nevertheless, c a v a l r y

u n i t s t o d a y must s u c c e s s f u l l y p l a y t h e i r r o l e i n t h e b a t t l e w i t h t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l b e i n g t o win t h e b a t t l e i n t h e c o v e r i n g f o r c e area. W e must win f r o m t h e o u t s e t .

C a v a l r y u n i t s d i d p l a y a r o l e i n t h e g r e a t C i v i l War b a t t l e o f t h e Western Theater, Chickamauga. Cavalry u n i t s

were a v a i l a b l e f o r employment b e f o r e t h e a c t i v e f i g h t i n g s t a r t e d i n t h e campaign, aftermath. Chickamauga, t h r o u g h t h e b a t t l e , and d u r i n g i t s however, was an i n f a n t r y f i g h t .

The t a n g l e d undergrowth and woods k e p t use o f a r t i ll r r y and mounted c a v a l r y o p t i o n s v e r y r e s t r i c t e d . Glenn Tucker s a i d

t h a t Chickamauga was "mere ground t h a t few had ever h e a r d o f , much o f i t near w o r t h l e s s ground t h a t l a y u n c u l t i v a t e d , vine-strewn, thicket-matted,--stretches t h a t haa never known

a saw o r heard t h e r i n g o f t h e axe o f man.

"*

Looking a t a

map o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and r e c a l l i n g t h i s s t a t e m e n t makes one wonder whether t h e r e were a c a v a l r y m i s s i o n here. Confederate c a v a l r y u n i t s were p r e s e n t and made a contribution. defeat? D i d t h e i r presence c o n t r i b u t e t o Union Why were t h e i r uses Yet,

Could t h e y have g i v e n more?

and accomplishments so l i m i t e d i f t h e y c o u l d have done better? General James M. Gavin o f World War I 1 fame w r o t e i n

1954 t h a t he was n o t convinced t h a t t h e army knew what i t


was d o i n g w i t h c u r r e n t c a v a l r y o p e r a t i o n s . we now need, as a n a t i o n , He s a i d , "What

i s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p a s t

t h a t can be c o n v e r t e d i n t o t a c t i c s and b a t t l e hardware, and g i v e i t s s o u l back t o t h e c a v a l r y .


'I2

However, t h e t r e n d Tables o f has been

which has c u l m i n a t e d i n t h e c u r r e n t J - S e r i e s

O r g a n i z a t i o n and Equipment (TOkE) i n t h e U S Army, away f r o m General Gavin ' s d e s i r e d o b j e c t i v e .

Current

d o c t r i n e has emasculated t h e d i v i s i o n a l c a v a l r y squadrons w i t h t h e i n t e n t of making them l i g h t - w e i g h t u n i t s only. reconnaissance

Many suspect t h a t t h e i r a b i l i t y t o develop t h e thereby r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r usef u l n e s s

s i t u a t i o n i s 1i m i t e d ,

t o a d i v i s i o n commander. Conversely, a t the operational l e v e l , t h e armored

c a v a l r y r e g i m e n t o f an army c o r p s i s one o f t h e s t r o n g e s t , most v e r s a t i l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e h i s t o r y o f warfare. T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s n o t o n l y w e l l manned and equipped b u t i t h o n e s t l y has t h e a b i l i t y t o h u r t an enemy. The U S Army adopted t h e d o c t r i n e o f A i r Land B a t t l e i n t h e 1980's." initiative. The i d e a was t o g a i n and m a i n t a i n t h e The i n t e n t i o n was t o h i t t h e enemy h a r d on t h e He must be h i t

b a t t l e f i e l d and deep b e h i n d t h e l i n e s .

c o n t i n u a l l y u n t i l he can no l o n g e r h o l d h i s army t o g e t h e r . T h i s d o c t r i n e c a l l e d f o r a commander o f s t r o n g f i b e r who had h i s u l t i m a t e g o a l i n mind and who, by p e r s o n a l l e a d e r s h i p ,

imbued h i s whole army w i t h h i s conf i d e n c e and w i l l t o win. Continuous o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e a l m o s t snperhuman e f f o r t , because w i n n e r s g e t j u s t as t i r e d as l o s e r s . ~lsing t a c t i c a l maneuver and e f f o r t However, when

t o gain the national

objective, reward.

e x t r a e f f o r t even when t i r e d pays o f f w i t h g r e a t

Chickamauga was a b a t t l e i n which t h e Confederate army was t h e c l e a r v i c t o r on t h e f i e l d . The Chickamauga

campaigns, however, were n o t a C o n f e d e r a t e v i c t o r y . R e t r e a t s , t a c t i c a l setbacks, and l o s s e s o f t e r r i t o r y

demonstrated t h e poor Confederate performance i n t h e maneuver phase of Chickamauga, the battle. The a f t e r m a t h was even worse. was n o t h i n g b u t

the clear b a t t l e f i e l d victory,

a hollow victory, successes.

wasted because t h e commander c a s t away i t s Chickamauga was a superb v i c t o r y . Confederate

Tactically,

Operationally,

Chickamauga was a l o s s .

l e a d e r s h i p l o s t s i g h t of l a r g e r o l e i n t h e defeat.

i t s g o a l s and i t s c a v a l r y p l a y e d a

The o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f war, just battles,

campaigns as opposed t o

i s t h e l e v e l a t which t h e Confederacy l o s t t h e The o p e r a t i o n a l a r t o f war t a k e s t h e

b a t t l e o f Chickmauga.

g o a l s and p o l i t i c a l aims o f a c o u n t r y and c o n v e r t s resouces a v a i l a b l e i n t o p l a n s and o r d e r s f o r m i l i t a r y campaigns.4 t h e Chickamauga campaigns, t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f t h e Army In

o f Tennessee s h o u l d have been employed i n a s e r i e s o f maneuvers o r b a t t l e s designed t o f u l f i l l t h e well-planned g o a l s o f t h e army commander. completion, A s one campaign neared t h e commander

whether d e f e n s i v e o r o f f e n s i v e ,

s h o u l d have known what t o do n e x t t o f u r t h e r h i s g o a l s . These r a p i d l y executed f o l l o w - o n campaigns s h o u l d cause t h e

g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e h u r t t o t h e enemy.

While t h e commander p l a n s h i s campaigns,

he s h o u l d a l s o

d e c i d e when he w i l l g i v e b a t t l e and on what t e r r a i n . f e e l s t h e need, he can d e c l i n e b a t t l e a t any p o i n t ,

I f he
planning He

t o f i g h t on h i s own terms and t e r r a i n a t a l a t e r date.

s h o u l d s t r e n u o u s l y i d e n t i f y t h e s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of h i s enemy, as w e l l a s t h o s e o f h i s own army. He s h o u l d He s h o u l d

p r o t e c t h i s weaknesses and e x p l o i t h i s s t r e n g t h s . go f o r t h e enemy's j u g ~ i l a r

-- h i s

c e n t e r of

gravity

--

and

a v o i d h i s enemy's s t r e n g t h s . To accomplish h i s g o a l s , constantly. protected. t h e commander must p l a n i n f ormed and

He must keep h i m s e l f w e l l

I n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g and s e c u r i t y a r e t h e j o b The commander must o r g a n i z e , equip, and

of t h e cavalry.

t r a i n h i s c a v a l r y t o accomplish what he d e s i r e s and t h e n l e t them go do t h e job. him. According t o F'M 100-5 i n May 1986, t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f war " r e q u i r e s t h e commander t o answer t h r e e questions: He must a l s o p u t t o use what t h e y b r i n g

1) What m i l i t a r y c o n d i t i o n must be produced i n t h e


t h e a t e r o f war o r o p e r a t i o n s t o a c h i e v e t h e s t r a t e g i c g o a l ?

2) What sequence o f a c t i o n s i s most l i k e l y t o


produce t h a t c o n d i t i o n ?

3 ) How s h o u l d t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e f o r c e be
a p p l i e d t o accomplish t h a t sequence o f a c t i o n s ? " = The t h i r d q u e s t i o n , Tennessee's c a v a l r y , as i t p e r t a i n s t o t h e Army o f General Bragg

i s addressed here.

employed his forces i n a manner which allowed h i m to fail operational1 y. The consequences of his actions reflected Hopefully, a lesson will

the haphazardness of his planning.

be learned for future operations and future ~ o m m a n d e r s . ~

=Glenn Tucker, The B a t t l e o+ C h i c k a m a ~ a ,(Jamestown, V i r g i n i a : Eastern Acorn Press, 1987), p. C a. =James M. Gavin, "Cavalry And I Don't Mean Horses", Har~er's Maaazine, A p r i l 1954, pp. 54-60. "U.S. Army, F M 10Gi-5, O ~ e r a t i o ~ ~ s May - , 1986, p. i-ii.

--

& I n t h i s study t h e r e are numerous references t o t h e u n i t s of t h e Union and Confederate armies. The Union army began e a r l y i n t h e war t o number corps and d i v i s i o n s . Corps were most o f t e n c a l l e d by t h e number assigned t o them. D i v i s i o n s were sometimes r e f e r r e d t o by t h e i r numbers b u t most o f t e n by t h e commander's name. I n t h e Confederate army, no attempt was made t o number u n i t s a t any l e v e l . Throughout t h e war, a l l u n i t s were named a f t e r t h e i r commanders. Rs t h e commanders changed, u s u a l l y t h e name of t h e u n i t changed. References t o u n i t s i n t h i s paper g e n e r a l l y use t h e proper names of t h e u n i t s . Therefore, Confederate u n i t s " s i z e s " a r e c a p i t a l i z e d . Union corps a r e c a p i t a l i z e d when t h e i r numerical d e s i g n a t i o n i s used. W h e n t h e commanders name i s used t o denote t h e possessive;the u n i t s i z e i s n o t c a p i t a l i z e d , no matter t h e s i d e o r t h e size.

C~!EK..ONE
American C a v a l r y T r a d i t i o n and T a c t i c s The American c a v a l r y e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t b u i 1t upon t h e European model. There were many reasons t h a t America d i d n o t t h e l e a s t of which

n o t adopt p u r e l y European t a c t i c s , was t h a t t h i s was America,

n o t Europe.

The enormous s i z e of

t h e c o u n t r y r e q ~ t i r e du n i t s t o be spread t h i n l y a c r o s s i t . The s e t t l e r s s i m p l y r e f u s e d t o a l l band t o g e t h e r and go t o one f a i r l y e a s i l y p r o t e c t e d r e g i o n . The d i s t a n c e f r o m S t .

L o u i s t o F o r t Laramie was g r e a t e r t h a n f r o m t h e A t l a n t i c t o B e r l i n , and t h i s was b a r e l y h a l f w a y t o Oregon. country, expanse. t h e East. n o t numerous p r i n c i p a l i t i e s , Also, Only one

protected t h i s

t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n was i n

The t h r e a t was t o t h e west. t h e m a j o r i t y o f American e x p e r i e n c e

Up t o t h e 1840's,

came f r o m t e r r a i n t h a t was l e s s conducive t o c a v a l r y movement. I n t h e War Between t h e S t a t e s , t h e land east of In

t h e M i s s i s s i p p i R i v e r was t h e p r i n c i p l e b a t t l e + i e l d . t h i s area, t h e l a n d was a jumble o f dense f o r e s t s ,

numerous The

r i v e r s and mountains,

and r e c u r r e n t swamps and j u n g l e s .

l a r g e f o r c e s o f Europe d i d n o t r e p e a t e d l y encounter such d i v e r s i t y of t e r r a i n features. Because t h e l a n d was so l a r g e , was enormous a l s o . t h e business o f resupply

Wagons moving enough s u p p l i e s t o p r o v i d e

f o r l a r g e b o d i e s o f c a v a l r y formed t r a i n s i m p o s s i b l y l o n g due t o f o r a g e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e i r own. Unpopulated

regions d i d not allow the a v a i l a b i l i t y of provisions or

e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f slapply magazines as was done i n Europe. The R e v o l u t i o n a r y War p r o v i d e d v e r y l i m i t e d e x p e r i e n c e w i t h w a r f a r e o f t h e i n t e n s i t y which r e q u i r e d such l o g i s i t i c a l operations.

*
t h e American army was e s s e n t i a l l y a a p o l i c e force.
I t was accustomed t o

I n experience,

f r o n t i e r constabulary,

f i g h t i n g i n t h e American way,

n o t t h e enormous European way.

T h i s American way o f war c a l l e d f o r c h a s i n g down s m a l l bands of I n d i a n s , p a t r o l l i n g enormous1 y l o n g t r a d e r o u t e s , I n addition, Indians. and

p e r f o r m i n g unending guard duty. p a r t i c u l a r l y adept a t f i g h t i n g

t h e y were n o t they

However,

c e r t a i n l y had even l e s s e x p e r i e n c e a t command and employment o f u n i t s l a r g e r t h a n a company i n c o n v e n t i o n a l European conflicts. What t h e y d i d n o t need o r use, they d i d n o t

p r a c t i c e or learn." enother f a c t o r even more i n v o l v e d i n American c a v a l r y t r a d i t i o n s was t h a t Americans had an i n t e n s e d i s l i k e f o r l a r g e s t a n d i n g armies. O r i g i n a l 1y, t h i s may have developed

f r o m t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e l a r g e B r i t i s h army s t a t i o n e d i n t h e c o l o n i e s b e f o r e t h e war. "oppressive" C o l o n i s t s c a l l e d t h i s army

even though i t v e r y o f t e n was c a l l e d upon t o ( I n d i a n s ) and

defend c o l o n i a l l i v e s a g a i n s t i n t e r n a l external (European) foes.

The t r u t h i s more l i k e l y t o be

t h e f a c t t h a t Americans d i d n o t l i k e t h e c o s t o f a s t a n d i n g army any more t h e n t h a n t h e y do now. They r e a l l y d i d n o t

complain about t h e B r i t i s h u n t i l P a r l i a m e n t t a x e d t h e c o l o n i e s t o pay f o r t h e troops. S t a n d i n g armies c o s t money

n o t o n l y when wars a r e b e i n g f o u g h t b u t , n o t being fought. money.

also,

when wars a r e

To Americans t h i s seemed a waste o f good

The h a b i t o f r a i s i n g m i l i t i a armies o n l y when a c t u a l l y a t war seemed a l o t more s e n s i b l e e c o n o m i c a l l y t o Americans. T h i s argument can be f u r t h e r a p p l i e d t o t h e s u b j e c t a t hand. Mounted u n i t s c o s t d e c i d e d l y more t o e q u i p , m a i n t a i n t h a n do i n f a n t r y t r o o p s . So, train, and

Americans always For t h i s reason, the

responded by g o i n g t h e cheaper r o u t e .

h i s t o r y and e x p e r i e n c e o f American mounted u n i t s was as s p a r s e as were t h e u n i t s . The s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t h e r e i s

t h a t what d i d n o t e x i s t c o u l d n o t t r a i n i t s e l f . The Europeans p r o b a b l y d i d n o t l i k e t o pay t h e enormous c o s t s o f t h e massive mounted c o r p s e x t a n t i n European a r m i e s either. However, t h e s e c o u n t r i e s and a r m i e s were g e n e r a l l - y

r u l e d by. one q u i t e a u t o c r a t i c man who c o u l d do as he pleased. He made up h i s army a s he pleased. The p o o r e r

p e o p l e who were c a l l e d upon t o pay t h e b i l l were never c o n s u l t e d i n Europe. said I n America, t h e y were c o n s u l t e d and

"No".

Amateurs commanded most C i v i l War c a v a l r y u n i t s . Volunteers, not regulars, manned t h e s e u n i t s . These

amateurs rushed t o make up grand and g l o r i o u s t i t l e s f o r t h e i r u n i t s and t h e n made up t h e d r i l l t o go a l o n g w i t h t h e c o l l e c t i o n of troops. Many o f them had t h e i r own way o f

d o i n g t h i n g s and t h e y were n o t g o i n g t o l e t a f a n c y , aristocratic, West P o i n t e r t e l l them how i t s h o u l d be done.

Many o f t h e amateurs were r i g h t .

The West P o i n t e r s d i d n o t either. History

have much background i n c a v a l r y o p e r a t i o n s ,


,"

shows t h a t many o f t h e amateurs were e x t r e m e l y s u c c e s s f u l . As i n a l l arms o r branches o f t h e s e r v i c e , a p p a r e n t l y some

cream r o s e t o t h e t o p f r o m t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s and amateurs alike. L i t t l e o f t h i s was due t o f o r m a l t a c t i c s and d r i l l . ' s though. The armies

One p o i n t h e r e must be b r o u g h t o u t ,

on b o t h s i d e s o f t h e war were made up o f c i t i z e n - s o l d i e r s who came t o f i g h t and t h e n went home a f t e r t h e war was o v e r , i f not before. careerists. They were n o t l o n g - t e r m p r o f e s s i o n a l s though, t h a t t h e s e were by t h e but rather they and

--

I t i s arguable,

p r o f e s s i o n a l armies, middle of

a t l e a s t n o t m i l i t i a armies,

1863.

They were c e r t a i n l y n o t r o o k i e s , By t h i s t i m e i n t h e war,

well-seasoned

veterans.

c e r t a i n l y knew t h e i r business,

knew t a c t i c s and d r i l l ,

had weeded o u t t h e g r o s s l y incompetent commanders, t h e y be c i v i 1i a n s o r essionals.

whether

Because o f t h e s e and o t h e r f a c t o r s , developed a d i s t i n c t c a v a l r y experience.

t h e U.S.

Army

It i s q u i t e

e v i d e n t t h a t Americans d i d n o t use c a v a l r y i n t h e Napoleonic fashion, but rather, i n an American f a s h i o n . Napoleon's

numeroue t y p e s of

c a v a l r y each had a d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n as However, more o f t e n t h a n

u n i q u e as t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e names. not,

t h e name and f u n c t i o n was s u b j u g a t e d t o n e c e s s i t y as hussars, lancers, carabiniers, grenadiers, Mamelukes,

dragoons, chasseurs,

and c u i r a s s i e r s a l l charged t o g e t h e r .

These u n i t s and t h e i r mounted charges i n b a t t l e comprised a t


11

times up t o a quarter of t h e Napoleonic army, 25,000 strong. Weapons,

10.000 t o

t e r r a i n , and requirements governed

t h e i r usage and t h e i r success.s The e f f e c t i v e range of a musket was 100 yards. could be f i r e d no more than 3 t o 4 times a minute. It Massed

c a v a l r y charges a f f o r d e d a very e f f e c t i v e means of r o u t i n g an army against such l i m i t e d firepower. Even then, there

were defenses against c a v a l r y a s s a u l t s such as t h e B r i t i s h square.


I f t h e t r u t h be known, Americans d i d not spend an

i n o r d i n a t e amount of time studying Napoleon's c a v a l r y . However, t h e r e were several o f f i c e r s and t h e o r i s t s who d i d understand t h e lessons learned. However, many of t h e

experiences d i d n o t t r a n s l a t e w e l l i n t o t h e hmerican s i t u a t i o n o r psyche. 'Added t o t h e f a c t t h a t . t h e r e was


'

l i t t l e i n common between t h e wars of America,

1810 Europe and 1860

was t h e f a c t t h a t technology had brought k i l l i n g t o

a more r e f i n e d and accurate a r t . . The e f f e c t i v e range of t h e new r i f l e d - m u s k e t s against i n d i v i d u a l s was around 500 yards. I t was up t o 1000 yards against massed t a r g e t s . technology should have l e d t o r e v i s e d t a c t i c s . Improved However,

t a c t i c a l i n n o v a t i o n lagged behind technology i n t h e 1860's, a t t h i s c r u c i a l p o i n t i n American h i s t o r y . This f a c t was

n o t immediately grasped by e i t h e r t h e North or t h e South, b u t would p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of c a v a l r y throughout t h e war.7

The l a s t major e x p e r i e n c e Americans had w i t h war was a g a i n s t Mexico i n 1846-1848. I n many ways, t h i s war was a The

c o n v e n t i o n a l war f o u g h t a l o n g Napoleonic 1i n e s . o f f i c e r s who f o u g h t t h i s war were, commanders d u r i n g t h e 1860's.

i n l a r g e part, t h e senior

They experienced t h e i r " v i e w

o f t h e e l e p h a n t o q si n t h e Napoleonic f a s h i o n and t h e y were q u i t e e x c e p t i o n a l i n t h e i r performance. t h e Napoleonic f a s h i o n , U n i t s rode, C a v a l r y charged i n

a l b e i t on a much s m a l l e r s c a l e . a g a i n s t i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y Kearny a.t

sabers r a i s e d ,

l i n e s a t t h e c r u c i a l moment o f t h e b a t t l e .

Chur~kbuscoand May a t Resaca de l a Palma achieved overwhelming success. c l a s s i c saber charge. I n some minds, t h i s war v a l i d a t e d t h e

T h i s e x p e r i e n c e l i v e d on i n memory

even as t e c h n o l o g y changed:>
HOW&-,

. a s t h e War Between t h e S t a t e s - began,

both

si.des e n v i s i o n e d a s h o r t f i g h t w i t h l i t t l e l o n g t e r m e f f e c t . Each s i d e saw a d i f f e r e n t outcome o f t h i s s h o r t f i g h t . first, n e i t h e r s i d e r e c r u i t e d many c a v a l r y u n i t s .

At

The.first

b a t t l e s f o u g h t were almost s o l e l y i n f a n t r y f i g h t s . a m When t h e a r m i e s f i n a l l y o r g a n i z e d c a v a l r y u n i t s , t h e y d i d so on t h e model o f t h e r e g u l a r U.S. 1860. of mounted s e r v i c e s o f

The mounted m i s s i o n s were t h e c o l l e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s The manuals f o l l o w e d War U.S. Army.

t h e Mexican War and t h e f r o n t i e r .

by b o t h s i d e s remained t h o s e o f t h e p r e - C i v i l

Saber s w i n g i n g c a v a l r y charges came L u r i n g t h e war, s i d e s d i s c o v e r e d o t h e r uses f o r mounted men."

yet both

The mounted charge a g a i n s t formed i n f a n t r y was a h a l l m a r k o f Napoleonic c a v a l r y . S e v e r a l u n i t s t r i e d mounted

charges e a r l y i n t h e war w i t h e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same r e s u l t s each t i m e

--

no t a c t i c a l g a i n and numerous empty saddles. C a v a l r y l o s t 6B% a t Gaines' W i l l w h i l e The same

The 5 t h U.S.

c o n v e r t i n g t h e i r own army's r e t r e a t i n t o a r o u t .

t y p e o f e v e n t s o c c u r r e d a t Chancel l o r s v i 1l e , Cedar Mountain, and Gettysburg. C r i t i c s say t h e f a i l u r e s were due t o t h e A p o l o g i s t s say f a i l u r e

small s i z e of t h e charging forces.

was due t o t h e i n c r e a s e d volume o f a c c u r a t e f i r e p o w e r f r o m t h e i n f a n t r y formations, much t h e same reason g i v e n f o r

i n c r e a s e d c a s u a l t i e s i n a l l f a c e t s o f combat i n t h i s w a r . l Z Another Napoleonic e v e n t , t h i s war, which o c c u r r e d v e r y seldom i n melee.

was t h e c l a s s i c l a r g e c a v a l r y - o n - c a v a l r y

These r o m a n t i c v i s i o n s of

k n i g h t h o o d were near1y e x c l u s i v e Without c o u n t i n g

t o t h e e a s t e r n t h e a t e r and v e r y l i m i t e d .

b a t t l e s where c a v a l r y was engaged by opposing c a v a l r y i n s u c c e s s i v e c o u n t e r a t t a c k s secondary t o t h e i n f a n t r y b a t t l e , o n l y t h r e e examples a r e w i d e l y known. The c a v a l r y f i g h t s a t

Brandy S t a t i o n and t o t h e e a s t o f G e t t y s b u r g i n 1863, and t h e one a t Yellow Tavern i n 1864 were e x c l u s i v e l y mounted f i g h t s and degenerated i n t o t h e c l a s s i c saber w i e l d i n g variety.
lX

The e v o l u t i o n o f c a v a l r y t a c t i c s caused much r i d i c u l e aimed a t t h e mounted arm. A well-known q u o t e t h a t was

b a n t e r e d around t h e a r m i e s u s u a l l y went something l i k e "Who Again, ~ ever saw a dead ~ a v a l r y m a n ? " ~ t h e infantryman's

d i s l i k e f o r c a v a l r y was g i v e n v o c i f e r o u s acknowledgement i n Stephen C r a n e ' s c l a s s i c n o v e l The Red Badq.e of Couraqe. t a l l s o l d i e r was quoted a s s a y i n g "They say t h e r e a i n ' t h a r d l y any c a v a l r y l e f t i n camp. o r some p l a c e , T h e y ' r e g o i n g t o Richmond, I t ' s some The

while w e f i g h t a l l t h e Johnnies. I n the narration,

dodge l i k e t h a t . " % "

Crane a l s o says,

" I n t o t h e unspeakable jumble i n t h e roadway r o d e a squadron of cavalry. bravely. The f a d e d y e l l o w o f t h e i r f a c i n g s shone Cavalry d i d

There was a m i g h t y a l t e r c a t i o n . " "

- n o t g e t much good p r e s s w i t h t h e armies and and was seen as t r y i n g t o a v o i d a r e a l f i g h t o r j u s t c l o g g i n g up t h e road. I n g r a i n e d i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of was a new school o f t h o u g h t . American c a v a l r y t a c t i c s armies needed u n i t s

First,

w i t h f a s t operational mobility.

These f a s t u n i t s c o u l d

p r o v i d e a s t r o n g mounted r e s e r v e f o r t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n when t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t o f b a t t l e came. They a l s o a l l o w e d

t h e commander t o e x t e n d h i s c o n t r o l over a l a r g e r f i e l d o f battle.


I7

The o p e r a t i o n a l m o b i l i t y o f c i v i l war c a v a l r y a l l o w e d t h e t r o o p e r s t o overwhelm and c o n f u s e enemy commanders unaccustomed t o such r a p i d movement. movement of The e x t r a freedom o f

a s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e p r o v i d e d t h e u s i n g commander Cavalry could Cavalry

another added dimension t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

u s u a l 1y s t a y ahead o f enemy i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g .

c o u l d u s u a l l y g e t a f o r c e i n f i r s t w i t h enough f i r e p o w e r t o h o l d u n t i l r e l i e v e d o r a t l e a s t t o d e l a y an enemy f o r c e o f infantry.

T h i s t a c t i c was v e r y r a p i d i n e x e c u t i o n and f a c i l i t y o f maneuvering. place,

A l i n e c o u l d l i t e r a l l y be thrown down i n one


and moved t o t h e n e x t h o t s p o t .

p i c k e d up e a s i l y ,

The speed o f moving t h e u n i t o u t o f a l o s i n g s i t u a t i o n was j u s t as r a p i d . success, Even i f each i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n was n o t a

a s e r i e s o f such q u i c k b l o w s c o u l d t h r o w an enemy

o f f guard as he r e a c t e d t o a l l o f t h e minor annoyances. There was a l s o a new w i l l i n g n e s s t o r i d e t o b a t t l e and f i g h t on f o o t . T h i s happened i n America a t t h e same In

t i m e t h a t Europeans s a i d such t a c t i c s were a f a i l u r e .

h i s book on European c a v a l r y , Jean Roemer s a i d i n 186.3, t h a t " i t i s n o t l i k e l y t h a t any government w i l l a g a i n a t t e m p t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f mounted i n f a n t r y . States,
"lP

He w r o t e i n t h e U n i t e d

b u t h i s e x p e r i e n c e s were a l l European and t h a t o f

one who was o f " l a t e an o f f i c e r o f c a v a l r y i n t h e s e r v i c e o f . t h e nether land^".^^ As he wrote, he was b e i n g proven wrong.

B r i g a d i e r General B a s i l W. John H .

Duke d e s c r i b e d Major General

Morgan's dismounted methods as f o l l o w s :

I f t h e r e a d e r w i l l o n l y i m a g i n e a r e g i m e n t drawn up i n s i n g l e rank, t h e f l a n k companies s k i r m i s h i n g , sometimes on horseback, and t h e n thrown o u t a s s k i r m i s h e r s on f o o t , and s o deployed a s t o c o v e r t h e whole f r o n t o f t h e regiment, t h e r e s t o f t h e dismounted men (one o u t o f each s e t o f f o u r , and t h e c o r p o r a l s r e m a i n i n g t o h o l d t h e h o r s e s ) , and deployed as circumstance5 r e q u i r e d , and t h e command i n d i c a t e d t o t h e f r o n t o f , on e i t h e r f l a n k , o r t o t h e r e a r o f t h e l i n e o f horses, t h e f i l e s two y a r d s a p a r t , and t h e n i m a g i n e t h i s l i n e moved f o r w a r d a t t h e d o u b l e q u i c k , o r o f t e n e r a h a l f r u n , he w i l l have an i d e a o f Morgan's s t y l e of f i g h t i n g . Zm
Dismounted f i g h t i n g c a l l e d f o r an i n n o v a t i o n horse holders

--

t h a t of

--

touched upon i n General Duke's d i s c o u r s e .

Each c a v a l r y u n i t counted o f f f i g h t i n g dismounted,

i n groups o f f o u r .

When

t h e number f o u r man h e l d t h e h o r s e s Many t r o o p e r s would They k e p t t h e

w h i l e t h e o t h e r t h r e e fought.

d i l i g e n t l y v i e f o r number f o u r p o s i t i o n !

h o r s e s a t a s a f e d i s t a n c e b u t a l s o a v a i l a b l e f o r i n s t a n t use f o r r e t r e a t or pursuit. Also, i f needed, t h e s e men c o u l d

provide a l o c a l reserve although a t t h e h i g h cost of wandering horses. Horse h o l d i n g had n e g a t i v e aspects.


It

r e q u i r e d a q u a r t e r o f a v a i l a b l e combat power d u r i n g a f i g h t . There was, also, y r e a t c o n f u s i o n i f enemy s o l d i e r s o r

a r t i l l e r y f i r e separated t h e t r o o p e r s from t h e i r horses a t an i n o p p o r t u n e time.== Mounted i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s had i t s d e t r a c t o r s even i n t h e f a c e o f i t s many successes. Many s e n i o r o f f i c e r s d i d n o t

l i k e t h e h a b i t because t h e y saw t r a i n i n g b e i n g divided."' Troopers had t o be t r a i n e d as c a v a l r y which was a l r e a d y d i f f i c u l t and t i m e consuming t o do. They a l s o had t o be

t r a i n e d as i n f a n t r y which d i d t h i n g s d i f f e r e n t l y and more strictly. Some f e a r e d t h a t a u n i t t h a t c o u l d n o t accomplish General

e i t h e r i n f a n t r y o r c a v a l r y m i s s i o n s would r e s u l t .

F o r r e s t and o t h e r s s o l v e d t h i s problem by m a i n t a i n i n g a mounted element w h i l e most o t h e r s were dismounted. F o r r e s t ' s case, and h i s e s c o r t , In

t h e mounted element was g e n e r a l l y h i m s e l f a l i g h t company.'"


'

Other c r i t i c s s a i d d i s m o u n t i n g t h e c a v a l r y was bad f o r morale and t o o k away t h e o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t o f t h e u n i t . s t a t e d above, t h e y i g n o r e d t h e success o f t h e t a c t i c . As There

a r e p l e n t y o f examples o f such t a c t i c s b e i n g used t o g r e a t success w i t h no d e g r a d a t i o n o f morale o r o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t . F o r r e s t ' s v i c t o r y a t B r i c e ' s Crossroads i s such an example and one o f t h e c l a s s i c s o f t h e war and American h i s t o r y . = 4 Frank B a t c h e l o r , one o f T e r r y ' s Texas Rangers, p u b l i s h e d some o f h i s l e t t e r s , a l o n g w i t h a + e l l o w Ranger. I n t h e work e n t i t l e d " B a t c h e l o r - T u r n e r he says o f t h e c a v a l r y , T h e i r s i s t h e d u t y o f s c o u r i n g t h e enemy l i n e s n i g h t and day and r e p o r t i n g h i s movements-- t h e y a r e c o n s t a n t l y i n s i g h t o f t h e advancing f o e , f i g h t i n g h i m a t e v e r y f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n , h u r r y i n g up t h e jaded i n f a n t r y , o b s t r u c t i n g t h e roads, and o f t e n s t a n d i n g under severe f i r e s o f h i s a r t i l l e r y , o r r e s i s t i n g t h e charges o f h i s c a v a l r y . ''*s L e t t e r s 1861-1864",

I n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e job of cavalry,

Trooper B a t c h e l o r

touches on many o f t h e r e m a i n i n g m i s s i o n s assigned t o c a v a l r y u n i t s under t h e t a c t i c s r e f i n e d i n t h i s war. need t o be e x p l a i n e d somewhat.' Guard m i s s i o n s were a means o f s e c u r i t y u s u a l l y r e q u i r e d w h i l e t h e army i s on t h e march. Advance and f l a n k These

guards k e p t t h e commander warned o f any i n t e r f e r e n c e which could a f f e c t h i s u n i t . Guard m i s s i o n s a l s o o c c u r r e d w h i l e They a l l o w e d a commander

t h e u n i t was engaging an enemy.

t h e t i m e t o r e a c t t o an enemy f l a n k i n g movement t h r e a t e n i n g h i s l i n e of b a t t l e . The r e a r g u a r d v e r y o f t e n concealed an

a r m y ' s poor s t a t e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n f r o m an enemy and protected i t from f u r t h e r i n j u r y . p u r s u i t b y s l o w i n g down t h e enemy. usually the f i n a l act of a b a t t l e ,
1a

It could f o r e s t a l l a A r e a r g u a r d a c t i o n was a l l o w i n g t h e main body t o

disengage and g e t away.

C a v a l r y u n i t s q u i t e o f t e n conducted

r e a r g u a r d f i g h t s f r o m t h e t r e n c h e s r e c e n t l y abandoned by t h e infantry. They were u s u a l l y q u i t e v i o l e n t and b l ~ o d y . ~ " another means o f s e c u r i t y , were g e n e r a l l y These p i c k e t s were

Outposts,

mounted p i c k e t s around an encamped army.

u s u a l l y f a r t h e r o u t t h a n i n f a n t r y p i c k e t s and p r o v i d e d t h e s e c u r i t y f o r t h e army as i t r e s t e d and r e o r g a n i z e d . Cavalry

was a l s o q u i t e adept a t h a r r a s s i n g t h e enemy p i c k e t s because r i d e r s c o u l d g e t away r a p i d l y b e f o r e a l a r g e r enemy f o r c e could

Screening was b o t h a d e f e n s i v e and o f f e n s i v e s e c u r i t y mission. Defensively, a screen was used t o keep t h e enemy

f r o m u s i n g h i s c a v a l r y t o g a i n i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e f r i e n d l y army. T h i s a l l o w e d t h e army t o move, u n d e t e c t e d b y enemy

i n t e l l i g e n c e , t h u s p r o v i d i n g an element o f s u r p r i s e . D e f e n s i v e s c r e e n i n g u s u a l 1y r e q u i r e d t h e d i s p e r s a l o f t h e force, b u t upon r e t i r e m e n t i n f r o n t o f an enemy, t h e screen

became s t r o n g e r as i t c o l l a p s e d upon i t s e l f and i t s army.

A n o f f e n s i v e s c r e e n was q u i t e p r o b a b l y t h e o p p o s i t e .

The

f o r c e c o n s o l i d a t e d t o punch a h o l e t h r o u g h t h e enemy screen a t a weak p o i n t t o g a i n more i n f o r m a t i o n . C a v a l r y screened Major

i n f a n t r y movements and achieved t a c t i c a l s u r p r i s e . " =

General F i t z h u g h Lee d i d t h i s q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h a s m a l l f o r c e d r a g g i n g b r u s h t o i n d i c a t e a l a r g e r movement a t t h e 2nd B a t t l e o f M a n a s ~ a s . " ~ I n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g was another f o r t e o f t h e c a v a l r y . T h i s embraced reconnaissance, which was a s t r a t e g i c use of

cavalry,

as w e l l as s c o u t and spy systems.

While s e c u r i t y

was u s u a l l y a d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n , i n v o l v e d t h e u n i t i n combat.

information gathering often

The reconnaissance was e x e m p l i f i e d most a c c u r a t e l y by t h e r i d e s t h a t Major General J.E.B. S t u a r t made i n t h e E a s t .

D u r i n g h i s two r i d e s a r o ~ m dt h e Army o f t h e Potomac, S t u a r t ' s m i s s i o n was t o d e t e r m i n e t h e s i z e and d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e opposing f o r c e .

He b r o u g h t back q u i t e a b i t o f
This i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering

use+u l and t i m e 1 y i n t e l l i g e n c e .

was m~tchmore a c c u r a t e and v a l u a b l e t h a n t h a t o b t a i n e d by most o t h e r means o f more l i m i t e d scope. O n a strategic

reconnaissance, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r e r s were t r a i n e d m i l i t a r y observers. These o b s e r v e r s tended t o e x a g g e r a t e


i f not

l e s s t h a n c i v i l i a n s , a t l e a s t on t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n , on t h e i r own accomplishments.

The dangers o f such m i s s i o n s replaced

became apparent a t G e t t y s b u r g when g l o r y - s e e k i n g

m i s s i o n accomplishment as t h e purpose o f t h e r i d e . = " Every army s h o u l d have a t h o r o u g h l y planned and executed s c o u t system. Each s c o u t s h o u l d b e s p e c i a l l y water c r o s s i n g s , and

trained i n picking favorable t e r r a i n , routes,

and i n e s t i m a t i n g enemy s t r e n g t h and t h e l a n d ' s These t r o o p e r s needed t o be

c a p a b i l i t y t o s u p p o r t t h e army.

s e n t ahead o f an advancing f o r c e t o keep t h e main b o d y ' s march as f r e e o f c o m p l i c a t i o n s as p o s s i b l e . Generals scouts.

F o r r e s t and Morgan used an e x t e n s i v e network of

These s c o u t s r o d e o u t days o r weeks i n advance o f t h e main body. The s c o u t s s t a y e d ahead o f t h e column t h r o u g h o u t t h e

o p e r a t i o n wtii l e sending n e c e s s a r y i n f o r m a t i o n back t o t h e main column. S c o u t s s e n t d u p l i c a t e r e p o r t s back t o m u l t i p l e

a d d r e s s e e s thereby i n s u r i n g t h e information g o t back t o t h e r i g h t p l a c e and h a d n o t been compromised.


Of

course, e a c h
For

m e s s a g e s t i p u l a t e d t o whom a d u p l i c a t e h a d b e e n s e n t . s u c h m i s s i o n s , t h e need f o r a well-organized

network w a s

e s s e n t i a l t o p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t men a n d h o r s e s t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e t a s k s a t hand.=' S p i e s were a n o t h e r s o u r c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n . While t h i s

w a s n o t a r e g u l a r c a v a l r y m i s s i o n p e r se, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e
r e t r i e v e d from s p i e s c o u l d b e t r a n s p o r t e d , v e r i f i e d , and e x p l a i n e d by t r a i n e d o f f i c e r s and t r o o p e r s . I t was

e s s e n t i a l t o v e r i f y information by m u l t i p l e s o u r c e s t o

assist i n b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h d e c e p t i o n p l a n s .

In addition,

t h e commander o r h e a d q u a r t e r s b u r e a u o f i n f o r m a t i o n n e e d e d a t r a i n e d and informed messenger a v a i l a b l e and p r e p a r e d t o answer q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n forwarded. This

a l l o w e d d i f f e r e n t r e p o r t s t o b e s i f t e d and compared b e f o r e c o n c l u e i o n s were r e a c h e d . Any commander who a c t e d too

h a s t i l y , or i n d e e d too s l o w l y , o n i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r e d , most a s s u r e d l y made more wrong t h a n c o r r e c t g u e s s e s . 3 z T h e r a i d w a s o n e o f t h e p r e m i e r n o v e l t i e s i n t h e realm o f c i v i l war c a v a l r y t a c t i c s . The S o u t h began t h e c r a z e and

h a d many e x p e r t s among i t s f o r e m o s t c a v a l r y l e a d e r s . S o u t h e r n r a i d e r s of n o t e i n c l u d e d M o r g a n , F o r r e s t , W h e e l e r , A s h b y , a n d , on a more l i m i t e d s c a l e , Mosby i n V i r g i n i a . However, t h e N o r t h l e a r n e d t h e u s e s o f a good r a i d a n d set

LIP i t s own p r a c t i c e .

C o l o n e l Benjamin G r i e r s o n d i d w e l l i n Colonel Abel S t r e i g h t a l s o t r i e d Streight's

M i s s i s s i p p i i n 1863.""

v e r y h a r d i n Alabama and Georgia t h a t same year.

o n l y problem was t h a t he was up a g a i n s t t h e r a i d i n g e x p e r t , F o r r e s t , who r a n h i s b l u e c l a d t r o o p e r s t o ground."" end o f t h e war, By t h e

t h e Yankees had t a k e n a Rebel i d e a and Major General James Wilsnn and a

r e f i n e d i t i n t o an a r t form.

h i s 18,000 b l u e horsemen were t h e epitome o f such, v e r i t a b l e r a i d i n g army.


3"

R a i d s v e r y s e r i o u s l y d i s r u p t e d t h e enemy r e a r a r e a and l o g i s t i c s bases even though t h e y were a l s o q u i t e d e s t r u c t i v e o f f r i e n d l y cavalrymen and t h e i r mounts. Even though r a i d s

v e r y o f t e n decimated t h e f o r c e e x e c u t i n g them, when a s t r o n g enough d i v e r s i o n c o u l d be c r e a t e d t o cover f o r them, s t r o n g d i v e r s i o n was needed t o c o v e r another move, or i f a

the r a i d

was q u i t e b e n e f i c i a l due t o t h e t r o u b l e s i t caused enemy commanders and t h e i r l i n e s o f c o m r n ~ n i c a t i o n . ~ ~ P u r s u i t s were another s t r o n g c a p a b i l i t y o f c a v a l r y units. "Fresh i n f a n t r y u n i t s can pursue d e f e a t e d i n f a n t r y , I n t h i s case c a v a l r y i s

b u t exhausted i n f a n t r y cannot. necessary."37

P u r s u i n g c a v a l r y came f r o m a mounted element The f r e s h e r t h e y

r e t a i n e d f o r j u s t such an e v e n t u a l i t y . were,

t h e more a b l e t h e y were t o p r e s s t h e p u r s u i t t o i t s 4 r m i e s pursued by n i p p i n g a t t h e h e e l s o f a Better yet, by moving p a r a l l e l t o t h e

culmination.

r e t r e a t i n g enemy.

enemy and h i t t i n g h i s f l a n k s over and over a g a i n u n t i l he was slowed, t h e enemy c o u l d t h e n be a s s a i l e d a t t h e head o f

h i s col~lmn.

T h i s l e d t o h i s b e i n g surrounded and t o h i s Commanders pressed p u r s u i t s w i t h o u t They a l s o

detailed destruction.

a l l o w i n g t h e p u r s u i n g t r o o p e r s t o s t o p and l o o t .

e x e r c i s e d t i g h t c o n t r o l so t h a t t h e p u r s u i t i t s e l f d i d n o t become overextended o r premature. away i n p u r s u i t of Cavalry could n o t r i d e

s m a l l u n i t s b e f o r e t h e enemy main body The

was d e f e a t e d i n d e t a i l and d r i v e n f r o m t h e f i e l d .

c l a s s i c p u r s u i t was F o r r e s t ' s chase o f S t u r g i s a f t e r t h e Union d e f e a t a t B r i c e ' s Crossroads. "After such a d e f e a t ,

t h e r e s h o u l d be no s t o p p i n g a p u r s u i t and i t s h o u l d he pushed as f a r and as l o n g as p o s s i b l e . ' ' general, conflict.

="

However,

in

p u r s u i t s were n o t accomplished w e l l d u r i n g t h i s
A t Chickamauga,

a p u r s u i t was n o t even attempted. Nosby b r o u g h t ambushes by

Confederate C o l o n e l John S.

mounted men t o a l e v e l unmatched by any o t h e r u n i t d u r i n g t h e war. Personal i n n o v a t i o n and i n g e n u i t y was added by F o r r e s t used h i s men and a r t i l l e r y t o and t h e n use Union gunboats on t h e

each p r a c t i t i o n e r . ambush, defeat,

capture,

Tennessee R i v e r .

He was l i k e l y u n i q u e i n t h a t he was t h e a l b e i t a short-lived

o n l y c a v a l r y commander t o have a navy, one.


39

Mounted c o u r i e r s and a i d e s were a f i n a l c a v a l r y chore. T h i s was one o f t h e i r non-combat r o l e s which tended t o The

d i v i d e up u n i t s and make them much l e s s e f f e c t i v e . Union c a v a l r y , especially i n Virginia,

s u f f e r e d much under

t h e s t r a i n of t h i s type of mission during t h e f i r s t years of t h e war. The mounted c o u r i e r was an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the

ever-expanding command and c o n t r o l e f f o r t which was a t loggerheads w i t h t h e need f o r a combined c a v a l r y e f f o r t and force. The way t h e Union solved t h e problem was t o mount The South had a more severe problem s i n c e i t Its

more s o l d i e r s .

d i d not have t h e resources necessary t o do t h i s . c a v a l r y s u f f e r e d more as a r e s u l t .

Some c r i t i c s c l a i m t h a t c a v a l r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e W a r Between t h e States was n e g l i g i b l e and n o t worth mentioning."However, t h i s is a view brought about because

t a c t i c a l usage of c a v a l r y d i d not conform t o t h e Napoleonic standard. The b l o o d i e s t day of t h e war, a t Sharpsburg, led

t o o n l y 28 Union c a v a l r y c a s u a l t i e s . a t o t a l of e i g h t , casualties.

Fredericksburg l e d t o

l e s s than one i n every 1,300 Union o n l y f i v e charges were made i n

I n t h r e e years,

major b a t t l e s , which was l e s s than what Marshall Ney made i n t h r e e hours a t water lo^.^^ Yet, f o r t h e war a t hand, t h e Cavalry

Napoleonic standard was an i n a p p r o p r i a t e gauge. charges alone were n o t t h e answer.

Cavalry was n o t used i n

t h e Napoleonic manner b u t t h i s d i d n o t mean t h a t they were immaterial t o t h e prosecution of t h e war. The most f i t t i n g conclusion t o t h i s s e c t i o n on c a v a l r y t a c t i c s has already been w r i t t e n . These two quotes are

w r i t t e n by men on opposite sides of t h e i s s u e of c a v a l r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s d u r i n g t h i s war, b u t they end w i t h s t a r t l i n g l y

s i m i 1i a r summations even i f d i f f e r i n g assessments. I n Attack andai?, t h e authors say:

Civil W a r c a v a l r y commanders b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e c a v a l r y arm should have been used aggressively, but t h e

i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e r i f l e made c a v a l r y a t t a c k s a g a i n s t i n f a n t r y perilous. I n f a n t r y armed w i t h t h e r i f l e c o u l d r a p i d l y empty t h e s a d d l e s o f advancing c a v a l r y . Cavalrymen made enough s u c c e s s f u l saber charges d u r i n g t h e war t o m a i n t a i n t h e s a b e r ' s r e p u t a t i o n , b u t saber charges were n o t common. C a v a l r y o f t e n was g i v e n semicombat and noncombat assignments, b u t when i t d i d t a k e a combat r o l e , C i v i l War c a v a l r y o f t e n f o u g h t on foot. Dismounted c a v a l r y was used b o t h t o defend and a t t a c k entrenchments. The Union c a v a l r y , b e t t e r armed w i t h r e p e a t i n g r i f l e s , was a b l e i n t h e l a t e r war p e r i o d t o s k i l l f u l l y combine dismounted and mounted t a c t i c s . The C i v i l War was a p e r i o d o f change i n c a v a l r y t a c t i c s , and t h e war l e f t t h e c a v a l r y arm w i t h an uncertain future.4" More i n t u n e w i t h American, o r a t l e a s t non-Napoleonic

a f f i c i o n a d o s , i s B r i t i s h L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Denieon who said: i n t h e American C i v i l War, t h e c o n t e n d i n g p a r t i e s had c e r t a i n l y o r i g i n a t e d and improved a system o f working c a v a l r y t h a t was c a p a b l e o f p r o d u c i n g g r e a t results. No one can r e a d t h e accounts o f Morgan's r a i d s , of F o r r e s t ' s expeditions, of S t u a r t ' s great sweeping reconnaissances, o f G r i e r s o n ' s o p e r a t i o n s i n M i s s i s s i p p i , of W i l s o n ' s i n v a d i n g army o f c a v a l r y , o f S h e r i d a n ' s t u r n i n g movements a t P e t e r s b u r g , o f h i s f i g h t i n g i n l i n e o f b a t t l e , o f h i s p u r s u i t s , &c., w i t h o u t f e e l i n g t h a t t h e mounted r i f l e p r i n c i p l e had been w o n d e r f u l l y e f f e c t i v e , and t h a t i t i s t h e p r o p e r method o f u s i n g horsemen under t h e improved s t a t e o f p r o j e c t i l e weapons. The p r o f e s s i o n a l c a v a l r y o f f i c e r i n Europe, wrapt up i n t h e t r a d i t i o n s o f t h e wars o f F r e d e r i c k t h e Great and Napoleon, b e a r i n g i n mind t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e dragoon p r i n c i p l e i n t h e seventeenth c e n t u r y , and h o l d i n g i t as a f i x e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t c a v a l r y r e l y i n g upon f i r e a r m s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y w o r t h l e s s , has never given t h e proper weight t o t h e teachings o f t h e American C i v i 1 War.rr3

...

E N D N O T E S 'Paddy G r i f f i t h , B a t t l e T a c t i c s i n t h e C i v i l W a y (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 19891, p . 181. =Gregory J.W. Urwin, The United States Cavalry - & 1 l l u s t r a t . e d Histg= (New York: S t e r l i n g Pub1i s h i n g Co. l 9 8 4 ) , p. 93.

"Perry David Jamieson, "The Development of C i v i l W a r T a c t i c s " (Ph.D. diss., Wayne S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , 1979), p. 134-136. 4George T. Denison, A H i s t o r y of Cavalry From the. E a r l i e s t Times w i t h Lessons f o r t h e Futt&ir_e_, Zd ed., (London: MacMillan, 1913), p. S93.

H . Q : The Q u & ~ ~ - e r Journ.,& lv " I r a M e i s t r i c h , "En Avant," N of M i l i t a r y History. I,3, (Spring 1989): 46-59.
&Denison, p. 393. 7Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and D i e ( U n i v e r s i t y , Alabama: U n i v e r s i t y of Alabama Press, 1982), p. 36.

. -This i s a term used d u r i n g t h e C i v i l W a r p e r i o d which denoted t h e f i r s t t i m e a s o l d i e r went i n t o combat. This . term today has been superseded by t h e term " f i r s t blood" or "baptism of f i r e " .
York: T ~ w aff ord Johnson, Eiliorv of t h e U. S. Cavalry (New Crown P u b l i s h i n g Inc., 1985), pp. 40-42.

aaAlonzo Gray, C x a l r v T a c t i c s as I l l u s t r a t e d bv t h e W a r of t h e R e b e l l i o n ( F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1916). l"Paddy G r i f f i t h , " C i v i l W a r Cavalry: Missed Dpportunities" M H Q : The Q u a r k e r l y Journal of Lvlilitaryy H i s t o r y I , 3 , (Spring 1989): pp.61-63. '"Emory M. Thomas, Bold Draaoon: The L i f e of J.E.B2. S t u a r t (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 219-231, 252-256, 290-300. 14McWhiney and Jamieson, p. 133f.

l=St e p hen Crane, TheBecLB&.es.f&L!K.&GLE ( H a r r i s o n b u r g , V i r g i n i a : Penguin Books, l 9 8 3 ) , p.

53.

'-Jean Roemer, Cavalry: I t s H i s t o r y , Nanaqement, andUses i n War (New York: D. Van N o r s t r a n d , 1863), p. 360. '9Roemer, T i t 1 e page.

Z"Denison,

pp.

362,

375. Eastern

24D. Alexander Brown, "The B a t t l e of B r i c e ' s Crossroads", Nathan 5. F o r r e s t (Jarnestown, V i r g i n i a : Acorn Press, 1988), p. 2.

"'Frank B a t c h e l o r t o J u l i a B a t c h e l o r , 7 J u l y 1863, "Batchelor Turner L e t t e r s 1861 1864" ( A u s t i n , Tesas: Steck Co., 1961), p. 60.

The

swGray, p.

118; 117.

Griffith,

B a t t l e Tactics i n the C i v i l

War, p. 183.
JIGray, p.

A Narrative., ""Shelby Foote, The C i , v i l War (New York, Random House, 1963), pp. 334-341. "-Ibid., "'Griffith, =&Gray, p.
pp.

Vol.

181-186. R a t t l e T a c t i c s i n t h e C i v i l War, p. 185.

135.

="Ibid.

s9Denison, p . 376. 4mGriffith, Battle Tactics in the Civil War, p . *lIbid. 4"McWhiney and Jamieson, p . 43Denison, p . 394. 159.
179.

CHnPTERTWS!
Confederate C a v a l r y To gauge a u n i t ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , one must understand t h e foundation upon which i t i s b u i l t . The primary b u i l d i n g

blocks f o r a m i l i t a r y formation i n c l u d e doctrine, organization, armament, and leadership. Each of these

ability to blocks contributes s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e ~ m i t ' s accomplish t h e assigned mission. Even though an army can

succeed w i t h weaknesses, t h e s t r e n g t h o f i t s foundation i s a t t h e h e a r t of a l l of i t s endeavors. strong. The Southern army was t h e f i r s t t o p u t together a c a v a l r y o r g a n i z a t i o n o f any s i g n i f i c a n t size. T h i s was Each block must be

s t i l l a minimal investment g i v e n t h e reasons s t a t e d before. However.,.whereas t h e Federals o n l y had a regiment o r so of mounted combat t r o o p s a t F i r s t Manassas, t h e Confederate t o t a l was seven regiments. t h e war, purpose. Whether t h e widely h e l d Southern b e l i e f t h a t any one Southerner could whip 10 Yankees i s c o r r e c t or n o t , t h e Southern way of l i f e d u r i n g t h e antebellum years provided f o r a more out-of -doors, a g r a r i a n 1 if estyle.= This held Not everyone I n t h i s f i r s t major b a t t l e of

n e i t h e r s i d e used i t s c a v a l r y t o any c o n s t r u c t i v e

t r u e most s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e eastern s t a t e s .

i n t h e North was a s p i n d l y f a c t o r y worker o r s t o r e c l e r k any more than a l l Southerners were Daniel Boone clones. However, j u s t as s l a v e r y was an i n s t i t u t i o n more p e c u l i a r t o

t h e South,

t h e requirement t o r i d e ,

shoot,

and f i g h t was

more a p a r t o f growing up t o many Southerners. vein,

In this
This

t h e South p r a c t i c e d t h e e q u e s t r i a n a r t s more.

gave t h e Southern commanders a g r e a t e r p o o l o f horsemen t o draw from when c a v a l r y u n i t s became necessary. One o f t h e major weaknesses o f Southern cavalrymen was t h e i r a f f i n i t y f o r independence. w e l l as a c o l l e c t i v e phenomenon. T h i s was an i n d i v i d u a l as Each s o l d i e r r e a c t e d As

p o o r l y t o m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e because o f h i s u p b r i n g i n g . u n i t s , t h e y p r e f e r r e d t o a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y also. This i s

seen i n t h e i r g r e a t p r o p e n s i t y f o r and success a t r a i d i n g . Commanders such as Mosby, F o r r e s t , Morgan, and S t u a r t were

a t t h e i r b e s t when l e f t t o t h e i r own devices.= A standard procedure adopted b y Confederate c a v a l r y a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e war r e q u i r e d each t r o o p e r . t o f u r n i s h h i s own horse. T h i s procedure remained i n e f f e c t . t h r o u g h o u t I n d i v i d u a l remounting caused

t h e army d u r i n g t h e whole war.

some severe problems among Confederate c a v a l r y u n i t s b u t was most l i k e l y t h e o n l y s o l u t i o n a v a i l a b l e . The South d i d n o t

have t h e v a s t r e s e r v e s o f horses a v a i l a b l e t o t h e N ~ r t h . ~ The most s i g n i g i c a n t e f f e c t o f i n d i v i d u a l remounting w a . 5 the. absence o f many t r o o p e r s f r o m t h e r a n k s a t any g i v e n time. Hard campaigning was r u i n o u s o f h o r s e f l e s h and As each t r o o p e r l o s t o r

n e c e s s i t a t e d c o n s t a n t remounting. wore o u t a horse, found a new one.

he was o f no use t o t h e u n i t u n t i l he He would l e a v e t h e u n i t t o seek t h i s new b u t o f t e n a t home o r i n

horse, h o p e f u l l y from a Yankee,

someone e l s e ' s barn.

The command r e c o g n i z e d t h i s need and This

a l l o w e d t r o o p e r s t o go on t h e i r h u n t i n g t r i p s . process, though,

had e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same e f f e c t on t h e u n i t

a s d e s e r t i o n because t h e t r o o p e r s were n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r battle. Also, many t r o o p e r s d i d t a k e advantage o f t h e t r i p p l a n t crops, h a r v e s t crops, or j u s t p l a i n

t o v i s i t family, desert.

They were n o t always i n a r u s h t o r e t u r n t o campss

Another e f f e c t o f t h i s p o l i c y was t h e well-known tendency o f c a v a l r y u n i t s t o go " r i d i n g a r a i d " . Troopers as

c a p t u r e d and herded l o n g l i n e s o f enemy wagons and mules, w e l l as l a r g e pony herds, t o keep Southern armies s u p p l i e d Commanders w i t h an imminent

and Southern c a v a l r y mounted.

problem o f blown h o r s e s o f t e n s u b o r d i n a t e d a l l o t h e r i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c needs, t o t h e more

t h r i l l i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f p l u n d e r and irrdependent o p e r a t i o n s which came w i t h a r a i d . Many o f t h e r a i d s may Some

have h u r t t h e Southern cause more t h a n t h e y helped. were no doubt made f o r m e r e l y p e r s o n a l g a i n .

B u t again,

t h e r e was no o t h e r a v a i l a b l e s o l u t i o n so t h e d e t r i m e n t c o u l d be l a i d more p r o p e r l y on t h e d o o r s t e p o f t h e Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments. However, t h e r e were some b e n e f i t s o f each t r o o p e r s u p p l y i n g h i s own h o r s e which gave t h e Southern c a v a l r y an advantage. Each t r o o p e r t o o k much b e t t e r c a r e o f h i s own t i m e than To t h i s

a n i m a l ' s back and hooves d u r i n g non-campaigning would someone who had a government i s s u e mount. day,

s o l d i e r s take b e t t e r care o f t h e i r personal v e h i c l e s

than they do of t h e i r assigned m i l i t a r y vehicles.'

This

happens even though t h e m i l i t a r y v e h i c l e w i l l q u i t e p o s s i b l y save t h e i r l i v e s i n a combat s i t u a t i o n i f i t i s maintained and understood w e l l . This more l a v i s h c a r e of t h e animals

made i t p o s s i b l e f o r a v a i l a b l e Confederate c a v a l r y t o s t a r t o u t on many campaigns w i t h b e t t e r c o n d i t i o n e d horses. The

f a c t t h a t t h e i r animals s u f f e r e d such heavy t o l l s d u r i n g o p e r a t i o n s only leads one t o wonder a t t h e increased losses t h a t would have come from l e s s c a r e b e f o r e t h e departure from camp.= Confederate c a v a l r y o r g a n i z a t i o n f o l l o w e d t h e model of t h e pre-war

U.S.

Cavalry as c l o s e l y as possible.

Initially,

o r g a n i z a t i o n s s t a r t e d as i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s and regiments assigned t o i n f a n t r y commands i n a supporting r o l e . Army

commanders r a p i d l y consolidated these separate u n i t s i n t o brigades, d i v i s i o n s , and even corps. Even though they never t h e South

reached t h e s i z e of t h e i r Napoleonic counterparts,

d i d recognize t h e need f o r t h i s c o n s o l i d a t i o n some t i m e before t h e North came t o t h e same c o n c l ~ ~ s i o n . ~ Corps, divisions, and brigades v a r i e d i n s i z e from two The primary

t o f i v e of t h e i r next subordinate commands. b u i l d i n g block was t h e regiment.

Regiments were e i t h e r

r a i s e d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y or made up by c o n s o l i d a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l b a t t a l i o n s and companies. per company, Ten companies, 80'men

g e n e r a l l y made up a regiment which was then Theref ore, As

subdivided i n t o squadrons of two companies each. a regiment, s t a f f included,

had a l i t t l e over 800 men.

a t t r i t i o n took i t s t o l l ,

commanders reduced t h e number o f Finally,

squadrons as companies were k e p t up t o s t r e n g t h .

even t h i s e f f o r t c o l l a p s e d as u n i t s dropped t o between 200 and 400 men.%*

A t t h e onset o f t h e war,

t h e Southern c a v a l r y had a Southern s t a t e s had t h e

d i s t i n c t advantage o f o r g a n i z a t i o n .

b e g i n n i n g s o f t h e i r mounted u n i t s i n t h e i r o r g a n i z e d militia. These u n i t s were c h i e f l y s o c i a l c l u b s . They but the

r e q u i r e d e x t e n s i v e e f f o r t t o a c h i e v e wartime s t a t u s , framework d i d e x i s t .

M o r a l e i n Southern mounted u n i t s was

commensurately h i g h e r due t o t h e i r camaraderie and ~rganization.~' Conversely, languished. p r i o r t o t h e war, Northern m i l i t i a r o l l s

Many s t a t e s had n o t t u r n e d i n t h e i r r e q u i r e d Others had

r o l l s t o t h e War Department f o r s e v e r a l decades. merely' t u r n e d i n l i s t s of t h e census r o l l s . no mounted u n i t s . a 2

a l l males o f e l i g i b l e ages f r o m

There was l i t t l e o r g a n i z a t i o n a t a l l and

T o add t o t h e m i l i t i a o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

t h e new C o n f e d e r a t e

c a v a l r y c l a i m e d most o f t h e s e n i o r l e a d e r s h i p and t a l e n t o f t h e o l d U.S. Cavalry. As t h e i r home s t a t e s seceded f r o m t h e

Union, S o u t h e r n e r s i n t h e army r e s i g n e d t h e i r commissions and went home t o h e l p t h e war e f f o r t o f t h e s t a t e s and t h e Confederacy.


O f t h e f i v e pre-war

mounted u n i t s ,

f o u r of t h e Not o n l y

f u l l c o l o n e l s commanding t h e r e g i m e n t s went South.


was t h i s d e v a s t a t i n y t o t h e U.S. units,

but these o f f i c e r s

were educated i n and understood c a v a l r y o p e r a t i o n s as i t was

i n t h e U.S Army. South's benefit.

They were t o use t h i s knowledge t o t h e To make t h i n g s worse, t h e one r e m a i n i n g George Cooke o f t h e

r e g i m e n t a l commander, C o l o n e l P h i l i p St. 2nd Dragoons, trusted. Cavalry,

was a Southerner by b i r t h and n o t i n i t i a l l y

Two r e g i m e n t a l commanders,

R. E.

Lee o f t h e 1 s t

and A l b e r t Sidney Johnston o f t h e 2nd C a v a l r y went Even

on t o become f u l l g e n e r a l s i n t h e Confederate Army. though C o l o n e l s Thomas T. W i l l i a m W.

F a u n t l e r o y o f t h e 1 s t Dragoons and

L o r i n g of t h e Mounted R i f l e s were b o t h g e n e r a l t h e y were by no means as

o f f i c e r s w i t h Southern f o r c e s , s t e l l a r as Lee and Johnson.

However, t h e i r l o s s t o t h e This i n i t i a l l i s t of

Union came a t t h e c r i t i c a l time.

names and d u t y p o s i t i o n s l e n d s credence t o t h e view t h a t more S o u t h e r n e r s were "horsemen" t h a n N o r t h e r n e r s were.*= a l o n g ' w i t h t h e s e n i o r l e a d e r s h i p o f the.mounted u n i t s , many j u n i o r mounted o f f i c e r s made names f o r themselves i n Southern s e r v i c e . Among t h o s e horsemen t h a t gained t h e i r Johnston

r a n k and fame i n Confederate s e r v i c e were Joseph E. (GEN), E. R i c h a r d S. Crittenden E. K i r b y Smith (GEN), John Ewe11 (LTG), W i l l i a m J.

B.

Hood (LTG/Temp.GEN),

Hardee (LTG), George Dabncy Maury ( M G ) , Joseph Wheeler James


(MG),

(MG),

F i t r h u g h Lee ( M G ) ,

B.

S t u a r t (MG),

E a r l Van Dorn ( M G ) ,

and Henry S i b l e y (BG).14 The Confederates were t h e f i r s t t o accept t h e need f o r l a r g e numbers o f c a v a l r y . This d i d not t r a n s l a t e i n t o the

immediate a b i l i t y t o equip and arm l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s o r quantities. To a l a r g e e x t e n t , e a r l y i n .the war, troopers

l a c k e d t a c k and arms s ~ ~ i t a b f lo e r m i l i t a r y use. t r o o p e r who b r o u g h t h i s horse, weapons w i t h him.

But,

each

u s u a l l y b r o u g h t t a c k and military

As t h e war progressed,

p u r c h a s i n g and t h e " b a t t l e f i e l d s u p p l y system" p r o v i d e d f o r some needs. "Rebel i n g e n u i t y N , s p u r r e d on by a sense of


lJ

urgency and n e c e s s i t y , r e q u i r e d c o n s t a n t i m p r o v i s a t i o n . Confederate c a v a l r y u n i t s armed themselves w i t h a m y r i a d o f weapons t o b e g i n t h e war. Some o f t h e s e arms

remained t h e h a l l m a r k o f Southern c a v a l r y and o t h e r s f e l l by t h e wayside. Many t r o o p e r s a r r i v e d i n camp w i t h p e r c u s s i o n They

and f l i n t l o c k r i f l e s o f v a r y i n g l e n g t h s and c a l i b e r s . b r o u g h t f o w l i n g p i e c e s and shotguns t h a t had p r e v i o u s l y accompanied them on h u n t i n g t r i p s .

They a r r i v e d w i t h k n i v e s

o f a l l s i z e s up t o Bowie k n i v e s approaching t h e l e n g t h and w e i g h t o f t h e Roman s h o r t sword. p a s t wars, o f a l l types, uses, Some b r o u g h t swords, from

and u t i l i t y . ' " t r o o p e r s q u i c k 1y r e a l i z e d The l o n g

As t h e y l e a r n e d t h e i r t r a d e ,

t h a t n o t a l l o f t h e s e weapons were u s e f u l .

b a r r e l e d weapons were o f l i t t l e use and h a r d t o c a r r y on horseback. camp l i f e , The k n i v e s were good a s f a r a s k n i v e s went f o r b u t were n o t a l l t h a t u s e f u l f o r f i g h t i n g .
17

A r r i v i n g a l o n g w i t h u n i f o r m s and a more r e g i m e n t e d e x i s t e n c e were t h e once-coveted sabres. No m a t t e r what t h e Southern

t h e i r f u n c t i o n was i n European c a v a l r y u n i t s ,

t r o o p e r s knew t h a t sabers were made f o r r o a s t i n g e a r s o f c o r n , meat, and b r e a d over a c a m p f i r e . Very seldom were They

t h e s e c l a s s i c symbols o f c a v a l r y used f o r f i g h t i n g .

were most a s s u r e d l y l o n g and sharp k n i v e s , reached f a r t h e r and h u r t more. s a b e r s i n camp.


lo

but firearms

Troopers v e r y o f t e n l e f t

The famous Confederate r a n g e r ,

C o l o n e l Mosby, s a i d h i s

company i n t h e 1 s t V i r g i n i a C a v a l r y was i s s u e d sabers i n 1861. H i s o p i n i o n was summed up i n h i s statement: b u t t h e o n l y r e a l use I ever heard o f t h e i r b e i n g p u t t o was t o h o l d a p i e c e o f meat over a f i r e f o r frying. I dragged one t h r o u g h t h e f i r s t year o f t h e It war, b u t when I became a commander, I d i s c a r d e d i t . was o f no use a g a i n s t g ~ n p o w d e r . ' ~ Even t h e Yankees t h o u g h t l i t t l e o f t h e saber. General Wilson, Major

t h e s u c c e s s f u l Union c a v a l r y commander,

f o u g h t i n b o t h major t h e a t e r s o f t h e war and f i n a l l y d e f e a t e d General F o r r e s t a t t h e end o f t h e war. He s a i d :

I t h i n k i t i s demonstrable, b o t h f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e c a v a l r y o f t h e Army o f t h e Potomac, as w e l l as t h a t o f t h e Army o f t h e West, t h a t t h e saber i s as much o u t o f d a t e f o r c a v a l r y i n a c o u n t r y l i k e o u r s as t h e s h o r t sword o f t h e Roman s o l d i e r 1 s f o r infantry. I t i s i n t h e way and i s o f no v a l u e whatever i n a f i g h t , as compared w i t h r e p e a t i n g r i f l e s , c a r b i n e s , and p i s t o l s . ="
Sabers were used some i n t h e c a v a l r y - o n - c a v a l r y a t Brandy S t a t i o n and Gettysburg. battles, battles

However, even i n t h e s e

f i r e a r m s were t h e weapon o f c h o i c e f o r most

t r o o p e r s u n t i l t h e y had f i r e d a l l o f t h e i r loaded guns. Then, w i t h no f i r e p o w e r l e f t , t h e y r e s o r t e d t o sabers. Hy

t h e t i m e o f t h e B a t t l e o f Y e l l o w Tavern i n 1864, a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y used f i r e a r m s i n t h e melee."=

troopers

Many o t h e r commanders never s a i d much q u o t a b l e about sabers, b u t c a s t t h e i r v o t e s by t h e i r a c t i o n s . General


I t was t o o

Morgan never even had h i s men armed w i t h sabers. 36

much added weight and noise for no useful purpose.2:,' Forrest and his men carried sabers, but rarely used them albeit many modern renditions of Forrest show him wielding a saber ferociously. One of his many wounds was inflicted by

a young Union lieutenant with a sword whom Forrest tired of and shot dead with a pistol.=" Firepower did survive the test of combat to become the guiding light of cavalry arms. This was manifest by numbers At close quarters, At

of shotguns, revolvers, and carbines.

these weapons were immensely effective and deadly.

greater distances, the ballistics, accuracy, and reliability were not of the highest order but they provide an impressive rate of fire which sufficed for the job at hand.z4 Shotguns were an exclusive weapon of the Southern units. They were useful because they could be loaded with a myriad of available ammunitions, from lead shot to nails and rocks. They were effective against several targets at once when at close quarters. Carbines came into their own during these times. Initially, troopers cut down longer weapons to be more manageable on horseback. These weapons were usually They, too, could use a myriad

smoothbore percussion guns.

of ammunition ranging from single bullets to lead shot to the southern innovation called buck and ball. This latter

load, a large caliber ball with several shot thrown in for good measure, was a s useful at close range as a s h o t g ~ n . ~ = ~ Later issues included many different types and makes of

b r e e c h l o a d i n g c a r b i n e s purchased overseas, battlefield,

taken from t h e Southerners t h e newer

o r c o p i e d i n Confederate a r s e n a l s . old Hall's,

c a r r i e d models such a s t h e 20-year Sharps, Burnside,

and Maynard models,

and even a few Most of

c a p t u r e d r e p e a t e r s such as Spencers and Henrys. t h e s e were p e r c u s s i o n weapons.

The a v a i l a b i l i t y o f

ammunition made them more u s e f u l i n t h e South t h a n t h e b r a s s c a r t r i d g e r e p e a t i n g weapons t h e N o r t h was b e g i n n i n g t o produce. The most b e l o v e d weapon i n t h e Confederate c a v a l r y was the revolver. F i r s t i n v e n t e d by Samuel C o l t , i t became

q u i t e famous w i t h t h e Texas Rangers.

The U S Cavalry f i n a l l y

adopted r e v o l v e r s i n t h e decade b e f o r e *he War Between t h e States. C o l t s o f t h e Navy '51 and Army '60 models were by

f a r t h e most p l e n t i f u l even though t h e Confederate Ordnance ~ e p a r t m e n tdid a m a g n i f i c e n t j o b o f p r o d u c i n g c o p i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e war. One o f t h e most p r i z e d possessions o f

any s o u t h e r n t r o o p e r was one o f French Doctor Jean L e M a t ' s f o r m i d a b l e .40 c a l i b e r , 9-shot r e v o l v e r s t h a t had an Confederate b u y e r s d i d

18-gauge shotgun b a r r e l i n c l u d e d .

t h e i r utmost t o g e t l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s o f t h e s e weapons home, b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e South, about t h a n ~ a r r i e d . ' ~ D e s i r i n g t h e f i r e p o w e r p r o v i d e d by t h e r e v o l v e r , s o u t h e r n t r o o p e r s c a r r i e d as many o f them as p o s s i b l e . had r e v o l v e r s on t h e i r b e l t s , boot tops, i n t h e i r pants waist, They t h e y were more o f t e n t a l k e d

i n their

s l u n g over t h e saddle,

and i n t h e i r saddlebags.

S i n c e r e v o l v e r s were d i f f i c u l t t o l o a d ,

many t r o o p e r s They

c a r r i e d numerous e x t r a c y l i n d e r s f o r t h e i r weapons. k e p t pre-loaded shirts, c y l i n d e r s i n s p e c i a l p o c k e t s on t h e i r

a v a i l a b l e f o r a q u i c k changeover.

By t h e t i m e many

o f them emptied a l l o f t h e i r l o a d s , t h e b a t t l e was u s u a l l y over o r t h e i r m i s s i o n accomplished. As t h e war c o n t i n u e d , small b a t t e r i e s of organizations. success. c a v a l r y commanders began t o add horse a r t i l l e r y t o t h e i r

light-weight

They used t h e s e guns w i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f

The h o r s e a r t i l l e r y confused t h e enemy as t o u n i t

s i z e and makeup.

I t a l s o p l a y e d i t s more common r o l e of
The two b e s t known a r t i l l e r y

providing supporting f i r e .

commanders o f such u n i t s were S t u a r t ' s g a l l a n t Major John Pelham and F o r r e s t ' s C a p t a i n John Morton. Morton t o o k h i s

p e r i l o u s command t h r o u g h o u t t h e war w i t h F o r r e s t w i t h o u t ever l o s i n g one o f h i s guns, guns he added t o h i s u n i t . = There were two major t h e a t e r s o f o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h i s conflict, t h e e a s t e r n and t h e western. T h i s s t u d y i s about These no m a t t e r how many c a p t u r e d

t h e campaigns and b a t t l e f o u g h t around Chickamauga.

engagements t o o k p l a c e i n t h e western t h e a t e r which had a c h a r a c t e r o f i t s own, See Map 1. I n t h e western t h e a t e r o f war, c a v a l r y u n i t s and
i f possible.

v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f t h e East.

t a c t i c s t o o k on an even more Southern f l a v o r ,

Above and beyond t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e men were b o t h Southern and Western, t h e y were a l o n g way from t h e s e a t o f power.

D i s t a n c e and p o l i t i c s b o t h removed them f r o m p r i m a r y importance i n t h i s war. S i n c e t h e y were o u t o f s i g h t and t h e y were

o u t o f mind o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Richmond,

much more l i b e r a l i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y standards. They were q u i t e o f t e n l e f t t o f e n d f o r

themselves by t h e c e n t r a l government which had a h a r d enough t i m e e q u i p p i n g and f e e d i n g t h e a r m i e s i n t h e East which defended t h e i r c a p i t a l

.""
a B r i t i s h L i e u t e n a n t Colonel o f Southern c a v a l r y , said i n h i s

H.

N.

Johnstone,

Cavalr'y and proponent of

H i s t o r y o f T a c t i c s (1906): ..another good i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e a d m i r a b l e f i g h t i n g q u a l i t i e s o f F o r r e s t ' s C a v a l r y , and o f t h e i r a b i l i t y t o a c t b o l d l y and e f f e c t i v e l y e i t h e r mounted o r dismounted... may be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p e r i o r i n t e l l e c t o f t h e Southern gentleman o f whom h i s f o r c e was m a i n l y composed, men o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y s e l f - r e l i a n c e and s t r o n g common sense; men who knew p e r f e c t l y . w e l l when each system o f f i g h t i n g would be most advantageous, and who had g a i n e d t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r k , o f war upon t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . It must be a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n America were p e c u l i a r t o t h e c o n t i n e n t , and t h a t t h e same sys.tem m i g h t n o t be q u i t e s o s u c e s s f u l i n European armies, f i l l e d w i t h peasants o f l e s s i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a n t h e American c i t i z e n s . " ' T h i s would most a s s u r e d l y have b r o u g h t f o r t h numerous b e l l y laughs, guffaws, and s t r u t t i n g f r o m t h e Tennessee and But, they 1862,

Alabama t r o o p e r s who made up F o r r e s t ' s commands. were good s o l d i e r s , w e l l - l e d , s ~ ~ p r e mveterans. e and,

by t h e b e g i n n i n g o f

They d i d go about t h e i r b u s i n e s s i n a much l e s s c o n v e n t i o n a l way t h a n d i d E a s t e r n Confederates. e a s t e r n army used l a r g e b o d i e s of Whereas t h e

c a v a l r y and t h e y even had

some c a v a l r y melees,

such d i d n o t occur i n t h e west. scouting,

Western and

l e a d e r s moved much more r a p i d l y t o r a i d i n g , dismounted f i g h t i n g . saddle,

During t h e i r f i r s t t h r e e years i n t h e

western C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y p l a y e d havoc w i t h

r a i l r o a d s and had a s e r i o u s impact on t h e Union l o g i s t i c system. There were s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s when Southern c a v a l r y

o p e r a t i o n s delayed o r caused Union o f f e n s i v e s t o be abandoned a l t o g e t h e r , such as G r a n t ' s problems around H o l l y

S p r i n g s and R u e l l ' s advance i n t o e a s t Tennessee.=* The l e a d e r s themselves were l e s s c o n v e n t i o n a l . t h e pre-war t r a i n e d t a l e n t went t o t h e East. Most o f

Cavalry and

l e a d e r s o f n o t e i n t h e West were F o r r e s t , Wheeler. training,


O f these,

Morgan,

o n l y Wheeler was a man o f any m i l i t a r y Wheeler had a West

much l e s s a West P o i n t e r .

P o i n t e r ' s l i m i t e d e d u c a t i o n i n c a v a l r y b u t d i d have a year o f e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e Mo~rntedR i f l e s . = = t o t h e Confederacy, though, His i n i t i a l service

was i n a r t i l l e r y and i n f a n t r y he was made a c a v a l r y

u n t i l , a f t e r t h e R a t t l e o f Shiloh, commander i n J u l y 1862. t r a i n i n g whatsoever.

F o r r e s t and Morgan had no m i l i t a r y

They g r a v i t a t e d t o c a v a l r y and t o Because t h e y

command t h r o u g h an i n n a t e and i n b o r n a b i l i t y . had no t r a i n i n g , went along.

t h e y made up t a c t i c s and even d r i l l as t h e y


i f i t d i d n o t work,

I f i t worked, good;

they

d i d n o t do i t t h a t way again.

Unlike the aristocratic

e a s t e r n v i s i o n of c a v a l i e r s and k n i g h t s , t h e s e w e s t e r n e r s were f i g h t e r s . F o r r e s t had one s i m p l e u n d e r l y i n g p h i l o s o p h y and f i g h t i n ' means

o f w a r f a r e which s a i d "War means f i g h t i n '

killin,.

I!:>+

He d i d b o t h w e l l .

He has been c r e d i t e d w i t h

t h e b a s t a r d i z e d s a y i n g "Get t h a r f u r s t e s t w i t h t h e mostest". Some b i o g r a p h e r s say he s a i d i t j u s t t h a t way, o t h e r s say he

was n o t q u i t e so murderous o f t h e E n g l i s h language.

A l l

b i o g r a p h e r s agree t h a t t h e s a y i n g i s q u i t e a c c u r a t e t o h i s t r a i n o f t h o u g h t and h i s
action^.^"

The western t r o o p e r s t o o k t h e i r Southern i n d i v i d u a l i t y p e r s o n a l l y and t o t h e extreme. They b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s was

t h e r e a l cause o f t h i s war i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e * t h e chance t o do t h i n g s t h e i r own way. t h e Civil War expounded: They t h e r e f o r e f e l t f r e e t o go home when t h e y f e l t l i k e i t , o r t o wander away l o o k i n g f o r f o r a g e , f o r remounts ( o f t e n s t o l e n f r o m t h e Yankees ) , o r f o r meals ( u s u a l l y f r o m d i s t a n t c o u s i n s r e s i d e n t i n t h e a r e a o f o p e r a t i o n s ) . T h i s was d o u b t l e s s a h i g h l y a g r e e a b l e and c i v i l i s e d way t o f i g h t a war, b u t i t l e f t t h e r e g i m e n t s p r e s e n t f o r d u t y l a m e n t a b l y weak. The extreme case came i n F i r s t Tennessee C a v a l r y , when i t u n i l a t e r a l l y decided t o disband i t s e l f c o m p l e t e l y a p a r t f r o m s i x t e e n men who p r e f e r r e d t o s t a y i n camp.=& They m e r e l y came and went as t h e y d e s i r e d . t u r n e d a g a i n s t them, "going" A4 t h e war Paddy G r l f f i t h i n his

&>.Lt.J-@...ln,

gbt

worse.

The army made

e f f o r t s t o stem t h e f l o w and t o r o u n d up d e s e r t e r s and stragglers, b u t t h e s e , e f f o r t s were i n s u f f i ~ i e n t . " ~

The weapons used were e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same as i n t h e E a s t w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n s a l r e a d y noted. The one n o t a b l e

r e m a i n i n g d i f f e r e n c e between e a s t e r n and western Confederate c a v a l r y was t h e l a c k o f a n o t a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between "Johnny Keb" and " B i l l y Yank" i n t h e West. The Union t r o o p s i n t h e To

West were o f t h e same r ~ i r a ls t o c k as t h e i r a n t a g o n i s t s . a l a r g e e x t e n t on b o t h s i d e s ,

s o l d i e r s were f r o m t h e r e g i o n
43

i n which t h e y .Fought.

The West was on t h e edge o f t h e So, t h e c a v a l r y

f r o n t i e r a l l along t h e M i s s i s s i p p i River.

o f t h e Army o f t h e Tennessee f a c e d Union c a v a l r y which had as s t r o n g a c l a i m t o e q u e s t r i a n s k i l l s as t h e y d i d . o r g a n i z a t i o n was n o t as s t r o n g a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of Union t h e war,

b u t t h e y f i n i s h e d t h e c o n f l i c t i n s u p e r l a t i v e shape. Three men p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e use o f Confederate c a v a l r y d u r i n g t h e p e i o d o f t h i s study. were t h e l e a d e r s , They

t h e commander o f t h e army and t h e s e n i o r General . W a x t o n Bragg had commanded t h e

c a v a l r y commanders.

Army o f Tennessee s i n c e soon a f t e r t h e B a t t l e o f S h i l o h i n 1862. He had two major c a v a l r y f o r m a t i o n s which f l u c t u a t e d Major General Brigadier

i n s i z e t h r o u g h o u t t h e campaigns under study. Joseph Wheeler,


Jr,

commanded a c a v a l r y corps.

General Nathan B e d f o r d F o r r e s t commanded a d i v i s i o n d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l phases of t h i s s t u d y and, own. l a t e r a corps.of his

The c a r e e r s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s o f t h e s e o f f i c e r s

g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d t h e u t i l i z a t i o n and success r a t e o f t h e Army o f Tennessee's c a v a l r y f o r m a t i o n s . B r a x t o n Bragg was b o r n on 22 March 1817, Warren County, N o r t h C a r o l i n a . His father, i n Warrenton,

Thomas, was a

s k i l l e d c a r p e n t e r and c o n t r a c t o r . Crosland Bragg. One of

H i s mother was Margaret Thomas, was t h e

h i s older brothers,

Confederate A t t o r n e y General f o r a f our-month 1861-1862, U.S. and a l s o served as s t a t e governor (1859-1861), John,

period i n (1855-1859),

senator

and wartime a i d e t o t h e governor. Alabama as a

Another b r o t h e r ,

served Mobile,

congressman and judge. William, t h e youngest,

Others were l e s s d i s t i n g u i s h e d and died i n


omb bat."^'

B r a x t o n e n t e r e d t h e U.S. d u r i n g t h e summer o f

M i l i t a r y Academy a t West P o i n t He t u r n e d

1833, a t t h e age o f s i x t e e n .

o u t t o be an e x c e l l e n t s t ~ ~ d e n by t doing w e l l i n t h e subjects taught. Even though he f l i r t e d w i t h d i s c i p l i n a r y p l a y i n g cards,

i n f r a c t i o n s and was almost e x p e l l e d f o r remained h i g h i n c l a s s s t a n d i n g . h i s "manliness, independence,

he
for

He was w e l l - r e s p e c t e d

and unbending i n t e g r i t y " as Joseph Hooker,

remembered b y classmate and l a t e r opponent, and many o t h e r s . West P o i n t ,

Even though he f o u g h t no d u e l s w h i l e at:

f e l l o w c a d e t s remembered him f o r b e i n g " r e c k l e s s He gave " h i s o p i n i o n s on a l l

and d a r i n g " and d i s p u t a t i o u s . o c c a s i o n s and a l l s u b j e c t s i n

most t a c t l e s s manner".39

L i e u t e n a n t B r a g g ' s f i r s t few y e a r s i n t h e army were a n y t h i n g b u t u s u a l . f o r an o f f i c e r . He guarded h i s r a n k

a g a i n s t a l l s o r t s of perceived personal a f f r o n t s . v e r y s t r i c t and e x a c t i n g , though t h o r o u g h l y f a i r , O n t h e o t h e r hand, he

He was a junior

o f f i c e r towards h i s t r o o p s .

vehemently d i s l i k e d any a t t e m p t t o c u r b h i s r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s from s e n i o r o f f i c e r s . d i s p u t a t i o u s ways. He c o n t i n u e d h i s

He a t t a c k e d many o f h i s s e n i o r s i n He developed some

pub1 i s h e d w r i t i n g s under a pseudonym. good i d e a s f o r army a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,

but a l l of h i s w r i t i n g

was done f o r c i v i l i a n p u b l i c a t i o n s w i t h h i s goal t h a t o f showing how p o l i t i c a l and incompetent s e n i o r o f f i c e r s were r a t h e r t h a n s e e k i n g improvement o f t h e army.4"

B r a g g d i s c o v e r e d h i s s e v e r e l a c k of g o o d h e a l t h d u r i n g h i s t o u r s w i t h t h e 3 r d A r t i l l e r y i n t h e S e c o n d S e m i n o l e War i n Florida. H i s p o o r h e a l t h was t o c o n t i n u e t o a f f e c t h i m D u r i n g much o f t h i s time b e f o r e

f o r t h e rest of h i s l i f e .

t h e M e x i c a n War, h e was o n s i c k l e a v e or p e r s o n a l l e a v e t a k e n i n a n e f f o r t t o restore h i s h e a l t h . G i v e n h i s weak

c o n s t i t u t i o n , h i s i n a b i l i t y t o g e t a l o n g w i t h p e o p l e , and h i s c a n t a n k e r o u s moods, h e was e x i l e d t o G e n e r a l Z a c h a r y T a y l o r ' s army i n T e x a s a s t h e b o r d e r t u r n e d t u r b u l e n t . " l The n e w l y p r o m o t e d C a p t a i n B r a g g r e p ~ t t e d l yh a d t h e beet-trained l i g h t a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r y i n T a y l o r ' s army. He

demanded i n s t a n t o b e d i e n c e a n d c o u r a g e , b u t h e w a s a l w a y s w i t h h i s t r o o p s as t h e y fought.

H e became l e g e n d a r y d u e t o

h i s " F l y i n g A r t i l l e r y " and h i s p u n c t i l i o u s n e s s f o r p r o t e c t i n g government p r o p e r t y , r e g u l a t i o n s , and h i s soldjet-s. H e r e c e i v e d s e v e r a l b r e v e t s up t o l i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l J o h n E. Wool

c o l o n e l f o r b r a v e r y a t B u e n a Vista.

d e l e g a t e d him a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l o f t h e a r m y a f t e r G e n e r a l T a y l o r re1 i n q u i s h e d command.


42

Bragg remained v e r y f r a n k and c r i t i c a l i n h i s p r o l i f i c w r i t i n g a b o u t Buena V i s t a . T a y l o r c r e d i t e d Bragg w i t h Bragg

s a v i n g t h e army b y h i s p e r f o r m a n c e d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e .

g a v e t h e c r e d i t t o t h e " a r t i l l e r y " , h i s men a n d g u n s , n o t himself. H e argued h i s d i s l i k e f o r v o l u n t e e r s , e s p e c i a l 1y

q u e s t i o n i n g t h e c o u r a g e o f K e n t u c k i a n s who r a n a t t h e f i r s t shot.

H e s u p p o r t e d o n l y t h e M i s s i s s i p p i a n s who s t o o d t h e i r

g r o u n d u n d e r t h e i r West P o i n t c o m m a n d e r , J e f f e r s o n D a v i s . 4 J

Bragg may have l e a r n e d some wrong l e s s o n s from Buena Vista, also. He d i d n o t see t h a t t h e army came c l o s e t o He o n l y saw t h a t h i s mentor, a

a n n i h i l a t i o n t h r o u g h rashness. Taylor, had won.

He f a i l e d t o l e a r n t h e s t r e n g t h of

defensive position.

He saw t h a t v i c t o r y came f r o m o f f e n s e .

He a l s o o v e r r a t e d t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f a r t i l l e r y b y a p p l y i n g t h e r e s u l t s a t Buena V i s t a equal1y t o e v e r y s i t u a t i o n . A f t e r t h e war, L o u i s i a n a woman. Bragg met and m a r r i e d a r i c h young

-''

He t r a i n e d h i s b a t t e r y e x c e l l e n t 1y f o r Missouri. The army

t h r e e y e a r s a t J e f f e r s o n Barracks, e v e n t u a l l y s e n t h i m f u r t h e r west, and away f r o m Washington.

p o s s i b l y t o keep him q ~ ~ i e t

T h i s t r a n s f e r caused c o n f l i c t

between Bragg and h i s o l d f r i e n d J e f f e r s o n D a v i s , now t h e S e c r e t a r y o f War. I n 1856, t i r e d c o m p l e t e l y o f f r o n t i e r

l i f . e , he r e s i g n e d f r o m t h e s e r v i c e a f t e r n i n e t e e n y e a r s of. active As a new c i v i l i a n , he purchased a 1,600-acre sugar

p l a n t a t i o n near h i s w i f e ' s L o u i s i a n a home and went t o work.

He a l s o e n t e r e d i n t o minor s t a t e p o l i t i c s where he was


disgusted w i t h t h e corruption, dishonesty. graft, and g e n e r a l

He was a b l e t o a s s i s t i n t h e f o u n d i n g o f a

m i l i t a r y c o l l e g e i n L o u i s i a n a which was t o be p r e s i d e d over by an o l d West P o i n t f r i e n d , W i l l i a m T. Sherman.4h

Even b e f o r e L o u i s i a n a seceded, t h e governor a p p o i n t e d Bragg t o command t h e s t a t e t r o o p s . Bragg s u c c e s s f u l l y

n e g o t i a t e d t h e peaceful surrender o f t h e f e d e r a l arsenals i n Baton Rouge. With t h i s s e i z u r e , t h e s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e v o t e d

L o u i s i a n a o u t o f t h e Union,

c r e a t e d a s t a t e army and named

Bragg i t s commander w i t h t h e r a n k o f major general.47

A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e war,

no one on e i t h e r s i d e had He f i n a l l y

doubts as t o Bragg's f i t n e s s o r a b i l i t i e s .

v o l u n t e e r e d f o r Confederate s e r v i c e and was p u t i n command o f Southern f o r c e s i n Pensacola i n mid-1861 as a maior general.

I n 1862, he was promo-ted t o l i e u t e n a n t g e n e r a l i n


At

command o f t h e Department o f Alabama and West F l o r i d a . Shiloh i n A p r i l

1862, he commanded t h e 2nd Corps o f General When Johnston d i e d a t

A l b e r t Sidney J o h n s t o n ' s army. Shiloh, General P.G.T.

Beauregard t o o k command b u t was l a t e r

r e l i e v e d by Confederate P r e s i d e n t J e f f e r s o n D a v i s and r e p l a c e d by Bragg. Now a f u l l g e n e r a l , Bragg commanded t h e I n mid-1862, he began Then

p r i m a r y C o n f e d e r a t e army i n t h e West.

an i n v a s i o n o f Kentucky which went w e l l a t f i r s t . Bragg l o s t h i s c o n f i d e n c e , l o s t t h e campaign.

won a b a t t l e a t P e r r y v i l l e and

He r e t r e a t e d i n t o Tennessee where he won

another p y r r h i c v i c t o r y a t M u r f r e e s b o r o w h i l e l o s i n g another campaign. He t h e n backed o f f t o the Shelbyville, Tennessee

a r e a and s a t u n t i l Rosecrans began t h e Tullahoma-Chickamauga campai gns.


4e

I n t h e t i m e t h a t he had h e l d command of Tennessee, he c o n t i n u e d i n h i s o l d ways.

t h e Army o f

He argued w i t h

s u p e r i o r s and i r r i t a t e d s u b o r d i n a t e s .

He a d m i n i s t e r e d t h e

army w e l l and t o o k c a r e o f t h e s o l d i e r s even though he remained a s t r i c t d i s c i p l i n a r i a n . Many o f h i s s e n i o r Many

s u b o r d i n a t e s d i s l i k e d h i m and c o n s p i r e d a g a i n s t him.

anti-Hragg of

men were Kentuckians who d i s l i k e d h i s a c c u s a t i o n s

rampant cowardice by K e n t u c k i a n s a t Buena V i s t a and t h e

s t a t e i n g e n e r a l d u r i n g h i s P e r r y v i l l e campaign.49 Many o f t h e g e n e r a l o f f i c e r s d e l v e d d e e p l y i n t o politics. They were a n t i - D a v i s men who saw Hragg as a D a v i s also."m Bragg was f u l l of

f a v o r i t e so t h e y were a n t i - B r a g g ,

i n d e c i s i v e n e s s t h a t may have stemmed f r o m h i s o l d h a b i t of l e a r n i n g t h e book w e l l and n o t bending on a n y t h i n g . He

s t a r t e d e v e r y move w i t h c o n f i d e n c e and t h e n seemed t o l o s e c o n f i d e n c e and f a i l e d t o push on t o v i c t o r y . The p e t t i n e s s

o f h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s and h i s l a c k o f t r u s t i n them p r o b a b l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o h i s wariness. H i s u n i t s o f h i s army

c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t work as a team as t h e y headed toward Chickamauga. Joseph Wh,eeler,Jr. September 1836. was b o r n i n Augusta, Georgia on 10

His father,

o r i g i n a l l y from C o n n e c t i c u t ,

was a merchant who moved s o u t h i n 1819 w i t h h i s f i r s t w i f e who d i e d soon t h e r e a f t e r . d a ~ t g h t e r of t h e we1 1-known, H i s mother, J u l i a Knox . H u l l ,

i f disgraced,

General W i 11iam

H u l l o f D e t r o i t s u r r e n d e r fame, Joseph Wheeler, Sr.

was t h e second w i f e o f the

She had two sons and two daughters, Jr., b e f o r e she a l s o d i e d i n 1842.

youngest b e i n g Joseph,

Two of J u l i a Wheeler's s i s t e r s t o o k young Joe and p u t h i m i n p r i v a . t e s c h o o l s i n t h e i r hometown of Connecticut. Cheshire, Joe moved

Upon f i n i s h i n g h i s ' schoolwork t h e r e ,

t o New York t o l i v e w i t h h i s s i s t e r .

H u l l and Wheeler

f a m i l y i n f l u e n c e managed t o s e c u r e him an appointment t o t h e

M i l i t a r y Acadeiny a t West P o i n t a l l o w i n g Joe t o f u l f i l l h i s m a r t i a l ambition.=l Cadet Joe Wheeler began h i s West P o i n t s t u d i e s i n 1854, under a t e s t - b e d five-year program. Wheeler managed t o make b u t was never a s t a r . He

i t t h r o u g h t h e Academy c u r r i c u l u m ,

d i d w e l l enough i n m i l i t a r y "deportment", n o t a d i s c i p l i n e problem. s t e a d i l y declined. class,

which means he was

However, h i s academic grades

He graduated near t h e bottom o f h i s He does n o t seem t o have done much h i s p o o r e s t grades b e i n g t h o s e

1 9 t h o u t o f 22.

b e t t e r i n t a c t i c a l studies, i n cavalry tactics.="

A t t h e time of graduation,

h i s s t a n d i n g was so low t h a t

he was ranked i n t o t h e c a v a l r y even though i t was h i s w o r s t subject. To compound Wheeler's shame, he was so low t h a t , So,

even i n t h e cava.lry, t h e r e were no v a c a n c i e s f o r him.

he was o n l y b r e v e t t e d a second l i e u t e n a n t o f c a v a l r y upon g r a d u a t i o n and was assigned t o more s c h o o l i n g i n c a v a l r y tactics a t Carlisle B a r r a ~ k s . ~ ~ S e v e r a l months l a t e r , Lieutenant, of promoted t o f u l l Second

Joe Wheeler went west t o s e r v e w i t h t h e Regiment H i s s e r v i c e of l e s s t h a n a year w i t h t h e

Mounted R i f l e s .

r e g i m e n t e n t a i l e d c h a s i n g a few I n d i a n s w i t h no more t h a n a p l a t o o n i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f F o r t C r a i g , New Mexico. manage t o p i c k up t h e nickname o f Indian attackaSrr As s e c t i o n a l i s m grew, Wheeler had t o make h i s d e c i s i o n Many o f h i s f r i e n d s He d i d

" F i g h t i n g Joe'' d u r i n g an

on which way t o t u r n h i s a l l e g i a n c e .

were N o r t h e r n e r s .

Even though he was b o r n i n t h e South, He owned no He l o v e d t h e

his

e d u c a t i o n was i n C o n n e c t i c u t and New York. slaves, b u t h i s f a m i l y l i v e d i n Georgia.

Union and t h e army. his life. Yet,

He was u n c e r t a i n o f r e p l a c i n g e i t h e r i n

he determined t o f o l l o w Georgia i n whatever Young Wheeler r e c e i v e d h e l p i n h i s I t 5 commanders and o f f i c e r s

d e c i s i o n she made.

d e c i s i o n f r o m h i s regiment.

were almost e x c l u s i v e 1y Southerners. ss Wheeler's b r o t h e r had a commission w a i t i n g f o r h i m i n Georgia. Pensacola, Even so, as Wheeler made h i s way e a s t t h r o u g h

he o f f e r e d t o h e l p t h e commanding g e n e r a l ,

B r a x t o n Pragg, g e t h i s a r t i l l e r y o r g a n i z e d and t r a i n e d on t h e harbor. engineer. offer. Wheeler had no a r t i l l e r y experience, b u t was an

Rragg needed t h e h e l p and decided t o t a k e up t h e


,

Wheeler never made i t t o h i s Georgia troops.gh

Wheeler came t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l r i g h t away by d o i n g a good j o b a t h i s assigned t a s k s . He soon r e c e i v e d

h e l p from s e v e r a l prominent Alabamians and accepted a colonel

's

commission,

t o which was soon added a r e g i m e n t .

When a n o r t h Alabama i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e came t o t h e M o b i l e area, Wheeler was t h e o n l y o f f i c e r assigned w i t h any Soon though, Wheeler's

t r a i n i n g o r m i l i t a r y experience.

r e g i m e n t was d r i l l e d and t r a i n e d w h i l e t h e o t h e r s p a r t i e d and t h k i r o f f i c e r s spent t i m e i n town. The 1 9 t h Alabama

I n f a n t r y was soon head and s h o u l d e r s above t h e o t h e r u n i t s i n d r i l l and d i s c i p l i n e . This f a c t , o f course, b r o u g h t more

f a v o r a b l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i r young c ~ r n m a n d e r . ~ C ~ olonel

Wheeler f o u g h t h i s f i r s t l a r g e - s c a l e b a t t l e a t S h i l o h i n A p r i l 1862. K. The 1 9 t h Alabama j o i n e d a b r i g a d e under B G John t h e Army o f

Jackson on t h e r i g h t wing o f B r a g g ' s Corps of As t h e y s t a r t e d t h e b a t t l e ,

Mississippi.

t h e commanders However,

l o s t the l a s t of t h e pre-battle organization.

Wheeler c o n t r o l l e d h i s r e g i m e n t w e l l as t h e y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f Union Generals P r e n t i s s ' and H u r l b u r t ' s u n i t s a t t h e " H o r n e t ' s N e s t " and t h e "Peach Orchard". r e g i m e n t performed w e l l , i n the battle.%As t h e Con+ederates began t h e i r r e t r e a t t o C o r i n t h a f t e r t h e B a t t l e of Shiloh, the responsibility f o r rear While His

but l o s t o n e - t h i r d of i t s strength

guard o p e r a t i o n s f e l l upon Wheeler and h i s r e g i m e n t . a t C o r i n t h , Wheeler became a b r i g a d e commander.

Wheeler's t h i s time

men ended up c o v e r i n g another Confederate r e t r e a t , from an e n c i r c l e d C o r i n t h , M i s s i s s i p p i .=-

A f t e r Bragg t o o k command o f t h e Army, assigned t o command a c a v a l r y b r i g a d e .

Wheeler was

Wheeler used h i s

f o r c e s t o f e i n t and t o h a r r a s s t h e Union f o r c e s around N a s h v i l l e as Bragg marched i n t o Kentucky. Wheeler f i r s t

came i n t o u c h and c o n f l i c t w i t h Nathan Bedford F o r r e s t a t t h i s time. F o r r e s t was a b r i g a d i e r , b u t was somewhat Therefore, Bragg

unorthodox i n h i s s t y l e compared t o Bragg.

k e p t Wheeler s e p a r a t e f r o m F o r r e s t even though F o r r e s t s h o u l d have had command o f a c o n s o l i d a t e d c a v a l r y corps. L a t e r i n t h e campaign, r e l a t i o n s between Rragg and F o r r e s t deteriorated further. Bragg s e n t F o r r e s t back t o

M ~ a r f r e e s b o r oand t u r n e d t h e t r o o p s over 'to W h e e l e r ' s command."" Wheeler showed t h a t he c o u l d g e t t h e j o b done, and t h a t

he a l s o had p a t i e n c e and t h e a b i l i t y t o work w i t h and f o r others. F o r r e s t c o u l d g e t h i s j o b done, b u t had few o f

Wheeler's more r e f i n e d t r a i t s .

These t r a i t s b r o u g h t Wheeler The g u l f

c l o s e r t o Braqg w h i l e F o r r e s t moved f u r t h e r away.

between Wheeler and F o r r e s t grew as an e x t e n s i o n o f t h e Pragg s i t u a t i o n . I n t h e long run, t h i s had some d i r e I n the short t h e newly

consequences f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e army. run, Bragg a p p o i n t e d Wheeler Chief Tennessee.&= of C a v a l r y of

named Army of

Wheeler's s t r e n g t h l a y i n t h a t "He was always ready t o . work i n t h e team and p l a y a s u b o r d i n a t e p a r t t a h i s commanding g e n e r a l " . 6 z He a c t u a l l y p r e f e r r e d w o r k i n g as H i s next

p a r t o f t h e team r a t h e r t h a n o p e r a t i n g on h i s own. mission, though, p u t him on h i s own.

Bragg s e n t Wheeler

r a i d i n g i n t o west Tennessee i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h F o r r e s t t o d i s r u p t t h e enemy l i n e s o f communication. They went west

o f N a s h v i l l e and d e s t r o y e d many b o a t s on t h e Cumberland R i v e r and t h e n a t t a c k e d F o r t Donelson h o p i n g t o r e g a i n t h i s jewel l o s t a year e a r l i e r by t h e Condederates. R e p o r t s d i f f e r on t h e cause o f t h e d i s a s t e r t h e r e , t h e upshot was a v i o l e n t t a n t r u m by F o r r e s t about t h e s l a u g h t e r of h i s t r o o p s i n an i l l - p l a n n e d Wheeler, a t t a c k he had but

counselled against. a fighter,

b e i n g a s o l d i e r f i r s t and t h e n

l e t the o ~ ~ t b u r s go t by w i t h o u t m a l i c e o r o f f i c i a l

r e p o r t , and t h e n accepted f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e defeat. Forrest, being a f i g h t e r f i r s t and t h e n a s o l d i e r ,

k e p t t h e grudge and s a i d ,

"You can have m y sword i f you

demand i t , b u t t h e r e i s one t h i n g I want you t o p u t i n t h a t r e p o r t t o General Bragg. y T e l l h i m t h a t I w i l l be i n m

c o f f i n b e f o r e I w i l l f i g h t a g a i n under your command. F o r r e s t k e p t h i s promise t h r o u g h o u t t h e war and t h e

"*"

commanders o f t h e army a l l o w e d h i m t o g e t away w i t h i t . Wheeler d i d n o t appear t o have h e l d a grudge even i f he d i d f i n d F o r r e s t h a r d t o work w i t h i n t h e f u t u r e . Knowing o f t h i s c o n f l i c t and t r y i n g t o g a i n some e f f i c i e n c y i n h i s cavalry, Bragg went a l o n g w i t h F o r r e s t ' s

u l t i m a t u m and c o m p l e t e l y separated h i s c a v a l r y u n i t s , g i v i n g each commander a s e p a r a t e c a v a l r y corps. f e d up w i t h F o r r e s t ' s e c c e n t r i c i t i e s , choice i n t h e matter. Bragg d i d appear

b u t had l i t t l e o t h e r Streight's raid

Union C o l o n e l Abel D.

t h r o u g h Alabama and Georgia h e l p e d B r a g g ' s predicament i n A p r i l of

1863.

Bragg s e n t F o r r e s t t o chase down S t r e i g h t

and t h e n p u t Wheeler i n charge w i t h a new p r ~ m o t i o n . " ~ Wheeler s e t about c o n s o l i d a t i n g and r e o r g a n i z i n g h i s new c o r p s and remained a c o n s t a n t t h r e a t t o Union s u p p l i e s and o u t p o s t s . Murfreesboro. He screened t h e a r m y ' s f r o n t t o t h e s o u t h of He a l s n s e t o u t t o c o r r e c t a d e f i c i e n c y he There were no good manuals on Even t h e ones t h a t d i d

saw i n c a v a l r y t a c t i c s .

c a v a l r y t a c t i c s i n American use.

e x i s t d i d n o t address t h e Southern h a b i t o f u t i l i z i n g mounted i n f a n t r y . The r e s ~ t l t was a manual, w r i t t e n by

Wheeler and pub1 i s h e d i n M o b i l e i n 1863.

" A Revised System

o f C a v a l r y T a c t i c s f o r t h e Use o f t h e C a v a l r y and Mounted Infantry, CSA" was t h e f i r s t manual which e s t a b l i s h e d

mounted i n f a n t r y and abandoned heavy c a v a l r y as a method o f fighting. The Confederacy adopted t h e manual and a l l u s e r s

were r e l a t i v e 1 y happy.&= Nathan B e d f o r d F o r r e s t was b o r n on 13 J u l y 1821 i n t h e n B e d f o r d County, Chapel H i l l . Forrest. Tennessee n e a r . t h e present-day town of

H i s p a r e n t s were W i l l i a m and Mariam Heck Nathan and

H i s . g r a n d f a t h e r and g r e a t - g r a n d f a t h e r ,

Shadrach F o r r e s t ,

moved i n t o Tenessee i n 18@6 f r o m N o r t h

C a r o l i n a a f t e r Shadrach o r i g i n a l l y l e f t V i r g i n i a i n 1740. W i l l i a m moved around s e v e r a l t i m e s i n Tennessee t o keep up w i t h t h e edge o f t h e f r o n t i e r . m a r r i e d i n 1820.

He f i n a l l y s e t t l e d down and

He l i v e d on t h e Duck R i v e r o f m i d d l e Fannie

Tennessee when Nathan B e d f o r d and h i s t w i n - s i s t e r were born.66 W i l l i a m F o r r e s t was a wandering b l a c k s m i t h .

He owned a

s m a l l amount o f p r o p e r t y everywhere he l i v e d b u t he was n o t prosperous and he owned no s l a v e s . H i s w i f e was a s i m p l e She gave

b u t s t r o n g woman who s t r i c t l y r u l e d h e r household.

W i l l i a m F o r r e s t a t o t a l o f e i g h t sons and t h r e e daughters. A f t e r W i l l i a m ' s death, she was m a r r i e d t o a M r . Joseph

L u x t o n and mothered t h r e e more sons and a daughter t o him."' I n 1834 t h e f a m i l y moved t o new l a n d s t h a t opened t o s e t t l e m e n t i n Tippah County, Mississippi.

I t was h e r e t h a t

W i l i a m d i e d and l e f t h i s p r e g n a n t wi.fe and t e n c h i l d r e n i n

d i r e s t r a i t s t o fend f o r themselves. Forrest, a t t h e age o f s i x t e e n ,

Nathan Bedford

became t h e man o f t h e house

and t h e bread-winner

f o r t h i s l a r g e family."e

B e d f o r d F o r r e s t had o n l y about s i x months o f s c h o o l education, schools. s p l i t e v e n l y between Tennessee and M i s s i s s i p p i He was a p p a r e n t l y b r i g h t b u t u n r u l y and, h i s l a t e r p e r s o n a l correspondence, given

examples of

d i d not

absorb much i n t h e c l a s s i c a l sense.

Bedford d i d recognize when he was a b l e

t h i s d e f i c i e n c y i n h i s own l i f e and l a t e r , to,

he i n s u r e d h i s youngest b r o t h e r J e f f r e y g o t a f u l l Redford d e f i n i t e l y d i d n o t r e c e i v e any m i l i t a r y

education.

e d u c a t i o n a t a11 . 6 9 H i s e x p e r i e n c e s t h r o u g h o u t h i s younger y e a r s c l e a r 1 y demonstrate a t e n a c i t y and an a b i l i t y t o p u t h i s words i n t o action. Even as a young man, he p r a c t i c e d a d i r e c t n e s s i n

c o n f r o n t i n g s i t u a t i o n s f o r which he was l a t e r t o become famous. As a young man, he was i n d u s t r i o u s and s e n s i b l e i n B e f o r e he was

h i e e f f o r t s t o earn a l i v i n g f o r h i s family. eighteen,

he went i n t o a p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h an e l d e r l y u n c l e .

T h i s b u s i n e s s proceeded w e l l and a l l o w e d F o r r e s t t o move h i s f a m i l y i n t o b e t t e r accommodations and g i v e them a b e t t e r livelihood. slave-trading F o r r e s t expanded h i s b u s i n e s s i n t o h o r s e and and r e a l e s t a t e . He became w i d e l y known and were n o t

w e a l t h y though, w e l l regarded.7m

even i n t h e South, s l a v e - t r a d e r s

I n 1845, he m a r r i e d Mary Ann Armstrong,

a kinswoman o f

General R i c h a r d Montgomery o f R e v o l u t i o n a r y War B ~ ~ e b e fame. c

From t h i s m a r r i a g e came a son who f o u g h t d u r i n g t h e war w i t h h i s f a t h e r and a daughter who d i e d young.71 By 1859, he was t h e owner o f two l a r g e c o t t o n - p r o d u c i n g p l a n t a t i o n s i n Tennessee and M i s s i s s i p p i and p a r t owner o f another. He l e f t t h e s l a v e b u s i n e s s as soon as he had made even though he d i d m a i n t a i n a l a r g e number F o r r e s t became v e r y f a m i l i a r w i t h

a decent l i v i n g ,

o f s l a v e s on h i s farms.

t h e l o c a l area around Memphis and was a w e l l - r e s p e c t e d c i t i z e n of the region. c i t y alderman. The p e o p l e of Memphis e l e c t e d him a

He was known t o be v e r y p r a c t i c a l and

i n t e n s e 1y honest .'= F o r r e s t was a s t r o n g proponent o f s t a t e s r i g h t s and a Southern Democrat even though he d i d n o t seek a p o l i t i c a l career. He r e s i g n e d a f t e r one t e r m as a c i t y alderman b u t

stayed abreast o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e d i v i d i n g t h e nation.. As secession came t o Tennessee i n 1861, F o r r e s t r o d e i n t o t h e camp o f W h i t e ' s Tennessee Mounted R i f l e s ( l a t e r p a r t o f t h e 7 t h Tennessee C a v a l r y ) w i t h h i s son and h i s b r o t h e r J e f f r e y t o e n l i s t as p r i v a t e s f o r t h e war. was w o r t h about $1.5 Bedford F o r r e s t He

m i l l i o n and was v e r y i n f l u e n t i a l . I n s t e a d , h e was a

d i d n o t use t h i s f a c t t o h i s g a i n .

p r i v a t e when h i s s t a t e came t o him f o r h e l p . 7 J I n June 1861, t h e governor asked F o r r e s t t o r a i s e a b a t t a l i o n o f c a v a l r y f o r t h e Confederacy. The governor By October

promised h i m command as a l i e u t e n a n t c o l o n e l .

1861 he had r a i s e d 650 men and equipped them w i t h h o r s e s and arms, much o f i t t h r o u g h h i s own p e r s o n a l f a r t u n e . With

t h i s unit,

he won h i s f i r s t v i c t o r y i n December 1861, and

moved i n t o F o r t Donelson f o r t h e d r a m a t i c e v e n t s t h e r e . " He was t h e s e n i o r c a v a l r y l e a d e r a t F o r t Donelson s o he t o o k command o f a l l o f t h e 1400 Southern horsemen p r e s e n t . He f o u g h t d e l a y i n g a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e advance o f G r a n t ' s army f r o m F o r t Henry and t h e n f o u g h t w e l l d u r i n g t h e s h o r t b u t v i o l e n t s i e g e a t F o r t Donelson. When t h e commanders a t the

F o r t Donelson decided t o t r y t o f i n d a way o u t of e n c i r c l i n g Union f o r c e s ,

i t was F o r r e s t who c u t a h o l e and


Then t h e commanders

h e l d i t f o r t h e t r o o p s t o escape.

e l e c t e d n o t t o march o u t and F o r r e s t g o t h i s f i r s t t a s t e of m i l i t a r y "booklearning". surrender! Then he g o t mad. They decided t o

F o r r e s t made i t c l e a r t h a t he had n o t r a i s e d

t h i s u n i t and bought i t s equipment f o r someone e l s e t o g i v e

i t away t o t h e enemy.

He decided t o go o u t t h r o u g h the,
A l l

l i n e s b e f o r e t h e surrender. s a f e l y w i t h him.

1400 cavalrymen r o d e o u t
t h i s u n i t was known as

From t h i s t i m e on,

F o r r e s t ' s "Old Regiment".7s F o r r e s t and t h i s r e g i m e n t t h e n r o d e t h r o u g h N a s h v i l l e and found mobs i n c o n t r o l and l o o t i n g government warehouses. He clubbed t h e r i n g l e a d e r s and d i s p e r s e d t h e crowds. He

t h e n shipped as much o f t h e s u p p l i e s o u t t o t h e Southern army as he c o u l d and d i s p e r s e d t h e r e s t t o t h e p o p u l a t i o n w h i l e p r o t e c t i n g medical s u p p l i e s t o be used by competent a u t h o r i t i e s o f whichever s i d e was a b l e t o use them f o r t h e i r i n t e n d e d purpose. army.
76

He t h e n r o d e t o C o r i n t h and t h e g a t h e r i n g

H i s n e x t b a t t l e was S h i l o h where he saw incompetence i n t h e way t r o o p s were handled and l e d . He found weak s p o t s

i n t h e Union f l a n k s b u t c o u l d n o t g e t t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s t o a c t d e c i s i v e l y on h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . He r e p o r t e d t h i s as t h e The army t h e n

reason f o r t h e C o n f e d e r a t e l o s s and r e t r e a t .

p l a c e d h i s " O l d Regiment" under someone e l s e ' s command and o r d e r e d F o r r e s t i n t o m i d d l e Tennessee t o r e c r u i t a new brigade. He k e p t o n l y h i s e s c o r t company commanded by h i s and h i s s t a f f . F o r r e s t r e c r u i t e d i n an

brother, William,

occupied p a r t o f t h e s t a t e b u t he l e f t f o r t h e Kentucky Campaign w i t h a f u l l y armed, and t r a i n e d b r i g a d e o f c a v a l r y .

By J u l y 1862, he was a b r i g a d i e r g e n e r a l and covered B r a g g ' s l e f t f l a n k f o r t h e invasion of K e n t ~ ~ c k y . ~ ~ H i s b r i g a d e performed b r i l l i a n t l y i n t h e P e r - r y v i l l e Campaign even though t h e army b e a t another i g n o m i n i o u s r e t r e a t t o Tennessee. To t o p i t a l l o f f , Bragg o r d e r e d

F o r r e s t t o turn h i s new b r i g a d e over t o Joe Wheeler and t o go t o t h e M u r f r e e s b o r o a r e a t o r a i s e s t i l l another b r i g a d e . Oui t e o b v i o ~ ~ y, s l F o r r e s t had a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e a t i n g Yankees and f o r r e c r u i t i n g s o l d i e r s . Bragg l i k e d h i s

a b i l i t y t o r e c r u i t and p o t e n t i a l r e c r u i t s l i k e d t h e chance t o f i g h t w i t h a winner. But, F o r r e s t ' s o l d t r o o p e r s were

n o t happy g e t t i n g passed t o someone whom t h e y found l e s s competent and F o r r e s t was g e t t i n g t i r e d o f u s i n g h i s f o r t u n e t o r a i s e and equip u n i t s f o r o t h e r p e o p l e t o
command:'^

With h i s money r u n n i n g o u t b u t new t r o o p s corning i n t o j o i n him, F o r r e s t found a novel way t o mount and e q u i p h i s

men.

He t u r n e d t o t h e b e s t o u t f i t t e r on t h e c o n t i n e n t , F o r r e s t went n o r t h i n t e r d i c t i n g G r a n t ' s s u p p l y men, o f whom 1,000 were n o t

Uncle Sam.

l i n e s t o V i c k s b u r g w i t h 2,100 armed. Two weeks l a t e r ,

he r e t u r n e d w i t h s e v e r a l v i c t o r i e s ,

one near miss d i s a s t e r because a s u b o r d i n a t e f a i l e d t o f o l l o w orders, more t r o o p e r s t h a n he t o o k i n and e v e r y one

o f them mounted s p l e n d i d 1 y and armed even b e t t e r .

He a l s o

caused Grant t o c a l l o f f an a t t e m p t a t V i c k s b u r g and t o change h i s s u p p l y r o u t e t o t h e r i v e r r a t h e r t h a n t h e railroad.


79

For some t i m e a f t e r t h i s r a i d , F o r r e s t served under t h e command o f t h e C h i e f o f C a v a l r y o f t h e Army o f Tennessee, Joe Wheeler. The s t o r y o f t h e i r r a i d s and c o n f l i c t s has ~ o i r e s t h e n went t o work f o r Major

a l r e a d y been t o l d .

General E a r l Van Dorn b u t t h e y d i d n o t g e t a l o n g w e l l either. F o r r e s t demonstrated . t h a t he c o u l d n o t work f o r

anybody v e r y w e l l and t h a t he was n o t a g r e a t team p l a y e r . Later, over. Because o f F o r r e s t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o work w e l l under others, talents. Bragg f o u n d t h e p e r f e c t o p p o r t u n i t y t o use h i s Union cavalrymen, 1,500 s t r o n g , under C o l o n e l Abel a j e a l o u s husband k i l l e d Van Dorn and F o r r e s t t o o k

D.

S t r e i g h t r a i d e d t h r o u g h n o r t h Alabama headed f o r Rome, Bragg s e n t F o r r e s t t o r u n them down.

Georgia.

I t took

F o r r e s t f i v e days t o l i t e r a l l y r u n S t r e i g h t ' s men i n t o t h e ground w i t h c o n t i n u o u s f i g h t i n g , well-laid plans of and

e n c i r l e m e n t , r e s t b r e a k s f o r h i s own t r o o p s ,

m o b i l i z a t i o n o f t h e c o ~ m t r y s i d e . With o n l y 500 men a t h i s disposal, he d e f e a t e d and c a p t u r e d t h e e n t i r e e x p e d i t i o n .

H i s r e p u t a t i o n grew and he won t h e t h a n k s o f t h e Confederate Congress. I n t h e f o u r y e a r s t h a t he f o u g h t , he was wounded He had

s e r i o u s l y four t i m e s and much more o f t e n l e s s so. twenty-nine

h o r s e s s h o t o u t from under h i m b u t r e v e l l e d i n

t h e f a c t t h a t he had p e r s o n a l l y k i l l e d a Yankee s o l d i e r f o r each h o r s e p l u s one by t h e t i m e i t was a l l over. There were

n o t v e r y many o t h e r g e n e r a l o f f i c e r s who c l a i m e d one p e r s o n a l k i l l , much l e s s t h i r t y o f them."" H i s one g r e a t e s t handicap was h i s v i o l e n t temper. He

was a l s o known t o b e a t h i s own men and even shoot them f o r perceived i n f r a c t i o n s , false reports. f o r d i s o b e d i e n c e o r even f o r b r i n g i n g

He always r e c o g n i z e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r

d i s c i p l i n e and obedience even i f h e h i m s e l f was n o t good a t t a k i n g orders.


He d i s c h a r g e d a shotgun i n t o some

Confederate t r o o p s who were f l e e i n g t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . s u r v i v o r s went back t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . i n f a n t r y color-bearer who t u r n e d t o f l e e .

The

He s h o t dead an H i s t r o o p s and They a l l

h i s f r i e n d s admired him and ' t h e y r e s p e c t e d him.

f o u g h t h a r d t o s t a y w i t h h i m and no o t h e r commander was good enough, b u t t h e y f e a r e d h i m r a t h e r t h a n l o v e d him.o" He had

F o r r e s t ' s e d u c a t i o n p u t one t h i n g i n h i s f a v o r . never been t o l d he c o u l d n o t do something.

He d i d n o t do

something if i t seemed wrong t o h i m o r i f he had t r i e d i t and i t d i d n o t work. The l a c k o f a f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n

c e r t a i n l y was n o t a l i m i t i n g f a c t o r f o r a man l i k e F o r r e s t . I 11i n o i e Colonel Robert G. captured, I n y e r s o l I, whom F o r r e s t once

s a i d l a t e r t h a t c o l l e g e s were p l a c e s "where
'Ia4

p e b b l e s a r e p o l i s h e d and diamonds a r e dimmed.

Forrest

never opened a book on m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s b e f o r e t h e war b u t he had a c o m p l e t e l y matured i n s t i n c t f o r war, simply, He s a i d

"War means f i g h t i n g and f i g h t i n g means k i l l i n g . " " "

H i s i n s t i n c t s were n e a r l y always c o r r e c t . F o r r e s t was an o f f e n s i v e f i g h t e r . He d i d n o t however

l i k e t h e f r o n t a l a t t a c k s t h a t were a h a l l m a r k o f g e n e r a l s o f both sides of t h i s c o n f l i c t . i n the flank, or, F o r r e s t l i k e d t o h i t h i s enemy 'em on t h e end."

a s he c a l l e d i t , " h i t t i n g

He p i c k e d s p o t s t h e enemy would n o t expect and he h i t them i n more t h a n one p l a c e a t t h e time. He d i d l i k e t o a r r i v e . . f i r s t and w i t h a d e c i s i - v e f o r c e a t t h e p o i n t o f impact. O n such occasions, men, he y e l l e d h i s f a v o r i t e b a t t l e c r y , 'em!"o6 "Forward,

and m i x w i t h

F o r r e s t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t a c t i c s d u r i n g t h i s war was i n t h e r e a l m o f mounted i n f a n t r y and r a i d s . H i s men c o u l d

f i g h t on horseback b u t t h e i r p r i m a r y g o a l was t o r i d e t o t h e p o i n t of b a t t l e quickly, infantry. dismount and f i g h t as l i g h t

They were e x c e l l e n t a t t h i s t y p e o f f i g h t i n g and Forrest also d i d H i s were n o t t h e rampages

even won r e c o g n i t i o n f r o m t h e i n f a n t r y . l a r g e amounts o f damage on h i s r a i d s . f a n c i f u l g a l a s o f J.E.B. of John H. Morgan.

Stuart o r t h e fool-hardy

H i s r a i d s went f a r b e h i n d t h e enemy

l i n e s t o occupy an a r e a and d e f e a t any enemy t h a t would come

ortt t o f i g h t him.

He d i d n o t u s u a l l y p l a n h i t and r u n

a f f a i r s n o r d i d he u s u a l l y b r i n g h i s men and h o r s e s back t o t a l 1y wiped o u t and i n e f f e c t i v e .


O7

Forrest concentrated firepower p i s t o l s f o r close-in

i n h i s tactics.

He used

work and when mounted b u t p r e f e r r e d t h e He

s h o r t E n f i e l d f o r h i s men i n t h e i r dismounted r o l e .

combined a r t i l l e r y i n a l l o f h i s f i g h t s once he l e a r n e d of i t s usefulness. He decided t o r e a d t h e a r t i l l e r y manual and He came t o l i k e t h e range and

l e a r n e a r l y i n t h e war.

e f f e c t o f a r t i l l e r y and was a master a t u s i n g f i r e s t o save h i s t r o o p s ' l i v e s i f possible."" F o r r e s t was a f i g h t e r b u t a v e r y independent one. had argued w i t h as many men as had Pragg. He

He c o u l d p e r f o r m

h i s j o b b e t t e r t h a n any o t h e r b u t he was n o t a team p l a y e r . As he moved toward t h e summer and f a l l of


1863, F o r r e s t was

as.much a p a r t o f t h e problem as he was t h e s o l u t i o n . These t h r e e men l e a d t h e Army o f Tennessee and i t s c a v a l r y t h r o u g h o u t t h e campaigns addressed i n t h i s s t u d y . T h e i r i n f l u e n c e w i l l be apparent i n t h e m i s s i o n s assigned and t h e manner i n which t h o s e m i s s i o n s were executed.
SLICC~SS

The

o f t h e Confederate c a v a l r y a t Chickamauga r o d e on

t h e e h o u l d e r s n f t h r e e v e r y d i v e r s e s o l d i e r s who d e p a r t e d t h e s e campaigns w i t h q r o s s l y d i s p a r a t e r e p u t a t i o n s .

"James A. Schaefer, "The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry during the American Civil War" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toledo, 1982), p. 49. "John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Story of-..the U.S. Cavalry 1775-1942 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1953), p. 1 1 1 . 4Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University F'ress, 1971), pp. 6-8. =Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p. YConnelly, pp. 15-18. 7This statement is based upon personal experience over 15 years on active duty service in the U.S. Army a s a unit maintenance officer and company commander. =Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p. 182. 183.

zwPaddy Griffith, &a_ct-le in the C i v i l War (Nottinghamshire: Fieldbooks, 1986), p. 42. ItSchaefer, p. 28. l"Ibid., p. 29.

%=Herr and Wallace, p. 88. 14Schaefer, p. 29. lSIbid., p. 39. i6Davis, pp. 84-87. 17Wiliam C. Davis, The Fiahtina Men of the Civil War (New York: Gallery Books, 1989), p. 65. ieDenison, p. 361. 17McWhiney and Jamieson, p. "wIbid.,
p.

151.

131-132. 64

21Davis, pp.

83-89.

""J. Appleton,

Harvey Mathes, 1902), p. 343. 61-62.

Eeneral F o r r e (New York:

z4Davis, pp.

Z?6Davi

S,

pp.

58,

76-81.

"-This i s a h a b i t t h a t was l e a r n e d v e r y r a p i d l y i n t h e c a v a l r y o f t h e western armies. The s o - c a l l e d " G u e r i l l a " s h i r t s worn by Southern t r o o p e r s had s p e c i a l o v e r - s i z e d p o c k e t s t h a t were i n t e n d e d s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r c a r r y i n g additional revolver cylinders. T h i s p r a c t i c e i s s t i 11 used t o d a y by C i v i l War r e - e n a c t o r s . Davis, p. 219. xvRndrew Nelson L y t l e , 0edf o r d F o r r e s t and-k!!s-CZLL%er Com~any, (New York: Minton, B a l c h k Co., 1931), p. 303.

"iH.M. Rees, LTD.,

-Johnstone, A H i s t o r y o f T a c t i c s (London: 1906), p. 374. 109, 124.

Hugh

= = L y t l e , pp.

="John P. Dyer, " F i q h t i n ' Joe" Wheeler (Baton Ro~lge: L o u i s i a n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1941) p. 18. J4Paul E. S t e i n e r , Medical Military Portraits 0 3 Union and Confederate G e n e r a l j ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : Whitmore P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1968), p. -7 ,341. "JJac W e l l e r , "Nathan B e d f o r d F o r r e s t : An A n a l y s i s o f U n t u t o r e d M i l i t a r y Genius", Tennessee H i s t o r i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , Vol 18, No. 5, (Sep 1959) p. q.77 LLJ.

J6Griffith,

5 a t t l e T a c t i c s of

t h e C i v i l wa.~., p.

183.

"7The-!&a~-p_ithe-&b-e1 U-o?,~:0.f_fl,cialecords--o4.-t.~, Union and Confederate -fi,~mL@-s., (hereafter ) & . O (Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1880-1901) S e r i e s 1, Volume X X I I I , p a r t 2, p. 902; X X X , p a r t 4, pp. 502, 656. (Hereafter a l l references are t o Series 1 unless otherwise stated. )

"-Grady McWhiney, H&.axton B r a a a a n d t h e C~nf~e_d.gvat_e. Defeat Volume I;-,. F i e l d Command ( N e w Yor k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , l 9 6 9 ) , p. 10.

401bid.,

pp.

35-36.

4 L I b i d . , pp. "=Ibid., +"Ibid., rr41bid., 45Seitz, pp. p.

28, 51.
95-96. 87.

p. 89.
p.

15.
pp.

46McWhiney, 471bid., pp.

145-149.

151-152.

l h i c a l D i c: t i o n d r y o f t h e . 4 e J o n L. W a k e l y n , B i o a r a & P r e s s , 1977) , E Conf e d e w ( W e s t p o r t , C o n n e c t: i c u t : G ~?enwood p . 105. 49Connelly, =-Ibid., slDyer, ==Ibid., ="Ibid., =41bid. SSSchaefer, ='Wakelyn, p.
p.

p. 72. 12.
14.

20.

p.
p.

p. p.

15.

29.
434.

s7Ezra J. Warner, G e n e r a l s i n Gray: L i v e s o t : C o n f e d e r a t e Commanders ( B a t o n Rouge: L o u i s i a n a S t a t e , . ? . U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959), p. .A.L,. Writer's n o t e : T h e A l a b a m a I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t i s t h e u n i t t h a t my w i f e ' s a n c e s t o r s , t h e H u g h e s ' f ami 1 y , j o i n e d , f o ~ t g h tw i t h , d w i t h , a n d s u r r e n d e r e d w i t h ' f r o m 1861 t o 1 8 b 5 .

'-Robert 5 . H e n r y , :First w i t h the-Most" ( W i l m i n g t o n , N.C.: B r o a d f o o t P u b l i s h i n g Co.,


66

Forrest 1 9 8 7 ) , p.

100.

asSteiner, p. 331.
= & I b i d . , pp. 331-532.
a7Johnson,
pp. 86-93;
Gray, p.137.

"=We1 1 er , pp. 228-234.

~C.HArTSFIIH!ElE

T_c!U.&m!_aCa.meaLm
The Tullahoma Campaign demonstrated the low point to which the Army of Tennessee could sink without actually losing a battle. Rosecrans deceived and then flanked the

Confederate army out of its strong defensive position wi,th hardly a murmur of protest. The campaign lasted only

fifteen days, 23 June to 7 July 1863, and the Southern cause lost all of Middle Tennessee. Only for short periods of

time during the rest of the war would a Southern army control portions of Middle Tennessee, and then, only the ground upon which they stood. General Bragg encamped his army on the Duck River south of Murfreesboro after withdrawing from that battlefield in January 1863. For six months, he strengthened his lines

which spread across seventy miles of countryside from McMinnville to Columbia, Tennessee. At the apex of the arc

created by Bragg's army was.the Union army of General

. Kosecrans at Murfreesboro.l William S


Logistics and geography worked against Bragg's defense. In the vicinity o f Bragg's army, numerous roads led from Murfreesboro to Chatttanooga. The railroad from Louisville

to Nashville continued through the. heart of Bragg's defensive area and on from Tullahoma to his base in Chattanooga. Numerous water courses ran east to west across

the line of march of Bragg's supply lines, the largest ones being the Duck, the Elk, and the Tennessee Rivers. From

Murfreesboro t o t h e east,

t h e l a n d was covered w i t h steep Through t h e s e The r o a d s

and rugged mountains covered i n f o r e s t s .

mountains r a n s e v e r a l r o a d s o f dubious q u a l i t y .

wound t h r o u g h t h e mountains and descended i n t o t h e v a l l e y s i n small, of winding s t r i p s p o i n t e d g e n e r a l l y i n t h e d i r e c t i o n The l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n b u t t h e y were

low s p o t s i n t h e mountains.

r e f e r r e d t o t h e s e low s p o t s as "gaps",

c e r t a i n l y n o t e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e o r pronounced t e r r a i n features. Given t h e t y p e o f t e r r a i n ,

i t i s easy t o

understand why t h e s p a r s e l y s e t t l e d a r e a had l i t t l e a v a i l a b l e provender f o r an army.= General Bragg ' s main problem was t h a t t h e a r e a was so v a s t t h a t he d i d n o t have adequate f o r c e s t o f o r t i f y i t a l l . Hosecrans c o u l d o u t f l a n k Bragg, spread o u t ' no m a t t e r how f a r Bragg

The t e r r a i n became more d i f f i c u l t t h e f u r t h e r so no m a t t e r how f a s t Bragg

t o t h e e a s t t h e army t r a v e l l e d , moved h i s army,

t h e c h a s i n g army was always g o i n g t o c a t c h

up + a s t e r t h a n he

caul-d g e t away.

Many p l a c e s e x i s t e d a l o n g t h e l i n e o f communications which c o u l d be used t o d e l a y o r s t o p an a t t a c k i n g f o r c e . mentioned above, though,

A5

most o f t h e s e p l a c e s c o u l d s t i l l be Still, these

t a k e n by f l a n k i n g t h e d e f e n d i n g f o r c e .

l o c a t i o n s a l o n g t h e main avenue c o u l d be i n t e r d i c t e d and, even i f l o s t , t h e y c o u l d be made u s e l e s s t o t h e i n v a d e r . the constricted

Tunnels and b r i d g e s on t h e r a i l r o a d l i n e s , gaps over t h e mountains,

and t h e numerous b r i d g e s , f e r r i e s ,

a n d f o r d s c o u l d b e d e s t r n y e d o r damaged t o d e l a y t h e enemy

or h a r r a s s h i s SLIPPI y lines.
G e n e r a l B r a g g h a d a n o t h e r major r e a s o n , b e s i d e s g u a r d i n g a g a i n s t a Union a d v a n c e , t o s p r e a d h i s army o v e r such a wide f r o n t . T h e Army o f T e n n e s s e e was v e r y s h o r t o n The area w a s n o t t h e b e s t

f o o d f o r i t s men a n d i t s a n i m a l s .

l a n d f r o m w h i c h t o f e e d a n a r m y , s o Ecragg was f o r c e d t o p u t s e p a r a t e p a r t s of t h e a r m y i n d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s f o r i t t o be able t o sustain i t s e l f . Even w i t h t h e s e e f f o r t s across

l a r g e a r e a s , t h e a r m y was s t i l l r e q u i r e d t o c o l l c c t s u p p l i e s from as f a r w e s t Alabama. as F r a n k l i n , Tennessee and s o u t h i n t o f o r a g i n g c a u s e d a major t a x a t i o n of The

Wide-ranging

B r a g g ' s weak t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d d r a f t a n i m a l r e s o u r c e s .

w a g o n s a n d a n i m a l s , a l r e a d y i n a c u t e demand, were worn o u t by t h e g r e a t d i s t a n c e s t r a v e l l e d . I t seemed t h a t a l l

s o l u t i o n s t o h i s p r o b l e m s o n l y made B r a g g ' s s h o r t a g e s more severe. B r a g g made h i s d i s p o s i t i o n s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h h i s m i l i t a r y and l o g i s t i c s requirements.


He m a i n t a i n e d h i s

h e a d q u a r t e r s a t T u l l a h o m a , s o u t h o f t h e Duck R i v e r . i n f a n t r y c o r p s f o r t i f i e d t h e Duck R i v e r . Confederate

His

L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l L e o n i d a s P o l k commanded a c o r p s d u g i n around Shelhyville.


J.

H i s p a r t n e r , L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l William

H a r d e e , commanded t h e o t h e r c o r p s e n t r e n c h e d i n t h e Each c o r p s h a d a c a v a l r y u n i t Forrest's cavalry division From Wartrace t o

v i c i n i t y of Wartrace.

detailed t o screen t h e flanks.

c o v e r e d P o l k ' s c o r p s on t h e a r m y ' s l e f t .

McMinnville i n t h e east, Hardee.

Wheeler's c a v a l r y c o r p s covered

Each c a v a l r y screen covered a d i s t a n c e o f about

t h i r t y miles.D u r i n g t h e t i m e spent i n f r o n t o f Rosecrans' army a t Murfreesboro, thinly. t h e Confederate c a v a l r y u n i t s were spread

W h e e l e r ' s Corps was g a r r i s o n i n g t h e e a s t e r n f l a n k , and was n o t c o n c e n t r a t i n g on i t s s c r e e n i n g t h e command and c o n t r o l

b u t was s p l i t , mission.

O n t h e western f l a n k ,

changed a l o n g w i t h t h e numerous d i v i s i o n s o f t h e f o r c e s . Upon r e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n February a f t e r Murfreesboro, c a v a l r y appeared t o be w e l l s e t . By e a r l y May, the

t h e y even

numbered n e a r l y s i x t e e n thousand e f f e c t i v e t r o o p e r s . However, n e i t h e r f l a n k was well-manned d e d i c a t e d t o t h e j o b a t hand.= General Bragg gave t h e u n i t s t h e i r assignments and a r e a s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y around 23 A p r i l . ' not overly specific, but, These o r d e r s were nor i n t e n t l y

b y 1863, t h e c a v a l r y commanders

s h o u l d have known i n s t i n c t i v e l y what was expected o f them when g i v e n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . They s h o u l d have been

w e l l aware o f t h e n a t u r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would be u s e f u l t o t h e army commander. What t h e y a c t u a l l y a t t e m p t e d and and a c u t e l y degraded t h e

accomplished was q u i t e a b i t l e s s ,

performance o f t h e Army o f Tennessee. O n 6 June, General Bragg. Wheeler r e c e i v e d s p e c i f i c o r d e r s f r o m These o r d e r s s a i d :

The advance i s almost c e r t a i n . C o n c e n t r a t e your whole f o r c e . . . . t h a t General Morgan m i g h t r e l i e v e you and a l l o w your whole command t o move round t o our f r o n t (Shelbyville) . H u r r y t h e movement as w e have r e p o r t s

..

o f t h e enemy's advancem7 To accomplish t h i s m i s s i o n , Wheeler had o n l y t h e numbers assigned as shown i n Table l . = Wheeler made h i s t r o o p d i s p o s i t i o n s between S h e l b y v i l l e and M c M i n n v i l l e as seen on Map 2. Orders t o t h e s e u n i t s a r e

n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y d e t a i l e d i n t h e O f f i c i a l Records as Wheeler made no o f f i c i a l r e p o r t of t h e campaign, b u t ware p r o b a b l y

v e r y g e n e r a l l y s t a t e d a l o n g t h e same l i n e s as t h o s e r e c e i v e d f r o m Bragg.9 H i s major problems w i t h d i s p o s i t i o n s came i n

t h e form o f a command f a i l u r e a t c o r p s and army l e v e l s . Wheeler l o s t c o n t r o l over h i s most flamboyant and notable subordinate. As a c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n commander,

B r i g a d i e r General John Hunt Morgan c o n t i n u a l l y caused t r o u b l e f o r Wheeler and t h e army.


He much p r e f e r r e d t o

o p e r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y and f e l t he was b e i n g suppressed by b e i n g assigned t o a s u b o r d i n a t e r o l e . Wheeler assigned

Morgan's d i v i s i o n t o p i c k e t t h e a r m y ' s extreme r i g h t f l a n k a1 ong t h e r o a d f r o m M ~ w rf e e s b o r o t o McMi n n v i 11e and Nashville t o K n o x ~ i l l e . ~ ~ Morgan found t h i s m i s s i o n t o t a l l y u n f i t f o r h i s s t y l e o f war and h i s ego.

He much p r e f e r r e d t o l e a v e t h e main
Bragg d i s a g r e e d w i t h a m i s s i o n which Morgan's He f e l t he

army and conduct a r a i d i n t o Kentucky. Morgan and k e p t h i m on t h e p i c k e t d u t y ,

s u p p o r t e d t h e e f f o r t o f t h e army as a whole. d i s l i k e of t h i s s e r v i c e became q u i t e obvious.

was b e i n g maligned by t h e h i g h command because he was n o t a professional, a West P o i n t e r , so he l e t d i s c i p l i n e and

+
Abslrncr front rrlsr~t n j tho drtny of ~ ~ I ~ I I W W G ,r n r ~ dJlrttxluu I h g g , C . 8. .-frtny, cunlmnnding, for Junc 10,lWJ.

-ft
Command.

.
= ':

E ; :

~2
4 -

................................... Polk's wrpsr ~nrmtrp .......................................... . . .......... ~ r t l l l ~.................. rp Covrlrg...................................... .... ........................ Total' ................; Hbrdee'8 eorper lnfmtrp ......................................... ArWllery.............................: . . ....... C a nk y . . . . ........................ . . Totd ................ ................
Conoral hcndqnartom: SlauTurdescort
..., A

21c --

!a, a3
8W it,
Mi 95(

4741

251

011

811 -

.....,..; ., ; ............. .. . . . . c.va1 FF?MI~~*. eorpe ...................... . . ...... Tibeelet's corps utillccy ...................... I2 Fomsts diaaton : ............................... Pomt'a dlvMon ...................... To* .......................... . . : ......... Armen R w m r Adllerp ......................................... lnfmtq ................................
. Tolil.
t
A
'

...... ......
.

...... .
I E , all ,881

; .

dcqf ;

4 611
211

t1,m
be4

........................................... ----DiatrIct of Tenneesee ............................... M d e f a wmmmd .................................. Cmdtotal ..................................... I


Total

attaehd

94:
87(

8.4ii -

2,031

n, 51:

T a b l e 1. A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n of Arny of T e n n e s s e e , 10 June 1863

Flap 2 . Area of Interest

diligence slip.

Union t r o o p s o v e r r a n h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s and p a r t l y due t o h i s l a c k a d a i s i c a l By t h e n , Rragg and h i s


' l

captured h i s w i f e i n A p r i l ,

a t t i t u d e towards Wheeler's orders.

c o r p s commanders began t o l o s e f a i t h i n Morgan. F i n a l 1y,

t h e s i t u a t i o n degenerated t o t h e p o i n t where Even

Wheeler p r e v a i l e d upon Bragg t o a l l o w Morgan h i s r a i d .

though Bragg knew by 6 June t h a t t h e enemy was p l a n n i n g a move, he s t i l l f u r t h e r fragmented h i s a l r e a d y t h i n l y s t r e t c h e d c a v a l r y by d e t a c h i n g Morgan and 2,500 June, men on 18

l e s s t h a n a week b e f o r e t h e Union advance began.

Wheeler r e f ~ ~ s e Morgan d p e r m i s s i o n t o c r o s s t h e Ohio R i v e r i n the raid. Wheeler i n s t r u c t e d Morgan t o r e t u r n q u i c k l y , specific instructions. but

gave no f u r t h e r

The command a l l o w e d

Morgan t o l e a v e m e r e l y because he was a d i s r u p t i o n i f he stayed.


l"

To add i n s u l t t o t h e i n j u r y a l r e a d y i n f l i c t e d , W h e e l e r ' s c o r p s a l s o l o s t B r i g a d i e r General P h i 1i p Roddey ' s 1000-man b r i g a d e . Rragg s e n t t h i s u n i t i n t o N o r t h e r n

Alabama a t t h e same t i m e he a l l o w e d Morgan t o leave. Wheeler s t r e t c h e d h i s f o r c e s over a wide f r o n t w i t h no d e p t h t o h i s p o s i t i o n s and, over 5000 men. flank, still, h i s numbers were d i m i n i s h e d b y

Combined w i t h t r o o p t r a n s f e r s on t h e l e f t He His

Bragg a l l o w e d h i s c a v a l r y t o be f r i t t e r e d away.

boasted o n l y about n i n e thousand c a v a l r y by l a t e June. army would pay f o r t h i s s h o r t s i g h t e d n e s s . A f t e r t h e l o s s of f o c u s Wheeler's o r d e r s . troopers,


l3

Hragg d i d n o t change o r

Wheeler had fewer t r o o p s t o

accomplish t h e same m i s s i o n .

He h i m s e l f found t h i s m i s s i o n While Wheeler defended t h e Bragg t u r n e d the

a l e s s t h a n g l o r i o u s occupation.

army's f l a n k s f r o m Hoover's Gap eastward,

towards what he f e l t would be t h e main Union t h r u s t , f o r t i f i c a t i o n s a t S h e l b y v i l l e and Wartrace. t h e a t t e n t i o n i n h i s own army,

S i n c e most of

and t h e c u r r e n t appeared t o be i n t h e

d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o f t h e enemy army,

v i c i n i t y o f S h e l b y v i l l e , Wheeler a l l o w e d h i s a t t e n t i o n and h i s u n i t s t o wander almost e x c l u s i v e l y t o t h a t a r e a w i t h o u t orders. I n a l l actuality, Wheeler i g n o r e d h i s o r i g i n a l o r d e r s

by l e a v i n g t h e e a s t e r n f l a n k e s s e n t i a l l y unguarded once Morgan l e f t t h e army. East o f L i b e r t y Gap, Brigadier

General W i l l M a r t i n ' s d i v i s i o n went t o h e l p F o r r e s t on t h e left.


.

A . s i n g l e brigade,, H a r r i s o n 's, f r o m B r i g a d i e r General

John Wharton's d i v i s i o n remained t o watch f r o m H o o v e r ' s Gap t o L i b e r t y Gap. location, What proved t o be t h e most c r i t i c a l c o n t a i n e d o n l y one o f t h e 1 s t Kentucky, t o guard i t . b u t no adequate

H o o v e r ' s Gap i t s e l f ,

Wharton's weakened r e g i m e n t s ,

The defenses i n t h e gap were s t r o n g ,

reconnaissance was s u b s t a n t i a l l y f o r w a r d o f t h e e n t r a n c e t o t h e gap and t h e i n f a n t r y was t o o f a r back t o respond immediately t o a c a l l f o r help.


l4

Wheeler p e r s o n a l l y commanded o n l y about a d i v i s i o n , t h e center of t h e i n f a n t r y l i n e .

in

He had l i t t l e c o n t a c t w i t h

and no a b i l i t y t o s u p p o r t o r r e i n f o r c e h i s u n i t s t o t h e east. He focused h i s a t t e n t i o n on t h e r o a d s i n t o

S h e l b y v i l l e where a strong Union advance was begun on 24 June.

'=
Rosecrans o b v i o u s l y was w e l l - i n f o r m e d on t h e problems

f a c i n g Bragg.

" O l d Rosey" spent q u i t e some t i m e s e t t i n g h i s He i n c o r p o r a t e d B r a g g ' s and t h e geography

p l a n and p r e p a r i n g h i s f o r c e s . extended f o r c e s , of

Bragg's army's c o n d i t i o n ,

t h e l a n d t o s e t up d e c e p t i o n p l a n s and r u s e s t o i n s u r e

success when he f i n a l l y moved. There were s e v e r a l o p t i o n s open t o t h e Union f o r c e s i n a t t a c k i n g Bragg. Rosecrans knew he c o u l d move t o t h e west

t o t h r e a t e n B r a g g ' s f o o d s u p p l y which was b e i n g b r o u g h t over long distances. He knew a l s o t h a t he had a v a i l a b l e good

r o u t e s i n t o B r a g g ' s r e a r by t u r n i n g t h e e a s t e r n f l a n k and t r a p p i n y t h e Army o f Tennessee a g a i n s t t h e Duck R i v e r . Another o p t i o n f o r Rosecrans was a head-on movement s o u t h Any of

f r o m M u r f r e e s b o r o towards S h e l b y v i l l e and Wartrace. these routes,


i f pressed v i g o r o u s l y ,

would f o r c e Bragg t o

abandon h i s whole l i n e .

Rosecrans came up w i t h a p l a n t h a t

combined a l l o f t h e s e avenues o f approach.16 Bragg, on t h e o t h e r hand, had no d i s t i n c t p l a n . Bragg

was n o t on good t e r m s w i t h h i s commanders and t o o k no t i m e t o e x p l a i n h i s s t r a t e g y o r plan. and w i t h h i s t r o o p s i l l - f e d , B e i n g spread so t h i n l y ,

General Bragg b e l i e v e d he was A l l of h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e

r e q u i r e d t o s t a y on t h e d e f e n s i v e .

sources t o l d Bragg t h a t h i s enemy was w e l l s u p p l i e d and f i l l e d w i t h reinforcements. He v a g u e l y l e t i t be known t h a t Hardee

he expected an a t t a c k a g a i n s t Hardee a t Wartrace.

was t o h o l d i n h i s e n t r e n c h m e n t s w h i l e P o l k m a r c h e d n o r t h
f r o m S h e l b y v i l l e a n d t h e n t u r n e d east t o h i t t h e U n i o n flank. flanks. B r a g g e x p e c t e d v e r y l i t t l e a c t i v i t y on h i s a r m y ' s T h e c a v a l r y was t o p r o v i d e a s c r e e n o n t h e s e f l a n k s Polk

and guard t h e g a p s l e a d i n g i n t o t h e Southern d e f e n s e s . a n d H a r d e e were c o n f u s e d b y t h e p l a n a n d s k e p t i c a l t h a t Hardee's l i n e could be held.

*'

R o s e c r a n s ' p l a n i n c o r p o r a t e d a l l of h i s o p t i o n s a n d maximized t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s by p l a y i n g on B r a g g ' s f e a r s . R o s e c r a n s d e c i d e d t o f e i n t toward Columbia t o keep t h e C o n f e d e r a t e s wondering about t h e i r food s u p p l y . Bragg

e x p e c t e d t h i s and k e p t F o r r e s t i n p l a c e t o watch f o r i t . R o s e c r a n s made m o v e s a t M c M i n n v i l l e t o t h e east e a r l y i n A p r i l t o keep Bragg concerned o v e r t h e r i g h t f l a n k . w o r r i e d a b o u t i t a n d k e p t W h e e l e r , w i t h Morgan, Bragg

in place

u n t i l all a c t i v i t y stopped i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n e a r l y i n June. By J u n e 1863, most o f R o s e c r a n s a c t i v i t y h a d moved b a c k t o t h e c e n t e r of P o l k ' s a n d H a r d e e ' s l i n e s d r a w i n g B r a g g ' s attention to that front. f l a n k s was l o s t .
lo

Confederate i n t e r e s t with t h e

R o s e c r a n s f i n a l l y made h i s move o n 21 J u n e 1863.

He

s e n t h i s r e s e r v e c o r p s u n d e r G e n e r a l Gordon G r a n g e r a n d h i s newly c r e a t e d c a v a l r y c o r p s u n d e r G e n e r a l David S t a n l e y s t r a i g h t toward P o l k ' s i n f a n t r y a t S h e l b y v i l l e . These

f o r c e s i n i t i a t e d s t a n d a r d d e c e p t i o n p r a c t i c e s by making e x c e s s i v e n o i s e and l i g h t i n g numerous a d d i t i o n a l c a m p f i r e s

t o f o s t e r t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a major a d v a n c e h a d b e e n
79

i n i t i a t e d on t h i s r o u t e .

General Alexander M.

McCook's X X

Corps moved b e h i n d Granger u n t i l t h e y reached t h e r o a d t o Wartrace and t h e n headed toward Hardee's i n f a n t r y around Wartrace. B r a g g ' s s u s p i c i o n s were coming t r u e b u t he d i d

n o t know i t . l' I n t h e meantime, infantry left. Rosecrans had two l a r g e c o r p s o f

These t r o o p s were h i s t r u e main e f f o r t . Thomas's X I V Corps and General Thomas L.

General George H.

C r i t t e n d e n ' s X X I Corps marched e a s t toward Manchester, b o w l i n g t h r o u g h Wheeler's l i g h t c a v a l r y screen.'As t h e Union advance developed on 24 June, Bragg e n t e r e d i n t o a p e r i o d when he d i d n o t know what was happening around him. H i s screen was so weak t o t h e r i g h t

t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n t enemy movements t h e r e were misread o r missed c o m p l e t e l y . . she1 b y v i 1l e , I n t h e c e n t e r o f t h e ~ o u . t h e r nl i n e a t

Bragg r e c e i v e d bad i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m Wheeler.

S i n c e he had no i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m o t h e r s e c t o r s o f t h e f i e l d , Wheeler was convinced t h a t t h e s t r o n g c a v a l r y and i n f a n t r y advances on h i s p o s i t i o n s which began on 23 June were t h e main enemy e f f o r t . T h i s m i s r e a d i n g o f t h e s i t u a t i o n may

have been a r e s u l t o f Wheeler t r y i n g t o j u s t i f y h i s b e i n g o u t of p o s i t i o n contrary t o Bragq's orders. He may have

been a t t e m p t i n g t o p a t h i m s e l f on t h e back for- h i s seemingly b r i l l i a n t r e a d i n g o f t h e enemy's i n t e n t i o n s t o j u s t i e y h i s disobedience. E i t h e r way, Wheeler was convinced t h a t t h e

advance on t h e S h e l b y v i l l e works was t h e main e f f o r t and he passed t h a t c o n v i c t i o n on t o Bragg. Wheeler was n o t o n l y

wasting h i s e f f o r t a g a i n s t a f e i n t , main e f f o r t .

b u t he a l s o missed t h e

Rosecrans' d e c e p t i o n worked b e a u t i f u l 1y . = l t h e 1 s t Kentucky C a v a l r y had remained Union

I n t h e meantime, i n H o o v e r ' s Gap."= C o l o n e l John T.

O n t h e r a i n y morning o f 24 June,

W i l d e r ' s b r i g a d e o f mounted i n f a n t r y

a t t a c k e d t h i s r e g i m e n t and l i t e r a l l y r a n them o u t of t h e Gap. S i n c e t h i s o c c ~ l r r e dso r a p i d l y , t h e screen d i d n o t

have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o warn t h e i n f a n t r y u n i t s i n s u p p o r t . The n e a r e s t i n f a n t r y s ~ ~ p p o was rt f o ~ r m i l e s s o u t h near Reech Grove. No'one n o t i f i e d t h i s u n i t , Bate's' Brigade of

Stewart's Division, attack.

u n t i l well i n t o t h e afternoon of t h e

A c o u n t e r a t t a c k l a t e i n t h e after-noon f a i l e d t o

d i s l o d g e t h e t h e n entrenched Union b r i g a d e f i r i n g Spencer rifles. Outnumbered by manpower a l o n e , Rate was c e r t a i n he

la h r g e r u n i t as he and h i s men were had r u n i n t o a m ~ ~ c i n t r o d u c e d t o t h e r a p i d f i r i n g now weapon. The Confederates

l o s t c o n t r o l o f t h e gap and t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s had h a r d l y even slowed t h e advance."' H a r r i s o n ' s B r i g a d e remained t h e o n l y c a v a l r y u n i t f a c i n g a determined advance i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f H o o v e r ' s Gap. Wheeler had t h e s i s t e r b r i g a d e o f Wharton's D i v i s i o n w i t h him i n f r o n t of S h e l b y v i l l e . H a r r i s o n ' s men, under

C Hardee's Wharton's d i r e c t command, began a weak screen o Corps i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f Wartrace t o Beech Grove. The main

g o a l o f t h i s b r i g a d e appeared t o be t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t between S t e w a r t ' s and C l e b u r n e ' s D i v i s i o n s so t h a t H a r d e e ' s Corps was n o t s p l i t . To accomplish t h i s , Wharton a l l o w e d

h i m s e l f t o be pushed back t o t h e west once he was s u r e he could not hold h i s l i n e . evening o f 25 June. This, indeed, happened b y t h e

The p r i m a r y upshot o f f a l l i n g back t o

t h e west was t h a t na f o r c e remained t o c o n t e s t a Union advance i n t o B r a g g ' s r e a r by way of Manchester. Bragg was

i n danger o f b e i n g c u t o f f from h i s l i n e s o f communications t o Chattanooga. He n o t o n l y d i d n o t know o f t h i s danger,

b u t he a c t i v e l y gave o r d e r s which f a c i l i t a t e d t h e process. Initially, t h e r e s t o f H a r r i s o n ' s B r i g a d e guarded

around and i n L i b e r t y Gap i n f r o n t o f C l e b u r n e ' s D i v i s i o n .


H brigade of t h i s d i v i s i o n ,

L i d d e l l ' s , had two o f

i t s

r e g i m e n t s a t t a c k e d and thrown back o u t o f t h e Gap l a t e on 2 4 June. B r a g g ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s knew o f t h e e v e n t s on C l e b u r n e ' s so h i s s i t u a t i o n was known t o t h e

f r o n t as t h e y developed, h i g h command,

i n d i d t i n c t contrast t o Stewart's unrealized

p r e d i ~ a m e n t . ~ Wheeler ~ a l s o i n i o r m e d Bragg as p r e s s u r e on t h e S h e l b y v i l l e a x i s diminished. The news f r o m Wheeler and convinced Bragg

Cleburne., and t h e l a c k o f news Qrom S t e w a r t ,

on 25 June t h a t t h e L i b e r t y Gap a x i s was t h e main a t t a c k and he moved t o c o u n t e r a t t a c k i t i n t h e f l a n k w i t h P o l k ' s Corps. zs Wheeler's l a c k o f c o n t r o l over a l l o f h i s t h i n l y

spread u n i t s s t i l l gave Bragg bad i n t e l l i g e n c e f r o m which t o make d e c i s i o n s . Finally, on 26 June, two days l a t e r , Bragg r e c e i v e d By

word o f t h e hazard t o h i s r i g h t f l a n k f r o m S t e w a r t . then, t h e U n i o n ' s X I V Corps n o t o n l y had u n c o n t e s t e d

possession o f t h e Manches.ter P i k e ,

b u t was w i t h i n s i x m i l e s

of Manchester inself.

This open door put Union forces

across the Duck River, behind Bragg's army which still fortified north of the river from Shelbyville to Wartrace. Confederate headquarters at Tullahoma was vulnerable, also. Immediately, Bragg recognized his dilemma and called off his plans for Polk's counterattack. He called for both of his

corps to fall back upon the defenses of T~llahoma."~ Wheeler's cavalry units covered both corps as they pulled out of position. To accomplish this task, Wharton

still had only Harrison's Brigade to protect Mardec's Corps and screen the army's right flank from the enemy forces nuw moving into Manchester. Wheeler had Wharton's other

brigade, commanded by Colonel C.C. Crews, along with Will Martin's returned division to protect Polk's Corps and the vast amount of supplies built up in Shelbyville over the six months of relative inactivity. These supplies and the

transport allocated to moving them were vital to Bragg's success and ability to remain.in the field. Guy's Gap in front of Polk. Wheeler held

He stayed there with Martin's

Division and Crews' Brigade to allow Polk time to move h i s Corps and the supply train across the Duck River at Shelbyville and south to the rendezvous in the Tullahoma defenses. " Bragg fell completely into Rosecrans' trap. When Bragg

realized his flank was turned, he discarded his previous plan and ordered the army to fall back on Tullahoma. decided to challenge Rosecrans to a battle from the
83

Bragg

Tullahoma defenses..

However, i t t o o k B r a g g ' s army t o o l o n g The day t h e campaign began,

t o c o n c e n t r a t e i n t o Tullahoma.

r a i n s t a r t e d t o f a l l and c o n t i n u e d f o r over two weeks. These r a i n s caused e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s f o r b o t h armies, b u t e s p e c i a l l y slowed R r a g g ' s e f f o r t s t o e s t a b l i s h a E v e n t u a l l y , Bragg had h i s whole army a t Union f o r c e s were a l l around h i s

defensive l i n e .

Tullahoma by 29 June. f r o n t and f l a n k s ,

and t h e y s e v e r e l y t h r e a t e n e d h i s rear.z:"

From h i s t r i u m p h a n t r e t u r n t o t h e army a f t e r t h e S t r e i g h t r a i d t o t h e b e g i n n i n g of Rosecrans' advance,

F o r r e s t ' s u n i t s encountered b l u e c l a d t r o o p s almost d a i 1y. Very l i t t l e o f t h i s s k i r m i s h i n g amounted t o more t h a n l e t t i n g each o t h e r know t h a t someone was on guard. Forrest

m a i n t a i n e d h i s v i g i l a n c e and t h e i n v i o l a b i l i t y o f B r a g g ' s f l a n k w h i l e t h e main armies p r e p a r e d f o r whatever came n e x t . Even t h e n , B r a g g ' s f a v o r i t e s o u r c e o f i n t e l l i g e n c e on enemy

o p e r a t i o n s came f r o m t h e newspaper o f t h e enemy occupied areas. N a s h v i l l e and ~ o u i s v i i l e newspapers were a s t a p l e and numerous Southern s y m p a t h i z e r s t h r o u g h o u t

f o r Bragg,

Tennessee and Kentucky s e n t them t o h i s headquarters."* F o r r e s t a l s o s e n t s p i e s and s c o u t s o f f t o h i s n o r t h e a s t i n t o t h e v i c i n i t y o f M u r f r e e s b o r o and N a s h v i l l e . He

a c t u a l l y even had men i n s i d e t h e c i t i e s p r o v i d i n g Bragg w i t h h i s f i r s t knowledge t h a t Rosecrans was b e g i n n i n g t o move. O n 1 June, F o r r e s t i n f o r m e d Fragg t h a t t h e enemy was p r e p a r i n g t o move.jo He was unsure whether t h e y would move but c e r t a i n l y a

f o r w a r d o r backward due t o c o n f l i c t i n g d a t a ,

move was imminent.

On 2 June, other scouts reported that

Rosecrans had cavalry units concentrating at Murfreesborn giving the appearance of a move south.3' Union officers

suspected Forrest of sending two captured spies into the Union camp at Franklin. Rosecrans ordered these men hung

after an immediate drumhead court martial "thus placing it beyond the possibility of Forrest's profiting by the inf ormation they have gained". 32 The spies never revealed

their purpose or the originator of their orders, but Forrest was the first suspect. As much as Forrest was an active campaigner during this time frame, he was also causiny consternation in the Union ranks in a passive way. He became a source of immense

irritation t o the Northern leaders, all the way up t o President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin A. Stanton. They were worried in Washington that Forrest would get away from Rosecrans and fall onto General Grant's Vicksburg operations and communications lines. General-in-Chief

Halleck ordered Rosecrans t o keep Forrest occupied and present in middle T e n n e ~ s e e . " ~ , " ~ As for Rosecrans, his fear of Forrest kept him constant1 y demanding more cavalry of General Halleck. The net result was that Rosecrans

continued to delay his advance awaiting the cavalry which could protect him from Forrest's d c p r a d a t i ~ n s . ~ ~ However, even with daily skirmishing across the screen line, no significant action accurrcd on the le.ft flank of Rragg's army a s the Union advance progressed into 26 June.

F o r r e s t was prepared t o cover P o l k ' s n o r t h e r n f l a n k when he t u r n e d t o h i t t h e enemy advance a t L i b e r t y Gap. When Hragg

r e s c i n d e d t h e o r d e r f o r t h i s c o ~ m t e r a t t a c k , " ~ F o r r e s t was s t i l l w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m h i s p i c k e t l i n e s and r e c o n s o l i d a t i n g h i s division. When he a r r i v e d ,


J7

he found P o l k a l r e a d y o u t o f e v e n t s were n o t t o

She1b y v i 1l e on 27 June. t r a n s p i r e smoothly, Southern f o l k l o r e

However,

b u t t h e y c r e a t e d another legend f o r

.
Numerous Even t h e n ,

N e i t h e r Southern c a v a l r y commander completed an o f f i c i a l r e p o r t f o r t h e Tullahoma Campaign.

r e f e r e n c e s mention b o t h i n t h e O f f i c i a l Records.

v e r y few p i e c e s o f correspondence d i r e c t l y t o o r f r o m them s u r v i v e d t o be i n c l u d e d w i t h t h e r e c o r d s o f t h e Army o f Tennes~ee.~ However, ~ t h e s t o r y o f t h e f i g h t a t Newsom's

( o r S k u l l Camp) B r i d g e i n S h e l b y v i l l e i s r e c o u n t e d i n e v e r y b i o g r a p h y o f t h e numerous men i n v o l v e d i n t h e f i g h t as w e l l a s i n t h e r e p o r t s o f t h e Union commanders who were there.=' The accounts v a r y depending upon t h e c o l o r o f t h e w r i t e r ' s u n i f o r m , b u t each a t t a c h e s honor and s k i l l t o b o t h s i d e s . The d i v i s i o n w i t h Wheeler covered t h e enemy movements a t Guy's Gap t h r o u g h 26 June. The b r i g a d e w i t h Wharton

remained as t h e r e a r guard f o r H a r d e e ' s Corps a t W a r t r a ~ e . " ~ While i n t h e h i l l s n o r t h o f S h e l b y v i l l e , Wheeler h e l d o f f

S t a n l e y ' s c a v a l r y and G r a n g e r ' s r e s e r v e c o r p s i n f a n t r y . P o l k r e c e i v e d o r d e r s on 26 June, Bragg, ,to w i t h d r a w . " l a f t e r conferring with

As P o l k p u l l e d o u t o f S h e l b y v i l l e on

27 June,

Union f o r c e s t h r e w Wheeler o u t o f Guy ' S Gap.

W h e e l e r ' s m i s s i o n remained t o cover P o l k ' s w i t h d r a w a l and t h i s now became a r u n n i n g f i g h t w i t h S t a n l e y ' s C a v a l r y under C o l o n e l Robert H.
G.

Minty.

Even though S t a n l e y and Granger S t a n l e y asked f o r

were wary o f F o r r e s t ' s whereabouts,

p e r m i s s i o n t o chase Wheeler's t h r e e b r i g a d e s t o t h e Duck R i v e r i n S h e l b y v i 1le.'" S t a n l e y ' s 4 t h U.S. He r e c e i v e d p e r m i s s i o n and

R e g u l a r s and t h e 1 s t M i d d l e Tennessee

C a v a l r y moved i n h o t p u r s u i t under Colonel Minty.""


A s he t r i e d t o make a s t a n d i n t h e abandoned

f o r t i f i c a t i o n s n o r t h o f town,

the f u l l force o C the

r e o r g a n i z e d Union c a v a l r y , under b r i l l i a n t and e n e r g e t i c leadership, h i t Wheeler's f o r c e s . M i n t y ' s charge b r o k e

Wheeler's t r o o p e r s who l o s t n e a r l y 300 p r i s o n e r s and r e t r e a t e d t o another l i n e f r o n t e d by f o u r a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s . The F e d e r a l s c o n t i l x t e d t h e i r . mal.tnted charge and c o m p l e t e l y b r o k e t h e C o n f e d e r a t e ranks, directions. s c a t t e r i n g them i n a l l

Most headed a c r o s s t h e S k u l l Camp B r i d g e t o

f o l l o w P o l k ' s r e t r e a t i n g wagons.4' J u s t a f t e r Wheeler and h i s men made i t s o u t h o f t h e D ~ l c kR i v e r , Major Commissary,

G. V.

Ramant, F o r r e s t ' s C h i e f o f

a r r i v e d w i t h word o f F o r r e s t ' s imminent a r r i v a l


4"

upon t h e scene.

Even though no one had been a b l e t o f i n d F o r r e s t was w i t h i n s i g h t o f

h i m b e f o r e t h i s word a r r i v e d ,

S h e l b y v i l l e as M i n t y pushed Wheeler a c r o s s t h e b r i d g e . L u c k i l y f o r t h e S o u t h e r n e r s , t h e Union c a v a l r y s t i l l d i d have t h a t word and w o ~ ~ l od n l y l e a r n o f t h e e v e n t s which t r a n s p i r e d n e x t a t a l a t e r date. Wheeler t h e n made a v e r y
110t

b r a v e and f o o l h a r d y d e c i s i o n t o a t t e m p t t o save F o r r e s t . c o s t him d e a r l y i n k i l l e d and c a p t u r e d .

It

Wheeler and M a r t i n l e d t h e 1 s t Confederate C a v a l r y and two guns back t o t h e n o r t h s i d e o f t h e b r i d g e i n an a t t e m p t t o c l e a r t h e F e d e r a l s f r o m t h e b r i d g e and h o l d i t open f o r Forrest. T h i s move c l e a r e d t h e b r i d g e m o m e n t a r i l y b e f u r e i t The F e d e r a l s chopped t h e Lieutenant

was innundated by f r e s h F e d e r a l s . 1 s t Confederates, Colonel, ranks,

who l o s t t h e i r C o l o n e l ,

and r e g i m e n t a l c o l o r s as w e l l a s up t o 900 o t h e r Wheeler t u r n e d t o t h e r i v e r and gave t h e

t o pieces.

o r d e r f o r t h e remainder t o c u t t h e i r way o u t a f t e r an overturned caisson blocked t h e bridge. along w i t h a handful of others, river. Wheeler and M a r t i n ,

survived a leap i n t o t h e

Most never g o t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o jump o r were F o r r e s t n o t e d t h e change i n t h e .He

drowned i n t h e attempt.'6

s i t u a t i o n by t h e n o i s e l e v e l and t u r n e d t o go n o r t h . crossed t h e r i v e r a t another s p o t .

5 0 t h F o r r e s t and Wheeler

moved t o P o l k ' s r e a r . t o guard t h e wagons e n r o u t e t o T u l 1ahoma. The F e d e r a l s r e v e l e d i n t h e i r good d a y ' s work, but

f a i l e d t o r e a l i z e how c l o s e and unguarded P o l k ' s wagons were when t h e y t o o k S h e l b y v i l l e . They made no f u r t h e r p~~r~iuit,

b u t found few s t o r e s l e f t behind." succeeded i n g e t t i n g away, dearly.

F'olk and Wheeler

b u t Confederate c a v a l r y p a i d

S t a n l e y b e l i e v e d and s a i d i n h i s memoirs t h a t t h e

Army o f Tennessee's c a v a l r y "never r e c o v e r e d f r o m t h e

d e m o r a l i z i n g e f - f e c t which i t experienced tha'k day o f b e i n g r i d d e n down by t h e Union c a v a l r y " . Meanwhile, Wharton,


q " '

w i t h H a r r i s o n ' s Brigade,

was they In this

c o v e r i n g Hardee's r e t r e a t t o Tullahoma.

I n so d o i n g ,

l e f t t h e Manchester P i k e open t o Union o p p o r t u n i t y . g e n e r a l Union advance,

LJnion c a v a l r y .tool.: advantage o f t h e i r Wharton f e l 1 back towards t-lzrr dc:e of Fairfield. O n 27 June,

o p p o r t ~ ~ n i ' t i e s .O n 26 June, and remained i n t h e v i c i n i t y

Whar-ton a r r i v e d a t Wartrace as Hardee began h i s ret:r-eat. WlheelrtWharton found no enemy t o h i s f r o n t and r e p o r . t e d t r ~ Cha-i Ihe was y o i n u t o sencl two regimen'ts t o Find and att;+c:l:: them."" T h i s he f a i l e d t o accomplish because t h e enerny was

a l r e a d y p a s t him and moving s o u t h t o Man'chester and beyond.

By 28 June, W i l d e r and h i s " L i g h t n i n g B r i g a d e " moved


s o u t h a l o n q t h e Manchester P i k e headed deep i n t o B r a g g ' s rear. W i l d e r moved h i s men towards H i l l s b o r o , Estill

Springs,

and Felham w i t h t h e i n t e n t o f t a k i n g t h e b r i d g e s The d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e E s t i l l S p r i n g s The F'elham b r i d g e His

a c r o s s .the E l k R i v e r .

Ecridge would c ~ t t Braqg's l i n e of r e t r e a t . would h e l p W i l d e r ' s e x p e d i t i o n ,

i C he c o u l d h o l d i t .

men d i d save t h e b r i d g e a t Pelham f o r use by themselves and, later, by Thomas' X I V Corps. The b r i d g e at E s t i l l S p r i n g r

was t o o s t r o n g l y h e l d f o r

Wilder ' s men t o c a p t u r e .


:5"

Still..

W i l d e r moved f u r t h e r south. By 28 June,

F o r r e s t c l o s e d an t h e army a t Tullahoma and He sen.t S t a r n e s ' B r i g a d e toward

was s e n t toward I'lanchest.er.

Manchester. and D i b r e l l ' s 8 t h 'Tennessee C a v a l r y toward

Hillsboro.

O n 30 June,

D i b r e l l ' s men caught W i l d e r ' s

b r i g a d e t e a r i n g up t r a c k a t Decherd a f t e r f o l l o w i n g them from H i l l s b o r o . Even though t h e y a r r i v e d t o o l a t e t o save

t h e s t o r e s i n t h e r a i l r o a d depot and some t r e s t l e m a n u f a c t u r i n g equipment, D i b r e l l ' s 8 t h d i d manage t o r e s c u e

men o f f w i t h t h e g a r r i s o n and run Wild@*p='s


track

e n l y 3@1 y w d s sP

F o r r e s t h i m s e l f nscd A r n ~ a ~ k r a n Br ~i y '~ xlc?

and h i s e s c o r t t o a t t e m p t t o c u t o f f W i l d e r ' s r e t r e a t t o Pelham. With o n l y h i s e s c o r t , he met and passed by W i l d e r ' s

advance guard.

Rut b e f o r e t h e b r i g a d e c o ~ ~ g le dt i n t o F o r r e s t r a n i n t o W i l d e r ' s whole column He q u i c k l y c u t down t h e advance guard as with the r e s t of h i s u n i t , was a b l e t o

supporting distance, and t u r n e d around. he r e t u r n e d . g e t away.=" I n t h e meantime,

Wilder,

Starnes w i t h t h e r e s t of h i s brigade

r a n i n t o t h e body o f C r i t t e n d e n ' s X X I Corps f o l l o w i n g W i l d e r on t h e Manchester P i k e a x i s . Starnes p u t out a strong His

s k i r m i s h l i n e and advanced t o s l o w t h e l e a d u n i t s . a c t i o n s delayed t h e enemy advance, O n t h e evening of 30 June,

b u t c o s t him h i s l i f e .

D i b r e l l became t h e b r i g a d e

~ommander.~ W ~i t h enemy f o r c e s t h i s near t o Tullahoma and h e l d a t bay by o n l y a c a v a l r y b r i g a d e , p o s i t i o n was untenable. General W. W. Bragg r e a l i z e d h i s

H i s Chief of S t a f f

Brigadier

M a c k a l l k e p t ask:ing Wheeler f o r a c c u r a t e

r e p o r t s on enemy whereabouts and s t r e n g t h on t h e a r m y ' s r i ~ h t .When ~ ~ r e l i a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e d i d n o t come, Pragg f i n a l l y bowed t o Hardee's advices5 and o r d e r e d a r e t r e a t t o

t h e mountains near C ~ w a n . : ~ Bragg ~ p c ~ l l e dbehind t h e E l k River, des.kroyed t h e b r i d g e s over t h e f l o o d e d r i v e r , and s e t

a l i n e of

b a t t l e on 2 J u l y w i t h b o t h f l a n k s anchored on t h e

Wheeler c o n t i n u e d t o cover t h e r e t r e a t and F o r r e s t covered t h e r i g h t f l a n k and h e l d t h e gaps i n t h e Cumber-land Plountains.


: $ "

Again,

numerous s k i r m i s h e s o c c u r r e d between Bragg o r d e r e d Wheeler t o

t h e two f o r c e s ' c a v a l r y

burn t h e A l l i s o n a R a i l r o a d Bridge a f t e r c r o s s i n g t h e E l k River, which was done.s7 by 1 J ~ t l y , t h e F e d e r a l f o r c e s crossed t h e E l k

Still,

R i v e r w e l l n o r t h and e a s t of Confederate f o r c e s which s t i l l p u t t h e S o u t h e r n e r s i n jeopardy o f b e i n g t u r n e d away f r o m t h e i r escape r o u t e t o Chattanooga. However, the l a s t of the

s e r i o u s f i g h t i n g i n t h i s campaign o c c u r r e d near t h e Duck R i v e r and a t t h e f o r d s o f t h e E l k R i v e r b e f o r e t h e Confederates p u l l e d o u t o f Tullahoma. moved s o u t h , By t h e t i m e Brayg

Rosecrans decided t o b r i n g up h i s whole army When Rosecrans showed no i n c l i n a t i o n t o Cowan,

and c o n s o l i d a t e i t .

a t t a c k t h e Confederate l i n e a t t h e mountains s o u t h of

Bragg o r d e r e d a r e t r e a t b e h i n d t h e Tennessee R i v e r and i n t o Chattanooga a t 1:30 A.M. on 2 J u l y . & -

Hardee marched h i s c o r p s t h r o u g h a pass a t B r a k e f i e l d Point, f i v e m i l e s f r o m Cowan, on 3 J u l y . & * F o r r e s t covered

him as f a r as U n i v e r s i t y Place. pass u n t i l 4 J u l y .

D i b r e l l ' s brigade held the

A r m s t r o n g ' s B r i g a d e went ahead o f t h e j u s t short of

i n f a n t r y t o cover t h e c o r p s ' f l a n k a t Jasper,

the river.'-=

On 4 July, no enemy showed up in pursuit, so Then, Forrest

Dibrell followed the infantry t o the river.

sent Dibrell's 8th Tennessee around to the east and north back into the Sparta area north of McMinnville t o keep an eye on Rosecrans' m ~ v e m e n t s . ~ This ~ move again caused a Forrest-induced panic in the Union high command."'" Wheeler continued t o cover Polk's Corps a s it came over the mountains at University Place. of Staff, W.W. Bragg, through his Chief

Mackall, ordered Wheeler t o destroy bridges However, as

and roads, and t o defend the railway.&=

Wheeler's men moved down the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad out of Cowan, no orders came t o seriously block the large railroad tunnel east of town or destroy the railroad bed. Wheeler's men merely choked the They

tunnel's ventilator shafts with debris and moved on.

burned several small bridges, but did not touch the large road or rail trestles.&& This grave mistake was t o allow

Rosecrans t o resume resupply of his army relative1 y quick1 y in front of Chattanooga. Later, in the Atlanta Campaign,

General William T. Sherman reaped the benefits of this

Bragg managed t o make his full retreat by 4 July with little loss other than to his rear guard cavalry which continued its skirmishing with enemy cavalry. Rosecrans had

stopped his main infantry forces and was reorganizing longer cha~ing."'~

--

no

As P o l k ' s men moved toward t h e r i v e r a t B r i d g e p o r t , Po1.k s e n t Wheeler- t o a p o i n t t h r e e m i l e s above t h e mouth o f B a t t l e Creek. a t that point, P o l k ' s r o a d came v e r y c l o s e t o Hardee's r o a d and P o l k d e s i r e d t h a t Wheeler r e c o n n o i t e r t h e

a r e a t o keep i t s a f e and t r o u b l e f r e e . 6 9 July,

A t 2:30 P.M.

on 4

P o l k r e l e a s e d h i s b r i d g e r i g h t s t o Hardee and f i n i s h e d Wheeler s t a y e d t n cover

h i s c o r p s ' c r o s s i n g by 4 P.M.

Hardee's f l a n k u n t i 1 Hardee was complete1y a c r o s s t h e r i v e r . Hardee d i d n o t use t h e b r i d g e , b u t Wheeler s t i l l guarded i t .

Wheeler d i d n o t want t o d e s t r o y t h e b r i d g e a f t e r t h e army's passage u n t i l o r d e r e d t o do so by t h e commanding g e n e r a l . I n t h e meantime, C a p t a i n George B. get i n s t r u c t i o n s . on 5 J u l y , he t u r n e d t h e b r i d g e o v e r t o P i c k e t t o f t h e e n g i n e e r s w h i l e he went t o Soon a f t e r , t h e Confederates burned t h e They r e g r e t t e d t h i s a c t

l a s t o f Bragg's. pontoon b r i d g e s .

l a t e r i n t h e year because i t p l a c e d l i m i t a t i o n s on B r a g y ' s options.


'7w

By 5 J u l y , the river.

t h e e n t i r e army and i t s c a v a l r y were a c r o s s

The Union c a v a l r y f o r c e s pursued t o t h e t o p o f and t h e n stopped. Rosecrans

t h e Sequatchie Mountains,

stopped h i s army i n t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n s abandoned b y Bragg i n Tullahoma and began t o r e c o n s t i t u t e h i s f o r ~ e s . ' ~ The , f i f t e e n day campaign was over. . p e r i o d o f t h e campaign.

It rained heavily the e n t i r e

As one o f H a r d e e ' s s t a f f o f f i c e r s t h e name "Tullahoma", he

was asked about t h e d e r i v a t i o n of

r e p l i e d " t h a t i t was f r o m two Greek words 'mud' and homa, meaning 'more mud'

tulla,

meaning

".

T h i s s o b r i q u e t seemed

t o fit.'"

O n 7 July,

Hragg o r d e r e d Wheeler t o p i c k e t t h e The

Tennessee below K e l l y ' s F o r d and F o r r e s t above i t . expressed i n t e n t o f t h e o r d e r s was t o guard a g a i n s t

d e s e r t i o n s from t h e Army o# T e n n e ~ s e e . ~ " Thus ended t h e T u l lahoma Campaign. Rosecrans had managed a b r i l l i a n t campaign w i t h t o t a l l o s s e s o f o n l y 560 men. Bragg was deceived and unprepared.

He was c o n t i n u a l l y outmaneuvered by Hosecrans and f o r c e d t o g i v e up about 100 m i l e s o f t e r r i t o r y and t h r e e l i n e s o f s t o u t entrenchments. Not on1 y was m i d d l e Tennessee l o s t ,

b u t n o r t h Alabama above t h e Tennessee R i v e r went w i t h i t . Hardee s u f f e r e d most of t h e 1700 C o n f e d e r a t e l o s s e s , most o f

whom were c a p t u r e d a l o n g w i t h 11 guns and t o n s of es. needed suppl i


74

much

The C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y f o u g h t a v a l i a n t r e a r g u a r d f i g h t d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e r e t r e a t t o t h e Tennessee R i v e r . However, t h i s was o n l y a f t e r t h e y had f a i l e d t o d i s c o v e r t h e They were o u t o f Bragg

Union main e f f o r t i n f r o n t o f S h e l b y v i l l e .

p o s i t i o n when t h e t i m e came t h a t t h e y were needed.

f a i l e d t o g i v e h i s c a v a l r y commanders s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s which d e t a i l e d h i s i n t e n t and t h e i r m i s s i o n s . Theref o r e ,

t h e cavalrymen were q u i t e o f t e n n o t d o i n g what needed t o be done. They f a i l e d t o be o f d e c i s i v e i m p o r t a n c e d u r i n g t h i s

campaign.

IHorn, p. zConnelly, "Ibid., p.

231. p. 113.

115.

.War *Stephen 2 . S.ta r r The--l?n_l:.~n C ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ , r ~ ~ . , . ~ l : .1 .n .~~h,~~..~,~.*1 I: v_F?L 1.LL T L ! x B W W 1.~_th~~-1?-esZ..~_1-~.~-1.-:~L~b.5. a . r (Baton R O U ~ E L o u i s i a n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985) p. 234.

. .

'Connell y ,
"O.R,.,

p. 122. p a r t 2, p. 784.

XXIII, p.

?Ibid., =Ibid.,

866. 943. p a r t I, p.615. 123. p a r t 2, pp. 656, 824.

p.

,. R .0 9

XXIII,
p.

lmConnelly,

llO.R.,
.120.RL,

XXIII, XXIII,
p.

p a r t 1, pp. 125.

817-818.

lSConnelly, '*Starr, p.

240. 127. p a r t 1, pp. 117. 404-4a5.

a3Connelly, p .

lhO.R., X X I I I ,
'7Connelly, p.

a-Ibid.,

p.

lib.
235.

19Horn, p. ""Ibid. 21Connelly,

p.

127.

"7lany sources l i s t t h i s u n i t as t h e 3 r d Kentucky Cavalry. "Because of i t s d i f f i c u l t s e r v i c e i n Kentucky d~~rin September g and October, 1862, i t was r e d ~ ~ c e td o a b a t t a l i o n and assigned t o t h e 3 r d Kentucky C a v a l r y . " Joseph H. Crute, J r . , U n i t s of t h e Confederate S t a t e s army

( M i d l o t h i a n , V i r g i n i a : Derwent Rooks, l 9 8 7 ) , p. 128. This t u r n of events explains t h e confusion i n t h e u n i t d e s i g n a t i o n as t h e u n i t m a i n t a i n e d b o t h r e g i m e n t a l c o l o r s and t h e men r e f e r r e d t o themselves by t h e d e s i g n a t i o n under which t h e y mustered i n t o t h e s e r v i c e , f o r reasons o f p r i d e , etc. ) XXIII, z4Connelly, " T l.> R. ""O,H,., 270.R., '=Ibid.; '"Horn,
JwO_,-&.,
I

p a r t 1, p. 127. p a r t 1, p. p a r t 2, p.

612.

p.

XXIII,
XXIII,

618. 886. 619.

XXIII, p.
p.

p a r t 1, p.

584. 254. p a r t 2, p.856.

XXIII,
p.

3iConnelly, s%yeth, 331bid., 340&, ='Ibid., 361bid., 37Starr,


,O R . e L =

121.

p.
p.

206. 203. p a r t 2, pp. 3629 375.

XXIII,
p. p. p.

270. 886. 242. p a r t 2. p a r t 1, p. p a r t 2, 557.

XXIII,

5 9 0 & ,

XXIII,
XXIII,

~ " o . R . ,
411bid., 4=Ibid.,

p. 888.

p . 886.
pp. 459-461. p a r t 1, p.539.

4=~~,, X X I I I ,
44Ibid.

pp.

556-559. 247. p a r t 1, p. 558.

+ = S t a r r , p. R L , 0 .4 "

XXIII,

96

"'Ibid., 4"Starr, 470.R.,

p.

540.

248.

XXIII, XXIII,
pp. p.

p a r t 2,

p.

889. 460.

'"O_.R.,
SIIbid.,

p a r t 1, p.

460-461. 461. p. 293. pp. 891-892. 623-624. 895.

"..,--.Ibid.,
"Jordan

and P r y o r ,

s40.R.,X X I I I ,
5sO-.B
2..,

p a r t 2,

XXIII,
XXIII, p. p. 237.

p a r t 1, pp. p a r t 2, p.

%YJr!.-R2.,
%'Horn, ==Wyeth,
='O.R., ""O.R.,

212. p a r t 2, pp. 894-895. 624.

XXIII,

XXIII,
p.

p a r t 1, p.

"'Henry, "=Jordan

167.

and P r y o r , .p. 293. 213. p a r t 2 , pp. p a r t 1, p. 134.. 595. 624.

&=Wyeth, p.

640.R.,X X I I I ,
&W.., X X I I I ,
""Connel l y , "7Horn, pp p.

. 237-238.
p.
13.3.

"Tonnelly,

6 7 0 R .,
'"Ibid., 71Starr, "Henry,
-1 7.x0

XXIII,

p a r t 2,

p.

898.

pp. p. p.

898-901. 249. 517. p a r t 2, p. 902.

XXIII,

9'7

7'bga41, X X I I I .

part

1 , P.

4m9.

CHRF:TEF\'.-FOUR

Ch i-c-!i~.aam~~~&,.C_aan~.~i4n
The Chickamauga Campaign i s a p e r f e c t example of bumbling commanders, opportunities. wandering armies, and missed

D u r i n g much o f t h e t i m e d e d i c a t e d t o t h e

"maneuver' phase o f t h i s campaign,

8 J u l y t o 17 September,

b o t h armies sat: back and d i d v e r y l i t t l e t h a t was constructive. General Rosecrans d i d b u i l d up h i s s u p p l i e s

f o r s i x weeks b e f o r e he moved so he was w e l l s e t f o r t h e n e x t phase o f h i s p l a n s . The s i x weeks r e q ~ ~ i r e td o do t h i s

seems e x c e s s i v e g i v e n t h e s i x months spent d o i n g t h e same t h i n g b e f o r e h i s f i . f t e e n day Tullahoma Campaign t h a t was jktst f i n i s h e d . He s h o u l d have been a b l e t o move d i r e c t l y F u t u r e e v e n t s would n e a r l y 1~2ad

f r o m one phase t o t h e next.

t o t h e s t a r v a t i o n o f h i s army i n Chattanooga l e a d i n g one t o b e l i e v e he d i d n o t use h i s t i m e w e l l .


l

W h i l e Rosecrans b u i I t up h i s s u p p l i e s , Chattanooga. T h i s c i t y was Rosecrans!

Bragg f o r t i f i e d

immediate o b j e c t i v e

and he wanted t o h a n d l e i t s conquest t h e same way he had won m i d d l e Tennessee. without a f i g h t . doing t h a t , Tennessee. H i s p l a n was t o make Bragg l e a v e t h e c i t y While Rosecrans decided how t o go about

Bragg contemplated a r e t u r n o f f e n s i v e .to m i d d l e However, g i v e n h i s weaknesses i n t r o o p s t r e n g t h

and l o y i ~ t i c s ,he soon dropped t h i s idea.' Confederate c a v a l r y performance d u r i n g t h e maneuver phase was l e s s t h a n o p t i m a l . Each u n i t was assigned a but

m i s s i o n by t h e h i g h command o f t h e Army o f Tennessee,

w a s e i t h e r - assi g n c d t h e wrong m i s s i o n , a c o n f u s e d m i s s i o n , or i t f a i l e d t o c a r r y o u t t h e m i s s i o n c o r r e c t l y , w i t h a
s e n s e of urgency. nothing. T h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t t h e y were d o i n g

The u n i t s d i d keep t h e m s e l v e s b u s y and moving, b u t

a g a i n , a5 a t T u l l a h o m a , t h e y d i d n o t g i v e G e n e r a l F r a g g a n a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e of what w a s - h a p p e n i n g a r o u n d him. Once t h e army w a s s o u t h o f t h e T e n n e s s e e R i v e r , . t h e c a v a l r y c o m m a n d e r s were g i v e n a r e a s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o picket. S e e Map 3. Rragg a s s i g n e d W h e e l e r ' s Corps t h e

c r o s s i n g s of t h e T e n n e s s e e s o u t h of C h a t t a n o o g a , a s w e l l a s command 0.f R o d d e y ' s B r i g a d e w h i c h w a s f u r - t h e r t o t h e e a s t o f D e c a t u r , Alabama.

Forrest obeyed o r d e r s - t o p i c k e t t h e

c r o s s i n g s from K e l l e y ' s Ford n o r t h t o Kingston, where h e maintained h i s headquarters.= A s s i s t i n g i n t h i s p i c k e t of dn 12 J u l y , Fragg

t h e r i v e r was t h e C o n f e d e r a t e i n f a n t r y .

ordered Polk t o p r o v i d e a b r i g a d e t o guard t h e r i v e r from B r i d g e p o r t t o S h e l l m o u n d , a s t r e t c h of t h e r i v e r w i t h i n B r i g a d i e r General P a t t o n W h e e l e r ' s area o f r e ~ p o n s i b i l i t y . ~ Anderson's b r i g a d e drew t h i s d u t y w i t h t h e 3 r d C o n f e d e r a t e C a v a l r y Regiment a t B r i d g e p o r t s u b j e c t t o h i s o r d e r s . =

However, i n F o r r e s t ' s a r e a ,

i n s t e a d o f o n l y a b r i g a d e , moat

of t h e C o n f e d e r a t e i n f a n t r y g a r r i s o n e d from Chattanooga n o r t h t o t h e Hiwassee R i v e r . * > On 20 J u l y , t h e c a v a l r y

s u b m i t t e d t h e " r e t ~ l r no f t r o o p s " a s i n T a b l e 2 . ' W h e e l e r was s t i l l i n C h a t t a n o o g a o n 19 J ~ l l yd e v e l o p i n g

a p l a n t o d e f e n d t h e r a i l r o a d s i n t h e s t a t e of G e o r g i a .
T h i s h e s u b m i t t e d o n 19 J u l y .

H e concluded t h a t a c a v a l r y

Map 3. Chickamauga Campaign

101

--

dbdlraot/ros~ rttu~n o/ thu lroo h g , j o r July

A,

11 Dcpartn~cnt Avo. 2, Qeneml l;ruxloa Brqg comma~& 1W; Accrdpuarhr Chdlakoogcl, Tmm.

Commmd

.......................................... ................ Polk'~ mrpa I n f a t q .......................................... Cardry ........................................... drtlllery .........................................


Qsnenl #LIT
I

---! 2 2

)I

Told Polk'~~om................

EU~W'B mrpaa
Infantry Cavalry Artilleq

. . ........................................ ........................................... ............................... ........ Total Iluclae'a wrps ............................ Jacknon'sbrlpdar I n h t r y . . . . . . . . ................. ArlUlery ..........................................
T ArlUlor). Rc~ome Infrrit~ with ArLlUory Bew?m

-...............

--

PlokeU'~ oompar~y 80 pen and ldlaon OIIIodBnpg'* or ryewar(

.............. ....;.................. T o t d ........................................... Whmler'r oorprt c m r ~ l.......................................... q A r u o y ......................................... Fomt'a d Canlry ........................................... ArUlleq ................................:......... TOW...... : .................................... To(.lArm~.ofTenrr.......................
nP
&mi

..................................... ...................... TOW ................................ .........


. ;

oJ

ado..........

Dblrlct of NorIbern d l a h m r : Caralq drtilleq

........................................... .........................................
-

Told Dlstrlct of XorlLern A l h r n .


Provoet baltrlloa, Atkota

............................ , . .... QrnodloklDep.rtmontXo.S .............

Table 2. A b s t r a c t from Return of Army of ~ e A n e s s e e , 20 July 1863

d i v i s i o n a t Home, Georgia and one a.k Gadsden,

rhlabarna were
c'

c a l l e d f o r t o defend a g a i n s t Rosecr-ans' c a v a l r y .

'The

o r d e r s a l l o w i n g Wheeler t o implement t h i s pl-an and e s t a b l i s h h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s a t Gadsden, a r r i v e d on 22 July.'

F o r r e s t ' s d i v i s i o n a t f i r s t went i n t o camp around Chattanooga t o re.$ i t and a w a i t o r d e r s . on t h e eas,t bank of 'Tennessee,
A l l o f t h e men were
'5;

.the Tennessee except f o r D i b r e l 1.

';3t.i1

which F o r r e s t s e n t t o watch Rosecr-ans' army fr-mn Tennessee, on D i b r e l l ' s own

t h e v i c i n i t y of Sparta, plantation.

U n t i l . 24. J u l y ,

F o r r e s t ' s men r e s t e d d u e to .the He t h e n r e c e i v e d H i s mission

i n a c t i o n o f b o t h s i d e s o f t h e con+ l i c t .

o r d e r s t o move n o r t h t o K i n g s t o n , Tennessee.

t h e r e was t o watch t h e approach t o t h e Tennessee from a c r o s s t h e Sequatchie V a l l e y towards Chattanooga and t o watch R u r n s i d e as he moved h i s X X I I I Corps on K n o ~ v i l l e . " ~ Between t h e end of t h e Tullahoma Campaign on 7 J u l y and

t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e Chickamauga Campaign on 16 A u g ~ t s t . Rosecrans k e p t a busy schedule f o r h i s t r o o p s . c o u l d move forward, and communications. B e f o r e he supply

he needed t o s e c u r e h i s l i n e s of

He needed t o r e p a i r t h e N a s h v i l l e and Alabama, so t h a t a

Chattanooga R a i l r o a d as f a r as Stevenson, f r e e f l o w o f s u p p l i e s would e x i s t .

The r o a d s were n e a r l y

i m p o s s i b l e t o t r a v e r s e w i t h t h e amount o f s u p p l i e s r e q u i r e d by t h e Rrmy o f t h e Cumberland, essential. so t h e r a i l r o a d was Bridgeport, and

The a r e a between Stevenson,

Tracy C i t y became a huge s u p p l y depot which was needed t o ensure c o n t i n u o u s s u p p l y of t h e army. Union e n g i n e e r s

1 1 2 1 9

r e b u i l t t h e E l k R i v e r R r i t l g e by 15 J u l y and t h e main l i n e t o B r i d g e p o r t was open by 25 J u l y . t o Tracy C i t y on 13 August, They completed t h e branch

one day a f t e r t h e s p e c i a l engine

r e q u i r e d t o n e g o t i a t e t h e steep s w i t c h b a c k s on t h i s l i n e arrived. advance.


' l

When t h i s l i n e opened,

Rosecrans began h i s

Rosecrans experienced no p r o b l em5 r e i n f o r c i ny o r resupplying h i s forces. As has been r e c o u n t e d e a r l i e r - .

B r a q g ' s army r e t r e a t e d t h r o u g h t h e a r e a so r a p i d l y t h a t v e r y l i t t l e d e s t r u c t i o n had been accomplished on t h e l i n e s o f communication, r o a d s , and r a i l r o a d s . Rain f e l l so h a r d + o r

so l o n g t h a t b r i d g e s t h a t were s e t a f i r e by F o r r e s t ' s and W h e e l e r ' s u n i t s s i m p l y would n o t burn. Wheeler l e f t t h e

r a i l r o a d t u n n e l i n t h e mountains near Cowan i n t a c t i n t h e r u s h t o leave. Bragg may have had hopes o f i t s u s e t o Sirice t h e Conf edera.t.es d i d so

s u p p l y f u t u r e Southern moves. l i t t l e damage,

a l l o f . t h e routes required t o supply t h e

F e d e r a l campaign a g a i n s t Chattanooga were f u l l y o p e r a t i o n a l by 25 J u l y , a l l t h e way t o t h e Tennessee R i v e r .


l2

Bragg was s t i l l h a v i n g a d i f f i c u l t t i m e s u p p l y i n g h i s army. He s a t a t t h e r a i l r o a d s o f Chattanooga d i r e c t l y n o r t h

o f t h e g r e a t depot i n A t l a n t a and s t i l l he c o u l d n o t g e t f o o d f o r h i s army. The cumbersome Confederate S u b s i s t e n c e E. L e e ' s Army o f N o r t h e r n

Department s u p p l i e d General R. V i r g i n i a f r o m t h i s area. of

Bragg had t o go elsewhere, o u t s i d e for- s u b s i s t e n c e . Br-agg a l s o 100,0t20

h i s own area o f o p e r a t i o n s ,

b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s 95,000

men were f a c i n g an army o f

U n i o n i s t s being r e i n . f o r c e d by t r o o p s now r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e i r successful Vicksburg sieqe. To s o l v e h i s m i l i t a r y problems

he needed more t r o o p s , b u t t h e s e t r o o p s o n l y added t o h i s mounting l o g i s t i c s p r ~ b l e m s . ' : ~ Rosecrans knew t h a t Chattanooga was t o o w e l l defended f o r him t o be a b l e t o t a k e i t by a s s a u l t . He had no d e s i r e

t o g i v e b a t t l e .t.o t a k e Chattanooga i.f he c o u l d t u r n B r - a y g ' s + l a n k a g a i n and a c c o m p l i s h t h e same purpose. had t o d e c i d e whether t o go n o r t h o r s o u t h of T h e r e f u r e . hc t h e town t o

c r o s s t h e r i v e r and come i n behind B r a g g ' s army i n i t s de.fenses. I f he g o t behind B r a g q , he would a t least f o r c e Chattanooqa.
1 : from He m i g h t even c u t Bragg of .

Bragg o u t of

h i s o n l y supply l i n e t o A t l a n t a . Rosecrans s e t about making h i s p l a n s and d e c i s i o n s . he went n o r t h , he would have t o c r o s s t h e Cumberland Mountains and W a l d e n ' s R i d g e , b u t h i s f l a n k s would be covered by General Ambrose E. B u r n s i d e ' s army moving t o c a p t u r e Knoxvi 11e. T h i s r o u t e provided several places t o If

c r o s s t h e r i v e r and march s o u t h a l o n g good r o u t e s i n t o Chattanooga. If he went s o u t h , he would have t o p r o v i d e h i s

own f l a n k s e c u r i t y and h i s u n i t s would be w i d e l y s e p a r a t e d a t d i s t a n t crossing s i t e s . He a l s o would have d i f f i c u l t This

t e r r a i n t o c r o s s i n approaching Chattanooga i t s e l f .

same d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n , t h o u g h , would a l l o w h i m t o g e t f a r i n t o B r a g g ' s r e a r even w h i l e s p l i t t i n g h i s own f o r c e s . " Rosecrans d e c i d e d t o o p e r a t e s o u t h and west of Chattanooga. He would be a b l e t o d i r e c t l y s u p p l y h i s f o r c e s

by r a i l r o a d r a t h e r Walden's Ridge.

than h a v i n g t o c l i m b .the t e n u o ~ ~ gaps s i n t h a t he needed t o

He b e l i e v e d , though,

c o n v i n c e Bragg t h a t t h e n o r t h e r n s i t e s were t o be used so t h a t s u r p r i s e would a l l o w h i m t o g e t h i s army e a s t o f t h e Tennessee R i v e r . Again, Rosecrans used e x c e l l e n t d e c e p t i o n

and t h e l a c k of Confederate reconnaissance t u h i s berief i t . '.':, Braqg p u l l e d h i s army i n t o Chattanooga. Simon B. Major General

B u c k n e r ' s army o f 9,000 abandoned K n o x v i l l e i n These men t h e n

e a r l y September as B u r n s i d e approached. r e i n f o r c e d B r a g g ' s army.

The a d d i t i o n a l men were needed,

b u t t h e r e s u l t a n t l o s s o f K n o x v i l l e and i t s r a i l w a y d i r e c t t o V i r g i n i a would h ~ ~ t h re t cause v e r y soon. n o r t h e a s t o f Chattanooga. General Joseph E. Burnsi.de s t a y e d J o h n s t o n ' s army

i n c e n t r a l M i s s i s s i p p i a l s o r e i n f o r c e d Pragg w i t h 11,500 troops. O n t h e f l a n k n o r t h o f town, Forrest ' s .cavalry Wheeler's

p r o v i d e d a screen on t h e e a s t s i d e o f t h e r i v e r . c o r p s d i d t h e same s o u t h o f Chattanooga.ld> D u r i n g t h i s iull i n t h e a c t i v e campaigning, h i s orders t o p i c k e t t h e r i v e r . " ' t h i s mission very ably.

Wheeler had

He d i d n o t accomplish

Rather t h a n p u t t i n g h i s whole

e f f o r t i n t o w a t c h i n g t h e r i v e r , he l e f t a v e r y t h i n screen a c r o s s many m i l e s o f r i v e r and p u l l e d h i s u n i t s back t o relax. Bragq's Chief of S t a f f ,

W.

W.

Mackall,

irifornied

Wheeler a t T r e n t o n on 9 J u l y ,

t h a t Bragg c o n s i d e r e d Wheeler was

i n f o r m a t i o n on Rosecrans' movements v i t a l .

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e Union r i g h t and F o r r e s t would cover t h e l e f t f l a n k of t h e enemy.


A s m a l l f o r c e of

s c o ~ ~ was ts

required t o pather t h i s information.

F o r r e s t had Colonel. Lieutenant: J.


A.

D i b r e l l w i t h t h e 8-th Tennessee a t Sparta. M c F e r r i n covered Wheeler's f r o n t .

He ranged f a r and wide t o

watch Rosecrans and b r i n g i n s u p p l i e s .

He remained west 0.f

t h e r i v e r u n t i l s i x days a f t e r Rosecr-ans began h i s advance.

""
.f-r.cr:r~

Wheeler spread h i s c o r p s orrt quit:,e a l o n y d15'tdni.e t h e Tennessee R i v e r . C o l o n e l W. From Wharton's D i v i s i o n , Wheeler

1e.f k

M.

E s t e s and t h e 5 r d C o n f e d e r a t e C a v a l r y t o
'The rest

p i c k e t t h e r i v e r f r o m B r i d g e p o r t t.o Gunkersvi 1 le. o f What- t o r i ' s D i v i s i o n moved t o Rome, Georyia. Division, o n l y C o l o n e l W.

From I * l i \ r C i n ' s

H. Wade's 8 t h Confederate C a v a l r y
M a r t i n and t h e

p i c k e t e d from G ~ ~ n t e r s v i l t le o Decatur.

remainder o f h i s d i v i s i o n q u a r t e r e d themselves near A1 e x a n d r i a, brigade, A1 abarna. General P.


D.

Roddey ' s s e p a r a t e
l7

t h e so-called

D i s t r i c t o f N o r t h e r n Alabama,

was

a t t a c h e d t o W h e e l e r ' s Corps and o p e r a t e d from Decatur west as f a r as C o r i n t h , near Tuscumbia, Mississippi. Hoddey's h e a d q u a r t e r s was

Alabama.

The 4 t h Alabama was d e t a i l e d t o

General Gideon P i l l o w on 15 J u l y t o a i d i n c o n s c r i p t i o n duty.


ZB

Wheeler c l a i m e d i n h i s r e p o r t t h a t he d e t a i l e d an bu.t t h e r e i s no o t h e r

a d d i t i o n a l regiment t o t h i s duty, evidence o f t h i s . " '

As. Wheeler g a r r i s o n e d t h e western f 1 ank, Morgan r a i d began t o f i l t e r back t o t h e army. d i s o b e y i n g o r d e r s and c r o s s i n g t h e Ohio R i v e r , Morgan r a i d e d i n t o I n d i a n a and Ohio.

news o f t h e After General John

H e r a n i n t o much more

d i . f f i c u l . t y t h e n he had expected because t h e r e was no l o c a l Copperhead u p r i s i n g o r o f f e r o f a s s i s t a n c e a t any p o i n t . Union f o r c e s chased h i m u n m e r c i f u l 1 y.=" h a l f weeks o f r a i d i n g and r u n n i n g , Q f t e r t h r e e and a

t h e s e Union f o r c e s

c a p t u r e d Morgan and most o f t h e remnant o f h i s 2,900-man r a i d i n g f o r c e near New Lisbon, Ohio on 26 J ~ l y . " ; ~ Very few The c a v a l r y

o f h i s men made i t back t o f r i e n d l y l i n e s .

assigned t o Ruckner i n e a s t Tennessee absorbed t h o s e t h a t did. One whole d i v i s i o n o f Wheeler's Corps ceased t o
'4

e,:i s t .

Wheeler k e p t h i s u n i t s spread o u t and, t h e y were r e f i t t i n g and remounting.

t o some e x t e n t , they

I n many cases,

were m e r e l y r e l a x i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g an u n d i s c i p l i n e d lifestyle. The Army o f Tennessee i t s e l f complained abowt

t h e way t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s behaved. i n the reports, n o t F o r r e s t 's.

. I n a1 1 cases mentioned

t h e s e u n i t s were under Wheeler's command,

O n 30 J u l y ,

Bragg sent' an " i n f o r m a t i o n " Bragg was

message t o Wheeler a p p r i s i n g h i m o f t h e problem.

q u i t e o b v i o u s l y t e l l i n g Wheeler t o t a k e c o n t r o l o f t h e two u n i t s mentioned i n p a r t i c u l a r , o f Morgan's s u r v i v o r s ) and R. of h i s command i n g e n e r a l . P r e c k e n r i d g e ' s Regiment (one

D.

A l l i s o n ' s Squadron,

and all

F u r t h e r mention o f misbehavior

i s n o t n o t e d , b u t Wheeler s t i l l e s e r c i s e d o n l y l o o s e control, as made o b v i o u s by t h e amount o f t i m e he r e q u i r e d

t o g a t h e r h i s u n i t s l a t e r i n t h e campaign.=" F o r r e s t a r r i v e d a t h i s l o c a t i o n i n K i n g s t o n and e s t a b l i s h e d c o n t a c t w i t h Huckner ' s Department i n t::nosvi 1 1e

b y 3V) J u l y .

W t , t h i s t i m e , Pl.icknsr o r d e r e d h i s p r i m a r y

c a v a l r y commander, B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l J o h n Fegram t o keep i n c o n s t a n t communication w i t h F o r r e s t . The t w o o r g a n i z a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e Wrmy Later-,

began t o w o r k t o g e t h e r i n t h e f i r s t link-up of

T e n n e s s e e a n d t h e D e p a r t m e n t of E a s t Tennessee.'&

on 6 Wuqust, t h e D e p a r t m e n t of E a s t T e n n e s s e e became t h e 3 r d C o r p s o f F r a g q ' s army."' Numbers a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n o f

the

Army o f T e n n e s s e e a n d D e p a r t m e n t o f E a s t T e n n e s s e e c a v a l r y u n i t s o n 31 J u l y a r e n o t e d i n T a b l e s 3 , 4 , a n d 5 . : : " U n t i l t h e Union army b e a m i t s a d v a n c e f r o m t h e v i c i n i t y of Tullalioma, there w a s little a c t i v i t y along t h e N u m e r o ~ ~ssl i g h t

r i v e r . t o t h e n o r t h or s o u t h o f C h a t t a n o o g a .

s k i r m i s h e s a n d r e p o r t s o f c o n t a c t o c c u r r e d , b u t enemy m o v e m e n t s p r o v i d e d v e r y l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n a t t h i s time. G e n e r a l A n d e r s o n d i d r e p o r t o n s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s . t h a t . enemy c a v a l r y was s e e n r i d i n g a n d m a r a u d i n g n e a r t h e r i v e r a t t h e m o u t h o f B a t t l e C r e e k a n d B r i d g e p o r t a s e a r l y a s 24 July."' T h e w h o l e c o u n t r y a p p e a r e d t o b e a l i v e w i t h small s c o u t s o f c a v a l r y troops, b u t t h e Confederates discerned no p a t t e r n f r o m Union e f f o r t s . F o r r e s t and Wheeler q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e l y t h e n u s e d t h i s

t i m e t o rest a n d r e f i t t h e i r u n i t s .

R s i n many o t h e r

b r a n c h e s o f t h e a r m y , t h e c a v a l r y a l l o w e d i t s men t o g o home

t o a c q u i r e new o u ' t f i t s o f c l o t h i n g , e q u i p m e n t , a n d h o r s e s .
T h e c a v a l r y s i m p l y t o o k g r e a t e r l i b e r t i e s w i t h t h e number o f s o l d i e r s a b s e n t and t h e l e n g t h of

t i m e t h e y were g o n e .

Abtlracljrom rdum o j Lha :roo r tr Dcjmrfmcnt Xo. 9, Gcnrral Brazfoa h g g m r o n l . maadisg,jor July lW; Asadquartm Chattanooga. 3enr..

&,

............... .......................................... ......................................... ......................................... ToWPO&'#CO~~S ...= .......................... ......................................... .......................................... ......................................... TOM~111'8c o p . , ............................. Jackwn's brlgder .................................... TOWJlckton'8 brlgrdr ....................... . .
& n o d 8trb(CbaItanoo.r Tsnn.) Polk'8 O o r p l l ' Infintry Cavalry
drtIllery

11

..............................-. , ...... Plokett'8 oompmy 8. p Ybm. .............. Qsneml Bmpg'8 I:1on .....-..-..-...-...... M u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.......................... Wbdor'n Candq .......................................... Ar(Ulery ......................................... Forre&" dlrWon: cm* .......................................... ArLUlOq .........................................
Total
orrr

......................

sad a8~l.L

corps

--

Gnnd total DepuLment X'o. 2

..................

Table 3.

Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee, 31 July 1863

7th Alabams CoL J. C. Malnoe. j i 26 Georgia, h u t . Col. F . 11. Ison. 36 Georgia, Llaur Col. R. Thornyon. 4th Ccorgla, Col. I. W. A v v j .

M Cnufrdents, Cd. W. N .E.h 1.t [MI Kcntnck$ Col. J. B . Ilutlar.

dndcmn. 8th ~ c x Lfcor y COL a. c & . l l l b Tesu, L1c.L Col. J. Y B a m d r

'Ih

LstL1Tenmuds-

CoL P- F.

lnt Aldaamn, UaJ. A. A. Jo1~1r.w 3d Alabmm, Llcnt Col. T. 11.Uauldlo. Glst Alabama, CnpL M. L. Rlrklr?lrkk. 8th Confodorste, Cap& J. & Pldd.
.

- =-

. .-

r*.

4th Altbnma. LlcnL Col. J. U IIanr. brick. 1st Coufcderntc, Capl. C. A . Connu.

T. D . Wehber. 8th Kaolaeky Cot I L 8. C l o b S* ~ e o t n c 4 . D .R ~ m i t ~ IW ~ o o t o c t ~ ' A ~ . oB . l ~o~mom. 6 ( b harrlmckj Col. J. WatnnOrigb C k n e d i b &-t, CoL D. W. Ck Oth ~ s o t u c b COI. : ~.~.P.~meki~rid. neolt. Wud'a Olh ~ e n n c r c ) , m ~ m a o t , ~ a l . % C.no's mgimmt, LleoL b L J. U HmFard. a.m.

ld Ksntorkj, X

d . '

PI.

6th Alabama Cardrr. b l . J a i a L Psttanos.

8ri.. h. P. C. ~ a r m o r o .

b l . N. N. C a

! r Tc-

Arlillq.

hum,. C.PL 6 L Fm-. h U e r J . a P L J. di hbXm,

ble 4.

Confederate Cavalry Order of Battle, 31 ~ u l y 1863 Army of Tennessee

Abtlracl from $ e l l rctvrn o f the I h y o r l m n l o f E a r l Tmncam~, H a ' C n . Wmm B. Buchm ammanding, jor July 31, 1863; h m d p a r t m ~ n m d Tma. ,

Organkation o f ihe Anny o f

&mos 23. Budner, July 3 1 , 1863.

Eat Tennessee, commanded by Maj. Gcn.

Fird C a r a l r ~ Brigade (hurdguaruts Ekna. :cr, Tmn.).

Brig. Gen. Jon\- PEGIUU.


1st doorgia, COI. J. J. Iforrison. 6th Goorgin, Col. John R. H a r t . ' 7th h'ortl~ Carolina Battalion, Licut. Col.
1st Tellu~tiwc.,Col. J.

E . Caricr. Rut4irr'r. IAgion, Col. E. \\'. Ruekw. battery, Capt. Gas. A. I3unald. Il~~nalc!'r

G. x. Folk.

able

5. A b s t r a c t fzom Return and Cavalry Order of B a t t l e , 31 J u l y 1863

Department of East Tennessee

112

Because of number of

this fact,

n e i t h e r commander k e p t an o v e r 1 y l a r q e

s o l d i e r s o r u n i t s engaqed a t p i c k e t i n g .

While cavalrymen were a t home o r r e l a x i n g i n t h e mountain r i v e r s near t h e i r camps,"o t h e Confederate army was Several t i m e s t h e

having a d i f f i c u l t time w i t h desertions.

c a v a l r y commanders r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o round up and r e t u r n dc+serters. Durinq the l u l l , g u a r d i n g a q a i r ~ s tde?ii~.r..ters

was a p p a r e n t l y B r a g g ' s p r i o r i t y m i s s i o n f o r h i s c a v a l r y . East Tennessee and N o r t h C a r o l i n a u n i t s l o s t so many t r o o p s t h a t t h e o n l y way t o stem t h e t i d e was t o t r a n s f e r them t o m o t h o r theater.
" : "

The Army o f Tennessee o f f e r e d a g e n e r a l and o f f i c e r s , who would r e t u r n t o

amnesty for- any t r o o p s , t h e i r duty stations.""

S i n c e t h e c a v a l r y commanders were

more generous w i t h t i m e away, more o f t e n t h a n i n t h e case o f foot soldiers, units. mounted men d i d e v e n t u a l l y r e t u r n tp tt.1ei.r assigned s t r e n g t h s never matched p r e s e n t

However,

f o r d u t y s t r e n g t h s and d e s e r t i o n s f r o m c a v a l r y u n i t s would be rampant t h r o u g h o u t t h i s campaign.


9. )

(See Tables 1 t h r o u g h

While h i s men were r e c u p e r a t i n q ,

F o r r e s t h i m s e l f was

h a t c h i n g a p l a n t o g e t away from Rragg and t h e Army o f Tennessee. He so d e t e s t e d a s u b o r d i n a t e r o l e t h a t . he b o t h t h r o u g h and o u t s i d e o f t h e c h a i n o-F

offered a plan,

command, t o t h e Conf e d e r a t e h i g h command a t Richmond t h a t would t a k e him west t o an independent command. He even

o f f e r e d t o l e a v e most o f h i s d i v i s i o n t o t h e l e a d e r s he de.tested i f he c o u l d o n l y g e t away ,to execute h i e p l a n . He

.................................................. w ...................................................... . Cb&&d.dl.Yla ..................................... ........................................ .......................................... .................................................. I&Polk*.oorp. ...................................... Bill'. s,.u ...................................................... ....................................... ........................................ .................................. A N U y .................................................. T U B 5 C s r a p....................................... J#ok.oo\br(Fd.i Inr-q ................................................ ..................................................
lk.dns
s'dL'.nxp:
W i ~ b d d ~ h h . C..lrJe,eMe
;

ARilk,,

mlp,

Rle.uCadwl.*~ Cmlq-M....'.....

Clrbwr'adMh

Aruh,

Table 6 . Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee and Department of East Tennessee, 10 August 1863

114

M.J. Gcn. Jous A. Wnmmx.

n"I

B*&

CoL C. C. C n z r r 7lh U.b.m. Col. J. C. Mdom Jr. O ~ ~ ~ I . , COI. ~ U F.I U. . ik. G-mxi., Waut. cot. R. ~ O W I - . 4lh Goorgb, Cot. 1. U ' . Awry.

h.r

B*&

6 L ' h o u r s IL\uuor.

l r ad] P*omrks. Cat. J. a hilor. [ah] L1e.L COL P . F. Andew &b Texm LlruL CoL 0. & k . Illh T u r LlrmL CoL J . Y k n d r

ad Cmfcdenls. Col. W. N. E.tr

em-

&I Arhuou Col. A. U.1lol*oo. W rmtucl;& Lirul. Col. T. GO.Waul.

41hTmna-. B h j . W.BMchmorr. erb l l l b l Tenuawe. WIOI. CDL F.

Table 7 . Confederate c a v a l r y Order of B a t t l e , 10 August 1 8 6 3 Army o f Tennessee

6
= L

Command.

0 "

< QeDeral besdquarters: Escort Rappers and mlnm

e %:

b ?

............................................... ................................

stnn u d escort-. b t L a m ' s division Eiqls divhjon.


~

. -~ ..................... ;.............. ............................,....


.................................
--

--E 4 317 I....


I(Yl

159

A. 110
840

1 3 v, W!

.-

S t a f f &d d m i
Qe-o

divkiou $*rw.sn's division

..................................... .................................. ....................................

IS. 1%

rneelerb Cav*
Cavalry Artilkry

Corps: ............................................. ............................................

m -1 i . ns IR =I=
3 x 3 90: 1i 8.8% IJ.*N . . 8.31
I3,m

9,105 7,x

se

1 0 . 0 . 2 10,515 I.. 3

... .

I.. 11
11

F o W s Cardry Division : Csralrg

.............................................. m v g .............................................

4.m
1%

G.4W 1.. 2'; I __I_


6,iM --.--.-

a b l e 8.

A b s t r a c t from Return of Army of Tennessee, 20 August 1863

want.4

t o qo t o t h e M i s s i s s i p p i R i v e r and o r g a n i z e a
He

d i v i s i o n o f t r o o p s t o harr-ass t h e enemy on t h e r i v e r .

was s u r e he c o u l d r a i s e and arm t h e u n i t s w i t h l i t t l e h e l p f r o m t h e government ( a t l e a s t t h e Confederate government)

and m a i n t a i n them i n t h e r e g i o n above V i c k s b u r g and Memphis. S i n c e t h e M i s s i s s i p p i River. had r e c e n t 1y been 1os.t. w i t h t h e f a 1 1 of Vicksburq, he f e l t he c o u l d i n t e r d i c t i - t from bo-kh t h e Union cause."" Richmond and

banks t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of

Braqq l o o k e d upon t h i s p r o p o s a l f a v o r a b l y and t h e y were convinced F o r r e s t was -the man t o succeed i n such a b o l d ventur-e. However.,
t. F o r r e s t ' s d i r e c - t communication was s~1.1

t h r e e days a f t e r Rosecr-ans began h i s move toward Chattanooga. B r a g g ' s endorsement o f t h e o f f i c i a l r e q u e s t However,

went f o r w a r d o n l y two days b e f o r e Rosecrans' move. t h e c o n d i t i o n and d i r e s t r a i t s of t h e flrmy

o f Tennessee d i d 'The p l a n

n o t a l l o w t h e a t t e m p t when F o r r e s t advocated i t . was overcome by events. Rosecrans began h i s move on 16 August.

His f i r s t

t r o o p s t o make c o n t a c t were M i n t y ' s c a v a l r y who r a n i n t o D i b r e l l ' s men s t i l l a t S p a r t a on 17 August. D i b r e l l ' s men

had m a i n t a i n e d a watch on t h e Union f o r c e s w h i l e t h e y r e f i t t e d themselves and any new r e c r u i t s t h e y r e c e i v e d . These f o r c e s j o u s t e d t h e week b e f o r e and c o n t i n u e d t o v i e a q a i n s t each o t h e r a l l t h e ' way t o t h e r i v e r . i n the strength of The d i f f e r e n c e

t h e a s s a u l t s on 17 August f r o m t h e

p r e v i o u s minor s k i r m i s h e s confirmed i n D i b r e l l ' s mind t h a t a major advance was i n ef feet.'"=' D i b r e l l managed t o m a i n t a i n

his unit integrity,

b u t was s t e a d i l y pushed back on.to

F0rres.t'~ s u p p o r t i n g u n i t s which began a r r i v i n g a t Bon A i r . D i b r e l l k e p t h i s u n i t t o t h e west of the river u n t i l called

back when F o r r e s t began t o move s o u t h w i t h Ruckner. To keep Rragg deceived as t o h i s p l a n s , Rosecrans s e n t

mounted u n i t s n o r t h a l o n g t h e r i v e r w h i l e he s e n t C r i t t e n d e n ' s X X I Corps s t r a i g h t a t Chattanooga. The mor..rnted

t r o o p s were t o p r o v i d e d e c e p t i o n b y l i g h t i n g f i r e s and pretending t o b u i l d boats f o r crossing t h e r i v e r . C r i t t e n d e n ' s men were t o demonstrate i n f r o n t o f , a r t i l l e r y into, t h e town. and f i r e

Hragg f e l l r i g h t i n t o t h e t r a p

a g a i n as he had no c o n c r e t e i n t e l l i g e n c e f r o m t h e enemy s i d e of the r i v e r . W h i l e t h e d e c e p t i o n went on, Rosecrans

proceeded w i t h h i s main e f f o r t . = * O n 17 August, new campaign. Wheeler r e c e i v e d h i s f i r s t o r d e r o f the

The enemy began i t s approach t o t h e r i v e r on

16 August,
Tennessee.

and t h e s c o u t s began t o move back a c r o s s t h e The army s u f f e r e d a c u t e l y from d e s e r t i o n s and

Army Headquarters o r d e r e d Wheeler t o r e d o u b l e t h e e f f o r t s o f h i s p i c k e t s i n stopping unauthorized t r a v e l e r s . Rragg's

h e a d q u a r t e r s r e f u s e d any more absences i n t o areas under enemy c o n t r o l and r e s t r i c t e d a l l o t h e r d e p a r t u r e s . Leaves

were v a l i d o n l y if s i g n e d a t Army h e a d q u a r t e r s i t s e l f . Wheeler began t h i s campaign t h e same way he ended t h e l a s t

--

looking f o r

deserter^.^'

Wheeler r e a l i z e d he would be f a l l i n g back f r o m .the r i v e r sometime soon a f t e r t h e advance began. He asked f o r

i n s . t r ~ ~ uris c t i on ,the "removhl o f rieqroes, Tennessee R i v e r " . able-bodied

&c.

f ronl

ttlt:!

Wheeler's order-s s a i d t o b r i n g t h e d e s t r o y s u p p l i e s such as

Negroes w i t h him,

c o t t o n i f necessary, a~tions."~

and t o keep good r e c o r d s o f a l l such

While D i b r e l l was f i g h t i n g t h e o n l y a c t i o n west o+ t l ~ e Tennessee H i ver the river.

Roaecrans ' c o r p s c o n t i n u e d t h e i r :~dvanc~.t t ! ,


X I V and McCook's X X Corps moved soutt-I of

Thomas'

Chattanooga t o t h e r i v e r a t Stevenson.

C r i ttenden 's X X I

Corps moved d i r e c t l y a t Cha.ttanooga w i t h Colonel W i l d e r ' a Lightning Brigade leading.z" The Union army a r r i v e d a t t h e

r i v e r on 20 Rugust and announced i t s a r r i v a l l o u d l y on t h e

21 August by bombarding t h e c i . t y and s i n k i n g some boats.


Confederate P r e s i d e n t J e f f e r s o n D a v i s had d e c l a r e d F r i d a y ,
21 August,

1863 a Day of

F a s t i n g and Prayer f o r t h e

C o n f e d e r a ~ y . ' ~ As t h e o f f i c e r s and c i t i z e n s were a t p r a y e r i n t h e churches o f t h e c i t y , s h e l l s i n t o t h e town. sustained, W i l d e r ' s guns lobbed a few

Very l i t t l e p h y s i c a l damage was

b u t t h e e f f e c t upon General P r a g g ' s and Southern

morale i n g e n e r a l was e ~ t e n s i v e . ~ ' W i l d e r t h e n p u l l e d back and commenced o p e r a t i o n s aimed a t d e c e i v i n g Rragg as t o Rosecrans'


intention^."^

Up t o .the day t h a t t h e F e d e r a l s 'took t h e wes-t r i v e r bank, Confederate s c o u t s remained on t h e west s i d e of the

r i v e r and up i n t h e mountains t o a s c e r t a i n Union movement. They g a t h e r e d i n f o r m a t i o n , h e l p e d move f o o d s t u f f s .to Hr-agg,

and g e n e r a l l y p o l i c e d .the bushwhackers and " t o r i e s " i n t h e

mountains.

Uy 22 R u q u s t , t h o u g h , t h e y h a d b e e n rec:al l e d t o Brent.

. t h e e a s t b a n k b y L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l G e o r g e Wm. P r a g g ' s A s s i s t a n t Adjutant-General,

a n d set t o a c t i n g as
A s Forrest recalled

s c o u t s and c o u r i e r s a l o n g t h e river.-" D i b r e l l t o t h e east s i d e o f

t h e r i v e r a t a b o u t t h e same

t i m e , t h e Army o f T e n n e s s e e h a d n o r e m a i n i n g p r e s e n c e o n t h e
w e s t bank t h e r e a f t e r .

"'

Pragg w a s then i n t h e dark about

R o s e c r a n s ' t r u e i n t e n t and h i s d e c e p t i o n s . Even w i t h t h e i n c r e a s e i n a c t i v i t y a l o n g t h e r i v e r a n d t h e ' s h e 1 1 i n g o f C h a t t a n o o g a o n 21 A u g u s t , W h e e l e r s t i 1 1 f a i l e d t o call h i s u n i t s forward t o t h e r i v e r .


H e s e n t Maior

Wm.

E.

H i l l s o u t h w e s t o f H o m e t o C e n t r e , Alabama w i t h t h e

" E l i t e " B a t t a l i o n a s l a t e a s 23 A u g u s t .

Major H i l l w a s s e n t

s e v e n t y miles away +rom t h e r i v e r t o e n c a m p h i s command. W h e e l e r g a v e n o r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e move.4"

INot u n t i 1 27

August d i d Wheeler call M a r t i n ' s D i v i s i o n f o r w a r d from Alexandria, Alabama, e i g h t y miles a w a y . This division w a s

t o t a l l y u n f i t f o r f i e l d d u t y a n d m u s t e r e d o n l y 1200 men."6= On 30 A u g u s t , e x c e p t f o r o n e r e g i m e n t t h a t i s m e n t i o n e d

l a t e r , M a r t i n ' s D i v i s i o n w e n t b a c k s o u t h t o Ho~knd M o u n t a i n ,
A l a b a m a , t o p u l l i t s e l f t o g e t h e r a n d await f u r t h e r
order^.^.'

N o t u n t i l 29 R u g u s t d i d W h a r t o n r e c e i v e o r d e r s t o move
f o r w a r d t h e s e v e n t y m i l e s f r o m Rome, G e o r g i a . H i s unit's

c o n d i t i o n w a s p o o r , a l s o , as l i t t l e s u p e r v i s i o n had been e x e r t e d b y W h e e l e r o r h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s over- t h e l a s t six weeks. W h a r t o n ' s summons d i d n o t e v e n come f r o m W h e e l e r ,

bu.t i n s t e a d f rum Bragg ' s headquarters. " O


h e a d q u a r t e r s i n Gadsden.

Wheeler i::epk h i s

""
H i l l near Chattanooga

Wharton r e p o r t e d t o General D.H. on 29 August. O n 1 September,

he had s t i l l n o t a r r i v e d .

Martin's f i r s t unit,

500 men o f L i e u t e n a n t Colonel T.

H.

M a u l d i n ' s 3 r d Alabama f i n a l l y a r r i v e d i n Lookout V a l l e y on 29 August, b u t were t o o l a t e t o acconipl i s h much. and Hosecrans

As t h e X X I Corps demonstrated t o t h e n o r t h of a c r o s s f r o m Chattanooga t o keep B r a g y ' s a t t e n t i o n ,

moved X I V and X X Corps s o u t h t o c r o s s t h e Tennessee R i v e r west o f Chsttanooga. Hrayy r e c e i v e d word t h a t t r o o p s were b u t b e l i e v e d t h i s was a

along t h e r i v e r t o t h e south,

d i v e r s i o n because he a l s o b e l i e v e d he had enemy t o t h e north. He had decided t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e was where t h e

enemy would c r o s s . th te , enemy c r o s s e d t h e r i v e r t e n m i l e s O n 29 A ~ t q ~ ~ s below B r i d g e p o r t and f o r c e d C o l o n e l E s t e s ' p i c k e t s of 3 r d Confederate C a v a l r y away f r o m t h e r i v e r . reported t h i s crossing, on t h e day i t happened. Bragg from a c i v i l i a n . = " the

Colonel Estes t n Wheeler

by a l a r g e c a v a l r y f o r c e , However,

t h e word f i r s t g o t t o

A Union column crossed near

Stevenson a t C a p e r t o n ' s F e r r y and c l i m b e d t h e s t e e p r o a d towards Lookout Mountain. d e m o n s t r a t i o n s n o r t h of

On 2 September, Brayy knew t h e

Chattanooga were a d e c e p t i o n and Wheeler began t o

t h a t t h e major c r o s s i n g was t o t h e south. g e t c o n t r o l of slowing, h i s units,

b u t s t i l l t h e y were n o t s t o p p i n g ,

o r r e p o r t i n g enemy m ~ v e m e n t s . ~ '

O n 31 August,

Wheeler's o n l y for-ce i n c o n t a c t w i t h . k h e M a u l d i n was i n 'Trenton and

enemy was P l a ~ ~ l d i n '3 e r d Alabama.

r e p o r t e d enemy c a v a l r y a l l around h i m on Sand and Lookout Mountains. He a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t C o l o n e l E s t e s ' command was The whole l i n e i n t o Lookout V a l l e y

completely scattered.

was open t o t h e enemy.%" S i n c e i n f a n t r y p i c l : : e t s reached f r o m Chattanooga 'to t h e Hiwassee R i v e r , F o r r e s t was m a i n l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r w a t c h i n g t h e Hiwassee t o K i n g s t o n . Once B ~ ~ c b n e r

t h e r i v e r n o r t h of

was f a c e d w i t h B u r n s i d e ' s advance and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g c u t o f f from Hragg by C r i t t e n d e n , t h e e n t i r e 3 r d Corps

of t h e r i v e r a t Loudon on 30 began a w i t h d r a w a l 5 0 ~ 1 t h
August.=" August, F o r r e s t and Fegram had been c o o p e r a t i n g s i n c e 24 b u t Buckner wanted t o make s u r e he k e p t h i s c a v a l r y Forrest received orders through

c o v e r i n g h i s corps.%"

B u c k n e r ' s Headquarters f o r t h e c a v a l r y screen t o f a l l b a r k w i t h t h e corps from Knoxville."" This Forrest did. Buckner

consolidated a l l of h i s corps' cavalry a t L e n o i r ' s S t a t i o n except f o r S c o t t ' s B r i g a d e , Fegram, which he p l a c e d s u b o r d i n a t e t o

b u t l e f t t o cover t h e l a s t b r i d g e a c r o s s t h e

Tennessee a t L o ~ ~ d o nA. l ~ l ~ of t h e l a r g e cavalry o r g a n i z a t i o n s n o r t h of Chattanooga were concerned w i t h

c o v e r i n g Ruckner ' s w i t h d r a w a l

T h i s withdrawal continued Charleston,

s o u t h o f t h e Hiwassee R i v e r t o t h e v i c i n i t y of Tennessee, b e g i n n i n g t h e eveni ng o f 30 august .='

While t h e movement o f Buckner ' s Corps toward Cha-ttanooga was i n p r o g r e s s , o r d e r s came from Brayg t i . ,

r:onsolj.da~te al:L

(3.F

t h e c:av~I.ry ini its nc~r.t:l.~ wf

C:hi~tt.~~nc~r~g~

i n - t o one c o r p s o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h F o r r e s t i n conmand.

/Is

O+

9 September, F o r r e s t added t o h i s d i v i s i o n t h e b r i g a d e s of
Peyram, S c o t t , and Hodye under Pegram as d i v i s i o n commander. Included Ilorqan ' s

The t h r e e b r i g a d e s were c o n s o l i d a t e d i n t o two. w i t h t h e s e men were t h e remnants of

General John H.

men who had r i d d e n i n t o d e s t r u c t i o n i n Ohio dur.inu June i!nd JLI~Y."*" D u r i n g t h e week t h a t Buckner was r e t u r n i n g from Kno:.:ville, Hragg s t i l l had i n mind t h a t t h e deccp'tion

o p e r a t i o n s n o r t h o f Chattanooga were t h e advance o f t t ~ e enemy ' 5 main e f f o r t . He knew q u i t e w e l l o f t h e enemy's

appearance.south o f t h e c i t y on 21 August and o f t h e c r o s s i n g s b e g i n n i n g on 28 August, t h e s e as t h e f e i n t . b u t s t i l l he regarded Bragg was

By 4 September though,

f i n a l l y convinced t h a t Rosecrans had two c o r p s s o u t h o f t h e r i v e r below Chattanooga. He d i d come up w i t h a p l a n t o

c a t c h t h e enemy o f f guard now t h a t he knew t h e i r whereabouts. He wanted t o c r o s s H i 11 ' s Corps ( f o r m e r l y

H a r d e e ' s ) n o r t h o f t h e c i t y by r i d i n g them a c r o s s on F o r r e s t ' s horses. H i l l ' s Corps would t h e n f a l l upon

C r i t t e n d e n ' s men w h i l e t h e y were s e p a r a t e d from t h e remainder of t h e Union army. I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, Braqq

s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d moving i n f a n t r y a c r o s s t h e r i v e r by horseback even a f t e r he had p r e v i o u s l y d e n i e d access t o t h e west bank t o t h i s same c a v a l r y due t o problems o f c r o s s i n g the river. The e f f o r t came t o no a v a i l , though, because

Fiosecrans a g a i n d i d n o t do what Hrayg e x p e ~ t e d . ' ~ ' Fram 1

.tr~

4 September, Rosecrans crossed h i s main body over t h e r i v e r


and s t r u c k o u t t o t h e e a s t i n t o t h e mountains t o f l a n k Bragg ' s 1 i n e s o f communications. When Bragg r e a l i z e d h i s predicament, he a g a i n c a l l e d

upon h i s c a v a l r y t o g i v e him some i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e southern sector. from General W. September. s t a t e of The o f t - r e p e x t e d " c r y i n the w i ldurness"

W.

M a c k a l l went t o Wheeler a g a i n on 2

M a c k a l l and Bragg were b o t h "uneasy about t h e They deemed i t v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t t h a t

affairs".

Rragy have f u l l and c o r r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n as t o enemy l o c a t i o n and i n t e n t . The f a i l u r e t o r e c e i v e such i n f o r m a t i o n was C o l o n e l M a u l d i n ' s weak p i c k e t on Lookout

potentially fatal.

Mountain was t h e same t y p e o f t h i n l i n e t h a t was s o e a s i l y breached a t t h e r i v e r and on Sand Mountain o v e r l o o k i n y t h e river. Mack:all w o r r i e d t h a t t h i s l i n e would a l s o be broken

and t h a t t h e enemy would s e t up a screen which would n o t a l l o w t h e Confederates t o d i s c o v e r t h e Union i n t e n t a t a l l . He was begging f o r h e l p f r o m t h e man who had l e t them down bef ore. Wheeler decided t o answer t h e c a l l t h i s time. made allowance f o r t h e r a p i d t r a n s . f e r o f concerned p a r t i e s . O n 2 September,

He even

i n f o r m a t i o n t.o a l l

Wharton ' s d i v i s i o n

p i c k e t e d a l l o f t h e passes over Lookout Mountain f r o m W i l l ' s Valley. Wharton p a t r o l l e d t h e whole mountain f r o m t h e Rlabama, i n the

Tennessee River- i n t h e n o r t h t o Gadsden, south.

One o f Wharton ' s b r i g a d e s was t o be h e a d q ~ ~ a r t e r c d

ijl: L a F a y e t t e , t h e o'tlier a t A l p i n e .
Summervi 11e.
<'"'

Wharton lheadqnart.ercd a t

Wheeler ordered a1 1 c a v a l r y u n i t commanders


I f enemy

t o r e p o r t i n f o r m a t i o n a t l e a s t t h r e e t i m e s a day.

c o n t a c t o r movement was made, r e p o r t s were due e v e r y hour o r less. R e p o r t s went t o h e a d q u a r t e r s , Army o f Tennessee, as w e l l as

commanders o f t h e b r i d g e s a t Hesaca and Etowah, C a v a l r y Headquar.t~r-5. CJ'5 General M a r t i n ' s men came f o r w a r d , September. also,

on 2

Martin c a l l e d i n a l l of h i s far-flung

detachments and s c a t t e r e d t r o o p s t o r a l l y between LaFaye.tte and Dal.tan. The o n l y p o r t i o n o f l v l a r - t i n ' s d i v i s i o n l e f t

detached i n t h e f i e l d was h a l f o f t h e 3 r d Alabama under Mauldin. These 250 men were p i c k e t i n g f r o m t h e l e f t of across w i l l ' s the

i n f a n t r y down t h e r i v e r t o K e l l y ' s F e r r y ,

v a l l e y t o L-ookout Mountain near D a v i s ' M i l l . .

A t Davis'

Mill,

M a u l d i n l i n k e d up w i t h Wharton's mountain screen.

M a u l d i n r e c e i v e d t h e same i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r r e p o r t
procedure^.^"

The l a s t o u t p o s t s i n t h e l i n e formed a f i s h h o o k t o t h e west from Lookout Mountain a l o n g t h e Coosa R i v e r toward Gadsden. With Lookout M o ~ m t a i nc o m p l e t e l y p i c k e t e d e a s t o+

t h e enemy, a l i n e s o u t h o f t h e enemy would ensure t h a t any advance toward Home o r t h e Army o f Tennessee's s u p p l y l i ! ~ e s would be i n t e r c e p t e d . detachments of between A l p i n e , remounting. These outpos.ts c o n s i s t e d o f s m a l l

t r o o p s s c a t t e r e d among t h e communities Rome, and Gadsden f o r r e f i t t i n g and "Elite"

They a l s o i n c l u d e d t h e s o - c a l l e d

Battalion under Major tfi 11.

'These detachments yar-r-isoned

numerous gaps such a s Henderson's, Tap's, Standifrr's, Buck's, Davis', Baker's, and Blue Pond with anywhere from three men to a company. They reported to the commanding

officer at Alpine and General Wharton at Summerville all they could gather on enemy strengths, locations. and the names of general off icer-s commanding. L
, ~

From the reports he received, Wheeler concluded that the enemy was moving two divisions of cavalry and McCook's corps over Sand Mountain by the Caperton Road. His units

kept the Federals under observation and denied them possession of the summit of Lookout Mountain. On 4

September, Wharton reported enemy pickets at Winston's Gap.&& Wheeler redoubled his efforts and had his pickets in

the gaps blockade each gap at severa1,different spots to slow the enemy's progress. He insisted upon maint-aininq
.

observation on the enemy at every moment."" Instead of turning south into Alabama, Rosecrans turned his two corps east toward Bragg's supply lines. Again, Bragg was t o be run out of hie position without a fight. On 6 September, Bragg wrote out orders to evacuate

Chattanooga, and, on 7 September, ordered them executed at dawn on 8 September. These orders included Buclrner's Corps To cover

and brought the entire army south of Chattanooga.

Buckner's movement, Scott's Brigade chased two Union regiments back to Philadelphia, Tennessee and cleared
the!

Charleston,

Tennessee a r e a o f Un~.onf o r c e s on 7 September.

The r e a r o f t h e army was- ~ o v e r e d . " ' ~ Bragg moved h i s army t o L a F a y e t t e , Georgia, but

Rosecrans was s u r e Bragg would r e t r e a t a l l o f t h e way s o u t h toward Rome o r even t o A t l a n t a . A f t e r Bragg moved h i s whole

army ~ 0 ~ 1 C t rh i t t~ e n d e n crossed t h e r i v e r and o c c ~ l p i e d Cha-ttarioogs. days,


t30lzl-i

sides l o s t contact.

IFcw t h e n e x t

re!.^

t h e armies maneuvered w i t h o u t knowing where each other' Both commanders made

was or- where each o t h e r was headed.

uninformed d e c i s i o n s and l e f t themselves wide open t o a t t a c k by an a l e r t enemy. each army. Rosecrans s p l i t h i s f o r c e s and s e n t them a f t e r t h e enemy army a c r o s s a f o r t y t o s i x t y m i l e f r o n t . assumptions about B r a g g ' s r e t r e a t were wrong, Rosecrans' so he had Only t h e o t h e r s i d e ' s i g n o r a n c e savend

i g n o r a n t l y l e d h i s army i n t o p o s i t i o n s f r o m which i t s c o r p s were n o t m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e . None o f h i s w i d e l y s e p a r a t e d They

c o r p s c o u l d a s s i s t another w i t h i n a two day p e r i o d .

were e f f e c t i v e 1 y t h r e e s e p a r a t e a r m i e s f o r s e v e r a l days. The army was s u b j e c t t o d e f e a t i n d e t a i l . Bragg o n l y needed

t o t a k e advantage o f t h i s d i s p e r s a l b e f o r e i t was c o r r e c t e d . M a u l d i n ' s 3 r d Alabama was a t t a c h e d t o Pegram's D i v i s i o n of F o r r e s t ' s Corps when t h e army evacuated Chattanooya on 8 M a u l d i n s t a y e d f o r o n l y one day, working w i t h

September-.&-

Colonel Edmund Rucker i n p r o t e c t i n g t h e r e a r o f t h e army. O n 9 September, McLemore's Cove. General Bragg movccl M a u l d i n t o t h e f r o n t of
A t t h e same t i m e ,

w h i l e Forrest rode south

toward Home w i t h p a r t o f Wharton's d i v i s i u n ,

M a r t i n rsceivc?d

o r d e r s t o occupy McLemore's Cove f r o m a c r o s s Pigeon Mountain. Any enemy f o r c e i n McLemore's Cove would Rragg

t h e r e f o r e be caught between t h e two c a v a l r y screens. hoped t o f i n d t h e remainder o f t h e Union army i n t h i s vicinity.'" O n 8 September,

Rragg o r d e r e d Wheeler and F o r r e s t t o F o r r e s t l e f t F'egr-atn's With t h e remainder

c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r u n i t s a t LaFayette. D i v i s i o n t o cover t h e r e a r o f t h e army. 0.f h i s u n i t ,

he assumed c o n t r o l o f 300 o+ Wharton's men and F o r r e s t moved

moved t o r e t a r d t h e enemy advance on Home.

o u t i m m e d i a t e l y t o l e a d t h e army as i t marched s o u t h away f r o m Chattanooga. I n addition, F o r r e s t ' s o r d e r s were t o slow t h e enemy.

F o r r e s t determined on h i s own v o l i t i o n t h a t he
i f the

was g o i n g t o go d i g them o u t o f t h e i r h i d i n g p l a c e s , enemy d i d n o t advance t o meet him.'l

While F o r r e s t r o d e toward Rome, Wheeler's u n i t s went i n o t h e r d i r e c t i o n s l o o k i n g f o r t h e enemy. enemy was headed s o u t h and e a s t , Bragg knew t h e

b u t he s t i l l had no e x a c t Wheeler was

enemy l o c a t i o n s o r i n t e n t i o n t o p l a n a g a i n s t .

o r d e r e d t o d r i v e i n t o t h e v a l l e y s t o meet t h e enemy p i c k e t s . Rragg wanted t o know enemy " d e s i g n s , position"." Cove. strengths, and

Rragg moved Mauldin and M a r t i n i n t o McLemore's

Wharton's D i v i s i o n had Crews' B r i g a d e i n W i l l ' s

V a l l e y a t Winston. enemy.

A l l o f t h e s e u n i t s were 1ool::ing f o r .the

When Bragg combined i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m a l l 0.f t h e s e he

s c o u t i n g p a r t i e s w i t h t h a t g a t h e r e d by F o r r e s t a t A l p i n e ,

.1: in a l ly ~.indcr-r;,toudwhat: Ro!;ecri:ar~?i h a d accurnpl ishecl , and more


importantly, was.
7J

how f a r o u t on a l i m b t h e Union commander

With Rosecrans' army w i d e l y d i v i d e d , perfect opportunity t o s t r i k e .

Bragg had t h e

S i t u a t i o n s such as t h i s d i d General Hraqg

n o t occur v e r y o f t e n d u r i n g t h i s war. a c t u a l l y r o s e t o such a sj:tuation Rosecrans' army was s p l i t .

' t w i c e d u r i n g t h e t i . m e tihal-

Iiowever, Bragg c o u l d n o t

c a p i t a l i z e on t h e o p p o r t u n i . t i e s , c h i e f l y due t o t h e ' a t r o c i o u s command c l i m a t e i n h i s army. H i s c o r p s commanders H i s orders

had v e r y l i t t l e f a i t h i n Hragg o r i n h i s p l a n s .

were f r e q u e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y and l a c k i n g i n s p e c i . f i c s and directness. subordinates' Too o f t e n Bragg l e f t t o o much open t o h i s discretion.

I n t h e i n s t a n c e s which p r e s e n t e d this

. ,themselves i n t h i s phase o f t h e Chickamauqa campaign,


command c l i m a t e l e d t o . f a i l u t - e . O n 10 September,

Bragg o r d e r e d a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t t o

d e s t r o y General Thomas ' advance d i v i s i o n i n McLemore's Cove. Hesitation, f a u l t y coordination, and r e q u e s t s f o r

c l a r i f i c a t i o n a l l r e p l a c e d d e c i s i v e n e s s and i n g e n u i t y . B r a g g ' s s u b o r d i n a t e s a l l o w e d an enemy r e i n f o r c e m e n t and r e t r e a t b e f o r e a blow was s t r u c k . O n 10 September, Wheeler h i msel -f moved t o S~lmtner-vi l I. a movements, strength,

t o a s s i s t i n d i s c o v e r i n g t h e "designs, and p o s i t i o n of t h e erlemy".

McCook came over t h e mountains O n 11

w i t h g r e a t e r f o r c e arid pushed Wharton's men back.'+ September,

Wheeler moved back n o r t h t o T r i o n and r e p o r t e d

tha'k nu enemy appeared headed i n .the d i r e c t i o n c r f Rome. Instead, t h e enemy c a v a l r y t u r n e d toward t h e n o r t h and was

j u s t s h o r t o f Summervi 1l e i t s e l f

The two f o r c e s had s c r e e n

l i n e s f a c i n g each o t h e r j u s t west o f S ~ t m m e r v i l l e . ~ ~ Rosecrans had C r i t t e n d e n ' s c o r p s occupying Chattanooga a f ' t e r Rragg abandoned t h e c i t y . i t s e l f i n t o McLemore's Cove. s o u t h near A l p i n e . corps. Thomas' c o r p s extended

F o r r e s t found NcCook's c o r p s

Twenty m i l e s s e p a r a t e d t h e two s o u t h e r n

I t was t h i r t y more m i l e s on t o Chattanooga.

Rosecrans was overe:ctended and r i p e f o r de-feat i n d e t a i : l . Finally, Bragg knew what was g o i n g on and how t o h a n d l e t h e The q u e s t i o n was, c o u l d he make i t happen? Bragg assigned F o r r e s t back

situation.

By t h e n i g h t o f 9 September,

t o t h e n o r t h t o c o v e r t h e army's r e a r a g a i n s t C r i t t e n d e n who had occupied Chattanooga t h a t day. B r i g a d e back t o Cleveland, F o r r e s t s e n t Hodge?'s

Tennessee t o watch f o r any S c o t t ' s Brigade

movement f r o m B u r n s i d e o u t o f K n o x v i l l e .

went t o R i n g g o l d t o watch t h e r a i l r o a d s o u t h o u t o f Chattanooga t o d i s c o v e r any Union movement i n t h a t direction. Pegram guarded t h e r e a r a l r e a d y and c o n t i n u e d t o Pea Vine Church. The r e m a i n i n g

watch i n t h e v i c i n i t y of

b r i g a d e belonged t o General Armstrong.

I t remained f o r P o l k

near L a F a y e t t e t o cover t h e massed i n f a n t r y t h e r e . c o n t r o l l e d t h i s f a r f l u n g corps from Dalton,

Forrest

where he camped

w i t h h i s e s ~ o r t . ~ ' P o l k extended h i s l i n e and o r d e r e d C o l o n e l Rucker f r o m Pegram's D i v i s i o n t o cover t h i s advance and r e p o r t e v e r y c o n t a c t .


77

A l% % J c ~ r i 10 September'

Pegrain and t

h 6 ~t h Gcmrgi a

C a v a l r y met t h e s k i r m i s h e r s o f P a l m e r ' s Union d i v i s i o n 0.f: C r i t t e n d e n ' s corps i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Graysville. Georgia c a p t ~ ~ r e fd ifty-nine Rock S p r i n g s . The 6 t h

p r i s o n e r s b e f o r e r e t i r i n g toward about

C r i t t e n d e n ' s c o r p s was on t h e r a i l r o a d ,

a d a y ' s march e a s t o f Chattanooga and t h e r e b y t o t a l l y exposed t o a t t a c k and d e f e a t i n d e t a i l . For-r-eat r e p u r ' t e d i n f a n t r y suppor.L

t h e enemy's exposed p o s i t i o n and c a l l e d f o r f r o m b o t h P o l k and Bragg. Again,

Bragg planned a move


He

a g a i n s t one o f ' t h e i s o l a t e d p o r t i o n s o f Hosecrans' army. t u r n e d nor-th -to a t t a c k C r - i t.t.enden's c o r p s near Lee and Gordon's M i l l on t h e Chickmauga Creek. However, again

B r a g g ' s s u b o r d i n a t e s were slow and f a i l e d t o c a r r y o u t t h e plans. F o r r e s t p r e p a r e d f o r a b a t t l e on t h e n e x t day as he was c e r t a i n o f i n f a n t r y reinforcement. response t o h i s r e p o r t s . September, Finally, However, he heard no

a t m i d n i g h t on 10

he p e r s o n a l l y r o d e t o d i s c o v e r t h e problem.

Hragg had been a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t P o l k t o a s s i s t i n a move on Thomas i n McLemore's Cove, b u t c o n f u s i o n over t h e o r d e r s Hy 13 September,

k e p t Bishop P o l k f r o m moving h i s corps.7* t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y was l o s t . Polk t o attack,

Bragg t r i e d r e p e a t e d l y t o g e t the infantry

b u t f o r one reason o r ano'ther,

a - t t a c k s never t o o k [>lace. 7 9 F r u s t r a t e d as he was, F o r r e s t went back t o hamper He

Cr'it'tenden as much as p o s s i b l e w i t h h i s own u n i t s .

b r o u g h t S c o t t i n t o t h e f r a y on 11 September a g a i n s t W i l d e r ' s

Brigade.

'This u n i t pushed S c n t t back f r o m R i n g g o l d t o

Tunnel H i 11 u n t i l r e i n f o r c e m e n t came f r o m D i b r e l l ' s Brigade. fight,


Ow

F o r r e s t h i m s e l f was wounded s l i g h t l y i n t h i s O n the

b u t it d i d n o t remove him f r o m t h e b a t t l e . = =

morning o f

12 September,

C r i t t e n d e n began t o move h i s c o r p s

toward a rendezvous w i t h Thomas i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f Lee and Gordon's M i l l . S c o t t c o n t i n u e d t o h a r r a s s t h e enemy rear- as


A t t h e same t i m e ,

i t moved south.

F'egram engaged W i l d e r ' s Pegram


'l'h~

B r i g a d e l e a d i n g t h i s f o r c e near L e e t ' s Tanyard.

a g a i n had t h e 6 t h Georgia and Rucker ' s L e g i o n w i t h him. f i g h t i n g was q u i t e l i t e r a l l y hand-to-hand advancing enemy corps.
O2

as t h e y f o u g h t 'hc

Bragg r e c e i v e d immediate word o f the portent of a consolidation of

t h e move toward Thomas,

Hosecrans' Army o f t h e Cumberland. By 12 September, enemy back. Wheeler's men c o u l d n u l o n g e r keep t.he McCook's i n f a n t r y and S t a n l e y ' s Avery and h i s 4 t h Georgia

O n t h a t date,

c a v a l r y t h r e w C o l o n e l I s a a c W. troopers o u t of Alpine.

Bragg o r d e r e d Wheeler t o develop

t h e s i t u a t i o n even i f i t r e q u i r e d s a c r i f i c i n g t r o ~ p s . ~ ' ~ Wheeler's men had a p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f F e d e r a l f o r c e s and t h e i r l o c a t i o n s f o r Bragg, b u t t h e Federal forces This rupture

r u p t u r e d t h e Southern screen l i n e t o t h e west.

i s o l a t e d t h e u n i t s west o f A l p i n e and Lookout Mo~tntailnfrom t h e Army u n l e s s t h e y moved a l l t h e way t o Rome'and t h e n north. T h i s doubled t h e l e n g t h of
1 1 '

t h e l i n e s of

communication f o r t h e s c o u t s .

fi?5 Avery

p u l l e d back, Wheeler b r o u g h t oeve?n r-egi~ncn'c.?; Martin

o f Wharton ' s D i v i s i o n back toward LaFayette. c o n t i n u e d h i s move i n t o McLemore's Cove.

He marshaled h i s

d i v i s i o n on t h e Cove r o a d p a r a l l e l t o Lookout and Pigeon Mountains on h i s s i d e s . He s e n t s c o u t s t o h i s f r o n t and t o o f Lc~okuut: Urii. on

h i s r e a r t o watch a l l p o s s i b l e r o ~ r t e sdown o f f t"lol.~ri ta in

.'x~

He had s c ! x t t s who had v i s u a l con'tact wi't:.h Thomas'


X I V Corps.

t r o o p s near S t e v e n s ' Gap, September,

From 12 t o 17

Wheeler's f o r c e s skirmi!;hed

d a i 1y wi.th enemy

p a t r o l s and u n i t s .

They made c o n t a c t w i t h enemy c a v a l r y i r i


O L L ~

PlcLemore's Cove on 13 September- as Wheeler p ~ ~ l l e bac!.: d o f t h e Cove, enemy.


Oe,

l e a v i n g two r e g i m e n t s t o keep watch on t h e

Colonel W. Cavalry,

C.

P.

B r e c k i n r i d g e and h i s 9 t h Kentucky

one o f t h e u n i t s which had been c a u s i n g t r o u b l e i n had

t h e i n f a n t r y camps p r i o r t o t h e s t a r t o f t h e campaign, s i n c e moved t o ~ u n t e r s v i l l e , Alabama. Bragg r e c e i v e d messages warning h i m of reinforcements through H u n t s v i l l e .

From tha.t l o c a t i o n , t h e approach o f Union

C o n f l i c t i n g r e p o r t s from

second hand sources p l a c e d thousands o f new t r o o p s moving t o Rosecrans' succor.u7 September, Pragg answered such r e p o r t s on 15

by o r d e r i n g Wheeler t o have Roddey i n c r e a s e h i s enemy r e i n f o r c e m e n t s .to t h e west.

d e m o n s t r a t i o n s ' t o draw o f f To some e x t e n t , t o work f o r

t h e s c o u t and d e c e p t i o n p l a n s were b e g i r ~ n i n y

brag^.^"

O n 13 September, Kosecrans had C r i t t e n d e n headed s o u t h toward Thomas and he o r d e r e d McCook t o head n o r t h . He

wanted t o c o n s o l i d a t e h i s army i n McLemore's Cove And move a g a i n s t Braqg's forces. I t t o o k t h r e e days t o g e t h i s army

t o g e t h e r i n McLemore's Cove w i t h C r i t t e n d e n i n t h e n u r t h around Lee and Gordon's M i l l . With l i t t l e coordinated he had a s a f e o p p o r t u n i t y

a c t i o n coming f r o m B r a g g ' s army, t o b r i n g h i s army t o g e t h e r .

Rosecrans had been lrrcky."+' his

Bragg had m i s g i v i n g s about t h e earnestness of cavalry's effort. O n 16 September-,

h i s General Order Number He had i n d i v i d u a l

179 weighed h e a v i l y on h i s cavalrymen.

t r o o p e r s and s m a l l s c o u t i n g p ~ a r t i e sspread a l l over %he L a F a y e t t e Road and t o 'the west. Still, h i s o r d e r empr:rwwecl

any o f f i c e r o f t h e army t o s t o p any cavalryman n o t wikh his unit, c o n f i s c a t e t h e t r o o p e r ' s horse, and s h i p t h e man o f f I n d i v i d u a l s doing

t o h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r i n f a n t r y assignment.

t h e i r j o b s r e c e i v e d t h e same t r e a t m e n t a s b o n a f i d e stragglers. B r a g g ' s i n f l u x o f s i t u a t i o n r e p o r t s dropped

s i g n i f i c a n t l y when t h i s "no s t r a g g l e r " o r d e r went i n t o ef.fect. Again, Bragg had n o t t h o u g h t t h e problem t h r o u g h Another one

a l l t h e way and made p r o v i s i o n f o r h i s m i s s i o n . o f h i s p o l i c i e s worked t o h i s own detriment.-'" Meanwhile, back on t h e c a v a l r y screen,

S c o t t ' s Brigade

moved t o t h e n o r t h toward R i n g g o l d t o watch G r a n g e r ' s Reserve Corps o u t s i d e o f Chattanooga. His f i r s t contact

came on 17 September, when Union f o r c e s a g a i n advanced f r o m G r a y s v i 11e. The 2nd Tennessee C a v a l r y a t t a c k e d t h i s f o r c e 17 September, and s t i r r e d up q u i t e a

i n camp a t m i d n i g h t , b i t of

c o n f u s i o n b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o t h e i r own camp,

unnlol estud.

They accompl. ir;hcd

t h e same a g a i n a t Red t-iouse

on 18 Sep-tember

"-I.

hlso,

on 17 September Wheeler f o r c e d h i s way i n t o

McLemore's Cove by Dug Gap and o u t a g a i n by C a t l e t t ' s GapUv7= He i n t e n d e d t o grab some p r i s o n e r s f r o m t h e enemy masses i n t h e Cove and t h e n move on t o G l a s s ' M i l l . He f o u g h t t h r o u g h

t h e gaps ancl pressed t h e enemy u n ' t i l he determined t l i a t t h e r e were overwhelming numbers o f b l u e c l a d i n +o n t r y i n t h e cove. Wheeler's men t h e n quarded t h e passes as H i ' l ' e Corps

prepared t o move n o r t h 0 . F McI-emore'e Cove t o g e t he-tween t h e enemy and Chat'tanooqa. When H i 1l moved h i s c o r p s , Wheel $r.

p r o t e c t e d t h e c o r p s ' rear.':= Throughout t h e Chickamauga maneuver phase, Confedera-te

c a v a l r y a g a i n . f a i l e d t o be acjgresive i n i t s search .For t h e enemy. Though some e f f o r t s were made ' t o f i n d and h a r a s s .tlht. these e f f o r t s

enemy on t h e west s i d e o f t h e Tennessee R i v e r , were g e n e r a l 1y weak and i n e f f e c t u a l

C a v a l r y commanders

e i t h e r d i d n o t have s p e c i f i c i n e t r u c t i o n s o r t h e y d i d n o t seek c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f t h e commander's i n t e n t . cases, I n t o o many

t h e c a v a l r y was o u t o f p o s i t i o n and n o t a c c o m p l i s h i n g These f a i l u r e s p o i n t t o a

t h e t a s k s t h a t were assigned. l a c k of

c o n t r o l and i n i t i a t i v e among t h e commanders There were p l e n t y o f a s s e t s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e

involved.

c a v a l r y t o accomplish some good . f o r t h e Army o f Tennessee, b u t t h e h i e r a r c h y d i d n o t pursue a common and c l e a r g o a l .

CHAPTER FOUR
ENDNOTES %Horn, pp. 281-282.
'OA,
52-53.

XXIII,

p a r t 2, p .

518; D L , X X X , p a r t 1, pp.

= 0 & . ,

X X I I I , p a r t 2, p . 902.

7Q.0., X X I I I , p a r t 2, p . 920.

lmJordan
llO.R.,

and P r y o r , p .

293.

X X X , p a r t 1 , p. 50.

130.R.,

X X I I I , p a r t 2, pp. 688-689, 700, 702, 759-760,


X X X , p a r t 1 , pp. 51-52.

770-772.
140.R.,

pp.

1 6 0 & , X X I I I , p a r t 2, pp. 948, 952; Q . R . , 529, 530, 531, 598, 540, 541, 651.
170.R.,

X X X , p a r t 4,

X X I I I , p a r t 2, p. 902.

"OIbid.,
" l o & ,

p.

913.

X X X , p a r t 2, p . 520.

220,., X X I I I , p a r t 1, 644.
lsIbid.,
p.

633.

""Henry,
:'SO.

p.

174. p a r t 2, p. 958.

, -

XXIII, p. p.

261bid., '71bid., 2UIbid


?2.'>

940. 954.

., pp. 941-946. 1b i ,, . , p. 928. "*John W . Morton , Th.~,-(?~rL.FLI..zr~~o_.F-~~th_a~r!.~~~ed.C.c?r:.d. F o r r e s t ' s CC~a?/dry. ( N a s h v i l l e : M.E. Church, South,Smith,
&

Lamar,

1909), p.

111. p a r t 4, pp. 502, etc. 964-965.

"%O.H., XXX,
J , , '

R , , ,

XXIII,

p a r t 2, p.

pp.

952,

:'JO,B.,
"41bid.,

XXX, p.

p a r t 4, 507-509. p a r t 2,

489.

==O.R., X X X ,
='O.R.,

p.528. 51, 502. 4

XXX,

p a r t 1, pp. p a r t 4, 505. p a r t 1, p. p a r t 4, 529. p a r t 1, p. p a r t 4, p. p. p. p. p.

570.R

..., X X X ,
p.

==Ibid., " 7 0 L K A . , 4"0.R., 411bid.,

XXX,

445. 508.

XXX,
p.

420.R.,X X X ,
4 3 U 0 ,,

445. 535. 298. 540.

XXX,

44Jordan and P r y o r ,

430.R.,

XXX,

p a r t 4, p. 170. p a r t 4, 565. 567.

"bConnel l y,

4 7 Q L R ,,
401bid.,

XXX,
p.

p.

567.

4*71bid., p.

smIbid.,

p . 564.

"iConnelly, p . 170. szD.R.,

X X X , p a r t 4, p . 574.
p. p.

"=Ibid.,
=-Ibid., ==Ibid., 5bIbid., s71bid., =-Ibid.,
s91bid.,

569. 546.

p . 570. p. p. p.

586. 570. 591. 594. 584. 584-585.

p.
p.

&"Ibid., &*Ibid.

, pp.
p.

"Ibid.,
-=Ibid.,
*-1bid.

p. 586.

585.

&=Ibid.,
"&Ibid.,
671bid.,
A-Ibid., 691bid.,

p. p.

586. 595.

p. 601.
pp. p.

621-623. 611. 629-630. 628. 602. 629-650.

7"Ibid.
711bid.,
7=Ibid.,

, pp.
p. p.

731bid.

, pp.
p.

?*Ibid., p . 634.
7sIbid.,

636.

7 6 0 . R , ,

X X X , p a r t 2, pp. 523-524

7.f0,.B,.,

XXX,

p a r t 4,

p.

652.

" T " l k " b r i e f l y a t t e n d e d t h e Univ. o f N.C. ( h i s fa.therhad been one o f i t s f o u n d e r s ) b e f o r e e n t e r i n g West P o i n t . He was c o n v e r t e d w h i l e a 1 s t Classman ( s e n i o r ) , a f t e r t h r e e " l i v e l y years," and r e s i g n e d s i x months a f t e r g r a d u a t i o n t o study f o r t h e Episcopal m i n i s t r y . Ordained a deacon i n 1830, he was named M i s s i o n a r y Bishop of t h e Southwest i n 1838 and Bishop o f La. i n 1841. He was a c t i v e i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e Univ. o f t h e South and l a i d i t s c o r n e r s t o n e a t Sewanee (Tenn.) i n 1860. H i s f r i e n d and classmate J e f f e r s o n D a v i s p r e v a i l e d upon h i m t o accept a commission, and he was a p p o i n t e d Maj. Gen. 25 Jun ' 6 1 , more as a symbol t h a n as a mi. li t a r y l e a d e r . . .He was k i l l e d by a P a r r o t t gun d u r i n g t h e A t l a n t a campaign on 14 June ' 6 4 a t P i n e Mountain. Not an o u t s t a n d i n g combat l e a d e r , he was a l a r g e man w i t h an i m p r e s s i v e m i l i t a r y b e a r i n g and a commanding manner. R l t h o u g h J e f f D a v i s s a i d t h e Confederacy had s u s t a i n e d no h e a v i e r blow s i n c e S t o n e w a l l Jackson was k i l l e d , S.G. Fr-ench expressed t h e o p i n i o n o f many when he s a i d , 'Thus d i e d a gentleman and a h i g h Church d i g n i t a r y . As a s o l d i e r , he was more t h e o r e t i c a l t h a n p r a c t i c a l . ' " Mark Mayo Boatner 111, The C i v i l War D i c t i o n a r y (New York: 1987), pp. 657-658. David McKay Co., Inc., 791bid.,
="O.R.,

pp.

640-645. p a r t 2, p.530. 446. 528-530. 602.

XXX,

alO,R,,X X X ,
-*O 3 -

p a r t 1,. p. p a r t 2, p a r t 4, p a r t 2, p a r t 4, 647. pp. p. p. p.

XXX,

a"OLR,,
=-0.R.,
'=O.R.,

XXX, XXX, XXX,

520.
642.

EDkIbid., p.

""O.H., X X X ,
vOO.R.-, IIO.R., 9"O -.--., . R

p a r t 1, pp. p a r t 4, p a r t 2, p a r t 4, 663. p. p. p.

54-55. 656. 531. 657.

XXX, XXX,
XXX, p.

-"Ibid.,

The B a t t l e o f Chickamauga was t h e d e a d l i e s t b a t t l e f o u g h t by t h e western a r m i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e war. Glenn When

Tucker has c a l l e d i t t h e "Bloody B a t t l e i n t h e West".' taken as a two day b a t t l e ,

i t s t a l l y delivered the bloodiest The i r o n y of the situation

two day p e r i o d o f t h e c o n f l i c t .

i s t h a t t h e b a t t l e was n o t r e q u i r e d f o r Rosecrans t o accomplish h i s o b j e c t i v e . The g o a l of o f Chattanooga.' Rosecrans' maneuvering was t o t a k e t h e c i t y tie moved o u t o f Plurfreesboro and necessitating the l a t t e r ' s retreat t o Rosecrans a g a i n

outmaneuvered Bragg, Chattanooga.

A f t e r t h e s i x weeks w a i t ,

maneuvered h i s f o r c e s i n such a way as t o compel B r a q g ' s r e t r e a t f r o m Chattanooga. He accomplished t h i s w i t h v e r y Rosecrans d i d a l l o w he had

l i t t l e f i g h t i n g and minimal c a s u a l t i e s . h i s army t o become i s o l z t e d ,

b u t w i t h s k i l l and l u c k ,

s o l v e d t h a t problem w i t h o u t d i s a s t e r .

He had more t h a n

accomplished h i s g o a l s and had enormously s a t i s f i e d t h e d e s i r e s o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Washington. point, Up t o t h i s

Rosecrans was t h e w a r ' s f o r e m o s t h e r o f o r t h e n o r t h He c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t want

due t o h i s s k i l l and p l a n n i n g .

t h e b a t t l e t h a t was looming on Chickamauga Creek. Bragg, fight. on t h e o t h e r hand, decfded t h a t he needed t o

Given Rosecrans'

l o c a t i o n c e n t e r e d around Lee and

Gordon's M i l l on t h e L a F a y e t t e Road, EWagg's p r i z e was t h e road i t s e l f n o r t h of the m i l l . Possession o f t h e L a F a y e t t e

140

Road would sep+.r.ate R o s e c r a n ~ from h i s Ct-~a.ttafiocqa base :u#d l e a v e him v 1 ~ 1 1 n e r a b l'to e further a . t t a c k and d e f e a t . (See Map army

4.)

Rosecrans would be s o r e l y pressed t o r e s u p p l y ' i s

over t h e mountains from h i s r a i l h e a d a t Stevenson, With t h a t i n mind,

filabaina.

Bragg marched p a r t o f h i s army n o r t h t o

s t r i k e Rosecrans' f l a n k on t h e L a F a y e t t e Road a t Lee and Gordon's I l i 11.

! The Confederate Order o f B a t t l e f o r .the 1

day B a t t l e o f Chicl.:amauga i s shown a t Table 9. U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e Southern cause, m a n e ~ ~ v e r eal.sn. d Rosecrans the

He inarched Thomas' s o l d i e r s n o r t h of

m i l l and 'they a r r i v e d on t h e Chickainauga Crcek as Eiraag's


army attempted t o c r o s s . F o r r e s t moved h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s from D a l t o n t o R i n g g o l d on 17 September,
18 September.

and t h e n f o r w a r d toward Pea Vine Creel.: on

As F o r r e s t a r r i v e d near Pea Vine Creek,

B r i g a d i e r General Bushrod Johnson r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o c r o s s Reed's B r i d g e and e s t a b l i s h a camp on t'he west s i d e o f Chickainauga Creek. F o r r e s t p r o v i d e d cover f o r Johnson's

f r o n t and r i g h t f l a n k as t h e column marched from R i n g g o l d . The few t r o o p s F o r r e s t had w i t h hiin a t t h e t i m e were %he ones who had been w i t h h i m a t D a l t o n . These were some o f

Morgan's inen under L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l M a r t i n and F o r r e c s t ' s E s c o r t Company." F o r r e s t moved t h e s e men f u r w a r d s t e a d i l y

u n t i l t h e y a r r i v e d a t Pea Vine Creek. The b a t t l e opened a c c i d e n t a l l y on 18 September, when

Southern f o r c e s u n e x p e c t e d l y encountered Union f o r c e s n o r t h of the m i l l . F e d e r a l mounted u n i t s under M i n t y were i n

..

~ b l e9-1. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle. 19-20 September 1863

a d .R'wu

HI*. a n . J r r k DeuQ, m

,u

Arlillrry.

U " j . 7. R RrnWar* U p ( . H1AXT C. SmFLL

41a A b h m % QI. M w h L S d M KrrrNr ~jcn~%. 9 ~ R~..I(L . tieut. Col. J U R w. ~ M a 4th kmtuce: C o l .J-IL P .S u k h j .n 1 .

am-

I 16th h i d m a 1

Uh h h r n k : ~ CoLJ h8.Lri Lrnt-a h"b H. WCI. W Kmnrk: a J ' h x Q 1 d n a LirslCULJoh.CW~e.

=w,

I m Lmi*m.:

t.,i,.ianr, (35. D.nW

Gobn.

I4Lb L*riu.ru

a* R. A. x-J amdim. jl* J.


A .

LiluL Cal. Ricbrd U :Turns. l h j .Lmdm RUM.

b l e 9-2.

Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of B a t t l e , 19-20 September 1863

1 b I . PEYX~S Xi. Co141.1rr.

b i g . Grn. Smre': R. GIST. Liwt. G A Lenov


~ ' A ~ I ~ I I .

-.
Ligut. Col. h r n y h'alier. N8j. 2 . L.,\VnIkv& 1Gth South Corol~nn.* Col. J a n m (Ilillou h 24th South f2uok11: Col. Clr~ncnt 1 1 . Stcrcna. Lieut.Col. EIILm Calwn. h h Texas. Cd. Willinm H .Toung. 10th Trzar Cavalry,t Lieut. Col. C. R En rp. 14th Tcsas Caralry. Cnl. J. L Camp. S . ? d Texnn Caralr.r. Col. Julius A. An-

I'

25th Gmrda. Lieut. Col. A. J. Williams. 29th Georgia, Lieut. Gwr e R. BlcRac. 90th Georgla. L~eut. Col. k~~t.s S. Bopton. 1st Gee* Bamlion Shaq~sh~LPm. 31aj. Arlhur S h a d . 4th Lou~stann Batlalion. Licut. Col. J o h blcEnev. ArliJIq. Ferguson's (South Carolina) Banem.* Lieut. R T. Beauregard. HoweU'a (Georgia) Battery (formdy MnrtSs), Cap+ Evan P. HoweU
LIDDELL.6 DmlSIOS.

Bn'g. Gen. ST. Jons R LIDDELL.

Lieut. CoL Reuben F . / 24th Niksippi : Earner and Capt A. Lieut. Col. R P. NcKelraIae T. N&. I Maj. W.C. stapler Cal. L Fenthemton Capt. B. F. Tmmer. and Lieut. Col John Copt. J., D . Smiu,. urrar. . 27th M k i s i PI, Chl. J a m s A. C i a m p L.P CoL D. A . dillespie and ~ieut.COL Peter ~ n p 15 Ark-) dm. MIESIA- p: Ark: CUL L i u s I. &I=. Lieut CoL George F. Bnucum. Lieut. Col. Hugh -4. Reynolds. Mnj. A. Watkins Maj. James I . Johnson. NiEsiRRip, :. Naj. ~Ulnrn G. Pe~mrn. a p t . Xi. J. h a e n . h u t . Cd. Hug11 A. RqnrJd...$

I
j

Ilhlll~allrBrigade.

Brig. Gem EDWARD C. VAL-

'.

Table 9-3.

Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of B a t t l e , 19-20 September 1863

145

mnJ, w
av.

BUCK)rZRF CORPS slrm B . Bccmu


. I .

hp,-a*. .murC

M . j . o s ~ P . B m u r .
QL JOU S

Q*

* w.ad.

J M . Brrsa! w.oa BCPJ-

Bat#. * B

%bwIuaman.Ip.

Cd.Jd,.I. ma-. YJ. 0. Y Cndd


G e m '

t
a(h1lm:

cd.-x&hL
U-j. W. Y.
m,furi

I
1Uh I :
Cd JOCIJI R Rlmo.
k l . C ! . Willurn R B u l k

mr.

.*&.
w h k

CoL J. T . H01Yct.r.
-I.
%(h AhU.hnu.Co1.

SIb lean-:
.ZU T " " -

QIL Cidnn H.L o . =

Maj.

Cnl. John U.Lilhrd. Usj. Riclwd 11. SaWl.

63h AW-nm. LkuL Cd. A. R h n k fwd

P .F .Bunk. L h T .W

CoL K F. In=.

'able 9-4.

Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Ba+-+TSeptember 1863

--

la--

65th Oeorgin. Cd R. H .M r n h 5 t h Xenturk~, O o l :H i r a m Hawkina SUI North Camlinq Cd John B. Pal-

J O a S S O S ' S DmslOS.

Brig. Gen. BKSITMD R Joaxsox. &egg0# Brigudc AlcXaira#Brigode.

'

~ r iGen. ~ . Joes GRuxr. 0-s~ A. &a.

Brig. Gen. EYA..DEII McXm C o l . DAW Co-.i.

7cl

&j. Ii )I. \'anz;lndt. ~lcdsue's (Ukwuri) Baneq. LieuL R L

n r s s : C a l .H.R. Gmhur?.
wood.

Table 9-5.

Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of B a t t l e , September 1863

19-20

147

n .~~l,'~nh.w.J.maD.St
k t . (W

..."-..

..

h ad ~i n . : ~
C M I

%.Jsbn S ihnl. QLEJ.(loclour ~~bPpmb-.a~uh.w.~cn-

BU

I= ~~a~i.l~plr.~~ulas.xmd,.

~ ~ * ~ ~ ~ I + . ~ C - ~ . ~ & . C ~ . x-w. C.PL W. P . BUM.

. C O D %

nmuo..

bj. t k Soar R E m . k g .k . E Y d n n LAW.

Rdd.d*Bdpk:
C X VY

W .ap J n o n B .
I l . MA-

-wz

ARmLmT.

Mnj. F a n E R O P ~ I .

8d Kentucky, Lieu+ Od. J. W. W i t h . 4th Tern-, Lient. CoL Wul F. Anderson. 8th Teras, Lieut. CoL Oustarc Cook. 11th Teurs, Cd (3. R Reeves White's (Teanessee) &thy, Capt R F . White, jr.

8d

cod&&

cal w .N. E6tes

Fable 9-7.

Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of B a t t l e . 19-20 September 1863

Arncstmrg'o Brigade.

Huggins' (Term&) h t t e (fomerl~ ~ Freeman's). Capt A. L .Buggha Morton's (Tulllessce)Battery, Capt John W. Morton, jr.

Brig. Oen Joalr Psaw. DoYidson9#B.&?dc


1st ~ O n h % J ; x m i n a . Bth C CSLJahn3LBuC-. titb & ~ & d i n a . C v l . Gmge N.P& Enickd~tIsL T & L * . C n L . E W .Sdca.@tl~ Tennaa~e ~ 0. W- Bay. a d 1 Walim fapl John Q. A m o w l Eun.ald'~ fle.ylyfiee> Baiierr. a p t . Omlave 3. J3upsld

--

BrigBris +&

B P A ~ s .

I
~ M a ; r m ~

Table 9-8. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863

p l a c e i n Sr-orit

0.f

Heed '5 B r i d g e t o c o n t e s t t h e advance o f


M a r t i n ' 5 command d i sniouri tecl and a

+:he Conf e d e r a t e i n f a n t r y .

s p i r i t e d f i g h t k e p t up a l l t h e way t o Reed's B r i d g e a c r o s s t h e west Chickamauga Creek a t about noon on 18 September. Pegram's D i v i s i o n j o i n e d F o r r e s t a t t h i s p l a c e . for The f i g h ' t

t h e b r i d g e was n o t complete as Johnson c o u l d n o t nmvc Minty


'5;

tr-oops a c r o s s t h e i n t a c t br-idge in t h e .face of continued resistance.

F o r r e s t t h e n s e n t p a r t o-f h i s contmand T h i s f o r c e f l a n k e d M i n ' k y ' s men Johnson marched h i s

t o a f o r d above t h e b r i d g e .

who r e t i r e d t o t h e west about a m i l e . ,men a c r o s s t h e creek. upon t h e scene,

Major General John H e l l Hood came

t o o k command o f t h e f o r c e s a t t h e b r i d g e and the

t u r n e d them a l l s o u t h t o march up t h e west s i d e of creek. n i g h t of Bridge.= Pegrarn's D i v i s i o n , with Forrest present,

spent t h e

18 September b e h i n d Hood ' s t r o o p s near 0 1 exander ' s

Not o n l y was t h e opening o f t h e b a t t l e unexpected, e n v e l o p i n g Hosecrans' left

b u t B r a g g ' s grand s t r a t e g y of
f 1ant: was 1o s t .

Bragg gave o r d e r s f o r t h e movement o f h i s army n o r t h of t h e Union f o r c e and a c r o s s t h e Chickamauga Creek. Walker's

Corps was t o c r o s s a t A l e x a n d e r ' s B r i d g e o r Byram's Ford. Huckner was t o c r o s s h i s c o r p s a t T h e d f o r d ' s Ford. P o l k was

t o move n o r t h o f Lee and Gordon's M i l l and c r o s s a t t h e e a r l i e s t opportunity. cavalry.& A r m s t r o n g ' s D i v i s i o n was w i t h P o l k keeping t h a t c o r p s commander i n f o r m e d and secured. Armstr-ong r e p o r t e d enemy on H i s f o r c e was l e d by A r m s t r o n g ' s

t h e r o a d t o Chattanooga between Anderson's and Lee and Gordon's M i l l . He spent t h e evening o f

17 September
n o r t h as G l a s s ' leading Polk's

p i c k e t i n g i n t h e C r a w f i s h V a l l e y as f a r

Mill.

Armstrong moved o u t on 18 September,

Corps w i t h a r e g i m e n t ahead o f each o f F o l k ' s d i v i s i o n s . Two r e g i m e n t s moved f o r w a r d o f t h e c o r p s t o h o l d t h e +or-d a t Glass' M i l l . To p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y and cover t h e f l a n k , By 12:30 P.M.,

Armstrong p l a c e d a b r i g a d e a t Worthen's Gap.

A r m s t r o n g ' s men had found t h e enemy immediate1 y o p p o s i t e Lee and Gordon's M i 11

.'

The S o u t h e r n e r s crossed {:he crr-eel-: ,, b~.tt:

had n o t made i t t o t h e L a F a y e t t e Road, much l e s s enveloped t h e N o r t h e r n e r s on t h a t road. f o r c e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e n i g h t of When General D.H. Both s i d e s continued t o s h i f t
18 September.

H i l l moved h i s c o r p s n o r t h on 18

September, W h e e l e r ' s t r o o p e r s moved t o guard Owens' F o r d - w h i l e s t i l l l e a v i n g guards i n t h e gaps. day,


A t almost noon t h a t

M a r t i n passed a message t h a t t h e enemy were moving Wheeler a t t a c k e d t o d e l a y who used i t

n o r t h o u t o f McLemore's Coveda t h e enemy,

b u t l o s t Owens' Ford t o t h e F e d e r a l s ,

t o c r o s s t h e i r i n f a n t r y west o f t h e Chickamauga Creek. P.M. on 19 September, t h e enemy's c a v a l r y came o u t o f

A t 2

McLemore's.

Wheeler a t t a c k e d t h e column v i g o r o u s l y and

drove t h e d i v i d e d enemy column i n b o t h d i r e c t i o n s . " O n 19 September, Thomas' c o r p s on t h e Union l e f t moved

a g a i n s t Confederate f o r c e s on t h e west bank o f t h e r i v e r . Each s i d e f e d t r o o p s i n t o t h e b a t t l e , c a u s i n g a see-saw e f f e c t back and f o r t h a c r o s s t h e l i n e s o f b a t t l e . Both

s i d e s f e d kr-oops i n t o t h e b a t t l e as d i v i s i o r l ! ; succession, never i n a c o n c e r t e d e.ff o r t .

which mu-t i n

The f i g h t raged

f i r s t i n the north, of 19 September,

t h e n proceeded t o t h e 8 0 ~ 1 t h . By t h e end

n e i t h e r s i d e had gained any r e a l supremacy.

D u r i n g t h e n i g h t of

18-19 September,

Bragg a g a i n on 'tlic!

o r d e r e d Wheeler t o yuard a l l o f t h e passes and ford.; army


' 5

l e f t flank.

He was t o attact.:: t h e enemy ~ t 'e v e r - v

opportunity.

Headquarters t o l d Wheeler t h a t t h e Grancl Winy

on t h e l e f t was t o be commanded by James L o n g s t r e e t and khat:. he s h o u l d l e n d s u p p o r t when r e q u i r e d . Wheeler concentratt.?cl

h i s .force a t G l a s s ' I Y i l l f o r whatever was t o come t h e n e x t day.


lo

The e a r l y morning of Divisions,

19 September,

found Fegram's

d i r e c t l y under F o r r e s t ' s command, near

A l e x a n d e r ' s B r i d g e and A r m s t r o n g ' s D i v i s i o n s t i l l w i t h P o l k near Anderson's House, two m i l e s f r o m Lee and Gordon's M i l l ,

F o r r e s t was o r d e r e d t o move back toward Reed's B r i d g e and develop t h e s i t u a t i o n . B r i g a d i e r General Davidson ' s b r i g a d e just

encountered t h e enemy i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f J a y ' s M i l l , s h o r t o f Reed's B r i d g e . Rather t h a n o u t f l a n k i n g t h e

b l u e c l a d army by marching way n o r t h , Bragg had a l l o w e d h i s own f l a n k t o be exposed by a n i g h t march t o t h e n o r t h by Thomas' corps. C r i . t t e n d e n was no l o n y e r t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t I n s t e a d , Thomas had
18

Union f o r c e a t Lee and Gordon's M i l l .

marched b e h i n d and around C r i t t e n d e n i n t h e dark of September.

F o r r e s t found t h e l e a d elements o f t h i s u n i . t Forrest's

j u s t p r i o r t o them f l a n k i n g B r a g g ' s army.

t r o o p e r s were no l o n g e r f a c i n g s i m i l a r l y equipped c a v a l r y forces, but, instead, steady, long l i n e s of blue infantry.'.'

A mounted charge by R u c k e r ' s L e g i o n h e l d t h e enemy a t bay


l o n g enough f o r F o r r e s t t o r e a c t . = = F o r r e s t dismounted a l l o f Pegram's men and formed a l i n e of battle. He r e c o q n i z e d i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t F'egra~nwas so tie r e q u e s t e d r e t u r n of L i e u t e n a n t General D. H.

n o t s t r o n g enough to h o l d a l o n e , A r m s t r o n g ' s D i v i s i o n from Polk.

H i l l ' s Corps was c l o s i n g up on P o l k ' s l e f t f l a n k so o n l y a gap on h i s r i g h t was ~ m s e c u r e . one b r i g a d e , Forrest.


" : '

He p r o t e c t e d t h i s .flanl:: w i t h

that: o f Crews,

and s e n t D i b r e l l ' s B r i g a d e 'to

As soon as D i b r e l l a r r i v e d a t J a y ' s M i 11,

F o r r e s t dismounted h i m and p u t h i s men i n l i n e w i t h Pegram's forces. T h i s combined f o r c e h e l d t h e enemy advance u n t i 1

F o r r e s t p e r s o n a l 1y found and commandeered i n f antr-y b r i g a d e s t o t a k e up t h e f i g h t . As each s i d e t h r e w i n r e i n f o r c e m e n t s t h e t i d e of t h e b a t t l e swept back

as t h e y became a v a i l a b l e ,

and f o r t h on t h i s r i g h t f l a n k o f t h e army. Around one o ' c l o c k i n t h e afternoon, Rrmstrong a r r i v e d

w i t h h i s o t h e r b r i g a d e and covered t h e extreme r i g h t f l a n k .

A dismounted c a v a l r y charge was made t o cover t h e r e t i r e m e n t


o f t h e i n f a n t r y a f t e r t h e e n t i r e w e i g h t o f Thomas' f l a n k was b r o u g h t t o bear. left

F o r r e s t assumed temporary

command o f t h e i n f a n t r y i n h i s v i c i n i t y as w e l l as h i s c a v a l r y u n t i l Major General Walker, commander, John Rawle, arrived. Fragg's reserve corps

F o r r e s t used h i s a r t i 1l e r y under Maior along w i t h D i b r e l l ' s

Freeman's B a t t e r y ,

di,smounted br:igfide t:o c;'over t h e ir.i,$an.tr.y's fl.ankri arid thc:.j.r. retirements. Even though t h e i n f antr-y and dismoun'cud

c a v a l r y under F o r r e s t t o o k numerous guns away from t h e enemy, t h e y were u n a b l e t o b r i n g any o f t h e guns home, due t o a d e a r t h o f l i v e Union horses. a l l o f t h e i r own guns, hor ses o f t h e i r own. towards J a y ' s M i l l , They d i d manage t o save

even though t h e y had l o s t numerous

T h e Corif e d o r x t e s f i n a l 1.y f el I. b a c k
where t h e y had begun t h e f i g h t i n t h e

morning and h e l d a g a i n s t t h e Union d i v i s i o n s o f H a i r d and Rrannan. F i g h t i n g was so s e v e r e t h a t Union Colonc.1

Ferdinand Van Derveer, c:ommancli.ng a b r i g a d e i n Brannari's Division, troops. thought he had f a c e d two d i v i s i o n s of Instead, Longstreet's one o f

he had o n l y f o u g h t t h r e e b r i g a d e s ,

i n f a n t r y and two o f dismounted ~ a v a 1 r y . l ' ~ When F o r r e s t f e l l midafternoon, divisions. back t o Jay ' s M i l 1 Road aboul;

t h e f i g h t i n g slackened f o r b o t h o f F o r r e s t ' s

Forrest placed both of h i s d i v i s i o n s , h o l d i n g t h e road toward

c o n s o l i d a t e d under t h e i r own commanders,

a c r o s s Reed's B r i d g e and s o u t h i n f r o n t o f J a y ' s M i l l R l e x a n d e r ' s Ford. He r e p o r t e d t h e r e were no f u r t h e r Scott's

engagements w i t h t h e enemy on 19 September.16

b r i g a d e cori'tinued reconnaissance toward Rossvi I. I. e. For t h e n e x t d a y ' s f i y h t , c o n t i n u e f r o m where t h e y wer-e. rearrange t h e i r dispositions, same.

""

b o t h s i d e s made p l a n s .to Both f o r c e s c o n t i n u e d t o b u t t h e 1 i n e remained t h e

Rosecr-ans decided t o remain i n p l a c e and on t h e He p r e p a r e d d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s t o meet any

defensive.

155

attack.

Bragg d e c i d e d t o a t t a c k .

Hie ~ ~ n i , were ts t o dktd ,. c k


e f f e c t , still

from north t o south i n a zipper-like attempting to t u r n Rosecrans' Federal l i n e t o Chattanooga.

l e f t f l a n k and c u t o f f t h e

H i s p l a n s went awry

Bragg r e o r g a n i z e d h i s army d u e t o t h e a r r i v a l of L i e w t e n a n t G e n e r a l James L o n g s t r e e t o n t h e f i e l d f r o m Virginia. army. P o l k a n d L o n g s t r e e t commanded t h e wing!;


o.f t h e

Bragg d i s p a t c h e d o r d e r s t o a l l commanders f o r t h e

~ n u r n i . n g a't'tack, b u t n o t e v e r y o n e r e c e i v e d t h e i r o r d e r s . B r a g g h o p e d F o l k w o ~ ~ lr d o l l ~ t pt h e F e d e r a l l e f t , s e p a r a t e t h e m .from t h e L a F a y e t t e Road a n d t h e n L o n g c , t r e e . t c r ~ l d apply t h e c o u p d e g r a c e on t h e F e d e r a l r i g h t . * * On t h e n e x t m o r n i n g ,

20 S e p t e m b e r , F o r r e s t , w o r k i n g

d i r e c t l y f o r B r a g g , a c t e d u p o n o r d e r s t o move f o r w a r d o n t h e a r m y ' s r i g h t and t o keep h i s a l i g n m e n t on General Breckenridge's Division. F o r r e s t s e n t Pegram's ~ i v i s i . o n ,

s t i l l moun.ted, i n t o a r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n o n t h e f a r r i g h t . Armstrong's Division w a s dismounted, except f o r t h e 6 t h Tennessee and McDonald's 1 8 t h T e n n e s s e e B a t t ~ l i o n . ' " . " ~ A r m s t r o n g ' s D i v i s i o n , e s p e c i a l 1 y D i b r e l l 's B r i g a d e , f o u g h t

a l l day l o n g , s i d e by s i d e w i t h t h e i n f a n t r y .

As the

i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d , t h e two m o ~ t n t e d u n i t s moved a c r o s s t h e L a F a y e t t e Road w h e r e t h e y c a p t u r e d many p r i s o n e r s a n d a hospital

.::'
men b a r r i c a d e d t h e m s e l v e s b e h i n d s t o u t d e f e n s e s ,

Due t o command p r o b l e m s a n d v a r i o u s d e l a y s , t h e dawn

attack did n o t begin u n t i l a f t e r n i n e i n t h e morning.


Rosecrans'

taut e v e n s o , P o l 1 . : ' ~

a't'tacl:: progrccj.;;cd n i c a l y , c:au!sincj


Due t o a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n q ,

d i s t r e s s i n Thomas' l e f t f l a n k .

Rosecrans p u l l e d a d i v i s i o n o u t of h i s l i n e t o s t r e n g t h e n Thomas' d e f e n s e . B e f o r e h e f i l l e d t h e g a p w i t h Union

forces, t h e Confederates f i l l e d it.


A t t h e m o s t o p p o r t u n e t i m e a n d i n t h e p r e c i s e 1 . y cor'r.c:c-t.

p o s i t i o n f o r - t h e C o n f e d e r a t e s , L o r i g s t r e e t ! x n t a hca"y column of d i v i s i o n s c r a s h i n g i n t o t h e g a p l e f t b y t h e departing division. T h i s column c a u g h t t h e moving Union

f o r c e s i n t h e f l a n k and s h a t t e r e d them w i t h f i v e at.tackir~~lg d i v i s i o n s of L o n g s t r e e t ' s wing. T h e s h a . t : , t e r e d f o r c e s .f e ' L !.

b a c k t o w a r d Thomas' c o r p s a n d e i t h e r f e l l i n t o t h e i r d e f e n s e s or r e t r e a t e d a l l t h e way b a c k t o C h a t t a n o o g a a l o n g r o u t e s o t h e r t h a n t h e L a F a y e t t e Road. Along w i t h t h e s e

r e t r e a t i n g men a n d u n i t s w e n t d i v i s i o n a n d c o r p s c o m m a n d e r s

a s w e l l as t h e army commander, G e n e r a l R o s e c r a n s , h i m s e l f .
A t a b o u t t h i s same t i m e ,

ii:00 A M ,

F e g r a m s e n t w o r d , .from

t h e e x t r e m e r i g h t , t h a t U n i o n Major G e n e r a l G o r d o n G r a n g e r

w a s a p p r o a c h i n g f r o m R o s s v i l l e w i t h p a r t of R o s e c r a n s '
Reserve Corps. The a d v a n c e of t h i s u n i t , S t e e d m a n ' s

D i v i s i o n , c o m p e l l e d A r m s t r o n g ' s mounted u n i t s t o l e a v e t h e h o s p i t a l s w h i l e t h e d i s m o u n t e d u n i t s t ~ t r n e dt o f a c e t h e fue. F o r r e s t '!s a r t i 1l e r y a n d P e g r a m ' s m o u n t e d u n i t s h a r a ! s s e d Granger as t h e Union s o l d i e r s marched s o u t h t o w a r d K e l l y Field. Retween t h e h a r a s s m e n t on h i s l e f t . f l a n k and t h e

f o r t i f i e d r o a d t o h i s f r o n t , Granger had enough i n f o r m a t i o n

'to c a u s e h i m . t o l e a v e t h e L a F a v e t ' t e Road a n d move

cross-country

t o l i n k u p w i t h Thomas o n S n o d g r a s s H i l l .

F o r r e s t ' s f o r c e s w e r e n o t s t o u t enough t o c o m p l e t e l y s t o p G r a n g e r , b u t t h e y i n f l i c t e d a two-hour r e l i e v i n g Union f ~ r c e s . ~ ~ Thomas' c o r p s h a d b e e n i n v o l v e d i n t h e h e a v i e s t . f i g h t i n g o n b o t h 19 a n d 20 S e p t e m b e r - . only t r o o p s t o hold. S . t i l 1 , t h e y were t h e d e l a y upon t h e

A l o n g w i t h u n i t s w h i c h f e l l i n on

t h e i r l i n e s , t h e y h e l d l o n g enough t o b e r e i n f n r c e d by t h e Union R e s e r v e C o r p s u n d e r G e n e r a l Gordon G r a n g e r . F o r r e s t ' s r e p o r t made n o f u r t h e r m e n t i o n o f a c - t i o n o n t h e C o n f e d e r a t e r i g h t f l a n k a f t e r Gr-anger's r e l i e v i n g d i v i s i o n s went a r o u n d h i s b l o c k i n g position.'" l u l l o f a c o u p l e of Indeed, a

h o u r s o c c u r r e d a l l across t h e n o r t h e r n General Longstreet

p a r t of t h e f i e l d i n t h e m i d a f t e r n o o n .

p r e s s e d h i s a t t a c k f r o m t h e s o u t h , b u t P o l k ' . s wing a p p l i e d no further pressure u n t i l nearly four o'clock. W h i l e F o r r e s t a n d h i s men f o u g h t r e s o l u t e l y o n t h e r i g h t f l a n k , W h e e l e r moved h i s a v a i l a b l e f o r c e , d i s m o u n t e d , a n d a t t a c k e d a s i z a b l e enemy f o r c e o n t h e a r m y ' s l e f t w i t h a r t i l l e r y h o p i n g t o d r a w o f f some r e s e r v e s f r o m L o n g s t r e e t ' s front. The f i g h t went back and f o r t h q u i t e a b i t w i t h

l i t t l e change i n t h e s i . t u a t i o n u n t i l t h e Soi.ttherners h i t t h e
enemy h a r d a n d d r o v e t h e m b a c k t o w a r d C r a w f i s h S p r i n g s . O n c e a g a i n m o u n t e d , W h e e l e r ' s men c h a r g e d t h e F e d e r a l t r o o p s

a t a b o u t t h e same time L o n g s t r e e t b r o k e t h r o u g h t h e c e n t e r
of t h e Union l i n e . " =

As .the ct2rtter o,F .the Union 1.ine c13l lapsed,

t h e arlc!rny

'5

r i g h t wing m e l t e d away t o t h e n o r t h towar-d Chattanooga. L o n g s t r e e t c a l l e d Wheeler t o Lee and Gordon's M i l l t o a t t a c k Union c a v a l r y i n t h a t area.

A t about 3 P.M.,

Wheeler's men
The

a r r i v e d and i m m e d i a t e l y a t t a c k e d i n t o t h e Union t r o o p s .

F e d e r a l s d i d n o t s t a n d f o r l o n g b e f o r e t h e y retr-vsated up t:he Dry Va1.lcy Road t o ~ a r d 13ha.ttanooqa.

R.t about 5 F ' . M .

Rragg 's sta.f.f i n f or~nedWheeler o f t h e apparent good , f o r t u n e of t h e army i n i t s v i c t ~ r y , : ' ~ A few m i n u t e s l a t e r , General.

1 - o n g s t r e t ~ tg o t a message t h r m - ~ g ht o Wheeler

f o r h i m t.o r-i.dc:

down t h e Dry V a l l e y Road t o cause as m~lchhavoc as p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h e ranks 0 . F t h e r e t r e a t i n g enemy. L o n y s t r e e t saw an

o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a l i m i t e d p ~ ~ r s uand i t he s e n t Wheeler t o accomplish t h e t a s k . By t h e t i m e Wheeler g o t i n v o l v e d i n The p u r s u i t l a s t e d f u r

i t , t h e darkness began t o come on.

two h o u r s . a f t e r dark.

Still,

i n t h e i r a t t a c k s near Lee and Gordon's M i l % ,

W h e e l e r ' s t r o o p e r s p i c k e d up about one thousand p r i s o n e r s , t w e n t y wagons, weapons, f i v e large hospitals, l a r g e amounts o f as w e l l as a l l The s p o i l s o f When

ordnance,

medicines, camp equipment,

o f t h e wounded enemy and about 100 d o c t o r s .

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d d i d p r o v i d e some f e e d f o r t h e horses. t h e pew-suit ceased f o r t h e n i g h t , 'the b a t t l ~ . f i e l d . : : ' ~

Wheeler's men camped on

O n t h e Confederate r i g h t , t h e i n f a n t r y f i n a l l y moved .forward a g a i n a t about 4 P.M. F o r r e s t agreed .to t a k e and

h o l d t h e L a F a y e t t e K ~ a d . ' ~ F o r r e s t and h i s men-went f o r w a r d

di!mountecL

i n l i n e o f b a t t l e w i t h t h e i r i . f a n t r y , o n e nrorr?
A l l along t h e l i n e , t h e

time t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s t a s k .

a d v a n c e w a s made w i t h t h e c a v a l r y s e c u r i n g t h e f l a n k , D i b r e l l still hanging on t o t h e i n f a n t r y . Sharp f i g h t i n g

c o n t i n u e d u n t i l D i b r e l l r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e i n f a n t r y was stopped. 9th Within t h e i r exposed p o s i t i o n , t h e 4 t h , S t h , and

(Bif f l e 's) Tennessee Regiments s u s t a i n e d s e v e r e but still held t h e i r l i n e a f t e r t h e i n f a n t r y F o r r e s t h i m s e l f r a n t o t h e r-ight-most

ca.jualties,

u n i t s m e l t e d away.

i n f a n t r y u n i t s a n d r a l l i e d t h e m w i t h h e l p f r o m ' t h e i r - own o,ff i c e r s .


A renewed e f f o r t c a r r i e d t h e F e d e r a l

lines.

Hrayg d i d

n o t employ a r e s e r v e n o r d i d h e h a v e a p l a n t o e x p l o i t h i s unexpected success. T h e d e l a y a l l o w e d Thomas t o h o l d u n t i l

n i g h t Tell a n d ' t h e n h e g a v e t h e o r d e r t o r e t i r e .to h i s blueclad troops.23

H e e x t r i c a t e d a l l of t h e u n i t s w i t h h i s

c o r p s back toward Chattanooga. The C o n f e d e r a . t e s on t h e a r m y ' s r i g h t f l a n k d i d n o t organize a p ~ ~ r s u a is t t h c enemy l e f t e n r o u t e t o C h a t t a n o o g a .

N o commander, a t a n y l e v e l , o r d e r e d a p u r s u i t .
t h e enemy l e a v e a n d t h e n ,

They watched

i n f a n t r y and c a v a l r y a l i k e , F o r r e s t and t h e army,

b i v o u a c k e d upon t h e g r o u n d t h e y h a d j u s t t a k e n .

h i s men a n d h o r s e s s u f f e r e d , much l i k e t h e rest o f f r o m a l a c k o f water, r a t i o n s , and f ~ r a g e . ~ "

T h e n e x t m o r n i n g , Monday, 21 S e p t e m b e r , F o r r e s t mar-nted h i s w e a r y u n i t s a n d moved down t h e r o a d t o w a r d C h a t t a n o o g a .

H e g a t h e r e d up p r i s o n e r s a n d d i s c a r d e d e q u i p m e n t a s h e went

ancl shipped .it back i n c i ~ p ~ t t ~ r waquns. ed

He fo~end SUIIIE

c>f

M i n t y ' s c a v a l r y entrenchtld i n .tlhe H o s s v i l l e Gap,

b u t cot-cld

n o t d i s l o d g e them w i t h D i b r e l l ' s o l d 8 t h Tennessee and h i s artillery. He camped on t h e t i p o f t h e s o u t h e r n p o r t i o n o f

M i s s i o n a r y Ridge t h a t n i g h t and moved i n t o t h e v a l l e y t h e next m~rning.'~."" O n 'tha't: same day, Hrayq o r d e r e d Wheeler -to d e ' t a i l two

regiments t c p ~ i c k up weapons f r o m t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and ,to round up s t r a g g l e r s , another u n i t was senl: whether b l u e or. gray. By 9 A.M.,

up t h e r o a d toward Cha.t.tanoogi.?t o Wheel rr had abo~1.L 1 ,7VIkl rowi

de'termine enemy l o c a t i o n s . " - :

l e f t w i t h him when h i s men d i s c o v e r e d d u s t c l o u d s t o t h e s o u t h coming o u t o f McLemore's Cove. Also, a reinforcinq

column appeared t o be coming s o u t h o u t o f Chattanooga. Wheeler vowed t o keep t h e s e u n i t s s e p a r a t e d and marched . t o meet thpm.
:="

The f o r c e coming s o u t h o u t of

Chattanooga was h i t f i r s t

and pushed back toward ~ h a t t a n o o g a . Wheeler l e f t t h e 8 t h Texas Rangers under L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Gustave Cook w i t h Wheeler's own e s c o r t company t o keep t h i s f o r c e b o t t l e d up t o the north. Wheeler t h e n p e r s o n a l l y l e d t h e remainder o f Union c a v a l r y

h i s f o r c e s o u t h .to engaqe t h e remnants of coming o u t o f t h e cove.

Wheeler's t r o o p s b r o k e t h e enemy

d d e n s i v e l i n e and drove them back u n t i l a l l semblance o+ o r d e r was l o s t . Wheeler's men c a p t u r e d about focw hundred as w e l l as t h e e n t i r e wagon t r a i n o f More arms and weapons added t h e t o t a l

p r i s o n e r s on t h e r o a d , about n i n e t y wagons.

haul f c r r Wlheeler's u n i t s i n 'two days t o over 200Gl pri!mner.;,


100 wagons and teams,
u n i t colors.3s O n 22 September, Bragg o r d e r e d Wheeler t o push t h e t h e army was a p p l y i n g The enemy was mounds o f o t h e r p r o p e r t y , and eigh-Leer

enemy on t h e l e f t because t h e r e s t of

p r e s s u r e toward Chattanooqa on t h e r i g h t . s t i l l s o u t h of disruption.

t h e r i v e r and a v a i l a b l e f o r at.t.ack and Wheeler r e c e i v e d o r d e r s

By l a t e t h a t evening,

t o move i n t o t h e mountains and c r o s s t h e r i v e r on t h e l e f t t o g e t b e h i n d Rosecrans' army and i n t o i . t s l i n e s o f s u p p l y


and communications as w e l l as t o c u t t h e i r

l i n e o-f

retreat.."h of

Wheeler moved t o w i t h i n one and a q u a r t e r m i l e s

Chattanooga keeping t h e enemy f o r c e s pushed i n on each B e f o r e he complete1y deve1,oped t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e Rragg s t o p p e d ' h i m and p u l l e d him b a c k on 23

other.

enemy defenses, September, Station.

t o c o n c e n t r a t e a t Chickamauga and Tyner 's He l e f t u n i t s t o cover t h e f l a n k and watch t h e

enemy near t h e r i v e r and another u n i t t o c l e a r t h e t o p - of Lookout Mountain t o Chattanooga. t o cross t h e r i v e r . Corps. Bragg o r d e r e d Wheeler n o t Wheeler's

The b a t t l e was over f o r

=-'

Back on t h e n o r t h e r n p o r t i o n o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d on 22 September-, c a v a l r y u n i t s f o r c e d t h e enemy out of p o s i t i o n and F o r r e s t camped on Lookout Mountain, their with a
On

screen l i n e r u n n i n g t o S i l v a y ' s F o r d on t h e Tennessee.

25 September,

F o r r e s t t o o k McDonald's B a t t a l i o n a g o i n arid There t h e i n f a n t r y

reached t h e p o i n t o f Lookout Mountain.

v t

F o r r e s t o r d e r e d h i s men t o cook r a t i o n s w t ~ l ic : O n 25 September,

he p r e p w e d h i s f o r c e s f o r f u r . t h e r use.

Bragg o r d e r e d F o r r e s t and h i s men back t o e a s t Tennessee t o guard a g a i n s t B u r n s i d e ' s f o r c e s , Knoxville. f i n a l l y moving s o u t h 0u.t of

F o r r e s t and h i s u n i t s l e f t t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s o f

Chi ckamauga and moved on t o f ur-ther d u t i e s . :=-

b u t r e t r e a t e d no f u r t h e r ,

l l o s t C o n f e d e r a t e commantlers bu.k t h c y

wanted ' t o pursue Rosecrans a f t e r t h e b a t t l e ended, c o u l d n o t g e t Bragg'!; lethargic. Instead, agreement.

Bragg appeared remo.t:e and

Bragg occupied lvlis s i o n a r y Ridge and Bragg

l a i d s i e g e t o t h e f o r c e s b o t t l e d up i n Chattanooga.

had won a g r e a t t a c t i c a l v i c t o r y due t o t h e g r e a t f o r t u n e t h a t accompanied L o n g s t r e e t ' s advance. However, his failure

t o p r o v i d e a gen.era1 , r e s e r v e fqr d e s t r u c t i o n and p u r s u i t : d e p r i v e d him o f a v i c t o r i o u s campaign. command wasted t h i s b a t t l e f i e l d v i c t o r y . The Conf eder-ate

A t t h e B a t t l e o f Chickamauga,
gained a d d i t i o n a l

t h e Confederate c a v a l r y Due i n l a r g e p a r t t h e r e was a

l a u r e l s f o r i t s crown.

t o t h e e f f o r t s o f Redford F o r r e s t and h i s corps,

h e i g h t e n e d r e s p e c t f o r t h e c a v a l r y among t h e i n f a n t r y o f t h e Rrmy o f Tennessee. t o Rosecrans, Even though t h i s f i g h t was n o t necessary

i t was f o u g h t and was o f profound impact upon

t h e war e f f o r t o f b o t h a n t a g o n i s t s .

The c a v a l r y o.f Br-agg's

army began t h e b a t t l e and f o u g h t w i t h d i s t i n c t i o n t h r o u q h o u t b o t h days .of t h e g r u e l l i n g f i g h t . Both c a v a l r y corp!; were

g a i n f u l l y employed t o a g r e a t e x t e n t and t o g r e a t b e n e f i t .

T'hcx.t1~1~ ~ n e i t t l e r .had the o p p u r t t - t n i t y t o curlduct a grand pursuit, t h e y had been ready and a b l e t o do so if unleashed

i n a c o o r d i n a t e d e f f o r t by t h e army commander.

The .Failure

t o c a r r y t h r o u g h w i t h t h i s a t t e m p t d i d n o t r e s t upon t h e troopers, b u t w i t h t h e i r leaders.

*Glenn Tucker, Chickamauaa: Bloodv B a t t l e i-n-the (Dayton: M o r n i n g s i d e Bookshop, 1984), T i t l e page.

West

=0,H..,
:=0.-R2-.,

XXX, XXX,
XXX,

p a r t 1, pp. p a r t 2, p a r t 2, pp.

34-56. 31-32.

" O , & ,
"Ibid.

p.924.

, . R .O Bd

XXX,

p a r t 4, p a r t 2, p a r t 4, p a r t 2,

p. pp.

669. 45-46. 666. 520.

7Q2L, X X X ,

"',-J. K. , XXX,
'O,R,,,

P.
p.

XXX,

ImIbid.

l Z J o r d a n and P r y o r ,
==tl.R., XXX,

p. p.

318. 51.

p a r t 2, 324-525.

i'+Ibid.,

pp.

XXX,
160.R.,

p a r t 1, p.428. p a r t 2, p. p. 525. 332. 32-33.

XXX,

I 7 J o r d a n and P r y o r ,

'=o_.R.,
191bid.

XXX,

p a r t 2,

pp.

= " f o r r e s t c a l l e d t h e 6 t h Tennessee, t h e 1 s t Tennessee i n h i s report. A c c o r d i n g t o C r u t e , p. 281, t h e 6 t h Tennessee was f o r m e r l y c a l l e d W h e e l e r ' s 1 s t Tennessee C a v a l r y a f t e r i t s former r e g i m e n t a l commander, C o l o n e l James T. Wheeler, who was i t s b r i g a d e commanaer d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e . ==The 1 8 t h Tennessee B a t t a l i o n was made up o f f o u r companies from 'the 3 r d Tennessee C a v a l r y Regiment. 'This was F o r r e s t 'e "Old Regiment". The b a t t a l i o n was a l s o known

v a r i o u s 1 y a5 t h e 2 6 t h B a t t a l e i o n , Russel 1 's 4 t h Alabama, B a l c h ' s R a t t a l i o n , and McDonald's B a t t a l i o n . Crclte, p. 277.

XXX,
="Ibid. 141bid. ==Ibid., 'AO.R. 270.R_, "-Ibid., "'Jordan
9

p a r t 2,

p.

525.

p. XXX, XXX, pp.

520. p a r t 4, p a r t 2, 144-146. 340-344. p. 675. p. 521.

and P r y o r , pp. p a r t 2, p a r t 4, p a r t 2, p a r t 4, p a r t 2, 522. p a r t 4, 698-699. p a r t 2, pp.

:"OO,&., X X X ,

p. 525. p. p.
681.

" ' O , & ,


= * 0 & , s30.R.,
O lA R , '.'

XXX, XXX,

526.

XXX,'
XXX,

p . 682.
p. 521.

"=Ibid.,

p.

=&O.R., XXX,
='Ibid.
"RO.R.,

694-695.

, pp.
XXX,

p.526.

I"'H(qqEH "IS -.._. . . . . ..

, ,

conci.c!~.i.c?!?.z.
T o d a y ' s army o r g a n i z e s c a v a l r y ,

more p r o p e r l y c a l l e d

armored c a v a l r y , f o r t h e s p e c i f i c p u r p o s e s of s u r v e i l l a n c e , reconnaissance, and s e c u r i t y . Commanders a s s i g n c a v a l r y

u n i t s t o o n e o r m o r e o f t h e s e m i s s i o n s a c c o r d i n g t o FIvI
1 7-95

C . 3 . v .4 . 1.cy...Llp-c;r2~.c.r!?:.,

d e p e n d i n g 1.1por.1t h e m i 1 i t LWV ( m i s s i o n , enemy,

f a c t o r s known t o t h e a r m y a s METT-'T' terrain, troops, and time).

T h e s e a r e much t h e same

m i s s i o n s t h a t Ecraqq s h o u l d h a v e a s s i q n e d t o t h e Conf eder-a.t.e c:av,slry d u r i n g t h e T u l latioma a n d Chi. c k a m a u y a [:ampal gl-~s.. .I.r?

addition, today,

n ~ ~ ~1 cit lre i d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e o f Chj.cL::amacrqa

i t s e l f , c a v a l r y u n i t s may b e c o m e d e c i s i v e l y e n g a g e d a n d f i g h t f u r i o u s l y o n f o o t or m o u n t e d . C a v a l r y u n i t s are t o

d e v e l o p t h e s i t u a t i o n rattler t h a r i ' b e c o m e d e c i s i v e l y e n g a g e d . '. However, e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c a v a l r y u n i t s d e p e n d s g r e a t l y u p o n t h e s t a t e o f r e a d i n e s s of men a n d e q u i p m e n t , t r a i n i n g and cohesiveness of t h e t r o o p s , s k i l l and organizational. a b i 1i t i e s 0.f l e a d e r s a t a1 1 l e v e l s , a n d l o g i s t i c a l s r r p p o r t given t o .the u n i t s . P r o b a b l y t h e most i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t Hist,ory i n
1%

l i s t e d h e r e is t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e u n i t s .

a r Between .the States g e n e r a l , and t h e W

n particular..

r e p l e t e w i t h i n s t a n c e s of h i g h l y m o t i v a t e d t r o o p s , h a v i n g n o t h i n g l e f t b u t l e a d e r s h i p , coming f o r t h as v i c t o r s . o p p m s i t e is q u i t e t r u e also. Many e x a m p l e s a b o u n d 0.6


Thr

fully

t r a i n e d a n d e q u i p p e d s o l d i e r s who l o s t i n g l o r i o u s l y b c c a u s t ?

t h a i r - l e a d e r r ; f a i l e d them.

To e x t e n d % h i s t r a i n o f thouql.1-lr,

a r u n i t s equipped with the t h e r e were i n s t a n c e s when C i v i l W

most modern w e a p o n s o f t h e d a y d i d w e l l .
t r u l y inspired leadership,

However,

with

t h e y may h a v e a c h i e v e d a l e v e l o f

e f f e c t i v e n e s s n e v e r b e f ore e n v i s i o n e d . During t h e campaigns and b a t t l e s a d d r e s s e d


irl

this

s t u d y , C o n . f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y u n i t s t r a i l e d t h e i r IJnion c o u n t e r p a r t s i n n e a r l y e v e r y measure. t h i s case, t h o u g h , The key f a c , t o r i n

was l e a d e r s h i p , b e c a u s e t h e y h a d a l w a y s

'tr-ai 1 ecl i n most o f t h e o t h e r m e a ~ ; ~ i r . e s . T h i s t i me, h u u e v e r -Ir.lit=yd i d n o t m a k e up f o r t h e t a n g i b l e d e f i c i e n c i e s with

t h e i r i n t a n g i b l e assets.

Good l e a d e r s h i p w a s a v a i l a b l e t o However.

t h e C o n f e d e r a t e s d u r i n g t h e Chickamauga campaigns.

d u r i n g t h i s time f r a m e , C o n f e d e r a t e l e a d e r s h i p d i d n o t function well. T h e r e were n o " t e a m " l e a d e r s . The b e s t


*

c a v a l r y i n t h e world could have functioned very l i t t l e b e t t e r with such uninspired leadership. When l o o k e d u p o n a s a p a r t o f a team, t h e C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y d i d n o t r e n d e r a stellar performance during t h e Tul lahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. The u n i t s w e r e

commonly o u t o f p o s i t i o n , c o m b a t i n e f f e c t i v e , o r p e r f o r m i n g m i s s i o n s t h a t d i d n o t f o c u s on t h e q o a l s of who1 e . Again, t h e army a s a

it cannot be s a i d t h a t Confederate cavalry did


A s s e e n i n Appendices H and

nothing during these periods.

H, of t h e f r e q u e n t s k i r m i s h e s l i s t e d a s p r i n c i p l e e v e n t s
d u r i n g t h e c a m p a i g n s , c a v a l r y was i n v o l v e d a s a p l a y e r . if

n o t alone,

in

t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f t h e s e e n c o u n t ~ r s . T~~ECIII: delay, and s e c u r i t y missions and Georgia t e r r a i n o f

u n i t s d i d perform scout, t h r o u g h o u t t h e Tennessee, t h e s e campaigns.

Alabama,

The men,

as i n d i v i d u a l s and as u n i t s ,

p e r f armed superb1y t h r o u g h o u t . D u r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n a l o r maneuver phase, t i m e per-mi-tted many m.istal::es t r 3 accr.tmulato. t h e l e n g t h u4

The m i ~ j o r

m i s t a k e s made d u r i n g t h i s phase i n c l ~ l d e da f a i l u r e t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, p i c k e t i n g t h e wrong s i d e o f t h e Tennessee R i v e r , picket, u s i n g t o o few t r o o p s t o accomplish t h e bad o r d e r s , command

d i s p e r s a l . o.f f o r a g i n g u n i t s ,

confusion,

and a f a i l u r e t o obey o r d e r s o r r e a c t w i t h speed There were many t h i n g s which c o u l d and d i d

arid i n i t i a t i v e . go wrong.

The e x t e n u a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s which exacerbated thc

t h e s i t u a t i o n included the great distances involved, numerous c r o s s i n g s i t e s on t h e r i v e r , terrain,

t h e compartmentalized and t h e

t h e condition of t h e cavalry u n i t s ,

Confederate s u p p l y system. The B a t t l e o f Chickamauga i t s e l f d i d n o t p r e s e n t many cases o f misuse o f t h e c a v a l r y . I n s t e a d , t h e major f a i l i n g

on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d was t h e l a c k o f p r o s e c u t i o n o f an a g g r e s s i v e and coordina.ted e f f o r t . F o r r e s t ' s u n i t s engaged

t h e F e d e r a l s most h e a t e d l y on t h e Confederate r i g h t b u t t h e r e were numerous missed o p p o r t u n i t i e s on t h e l e f t . Wheeler was slow d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e , a c t i v e l y involved. even though he was

The c a v a l r y s u f f e r e d f r o m a l a c k of

s p e c i f i c o r d e r s and no s i n g l e c o o r d i n a t i n g p o i n t w i t h t h e

army command.

T h i s seems t o have been

i3

.fact w i t h n e a r l y The f a c t Cha-k

t h e whole Confederate army d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e .

t h e r e were two c a v a l r y commanders r a t h e r t h a n one i n c r e a s e d t h e problems. Professionals, o r even normal a d u l t s , should

have been a b l e t o work o u t t h e i r problems. I n many a c t i o n s , c a v a l r y i n c o r r e c t 1 y. t h e Confederates simp1 y used t h e i r They were i n e f f i c i e n t w i t h t h e i r However, given t h e i r

c a v a l r y on even more occasions. condition,

t h e c a v a l r y c o r p s d i d r e n d e r h a r d s e r v i c e and on
It i s

nunwrous o c c a s i cns s l owed t h e enemy advance.

s i g n i , f i c a n t t o no.te t h a t Kosecrans d i d n0.t lrnow any more o f Brayg ' s whereabouts t h a n Bragg knew of Kosecrans'

Hard

s e r v i c e k e p t t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s engaged i n c o n s t a n t f i g h t i n g w i t h t h e advancing Union f o r c e s from i n f r o n t o f S h e l b y v i l l e a l l t h e way t o t h e Tennessee R i v e r . S k i r m i s h i n g was a d a i l y

o c c u r r e n c e f o r them b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e r e t i r e m e n t f r o m t h e Duck R i v e r .


I t was even dismounted c a v a l r y which f o u g h t

some o f t h e h e a v i e s t e n c o u n t e r s o f t h e f i r s t day of t h e b a t t l e i t s e l f , f i y h t i n g as if t h e y were i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e s . So, was poor use o f Confederate c a v a l r y d u r i n g t h i s Such a charge would be h a r d t o p r o v e at

campaign c r i m i n a l ? best.

F o r r e s t most a s s ~ t r e d yl be1 ieved Bragg ' s hand1 i n g of even h i s own p e r s o n a l

h i s c a v a l r y deserved some punishment, t h r e a t o f death." The c r e d i t f o r though,

t h e successes o f t t ~ e

c a v a l r y u n i t s must go,

t o t h e same person who t a k e s Bragg c e r t a i n l y f a i l e d t o b u t somehow

t h e blame f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e s .

c a p i t a : l i z e on t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o him,

manaqed t:,o win *.I:,

Chi ckamauga Creel:: anyway.

Eir ai:)g dc!dj. ca't.c!c.l

h i s e n t i r e b e i n g t o t h e Southern cause and he c o n s t a n t l y s t r o v e t o do h i s b e s t f o r t h a t cause. He had some s t r o n g

p e r s o n a l i t y q u i r k s which clouded h i s judgment and, consequently, !subordinates. a f f e c t e d h i s a c t i o n s and t h e a c t i o n s of He was n o t . however, t h e on1 y one
{ : t i

his

blame.

Even . t h t i ~ ~ g he h gave t h e appearance o f

inr:ompe't:ericc! ~ . I i . w i r : ? ~

many phases o f t h e campaign, c r i n ~ i n a ln e q l igence.

he was p r o b a b l y n o t g u i l % v of

W h o o r what was t h e n t o blaine f o r any misuse?


aspect i n t h e cm~r.s,e o f e v e n t s , c r e d i t t o a d i f f e r e n t person,

0.f each

h i s t n r y can assess blame o r or condition. History

event,

can p l a c e t h e blaine o r c r e d i t on one person f o r t h e n v e r a l l showing once i t t a l l i e s t h e r a m i f i c a t i o n s of events. t h e major

A t t h a t t i m e t h e one t r u e t e s t ,
can be weighed.

how h i s t o r y Bragg was i n

remembers t h e e v e n t ,

Again,

command and i s t h e r e f o r e r e s p o n s i b l e .

However, who were i n

some o f t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s and what e v e n t s p l a y e d a p a r t , t h e g e n e r a l l y d i s m a l showiriy o f Confederate c a v a l r y ? c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s e x i s t today? General Bragg, Tennessee, as t h e commander 0.f t h e Army o f

Do

was u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e e v o l u t i o n of T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n c l u d e d t h e p r o p e r use The u n i m a g i n a t i v e performance o f h i s ar.fny therefore, r e f l e c t e d a command f a i l u r e on

t h e campaigns. of h i s cavalry.

and h i s c a v a l r y , Bragg's part.

Hragg must accept t h e blame f o r t h e f a i l u r e s

which o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e s e campaigns.

More o f t e n t h a n n o t , Br-aqg m i s u s e d h i s t w o c a k a l r y

corps.

During a l l t h r e e t i m e p e r i o d s addressed i n t h i s

study, cavalry u n i t s f a i l e d t o provide adequate early warning and r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . Bragg l a c k e d i n f o r m a t i o n t o

m a k e e s s e n t i a l d e c i s i o n s and d i s p o s i t i o n s of h i s f o r c e s . Again,

i t i s c e r t a i n l y riot i m p l i e d t h a t t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s

were s h i r k i n g comba't o r d a n y e r b y s t a y i n g away C r o n r .tl~c.


enemy. 'They were n e a r l y a l w a y s i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy. however, v e r y l i t t l e u s e f u l i n t e l l i g e n c e t o

They p r o v i d e d ,

t h e general headquarters. D u r i n g t h e T u l 1ahoma p h a s e , B r a g g s e n t F o r r e s t


' : ;

d i v i s i o n t o p e r f o r m i t s p i c k e t d u t y t o t h e w e s t of t h e army. This it d i d with fervor.

Forrest h i m s e l f s e n t s c o u t s i n t o

enemy t e r r i t o r y t o r e p o r t o n a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e enemy camp.


A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f J u n e , t h e s e report's w e r e s o v a g u e a s t o

r e r i d e r 1i t t l e a s s i s t a n c e t o G e n e r a l B r a g g .

H o w e v e r , Hr-agg

arid h i s s u b o r d i n a t e c o m m a n d e r s a n d s t a f f s s h o u l d h a v e a t

l e a s t b e e n a l e r t t o i m m i n e n t m o v e s b y t h e enemy.

They w e r e

n o more p r e p a r e d t o r e a c t t o a n enemy w i t h d r a w a l t h a n t h e y

w e r e t o a n enemy a d v a n c e .

By t h e t i m e F o r r e s t a t t a i n e d more

c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e of a n a d v a n c e by t h e enemy, t h e s i t u a t i o n moved s o r a p i d l y t h a t i t l e f t B r a g g a l w a y s t r y i n g t o c a t c h up w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n . S t i l l , w i t h t h e f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y r e a d and p r e p a r e

.for enemy c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , B r a g g c o u l d h a v e s a v e d o r
a m e l i o r a t e d t h e s i t u a t i o n had Wheeler been i n p o s i t i o n according t o h i s orders. Wheeler's corps f a i l e d t o discover

'the

LJlii

on nmvemwi t: o n H r a g g ' s r i gl"~'l:f 1 a n k .

Wtieeler h i d

f a i r l y w e l l d e s e r t e d t h e area i n w h i c h t h a t a d v a n c e w a s made.

H e w a s too busy e l s e w h e r e .

Bragg t o o k n o s t e p s t o

remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n .

The l a c k of w a r n i n g on t h i s f l a n k

most a s s u r e d l y s p e d u p t h e c o l l a p s e o f H r a g g 's d e f e n s i v e
posi tinn.
0 major col-id.i'kion t h a t p e r v a d e d a1 1 a c t i n n s o.f: t h e
121r tnv

0.f T e n n e s s e e was t h e u n s a - t i s f a c t o r y command c l i mate i 11 t h e

army. Br-agg.

Wear1 y e v e r y s u b o r d i n a t e commander h e h a d d i s l i k e d
T h e o n e ma-ior e x c e p t i o n w a s W h e e l e r , o n e oS hi!-. Whe-ther- B r a g g w a s a t f a u l t or w a s e v e n y u i l t y uf:

proteye.;.:'

t h e myriad of t h i n g s h e w a s a c c u s e d of h a s l i t t l e r e l e v a n c e . T h o s e w i t h whom h e n e e d e d t o work most c l o s e l y d e s p i s e d h i m . E v e r y s t e p h e made was s c r u t i n i z e d a n d d i s s e c t e d .

He

c a s t i g a t e d c o m m a n d e r s t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y were p i c a y r l r i e about d e t a i l s i n t h e i r orders. looked f o r + a u l t i n t h e other. T h e s u b o r d i n a t e c o m m a n d e r s were a m i x e d l o t o f u s e f u l and w o r t h l e s s o f f i c e r s . Apparently. . t h e most i m p o r t a n t B o t h s i d e s of t h e s q u a b b l e

i s s u e i n t h e Army o f T e n n e s s e e w a s p e r s o n a l s t a t u s a n d e g o . I f Braqg w e 5 g u i l t y of incompetence, then h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s

were n o t s e l f l e s s l y c o m m i t t e d t o s o l v i n g t h e p r o b l e m ,
either'. E a c h o f f i c e r h a d h i s own a q e n d a . Each had a n

escrrse t o f o m e n t d i s c o n t e n t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e S o l - ~ t h ,
p e t t y b i c k e r i n g among t h e many wounded e g o s a l w a y s interfered with military duties." T h e h i g h e r i n r-anl.: t h e

o , f f i c e r , . t h e more c u l p a b l e h e was s i n c e h e n o t on1.y a l l o w e d

the dissent, himself."

but,

i n most cases,

a c t i v e l .y p a r t . i c i p a t e d

The h a r d e s t t h i n g t o swallow f o r t h e " h a r d - l u c k "

Army o f Tennessee must have been t h a t i t had t o p u t up w i t h commanders who d i d n o t do i t j u s t i c e . Fragg a l s o a l l o w e d t h e depar.ture of t h e one s u b o r d i n a t e

commander he had who t r u l y understood t e r r a i n and how t u maxiinizc i - t ! advantages. ~ General Har-dee moved wezt in.t:.o

some r e l a t i v e 1 y i n s i g n i f i c a n t j c b s w o r k i n q f o r General J o e Juhn~ton.~ He ~ c o u l d have been much more v a l u a b l e w i t h t h e nia.jor army i n t h e f i e l d , him. e s p e c i a l l y i f Pragg would l i s t e n .to

Bragg r e c o g n i z e d some o f t h e p i t f a l l s o f t h e t e r r a i l l ,

b u t had l i t t l e knowledge o f how t o c o r r e c t t h e problems.

While

he r e a l i z e d h i s p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n i n Chattanooga
without

s h o u l d t h e enemy occupy t h e bank o p p o s i t e t h e c i t y ,

Hardee's h e l p Bragg d i d n o t h i n g t a p r e c l u d e t h e enemy's occupation. L e f t w i t h no apparent o p t i o n s , Brayg w a i t e d and l u s t as

was t h e n f o r c e d o u t o f Chattanooga w i t h o u t a f i g h t , he knew he would be.'7

Fragg must be found g u i l t y f o r t h e bad o r d e r s he i s s u e d and t h e improper use 04 h i s c a v a l r y f o r c e . o r d e r s were i n e x a c t and d i s c r e t i o n a r y . contradictory. Most o f h i s

Many were

These o r d e r s l e f t room f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

In some cases, what he wari.ted done was i m p o s s i b l e , giver? - t h e


assets available. Wheeler
' 5

c o r p s c o u l d n o t p a t r o l f rcsm c o n d i t i o n and s i z e .

Chattanooga t o Decatur g i v e n t h e c o r p s ' However, no l a r g e amounts of assigned m i s s i o n .

i n f a n t r y came t o a s s i s t i n t h e

Fragg a l s o d i d n o t make Wheeler account.

,fur h i s lacl*:adaisic:al e f + o r t s . the north, i n place.

For-rc2s.t bi.~ej.cld him!;elf

t.0

p i c k e t i n g t h e r i v e r and w a t c h i n g an enemy nL)t y e t He c o u l d have a c t i v e l y conducted reconnaissance Rosecrans' army.

against t h e primary t h r e a t ,

Fragg s h o u l d a l s o t a k e t h e blame f o r n o t b e l i e v i n g ora c t i n q upon i n t e l l i g e n c e b r o u g h t .to him. When McCook was iro

t h e s o u t h around RJ.pine, a Lieuttmant: I-3aylor repor-t:ed .tlhi !


f a c t t o Bragg, a l i a r because, t h r o u g h Wheeler. Bragg c o l l e d t h ~ !I . im-Lena~~t:

i n h i s own mind, he had decided t h a t t h e

whole Union army was i n McLemore's Cove."

I t accompli~he!+,
I.!LI

l i . t t l e f o r a commander t o have an i n t e l l i g e n c e network i . F one i n t e r p r e t s t h e m a t e r i a l o r a c t s upon i t s f i n d i n g s .

The

commander must c o n s i d e r a l l i n t e l l i g e n c e sources and s i f t a l l i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h an open mind. Bragg d i d n o t have such

a network and. much i n f o r m a t i o n was l o s t upon him. Rragg f a i l e d t o keep a s i g n i f . i c a n t screen on t h e enemy s i d e o f t h e Tennessee R i v e r . Even though t h e c a v a l r y t h e army was

commanders d i d keep some f o r c e s t o t h e west,

n o t we1 1 served by long-range s ~ i r v e i l 1 a n c e . ~ ' - l a Bragg ' s own ng a p a r t . sco~~ network t was f a1 1i

'

There were n~imerous The

excuses f o r n0.t l e a v i n g l a r g e f o r c e s on t h e o t h e r s i d e . c a v a l r y u n i t s were worn o u t . They had l i t t l e means t u

s u s t a i n themselves i n t h e b a r r e n c o u n t r y o f t h e Cumbc~rlac~d Mountains. There was no r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e c o u r i e r s e r v i c e

s e t t o r e t u r n information t o t h e south s i d e of t h e r i v e r . However, g i v e n t h e a1 1 - i m p o r t a n t need t o d e l a y and m a i w t a i n

c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy t o a s c e r t a i n h i s i n . t e n t i o n s , Bragg

s h o u l d have found ways t o a1 l e v i a t e t h e s e problems.

Small

u n i t s c o u l d have evaded enemy d e t e c t i o n and s e n t messengers back and f o r t h t o p i c k e t p o i n t s a l o n g t h e r i v e r . Given

F o r r e s t ' s success r a t e w i t h most i n t e l l i g e n c e m i s s i o n s , a1 1 he needed was an o r d e r and he s u r e l y would have c r e a t e d a system. F o r r e s t o p e r a t e d b e h i n d t h e l i n e s enough . t o know I n s t e a d , Bragq gave F o r r e ~ t o t t ; ~ never-

how t o g e t t h e job done. mis!sions.

Br-?agg, c o n t r a r y t o Sun T z u ' s teaching-,,

made an e f f o r t t o g e t t o know h i s enemy. 'l Prayg'c, h e a d q u a r t e r s s e n t n u m e r o ~ ~ messages s .for- c i l v a l r y u n i t s t o go here, mid-September. and f o r t h , .there, and everywhere d u r i n g e a r l y t o

Headquarters p u l l e d Wharton's D i v i s i o n back They o r d e r e d u n i t s t o on t h e same day, to

as t h e y d i d M a r t i n ' s .

consolidate,

but issued other orders, off on m i s s i o n s .

send s u b - u n i t s

~hese o r d e r s d i d n o t tllways but, i n s t e a d , sometimes After


'

go t h r o u g h t h e c o r p s commandgrs, we&

d i r e c t l y t o d i v i s i o n and lower commanders.

f i n a l l y a c c e p t i n g t h e f a c t t h a t McCook's c o r p s was n o t w i t h Thomas', Bragg " c o n s o l i d a t e d " both of h i s cavalry corps a t

L a F a y e t t e and t h e n s e n t F o r r e s t s o u t h towards A l p i n e t o f i n d McCook. P a r t o f Wheeler's u n i t went w i t h F o r r e s - t on t h i s S i n c e Wheeler had been o p e r a t i n g i n t h e

scouting mission.

s o u t h and F o r r e s t had f o r c e s maneuvering i n t h e n o r - t h , t h i s d e c i s i o n seems o v e r 1 y c o n f u s i n g . E v e n t u a l 1 y, the cavalry

c o r p s i n t e r m i : t e d and r o d e i n a l l d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s , a c r o s s each o t h e r s ' paths. They were u n a b l e t o g e t much

accomplished i n any d i r e c t i o n b e f o r e t h e y were p u l l e d o f f t o

~ I s Jo r n e t h i . n y

else.

& g a i n , Ecragg

'!;

c o n . f u s i o n and i n a b i 1 : i t y

t o d e v e l o p a n d f o l l o w t h r o u g h o n a p l a n were q u i t e
evident.
l J

I n t e r e s t i n g l y e n o u g h , H r a g g may d e s e r v e some c r e d i t f o r ingenuity. From t h e n u m e r o u s a c c o u n t s o f d e s e r t e r s

r e c o r d e d i n Union r e p o r t s , m i sconcepti.on!j

a web o f i n a c c u r a c i e s a h d
plans.
Some ncrcw~~n.?.;

tool.:: r o o t i n H r x j e c i - a n s '

claim Hragg p l a n t e d t h e s e d e s e r t e r s h i m s e l f , w h i l e o t h e r

s o w c e s c l a i m t h e men were m e r e l y t i r e d o f R r a g g a n d h i s
constawt re.kreating. IJnion offi.cer!;, W h i l e r e a d i n g t h e o f f i c i a l . r e p n r t s n-f

t h e l e v e l of d e t a i l and t h e developmerit of

t h o u g h t seems t o b e g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t n o r m a l l y e x p e c t e d o f p r i v a t e s i n a n army. The openness i n d i v u l g i n g t h e

movements a n d p l a n s of t h e army e s h i b i t e d by t h e s e " d e s e r t e r s " t e n d s t o lend credence t o t h e argument . t h a t t h e y

were c o a c h e d b e f o r e l e a v i n g t h e S o u t h e r n c a m p s .

1.f t h e s e

men were n o t i n d i v i d u a l l y c o a c h e d , t h e r e a t l e a s t may h a v e been a n a c t i v e "rumor m i l l " f e d b y t h e C o n f e d e r a t e command

which r e a l i z e d t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f d e s e r t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e . S u c h i s t h e make-up of s i n g u l a r e v e n t s i n t h e d e c e p t i o n

p l a n s d e v e l o p e d by t h e S o v i e t s i n World W a r I 1 and advocated by t h e U.S. Army t o d a y . l 8 If t h e s e desertions w e r e

i n t e n t i o n a l o r e v e n mere1 y c a p i . t a 1 i z e d u p o n , t h e n H r a g g d e s e r v e s kudos f o r a job w e l l done.

',=

Unfortunately .for t h e Confederates, p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f 1 i c t s p r e s e n t i n t h i s b a t t l e c o n t i n u e d t o m a n i f cst, themselves long a f t e r t h e b a t t l e w a s over. Cour.ts-martial

arid c h a r g e s f l e w r-ampar1.t. commander-s f r o m command. t r a n s f e r r e d commanders, Army o f T e n n e s s e e .


l-

Bragg removed s e v e r a l s e n i o r ,

H e reor-ganized u n i t s and
including Forrest, away f r o m t h e

When B r a g g l a t e r r e s i g n e d f r o m command

of t h e army a f t e r t h e d i s a s t e r a t M i s s i o n a r y R i d g e , h e went

'to work i n Richmond a s t h e p r e s i d e n t ' s s e n i o r m i l i t a r y


advisor.

I n t h i s p o s i t i o n , h e c o n t i n u e d t o s u p p r e s s ,the
In

careers nf h i s e n e m i e s , most n o t a b l y t h a t o f F o r r e s t .
1877, a t F o r r e s t ' s f u n e r a l , a g r i e v i n g J e f f e r s o n D a v i s

a d m i t t e d t h a t F o r r e s t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s were k e p t f r o m h i m
~ w i t i l too l a t e b y j e a l o u s a n d s e l f - s e r v i n g

officers.

Uragq

may h a v e h u r t t h e c a u s e more t h a n h e p l a n n e d just b y h o l d i n g back:: o f f i c e r s who c o u l d h a v e made a d i f f e r e n c e . 1 7

So, i s F r a g g t o b l a m e ?

General Fragg is q u i t e

o b v i o u s l y g u i l t y o f b e i n g i n a command b e y o n d h i s t a l e n t f o r combat operat,ions, b o t h i n f a n t r y and c a v a l r y .

He failed to

u s e h i s c a v a l r y p r o p e r l y i n a n y o f t h e r o l e s w h i c h were t h e n a n d a r e now a c c e p t e d a s t h e d o m a i n o f c a v a l r y u n i t s . These

r o l e s were a s l e g i t i m a t e i n 186.3 as t h e y are i n 1 9 9 0 , s o


h i s t o r y need n o t b e a f r a i d of c a s t i g a t i n g Bragg f o r merely n o t b e i n g f a r s i g h t e d and ahead of h i s t i m e . n o t well-advised Rather, he w a s

or l e a r n e d a b o u t c a v a l r y o p e r a t i o n s and
on C e r t a i n l y , t h i s is t h e f a i l u r ~

u s a y e s o f h i s own d a y s . h i s part.

However, e v e n i f h e must a c c e p t t h i s b l a m e d u e t o

h i s p o s i t i o n as t h e commander, h e w a s n o t t h e on1y o n e t o contribute to t h e -failure.

I n t h i ~i v c i r l , when sonwurle d:i s o b e y s o r d e r s , t:.hr:


lies d i r e c t l y a t t h e f e e t of t h e v i o l a t o r .

hl ~ m o

A s accepted i n

today's thought, v i o l a t e orders.

t h e r e are t w o c a t e g o r i e s of r e a s o n s t o The f i r s t i n v o l v e s t h e u n l a w f u l o r d e r which

i s enmeshed i n v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e l a w of w a r and v i o l a t i o n s
o f human r i g h t s . T h i s c a t e g o r y d i d n o t arise i n t h i s s t u d y .

T h e s e c o n d c a t e g o r y i n v o l v e s t h e " j u d g m e n t c a l l " , w h i c h is h a r d t o govern. I t can p l a c e a l l o r d e r s i n question i f If t h e commander o n t h e s c e n e seeL: a

t a k e n t o t h e extreme.

si t u a . t , i o n w h i c h w a s unknown t o a s e n i o r - commander i r ; s u i n a
orders,
tt1r.n t h e o n - s c e n e

0f.f i c e r i s r e q u i r e d t o i n c l ~ ~ d dc l .I.

r e l e v a n t in.formation i n h i s d e c i s i o n t o c a r r y o u t h i s orders. Obey or n o t , t h e commander n e e d s t o a l w a y s b e During t h e s e

p r e p a r e d t o j u s t i f y and d e f e n d h i s d e c i s i o n s .

c a m p a i g n s , i t i s t h i s c a t e q o r y of d i s o b e d i e n c e t h a t i s present. T h e p r i m a r y i n s t a n c e s o f d i s o b e d i e n c e or d i s r e g a r d o f o r d e r s o c c u r r e d i n W h e e l e r 's command. Fnr example, General

Morgan b e c a m e b o r e d p e r f o r m i n g p i c k e t d u t y b e c a u s e i t w a s n o t very glamorous.

He pressed f o r permission t o yo raiding

i n t o K e n t u c k y a n d , f i n a l l y , a f t e r much w h i n i n g , r e c e i v e d i t . In h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s , Ohio.

lie was % o l d n o t t o g o n o r t h 0.6

the

H o w e v e r , h e d i d g o n o r t h , h e accornpl i s h e d .ii V t l e , ,inc.I

h e g o t h i s u n i t s h o t up a n d c a p t u r e d . Confederacy as a whole,

H i s loss hurt the


1-11?

and B r a g g ' s army i n p a ' r t i c u l a r .

t r i e d later t o .justi.fy h i s disobedience.

H e w a s n o t 0verj.y

I n another

incjtance,

Bragg assigned Wheeler t o pj.c:I::et: A f t e r sending Morgan o f f


iiri

t h e Army's r i g h t a t 'Tullahoma. h i s raid,

Wheeler l e f t i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s on t h e f l a n k and

t o o k t h e m a j o r i t y o f h i s f o r c e s towards t h e c e n t e r where t h e enemy was c l o s e r t o t h e f r o n t . He was n o t where he was

needed when t h e enemy came i n t o h i s a r m y ' s f l a n k .

He

a p p a r e n t l y was a l s o l o o k i n g f o r g l o r y and suppressed t h e c r i t i c a l d u t y of d e f e n d i n g h i s army and h i s c o u n t r y . &gain,

d i s o b e d i e n c e was n o t j u s t i f i e d . Rlso,
i t has been seen t h a t t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s suf-feu-ed

tremendously d u r i n g t h e r e t r e a t t o t h e Tennessee River.. A f t e r w i t h d r a w i n g s o u t h of t o r e s t and r e c u p e r a t e . the r i v e r , Wheeler ' a men needed

Rather t h a n s h u t t l i n g o r r o t a t i n q

u n i t s t o r e f i t a r e a s so t h a t he c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y accomplish t h e job o f w a t c h i n g t h e r i v e r , Wheeler a g a i n l e f t a s k e l e t o n crew eo watch s m a l l s e c t i o n s o f t h e r i v e r . most everyone e l s e t o o f a r back, break. He t h e n t o o h

f o r an a b n o r m a l l y l o n g r e s t

Wheeler p o s i t i o n e d h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s p o o r l y and

caused undue and extended t r i p s f o r r e p o r t s o f a c t i o n a l o n g t h e river-. h i s troops, Rather t h a n b e i n g p l a c e d t o e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l gather information, and pass r e p o r t s , he was t h e

cause o f delayed r e p o r t s and i n a c c u r a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events.

I t was a b o ~ r ts i x weel.;s

f r o m t h e end of

the

Tullahoma campaign t o t h e t i m e when Union f o r c e s crossed t h e river. When Union f o r c e s crossed, Wheeler had no more s i x weeks e a r l i e r ,

t r o o p s on guard t h a n he d i d . t h a t day,

wltprl

c r ~ o ~ ~ .ttlc: ~jcd river.

t..le

-f a

i 1ed t o

as oyclcrmd I

again,

w i t:h no j u s t i f i c a t i o n .

Even when Pragg c a l l e d him f o r w a r d t o s c o u t and guard a g a i n s t Union f o r c e s s o u t h o f t h e r i v e r , and l a c k e d i n i t i a t i v e . Wheeler was slow

He almost seemed t o be l o o k i n g f o r He mod. certainly

excuses t o f a i l o r t o cover h i s f a i l u r e s .

f a i l e d t o c o n . j o l i d a t e and move f o r w a r d w i t h any speed wi~~:+ri t h e s i t u a t i o n and o r d e r s demanded i t . One o f Wheeler's l e g i t i m a t e excuses was contmon ' t o a].! Southern c a v a l r y u n i t s . Sowthern s u p p l y l i n e . Cavalry' was on t h e wrong wid of
t:hc

Absences p l a q ~ t e dc a v a l r y unil:,s' r - o l 1 . clothing. and

c a l l s w h i l e t r o o p e r s scavenged f o r remounts, food.

The problem was symptomatic o f t h e South and was t h e

. f a u l t o f t h e Southern s u p p l y system. o p t i o n e x i s t e d i n t h e South,

I f another v i a b l e

t h e n .those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Given t h e

a l l o w i n g t h i s system t o c o n t i n u e were t o blame. situation, though,

a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e was h a r d l y p o s s i b l e .

Even - i n r e t r o s p e c t , no ot.her o p t i o n s come t o mind today. C e r t a i n sources c r i t i c i z e d Wheeler f o r n o t g o i n q back

i n t o t h e Lookout Mountain passes when o r d e r e d t o qo f o r w a r d t o f i n d and observe t h e enemy. He had p r e v i o u s l y o b s t r u c t e d When t h e s e o r d e r s

t h e same passes a g a i n s t enemy movement. a r r i v e d on 5 and 6 September,

Wheeler w r o t e a l e n g t h y r.r?por-!: He e x p l a i n e d t h a t hc

as t o what he knew and how he knew i t .

saw no reason t o qo back i n t o t h e passes and c l e a r them so t h a t h i s c a v a l r y c o u l d move about f r e e l y . He defended h i s

d e c i s i o n s k i l l f u l l y and b u i l t a s o l i d case showing t h a t !te

c r ~ u l dl e a r n no.t,tiing more +ram . t h i s a d d i t i o n a l what he a l r e a d y i::new.

l ~ t r o rt h a n

He a l s o e x p l a i n e d t h a t he would bc!

exposed t o enemy .Flanking s i n c e t h e o b s t r u c t i o n d i d l i t t l e t o r e s t r i c t t h e movement o f f o o t primary threat. I n t h i s case, s o l d i e r s which were h i s

Wheeler had a s o l i d reason

f o r not f o l l o w i n g orders.

These o r d e r s were n o t based oc a

c u r r e n t assessmen't o f t h e s i t u a t i . on. Major General Wheeler was a c o n v e n t i o n a l cavalryman who was adept a t p r o t e c t i n g t h e army, and f i g h t i n g i n t h e more

c o n v e n t i o n a l b a t t l e s o f th'e e a s t e r n t h e a t e r o f t h e War Between t h e S t a t e s . H i s c a r e e r shows him %o have b w ~ n

p o o r l y i n c l i n e d toward independent o p e r a t i o n s o r o p e r a t i n g outside of d i r e c t control. When he was n o t b e i n g watched, his

Wheeler was n o t v e r y d i l i g e n t i n t h e performance of missions.


. H e was a b l e ,

b u t n o t always w i l l i n g .

D i s c o n t e n t was n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e army as a - w h o l e . Even w i t h i n .the c a v a l r y c h a i n o f command, problems e x i s t e d .

Due t o p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f l i c t s between Wheeler and F o r r e s t , Hragg s p l i t h i s c a v a l r y f o r c e s . T h i s l e f t Bragg w i t h two

p o i n t s o f c o n t a c t and no one person below t h e Army commander coordinating c a v a l r y operations. The l a c k o f a u n i f i e d

c a v a l r y command k e p t t h e Confederate army t a r d y i n r e s p o n d i n g t o e v e n t s as t l i e y u n f o l d e d .

A t a t i m e when
a f u l l view o f

a c c u r a t e and t i m e l y i n f o r m a t i o n was needed,

t h e whole p i c t u r e c o u l d n o t be g a t h e r e d because u n i . t s were n o t working t o g e t h e r w h i l e t h e i r commanders feuded. t h e blame f o r t h i s predicament l a y w i t h a l l i n v o l v e d . Gqail.~, Bragg

d i d not 'I.ily owt: .r ~..tles and mandate coordilna'ted a c t i o n , . Wheel. er. was t o o unsure o.F Ihimsel f t o a5ser.t e f -f e c t i v a

c o n t r o l over a l l c a v a l r y u n i t s and t h e i r commanders. F o r r e s t was so i n t e n t on m a i n t a i n i n g h i e independence t h a t he d i d n o t work as a member o f t h e team f o r t h e g r e a t e r qood of all.:2m However, Forres't: s t i o ~ t l dbear t h e p r i m a r y b l nme for' internal. cavalry discontent. g e t a l o n g w i t h everyone, W h i l e Wheeler d i d h i c i b e s t t o t h e war n u t

F o r r e s t spent most of

g e t t i n g a l o n g w i t h any 0.F h i s s u p e r i o r s . w a l l as a p a r t of had a b e t t e r p l a n .

He f a i l e d t o w,:!rl.::

a u n i f i r ? d p l a n because he always f ~ ! l t : tie D u r i n g t h e summer- o f 1863, he was n o t A11 o f h i s

even c o n c e n t r a t i n g on h i s p r e s e n t m i s s i o n .

energy was b e i n g expended t r y i n g t o go west t o t h e Mississippi River. Because o f h i s i n a b i l i t y t o work w e l l as a team member, he was o f t e n l e f t t o t a k e c a r e of s h o u l d have been a s s i s t e d . problems h i m s e l f when he

When he was busy d e l a y i n g

G r a n g e r ' s column a l o n g t h e La F a y e t t e Road,

i t would have

been v e r y easy f o r t h e Confederate command t o have a s s i s t e d him and d e f e a t e d t h e whole Union column. However, due t o

t h e command r e l a t i o n s h i p r e s u l t i n g f r o m F o r r e s t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o work w i t h o t h e r s , t h e r e was no o r g a n i z e d e.ffor-t .to

r e i n f o r c e , o r s u p p o r t F o r r e s t and t h e enemy marched on to Snodgrass H i l l a f t e r bypassing F o r r e s t . c e r t a i n l y evident, but nevertheless, H i s a b i l i t i e s were

he was a t h o r n i n ,the

s i d e o f e v e r y commander he ever had.

and he somet:ime.;

caused

f l a w s i n t h e p l a n n i n g and e x e c u t i o n o f t h e o v e r a l l e f f o r t . However, when t h e r e was a . f i g h t , F o r r e s t and h i s men were always i n t h e t h i c k o f Chickamauga, infantry! ) it. O n day two of t h e B a t t l e of

t h e y f o u g h t so h a r d as dismounted c a v a l r y ( a s

t h a t t h e y won a s i n g u l a r compl iment f rorn


H.

L i e u t e n a n t General D.

Hill.

H i l l was a staunch

i n f a n t r y m a n who had a r e p u t a t i o n i n t h e Army o f N o r t h e r n V i r g i n i a f o r h a v i n g no use f o r c a v a l r y . He a d m i t t e d t o

b e i n g pre.jctdiced a g a i n s t c a v a l r y and had pub1 i c n l I. y c l a i m c d t o have never seen a dead cavalryman. fight, However, d w i n q khj.:;

when i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e u n i t f i g h t i n g so f i e r c e l y he

b e s i d e h i m was n o t i n f a n t r y b u t r a t h e r F o r r e s t ' s c a v a l r y , made a p e r s o n a l and d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t t o seek o u t F o r r e s t and compliment h i s command. and went back t o t h e f i g h t . F o r r e s t accepted t h i s p r a i s e H i l l ' s reports of the b a t t l e

r e c o u n t t h i s f i g h t as w e l l as s e v e r a l o,ther r e f e r e n c e s t o F o r r e s t and h i s t r o o p e r s as g a l l a n t and g e n t l e m a n l y o f f i c e r s and men who d i d yeoman's work d u r i n g t h i s f i g h t . c e r t a i n l y l e f t h i s i m p r e s s i o n on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . " l B r i g a d i e r General F o r r e s t t h e n was n o t a team p l a y e r . He was h i g h l y competent as i l l ~ t s t r o t e d by h i s many expltii.tcj. He was j u s t as gotid i n a head-to-head r a i d i n g and o t h e r independent a c t i o n s . f i g h t as he was a t The B a t t l e o f H i s major Forrest

Chickamauga e x e m p l i f i e s t h i s f a c t q u i t e w e l l . problem was h i s p e r s o n a l i t y .

He v e r y much wanted t o f i g h t b u t he was n o t o v e r l y

f o r and win Southern independence,

e n t - h u s i o%.t::ic i n d o i n q t h i s i f i t lneant. wcirking f o r s o m e r m c


else..

H e w a s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s a n d West

P o i n t e r s were a g a i n s t h i m b e c a u s e o f h i s l a c k o f s c h o o l i n g . However, h e w a s j u s t as p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t them as h e b e l i e v e d t h e y were a g a i n s t him. w i t h as t h e worst o f t h e m .

H e w a s j u s t as h a r d t o w o r k :

H e c e r t a i n l y s h a r e d t h e blame

f o r ahry p e r s o n a l i - t y corrf I. i c t s h e r a n i n t o w i t h c~,~n~.nar-lclur..-~ncl~~t-!: a n d pm ,~ a rs. T h e f a i l u r e t h e n f o r t h e firmy o f T e n n e s s e e ' s c a v a l r y

w a s o n e of l e a d e r s h i p .
conceived plan.

Rragg d i d n o t h a v e a thouroughly

H e h a d p i c k e d h i s c o i n m a n d e r s well. b u t d i d

n o t a d h e r e t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of w a r c a l l i n g f o r " U n i t y o f Command".

'"H e

allowed p e t t y d i f + e r e n c e e between .

s u b o r d i n a t e s , and s o m e i n v o l v i n g h i m s e l f , t o d e t r a c t from h i s army's


~LICC~SS.

H i s o p e r a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s were

t a i n t e d by h i s a c t i o n s . The C o n f e d e r a t e d o c t r i n e e x i s t e d f o r t h e p r o p e r u s e o f h i s cavalry. T h e o f f i c e r s i n c a v a l r y commands d u r i n g t h e s e i n t h e p r o p e r e x e c u t i o n of t h o s e

c a m p a i g n s were w e l l - v e r s e d cavalry missions.

T h e s e c o m m a n d e r s were h i g h l y c o m p e t e n t
the

a n d , t o d a y , a r e l o o k e d u p o n as h e r o e s a n d t h e masters o f

art.

But, t h e y e a c h h a d t h e i r f a i l i n g s a n d d e m o n s t r a . t e d

many o f t h e s e f a i l i n g s d u r i n g t h i s c a m p a i g n . T h i s campaign w a s l o s t a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l by p o o r leadership, p u r e and simple. Petty jealousies led t o

f a i l u r e s t o give properly detailed instructions with t h e commander's i n t e n t c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d . T h e r e were f a i l u r e s

TOE 17055J320 (TOE AS OF 24 OCTOBER 1984)

HHT

q6
0 WO
EM TOTAL

1
CAV TROOP

+-

TANK CO

ARlY BTRY

0 WO EM 18 2 213

0 WO EM 6 0 122

0 WO EM 5 0 69

0 WO EM 8 0 127

TOE 17055H040 [EQUIPPED WITH MET) (TOE AS OF 24 OCTOBER 1984)

@
0 WO
EM TOTAL

F i g u r e 1. Regimental Armored C a v a l r y Squadrons

187

TOE 17-105H020 (TOE AS O F: 24 OCTOBER 1984)

TOE 17-205J410 (TOE AS OF 24 OCTOBER 1984)

NBC RECON DET.

0 W O EM 3 12 19

0 WO EM 1 0 52

0 WO 1 0

EM 19

'PENDING APPROVAL

consulidated at t h e corps level.

They a r e n o t c a p a b l e of

a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h e m y r i a d o f m i s s i o n s r e q u i r e d or d e s i r e d a t t h e division level. They are c o n s t a n t l y o v e r - t a s k e d whether

t h e l e s s o n i s b e i n g t a u g h t d u r i n g a f i e l d e x e r c i s e or i n t o d a y ' s Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e c l a s s r o o m . hc!)

c a v a l r y m a n that s e r v e ? ; i n t . 0 d a . y ' ~ d i v i s i c m a l s q u a d r - o n s ft!?t:.l.!z t h e same k i n d o f o v e r - e x t e n s i o n f e l t by t h e S o u t h e r n

horsemen d u r i n g t h e Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns. Also,

1 i k e t h e s e h o r z e n r e n , . t o d a y ' s c a v a l r y m e n get t i r e d a n d
T h e y t o o need t o .fa:[1 b a c k t o r e f
it:,

r-oughly used. and r e l a x .

recoup,

Given t h e l i g h t , s i n y l e - t i e r e d c a v a l r y , f o r c e t h e v i t a l m i s s i o n p e r f o r m e d b y t h e s e modern

a v a i l a b l e today,

cavalrymen w i 1 l g o undone u n t i 1 t h e y are r e c d n s t i t u - t e d and r e a d y t o move f o r w a r d a g a i n . The d i v i s i o n w i l l b e

u n p r o t e c t e d a n d i n much t h e same s t r a i t s a s G e n e r a l B r a g g ' s Army


0.f

T e n n e s s e e w a s i n 1865.

T h i s c a m p a i g n h i s t o r y s h o w s how v i t a l c a v a l r y i s t o k e e p i n g a n army ar c o r p s i n f o r m e d a n d p r o t e c t e d . General

B r a g g h a d t i m e t o r e c o v e r f r o m h i s f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y use and control h i s c a v a l r y . Given its c u r r e n t d e p l e t e d s t a t e

and t h e p r o p e n s i t y of t o d a y ' s budget.-cuttiny

arm';,

a we~l:.t:r-

m d w e a k e r c a v a l r y f o r c e i s i n t h e c a r d s f o r . t h e 1J.S.. future. I t is q u i t e . f r i g h t e n i n g t o s p e c u l a t e on t h e

flrmy's

r a m i f i c a t i o n s of battleground.

a d e f u n c t c a v a l r y arm o n a n y f u t u r - e
it takes a

Today, as i n t h e 1 9 t h C e n t u r y ,

l o n g t i m e ' t o t r a i n a n d e q u i p c a v a l r y m e n a n d l e a d e r s i n !;i.~ch

~n v i frnl ,I:~.~nc.tj. un

klcrpl:?~l:~..~l. !y , sorna!orie

: i r.1

chi:wqe,

. I : I i e

of s t h e past b e f o r (2 leadership, will learn Srom the l e ~ ~ o n they go down in disgrace, like General Bragg did after his failures.

We must hope that leadership is never again the

reason for the failure of an American army.

"U.S. Army, F M 17-95, 1986, pp. 1-1 t o 2-2.

C a v a l r y Onerations,

February

"Dyer,

pp.

140-141.

- T h i s f a u l t r e s t s upon t h e s h o u l d e r s o f everyone involved. The Confederate H i g h Command knew o f t h e problem but f a i l e d t o act. When t h e y d i d a c t a f t e r t h e B a t t l e o f Chickamauga, t h e P r e s i d e n t merely s i d e s t e p p e d t h e i s s u e t r y i n g t o d i f f u s e i t . O.K., 1, X X X , p a r t 4, p.742, 744-745. Bragg and h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s were g r o s s l y g u i l t y o f l e t t i n g p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s overshadow t h e needs o f t h e army.

im02R,, X X X ,

p a r t 4,

p.

596..

l " ~ d n n e l l y , pp.

162-163. Griffith

%=Sun Tzu, T h e A r t of War, t r a n s . Samuel B. (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), p. 84. 130.R.,
14U. S.

XXX, Army,

p a r t 4,

pp.

634,

642. October

F M 90-2,

E a t t l e f i e l d Decention,

1988.
, . .R.O ='

XXX,

p a r t 3, p.

179.

'"Horn,

p.

233.
p a r t 4, p. 614. p. 938.

lVO.H., X X X ,

XXIII,

p a r t 2,

2'O.R.
JJiJ. 5 . 175-174,

XXX,
Army,

part 2 , pp.
F M IDD-5,

143-146.

Q~.g.r..&ti.orls_, May 1 9 8 6 % P p .

CIPPEI\IDI CES

JUNE 2 1 3

--

JlJLY 7,

186.3.

--The

Iviiddle 'Tennessee.

or

Tul 1ahoma

Campaign.

S U M M A R Y OF THE PRINCIPAL EVEhITS.

.:I

1-1 r k?

,,T .::.-a,

1863.

---

Hdvance of t h e Union Forces. S k i r m i s h e s a t Hover a n d U n i o n v i I. ln..

24,

1865.

Skirmish a t Middleton. S k i r m i s h near B r a d y v i l l a . S!.:irrni sh a-k C h r i s t j . mi). S k i r m i s h a.t: B i a S p r i n u Branch.

24-26, 24-27,

1863. 1863. 1863.

---

S k i r m i s h e s a t H o o v e r ' s Gap. Skirmishes a t L i b e r t y G a p : S k i r m i s h a t Guy's Gap. S k i r m i s h a t ~ u s t e r v il c l .

25,

----

26,

1863. 1863.

S k i r m i s h a t Beech Grove. Action a t Shelbyville. S k i r m i s h e s a t F o s t e r v i l l e and Guy's Gap. Skirmish a t F a i r f i e l d . Occupation u.f Manchester by The IJni on Forces.

27,

28, 29,

1863. 1869.

--

S k i r m i s h a t Rover. S k i r m i s h near H i l l s b o r o . S k i r m i s h a t Decherd.

20-3L3, 3 1 2 1 ,

1863. 186:s.

ahoma. l S k i r.mi shes near- ' r ~ t l

--

Confederate .f o r c e s evacuate T u l l a h o n ~ a . 194

JLI y~

1 , 1803.

O c c u p a ' t i o n o+ 1'1.1llahoma b y t h e U n i o n

Skirmish near Bethpaqe Bridge, River

Elk

S k i r m i s h n e a r Hobo's Cross-Roads.
2 , 1863.

S k i r m i s h a t Morris' F o r d , E l k R i v e r . S I : : i r m i s h a t Hock C r e e l : F o r d , E? ir V i u ~ c . . Skirmish a t E s t i l l Springs. S k i r m i s h e s a t Pelham and E l k River

B r i dqe:
5,

186:J.

S k i r m i s h a t H u i l i n q Fcri:.. nearWinchester-.

4,

1863.

---

Skirmish a t U n i v e r s i t y Depot. Army o f T e n n e s s e e ( C o n f e d e r a t e ) e n c a m p s around Chattanooya.

7 , 1869.

S o u r c e : Q,=,Fi_ ,., X X I I I , p a r t 1 , p.

399.

August

16

--

September 22,

1863.

--

The Chickamauga

Campaign.

S U M M A R Y O F THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.

CIIJ~LIS%

16-17,

1863.

--

General advancze of Cumber1and.

the A r m y o.f 1 : h e

17,

1863.

---

S k i r m i s h a t C a l f k i l l e r Creek, near Sparta, Trnn.

21,

lah3.

S k i r m i s h a t M a y s v i l l e . bila.
, mound, A c t i o n a t She1 1

T!mn.

Bombardment o f Chattanooga, Tenn.

22-24,

1863.

--

E x p e d i t i o n f r o m Tracy C i t y , t o t h e Tennessee R i v e r .

Tenn.,

24,

1863.

--

S k i r m i s h a t G u n t e r ' s Landiny, P o r t Deposit, Ala.

near

26-27,

1863.

----

S k i r m i s h e s a t H a r r i s o n ' s Landing, Tenn.

27-28,

1863.

S k i r m i s h a t t h e Narrows, She1 1mound, Tenn.

near

28-31,

1863.

Reconnai sc,ance from Steven!~on: Ala., t o Trenton,


Ga.

29,
3PI-31,

1863. 1863.

--

Skirmish a t Caperton's Ferry, Reconnaissance f r o m She1 I. rnolmd toward Chat tariooga,

nla.

---

Term
Ala.

31,

1863.

Skirmish a t W i l l ' s Valley,

196

.--. S L i r m . i . j h e s Davis
'

~3.t

M i11
' 5 ,

'5 C ~ r r e I . .a.~id a:

Tap

a n d Itleal

' 5

Gap.,,

A 1 a.

---

Skirmish near Alpine, Ga. R e c o n n a i s s a n c e f r o m W i n s t o n ' s Gap i n t o Hroom.town V a l l e y , S k i r m i s h at: L e b a n o n , A:La. Skirmish near Alpine, Ga. Des.truction of salt-works Kawlinqsville,
Ala.
d l :

Ala.

--

S l c i r m i s h a t S t e v e n ' s G a p , G.A. Skirmishes a t Summervillc. Skirmish at Stevenson, A l a . R e c o n n a i s s a n c e toward Chat'kanooc~a and s k i r m i s h i n Lookout Vall.ey, Tenn.
6a.

--

--

---

S k i r m i s h a t W i n s t o n ' s G a p , Rla. Skirmish a t Alpine, Ga. Chattanooga, Tenn.

occupied by

t h e Union f o r c e s . S k i r m i s h a t F r i a r ' s I s l a n d , Tenn.


k i a t Loo1::out Moi!.ntain, Skirmi s

( : a .

-. - R e c o n n a i . j s a n c e frum A 1 , p i n e kowar-d

Rome,

La F a y e t t e , a n d

S u m ~ n e r vl i l e , Ga. s1:irmish

and

a t Summervi l l c .

S k i r m i s h e s a t P e a V i n e Creek a n d

near Graysvi l l e , 11, 1863.

Ga.

--

Heconnai ssance toward Home, Ga. S k i r m i s h near B l u e B i r d Gap, Ga. S k i r m i s h a t D a v i s ' Cross-roads D a v i s ' House) Ga. S k i r m i s h near Rossvi! l c , S k i r m i s h near R i n g g o l d ,
Ua.

(or

near Dug Gap,

Ga.

11-13,

186.3.

--

S k i r m i s h e s near Lee and Gordon ' s M i l l s , Ga.

12, 186.3.

--

Skirmish a t Alpine.

Ga.

S k i r m i s h a t D i r t Town,

Ga.
or

S k i r m i s h near L e e t ' s Tan-yard, Rock S p r i n g ,

Ga.

S k i r m i s h on t h e La F a y e t t e r o a d , near Chattooga R i v e r , 13, 1863. Ga.

--

Reconnaissance f r o m Lee and Gordon's M i l l s toward La Fayette, Ga. and

skirmish. Reconnaissance f r o m Henderson's Gap, Ala., t o La F a y e t t e , Ga..

and skir'mi sh. S k i r m i s h near Summervil l e , 14, 1863. 1863. Ga.

15,

---

S k i r m i s h near La Fayet-Le, Ga. Skirmish a t T r i o n Factory. S k i r m i s h a t Summervil l e , Ga.

Ga.

Sl;irmisl-lee .ah Catlett:':; F'i guon Nount a i n , 6-7.

Cidp,

---

S k i r m i s h e s near Lee and Gordon's Mills, Ga.

Reconnaissance .from Rossvi 11e and s k i r m i s h a t Rinqgold. Slcirmish at-. Neal 's Gap, S k i r m i s h a t Owen's Ford, Chickamauga Creek, Ga.

A ~ A .
West

Ga.

--

S k i r m i s h e s a t Pea Vine R i d q e , A 1 exander ' s and Reed ' 5 R r i dye-, Dyer ' s Ford, Spr-inq Cruel: and near S t e v e n ' s Gap.

.!
Ga.,

---

B a t t l e o f Chickamauga,

Ga. I-ookuui: Ga.

S k i r m i s h e s a t Rossvi 1 l c , Church,

and Dry V a l l e y ,

--

Army o f t h e Cunberland r e t r e a t s t o Chattanuoga, Tenn.

--

S k i r m i s h e s a t M i s s i o n a r y Ridge and S h a l l o w F o r d Gap, Chattanooga, near

Tenn.

Source:

[3,,.R .,

XXX,

p a r t 1, pp.

27-28.

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