Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e requirements f o r t h e degree MASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
LAWYN C. EDWARDS, MAJ, USA B.S., U n i t e d S t a t e s M i l i t a r y Academy, 1975 M.S., A i r F o r c e I n s t i t u t e o f Technology, 1987
Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e r d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u n l i m i t e d
MASTERS O F MILITAKY ART A N D SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of candidate: T i t l e of Thesis: Went Wrona? Approved by: M A J L a m C. Edwar-
--
What
-----, Thesis
W i 11iam G . Robertson, Ph. D.
Committee Chairman
The opinions and conclusions expressed h e r e i n a r e those of t h e student author and do not n e c e s s a r i l y represent t h e views of t h e U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College or any other governmental agency. (References t o t h i s study should i n c l u d e t h e foregoing statement. )
CONFEDERATE CAVALRY A T CHICKAMAUGA W H A T W E N T W R O N G ? by NAJ Lawyn C. Edwards, USA, 206 pages. T h i s s t u d y i n v e s t i g a t e s General B r a x t o n B r a g g ' s use o f c a v a l r y d u r i n g t h e p i v o t a l Tul lahoma and Chi ckamauga Campaigns. A 5 army commander, Bragg was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r o r g a n i z i n g u n i t s , s e l e c t i n g commanders, and a s s i g n i n g missions. H i s d e c i s i o n s had s i g n i f i c a n t impact upon t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l f o r t u n e s o f t h e firmy o f Tennessee and on Conf e d e r a t e s t r a t e g y . F i r s t , t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n d e f i n e s t h e unique h e r i t a g e o f American c a v a l r y . Second, i t addresses t h e a c t u a l employment o f c a v a l r y i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America. Did t h e s e r o l e s c o i n c i d e w i t h t h o s e o f European c a v a l r y ? D i d a v a i l a b l e army and c a v a l r y l e a d e r s h i p p l a y a c r u c i a l p a r t i n t h e successes and f a i l u r e s o f Confederate p l a n s ? Do t h e c a r e e r s o f Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and F o r r e s t o f f e r c l u e s t o t h e i r e f f o r t s a t Chickamauga? A l s o , how d i d t h e elements o f n a t i o n a l power ( p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , economic, geographic, and n a t i o n a l w i l l ) , c o n t r i b u t e t o Confederate c a v a l r y performance? T h i s s t u d y concludes t h a t blame i s t o be shared between t h e commanders i n v o l v e d and t h e system w i t h i n which 'hey fought. T h i s s t u d y p r e s e n t s an i n depth view o f t h e performance o f C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y i n t h i s ' ' v i c t o r y ' ' a t t h e " R i v e r o f DeathN.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
...............i
....................vi i
D e d i c a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i i
Introduction Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter
......................... ..........................69
29
....194
2UU
CI
Appendix B
Bibliography......
.......................................
L I S T OF M A P S
O p e r a t i o n s ...................
Interest................................
..75
.........................lml ..........................14.2
Nap 3:
..
LIST O F TABLES
............................... .'7rl.
Army o f Tennessee,
A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n o f Ar-my o f Tennessee, 20 J u l y 1863.................................102 A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n o f Rrmy o f 'Tennessee, 8 6 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . % l m 31 J u l y 1 Confederate C a v a l r y Order o f B a t t l e , 31 J ~ t l y 1863, Army o f Tennessee.......................lll
Table 15.
T a b l e 4.
T a b l e 5 . A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n and C a v a l r y Order o f B a t t l e , 31 J ~ t l y1863, Department o f East Tennessee...ll2 T a b l e 6. A b s t r a c t f r o m R e t u r n o f Army o f ~ e n n e s s e eand Department of East Tennessee, 10 August 1863.114 Confederate C a v a l r y Order o f B a t t l e , 10 A~1gus.t 1863, Army of Tennessee......................115 A b s t r a c t from R e t u r n o f Army o f Tennessee, 20 August 1863
T a b l e 7.
T a b l e 8.
............................... 116
T a b l e 9.
SOURCES
L I S T OF FIGURES
SOURCES D.C.:
DEDICATION Ia m d e d i c a t i n g t h i s work t o t h e American s o l d i e r . Not o n l y t o t h e s o l d i e r o f today, o r t h e b l u e o r t h e gray, b u t t o a l l o f them. My f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n i n t h i s work does n o t l a y any g u i l t upon t h e p r i v a t e s o l d i e r o f t h e Army of I t r u l y b e l i e v e i t i s up t o t h e l e a d e r s h i p t o Tennessee. a s s i s t and a l l o w t h e American f i g h t i n g man t o win t h i s m n a t i o n ' s wars. As a member o f t h a t l e a d e r s h i p element, I a always reminded o f a quote from a p a s t p r e s i d e n t o f Lee. He s a i d , "Do your d u t y i n a l l Washington C o l l e g e , R.E. things. You cannot do more. You s h o u l d never w i s h t o do less. " I a l s o w i l l a l l o w myself t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e armies o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e Confederate S t a t e s i n t h e f i e l d d u r i n g t h e S p r i n g and Summer o f 1863, Americans a l l , were good enough t o have walked a c r o s s t h e f a c e o f Europe i f t h e y had been o f a mind t o do so. No m a t t e r what General von M o l t k e t h o u g h t about t h e s e b e i n g , t w o armed mobs r a t h e r t h a n armies, t h e y would have knocked h i s P r u s s i a n s o f f t h e f i e l d . S i n c e t h i s i s m e r e l y a p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g , I need n o t defend i t here. I hope t o do b e t t e r i n t h e t h e s i s on i t s s u b j e c t . . I thank m y w i f e f o r t h e u n t o l d a s s i s t a n c e i n t h i s work and t h e p a t i e n c e t o p u t up w i t h me. She m o t i v a t e d m e I a l s o w i l l now go p l a y b a l l w i t h my t w i n s , s e v e r a l times. j u s t l i k e I promised them. I thank m y mother and f a t h e r f o r t h e h e l p t h e y rendered also. The f i n a l work was w o r t h t h e hassle.
Introdu -. c t i o-n T h i s t h e s i s has deep r o o t s i n a l i f e - l o n g t h i r s t f o r knowledge on t h e War Between t h e S t a t e s , War. For m y family, t h e American C i v i l No one
t h i s was n o t a C i v i l War.
Alabama woods t h a t t h e y p r o b a b l y d i d n o t even know any "Yankees", much l e s s understand Yankee i d e a s and ways. grandfather Louis Trawick's family, One came home; ten In
m y great-great
i t was n o t L o u i s .
having
Ia m a cavalryman,
I have spent my
fast-moving,
helicopters.
t h a t Chickamauga was "mere ground t h a t few had ever h e a r d o f , much o f i t near w o r t h l e s s ground t h a t l a y u n c u l t i v a t e d , vine-strewn, thicket-matted,--stretches t h a t haa never known
"*
Looking a t a
map o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and r e c a l l i n g t h i s s t a t e m e n t makes one wonder whether t h e r e were a c a v a l r y m i s s i o n here. Confederate c a v a l r y u n i t s were p r e s e n t and made a contribution. defeat? D i d t h e i r presence c o n t r i b u t e t o Union Why were t h e i r uses Yet,
and accomplishments so l i m i t e d i f t h e y c o u l d have done better? General James M. Gavin o f World War I 1 fame w r o t e i n
i s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p a s t
which has c u l m i n a t e d i n t h e c u r r e n t J - S e r i e s
Current
s i t u a t i o n i s 1i m i t e d ,
c a v a l r y r e g i m e n t o f an army c o r p s i s one o f t h e s t r o n g e s t , most v e r s a t i l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e h i s t o r y o f warfare. T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s n o t o n l y w e l l manned and equipped b u t i t h o n e s t l y has t h e a b i l i t y t o h u r t an enemy. The U S Army adopted t h e d o c t r i n e o f A i r Land B a t t l e i n t h e 1980's." initiative. The i d e a was t o g a i n and m a i n t a i n t h e The i n t e n t i o n was t o h i t t h e enemy h a r d on t h e He must be h i t
b a t t l e f i e l d and deep b e h i n d t h e l i n e s .
imbued h i s whole army w i t h h i s conf i d e n c e and w i l l t o win. Continuous o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e a l m o s t snperhuman e f f o r t , because w i n n e r s g e t j u s t as t i r e d as l o s e r s . ~lsing t a c t i c a l maneuver and e f f o r t However, when
objective, reward.
demonstrated t h e poor Confederate performance i n t h e maneuver phase of Chickamauga, the battle. The a f t e r m a t h was even worse. was n o t h i n g b u t
Tactically,
Operationally,
Chickamauga was a l o s s .
l e a d e r s h i p l o s t s i g h t of l a r g e r o l e i n t h e defeat.
i t s g o a l s and i t s c a v a l r y p l a y e d a
campaigns as opposed t o
b a t t l e o f Chickmauga.
o f Tennessee s h o u l d have been employed i n a s e r i e s o f maneuvers o r b a t t l e s designed t o f u l f i l l t h e well-planned g o a l s o f t h e army commander. completion, A s one campaign neared t h e commander
whether d e f e n s i v e o r o f f e n s i v e ,
g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e h u r t t o t h e enemy.
he s h o u l d a l s o
I f he
planning He
-- h i s
c e n t e r of
gravity
--
and
He must keep h i m s e l f w e l l
of t h e cavalry.
t r a i n h i s c a v a l r y t o accomplish what he d e s i r e s and t h e n l e t them go do t h e job. him. According t o F'M 100-5 i n May 1986, t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f war " r e q u i r e s t h e commander t o answer t h r e e questions: He must a l s o p u t t o use what t h e y b r i n g
3 ) How s h o u l d t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e f o r c e be
a p p l i e d t o accomplish t h a t sequence o f a c t i o n s ? " = The t h i r d q u e s t i o n , Tennessee's c a v a l r y , as i t p e r t a i n s t o t h e Army o f General Bragg
i s addressed here.
employed his forces i n a manner which allowed h i m to fail operational1 y. The consequences of his actions reflected Hopefully, a lesson will
=Glenn Tucker, The B a t t l e o+ C h i c k a m a ~ a ,(Jamestown, V i r g i n i a : Eastern Acorn Press, 1987), p. C a. =James M. Gavin, "Cavalry And I Don't Mean Horses", Har~er's Maaazine, A p r i l 1954, pp. 54-60. "U.S. Army, F M 10Gi-5, O ~ e r a t i o ~ ~ s May - , 1986, p. i-ii.
--
& I n t h i s study t h e r e are numerous references t o t h e u n i t s of t h e Union and Confederate armies. The Union army began e a r l y i n t h e war t o number corps and d i v i s i o n s . Corps were most o f t e n c a l l e d by t h e number assigned t o them. D i v i s i o n s were sometimes r e f e r r e d t o by t h e i r numbers b u t most o f t e n by t h e commander's name. I n t h e Confederate army, no attempt was made t o number u n i t s a t any l e v e l . Throughout t h e war, a l l u n i t s were named a f t e r t h e i r commanders. Rs t h e commanders changed, u s u a l l y t h e name of t h e u n i t changed. References t o u n i t s i n t h i s paper g e n e r a l l y use t h e proper names of t h e u n i t s . Therefore, Confederate u n i t s " s i z e s " a r e c a p i t a l i z e d . Union corps a r e c a p i t a l i z e d when t h e i r numerical d e s i g n a t i o n i s used. W h e n t h e commanders name i s used t o denote t h e possessive;the u n i t s i z e i s n o t c a p i t a l i z e d , no matter t h e s i d e o r t h e size.
C~!EK..ONE
American C a v a l r y T r a d i t i o n and T a c t i c s The American c a v a l r y e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t b u i 1t upon t h e European model. There were many reasons t h a t America d i d n o t t h e l e a s t of which
n o t Europe.
The enormous s i z e of
L o u i s t o F o r t Laramie was g r e a t e r t h a n f r o m t h e A t l a n t i c t o B e r l i n , and t h i s was b a r e l y h a l f w a y t o Oregon. country, expanse. t h e East. n o t numerous p r i n c i p a l i t i e s , Also, Only one
protected t h i s
t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n was i n
Up t o t h e 1840's,
numerous The
r i v e r s and mountains,
l a r g e f o r c e s o f Europe d i d n o t r e p e a t e d l y encounter such d i v e r s i t y of t e r r a i n features. Because t h e l a n d was so l a r g e , was enormous a l s o . t h e business o f resupply
e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f slapply magazines as was done i n Europe. The R e v o l u t i o n a r y War p r o v i d e d v e r y l i m i t e d e x p e r i e n c e w i t h w a r f a r e o f t h e i n t e n s i t y which r e q u i r e d such l o g i s i t i c a l operations.
*
t h e American army was e s s e n t i a l l y a a p o l i c e force.
I t was accustomed t o
I n experience,
f r o n t i e r constabulary,
f i g h t i n g i n t h e American way,
t h e y were n o t they
However,
c e r t a i n l y had even l e s s e x p e r i e n c e a t command and employment o f u n i t s l a r g e r t h a n a company i n c o n v e n t i o n a l European conflicts. What t h e y d i d n o t need o r use, they d i d n o t
p r a c t i c e or learn." enother f a c t o r even more i n v o l v e d i n American c a v a l r y t r a d i t i o n s was t h a t Americans had an i n t e n s e d i s l i k e f o r l a r g e s t a n d i n g armies. O r i g i n a l 1y, t h i s may have developed
The t r u t h i s more l i k e l y t o be
also,
when wars a r e
The h a b i t o f r a i s i n g m i l i t i a armies o n l y when a c t u a l l y a t war seemed a l o t more s e n s i b l e e c o n o m i c a l l y t o Americans. T h i s argument can be f u r t h e r a p p l i e d t o t h e s u b j e c t a t hand. Mounted u n i t s c o s t d e c i d e d l y more t o e q u i p , m a i n t a i n t h a n do i n f a n t r y t r o o p s . So, train, and
responded by g o i n g t h e cheaper r o u t e .
t h a t what d i d n o t e x i s t c o u l d n o t t r a i n i t s e l f . The Europeans p r o b a b l y d i d n o t l i k e t o pay t h e enormous c o s t s o f t h e massive mounted c o r p s e x t a n t i n European a r m i e s either. However, t h e s e c o u n t r i e s and a r m i e s were g e n e r a l l - y
p e o p l e who were c a l l e d upon t o pay t h e b i l l were never c o n s u l t e d i n Europe. said I n America, t h e y were c o n s u l t e d and
"No".
amateurs rushed t o make up grand and g l o r i o u s t i t l e s f o r t h e i r u n i t s and t h e n made up t h e d r i l l t o go a l o n g w i t h t h e c o l l e c t i o n of troops. Many o f them had t h e i r own way o f
cream r o s e t o t h e t o p f r o m t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s and amateurs alike. L i t t l e o f t h i s was due t o f o r m a l t a c t i c s and d r i l l . ' s though. The armies
One p o i n t h e r e must be b r o u g h t o u t ,
on b o t h s i d e s o f t h e war were made up o f c i t i z e n - s o l d i e r s who came t o f i g h t and t h e n went home a f t e r t h e war was o v e r , i f not before. careerists. They were n o t l o n g - t e r m p r o f e s s i o n a l s though, t h a t t h e s e were by t h e but rather they and
--
I t i s arguable,
p r o f e s s i o n a l armies, middle of
a t l e a s t n o t m i l i t i a armies,
1863.
well-seasoned
veterans.
c e r t a i n l y knew t h e i r business,
knew t a c t i c s and d r i l l ,
whether
t h e U.S.
Army
It i s q u i t e
numeroue t y p e s of
u n i q u e as t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e names. not,
dragoons, chasseurs,
and c u i r a s s i e r s a l l charged t o g e t h e r .
10.000 t o
t h e i r usage and t h e i r success.s The e f f e c t i v e range of a musket was 100 yards. could be f i r e d no more than 3 t o 4 times a minute. It Massed
c a v a l r y charges a f f o r d e d a very e f f e c t i v e means of r o u t i n g an army against such l i m i t e d firepower. Even then, there
i n o r d i n a t e amount of time studying Napoleon's c a v a l r y . However, t h e r e were several o f f i c e r s and t h e o r i s t s who d i d understand t h e lessons learned. However, many of t h e
a more r e f i n e d and accurate a r t . . The e f f e c t i v e range of t h e new r i f l e d - m u s k e t s against i n d i v i d u a l s was around 500 yards. I t was up t o 1000 yards against massed t a r g e t s . technology should have l e d t o r e v i s e d t a c t i c s . Improved However,
The l a s t major e x p e r i e n c e Americans had w i t h war was a g a i n s t Mexico i n 1846-1848. I n many ways, t h i s war was a The
i n l a r g e part, t h e senior
sabers r a i s e d ,
l i n e s a t t h e c r u c i a l moment o f t h e b a t t l e .
Chur~kbuscoand May a t Resaca de l a Palma achieved overwhelming success. c l a s s i c saber charge. I n some minds, t h i s war v a l i d a t e d t h e
T h i s e x p e r i e n c e l i v e d on i n memory
even as t e c h n o l o g y changed:>
HOW&-,
both
At
The.first
by b o t h s i d e s remained t h o s e o f t h e p r e - C i v i l
yet both
--
The 5 t h U.S.
c o n v e r t i n g t h e i r own army's r e t r e a t i n t o a r o u t .
was t h e c l a s s i c l a r g e c a v a l r y - o n - c a v a l r y
These r o m a n t i c v i s i o n s of
t o t h e e a s t e r n t h e a t e r and v e r y l i m i t e d .
Brandy S t a t i o n and t o t h e e a s t o f G e t t y s b u r g i n 1863, and t h e one a t Yellow Tavern i n 1864 were e x c l u s i v e l y mounted f i g h t s and degenerated i n t o t h e c l a s s i c saber w i e l d i n g variety.
lX
b a n t e r e d around t h e a r m i e s u s u a l l y went something l i k e "Who Again, ~ ever saw a dead ~ a v a l r y m a n ? " ~ t h e infantryman's
d i s l i k e f o r c a v a l r y was g i v e n v o c i f e r o u s acknowledgement i n Stephen C r a n e ' s c l a s s i c n o v e l The Red Badq.e of Couraqe. t a l l s o l d i e r was quoted a s s a y i n g "They say t h e r e a i n ' t h a r d l y any c a v a l r y l e f t i n camp. o r some p l a c e , T h e y ' r e g o i n g t o Richmond, I t ' s some The
Crane a l s o says,
" I n t o t h e unspeakable jumble i n t h e roadway r o d e a squadron of cavalry. bravely. The f a d e d y e l l o w o f t h e i r f a c i n g s shone Cavalry d i d
- n o t g e t much good p r e s s w i t h t h e armies and and was seen as t r y i n g t o a v o i d a r e a l f i g h t o r j u s t c l o g g i n g up t h e road. I n g r a i n e d i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of was a new school o f t h o u g h t . American c a v a l r y t a c t i c s armies needed u n i t s
First,
w i t h f a s t operational mobility.
These f a s t u n i t s c o u l d
The o p e r a t i o n a l m o b i l i t y o f c i v i l war c a v a l r y a l l o w e d t h e t r o o p e r s t o overwhelm and c o n f u s e enemy commanders unaccustomed t o such r a p i d movement. movement of The e x t r a freedom o f
u s u a l 1y s t a y ahead o f enemy i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g .
p i c k e d up e a s i l y ,
a s e r i e s o f such q u i c k b l o w s c o u l d t h r o w an enemy
o f f guard as he r e a c t e d t o a l l o f t h e minor annoyances. There was a l s o a new w i l l i n g n e s s t o r i d e t o b a t t l e and f i g h t on f o o t . T h i s happened i n America a t t h e same In
h i s book on European c a v a l r y , Jean Roemer s a i d i n 186.3, t h a t " i t i s n o t l i k e l y t h a t any government w i l l a g a i n a t t e m p t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f mounted i n f a n t r y . States,
"lP
He w r o t e i n t h e U n i t e d
one who was o f " l a t e an o f f i c e r o f c a v a l r y i n t h e s e r v i c e o f . t h e nether land^".^^ As he wrote, he was b e i n g proven wrong.
B r i g a d i e r General B a s i l W. John H .
I f t h e r e a d e r w i l l o n l y i m a g i n e a r e g i m e n t drawn up i n s i n g l e rank, t h e f l a n k companies s k i r m i s h i n g , sometimes on horseback, and t h e n thrown o u t a s s k i r m i s h e r s on f o o t , and s o deployed a s t o c o v e r t h e whole f r o n t o f t h e regiment, t h e r e s t o f t h e dismounted men (one o u t o f each s e t o f f o u r , and t h e c o r p o r a l s r e m a i n i n g t o h o l d t h e h o r s e s ) , and deployed as circumstance5 r e q u i r e d , and t h e command i n d i c a t e d t o t h e f r o n t o f , on e i t h e r f l a n k , o r t o t h e r e a r o f t h e l i n e o f horses, t h e f i l e s two y a r d s a p a r t , and t h e n i m a g i n e t h i s l i n e moved f o r w a r d a t t h e d o u b l e q u i c k , o r o f t e n e r a h a l f r u n , he w i l l have an i d e a o f Morgan's s t y l e of f i g h t i n g . Zm
Dismounted f i g h t i n g c a l l e d f o r an i n n o v a t i o n horse holders
--
t h a t of
--
i n groups o f f o u r .
When
w h i l e t h e o t h e r t h r e e fought.
d i l i g e n t l y v i e f o r number f o u r p o s i t i o n !
a r t i l l e r y f i r e separated t h e t r o o p e r s from t h e i r horses a t an i n o p p o r t u n e time.== Mounted i n f a n t r y t a c t i c s had i t s d e t r a c t o r s even i n t h e f a c e o f i t s many successes. Many s e n i o r o f f i c e r s d i d n o t
l i k e t h e h a b i t because t h e y saw t r a i n i n g b e i n g divided."' Troopers had t o be t r a i n e d as c a v a l r y which was a l r e a d y d i f f i c u l t and t i m e consuming t o do. They a l s o had t o be
e i t h e r i n f a n t r y o r c a v a l r y m i s s i o n s would r e s u l t .
F o r r e s t and o t h e r s s o l v e d t h i s problem by m a i n t a i n i n g a mounted element w h i l e most o t h e r s were dismounted. F o r r e s t ' s case, and h i s e s c o r t , In
a r e p l e n t y o f examples o f such t a c t i c s b e i n g used t o g r e a t success w i t h no d e g r a d a t i o n o f morale o r o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t . F o r r e s t ' s v i c t o r y a t B r i c e ' s Crossroads i s such an example and one o f t h e c l a s s i c s o f t h e war and American h i s t o r y . = 4 Frank B a t c h e l o r , one o f T e r r y ' s Texas Rangers, p u b l i s h e d some o f h i s l e t t e r s , a l o n g w i t h a + e l l o w Ranger. I n t h e work e n t i t l e d " B a t c h e l o r - T u r n e r he says o f t h e c a v a l r y , T h e i r s i s t h e d u t y o f s c o u r i n g t h e enemy l i n e s n i g h t and day and r e p o r t i n g h i s movements-- t h e y a r e c o n s t a n t l y i n s i g h t o f t h e advancing f o e , f i g h t i n g h i m a t e v e r y f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n , h u r r y i n g up t h e jaded i n f a n t r y , o b s t r u c t i n g t h e roads, and o f t e n s t a n d i n g under severe f i r e s o f h i s a r t i l l e r y , o r r e s i s t i n g t h e charges o f h i s c a v a l r y . ''*s L e t t e r s 1861-1864",
I n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e job of cavalry,
Trooper B a t c h e l o r
touches on many o f t h e r e m a i n i n g m i s s i o n s assigned t o c a v a l r y u n i t s under t h e t a c t i c s r e f i n e d i n t h i s war. need t o be e x p l a i n e d somewhat.' Guard m i s s i o n s were a means o f s e c u r i t y u s u a l l y r e q u i r e d w h i l e t h e army i s on t h e march. Advance and f l a n k These
a r m y ' s poor s t a t e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n f r o m an enemy and protected i t from f u r t h e r i n j u r y . p u r s u i t b y s l o w i n g down t h e enemy. usually the f i n a l act of a b a t t l e ,
1a
C a v a l r y u n i t s q u i t e o f t e n conducted
r e a r g u a r d f i g h t s f r o m t h e t r e n c h e s r e c e n t l y abandoned by t h e infantry. They were u s u a l l y q u i t e v i o l e n t and b l ~ o d y . ~ " another means o f s e c u r i t y , were g e n e r a l l y These p i c k e t s were
Outposts,
Screening was b o t h a d e f e n s i v e and o f f e n s i v e s e c u r i t y mission. Defensively, a screen was used t o keep t h e enemy
A n o f f e n s i v e s c r e e n was q u i t e p r o b a b l y t h e o p p o s i t e .
The
General F i t z h u g h Lee d i d t h i s q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l l y w i t h a s m a l l f o r c e d r a g g i n g b r u s h t o i n d i c a t e a l a r g e r movement a t t h e 2nd B a t t l e o f M a n a s ~ a s . " ~ I n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g was another f o r t e o f t h e c a v a l r y . T h i s embraced reconnaissance, which was a s t r a t e g i c use of
cavalry,
While s e c u r i t y
was u s u a l l y a d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n , i n v o l v e d t h e u n i t i n combat.
He b r o u g h t back q u i t e a b i t o f
This i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering
use+u l and t i m e 1 y i n t e l l i g e n c e .
m i s s i o n accomplishment as t h e purpose o f t h e r i d e . = " Every army s h o u l d have a t h o r o u g h l y planned and executed s c o u t system. Each s c o u t s h o u l d b e s p e c i a l l y water c r o s s i n g s , and
c a p a b i l i t y t o s u p p o r t t h e army.
course, e a c h
For
network w a s
w a s n o t a r e g u l a r c a v a l r y m i s s i o n p e r se, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e
r e t r i e v e d from s p i e s c o u l d b e t r a n s p o r t e d , v e r i f i e d , and e x p l a i n e d by t r a i n e d o f f i c e r s and t r o o p e r s . I t was
e s s e n t i a l t o v e r i f y information by m u l t i p l e s o u r c e s t o
assist i n b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h d e c e p t i o n p l a n s .
In addition,
h a s t i l y , or i n d e e d too s l o w l y , o n i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r e d , most a s s u r e d l y made more wrong t h a n c o r r e c t g u e s s e s . 3 z T h e r a i d w a s o n e o f t h e p r e m i e r n o v e l t i e s i n t h e realm o f c i v i l war c a v a l r y t a c t i c s . The S o u t h began t h e c r a z e and
LIP i t s own p r a c t i c e .
M i s s i s s i p p i i n 1863.""
r e f i n e d i t i n t o an a r t form.
R a i d s v e r y s e r i o u s l y d i s r u p t e d t h e enemy r e a r a r e a and l o g i s t i c s bases even though t h e y were a l s o q u i t e d e s t r u c t i v e o f f r i e n d l y cavalrymen and t h e i r mounts. Even though r a i d s
v e r y o f t e n decimated t h e f o r c e e x e c u t i n g them, when a s t r o n g enough d i v e r s i o n c o u l d be c r e a t e d t o cover f o r them, s t r o n g d i v e r s i o n was needed t o c o v e r another move, or i f a
the r a i d
was q u i t e b e n e f i c i a l due t o t h e t r o u b l e s i t caused enemy commanders and t h e i r l i n e s o f c o m r n ~ n i c a t i o n . ~ ~ P u r s u i t s were another s t r o n g c a p a b i l i t y o f c a v a l r y units. "Fresh i n f a n t r y u n i t s can pursue d e f e a t e d i n f a n t r y , I n t h i s case c a v a l r y i s
r e t a i n e d f o r j u s t such an e v e n t u a l i t y . were,
culmination.
r e t r e a t i n g enemy.
h i s col~lmn.
detailed destruction.
a l l o w i n g t h e p u r s u i n g t r o o p e r s t o s t o p and l o o t .
was d e f e a t e d i n d e t a i l and d r i v e n f r o m t h e f i e l d .
="
However,
in
p u r s u i t s were n o t accomplished w e l l d u r i n g t h i s
A t Chickamauga,
Confederate C o l o n e l John S.
mounted men t o a l e v e l unmatched by any o t h e r u n i t d u r i n g t h e war. Personal i n n o v a t i o n and i n g e n u i t y was added by F o r r e s t used h i s men and a r t i l l e r y t o and t h e n use Union gunboats on t h e
capture,
Tennessee R i v e r .
Mounted c o u r i e r s and a i d e s were a f i n a l c a v a l r y chore. T h i s was one o f t h e i r non-combat r o l e s which tended t o The
s u f f e r e d much under
ever-expanding command and c o n t r o l e f f o r t which was a t loggerheads w i t h t h e need f o r a combined c a v a l r y e f f o r t and force. The way t h e Union solved t h e problem was t o mount The South had a more severe problem s i n c e i t Its
more s o l d i e r s .
Some c r i t i c s c l a i m t h a t c a v a l r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e W a r Between t h e States was n e g l i g i b l e and n o t worth mentioning."However, t h i s is a view brought about because
t a c t i c a l usage of c a v a l r y d i d not conform t o t h e Napoleonic standard. The b l o o d i e s t day of t h e war, a t Sharpsburg, led
t o o n l y 28 Union c a v a l r y c a s u a l t i e s . a t o t a l of e i g h t , casualties.
Fredericksburg l e d t o
I n t h r e e years,
major b a t t l e s , which was l e s s than what Marshall Ney made i n t h r e e hours a t water lo^.^^ Yet, f o r t h e war a t hand, t h e Cavalry
t h e Napoleonic manner b u t t h i s d i d n o t mean t h a t they were immaterial t o t h e prosecution of t h e war. The most f i t t i n g conclusion t o t h i s s e c t i o n on c a v a l r y t a c t i c s has already been w r i t t e n . These two quotes are
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e r i f l e made c a v a l r y a t t a c k s a g a i n s t i n f a n t r y perilous. I n f a n t r y armed w i t h t h e r i f l e c o u l d r a p i d l y empty t h e s a d d l e s o f advancing c a v a l r y . Cavalrymen made enough s u c c e s s f u l saber charges d u r i n g t h e war t o m a i n t a i n t h e s a b e r ' s r e p u t a t i o n , b u t saber charges were n o t common. C a v a l r y o f t e n was g i v e n semicombat and noncombat assignments, b u t when i t d i d t a k e a combat r o l e , C i v i l War c a v a l r y o f t e n f o u g h t on foot. Dismounted c a v a l r y was used b o t h t o defend and a t t a c k entrenchments. The Union c a v a l r y , b e t t e r armed w i t h r e p e a t i n g r i f l e s , was a b l e i n t h e l a t e r war p e r i o d t o s k i l l f u l l y combine dismounted and mounted t a c t i c s . The C i v i l War was a p e r i o d o f change i n c a v a l r y t a c t i c s , and t h e war l e f t t h e c a v a l r y arm w i t h an uncertain future.4" More i n t u n e w i t h American, o r a t l e a s t non-Napoleonic
a f f i c i o n a d o s , i s B r i t i s h L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Denieon who said: i n t h e American C i v i l War, t h e c o n t e n d i n g p a r t i e s had c e r t a i n l y o r i g i n a t e d and improved a system o f working c a v a l r y t h a t was c a p a b l e o f p r o d u c i n g g r e a t results. No one can r e a d t h e accounts o f Morgan's r a i d s , of F o r r e s t ' s expeditions, of S t u a r t ' s great sweeping reconnaissances, o f G r i e r s o n ' s o p e r a t i o n s i n M i s s i s s i p p i , of W i l s o n ' s i n v a d i n g army o f c a v a l r y , o f S h e r i d a n ' s t u r n i n g movements a t P e t e r s b u r g , o f h i s f i g h t i n g i n l i n e o f b a t t l e , o f h i s p u r s u i t s , &c., w i t h o u t f e e l i n g t h a t t h e mounted r i f l e p r i n c i p l e had been w o n d e r f u l l y e f f e c t i v e , and t h a t i t i s t h e p r o p e r method o f u s i n g horsemen under t h e improved s t a t e o f p r o j e c t i l e weapons. The p r o f e s s i o n a l c a v a l r y o f f i c e r i n Europe, wrapt up i n t h e t r a d i t i o n s o f t h e wars o f F r e d e r i c k t h e Great and Napoleon, b e a r i n g i n mind t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e dragoon p r i n c i p l e i n t h e seventeenth c e n t u r y , and h o l d i n g i t as a f i x e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t c a v a l r y r e l y i n g upon f i r e a r m s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y w o r t h l e s s , has never given t h e proper weight t o t h e teachings o f t h e American C i v i 1 War.rr3
...
E N D N O T E S 'Paddy G r i f f i t h , B a t t l e T a c t i c s i n t h e C i v i l W a y (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 19891, p . 181. =Gregory J.W. Urwin, The United States Cavalry - & 1 l l u s t r a t . e d Histg= (New York: S t e r l i n g Pub1i s h i n g Co. l 9 8 4 ) , p. 93.
"Perry David Jamieson, "The Development of C i v i l W a r T a c t i c s " (Ph.D. diss., Wayne S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , 1979), p. 134-136. 4George T. Denison, A H i s t o r y of Cavalry From the. E a r l i e s t Times w i t h Lessons f o r t h e Futt&ir_e_, Zd ed., (London: MacMillan, 1913), p. S93.
H . Q : The Q u & ~ ~ - e r Journ.,& lv " I r a M e i s t r i c h , "En Avant," N of M i l i t a r y History. I,3, (Spring 1989): 46-59.
&Denison, p. 393. 7Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and D i e ( U n i v e r s i t y , Alabama: U n i v e r s i t y of Alabama Press, 1982), p. 36.
. -This i s a term used d u r i n g t h e C i v i l W a r p e r i o d which denoted t h e f i r s t t i m e a s o l d i e r went i n t o combat. This . term today has been superseded by t h e term " f i r s t blood" or "baptism of f i r e " .
York: T ~ w aff ord Johnson, Eiliorv of t h e U. S. Cavalry (New Crown P u b l i s h i n g Inc., 1985), pp. 40-42.
aaAlonzo Gray, C x a l r v T a c t i c s as I l l u s t r a t e d bv t h e W a r of t h e R e b e l l i o n ( F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1916). l"Paddy G r i f f i t h , " C i v i l W a r Cavalry: Missed Dpportunities" M H Q : The Q u a r k e r l y Journal of Lvlilitaryy H i s t o r y I , 3 , (Spring 1989): pp.61-63. '"Emory M. Thomas, Bold Draaoon: The L i f e of J.E.B2. S t u a r t (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), pp. 219-231, 252-256, 290-300. 14McWhiney and Jamieson, p. 133f.
53.
'-Jean Roemer, Cavalry: I t s H i s t o r y , Nanaqement, andUses i n War (New York: D. Van N o r s t r a n d , 1863), p. 360. '9Roemer, T i t 1 e page.
Z"Denison,
pp.
362,
375. Eastern
24D. Alexander Brown, "The B a t t l e of B r i c e ' s Crossroads", Nathan 5. F o r r e s t (Jarnestown, V i r g i n i a : Acorn Press, 1988), p. 2.
"'Frank B a t c h e l o r t o J u l i a B a t c h e l o r , 7 J u l y 1863, "Batchelor Turner L e t t e r s 1861 1864" ( A u s t i n , Tesas: Steck Co., 1961), p. 60.
The
swGray, p.
118; 117.
Griffith,
B a t t l e Tactics i n the C i v i l
War, p. 183.
JIGray, p.
A Narrative., ""Shelby Foote, The C i , v i l War (New York, Random House, 1963), pp. 334-341. "-Ibid., "'Griffith, =&Gray, p.
pp.
Vol.
135.
="Ibid.
s9Denison, p . 376. 4mGriffith, Battle Tactics in the Civil War, p . *lIbid. 4"McWhiney and Jamieson, p . 43Denison, p . 394. 159.
179.
CHnPTERTWS!
Confederate C a v a l r y To gauge a u n i t ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , one must understand t h e foundation upon which i t i s b u i l t . The primary b u i l d i n g
ability to blocks contributes s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e ~ m i t ' s accomplish t h e assigned mission. Even though an army can
succeed w i t h weaknesses, t h e s t r e n g t h o f i t s foundation i s a t t h e h e a r t of a l l of i t s endeavors. strong. The Southern army was t h e f i r s t t o p u t together a c a v a l r y o r g a n i z a t i o n o f any s i g n i f i c a n t size. T h i s was Each block must be
s t i l l a minimal investment g i v e n t h e reasons s t a t e d before. However.,.whereas t h e Federals o n l y had a regiment o r so of mounted combat t r o o p s a t F i r s t Manassas, t h e Confederate t o t a l was seven regiments. t h e war, purpose. Whether t h e widely h e l d Southern b e l i e f t h a t any one Southerner could whip 10 Yankees i s c o r r e c t or n o t , t h e Southern way of l i f e d u r i n g t h e antebellum years provided f o r a more out-of -doors, a g r a r i a n 1 if estyle.= This held Not everyone I n t h i s f i r s t major b a t t l e of
n e i t h e r s i d e used i t s c a v a l r y t o any c o n s t r u c t i v e
t r u e most s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e eastern s t a t e s .
i n t h e North was a s p i n d l y f a c t o r y worker o r s t o r e c l e r k any more than a l l Southerners were Daniel Boone clones. However, j u s t as s l a v e r y was an i n s t i t u t i o n more p e c u l i a r t o
t h e South,
t h e requirement t o r i d e ,
shoot,
and f i g h t was
In this
This
t h e South p r a c t i c e d t h e e q u e s t r i a n a r t s more.
gave t h e Southern commanders a g r e a t e r p o o l o f horsemen t o draw from when c a v a l r y u n i t s became necessary. One o f t h e major weaknesses o f Southern cavalrymen was t h e i r a f f i n i t y f o r independence. w e l l as a c o l l e c t i v e phenomenon. T h i s was an i n d i v i d u a l as Each s o l d i e r r e a c t e d As
a t t h e i r b e s t when l e f t t o t h e i r own devices.= A standard procedure adopted b y Confederate c a v a l r y a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e war r e q u i r e d each t r o o p e r . t o f u r n i s h h i s own horse. T h i s procedure remained i n e f f e c t . t h r o u g h o u t I n d i v i d u a l remounting caused
have t h e v a s t r e s e r v e s o f horses a v a i l a b l e t o t h e N ~ r t h . ~ The most s i g n i g i c a n t e f f e c t o f i n d i v i d u a l remounting w a . 5 the. absence o f many t r o o p e r s f r o m t h e r a n k s a t any g i v e n time. Hard campaigning was r u i n o u s o f h o r s e f l e s h and As each t r o o p e r l o s t o r
a l l o w e d t r o o p e r s t o go on t h e i r h u n t i n g t r i p s . process, though,
had e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same e f f e c t on t h e u n i t
t o v i s i t family, desert.
c a p t u r e d and herded l o n g l i n e s o f enemy wagons and mules, w e l l as l a r g e pony herds, t o keep Southern armies s u p p l i e d Commanders w i t h an imminent
B u t again,
t h e r e was no o t h e r a v a i l a b l e s o l u t i o n so t h e d e t r i m e n t c o u l d be l a i d more p r o p e r l y on t h e d o o r s t e p o f t h e Quartermaster and Subsistence Departments. However, t h e r e were some b e n e f i t s o f each t r o o p e r s u p p l y i n g h i s own h o r s e which gave t h e Southern c a v a l r y an advantage. Each t r o o p e r t o o k much b e t t e r c a r e o f h i s own t i m e than To t h i s
a n i m a l ' s back and hooves d u r i n g non-campaigning would someone who had a government i s s u e mount. day,
This
happens even though t h e m i l i t a r y v e h i c l e w i l l q u i t e p o s s i b l y save t h e i r l i v e s i n a combat s i t u a t i o n i f i t i s maintained and understood w e l l . This more l a v i s h c a r e of t h e animals
f a c t t h a t t h e i r animals s u f f e r e d such heavy t o l l s d u r i n g o p e r a t i o n s only leads one t o wonder a t t h e increased losses t h a t would have come from l e s s c a r e b e f o r e t h e departure from camp.= Confederate c a v a l r y o r g a n i z a t i o n f o l l o w e d t h e model of t h e pre-war
U.S.
Cavalry as c l o s e l y as possible.
Initially,
commanders r a p i d l y consolidated these separate u n i t s i n t o brigades, d i v i s i o n s , and even corps. Even though they never t h e South
d i d recognize t h e need f o r t h i s c o n s o l i d a t i o n some t i m e before t h e North came t o t h e same c o n c l ~ ~ s i o n . ~ Corps, divisions, and brigades v a r i e d i n s i z e from two The primary
Regiments were e i t h e r
a t t r i t i o n took i t s t o l l ,
A t t h e onset o f t h e war,
d i s t i n c t advantage o f o r g a n i z a t i o n .
r e q u i r e d e x t e n s i v e e f f o r t t o a c h i e v e wartime s t a t u s , framework d i d e x i s t .
a l l males o f e l i g i b l e ages f r o m
T o add t o t h e m i l i t i a o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
t h e new C o n f e d e r a t e
mounted u n i t s ,
f o u r of t h e Not o n l y
but these o f f i c e r s
Two r e g i m e n t a l commanders,
R. E.
Lee o f t h e 1 s t
F a u n t l e r o y o f t h e 1 s t Dragoons and
However, t h e i r l o s s t o t h e This i n i t i a l l i s t of
names and d u t y p o s i t i o n s l e n d s credence t o t h e view t h a t more S o u t h e r n e r s were "horsemen" t h a n N o r t h e r n e r s were.*= a l o n g ' w i t h t h e s e n i o r l e a d e r s h i p o f the.mounted u n i t s , many j u n i o r mounted o f f i c e r s made names f o r themselves i n Southern s e r v i c e . Among t h o s e horsemen t h a t gained t h e i r Johnston
r a n k and fame i n Confederate s e r v i c e were Joseph E. (GEN), E. R i c h a r d S. Crittenden E. K i r b y Smith (GEN), John Ewe11 (LTG), W i l l i a m J.
B.
Hood (LTG/Temp.GEN),
(MG),
F i t r h u g h Lee ( M G ) ,
B.
S t u a r t (MG),
E a r l Van Dorn ( M G ) ,
and Henry S i b l e y (BG).14 The Confederates were t h e f i r s t t o accept t h e need f o r l a r g e numbers o f c a v a l r y . This d i d not t r a n s l a t e i n t o the
But,
each
u s u a l l y b r o u g h t t a c k and military
As t h e war progressed,
They a r r i v e d w i t h k n i v e s
o f a l l s i z e s up t o Bowie k n i v e s approaching t h e l e n g t h and w e i g h t o f t h e Roman s h o r t sword. p a s t wars, o f a l l types, uses, Some b r o u g h t swords, from
As t h e y l e a r n e d t h e i r t r a d e ,
t h a t n o t a l l o f t h e s e weapons were u s e f u l .
b a r r e l e d weapons were o f l i t t l e use and h a r d t o c a r r y on horseback. camp l i f e , The k n i v e s were good a s f a r a s k n i v e s went f o r b u t were n o t a l l t h a t u s e f u l f o r f i g h t i n g .
17
t h e i r f u n c t i o n was i n European c a v a l r y u n i t s ,
t r o o p e r s knew t h a t sabers were made f o r r o a s t i n g e a r s o f c o r n , meat, and b r e a d over a c a m p f i r e . Very seldom were They
t h e s e c l a s s i c symbols o f c a v a l r y used f o r f i g h t i n g .
but firearms
Troopers v e r y o f t e n l e f t
C o l o n e l Mosby, s a i d h i s
company i n t h e 1 s t V i r g i n i a C a v a l r y was i s s u e d sabers i n 1861. H i s o p i n i o n was summed up i n h i s statement: b u t t h e o n l y r e a l use I ever heard o f t h e i r b e i n g p u t t o was t o h o l d a p i e c e o f meat over a f i r e f o r frying. I dragged one t h r o u g h t h e f i r s t year o f t h e It war, b u t when I became a commander, I d i s c a r d e d i t . was o f no use a g a i n s t g ~ n p o w d e r . ' ~ Even t h e Yankees t h o u g h t l i t t l e o f t h e saber. General Wilson, Major
t h e s u c c e s s f u l Union c a v a l r y commander,
I t h i n k i t i s demonstrable, b o t h f r o m t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e c a v a l r y o f t h e Army o f t h e Potomac, as w e l l as t h a t o f t h e Army o f t h e West, t h a t t h e saber i s as much o u t o f d a t e f o r c a v a l r y i n a c o u n t r y l i k e o u r s as t h e s h o r t sword o f t h e Roman s o l d i e r 1 s f o r infantry. I t i s i n t h e way and i s o f no v a l u e whatever i n a f i g h t , as compared w i t h r e p e a t i n g r i f l e s , c a r b i n e s , and p i s t o l s . ="
Sabers were used some i n t h e c a v a l r y - o n - c a v a l r y a t Brandy S t a t i o n and Gettysburg. battles, battles
However, even i n t h e s e
troopers
much added weight and noise for no useful purpose.2:,' Forrest and his men carried sabers, but rarely used them albeit many modern renditions of Forrest show him wielding a saber ferociously. One of his many wounds was inflicted by
a young Union lieutenant with a sword whom Forrest tired of and shot dead with a pistol.=" Firepower did survive the test of combat to become the guiding light of cavalry arms. This was manifest by numbers At close quarters, At
greater distances, the ballistics, accuracy, and reliability were not of the highest order but they provide an impressive rate of fire which sufficed for the job at hand.z4 Shotguns were an exclusive weapon of the Southern units. They were useful because they could be loaded with a myriad of available ammunitions, from lead shot to nails and rocks. They were effective against several targets at once when at close quarters. Carbines came into their own during these times. Initially, troopers cut down longer weapons to be more manageable on horseback. These weapons were usually They, too, could use a myriad
of ammunition ranging from single bullets to lead shot to the southern innovation called buck and ball. This latter
load, a large caliber ball with several shot thrown in for good measure, was a s useful at close range as a s h o t g ~ n . ~ = ~ Later issues included many different types and makes of
The a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
ammunition made them more u s e f u l i n t h e South t h a n t h e b r a s s c a r t r i d g e r e p e a t i n g weapons t h e N o r t h was b e g i n n i n g t o produce. The most b e l o v e d weapon i n t h e Confederate c a v a l r y was the revolver. F i r s t i n v e n t e d by Samuel C o l t , i t became
The U S Cavalry f i n a l l y
adopted r e v o l v e r s i n t h e decade b e f o r e *he War Between t h e States. C o l t s o f t h e Navy '51 and Army '60 models were by
f a r t h e most p l e n t i f u l even though t h e Confederate Ordnance ~ e p a r t m e n tdid a m a g n i f i c e n t j o b o f p r o d u c i n g c o p i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e war. One o f t h e most p r i z e d possessions o f
any s o u t h e r n t r o o p e r was one o f French Doctor Jean L e M a t ' s f o r m i d a b l e .40 c a l i b e r , 9-shot r e v o l v e r s t h a t had an Confederate b u y e r s d i d
18-gauge shotgun b a r r e l i n c l u d e d .
t h e i r utmost t o g e t l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s o f t h e s e weapons home, b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e South, about t h a n ~ a r r i e d . ' ~ D e s i r i n g t h e f i r e p o w e r p r o v i d e d by t h e r e v o l v e r , s o u t h e r n t r o o p e r s c a r r i e d as many o f them as p o s s i b l e . had r e v o l v e r s on t h e i r b e l t s , boot tops, i n t h e i r pants waist, They t h e y were more o f t e n t a l k e d
i n their
s l u n g over t h e saddle,
and i n t h e i r saddlebags.
S i n c e r e v o l v e r s were d i f f i c u l t t o l o a d ,
many t r o o p e r s They
a v a i l a b l e f o r a q u i c k changeover.
By t h e t i m e many
o f them emptied a l l o f t h e i r l o a d s , t h e b a t t l e was u s u a l l y over o r t h e i r m i s s i o n accomplished. As t h e war c o n t i n u e d , small b a t t e r i e s of organizations. success. c a v a l r y commanders began t o add horse a r t i l l e r y t o t h e i r
light-weight
s i z e and makeup.
I t a l s o p l a y e d i t s more common r o l e of
The two b e s t known a r t i l l e r y
providing supporting f i r e .
commanders o f such u n i t s were S t u a r t ' s g a l l a n t Major John Pelham and F o r r e s t ' s C a p t a i n John Morton. Morton t o o k h i s
p e r i l o u s command t h r o u g h o u t t h e war w i t h F o r r e s t w i t h o u t ever l o s i n g one o f h i s guns, guns he added t o h i s u n i t . = There were two major t h e a t e r s o f o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h i s conflict, t h e e a s t e r n and t h e western. T h i s s t u d y i s about These no m a t t e r how many c a p t u r e d
engagements t o o k p l a c e i n t h e western t h e a t e r which had a c h a r a c t e r o f i t s own, See Map 1. I n t h e western t h e a t e r o f war, c a v a l r y u n i t s and
i f possible.
v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f t h e East.
Above and beyond t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e men were b o t h Southern and Western, t h e y were a l o n g way from t h e s e a t o f power.
o u t o f mind o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Richmond,
.""
a B r i t i s h L i e u t e n a n t Colonel o f Southern c a v a l r y , said i n h i s
H.
N.
Johnstone,
H i s t o r y o f T a c t i c s (1906): ..another good i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e a d m i r a b l e f i g h t i n g q u a l i t i e s o f F o r r e s t ' s C a v a l r y , and o f t h e i r a b i l i t y t o a c t b o l d l y and e f f e c t i v e l y e i t h e r mounted o r dismounted... may be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p e r i o r i n t e l l e c t o f t h e Southern gentleman o f whom h i s f o r c e was m a i n l y composed, men o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y s e l f - r e l i a n c e and s t r o n g common sense; men who knew p e r f e c t l y . w e l l when each system o f f i g h t i n g would be most advantageous, and who had g a i n e d t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r k , o f war upon t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . It must be a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n America were p e c u l i a r t o t h e c o n t i n e n t , and t h a t t h e same sys.tem m i g h t n o t be q u i t e s o s u c e s s f u l i n European armies, f i l l e d w i t h peasants o f l e s s i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a n t h e American c i t i z e n s . " ' T h i s would most a s s u r e d l y have b r o u g h t f o r t h numerous b e l l y laughs, guffaws, and s t r u t t i n g f r o m t h e Tennessee and But, they 1862,
by t h e b e g i n n i n g o f
some c a v a l r y melees,
Western and
During t h e i r f i r s t t h r e e years i n t h e
western C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y p l a y e d havoc w i t h
S p r i n g s and R u e l l ' s advance i n t o e a s t Tennessee.=* The l e a d e r s themselves were l e s s c o n v e n t i o n a l . t h e pre-war t r a i n e d t a l e n t went t o t h e East. Most o f
Cavalry and
Morgan,
much l e s s a West P o i n t e r .
I f i t worked, good;
they
d i d n o t do i t t h a t way again.
killin,.
I!:>+
He d i d b o t h w e l l .
He has been c r e d i t e d w i t h
A l l
b i o g r a p h e r s agree t h a t t h e s a y i n g i s q u i t e a c c u r a t e t o h i s t r a i n o f t h o u g h t and h i s
action^.^"
t h e r e a l cause o f t h i s war i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e * t h e chance t o do t h i n g s t h e i r own way. t h e Civil War expounded: They t h e r e f o r e f e l t f r e e t o go home when t h e y f e l t l i k e i t , o r t o wander away l o o k i n g f o r f o r a g e , f o r remounts ( o f t e n s t o l e n f r o m t h e Yankees ) , o r f o r meals ( u s u a l l y f r o m d i s t a n t c o u s i n s r e s i d e n t i n t h e a r e a o f o p e r a t i o n s ) . T h i s was d o u b t l e s s a h i g h l y a g r e e a b l e and c i v i l i s e d way t o f i g h t a war, b u t i t l e f t t h e r e g i m e n t s p r e s e n t f o r d u t y l a m e n t a b l y weak. The extreme case came i n F i r s t Tennessee C a v a l r y , when i t u n i l a t e r a l l y decided t o disband i t s e l f c o m p l e t e l y a p a r t f r o m s i x t e e n men who p r e f e r r e d t o s t a y i n camp.=& They m e r e l y came and went as t h e y d e s i r e d . t u r n e d a g a i n s t them, "going" A4 t h e war Paddy G r l f f i t h i n his
&>.Lt.J-@...ln,
gbt
worse.
r e m a i n i n g d i f f e r e n c e between e a s t e r n and western Confederate c a v a l r y was t h e l a c k o f a n o t a b l e d i f f e r e n c e between "Johnny Keb" and " B i l l y Yank" i n t h e West. The Union t r o o p s i n t h e To
s o l d i e r s were f r o m t h e r e g i o n
43
i n which t h e y .Fought.
f r o n t i e r a l l along t h e M i s s i s s i p p i River.
c a v a l r y commanders.
Army o f Tennessee s i n c e soon a f t e r t h e B a t t l e o f S h i l o h i n 1862. He had two major c a v a l r y f o r m a t i o n s which f l u c t u a t e d Major General Brigadier
commanded a c a v a l r y corps.
The c a r e e r s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s o f t h e s e o f f i c e r s
g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d t h e u t i l i z a t i o n and success r a t e o f t h e Army o f Tennessee's c a v a l r y f o r m a t i o n s . B r a x t o n Bragg was b o r n on 22 March 1817, Warren County, N o r t h C a r o l i n a . His father, i n Warrenton,
Thomas, was a
h i s older brothers,
Confederate A t t o r n e y General f o r a f our-month 1861-1862, U.S. and a l s o served as s t a t e governor (1859-1861), John,
period i n (1855-1859),
senator
Another b r o t h e r ,
served Mobile,
B r a x t o n e n t e r e d t h e U.S. d u r i n g t h e summer o f
M i l i t a r y Academy a t West P o i n t He t u r n e d
1833, a t t h e age o f s i x t e e n .
he
for
He was w e l l - r e s p e c t e d
most t a c t l e s s manner".39
He was a junior
o f f i c e r towards h i s t r o o p s .
but a l l of h i s w r i t i n g
was done f o r c i v i l i a n p u b l i c a t i o n s w i t h h i s goal t h a t o f showing how p o l i t i c a l and incompetent s e n i o r o f f i c e r s were r a t h e r t h a n s e e k i n g improvement o f t h e army.4"
f o r t h e rest of h i s l i f e .
c o n s t i t u t i o n , h i s i n a b i l i t y t o g e t a l o n g w i t h p e o p l e , and h i s c a n t a n k e r o u s moods, h e was e x i l e d t o G e n e r a l Z a c h a r y T a y l o r ' s army i n T e x a s a s t h e b o r d e r t u r n e d t u r b u l e n t . " l The n e w l y p r o m o t e d C a p t a i n B r a g g r e p ~ t t e d l yh a d t h e beet-trained l i g h t a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r y i n T a y l o r ' s army. He
demanded i n s t a n t o b e d i e n c e a n d c o u r a g e , b u t h e w a s a l w a y s w i t h h i s t r o o p s as t h e y fought.
H e became l e g e n d a r y d u e t o
c o l o n e l f o r b r a v e r y a t B u e n a Vista.
s a v i n g t h e army b y h i s p e r f o r m a n c e d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e .
q u e s t i o n i n g t h e c o u r a g e o f K e n t u c k i a n s who r a n a t t h e f i r s t shot.
H e s u p p o r t e d o n l y t h e M i s s i s s i p p i a n s who s t o o d t h e i r
g r o u n d u n d e r t h e i r West P o i n t c o m m a n d e r , J e f f e r s o n D a v i s . 4 J
Bragg may have l e a r n e d some wrong l e s s o n s from Buena Vista, also. He d i d n o t see t h a t t h e army came c l o s e t o He o n l y saw t h a t h i s mentor, a
He f a i l e d t o l e a r n t h e s t r e n g t h of
defensive position.
He saw t h a t v i c t o r y came f r o m o f f e n s e .
-''
p o s s i b l y t o keep him q ~ ~ i e t
T h i s t r a n s f e r caused c o n f l i c t
He was a b l e t o a s s i s t i n t h e f o u n d i n g o f a
L o u i s i a n a o u t o f t h e Union,
A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e war,
no one on e i t h e r s i d e had He f i n a l l y
doubts as t o Bragg's f i t n e s s o r a b i l i t i e s .
p r i m a r y C o n f e d e r a t e army i n t h e West.
won a b a t t l e a t P e r r y v i l l e and
t h e Army o f
He argued w i t h
s u p e r i o r s and i r r i t a t e d s u b o r d i n a t e s .
He a d m i n i s t e r e d t h e
s u b o r d i n a t e s d i s l i k e d h i m and c o n s p i r e d a g a i n s t him.
anti-Hragg of
s t a t e i n g e n e r a l d u r i n g h i s P e r r y v i l l e campaign.49 Many o f t h e g e n e r a l o f f i c e r s d e l v e d d e e p l y i n t o politics. They were a n t i - D a v i s men who saw Hragg as a D a v i s also."m Bragg was f u l l of
f a v o r i t e so t h e y were a n t i - B r a g g ,
c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t work as a team as t h e y headed toward Chickamauga. Joseph Wh,eeler,Jr. September 1836. was b o r n i n Augusta, Georgia on 10
His father,
o r i g i n a l l y from C o n n e c t i c u t ,
was a merchant who moved s o u t h i n 1819 w i t h h i s f i r s t w i f e who d i e d soon t h e r e a f t e r . d a ~ t g h t e r of t h e we1 1-known, H i s mother, J u l i a Knox . H u l l ,
i f disgraced,
General W i 11iam
She had two sons and two daughters, Jr., b e f o r e she a l s o d i e d i n 1842.
youngest b e i n g Joseph,
Two of J u l i a Wheeler's s i s t e r s t o o k young Joe and p u t h i m i n p r i v a . t e s c h o o l s i n t h e i r hometown of Connecticut. Cheshire, Joe moved
t o New York t o l i v e w i t h h i s s i s t e r .
H u l l and Wheeler
M i l i t a r y Acadeiny a t West P o i n t a l l o w i n g Joe t o f u l f i l l h i s m a r t i a l ambition.=l Cadet Joe Wheeler began h i s West P o i n t s t u d i e s i n 1854, under a t e s t - b e d five-year program. Wheeler managed t o make b u t was never a s t a r . He
i t t h r o u g h t h e Academy c u r r i c u l u m ,
1 9 t h o u t o f 22.
A t t h e time of graduation,
h i s s t a n d i n g was so low t h a t
he was ranked i n t o t h e c a v a l r y even though i t was h i s w o r s t subject. To compound Wheeler's shame, he was so low t h a t , So,
he was o n l y b r e v e t t e d a second l i e u t e n a n t o f c a v a l r y upon g r a d u a t i o n and was assigned t o more s c h o o l i n g i n c a v a l r y tactics a t Carlisle B a r r a ~ k s . ~ ~ S e v e r a l months l a t e r , Lieutenant, of promoted t o f u l l Second
Mounted R i f l e s .
r e g i m e n t e n t a i l e d c h a s i n g a few I n d i a n s w i t h no more t h a n a p l a t o o n i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f F o r t C r a i g , New Mexico. manage t o p i c k up t h e nickname o f Indian attackaSrr As s e c t i o n a l i s m grew, Wheeler had t o make h i s d e c i s i o n Many o f h i s f r i e n d s He d i d
" F i g h t i n g Joe'' d u r i n g an
on which way t o t u r n h i s a l l e g i a n c e .
were N o r t h e r n e r s .
his
He was u n c e r t a i n o f r e p l a c i n g e i t h e r i n
d e c i s i o n she made.
d e c i s i o n f r o m h i s regiment.
were almost e x c l u s i v e 1y Southerners. ss Wheeler's b r o t h e r had a commission w a i t i n g f o r h i m i n Georgia. Pensacola, Even so, as Wheeler made h i s way e a s t t h r o u g h
he o f f e r e d t o h e l p t h e commanding g e n e r a l ,
's
commission,
When a n o r t h Alabama i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e came t o t h e M o b i l e area, Wheeler was t h e o n l y o f f i c e r assigned w i t h any Soon though, Wheeler's
t r a i n i n g o r m i l i t a r y experience.
f a v o r a b l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i r young c ~ r n m a n d e r . ~ C ~ olonel
Mississippi.
t h e commanders However,
Wheeler c o n t r o l l e d h i s r e g i m e n t w e l l as t h e y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f Union Generals P r e n t i s s ' and H u r l b u r t ' s u n i t s a t t h e " H o r n e t ' s N e s t " and t h e "Peach Orchard". r e g i m e n t performed w e l l , i n the battle.%As t h e Con+ederates began t h e i r r e t r e a t t o C o r i n t h a f t e r t h e B a t t l e of Shiloh, the responsibility f o r rear While His
but l o s t o n e - t h i r d of i t s strength
Wheeler's t h i s time
Wheeler was
Wheeler used h i s
came i n t o u c h and c o n f l i c t w i t h Nathan Bedford F o r r e s t a t t h i s time. F o r r e s t was a b r i g a d i e r , b u t was somewhat Therefore, Bragg
k e p t Wheeler s e p a r a t e f r o m F o r r e s t even though F o r r e s t s h o u l d have had command o f a c o n s o l i d a t e d c a v a l r y corps. L a t e r i n t h e campaign, r e l a t i o n s between Rragg and F o r r e s t deteriorated further. Bragg s e n t F o r r e s t back t o
Wheeler's more r e f i n e d t r a i t s .
between Wheeler and F o r r e s t grew as an e x t e n s i o n o f t h e Pragg s i t u a t i o n . I n t h e long run, t h i s had some d i r e I n the short t h e newly
named Army of
Wheeler's s t r e n g t h l a y i n t h a t "He was always ready t o . work i n t h e team and p l a y a s u b o r d i n a t e p a r t t a h i s commanding g e n e r a l " . 6 z He a c t u a l l y p r e f e r r e d w o r k i n g as H i s next
Bragg s e n t Wheeler
o f N a s h v i l l e and d e s t r o y e d many b o a t s on t h e Cumberland R i v e r and t h e n a t t a c k e d F o r t Donelson h o p i n g t o r e g a i n t h i s jewel l o s t a year e a r l i e r by t h e Condederates. R e p o r t s d i f f e r on t h e cause o f t h e d i s a s t e r t h e r e , t h e upshot was a v i o l e n t t a n t r u m by F o r r e s t about t h e s l a u g h t e r of h i s t r o o p s i n an i l l - p l a n n e d Wheeler, a t t a c k he had but
b e i n g a s o l d i e r f i r s t and t h e n
l e t the o ~ ~ t b u r s go t by w i t h o u t m a l i c e o r o f f i c i a l
k e p t t h e grudge and s a i d ,
"*"
commanders o f t h e army a l l o w e d h i m t o g e t away w i t h i t . Wheeler d i d n o t appear t o have h e l d a grudge even i f he d i d f i n d F o r r e s t h a r d t o work w i t h i n t h e f u t u r e . Knowing o f t h i s c o n f l i c t and t r y i n g t o g a i n some e f f i c i e n c y i n h i s cavalry, Bragg went a l o n g w i t h F o r r e s t ' s
u l t i m a t u m and c o m p l e t e l y separated h i s c a v a l r y u n i t s , g i v i n g each commander a s e p a r a t e c a v a l r y corps. f e d up w i t h F o r r e s t ' s e c c e n t r i c i t i e s , choice i n t h e matter. Bragg d i d appear
Union C o l o n e l Abel D.
1863.
and t h e n p u t Wheeler i n charge w i t h a new p r ~ m o t i o n . " ~ Wheeler s e t about c o n s o l i d a t i n g and r e o r g a n i z i n g h i s new c o r p s and remained a c o n s t a n t t h r e a t t o Union s u p p l i e s and o u t p o s t s . Murfreesboro. He screened t h e a r m y ' s f r o n t t o t h e s o u t h of He a l s n s e t o u t t o c o r r e c t a d e f i c i e n c y he There were no good manuals on Even t h e ones t h a t d i d
saw i n c a v a l r y t a c t i c s .
c a v a l r y t a c t i c s i n American use.
mounted i n f a n t r y and abandoned heavy c a v a l r y as a method o f fighting. The Confederacy adopted t h e manual and a l l u s e r s
were r e l a t i v e 1 y happy.&= Nathan B e d f o r d F o r r e s t was b o r n on 13 J u l y 1821 i n t h e n B e d f o r d County, Chapel H i l l . Forrest. Tennessee n e a r . t h e present-day town of
H i s . g r a n d f a t h e r and g r e a t - g r a n d f a t h e r ,
Shadrach F o r r e s t ,
He f i n a l l y s e t t l e d down and
He l i v e d on t h e Duck R i v e r o f m i d d l e Fannie
He owned a
L u x t o n and mothered t h r e e more sons and a daughter t o him."' I n 1834 t h e f a m i l y moved t o new l a n d s t h a t opened t o s e t t l e m e n t i n Tippah County, Mississippi.
I t was h e r e t h a t
Nathan Bedford
and t h e bread-winner
f o r t h i s l a r g e family."e
B e d f o r d F o r r e s t had o n l y about s i x months o f s c h o o l education, schools. s p l i t e v e n l y between Tennessee and M i s s i s s i p p i He was a p p a r e n t l y b r i g h t b u t u n r u l y and, h i s l a t e r p e r s o n a l correspondence, given
examples of
d i d not
education.
he went i n t o a p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h an e l d e r l y u n c l e .
T h i s b u s i n e s s proceeded w e l l and a l l o w e d F o r r e s t t o move h i s f a m i l y i n t o b e t t e r accommodations and g i v e them a b e t t e r livelihood. slave-trading F o r r e s t expanded h i s b u s i n e s s i n t o h o r s e and and r e a l e s t a t e . He became w i d e l y known and were n o t
w e a l t h y though, w e l l regarded.7m
even i n t h e South, s l a v e - t r a d e r s
a kinswoman o f
From t h i s m a r r i a g e came a son who f o u g h t d u r i n g t h e war w i t h h i s f a t h e r and a daughter who d i e d young.71 By 1859, he was t h e owner o f two l a r g e c o t t o n - p r o d u c i n g p l a n t a t i o n s i n Tennessee and M i s s i s s i p p i and p a r t owner o f another. He l e f t t h e s l a v e b u s i n e s s as soon as he had made even though he d i d m a i n t a i n a l a r g e number F o r r e s t became v e r y f a m i l i a r w i t h
a decent l i v i n g ,
o f s l a v e s on h i s farms.
t h e l o c a l area around Memphis and was a w e l l - r e s p e c t e d c i t i z e n of the region. c i t y alderman. The p e o p l e of Memphis e l e c t e d him a
i n t e n s e 1y honest .'= F o r r e s t was a s t r o n g proponent o f s t a t e s r i g h t s and a Southern Democrat even though he d i d n o t seek a p o l i t i c a l career. He r e s i g n e d a f t e r one t e r m as a c i t y alderman b u t
stayed abreast o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e d i v i d i n g t h e nation.. As secession came t o Tennessee i n 1861, F o r r e s t r o d e i n t o t h e camp o f W h i t e ' s Tennessee Mounted R i f l e s ( l a t e r p a r t o f t h e 7 t h Tennessee C a v a l r y ) w i t h h i s son and h i s b r o t h e r J e f f r e y t o e n l i s t as p r i v a t e s f o r t h e war. was w o r t h about $1.5 Bedford F o r r e s t He
d i d n o t use t h i s f a c t t o h i s g a i n .
p r i v a t e when h i s s t a t e came t o him f o r h e l p . 7 J I n June 1861, t h e governor asked F o r r e s t t o r a i s e a b a t t a l i o n o f c a v a l r y f o r t h e Confederacy. The governor By October
promised h i m command as a l i e u t e n a n t c o l o n e l .
1861 he had r a i s e d 650 men and equipped them w i t h h o r s e s and arms, much o f i t t h r o u g h h i s own p e r s o n a l f a r t u n e . With
t h i s unit,
moved i n t o F o r t Donelson f o r t h e d r a m a t i c e v e n t s t h e r e . " He was t h e s e n i o r c a v a l r y l e a d e r a t F o r t Donelson s o he t o o k command o f a l l o f t h e 1400 Southern horsemen p r e s e n t . He f o u g h t d e l a y i n g a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e advance o f G r a n t ' s army f r o m F o r t Henry and t h e n f o u g h t w e l l d u r i n g t h e s h o r t b u t v i o l e n t s i e g e a t F o r t Donelson. When t h e commanders a t the
h e l d i t f o r t h e t r o o p s t o escape.
F o r r e s t made i t c l e a r t h a t he had n o t r a i s e d
i t away t o t h e enemy.
He decided t o go o u t t h r o u g h the,
A l l
l i n e s b e f o r e t h e surrender. s a f e l y w i t h him.
1400 cavalrymen r o d e o u t
t h i s u n i t was known as
From t h i s t i m e on,
F o r r e s t ' s "Old Regiment".7s F o r r e s t and t h i s r e g i m e n t t h e n r o d e t h r o u g h N a s h v i l l e and found mobs i n c o n t r o l and l o o t i n g government warehouses. He clubbed t h e r i n g l e a d e r s and d i s p e r s e d t h e crowds. He
t h e n shipped as much o f t h e s u p p l i e s o u t t o t h e Southern army as he c o u l d and d i s p e r s e d t h e r e s t t o t h e p o p u l a t i o n w h i l e p r o t e c t i n g medical s u p p l i e s t o be used by competent a u t h o r i t i e s o f whichever s i d e was a b l e t o use them f o r t h e i r i n t e n d e d purpose. army.
76
He t h e n r o d e t o C o r i n t h and t h e g a t h e r i n g
H i s n e x t b a t t l e was S h i l o h where he saw incompetence i n t h e way t r o o p s were handled and l e d . He found weak s p o t s
reason f o r t h e C o n f e d e r a t e l o s s and r e t r e a t .
p l a c e d h i s " O l d Regiment" under someone e l s e ' s command and o r d e r e d F o r r e s t i n t o m i d d l e Tennessee t o r e c r u i t a new brigade. He k e p t o n l y h i s e s c o r t company commanded by h i s and h i s s t a f f . F o r r e s t r e c r u i t e d i n an
brother, William,
By J u l y 1862, he was a b r i g a d i e r g e n e r a l and covered B r a g g ' s l e f t f l a n k f o r t h e invasion of K e n t ~ ~ c k y . ~ ~ H i s b r i g a d e performed b r i l l i a n t l y i n t h e P e r - r y v i l l e Campaign even though t h e army b e a t another i g n o m i n i o u s r e t r e a t t o Tennessee. To t o p i t a l l o f f , Bragg o r d e r e d
F o r r e s t t o turn h i s new b r i g a d e over t o Joe Wheeler and t o go t o t h e M u r f r e e s b o r o a r e a t o r a i s e s t i l l another b r i g a d e . Oui t e o b v i o ~ ~ y, s l F o r r e s t had a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e a t i n g Yankees and f o r r e c r u i t i n g s o l d i e r s . Bragg l i k e d h i s
n o t happy g e t t i n g passed t o someone whom t h e y found l e s s competent and F o r r e s t was g e t t i n g t i r e d o f u s i n g h i s f o r t u n e t o r a i s e and equip u n i t s f o r o t h e r p e o p l e t o
command:'^
With h i s money r u n n i n g o u t b u t new t r o o p s corning i n t o j o i n him, F o r r e s t found a novel way t o mount and e q u i p h i s
men.
Uncle Sam.
he r e t u r n e d w i t h s e v e r a l v i c t o r i e s ,
He a l s o
For some t i m e a f t e r t h i s r a i d , F o r r e s t served under t h e command o f t h e C h i e f o f C a v a l r y o f t h e Army o f Tennessee, Joe Wheeler. The s t o r y o f t h e i r r a i d s and c o n f l i c t s has ~ o i r e s t h e n went t o work f o r Major
a l r e a d y been t o l d .
anybody v e r y w e l l and t h a t he was n o t a g r e a t team p l a y e r . Later, over. Because o f F o r r e s t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o work w e l l under others, talents. Bragg f o u n d t h e p e r f e c t o p p o r t u n i t y t o use h i s Union cavalrymen, 1,500 s t r o n g , under C o l o n e l Abel a j e a l o u s husband k i l l e d Van Dorn and F o r r e s t t o o k
D.
Georgia.
I t took
e n c i r l e m e n t , r e s t b r e a k s f o r h i s own t r o o p s ,
h o r s e s s h o t o u t from under h i m b u t r e v e l l e d i n
was a l s o known t o b e a t h i s own men and even shoot them f o r perceived i n f r a c t i o n s , false reports. f o r d i s o b e d i e n c e o r even f o r b r i n g i n g
He always r e c o g n i z e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r
The
He d i d n o t do
s a i d l a t e r t h a t c o l l e g e s were p l a c e s "where
'Ia4
Forrest
a s he c a l l e d i t , " h i t t i n g
He p i c k e d s p o t s t h e enemy would n o t expect and he h i t them i n more t h a n one p l a c e a t t h e time. He d i d l i k e t o a r r i v e . . f i r s t and w i t h a d e c i s i - v e f o r c e a t t h e p o i n t o f impact. O n such occasions, men, he y e l l e d h i s f a v o r i t e b a t t l e c r y , 'em!"o6 "Forward,
and m i x w i t h
Stuart o r t h e fool-hardy
H i s r a i d s went f a r b e h i n d t h e enemy
ortt t o f i g h t him.
He d i d n o t u s u a l l y p l a n h i t and r u n
i n h i s tactics.
He used
s h o r t E n f i e l d f o r h i s men i n t h e i r dismounted r o l e .
l e a r n e a r l y i n t h e war.
e f f e c t o f a r t i l l e r y and was a master a t u s i n g f i r e s t o save h i s t r o o p s ' l i v e s i f possible."" F o r r e s t was a f i g h t e r b u t a v e r y independent one. had argued w i t h as many men as had Pragg. He
He c o u l d p e r f o r m
as.much a p a r t o f t h e problem as he was t h e s o l u t i o n . These t h r e e men l e a d t h e Army o f Tennessee and i t s c a v a l r y t h r o u g h o u t t h e campaigns addressed i n t h i s s t u d y . T h e i r i n f l u e n c e w i l l be apparent i n t h e m i s s i o n s assigned and t h e manner i n which t h o s e m i s s i o n s were executed.
SLICC~SS
The
o f t h e Confederate c a v a l r y a t Chickamauga r o d e on
t h e e h o u l d e r s n f t h r e e v e r y d i v e r s e s o l d i e r s who d e p a r t e d t h e s e campaigns w i t h q r o s s l y d i s p a r a t e r e p u t a t i o n s .
"James A. Schaefer, "The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry during the American Civil War" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toledo, 1982), p. 49. "John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Story of-..the U.S. Cavalry 1775-1942 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1953), p. 1 1 1 . 4Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University F'ress, 1971), pp. 6-8. =Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p. YConnelly, pp. 15-18. 7This statement is based upon personal experience over 15 years on active duty service in the U.S. Army a s a unit maintenance officer and company commander. =Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, p. 182. 183.
zwPaddy Griffith, &a_ct-le in the C i v i l War (Nottinghamshire: Fieldbooks, 1986), p. 42. ItSchaefer, p. 28. l"Ibid., p. 29.
%=Herr and Wallace, p. 88. 14Schaefer, p. 29. lSIbid., p. 39. i6Davis, pp. 84-87. 17Wiliam C. Davis, The Fiahtina Men of the Civil War (New York: Gallery Books, 1989), p. 65. ieDenison, p. 361. 17McWhiney and Jamieson, p. "wIbid.,
p.
151.
131-132. 64
21Davis, pp.
83-89.
""J. Appleton,
z4Davis, pp.
Z?6Davi
S,
pp.
58,
76-81.
"-This i s a h a b i t t h a t was l e a r n e d v e r y r a p i d l y i n t h e c a v a l r y o f t h e western armies. The s o - c a l l e d " G u e r i l l a " s h i r t s worn by Southern t r o o p e r s had s p e c i a l o v e r - s i z e d p o c k e t s t h a t were i n t e n d e d s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r c a r r y i n g additional revolver cylinders. T h i s p r a c t i c e i s s t i 11 used t o d a y by C i v i l War r e - e n a c t o r s . Davis, p. 219. xvRndrew Nelson L y t l e , 0edf o r d F o r r e s t and-k!!s-CZLL%er Com~any, (New York: Minton, B a l c h k Co., 1931), p. 303.
Hugh
= = L y t l e , pp.
="John P. Dyer, " F i q h t i n ' Joe" Wheeler (Baton Ro~lge: L o u i s i a n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1941) p. 18. J4Paul E. S t e i n e r , Medical Military Portraits 0 3 Union and Confederate G e n e r a l j ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : Whitmore P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1968), p. -7 ,341. "JJac W e l l e r , "Nathan B e d f o r d F o r r e s t : An A n a l y s i s o f U n t u t o r e d M i l i t a r y Genius", Tennessee H i s t o r i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , Vol 18, No. 5, (Sep 1959) p. q.77 LLJ.
J6Griffith,
5 a t t l e T a c t i c s of
t h e C i v i l wa.~., p.
183.
"7The-!&a~-p_ithe-&b-e1 U-o?,~:0.f_fl,cialecords--o4.-t.~, Union and Confederate -fi,~mL@-s., (hereafter ) & . O (Washington D.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1880-1901) S e r i e s 1, Volume X X I I I , p a r t 2, p. 902; X X X , p a r t 4, pp. 502, 656. (Hereafter a l l references are t o Series 1 unless otherwise stated. )
"-Grady McWhiney, H&.axton B r a a a a n d t h e C~nf~e_d.gvat_e. Defeat Volume I;-,. F i e l d Command ( N e w Yor k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , l 9 6 9 ) , p. 10.
401bid.,
pp.
35-36.
28, 51.
95-96. 87.
p. 89.
p.
15.
pp.
145-149.
151-152.
l h i c a l D i c: t i o n d r y o f t h e . 4 e J o n L. W a k e l y n , B i o a r a & P r e s s , 1977) , E Conf e d e w ( W e s t p o r t , C o n n e c t: i c u t : G ~?enwood p . 105. 49Connelly, =-Ibid., slDyer, ==Ibid., ="Ibid., =41bid. SSSchaefer, ='Wakelyn, p.
p.
p. 72. 12.
14.
20.
p.
p.
p. p.
15.
29.
434.
s7Ezra J. Warner, G e n e r a l s i n Gray: L i v e s o t : C o n f e d e r a t e Commanders ( B a t o n Rouge: L o u i s i a n a S t a t e , . ? . U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959), p. .A.L,. Writer's n o t e : T h e A l a b a m a I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t i s t h e u n i t t h a t my w i f e ' s a n c e s t o r s , t h e H u g h e s ' f ami 1 y , j o i n e d , f o ~ t g h tw i t h , d w i t h , a n d s u r r e n d e r e d w i t h ' f r o m 1861 t o 1 8 b 5 .
Forrest 1 9 8 7 ) , p.
100.
asSteiner, p. 331.
= & I b i d . , pp. 331-532.
a7Johnson,
pp. 86-93;
Gray, p.137.
~C.HArTSFIIH!ElE
T_c!U.&m!_aCa.meaLm
The Tullahoma Campaign demonstrated the low point to which the Army of Tennessee could sink without actually losing a battle. Rosecrans deceived and then flanked the
Confederate army out of its strong defensive position wi,th hardly a murmur of protest. The campaign lasted only
fifteen days, 23 June to 7 July 1863, and the Southern cause lost all of Middle Tennessee. Only for short periods of
time during the rest of the war would a Southern army control portions of Middle Tennessee, and then, only the ground upon which they stood. General Bragg encamped his army on the Duck River south of Murfreesboro after withdrawing from that battlefield in January 1863. For six months, he strengthened his lines
which spread across seventy miles of countryside from McMinnville to Columbia, Tennessee. At the apex of the arc
to Nashville continued through the. heart of Bragg's defensive area and on from Tullahoma to his base in Chattanooga. Numerous water courses ran east to west across
the line of march of Bragg's supply lines, the largest ones being the Duck, the Elk, and the Tennessee Rivers. From
Murfreesboro t o t h e east,
mountains r a n s e v e r a l r o a d s o f dubious q u a l i t y .
low s p o t s i n t h e mountains.
r e f e r r e d t o t h e s e low s p o t s as "gaps",
i t i s easy t o
understand why t h e s p a r s e l y s e t t l e d a r e a had l i t t l e a v a i l a b l e provender f o r an army.= General Bragg ' s main problem was t h a t t h e a r e a was so v a s t t h a t he d i d n o t have adequate f o r c e s t o f o r t i f y i t a l l . Hosecrans c o u l d o u t f l a n k Bragg, spread o u t ' no m a t t e r how f a r Bragg
up + a s t e r t h a n he
caul-d g e t away.
A5
t a k e n by f l a n k i n g t h e d e f e n d i n g f o r c e .
and t h e numerous b r i d g e s , f e r r i e s ,
a n d f o r d s c o u l d b e d e s t r n y e d o r damaged t o d e l a y t h e enemy
or h a r r a s s h i s SLIPPI y lines.
G e n e r a l B r a g g h a d a n o t h e r major r e a s o n , b e s i d e s g u a r d i n g a g a i n s t a Union a d v a n c e , t o s p r e a d h i s army o v e r such a wide f r o n t . T h e Army o f T e n n e s s e e was v e r y s h o r t o n The area w a s n o t t h e b e s t
f o o d f o r i t s men a n d i t s a n i m a l s .
Wide-ranging
B r a g g ' s weak t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d d r a f t a n i m a l r e s o u r c e s .
His
H i s p a r t n e r , L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l William
v i c i n i t y of Wartrace.
c o v e r e d P o l k ' s c o r p s on t h e a r m y ' s l e f t .
Wheeler's c a v a l r y c o r p s covered
b u t was s p l i t , mission.
O n t h e western f l a n k ,
t h e y even
numbered n e a r l y s i x t e e n thousand e f f e c t i v e t r o o p e r s . However, n e i t h e r f l a n k was well-manned d e d i c a t e d t o t h e j o b a t hand.= General Bragg gave t h e u n i t s t h e i r assignments and a r e a s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y around 23 A p r i l . ' not overly specific, but, These o r d e r s were nor i n t e n t l y
b y 1863, t h e c a v a l r y commanders
s h o u l d have known i n s t i n c t i v e l y what was expected o f them when g i v e n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . They s h o u l d have been
accomplished was q u i t e a b i t l e s s ,
The advance i s almost c e r t a i n . C o n c e n t r a t e your whole f o r c e . . . . t h a t General Morgan m i g h t r e l i e v e you and a l l o w your whole command t o move round t o our f r o n t (Shelbyville) . H u r r y t h e movement as w e have r e p o r t s
..
o f t h e enemy's advancem7 To accomplish t h i s m i s s i o n , Wheeler had o n l y t h e numbers assigned as shown i n Table l . = Wheeler made h i s t r o o p d i s p o s i t i o n s between S h e l b y v i l l e and M c M i n n v i l l e as seen on Map 2. Orders t o t h e s e u n i t s a r e
t h e form o f a command f a i l u r e a t c o r p s and army l e v e l s . Wheeler l o s t c o n t r o l over h i s most flamboyant and notable subordinate. As a c a v a l r y d i v i s i o n commander,
Morgan's d i v i s i o n t o p i c k e t t h e a r m y ' s extreme r i g h t f l a n k a1 ong t h e r o a d f r o m M ~ w rf e e s b o r o t o McMi n n v i 11e and Nashville t o K n o x ~ i l l e . ~ ~ Morgan found t h i s m i s s i o n t o t a l l y u n f i t f o r h i s s t y l e o f war and h i s ego.
He much p r e f e r r e d t o l e a v e t h e main
Bragg d i s a g r e e d w i t h a m i s s i o n which Morgan's He f e l t he
+
Abslrncr front rrlsr~t n j tho drtny of ~ ~ I ~ I I W W G ,r n r ~ dJlrttxluu I h g g , C . 8. .-frtny, cunlmnnding, for Junc 10,lWJ.
-ft
Command.
.
= ':
E ; :
~2
4 -
................................... Polk's wrpsr ~nrmtrp .......................................... . . .......... ~ r t l l l ~.................. rp Covrlrg...................................... .... ........................ Total' ................; Hbrdee'8 eorper lnfmtrp ......................................... ArWllery.............................: . . ....... C a nk y . . . . ........................ . . Totd ................ ................
Conoral hcndqnartom: SlauTurdescort
..., A
21c --
!a, a3
8W it,
Mi 95(
4741
251
011
811 -
.....,..; ., ; ............. .. . . . . c.va1 FF?MI~~*. eorpe ...................... . . ...... Tibeelet's corps utillccy ...................... I2 Fomsts diaaton : ............................... Pomt'a dlvMon ...................... To* .......................... . . : ......... Armen R w m r Adllerp ......................................... lnfmtq ................................
. Tolil.
t
A
'
...... ......
.
...... .
I E , all ,881
; .
dcqf ;
4 611
211
t1,m
be4
attaehd
94:
87(
8.4ii -
2,031
n, 51:
diligence slip.
captured h i s w i f e i n A p r i l ,
though Bragg knew by 6 June t h a t t h e enemy was p l a n n i n g a move, he s t i l l f u r t h e r fragmented h i s a l r e a d y t h i n l y s t r e t c h e d c a v a l r y by d e t a c h i n g Morgan and 2,500 June, men on 18
Wheeler r e f ~ ~ s e Morgan d p e r m i s s i o n t o c r o s s t h e Ohio R i v e r i n the raid. Wheeler i n s t r u c t e d Morgan t o r e t u r n q u i c k l y , specific instructions. but
gave no f u r t h e r
The command a l l o w e d
Alabama a t t h e same t i m e he a l l o w e d Morgan t o leave. Wheeler s t r e t c h e d h i s f o r c e s over a wide f r o n t w i t h no d e p t h t o h i s p o s i t i o n s and, over 5000 men. flank, still, h i s numbers were d i m i n i s h e d b y
Combined w i t h t r o o p t r a n s f e r s on t h e l e f t He His
Bragg a l l o w e d h i s c a v a l r y t o be f r i t t e r e d away.
Hragg d i d n o t change o r
accomplish t h e same m i s s i o n .
a l e s s t h a n g l o r i o u s occupation.
S i n c e most of
and t h e c u r r e n t appeared t o be i n t h e
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o f t h e enemy army,
John Wharton's d i v i s i o n remained t o watch f r o m H o o v e r ' s Gap t o L i b e r t y Gap. location, What proved t o be t h e most c r i t i c a l c o n t a i n e d o n l y one o f t h e 1 s t Kentucky, t o guard i t . b u t no adequate
H o o v e r ' s Gap i t s e l f ,
Wharton's weakened r e g i m e n t s ,
in
He had l i t t l e c o n t a c t w i t h
'=
Rosecrans o b v i o u s l y was w e l l - i n f o r m e d on t h e problems
f a c i n g Bragg.
p l a n and p r e p a r i n g h i s f o r c e s . extended f o r c e s , of
Bragg's army's c o n d i t i o n ,
t h e l a n d t o s e t up d e c e p t i o n p l a n s and r u s e s t o i n s u r e
success when he f i n a l l y moved. There were s e v e r a l o p t i o n s open t o t h e Union f o r c e s i n a t t a c k i n g Bragg. Rosecrans knew he c o u l d move t o t h e west
r o u t e s i n t o B r a g g ' s r e a r by t u r n i n g t h e e a s t e r n f l a n k and t r a p p i n y t h e Army o f Tennessee a g a i n s t t h e Duck R i v e r . Another o p t i o n f o r Rosecrans was a head-on movement s o u t h Any of
would f o r c e Bragg t o
abandon h i s whole l i n e .
Rosecrans came up w i t h a p l a n t h a t
r e q u i r e d t o s t a y on t h e d e f e n s i v e .
was t o h o l d i n h i s e n t r e n c h m e n t s w h i l e P o l k m a r c h e d n o r t h
f r o m S h e l b y v i l l e a n d t h e n t u r n e d east t o h i t t h e U n i o n flank. flanks. B r a g g e x p e c t e d v e r y l i t t l e a c t i v i t y on h i s a r m y ' s T h e c a v a l r y was t o p r o v i d e a s c r e e n o n t h e s e f l a n k s Polk
*'
R o s e c r a n s ' p l a n i n c o r p o r a t e d a l l of h i s o p t i o n s a n d maximized t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s by p l a y i n g on B r a g g ' s f e a r s . R o s e c r a n s d e c i d e d t o f e i n t toward Columbia t o keep t h e C o n f e d e r a t e s wondering about t h e i r food s u p p l y . Bragg
in place
u n t i l all a c t i v i t y stopped i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n e a r l y i n June. By J u n e 1863, most o f R o s e c r a n s a c t i v i t y h a d moved b a c k t o t h e c e n t e r of P o l k ' s a n d H a r d e e ' s l i n e s d r a w i n g B r a g g ' s attention to that front. f l a n k s was l o s t .
lo
Confederate i n t e r e s t with t h e
He
t o f o s t e r t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a major a d v a n c e h a d b e e n
79
i n i t i a t e d on t h i s r o u t e .
General Alexander M.
McCook's X X
Corps moved b e h i n d Granger u n t i l t h e y reached t h e r o a d t o Wartrace and t h e n headed toward Hardee's i n f a n t r y around Wartrace. B r a g g ' s s u s p i c i o n s were coming t r u e b u t he d i d
General George H.
C r i t t e n d e n ' s X X I Corps marched e a s t toward Manchester, b o w l i n g t h r o u g h Wheeler's l i g h t c a v a l r y screen.'As t h e Union advance developed on 24 June, Bragg e n t e r e d i n t o a p e r i o d when he d i d n o t know what was happening around him. H i s screen was so weak t o t h e r i g h t
S i n c e he had no i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m o t h e r s e c t o r s o f t h e f i e l d , Wheeler was convinced t h a t t h e s t r o n g c a v a l r y and i n f a n t r y advances on h i s p o s i t i o n s which began on 23 June were t h e main enemy e f f o r t . T h i s m i s r e a d i n g o f t h e s i t u a t i o n may
been a t t e m p t i n g t o p a t h i m s e l f on t h e back for- h i s seemingly b r i l l i a n t r e a d i n g o f t h e enemy's i n t e n t i o n s t o j u s t i e y h i s disobedience. E i t h e r way, Wheeler was convinced t h a t t h e
wasting h i s e f f o r t a g a i n s t a f e i n t , main e f f o r t .
b u t he a l s o missed t h e
O n t h e r a i n y morning o f 24 June,
W i l d e r ' s b r i g a d e o f mounted i n f a n t r y
have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o warn t h e i n f a n t r y u n i t s i n s u p p o r t . The n e a r e s t i n f a n t r y s ~ ~ p p o was rt f o ~ r m i l e s s o u t h near Reech Grove. No'one n o t i f i e d t h i s u n i t , Bate's' Brigade of
u n t i l well i n t o t h e afternoon of t h e
A c o u n t e r a t t a c k l a t e i n t h e after-noon f a i l e d t o
l o s t c o n t r o l o f t h e gap and t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s had h a r d l y even slowed t h e advance."' H a r r i s o n ' s B r i g a d e remained t h e o n l y c a v a l r y u n i t f a c i n g a determined advance i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f H o o v e r ' s Gap. Wheeler had t h e s i s t e r b r i g a d e o f Wharton's D i v i s i o n w i t h him i n f r o n t of S h e l b y v i l l e . H a r r i s o n ' s men, under
C Hardee's Wharton's d i r e c t command, began a weak screen o Corps i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f Wartrace t o Beech Grove. The main
g o a l o f t h i s b r i g a d e appeared t o be t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t between S t e w a r t ' s and C l e b u r n e ' s D i v i s i o n s so t h a t H a r d e e ' s Corps was n o t s p l i t . To accomplish t h i s , Wharton a l l o w e d
h i m s e l f t o be pushed back t o t h e west once he was s u r e he could not hold h i s l i n e . evening o f 25 June. This, indeed, happened b y t h e
t h e west was t h a t na f o r c e remained t o c o n t e s t a Union advance i n t o B r a g g ' s r e a r by way of Manchester. Bragg was
i t s
r e g i m e n t s a t t a c k e d and thrown back o u t o f t h e Gap l a t e on 2 4 June. B r a g g ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s knew o f t h e e v e n t s on C l e b u r n e ' s so h i s s i t u a t i o n was known t o t h e
f r o n t as t h e y developed, h i g h command,
on 25 June t h a t t h e L i b e r t y Gap a x i s was t h e main a t t a c k and he moved t o c o u n t e r a t t a c k i t i n t h e f l a n k w i t h P o l k ' s Corps. zs Wheeler's l a c k o f c o n t r o l over a l l o f h i s t h i n l y
spread u n i t s s t i l l gave Bragg bad i n t e l l i g e n c e f r o m which t o make d e c i s i o n s . Finally, on 26 June, two days l a t e r , Bragg r e c e i v e d By
possession o f t h e Manches.ter P i k e ,
b u t was w i t h i n s i x m i l e s
of Manchester inself.
across the Duck River, behind Bragg's army which still fortified north of the river from Shelbyville to Wartrace. Confederate headquarters at Tullahoma was vulnerable, also. Immediately, Bragg recognized his dilemma and called off his plans for Polk's counterattack. He called for both of his
corps to fall back upon the defenses of T~llahoma."~ Wheeler's cavalry units covered both corps as they pulled out of position. To accomplish this task, Wharton
still had only Harrison's Brigade to protect Mardec's Corps and screen the army's right flank from the enemy forces nuw moving into Manchester. Wheeler had Wharton's other
brigade, commanded by Colonel C.C. Crews, along with Will Martin's returned division to protect Polk's Corps and the vast amount of supplies built up in Shelbyville over the six months of relative inactivity. These supplies and the
transport allocated to moving them were vital to Bragg's success and ability to remain.in the field. Guy's Gap in front of Polk. Wheeler held
Division and Crews' Brigade to allow Polk time to move h i s Corps and the supply train across the Duck River at Shelbyville and south to the rendezvous in the Tullahoma defenses. " Bragg fell completely into Rosecrans' trap. When Bragg
realized his flank was turned, he discarded his previous plan and ordered the army to fall back on Tullahoma. decided to challenge Rosecrans to a battle from the
83
Bragg
Tullahoma defenses..
t o c o n c e n t r a t e i n t o Tullahoma.
r a i n s t a r t e d t o f a l l and c o n t i n u e d f o r over two weeks. These r a i n s caused e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s f o r b o t h armies, b u t e s p e c i a l l y slowed R r a g g ' s e f f o r t s t o e s t a b l i s h a E v e n t u a l l y , Bragg had h i s whole army a t Union f o r c e s were a l l around h i s
defensive l i n e .
and t h e y s e v e r e l y t h r e a t e n e d h i s rear.z:"
F o r r e s t ' s u n i t s encountered b l u e c l a d t r o o p s almost d a i 1y. Very l i t t l e o f t h i s s k i r m i s h i n g amounted t o more t h a n l e t t i n g each o t h e r know t h a t someone was on guard. Forrest
o p e r a t i o n s came f r o m t h e newspaper o f t h e enemy occupied areas. N a s h v i l l e and ~ o u i s v i i l e newspapers were a s t a p l e and numerous Southern s y m p a t h i z e r s t h r o u g h o u t
f o r Bragg,
a c t u a l l y even had men i n s i d e t h e c i t i e s p r o v i d i n g Bragg w i t h h i s f i r s t knowledge t h a t Rosecrans was b e g i n n i n g t o move. O n 1 June, F o r r e s t i n f o r m e d Fragg t h a t t h e enemy was p r e p a r i n g t o move.jo He was unsure whether t h e y would move but c e r t a i n l y a
f o r w a r d o r backward due t o c o n f l i c t i n g d a t a ,
Rosecrans had cavalry units concentrating at Murfreesborn giving the appearance of a move south.3' Union officers
suspected Forrest of sending two captured spies into the Union camp at Franklin. Rosecrans ordered these men hung
after an immediate drumhead court martial "thus placing it beyond the possibility of Forrest's profiting by the inf ormation they have gained". 32 The spies never revealed
their purpose or the originator of their orders, but Forrest was the first suspect. As much as Forrest was an active campaigner during this time frame, he was also causiny consternation in the Union ranks in a passive way. He became a source of immense
irritation t o the Northern leaders, all the way up t o President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin A. Stanton. They were worried in Washington that Forrest would get away from Rosecrans and fall onto General Grant's Vicksburg operations and communications lines. General-in-Chief
Halleck ordered Rosecrans t o keep Forrest occupied and present in middle T e n n e ~ s e e . " ~ , " ~ As for Rosecrans, his fear of Forrest kept him constant1 y demanding more cavalry of General Halleck. The net result was that Rosecrans
continued to delay his advance awaiting the cavalry which could protect him from Forrest's d c p r a d a t i ~ n s . ~ ~ However, even with daily skirmishing across the screen line, no significant action accurrcd on the le.ft flank of Rragg's army a s the Union advance progressed into 26 June.
F o r r e s t was prepared t o cover P o l k ' s n o r t h e r n f l a n k when he t u r n e d t o h i t t h e enemy advance a t L i b e r t y Gap. When Hragg
he found P o l k a l r e a d y o u t o f e v e n t s were n o t t o
However,
b u t t h e y c r e a t e d another legend f o r
.
Numerous Even t h e n ,
r e f e r e n c e s mention b o t h i n t h e O f f i c i a l Records.
( o r S k u l l Camp) B r i d g e i n S h e l b y v i l l e i s r e c o u n t e d i n e v e r y b i o g r a p h y o f t h e numerous men i n v o l v e d i n t h e f i g h t as w e l l a s i n t h e r e p o r t s o f t h e Union commanders who were there.=' The accounts v a r y depending upon t h e c o l o r o f t h e w r i t e r ' s u n i f o r m , b u t each a t t a c h e s honor and s k i l l t o b o t h s i d e s . The d i v i s i o n w i t h Wheeler covered t h e enemy movements a t Guy's Gap t h r o u g h 26 June. The b r i g a d e w i t h Wharton
As P o l k p u l l e d o u t o f S h e l b y v i l l e on
27 June,
W h e e l e r ' s m i s s i o n remained t o cover P o l k ' s w i t h d r a w a l and t h i s now became a r u n n i n g f i g h t w i t h S t a n l e y ' s C a v a l r y under C o l o n e l Robert H.
G.
Minty.
R e g u l a r s and t h e 1 s t M i d d l e Tennessee
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s n o r t h o f town,
Wheeler's t r o o p e r s who l o s t n e a r l y 300 p r i s o n e r s and r e t r e a t e d t o another l i n e f r o n t e d by f o u r a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s . The F e d e r a l s c o n t i l x t e d t h e i r . mal.tnted charge and c o m p l e t e l y b r o k e t h e C o n f e d e r a t e ranks, directions. s c a t t e r i n g them i n a l l
G. V.
Ramant, F o r r e s t ' s C h i e f o f
upon t h e scene.
h i m b e f o r e t h i s word a r r i v e d ,
S h e l b y v i l l e as M i n t y pushed Wheeler a c r o s s t h e b r i d g e . L u c k i l y f o r t h e S o u t h e r n e r s , t h e Union c a v a l r y s t i l l d i d have t h a t word and w o ~ ~ l od n l y l e a r n o f t h e e v e n t s which t r a n s p i r e d n e x t a t a l a t e r date. Wheeler t h e n made a v e r y
110t
It
Wheeler and M a r t i n l e d t h e 1 s t Confederate C a v a l r y and two guns back t o t h e n o r t h s i d e o f t h e b r i d g e i n an a t t e m p t t o c l e a r t h e F e d e r a l s f r o m t h e b r i d g e and h o l d i t open f o r Forrest. T h i s move c l e a r e d t h e b r i d g e m o m e n t a r i l y b e f u r e i t The F e d e r a l s chopped t h e Lieutenant
who l o s t t h e i r C o l o n e l ,
t o pieces.
o r d e r f o r t h e remainder t o c u t t h e i r way o u t a f t e r an overturned caisson blocked t h e bridge. along w i t h a handful of others, river. Wheeler and M a r t i n ,
survived a leap i n t o t h e
drowned i n t h e attempt.'6
5 0 t h F o r r e s t and Wheeler
moved t o P o l k ' s r e a r . t o guard t h e wagons e n r o u t e t o T u l 1ahoma. The F e d e r a l s r e v e l e d i n t h e i r good d a y ' s work, but
f a i l e d t o r e a l i z e how c l o s e and unguarded P o l k ' s wagons were when t h e y t o o k S h e l b y v i l l e . They made no f u r t h e r p~~r~iuit,
b u t Confederate c a v a l r y p a i d
S t a n l e y b e l i e v e d and s a i d i n h i s memoirs t h a t t h e
w i t h H a r r i s o n ' s Brigade,
c o v e r i n g Hardee's r e t r e a t t o Tullahoma.
I n so d o i n g ,
LJnion c a v a l r y .tool.: advantage o f t h e i r Wharton f e l 1 back towards t-lzrr dc:e of Fairfield. O n 27 June,
Whar-ton a r r i v e d a t Wartrace as Hardee began h i s ret:r-eat. WlheelrtWharton found no enemy t o h i s f r o n t and r e p o r . t e d t r ~ Cha-i Ihe was y o i n u t o sencl two regimen'ts t o Find and att;+c:l:: them."" T h i s he f a i l e d t o accomplish because t h e enerny was
Springs,
a c r o s s .the E l k R i v e r .
i C he c o u l d h o l d i t .
men d i d save t h e b r i d g e a t Pelham f o r use by themselves and, later, by Thomas' X I V Corps. The b r i d g e at E s t i l l S p r i n g r
was t o o s t r o n g l y h e l d f o r
Still..
Hillsboro.
O n 30 June,
e n l y 3@1 y w d s sP
advance guard.
Rut b e f o r e t h e b r i g a d e c o ~ ~ g le dt i n t o F o r r e s t r a n i n t o W i l d e r ' s whole column He q u i c k l y c u t down t h e advance guard as with the r e s t of h i s u n i t , was a b l e t o
Wilder,
Starnes w i t h t h e r e s t of h i s brigade
b u t c o s t him h i s l i f e .
D i b r e l l became t h e b r i g a d e
~ommander.~ W ~i t h enemy f o r c e s t h i s near t o Tullahoma and h e l d a t bay by o n l y a c a v a l r y b r i g a d e , p o s i t i o n was untenable. General W. W. Bragg r e a l i z e d h i s
H i s Chief of S t a f f
Brigadier
M a c k a l l k e p t ask:ing Wheeler f o r a c c u r a t e
r e p o r t s on enemy whereabouts and s t r e n g t h on t h e a r m y ' s r i ~ h t .When ~ ~ r e l i a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e d i d n o t come, Pragg f i n a l l y bowed t o Hardee's advices5 and o r d e r e d a r e t r e a t t o
a l i n e of
b a t t l e on 2 J u l y w i t h b o t h f l a n k s anchored on t h e
Again,
t h e two f o r c e s ' c a v a l r y
Still,
R i v e r w e l l n o r t h and e a s t of Confederate f o r c e s which s t i l l p u t t h e S o u t h e r n e r s i n jeopardy o f b e i n g t u r n e d away f r o m t h e i r escape r o u t e t o Chattanooga. However, the l a s t of the
and c o n s o l i d a t e i t .
a t t a c k t h e Confederate l i n e a t t h e mountains s o u t h of
the river.'-=
sent Dibrell's 8th Tennessee around to the east and north back into the Sparta area north of McMinnville t o keep an eye on Rosecrans' m ~ v e m e n t s . ~ This ~ move again caused a Forrest-induced panic in the Union high command."'" Wheeler continued t o cover Polk's Corps a s it came over the mountains at University Place. of Staff, W.W. Bragg, through his Chief
Wheeler's men moved down the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad out of Cowan, no orders came t o seriously block the large railroad tunnel east of town or destroy the railroad bed. Wheeler's men merely choked the They
burned several small bridges, but did not touch the large road or rail trestles.&& This grave mistake was t o allow
Rosecrans t o resume resupply of his army relative1 y quick1 y in front of Chattanooga. Later, in the Atlanta Campaign,
Bragg managed t o make his full retreat by 4 July with little loss other than to his rear guard cavalry which continued its skirmishing with enemy cavalry. Rosecrans had
stopped his main infantry forces and was reorganizing longer cha~ing."'~
--
no
As P o l k ' s men moved toward t h e r i v e r a t B r i d g e p o r t , Po1.k s e n t Wheeler- t o a p o i n t t h r e e m i l e s above t h e mouth o f B a t t l e Creek. a t that point, P o l k ' s r o a d came v e r y c l o s e t o Hardee's r o a d and P o l k d e s i r e d t h a t Wheeler r e c o n n o i t e r t h e
A t 2:30 P.M.
on 4
h i s c o r p s ' c r o s s i n g by 4 P.M.
Wheeler d i d n o t want t o d e s t r o y t h e b r i d g e a f t e r t h e army's passage u n t i l o r d e r e d t o do so by t h e commanding g e n e r a l . I n t h e meantime, C a p t a i n George B. get i n s t r u c t i o n s . on 5 J u l y , he t u r n e d t h e b r i d g e o v e r t o P i c k e t t o f t h e e n g i n e e r s w h i l e he went t o Soon a f t e r , t h e Confederates burned t h e They r e g r e t t e d t h i s a c t
l a s t o f Bragg's. pontoon b r i d g e s .
By 5 J u l y , the river.
t h e Sequatchie Mountains,
stopped h i s army i n t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n s abandoned b y Bragg i n Tullahoma and began t o r e c o n s t i t u t e h i s f o r ~ e s . ' ~ The , f i f t e e n day campaign was over. . p e r i o d o f t h e campaign.
r e p l i e d " t h a t i t was f r o m two Greek words 'mud' and homa, meaning 'more mud'
tulla,
meaning
".
T h i s s o b r i q u e t seemed
t o fit.'"
O n 7 July,
d e s e r t i o n s from t h e Army o# T e n n e ~ s e e . ~ " Thus ended t h e T u l lahoma Campaign. Rosecrans had managed a b r i l l i a n t campaign w i t h t o t a l l o s s e s o f o n l y 560 men. Bragg was deceived and unprepared.
He was c o n t i n u a l l y outmaneuvered by Hosecrans and f o r c e d t o g i v e up about 100 m i l e s o f t e r r i t o r y and t h r e e l i n e s o f s t o u t entrenchments. Not on1 y was m i d d l e Tennessee l o s t ,
much
Union main e f f o r t i n f r o n t o f S h e l b y v i l l e .
campaign.
231. p. 113.
115.
.War *Stephen 2 . S.ta r r The--l?n_l:.~n C ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ , r ~ ~ . , . ~ l : .1 .n .~~h,~~..~,~.*1 I: v_F?L 1.LL T L ! x B W W 1.~_th~~-1?-esZ..~_1-~.~-1.-:~L~b.5. a . r (Baton R O U ~ E L o u i s i a n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985) p. 234.
. .
'Connell y ,
"O.R,.,
p. 122. p a r t 2, p. 784.
XXIII, p.
?Ibid., =Ibid.,
p.
,. R .0 9
XXIII,
p.
lmConnelly,
llO.R.,
.120.RL,
XXIII, XXIII,
p.
p a r t 1, pp. 125.
817-818.
lSConnelly, '*Starr, p.
a3Connelly, p .
lhO.R., X X I I I ,
'7Connelly, p.
a-Ibid.,
p.
lib.
235.
p.
127.
"7lany sources l i s t t h i s u n i t as t h e 3 r d Kentucky Cavalry. "Because of i t s d i f f i c u l t s e r v i c e i n Kentucky d~~rin September g and October, 1862, i t was r e d ~ ~ c e td o a b a t t a l i o n and assigned t o t h e 3 r d Kentucky C a v a l r y . " Joseph H. Crute, J r . , U n i t s of t h e Confederate S t a t e s army
( M i d l o t h i a n , V i r g i n i a : Derwent Rooks, l 9 8 7 ) , p. 128. This t u r n of events explains t h e confusion i n t h e u n i t d e s i g n a t i o n as t h e u n i t m a i n t a i n e d b o t h r e g i m e n t a l c o l o r s and t h e men r e f e r r e d t o themselves by t h e d e s i g n a t i o n under which t h e y mustered i n t o t h e s e r v i c e , f o r reasons o f p r i d e , etc. ) XXIII, z4Connelly, " T l.> R. ""O,H,., 270.R., '=Ibid.; '"Horn,
JwO_,-&.,
I
p a r t 1, p. 127. p a r t 1, p. p a r t 2, p.
612.
p.
XXIII,
XXIII,
XXIII, p.
p.
p a r t 1, p.
XXIII,
p.
121.
p.
p.
XXIII,
p. p. p.
XXIII,
5 9 0 & ,
XXIII,
XXIII,
~ " o . R . ,
411bid., 4=Ibid.,
p. 888.
p . 886.
pp. 459-461. p a r t 1, p.539.
4=~~,, X X I I I ,
44Ibid.
pp.
+ = S t a r r , p. R L , 0 .4 "
XXIII,
96
p.
540.
248.
XXIII, XXIII,
pp. p.
p a r t 2,
p.
889. 460.
'"O_.R.,
SIIbid.,
p a r t 1, p.
"..,--.Ibid.,
"Jordan
and P r y o r ,
s40.R.,X X I I I ,
5sO-.B
2..,
p a r t 2,
XXIII,
XXIII, p. p. 237.
p a r t 1, pp. p a r t 2, p.
%YJr!.-R2.,
%'Horn, ==Wyeth,
='O.R., ""O.R.,
XXIII,
XXIII,
p.
p a r t 1, p.
"'Henry, "=Jordan
167.
&=Wyeth, p.
640.R.,X X I I I ,
&W.., X X I I I ,
""Connel l y , "7Horn, pp p.
. 237-238.
p.
13.3.
"Tonnelly,
6 7 0 R .,
'"Ibid., 71Starr, "Henry,
-1 7.x0
XXIII,
p a r t 2,
p.
898.
pp. p. p.
XXIII,
9'7
7'bga41, X X I I I .
part
1 , P.
4m9.
CHRF:TEF\'.-FOUR
Ch i-c-!i~.aam~~~&,.C_aan~.~i4n
The Chickamauga Campaign i s a p e r f e c t example of bumbling commanders, opportunities. wandering armies, and missed
D u r i n g much o f t h e t i m e d e d i c a t e d t o t h e
8 J u l y t o 17 September,
seems e x c e s s i v e g i v e n t h e s i x months spent d o i n g t h e same t h i n g b e f o r e h i s f i . f t e e n day Tullahoma Campaign t h a t was jktst f i n i s h e d . He s h o u l d have been a b l e t o move d i r e c t l y F u t u r e e v e n t s would n e a r l y 1~2ad
Bragg f o r t i f i e d
immediate o b j e c t i v e
and he wanted t o h a n d l e i t s conquest t h e same way he had won m i d d l e Tennessee. without a f i g h t . doing t h a t , Tennessee. H i s p l a n was t o make Bragg l e a v e t h e c i t y While Rosecrans decided how t o go about
and l o y i ~ t i c s ,he soon dropped t h i s idea.' Confederate c a v a l r y performance d u r i n g t h e maneuver phase was l e s s t h a n o p t i m a l . Each u n i t was assigned a but
w a s e i t h e r - assi g n c d t h e wrong m i s s i o n , a c o n f u s e d m i s s i o n , or i t f a i l e d t o c a r r y o u t t h e m i s s i o n c o r r e c t l y , w i t h a
s e n s e of urgency. nothing. T h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t t h e y were d o i n g
a g a i n , a5 a t T u l l a h o m a , t h e y d i d n o t g i v e G e n e r a l F r a g g a n a c c u r a t e p i c t u r e of what w a s - h a p p e n i n g a r o u n d him. Once t h e army w a s s o u t h o f t h e T e n n e s s e e R i v e r , . t h e c a v a l r y c o m m a n d e r s were g i v e n a r e a s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o picket. S e e Map 3. Rragg a s s i g n e d W h e e l e r ' s Corps t h e
Forrest obeyed o r d e r s - t o p i c k e t t h e
t h e r i v e r was t h e C o n f e d e r a t e i n f a n t r y .
ordered Polk t o p r o v i d e a b r i g a d e t o guard t h e r i v e r from B r i d g e p o r t t o S h e l l m o u n d , a s t r e t c h of t h e r i v e r w i t h i n B r i g a d i e r General P a t t o n W h e e l e r ' s area o f r e ~ p o n s i b i l i t y . ~ Anderson's b r i g a d e drew t h i s d u t y w i t h t h e 3 r d C o n f e d e r a t e C a v a l r y Regiment a t B r i d g e p o r t s u b j e c t t o h i s o r d e r s . =
However, i n F o r r e s t ' s a r e a ,
i n s t e a d o f o n l y a b r i g a d e , moat
a p l a n t o d e f e n d t h e r a i l r o a d s i n t h e s t a t e of G e o r g i a .
T h i s h e s u b m i t t e d o n 19 J u l y .
H e concluded t h a t a c a v a l r y
101
--
A,
11 Dcpartn~cnt Avo. 2, Qeneml l;ruxloa Brqg comma~& 1W; Accrdpuarhr Chdlakoogcl, Tmm.
Commmd
---! 2 2
)I
Told Polk'~~om................
EU~W'B mrpaa
Infantry Cavalry Artilleq
. . ........................................ ........................................... ............................... ........ Total Iluclae'a wrps ............................ Jacknon'sbrlpdar I n h t r y . . . . . . . . ................. ArlUlery ..........................................
T ArlUlor). Rc~ome Infrrit~ with ArLlUory Bew?m
-...............
--
.............. ....;.................. T o t d ........................................... Whmler'r oorprt c m r ~ l.......................................... q A r u o y ......................................... Fomt'a d Canlry ........................................... ArUlleq ................................:......... TOW...... : .................................... To(.lArm~.ofTenrr.......................
nP
&mi
oJ
ado..........
........................................... .........................................
-
rhlabarna were
c'
c a l l e d f o r t o defend a g a i n s t Rosecr-ans' c a v a l r y .
'The
F o r r e s t ' s d i v i s i o n a t f i r s t went i n t o camp around Chattanooga t o re.$ i t and a w a i t o r d e r s . on t h e eas,t bank of 'Tennessee,
A l l o f t h e men were
'5;
';3t.i1
t h e v i c i n i t y of Sparta, plantation.
U n t i l . 24. J u l y ,
i n a c t i o n o f b o t h s i d e s o f t h e con+ l i c t .
o r d e r s t o move n o r t h t o K i n g s t o n , Tennessee.
t h e r e was t o watch t h e approach t o t h e Tennessee from a c r o s s t h e Sequatchie V a l l e y towards Chattanooga and t o watch R u r n s i d e as he moved h i s X X I I I Corps on K n o ~ v i l l e . " ~ Between t h e end of t h e Tullahoma Campaign on 7 J u l y and
t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e Chickamauga Campaign on 16 A u g ~ t s t . Rosecrans k e p t a busy schedule f o r h i s t r o o p s . c o u l d move forward, and communications. B e f o r e he supply
he needed t o s e c u r e h i s l i n e s of
The r o a d s were n e a r l y
Tracy C i t y became a huge s u p p l y depot which was needed t o ensure c o n t i n u o u s s u p p l y of t h e army. Union e n g i n e e r s
1 1 2 1 9
When t h i s l i n e opened,
Rosecrans began h i s
r a i l r o a d t u n n e l i n t h e mountains near Cowan i n t a c t i n t h e r u s h t o leave. Bragg may have had hopes o f i t s u s e t o Sirice t h e Conf edera.t.es d i d so
h i s own area o f o p e r a t i o n s ,
b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s 95,000
he needed more t r o o p s , b u t t h e s e t r o o p s o n l y added t o h i s mounting l o g i s t i c s p r ~ b l e m s . ' : ~ Rosecrans knew t h a t Chattanooga was t o o w e l l defended f o r him t o be a b l e t o t a k e i t by a s s a u l t . He had no d e s i r e
t o g i v e b a t t l e .t.o t a k e Chattanooga i.f he c o u l d t u r n B r - a y g ' s + l a n k a g a i n and a c c o m p l i s h t h e same purpose. had t o d e c i d e whether t o go n o r t h o r s o u t h of T h e r e f u r e . hc t h e town t o
c r o s s t h e r i v e r and come i n behind B r a g g ' s army i n i t s de.fenses. I f he g o t behind B r a g q , he would a t least f o r c e Chattanooqa.
1 : from He m i g h t even c u t Bragg of .
Bragg o u t of
h i s o n l y supply l i n e t o A t l a n t a . Rosecrans s e t about making h i s p l a n s and d e c i s i o n s . he went n o r t h , he would have t o c r o s s t h e Cumberland Mountains and W a l d e n ' s R i d g e , b u t h i s f l a n k s would be covered by General Ambrose E. B u r n s i d e ' s army moving t o c a p t u r e Knoxvi 11e. T h i s r o u t e provided several places t o If
t e r r a i n t o c r o s s i n approaching Chattanooga i t s e l f .
same d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n , t h o u g h , would a l l o w h i m t o g e t f a r i n t o B r a g g ' s r e a r even w h i l e s p l i t t i n g h i s own f o r c e s . " Rosecrans d e c i d e d t o o p e r a t e s o u t h and west of Chattanooga. He would be a b l e t o d i r e c t l y s u p p l y h i s f o r c e s
by r a i l r o a d r a t h e r Walden's Ridge.
He b e l i e v e d , though,
and t h e l a c k of Confederate reconnaissance t u h i s berief i t . '.':, Braqg p u l l e d h i s army i n t o Chattanooga. Simon B. Major General
b u t t h e r e s u l t a n t l o s s o f K n o x v i l l e and i t s r a i l w a y d i r e c t t o V i r g i n i a would h ~ ~ t h re t cause v e r y soon. n o r t h e a s t o f Chattanooga. General Joseph E. Burnsi.de s t a y e d J o h n s t o n ' s army
p r o v i d e d a screen on t h e e a s t s i d e o f t h e r i v e r . c o r p s d i d t h e same s o u t h o f Chattanooga.ld> D u r i n g t h i s iull i n t h e a c t i v e campaigning, h i s orders t o p i c k e t t h e r i v e r . " ' t h i s mission very ably.
Wheeler had
He d i d n o t accomplish
Rather t h a n p u t t i n g h i s whole
W.
W.
Mackall,
irifornied
Wheeler a t T r e n t o n on 9 J u l y ,
i n f o r m a t i o n on Rosecrans' movements v i t a l .
s c o ~ ~ was ts
""
.f-r.cr:r~
1e.f k
M.
E s t e s and t h e 5 r d C o n f e d e r a t e C a v a l r y t o
'The rest
From I * l i \ r C i n ' s
H. Wade's 8 t h Confederate C a v a l r y
M a r t i n and t h e
p i c k e t e d from G ~ ~ n t e r s v i l t le o Decatur.
Roddey ' s s e p a r a t e
l7
t h e so-called
D i s t r i c t o f N o r t h e r n Alabama,
was
a t t a c h e d t o W h e e l e r ' s Corps and o p e r a t e d from Decatur west as f a r as C o r i n t h , near Tuscumbia, Mississippi. Hoddey's h e a d q u a r t e r s was
Alabama.
Wheeler c l a i m e d i n h i s r e p o r t t h a t he d e t a i l e d an bu.t t h e r e i s no o t h e r
As. Wheeler g a r r i s o n e d t h e western f 1 ank, Morgan r a i d began t o f i l t e r back t o t h e army. d i s o b e y i n g o r d e r s and c r o s s i n g t h e Ohio R i v e r , Morgan r a i d e d i n t o I n d i a n a and Ohio.
H e r a n i n t o much more
d i . f f i c u l . t y t h e n he had expected because t h e r e was no l o c a l Copperhead u p r i s i n g o r o f f e r o f a s s i s t a n c e a t any p o i n t . Union f o r c e s chased h i m u n m e r c i f u l 1 y.=" h a l f weeks o f r a i d i n g and r u n n i n g , Q f t e r t h r e e and a
t h e s e Union f o r c e s
c a p t u r e d Morgan and most o f t h e remnant o f h i s 2,900-man r a i d i n g f o r c e near New Lisbon, Ohio on 26 J ~ l y . " ; ~ Very few The c a v a l r y
assigned t o Ruckner i n e a s t Tennessee absorbed t h o s e t h a t did. One whole d i v i s i o n o f Wheeler's Corps ceased t o
'4
e,:i s t .
t o some e x t e n t , they
I n many cases,
. I n a1 1 cases mentioned
O n 30 J u l y ,
D.
A l l i s o n ' s Squadron,
and all
F u r t h e r mention o f misbehavior
b y 3V) J u l y .
W t , t h i s t i m e , Pl.icknsr o r d e r e d h i s p r i m a r y
began t o w o r k t o g e t h e r i n t h e f i r s t link-up of
T e n n e s s e e a n d t h e D e p a r t m e n t of E a s t Tennessee.'&
the
r i v e r . t o t h e n o r t h or s o u t h o f C h a t t a n o o g a .
s k i r m i s h e s a n d r e p o r t s o f c o n t a c t o c c u r r e d , b u t enemy m o v e m e n t s p r o v i d e d v e r y l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n a t t h i s time. G e n e r a l A n d e r s o n d i d r e p o r t o n s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s . t h a t . enemy c a v a l r y was s e e n r i d i n g a n d m a r a u d i n g n e a r t h e r i v e r a t t h e m o u t h o f B a t t l e C r e e k a n d B r i d g e p o r t a s e a r l y a s 24 July."' T h e w h o l e c o u n t r y a p p e a r e d t o b e a l i v e w i t h small s c o u t s o f c a v a l r y troops, b u t t h e Confederates discerned no p a t t e r n f r o m Union e f f o r t s . F o r r e s t and Wheeler q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e l y t h e n u s e d t h i s
t i m e t o rest a n d r e f i t t h e i r u n i t s .
R s i n many o t h e r
b r a n c h e s o f t h e a r m y , t h e c a v a l r y a l l o w e d i t s men t o g o home
t o a c q u i r e new o u ' t f i t s o f c l o t h i n g , e q u i p m e n t , a n d h o r s e s .
T h e c a v a l r y s i m p l y t o o k g r e a t e r l i b e r t i e s w i t h t h e number o f s o l d i e r s a b s e n t and t h e l e n g t h of
t i m e t h e y were g o n e .
Abtlracljrom rdum o j Lha :roo r tr Dcjmrfmcnt Xo. 9, Gcnrral Brazfoa h g g m r o n l . maadisg,jor July lW; Asadquartm Chattanooga. 3enr..
&,
............... .......................................... ......................................... ......................................... ToWPO&'#CO~~S ...= .......................... ......................................... .......................................... ......................................... TOM~111'8c o p . , ............................. Jackwn's brlgder .................................... TOWJlckton'8 brlgrdr ....................... . .
& n o d 8trb(CbaItanoo.r Tsnn.) Polk'8 O o r p l l ' Infintry Cavalry
drtIllery
11
..............................-. , ...... Plokett'8 oompmy 8. p Ybm. .............. Qsneml Bmpg'8 I:1on .....-..-..-...-...... M u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.......................... Wbdor'n Candq .......................................... Ar(Ulery ......................................... Forre&" dlrWon: cm* .......................................... ArLUlOq .........................................
Total
orrr
......................
sad a8~l.L
corps
--
..................
Table 3.
7th Alabams CoL J. C. Malnoe. j i 26 Georgia, h u t . Col. F . 11. Ison. 36 Georgia, Llaur Col. R. Thornyon. 4th Ccorgla, Col. I. W. A v v j .
'Ih
LstL1Tenmuds-
CoL P- F.
lnt Aldaamn, UaJ. A. A. Jo1~1r.w 3d Alabmm, Llcnt Col. T. 11.Uauldlo. Glst Alabama, CnpL M. L. Rlrklr?lrkk. 8th Confodorste, Cap& J. & Pldd.
.
- =-
. .-
r*.
4th Altbnma. LlcnL Col. J. U IIanr. brick. 1st Coufcderntc, Capl. C. A . Connu.
T. D . Wehber. 8th Kaolaeky Cot I L 8. C l o b S* ~ e o t n c 4 . D .R ~ m i t ~ IW ~ o o t o c t ~ ' A ~ . oB . l ~o~mom. 6 ( b harrlmckj Col. J. WatnnOrigb C k n e d i b &-t, CoL D. W. Ck Oth ~ s o t u c b COI. : ~.~.P.~meki~rid. neolt. Wud'a Olh ~ e n n c r c ) , m ~ m a o t , ~ a l . % C.no's mgimmt, LleoL b L J. U HmFard. a.m.
ld Ksntorkj, X
d . '
PI.
8ri.. h. P. C. ~ a r m o r o .
b l . N. N. C a
! r Tc-
Arlillq.
ble 4.
Abtlracl from $ e l l rctvrn o f the I h y o r l m n l o f E a r l Tmncam~, H a ' C n . Wmm B. Buchm ammanding, jor July 31, 1863; h m d p a r t m ~ n m d Tma. ,
E . Caricr. Rut4irr'r. IAgion, Col. E. \\'. Ruekw. battery, Capt. Gas. A. I3unald. Il~~nalc!'r
G. x. Folk.
able
112
Because of number of
this fact,
n e i t h e r commander k e p t an o v e r 1 y l a r q e
s o l d i e r s o r u n i t s engaqed a t p i c k e t i n g .
While cavalrymen were a t home o r r e l a x i n g i n t h e mountain r i v e r s near t h e i r camps,"o t h e Confederate army was Several t i m e s t h e
was a p p a r e n t l y B r a g g ' s p r i o r i t y m i s s i o n f o r h i s c a v a l r y . East Tennessee and N o r t h C a r o l i n a u n i t s l o s t so many t r o o p s t h a t t h e o n l y way t o stem t h e t i d e was t o t r a n s f e r them t o m o t h o r theater.
" : "
S i n c e t h e c a v a l r y commanders were
more generous w i t h t i m e away, more o f t e n t h a n i n t h e case o f foot soldiers, units. mounted men d i d e v e n t u a l l y r e t u r n tp tt.1ei.r assigned s t r e n g t h s never matched p r e s e n t
However,
(See Tables 1 t h r o u g h
F o r r e s t h i m s e l f was
offered a plan,
command, t o t h e Conf e d e r a t e h i g h command a t Richmond t h a t would t a k e him west t o an independent command. He even
.................................................. w ...................................................... . Cb&&d.dl.Yla ..................................... ........................................ .......................................... .................................................. I&Polk*.oorp. ...................................... Bill'. s,.u ...................................................... ....................................... ........................................ .................................. A N U y .................................................. T U B 5 C s r a p....................................... J#ok.oo\br(Fd.i Inr-q ................................................ ..................................................
lk.dns
s'dL'.nxp:
W i ~ b d d ~ h h . C..lrJe,eMe
;
ARilk,,
mlp,
Rle.uCadwl.*~ Cmlq-M....'.....
Clrbwr'adMh
Aruh,
Table 6 . Abstract from Return of Army of Tennessee and Department of East Tennessee, 10 August 1863
114
n"I
B*&
CoL C. C. C n z r r 7lh U.b.m. Col. J. C. Mdom Jr. O ~ ~ ~ I . , COI. ~ U F.I U. . ik. G-mxi., Waut. cot. R. ~ O W I - . 4lh Goorgb, Cot. 1. U ' . Awry.
h.r
B*&
6 L ' h o u r s IL\uuor.
l r ad] P*omrks. Cat. J. a hilor. [ah] L1e.L COL P . F. Andew &b Texm LlruL CoL 0. & k . Illh T u r LlrmL CoL J . Y k n d r
em-
6
= L
Command.
0 "
e %:
b ?
............................................... ................................
159
A. 110
840
1 3 v, W!
.-
S t a f f &d d m i
Qe-o
IS. 1%
rneelerb Cav*
Cavalry Artilkry
m -1 i . ns IR =I=
3 x 3 90: 1i 8.8% IJ.*N . . 8.31
I3,m
9,105 7,x
se
1 0 . 0 . 2 10,515 I.. 3
... .
I.. 11
11
.............................................. m v g .............................................
4.m
1%
a b l e 8.
want.4
t o qo t o t h e M i s s i s s i p p i R i v e r and o r g a n i z e a
He
d i v i s i o n o f t r o o p s t o harr-ass t h e enemy on t h e r i v e r .
and m a i n t a i n them i n t h e r e g i o n above V i c k s b u r g and Memphis. S i n c e t h e M i s s i s s i p p i River. had r e c e n t 1y been 1os.t. w i t h t h e f a 1 1 of Vicksburq, he f e l t he c o u l d i n t e r d i c t i - t from bo-kh t h e Union cause."" Richmond and
banks t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of
Braqq l o o k e d upon t h i s p r o p o s a l f a v o r a b l y and t h e y were convinced F o r r e s t was -the man t o succeed i n such a b o l d ventur-e. However.,
t. F o r r e s t ' s d i r e c - t communication was s~1.1
o f Tennessee d i d 'The p l a n
His f i r s t
had m a i n t a i n e d a watch on t h e Union f o r c e s w h i l e t h e y r e f i t t e d themselves and any new r e c r u i t s t h e y r e c e i v e d . These f o r c e s j o u s t e d t h e week b e f o r e and c o n t i n u e d t o v i e a q a i n s t each o t h e r a l l t h e ' way t o t h e r i v e r . i n the strength of The d i f f e r e n c e
t h e a s s a u l t s on 17 August f r o m t h e
t r o o p s were t o p r o v i d e d e c e p t i o n b y l i g h t i n g f i r e s and pretending t o b u i l d boats f o r crossing t h e r i v e r . C r i t t e n d e n ' s men were t o demonstrate i n f r o n t o f , a r t i l l e r y into, t h e town. and f i r e
Hragg f e l l r i g h t i n t o t h e t r a p
16 August,
Tennessee.
--
looking f o r
deserter^.^'
&c.
f ronl
ttlt:!
Negroes w i t h him,
c o t t o n i f necessary, a~tions."~
Thomas'
Chattanooga t o t h e r i v e r a t Stevenson.
C r i ttenden 's X X I
Corps moved d i r e c t l y a t Cha.ttanooga w i t h Colonel W i l d e r ' a Lightning Brigade leading.z" The Union army a r r i v e d a t t h e
1863 a Day of
F a s t i n g and Prayer f o r t h e
C o n f e d e r a ~ y . ' ~ As t h e o f f i c e r s and c i t i z e n s were a t p r a y e r i n t h e churches o f t h e c i t y , s h e l l s i n t o t h e town. sustained, W i l d e r ' s guns lobbed a few
mountains.
Uy 22 R u q u s t , t h o u g h , t h e y h a d b e e n rec:al l e d t o Brent.
a n d set t o a c t i n g as
A s Forrest recalled
t h e r i v e r a t a b o u t t h e same
t i m e , t h e Army o f T e n n e s s e e h a d n o r e m a i n i n g p r e s e n c e o n t h e
w e s t bank t h e r e a f t e r .
"'
Wm.
E.
H i l l s o u t h w e s t o f H o m e t o C e n t r e , Alabama w i t h t h e
" E l i t e " B a t t a l i o n a s l a t e a s 23 A u g u s t .
Major H i l l w a s s e n t
INot u n t i 1 27
August d i d Wheeler call M a r t i n ' s D i v i s i o n f o r w a r d from Alexandria, Alabama, e i g h t y miles a w a y . This division w a s
t o t a l l y u n f i t f o r f i e l d d u t y a n d m u s t e r e d o n l y 1200 men."6= On 30 A u g u s t , e x c e p t f o r o n e r e g i m e n t t h a t i s m e n t i o n e d
l a t e r , M a r t i n ' s D i v i s i o n w e n t b a c k s o u t h t o Ho~knd M o u n t a i n ,
A l a b a m a , t o p u l l i t s e l f t o g e t h e r a n d await f u r t h e r
order^.^.'
N o t u n t i l 29 R u g u s t d i d W h a r t o n r e c e i v e o r d e r s t o move
f o r w a r d t h e s e v e n t y m i l e s f r o m Rome, G e o r g i a . H i s unit's
Wheeler i::epk h i s
""
H i l l near Chattanooga
he had s t i l l n o t a r r i v e d .
Martin's f i r s t unit,
H.
moved X I V and X X Corps s o u t h t o c r o s s t h e Tennessee R i v e r west o f Chsttanooga. Hrayy r e c e i v e d word t h a t t r o o p s were b u t b e l i e v e d t h i s was a
along t h e r i v e r t o t h e south,
enemy would c r o s s . th te , enemy c r o s s e d t h e r i v e r t e n m i l e s O n 29 A ~ t q ~ ~ s below B r i d g e p o r t and f o r c e d C o l o n e l E s t e s ' p i c k e t s of 3 r d Confederate C a v a l r y away f r o m t h e r i v e r . reported t h i s crossing, on t h e day i t happened. Bragg from a c i v i l i a n . = " the
by a l a r g e c a v a l r y f o r c e , However,
t h e word f i r s t g o t t o
b u t s t i l l t h e y were n o t s t o p p i n g ,
o r r e p o r t i n g enemy m ~ v e m e n t s . ~ '
O n 31 August,
r e p o r t e d enemy c a v a l r y a l l around h i m on Sand and Lookout Mountains. He a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t C o l o n e l E s t e s ' command was The whole l i n e i n t o Lookout V a l l e y
completely scattered.
was open t o t h e enemy.%" S i n c e i n f a n t r y p i c l : : e t s reached f r o m Chattanooga 'to t h e Hiwassee R i v e r , F o r r e s t was m a i n l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r w a t c h i n g t h e Hiwassee t o K i n g s t o n . Once B ~ ~ c b n e r
t h e r i v e r n o r t h of
of t h e r i v e r a t Loudon on 30 began a w i t h d r a w a l 5 0 ~ 1 t h
August.=" August, F o r r e s t and Fegram had been c o o p e r a t i n g s i n c e 24 b u t Buckner wanted t o make s u r e he k e p t h i s c a v a l r y Forrest received orders through
c o v e r i n g h i s corps.%"
B u c k n e r ' s Headquarters f o r t h e c a v a l r y screen t o f a l l b a r k w i t h t h e corps from Knoxville."" This Forrest did. Buckner
b u t l e f t t o cover t h e l a s t b r i d g e a c r o s s t h e
c o v e r i n g Ruckner ' s w i t h d r a w a l
While t h e movement o f Buckner ' s Corps toward Cha-ttanooga was i n p r o g r e s s , o r d e r s came from Brayg t i . ,
r:onsolj.da~te al:L
(3.F
C:hi~tt.~~nc~r~g~
i n - t o one c o r p s o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h F o r r e s t i n conmand.
/Is
O+
9 September, F o r r e s t added t o h i s d i v i s i o n t h e b r i g a d e s of
Peyram, S c o t t , and Hodye under Pegram as d i v i s i o n commander. Included Ilorqan ' s
General John H.
men who had r i d d e n i n t o d e s t r u c t i o n i n Ohio dur.inu June i!nd JLI~Y."*" D u r i n g t h e week t h a t Buckner was r e t u r n i n g from Kno:.:ville, Hragg s t i l l had i n mind t h a t t h e deccp'tion
By 4 September though,
s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d moving i n f a n t r y a c r o s s t h e r i v e r by horseback even a f t e r he had p r e v i o u s l y d e n i e d access t o t h e west bank t o t h i s same c a v a l r y due t o problems o f c r o s s i n g the river. The e f f o r t came t o no a v a i l , though, because
.tr~
upon h i s c a v a l r y t o g i v e him some i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e southern sector. from General W. September. s t a t e of The o f t - r e p e x t e d " c r y i n the w i ldurness"
W.
M a c k a l l went t o Wheeler a g a i n on 2
affairs".
Rragy have f u l l and c o r r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n as t o enemy l o c a t i o n and i n t e n t . The f a i l u r e t o r e c e i v e such i n f o r m a t i o n was C o l o n e l M a u l d i n ' s weak p i c k e t on Lookout
potentially fatal.
Mountain was t h e same t y p e o f t h i n l i n e t h a t was s o e a s i l y breached a t t h e r i v e r and on Sand Mountain o v e r l o o k i n y t h e river. Mack:all w o r r i e d t h a t t h i s l i n e would a l s o be broken
and t h a t t h e enemy would s e t up a screen which would n o t a l l o w t h e Confederates t o d i s c o v e r t h e Union i n t e n t a t a l l . He was begging f o r h e l p f r o m t h e man who had l e t them down bef ore. Wheeler decided t o answer t h e c a l l t h i s time. made allowance f o r t h e r a p i d t r a n s . f e r o f concerned p a r t i e s . O n 2 September,
He even
i n f o r m a t i o n t.o a l l
Wharton ' s d i v i s i o n
p i c k e t e d a l l o f t h e passes over Lookout Mountain f r o m W i l l ' s Valley. Wharton p a t r o l l e d t h e whole mountain f r o m t h e Rlabama, i n the
ijl: L a F a y e t t e , t h e o'tlier a t A l p i n e .
Summervi 11e.
<'"'
Wharton lheadqnart.ercd a t
t o r e p o r t i n f o r m a t i o n a t l e a s t t h r e e t i m e s a day.
c o n t a c t o r movement was made, r e p o r t s were due e v e r y hour o r less. R e p o r t s went t o h e a d q u a r t e r s , Army o f Tennessee, as w e l l as
commanders o f t h e b r i d g e s a t Hesaca and Etowah, C a v a l r y Headquar.t~r-5. CJ'5 General M a r t i n ' s men came f o r w a r d , September. also,
on 2
Martin c a l l e d i n a l l of h i s far-flung
detached i n t h e f i e l d was h a l f o f t h e 3 r d Alabama under Mauldin. These 250 men were p i c k e t i n g f r o m t h e l e f t of across w i l l ' s the
i n f a n t r y down t h e r i v e r t o K e l l y ' s F e r r y ,
A t Davis'
Mill,
M a u l d i n r e c e i v e d t h e same i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r r e p o r t
procedure^.^"
The l a s t o u t p o s t s i n t h e l i n e formed a f i s h h o o k t o t h e west from Lookout Mountain a l o n g t h e Coosa R i v e r toward Gadsden. With Lookout M o ~ m t a i nc o m p l e t e l y p i c k e t e d e a s t o+
t h e enemy, a l i n e s o u t h o f t h e enemy would ensure t h a t any advance toward Home o r t h e Army o f Tennessee's s u p p l y l i ! ~ e s would be i n t e r c e p t e d . detachments of between A l p i n e , remounting. These outpos.ts c o n s i s t e d o f s m a l l
They a l s o i n c l u d e d t h e s o - c a l l e d
numerous gaps such a s Henderson's, Tap's, Standifrr's, Buck's, Davis', Baker's, and Blue Pond with anywhere from three men to a company. They reported to the commanding
officer at Alpine and General Wharton at Summerville all they could gather on enemy strengths, locations. and the names of general off icer-s commanding. L
, ~
From the reports he received, Wheeler concluded that the enemy was moving two divisions of cavalry and McCook's corps over Sand Mountain by the Caperton Road. His units
kept the Federals under observation and denied them possession of the summit of Lookout Mountain. On 4
September, Wharton reported enemy pickets at Winston's Gap.&& Wheeler redoubled his efforts and had his pickets in
the gaps blockade each gap at severa1,different spots to slow the enemy's progress. He insisted upon maint-aininq
.
observation on the enemy at every moment."" Instead of turning south into Alabama, Rosecrans turned his two corps east toward Bragg's supply lines. Again, Bragg was t o be run out of hie position without a fight. On 6 September, Bragg wrote out orders to evacuate
Chattanooga, and, on 7 September, ordered them executed at dawn on 8 September. These orders included Buclrner's Corps To cover
Buckner's movement, Scott's Brigade chased two Union regiments back to Philadelphia, Tennessee and cleared
the!
Charleston,
The r e a r o f t h e army was- ~ o v e r e d . " ' ~ Bragg moved h i s army t o L a F a y e t t e , Georgia, but
Rosecrans was s u r e Bragg would r e t r e a t a l l o f t h e way s o u t h toward Rome o r even t o A t l a n t a . A f t e r Bragg moved h i s whole
sides l o s t contact.
IFcw t h e n e x t
re!.^
uninformed d e c i s i o n s and l e f t themselves wide open t o a t t a c k by an a l e r t enemy. each army. Rosecrans s p l i t h i s f o r c e s and s e n t them a f t e r t h e enemy army a c r o s s a f o r t y t o s i x t y m i l e f r o n t . assumptions about B r a g g ' s r e t r e a t were wrong, Rosecrans' so he had Only t h e o t h e r s i d e ' s i g n o r a n c e savend
t o t a k e advantage o f t h i s d i s p e r s a l b e f o r e i t was c o r r e c t e d . M a u l d i n ' s 3 r d Alabama was a t t a c h e d t o Pegram's D i v i s i o n of F o r r e s t ' s Corps when t h e army evacuated Chattanooya on 8 M a u l d i n s t a y e d f o r o n l y one day, working w i t h
September-.&-
Colonel Edmund Rucker i n p r o t e c t i n g t h e r e a r o f t h e army. O n 9 September, McLemore's Cove. General Bragg movccl M a u l d i n t o t h e f r o n t of
A t t h e same t i m e ,
M a r t i n rsceivc?d
o r d e r s t o occupy McLemore's Cove f r o m a c r o s s Pigeon Mountain. Any enemy f o r c e i n McLemore's Cove would Rragg
t h e r e f o r e be caught between t h e two c a v a l r y screens. hoped t o f i n d t h e remainder o f t h e Union army i n t h i s vicinity.'" O n 8 September,
F o r r e s t determined on h i s own v o l i t i o n t h a t he
i f the
While F o r r e s t r o d e toward Rome, Wheeler's u n i t s went i n o t h e r d i r e c t i o n s l o o k i n g f o r t h e enemy. enemy was headed s o u t h and e a s t , Bragg knew t h e
enemy l o c a t i o n s o r i n t e n t i o n t o p l a n a g a i n s t .
o r d e r e d t o d r i v e i n t o t h e v a l l e y s t o meet t h e enemy p i c k e t s . Rragg wanted t o know enemy " d e s i g n s , position"." Cove. strengths, and
V a l l e y a t Winston. enemy.
s c o u t i n g p a r t i e s w i t h t h a t g a t h e r e d by F o r r e s t a t A l p i n e ,
Bragg had t h e
' t w i c e d u r i n g t h e t i . m e tihal-
Iiowever, Bragg c o u l d n o t
had v e r y l i t t l e f a i t h i n Hragg o r i n h i s p l a n s .
were f r e q u e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y and l a c k i n g i n s p e c i . f i c s and directness. subordinates' Too o f t e n Bragg l e f t t o o much open t o h i s discretion.
I n t h e i n s t a n c e s which p r e s e n t e d this
Bragg o r d e r e d a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t t o
c l a r i f i c a t i o n a l l r e p l a c e d d e c i s i v e n e s s and i n g e n u i t y . B r a g g ' s s u b o r d i n a t e s a l l o w e d an enemy r e i n f o r c e m e n t and r e t r e a t b e f o r e a blow was s t r u c k . O n 10 September, Wheeler h i msel -f moved t o S~lmtner-vi l I. a movements, strength,
tha'k nu enemy appeared headed i n .the d i r e c t i o n c r f Rome. Instead, t h e enemy c a v a l r y t u r n e d toward t h e n o r t h and was
j u s t s h o r t o f Summervi 1l e i t s e l f
l i n e s f a c i n g each o t h e r j u s t west o f S ~ t m m e r v i l l e . ~ ~ Rosecrans had C r i t t e n d e n ' s c o r p s occupying Chattanooga a f ' t e r Rragg abandoned t h e c i t y . i t s e l f i n t o McLemore's Cove. s o u t h near A l p i n e . corps. Thomas' c o r p s extended
F o r r e s t found NcCook's c o r p s
Twenty m i l e s s e p a r a t e d t h e two s o u t h e r n
Rosecrans was overe:ctended and r i p e f o r de-feat i n d e t a i : l . Finally, Bragg knew what was g o i n g on and how t o h a n d l e t h e The q u e s t i o n was, c o u l d he make i t happen? Bragg assigned F o r r e s t back
situation.
By t h e n i g h t o f 9 September,
movement f r o m B u r n s i d e o u t o f K n o x v i l l e .
went t o R i n g g o l d t o watch t h e r a i l r o a d s o u t h o u t o f Chattanooga t o d i s c o v e r any Union movement i n t h a t direction. Pegram guarded t h e r e a r a l r e a d y and c o n t i n u e d t o Pea Vine Church. The r e m a i n i n g
watch i n t h e v i c i n i t y of
I t remained f o r P o l k
Forrest
where he camped
A l% % J c ~ r i 10 September'
Pegrain and t
h 6 ~t h Gcmrgi a
C a v a l r y met t h e s k i r m i s h e r s o f P a l m e r ' s Union d i v i s i o n 0.f: C r i t t e n d e n ' s corps i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Graysville. Georgia c a p t ~ ~ r e fd ifty-nine Rock S p r i n g s . The 6 t h
p r i s o n e r s b e f o r e r e t i r i n g toward about
C r i t t e n d e n ' s c o r p s was on t h e r a i l r o a d ,
a g a i n s t one o f ' t h e i s o l a t e d p o r t i o n s o f Hosecrans' army. t u r n e d nor-th -to a t t a c k C r - i t.t.enden's c o r p s near Lee and Gordon's M i l l on t h e Chickmauga Creek. However, again
B r a g g ' s s u b o r d i n a t e s were slow and f a i l e d t o c a r r y o u t t h e plans. F o r r e s t p r e p a r e d f o r a b a t t l e on t h e n e x t day as he was c e r t a i n o f i n f a n t r y reinforcement. response t o h i s r e p o r t s . September, Finally, However, he heard no
a t m i d n i g h t on 10
he p e r s o n a l l y r o d e t o d i s c o v e r t h e problem.
b r o u g h t S c o t t i n t o t h e f r a y on 11 September a g a i n s t W i l d e r ' s
Brigade.
b u t it d i d n o t remove him f r o m t h e b a t t l e . = =
morning o f
12 September,
C r i t t e n d e n began t o move h i s c o r p s
i t moved south.
a g a i n had t h e 6 t h Georgia and Rucker ' s L e g i o n w i t h him. f i g h t i n g was q u i t e l i t e r a l l y hand-to-hand advancing enemy corps.
O2
as t h e y f o u g h t 'hc
Hosecrans' Army o f t h e Cumberland. By 12 September, enemy back. Wheeler's men c o u l d n u l o n g e r keep t.he McCook's i n f a n t r y and S t a n l e y ' s Avery and h i s 4 t h Georgia
O n t h a t date,
c a v a l r y t h r e w C o l o n e l I s a a c W. troopers o u t of Alpine.
t h e s i t u a t i o n even i f i t r e q u i r e d s a c r i f i c i n g t r o ~ p s . ~ ' ~ Wheeler's men had a p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f F e d e r a l f o r c e s and t h e i r l o c a t i o n s f o r Bragg, b u t t h e Federal forces This rupture
i s o l a t e d t h e u n i t s west o f A l p i n e and Lookout Mo~tntailnfrom t h e Army u n l e s s t h e y moved a l l t h e way t o Rome'and t h e n north. T h i s doubled t h e l e n g t h of
1 1 '
t h e l i n e s of
communication f o r t h e s c o u t s .
fi?5 Avery
He marshaled h i s
.'x~
From 12 t o 17
Wheeler's f o r c e s skirmi!;hed
d a i 1y wi.th enemy
p a t r o l s and u n i t s .
Colonel W. Cavalry,
C.
P.
B r e c k i n r i d g e and h i s 9 t h Kentucky
C o n f l i c t i n g r e p o r t s from
second hand sources p l a c e d thousands o f new t r o o p s moving t o Rosecrans' succor.u7 September, Pragg answered such r e p o r t s on 15
t h e s c o u t and d e c e p t i o n p l a n s were b e g i r ~ n i n y
brag^.^"
wanted t o c o n s o l i d a t e h i s army i n McLemore's Cove And move a g a i n s t Braqg's forces. I t t o o k t h r e e days t o g e t h i s army
t r o o p e r s and s m a l l s c o u t i n g p ~ a r t i e sspread a l l over %he L a F a y e t t e Road and t o 'the west. Still, h i s o r d e r empr:rwwecl
any o f f i c e r o f t h e army t o s t o p any cavalryman n o t wikh his unit, c o n f i s c a t e t h e t r o o p e r ' s horse, and s h i p t h e man o f f I n d i v i d u a l s doing
t o h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r i n f a n t r y assignment.
s i g n i f i c a n t l y when t h i s "no s t r a g g l e r " o r d e r went i n t o ef.fect. Again, Bragg had n o t t h o u g h t t h e problem t h r o u g h Another one
S c o t t ' s Brigade
came on 17 September, when Union f o r c e s a g a i n advanced f r o m G r a y s v i 11e. The 2nd Tennessee C a v a l r y a t t a c k e d t h i s f o r c e 17 September, and s t i r r e d up q u i t e a
i n camp a t m i d n i g h t , b i t of
c o n f u s i o n b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o t h e i r own camp,
unnlol estud.
on 18 Sep-tember
"-I.
hlso,
McLemore's Cove by Dug Gap and o u t a g a i n by C a t l e t t ' s GapUv7= He i n t e n d e d t o grab some p r i s o n e r s f r o m t h e enemy masses i n t h e Cove and t h e n move on t o G l a s s ' M i l l . He f o u g h t t h r o u g h
t h e gaps ancl pressed t h e enemy u n ' t i l he determined t l i a t t h e r e were overwhelming numbers o f b l u e c l a d i n +o n t r y i n t h e cove. Wheeler's men t h e n quarded t h e passes as H i ' l ' e Corps
prepared t o move n o r t h 0 . F McI-emore'e Cove t o g e t he-tween t h e enemy and Chat'tanooqa. When H i 1l moved h i s c o r p s , Wheel $r.
c a v a l r y a g a i n . f a i l e d t o be acjgresive i n i t s search .For t h e enemy. Though some e f f o r t s were made ' t o f i n d and h a r a s s .tlht. these e f f o r t s
C a v a l r y commanders
t h e t a s k s t h a t were assigned. l a c k of
involved.
CHAPTER FOUR
ENDNOTES %Horn, pp. 281-282.
'OA,
52-53.
XXIII,
p a r t 2, p .
518; D L , X X X , p a r t 1, pp.
= 0 & . ,
X X I I I , p a r t 2, p . 902.
7Q.0., X X I I I , p a r t 2, p . 920.
lmJordan
llO.R.,
and P r y o r , p .
293.
X X X , p a r t 1 , p. 50.
130.R.,
770-772.
140.R.,
pp.
1 6 0 & , X X I I I , p a r t 2, pp. 948, 952; Q . R . , 529, 530, 531, 598, 540, 541, 651.
170.R.,
X X X , p a r t 4,
X X I I I , p a r t 2, p. 902.
"OIbid.,
" l o & ,
p.
913.
X X X , p a r t 2, p . 520.
220,., X X I I I , p a r t 1, 644.
lsIbid.,
p.
633.
""Henry,
:'SO.
p.
174. p a r t 2, p. 958.
, -
XXIII, p. p.
940. 954.
., pp. 941-946. 1b i ,, . , p. 928. "*John W . Morton , Th.~,-(?~rL.FLI..zr~~o_.F-~~th_a~r!.~~~ed.C.c?r:.d. F o r r e s t ' s CC~a?/dry. ( N a s h v i l l e : M.E. Church, South,Smith,
&
Lamar,
1909), p.
"%O.H., XXX,
J , , '
R , , ,
XXIII,
p a r t 2, p.
pp.
952,
:'JO,B.,
"41bid.,
XXX, p.
p a r t 4, 507-509. p a r t 2,
489.
==O.R., X X X ,
='O.R.,
XXX,
570.R
..., X X X ,
p.
XXX,
445. 508.
XXX,
p.
420.R.,X X X ,
4 3 U 0 ,,
XXX,
44Jordan and P r y o r ,
430.R.,
XXX,
"bConnel l y,
4 7 Q L R ,,
401bid.,
XXX,
p.
p.
567.
4*71bid., p.
smIbid.,
p . 564.
X X X , p a r t 4, p . 574.
p. p.
"=Ibid.,
=-Ibid., ==Ibid., 5bIbid., s71bid., =-Ibid.,
s91bid.,
569. 546.
p . 570. p. p. p.
p.
p.
&"Ibid., &*Ibid.
, pp.
p.
"Ibid.,
-=Ibid.,
*-1bid.
p. 586.
585.
&=Ibid.,
"&Ibid.,
671bid.,
A-Ibid., 691bid.,
p. p.
586. 595.
p. 601.
pp. p.
7"Ibid.
711bid.,
7=Ibid.,
, pp.
p. p.
731bid.
, pp.
p.
?*Ibid., p . 634.
7sIbid.,
636.
7 6 0 . R , ,
X X X , p a r t 2, pp. 523-524
7.f0,.B,.,
XXX,
p a r t 4,
p.
652.
" T " l k " b r i e f l y a t t e n d e d t h e Univ. o f N.C. ( h i s fa.therhad been one o f i t s f o u n d e r s ) b e f o r e e n t e r i n g West P o i n t . He was c o n v e r t e d w h i l e a 1 s t Classman ( s e n i o r ) , a f t e r t h r e e " l i v e l y years," and r e s i g n e d s i x months a f t e r g r a d u a t i o n t o study f o r t h e Episcopal m i n i s t r y . Ordained a deacon i n 1830, he was named M i s s i o n a r y Bishop of t h e Southwest i n 1838 and Bishop o f La. i n 1841. He was a c t i v e i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e Univ. o f t h e South and l a i d i t s c o r n e r s t o n e a t Sewanee (Tenn.) i n 1860. H i s f r i e n d and classmate J e f f e r s o n D a v i s p r e v a i l e d upon h i m t o accept a commission, and he was a p p o i n t e d Maj. Gen. 25 Jun ' 6 1 , more as a symbol t h a n as a mi. li t a r y l e a d e r . . .He was k i l l e d by a P a r r o t t gun d u r i n g t h e A t l a n t a campaign on 14 June ' 6 4 a t P i n e Mountain. Not an o u t s t a n d i n g combat l e a d e r , he was a l a r g e man w i t h an i m p r e s s i v e m i l i t a r y b e a r i n g and a commanding manner. R l t h o u g h J e f f D a v i s s a i d t h e Confederacy had s u s t a i n e d no h e a v i e r blow s i n c e S t o n e w a l l Jackson was k i l l e d , S.G. Fr-ench expressed t h e o p i n i o n o f many when he s a i d , 'Thus d i e d a gentleman and a h i g h Church d i g n i t a r y . As a s o l d i e r , he was more t h e o r e t i c a l t h a n p r a c t i c a l . ' " Mark Mayo Boatner 111, The C i v i l War D i c t i o n a r y (New York: 1987), pp. 657-658. David McKay Co., Inc., 791bid.,
="O.R.,
pp.
XXX,
alO,R,,X X X ,
-*O 3 -
XXX,
a"OLR,,
=-0.R.,
'=O.R.,
520.
642.
EDkIbid., p.
""O.H., X X X ,
vOO.R.-, IIO.R., 9"O -.--., . R
p a r t 1, pp. p a r t 4, p a r t 2, p a r t 4, 663. p. p. p.
XXX, XXX,
XXX, p.
-"Ibid.,
two day p e r i o d o f t h e c o n f l i c t .
i s t h a t t h e b a t t l e was n o t r e q u i r e d f o r Rosecrans t o accomplish h i s o b j e c t i v e . The g o a l of o f Chattanooga.' Rosecrans' maneuvering was t o t a k e t h e c i t y tie moved o u t o f Plurfreesboro and necessitating the l a t t e r ' s retreat t o Rosecrans a g a i n
A f t e r t h e s i x weeks w a i t ,
b u t w i t h s k i l l and l u c k ,
s o l v e d t h a t problem w i t h o u t d i s a s t e r .
He had more t h a n
due t o h i s s k i l l and p l a n n i n g .
Given Rosecrans'
140
Road would sep+.r.ate R o s e c r a n ~ from h i s Ct-~a.ttafiocqa base :u#d l e a v e him v 1 ~ 1 1 n e r a b l'to e further a . t t a c k and d e f e a t . (See Map army
4.)
filabaina.
He inarched Thomas' s o l d i e r s n o r t h of
B r i g a d i e r General Bushrod Johnson r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o c r o s s Reed's B r i d g e and e s t a b l i s h a camp on t'he west s i d e o f Chickainauga Creek. F o r r e s t p r o v i d e d cover f o r Johnson's
f r o n t and r i g h t f l a n k as t h e column marched from R i n g g o l d . The few t r o o p s F o r r e s t had w i t h hiin a t t h e t i m e were %he ones who had been w i t h h i m a t D a l t o n . These were some o f
..
a d .R'wu
HI*. a n . J r r k DeuQ, m
,u
Arlillrry.
41a A b h m % QI. M w h L S d M KrrrNr ~jcn~%. 9 ~ R~..I(L . tieut. Col. J U R w. ~ M a 4th kmtuce: C o l .J-IL P .S u k h j .n 1 .
am-
I 16th h i d m a 1
=w,
I m Lmi*m.:
Gobn.
I4Lb L*riu.ru
b l e 9-2.
-.
Ligut. Col. h r n y h'alier. N8j. 2 . L.,\VnIkv& 1Gth South Corol~nn.* Col. J a n m (Ilillou h 24th South f2uok11: Col. Clr~ncnt 1 1 . Stcrcna. Lieut.Col. EIILm Calwn. h h Texas. Cd. Willinm H .Toung. 10th Trzar Cavalry,t Lieut. Col. C. R En rp. 14th Tcsas Caralry. Cnl. J. L Camp. S . ? d Texnn Caralr.r. Col. Julius A. An-
I'
25th Gmrda. Lieut. Col. A. J. Williams. 29th Georgia, Lieut. Gwr e R. BlcRac. 90th Georgla. L~eut. Col. k~~t.s S. Bopton. 1st Gee* Bamlion Shaq~sh~LPm. 31aj. Arlhur S h a d . 4th Lou~stann Batlalion. Licut. Col. J o h blcEnev. ArliJIq. Ferguson's (South Carolina) Banem.* Lieut. R T. Beauregard. HoweU'a (Georgia) Battery (formdy MnrtSs), Cap+ Evan P. HoweU
LIDDELL.6 DmlSIOS.
Lieut. CoL Reuben F . / 24th Niksippi : Earner and Capt A. Lieut. Col. R P. NcKelraIae T. N&. I Maj. W.C. stapler Cal. L Fenthemton Capt. B. F. Tmmer. and Lieut. Col John Copt. J., D . Smiu,. urrar. . 27th M k i s i PI, Chl. J a m s A. C i a m p L.P CoL D. A . dillespie and ~ieut.COL Peter ~ n p 15 Ark-) dm. MIESIA- p: Ark: CUL L i u s I. &I=. Lieut CoL George F. Bnucum. Lieut. Col. Hugh -4. Reynolds. Mnj. A. Watkins Maj. James I . Johnson. NiEsiRRip, :. Naj. ~Ulnrn G. Pe~mrn. a p t . Xi. J. h a e n . h u t . Cd. Hug11 A. RqnrJd...$
I
j
Ilhlll~allrBrigade.
'.
Table 9-3.
145
mnJ, w
av.
hp,-a*. .murC
M . j . o s ~ P . B m u r .
QL JOU S
Q*
* w.ad.
Bat#. * B
%bwIuaman.Ip.
t
a(h1lm:
cd.-x&hL
U-j. W. Y.
m,furi
I
1Uh I :
Cd JOCIJI R Rlmo.
k l . C ! . Willurn R B u l k
mr.
.*&.
w h k
CoL J. T . H01Yct.r.
-I.
%(h AhU.hnu.Co1.
SIb lean-:
.ZU T " " -
Maj.
P .F .Bunk. L h T .W
CoL K F. In=.
'able 9-4.
--
la--
J O a S S O S ' S DmslOS.
'
7cl
n r s s : C a l .H.R. Gmhur?.
wood.
Table 9-5.
19-20
147
n .~~l,'~nh.w.J.maD.St
k t . (W
..."-..
..
h ad ~i n . : ~
C M I
BU
I= ~~a~i.l~plr.~~ulas.xmd,.
. C O D %
nmuo..
Rdd.d*Bdpk:
C X VY
W .ap J n o n B .
I l . MA-
-wz
ARmLmT.
Mnj. F a n E R O P ~ I .
8d Kentucky, Lieu+ Od. J. W. W i t h . 4th Tern-, Lient. CoL Wul F. Anderson. 8th Teras, Lieut. CoL Oustarc Cook. 11th Teurs, Cd (3. R Reeves White's (Teanessee) &thy, Capt R F . White, jr.
8d
cod&&
Fable 9-7.
Arncstmrg'o Brigade.
Huggins' (Term&) h t t e (fomerl~ ~ Freeman's). Capt A. L .Buggha Morton's (Tulllessce)Battery, Capt John W. Morton, jr.
--
BrigBris +&
B P A ~ s .
I
~ M a ; r m ~
Table 9-8. Confederate Army of Tennessee Order of Battle, 19-20 September 1863
p l a c e i n Sr-orit
0.f
+:he Conf e d e r a t e i n f a n t r y .
s p i r i t e d f i g h t k e p t up a l l t h e way t o Reed's B r i d g e a c r o s s t h e west Chickamauga Creek a t about noon on 18 September. Pegram's D i v i s i o n j o i n e d F o r r e s t a t t h i s p l a c e . for The f i g h ' t
t o a f o r d above t h e b r i d g e .
spent t h e
b u t B r a g g ' s grand s t r a t e g y of
f 1ant: was 1o s t .
Corps was t o c r o s s a t A l e x a n d e r ' s B r i d g e o r Byram's Ford. Huckner was t o c r o s s h i s c o r p s a t T h e d f o r d ' s Ford. P o l k was
t o move n o r t h o f Lee and Gordon's M i l l and c r o s s a t t h e e a r l i e s t opportunity. cavalry.& A r m s t r o n g ' s D i v i s i o n was w i t h P o l k keeping t h a t c o r p s commander i n f o r m e d and secured. Armstr-ong r e p o r t e d enemy on H i s f o r c e was l e d by A r m s t r o n g ' s
17 September
n o r t h as G l a s s ' leading Polk's
p i c k e t i n g i n t h e C r a w f i s h V a l l e y as f a r
Mill.
Corps w i t h a r e g i m e n t ahead o f each o f F o l k ' s d i v i s i o n s . Two r e g i m e n t s moved f o r w a r d o f t h e c o r p s t o h o l d t h e +or-d a t Glass' M i l l . To p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y and cover t h e f l a n k , By 12:30 P.M.,
.'
had n o t made i t t o t h e L a F a y e t t e Road, much l e s s enveloped t h e N o r t h e r n e r s on t h a t road. f o r c e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e n i g h t of When General D.H. Both s i d e s continued t o s h i f t
18 September.
H i l l moved h i s c o r p s n o r t h on 18
b u t l o s t Owens' Ford t o t h e F e d e r a l s ,
A t 2
McLemore's.
which mu-t i n
The f i g h t raged
t h e n proceeded t o t h e 8 0 ~ 1 t h . By t h e end
D u r i n g t h e n i g h t of
18-19 September,
Bragg a g a i n on 'tlic!
l e f t flank.
opportunity.
19 September,
found Fegram's
A l e x a n d e r ' s B r i d g e and A r m s t r o n g ' s D i v i s i o n s t i l l w i t h P o l k near Anderson's House, two m i l e s f r o m Lee and Gordon's M i l l ,
F o r r e s t was o r d e r e d t o move back toward Reed's B r i d g e and develop t h e s i t u a t i o n . B r i g a d i e r General Davidson ' s b r i g a d e just
b l u e c l a d army by marching way n o r t h , Bragg had a l l o w e d h i s own f l a n k t o be exposed by a n i g h t march t o t h e n o r t h by Thomas' corps. C r i . t t e n d e n was no l o n y e r t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t I n s t e a d , Thomas had
18
He p r o t e c t e d t h i s .flanl:: w i t h
that: o f Crews,
as t h e y became a v a i l a b l e ,
F o r r e s t assumed temporary
command o f t h e i n f a n t r y i n h i s v i c i n i t y as w e l l as h i s c a v a l r y u n t i l Major General Walker, commander, John Rawle, arrived. Fragg's reserve corps
Freeman's B a t t e r y ,
di,smounted br:igfide t:o c;'over t h e ir.i,$an.tr.y's fl.ankri arid thc:.j.r. retirements. Even though t h e i n f antr-y and dismoun'cud
c a v a l r y under F o r r e s t t o o k numerous guns away from t h e enemy, t h e y were u n a b l e t o b r i n g any o f t h e guns home, due t o a d e a r t h o f l i v e Union horses. a l l o f t h e i r own guns, hor ses o f t h e i r own. towards J a y ' s M i l l , They d i d manage t o save
T h e Corif e d o r x t e s f i n a l 1.y f el I. b a c k
where t h e y had begun t h e f i g h t i n t h e
Ferdinand Van Derveer, c:ommancli.ng a b r i g a d e i n Brannari's Division, troops. thought he had f a c e d two d i v i s i o n s of Instead, Longstreet's one o f
he had o n l y f o u g h t t h r e e b r i g a d e s ,
i n f a n t r y and two o f dismounted ~ a v a 1 r y . l ' ~ When F o r r e s t f e l l midafternoon, divisions. back t o Jay ' s M i l 1 Road aboul;
t h e f i g h t i n g slackened f o r b o t h o f F o r r e s t ' s
b r i g a d e cori'tinued reconnaissance toward Rossvi I. I. e. For t h e n e x t d a y ' s f i y h t , c o n t i n u e f r o m where t h e y wer-e. rearrange t h e i r dispositions, same.
""
defensive.
155
attack.
Bragg d e c i d e d t o a t t a c k .
l e f t f l a n k and c u t o f f t h e
H i s p l a n s went awry
Bragg d i s p a t c h e d o r d e r s t o a l l commanders f o r t h e
20 S e p t e m b e r , F o r r e s t , w o r k i n g
s t i l l moun.ted, i n t o a r e s e r v e p o s i t i o n o n t h e f a r r i g h t . Armstrong's Division w a s dismounted, except f o r t h e 6 t h Tennessee and McDonald's 1 8 t h T e n n e s s e e B a t t ~ l i o n . ' " . " ~ A r m s t r o n g ' s D i v i s i o n , e s p e c i a l 1 y D i b r e l l 's B r i g a d e , f o u g h t
a l l day l o n g , s i d e by s i d e w i t h t h e i n f a n t r y .
As the
.::'
men b a r r i c a d e d t h e m s e l v e s b e h i n d s t o u t d e f e n s e s ,
taut e v e n s o , P o l 1 . : ' ~
d i s t r e s s i n Thomas' l e f t f l a n k .
r e t r e a t i n g men a n d u n i t s w e n t d i v i s i o n a n d c o r p s c o m m a n d e r s
a s w e l l as t h e army commander, G e n e r a l R o s e c r a n s , h i m s e l f .
A t a b o u t t h i s same t i m e ,
ii:00 A M ,
F e g r a m s e n t w o r d , .from
t h e e x t r e m e r i g h t , t h a t U n i o n Major G e n e r a l G o r d o n G r a n g e r
w a s a p p r o a c h i n g f r o m R o s s v i l l e w i t h p a r t of R o s e c r a n s '
Reserve Corps. The a d v a n c e of t h i s u n i t , S t e e d m a n ' s
D i v i s i o n , c o m p e l l e d A r m s t r o n g ' s mounted u n i t s t o l e a v e t h e h o s p i t a l s w h i l e t h e d i s m o u n t e d u n i t s t ~ t r n e dt o f a c e t h e fue. F o r r e s t '!s a r t i 1l e r y a n d P e g r a m ' s m o u n t e d u n i t s h a r a ! s s e d Granger as t h e Union s o l d i e r s marched s o u t h t o w a r d K e l l y Field. Retween t h e h a r a s s m e n t on h i s l e f t . f l a n k and t h e
cross-country
t o l i n k u p w i t h Thomas o n S n o d g r a s s H i l l .
A l o n g w i t h u n i t s w h i c h f e l l i n on
p a r t of t h e f i e l d i n t h e m i d a f t e r n o o n .
p r e s s e d h i s a t t a c k f r o m t h e s o u t h , b u t P o l k ' . s wing a p p l i e d no further pressure u n t i l nearly four o'clock. W h i l e F o r r e s t a n d h i s men f o u g h t r e s o l u t e l y o n t h e r i g h t f l a n k , W h e e l e r moved h i s a v a i l a b l e f o r c e , d i s m o u n t e d , a n d a t t a c k e d a s i z a b l e enemy f o r c e o n t h e a r m y ' s l e f t w i t h a r t i l l e r y h o p i n g t o d r a w o f f some r e s e r v e s f r o m L o n g s t r e e t ' s front. The f i g h t went back and f o r t h q u i t e a b i t w i t h
l i t t l e change i n t h e s i . t u a t i o n u n t i l t h e Soi.ttherners h i t t h e
enemy h a r d a n d d r o v e t h e m b a c k t o w a r d C r a w f i s h S p r i n g s . O n c e a g a i n m o u n t e d , W h e e l e r ' s men c h a r g e d t h e F e d e r a l t r o o p s
a t a b o u t t h e same time L o n g s t r e e t b r o k e t h r o u g h t h e c e n t e r
of t h e Union l i n e . " =
t h e arlc!rny
'5
r i g h t wing m e l t e d away t o t h e n o r t h towar-d Chattanooga. L o n g s t r e e t c a l l e d Wheeler t o Lee and Gordon's M i l l t o a t t a c k Union c a v a l r y i n t h a t area.
A t about 3 P.M.,
Wheeler's men
The
a r r i v e d and i m m e d i a t e l y a t t a c k e d i n t o t h e Union t r o o p s .
Rragg 's sta.f.f i n f or~nedWheeler o f t h e apparent good , f o r t u n e of t h e army i n i t s v i c t ~ r y , : ' ~ A few m i n u t e s l a t e r , General.
1 - o n g s t r e t ~ tg o t a message t h r m - ~ g ht o Wheeler
f o r h i m t.o r-i.dc:
two h o u r s . a f t e r dark.
Still,
W h e e l e r ' s t r o o p e r s p i c k e d up about one thousand p r i s o n e r s , t w e n t y wagons, weapons, f i v e large hospitals, l a r g e amounts o f as w e l l as a l l The s p o i l s o f When
ordnance,
di!mountecL
i n l i n e o f b a t t l e w i t h t h e i r i . f a n t r y , o n e nrorr?
A l l along t h e l i n e , t h e
time t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s t a s k .
ca.jualties,
u n i t s m e l t e d away.
lines.
Hrayg d i d
H e e x t r i c a t e d a l l of t h e u n i t s w i t h h i s
N o commander, a t a n y l e v e l , o r d e r e d a p u r s u i t .
t h e enemy l e a v e a n d t h e n ,
They watched
b i v o u a c k e d upon t h e g r o u n d t h e y h a d j u s t t a k e n .
H e g a t h e r e d up p r i s o n e r s a n d d i s c a r d e d e q u i p m e n t a s h e went
He fo~end SUIIIE
c>f
b u t cot-cld
M i s s i o n a r y Ridge t h a t n i g h t and moved i n t o t h e v a l l e y t h e next m~rning.'~."" O n 'tha't: same day, Hrayq o r d e r e d Wheeler -to d e ' t a i l two
regiments t c p ~ i c k up weapons f r o m t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and ,to round up s t r a g g l e r s , another u n i t was senl: whether b l u e or. gray. By 9 A.M.,
column appeared t o be coming s o u t h o u t o f Chattanooga. Wheeler vowed t o keep t h e s e u n i t s s e p a r a t e d and marched . t o meet thpm.
:="
The f o r c e coming s o u t h o u t of
Chattanooga was h i t f i r s t
and pushed back toward ~ h a t t a n o o g a . Wheeler l e f t t h e 8 t h Texas Rangers under L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l Gustave Cook w i t h Wheeler's own e s c o r t company t o keep t h i s f o r c e b o t t l e d up t o the north. Wheeler t h e n p e r s o n a l l y l e d t h e remainder o f Union c a v a l r y
Wheeler's t r o o p s b r o k e t h e enemy
d d e n s i v e l i n e and drove them back u n t i l a l l semblance o+ o r d e r was l o s t . Wheeler's men c a p t u r e d about focw hundred as w e l l as t h e e n t i r e wagon t r a i n o f More arms and weapons added t h e t o t a l
p r i s o n e r s on t h e r o a d , about n i n e t y wagons.
enemy on t h e l e f t because t h e r e s t of
By l a t e t h a t evening,
l i n e o-f
retreat.."h of
Chattanooga keeping t h e enemy f o r c e s pushed i n on each B e f o r e he complete1y deve1,oped t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e Rragg s t o p p e d ' h i m and p u l l e d him b a c k on 23
other.
enemy near t h e r i v e r and another u n i t t o c l e a r t h e t o p - of Lookout Mountain t o Chattanooga. t o cross t h e r i v e r . Corps. Bragg o r d e r e d Wheeler n o t Wheeler's
=-'
Back on t h e n o r t h e r n p o r t i o n o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d on 22 September-, c a v a l r y u n i t s f o r c e d t h e enemy out of p o s i t i o n and F o r r e s t camped on Lookout Mountain, their with a
On
25 September,
v t
he p r e p w e d h i s f o r c e s f o r f u r . t h e r use.
Bragg o r d e r e d F o r r e s t and h i s men back t o e a s t Tennessee t o guard a g a i n s t B u r n s i d e ' s f o r c e s , Knoxville. f i n a l l y moving s o u t h 0u.t of
F o r r e s t and h i s u n i t s l e f t t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s o f
b u t r e t r e a t e d no f u r t h e r ,
l l o s t C o n f e d e r a t e commantlers bu.k t h c y
l a i d s i e g e t o t h e f o r c e s b o t t l e d up i n Chattanooga.
t o p r o v i d e a gen.era1 , r e s e r v e fqr d e s t r u c t i o n and p u r s u i t : d e p r i v e d him o f a v i c t o r i o u s campaign. command wasted t h i s b a t t l e f i e l d v i c t o r y . The Conf eder-ate
A t t h e B a t t l e o f Chickamauga,
gained a d d i t i o n a l
l a u r e l s f o r i t s crown.
t h e war e f f o r t o f b o t h a n t a g o n i s t s .
g a i n f u l l y employed t o a g r e a t e x t e n t and t o g r e a t b e n e f i t .
T'hcx.t1~1~ ~ n e i t t l e r .had the o p p u r t t - t n i t y t o curlduct a grand pursuit, t h e y had been ready and a b l e t o do so if unleashed
i n a c o o r d i n a t e d e f f o r t by t h e army commander.
The .Failure
West
=0,H..,
:=0.-R2-.,
XXX, XXX,
XXX,
p a r t 1, pp. p a r t 2, p a r t 2, pp.
34-56. 31-32.
" O , & ,
"Ibid.
p.924.
, . R .O Bd
XXX,
p a r t 4, p a r t 2, p a r t 4, p a r t 2,
p. pp.
7Q2L, X X X ,
"',-J. K. , XXX,
'O,R,,,
P.
p.
XXX,
ImIbid.
l Z J o r d a n and P r y o r ,
==tl.R., XXX,
p. p.
318. 51.
p a r t 2, 324-525.
i'+Ibid.,
pp.
XXX,
160.R.,
XXX,
I 7 J o r d a n and P r y o r ,
'=o_.R.,
191bid.
XXX,
p a r t 2,
pp.
= " f o r r e s t c a l l e d t h e 6 t h Tennessee, t h e 1 s t Tennessee i n h i s report. A c c o r d i n g t o C r u t e , p. 281, t h e 6 t h Tennessee was f o r m e r l y c a l l e d W h e e l e r ' s 1 s t Tennessee C a v a l r y a f t e r i t s former r e g i m e n t a l commander, C o l o n e l James T. Wheeler, who was i t s b r i g a d e commanaer d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e . ==The 1 8 t h Tennessee B a t t a l i o n was made up o f f o u r companies from 'the 3 r d Tennessee C a v a l r y Regiment. 'This was F o r r e s t 'e "Old Regiment". The b a t t a l i o n was a l s o known
XXX,
="Ibid. 141bid. ==Ibid., 'AO.R. 270.R_, "-Ibid., "'Jordan
9
p a r t 2,
p.
525.
:"OO,&., X X X ,
p. 525. p. p.
681.
XXX, XXX,
526.
XXX,'
XXX,
p . 682.
p. 521.
"=Ibid.,
p.
=&O.R., XXX,
='Ibid.
"RO.R.,
694-695.
, pp.
XXX,
p.526.
, ,
conci.c!~.i.c?!?.z.
T o d a y ' s army o r g a n i z e s c a v a l r y ,
more p r o p e r l y c a l l e d
u n i t s t o o n e o r m o r e o f t h e s e m i s s i o n s a c c o r d i n g t o FIvI
1 7-95
C . 3 . v .4 . 1.cy...Llp-c;r2~.c.r!?:.,
T h e s e a r e much t h e same
addition, today,
i t s e l f , c a v a l r y u n i t s may b e c o m e d e c i s i v e l y e n g a g e d a n d f i g h t f u r i o u s l y o n f o o t or m o u n t e d . C a v a l r y u n i t s are t o
d e v e l o p t h e s i t u a t i o n rattler t h a r i ' b e c o m e d e c i s i v e l y e n g a g e d . '. However, e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c a v a l r y u n i t s d e p e n d s g r e a t l y u p o n t h e s t a t e o f r e a d i n e s s of men a n d e q u i p m e n t , t r a i n i n g and cohesiveness of t h e t r o o p s , s k i l l and organizational. a b i 1i t i e s 0.f l e a d e r s a t a1 1 l e v e l s , a n d l o g i s t i c a l s r r p p o r t given t o .the u n i t s . P r o b a b l y t h e most i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t Hist,ory i n
1%
l i s t e d h e r e is t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h e u n i t s .
n particular..
fully
t r a i n e d a n d e q u i p p e d s o l d i e r s who l o s t i n g l o r i o u s l y b c c a u s t ?
t h a i r - l e a d e r r ; f a i l e d them.
To e x t e n d % h i s t r a i n o f thouql.1-lr,
most modern w e a p o n s o f t h e d a y d i d w e l l .
t r u l y inspired leadership,
However,
with
t h e y may h a v e a c h i e v e d a l e v e l o f
this
was l e a d e r s h i p , b e c a u s e t h e y h a d a l w a y s
t h e i r i n t a n g i b l e assets.
Good l e a d e r s h i p w a s a v a i l a b l e t o However.
t h e C o n f e d e r a t e s d u r i n g t h e Chickamauga campaigns.
c a v a l r y i n t h e world could have functioned very l i t t l e b e t t e r with such uninspired leadership. When l o o k e d u p o n a s a p a r t o f a team, t h e C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y d i d n o t r e n d e r a stellar performance during t h e Tul lahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. The u n i t s w e r e
H, of t h e f r e q u e n t s k i r m i s h e s l i s t e d a s p r i n c i p l e e v e n t s
d u r i n g t h e c a m p a i g n s , c a v a l r y was i n v o l v e d a s a p l a y e r . if
n o t alone,
in
Alabama,
The men,
as i n d i v i d u a l s and as u n i t s ,
The m i ~ j o r
m i s t a k e s made d u r i n g t h i s phase i n c l ~ l d e da f a i l u r e t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, p i c k e t i n g t h e wrong s i d e o f t h e Tennessee R i v e r , picket, u s i n g t o o few t r o o p s t o accomplish t h e bad o r d e r s , command
d i s p e r s a l . o.f f o r a g i n g u n i t s ,
confusion,
arid i n i t i a t i v e . go wrong.
t h e compartmentalized and t h e
t h e condition of t h e cavalry u n i t s ,
t h e F e d e r a l s most h e a t e d l y on t h e Confederate r i g h t b u t t h e r e were numerous missed o p p o r t u n i t i e s on t h e l e f t . Wheeler was slow d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e , a c t i v e l y involved. even though he was
The c a v a l r y s u f f e r e d f r o m a l a c k of
s p e c i f i c o r d e r s and no s i n g l e c o o r d i n a t i n g p o i n t w i t h t h e
army command.
i3
have been a b l e t o work o u t t h e i r problems. I n many a c t i o n s , c a v a l r y i n c o r r e c t 1 y. t h e Confederates simp1 y used t h e i r They were i n e f f i c i e n t w i t h t h e i r However, given t h e i r
t h e c a v a l r y c o r p s d i d r e n d e r h a r d s e r v i c e and on
It i s
s i g n i , f i c a n t t o no.te t h a t Kosecrans d i d n0.t lrnow any more o f Brayg ' s whereabouts t h a n Bragg knew of Kosecrans'
Hard
some o f t h e h e a v i e s t e n c o u n t e r s o f t h e f i r s t day of t h e b a t t l e i t s e l f , f i y h t i n g as if t h e y were i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e s . So, was poor use o f Confederate c a v a l r y d u r i n g t h i s Such a charge would be h a r d t o p r o v e at
campaign c r i m i n a l ? best.
t h e successes o f t t ~ e
c a v a l r y u n i t s must go,
t h e blame f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e s .
c a p i t a : l i z e on t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o him,
p e r s o n a l i t y q u i r k s which clouded h i s judgment and, consequently, !subordinates. a f f e c t e d h i s a c t i o n s and t h e a c t i o n s of He was n o t . however, t h e on1 y one
{ : t i
his
blame.
inr:ompe't:ericc! ~ . I i . w i r : ? ~
he was p r o b a b l y n o t g u i l % v of
0.f each
event,
A t t h a t t i m e t h e one t r u e t e s t ,
can be weighed.
remembers t h e e v e n t ,
Again,
command and i s t h e r e f o r e r e s p o n s i b l e .
some o f t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s and what e v e n t s p l a y e d a p a r t , t h e g e n e r a l l y d i s m a l showiriy o f Confederate c a v a l r y ? c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s e x i s t today? General Bragg, Tennessee, as t h e commander 0.f t h e Army o f
Do
t h e campaigns. of h i s cavalry.
which o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e s e campaigns.
More o f t e n t h a n n o t , Br-aqg m i s u s e d h i s t w o c a k a l r y
corps.
During a l l t h r e e t i m e p e r i o d s addressed i n t h i s
m a k e e s s e n t i a l d e c i s i o n s and d i s p o s i t i o n s of h i s f o r c e s . Again,
i t i s c e r t a i n l y riot i m p l i e d t h a t t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s
They p r o v i d e d ,
Forrest h i m s e l f s e n t s c o u t s i n t o
r e r i d e r 1i t t l e a s s i s t a n c e t o G e n e r a l B r a g g .
H o w e v e r , Hr-agg
arid h i s s u b o r d i n a t e c o m m a n d e r s a n d s t a f f s s h o u l d h a v e a t
l e a s t b e e n a l e r t t o i m m i n e n t m o v e s b y t h e enemy.
They w e r e
n o more p r e p a r e d t o r e a c t t o a n enemy w i t h d r a w a l t h a n t h e y
w e r e t o a n enemy a d v a n c e .
By t h e t i m e F o r r e s t a t t a i n e d more
.for enemy c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , B r a g g c o u l d h a v e s a v e d o r
a m e l i o r a t e d t h e s i t u a t i o n had Wheeler been i n p o s i t i o n according t o h i s orders. Wheeler's corps f a i l e d t o discover
'the
LJlii
Wtieeler h i d
f a i r l y w e l l d e s e r t e d t h e area i n w h i c h t h a t a d v a n c e w a s made.
H e w a s too busy e l s e w h e r e .
Bragg t o o k n o s t e p s t o
remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n .
The l a c k of w a r n i n g on t h i s f l a n k
most a s s u r e d l y s p e d u p t h e c o l l a p s e o f H r a g g 's d e f e n s i v e
posi tinn.
0 major col-id.i'kion t h a t p e r v a d e d a1 1 a c t i n n s o.f: t h e
121r tnv
army. Br-agg.
Wear1 y e v e r y s u b o r d i n a t e commander h e h a d d i s l i k e d
T h e o n e ma-ior e x c e p t i o n w a s W h e e l e r , o n e oS hi!-. Whe-ther- B r a g g w a s a t f a u l t or w a s e v e n y u i l t y uf:
proteye.;.:'
He
were n o t s e l f l e s s l y c o m m i t t e d t o s o l v i n g t h e p r o b l e m ,
either'. E a c h o f f i c e r h a d h i s own a q e n d a . Each had a n
escrrse t o f o m e n t d i s c o n t e n t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e S o l - ~ t h ,
p e t t y b i c k e r i n g among t h e many wounded e g o s a l w a y s interfered with military duties." T h e h i g h e r i n r-anl.: t h e
but,
i n most cases,
a c t i v e l .y p a r t . i c i p a t e d
Army o f Tennessee must have been t h a t i t had t o p u t up w i t h commanders who d i d n o t do i t j u s t i c e . Fragg a l s o a l l o w e d t h e depar.ture of t h e one s u b o r d i n a t e
commander he had who t r u l y understood t e r r a i n and how t u maxiinizc i - t ! advantages. ~ General Har-dee moved wezt in.t:.o
some r e l a t i v e 1 y i n s i g n i f i c a n t j c b s w o r k i n q f o r General J o e Juhn~ton.~ He ~ c o u l d have been much more v a l u a b l e w i t h t h e nia.jor army i n t h e f i e l d , him. e s p e c i a l l y i f Pragg would l i s t e n .to
Bragg r e c o g n i z e d some o f t h e p i t f a l l s o f t h e t e r r a i l l ,
While
he r e a l i z e d h i s p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n i n Chattanooga
without
Fragg must be found g u i l t y f o r t h e bad o r d e r s he i s s u e d and t h e improper use 04 h i s c a v a l r y f o r c e . o r d e r s were i n e x a c t and d i s c r e t i o n a r y . contradictory. Most o f h i s
Many were
These o r d e r s l e f t room f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
c o r p s c o u l d n o t p a t r o l f rcsm c o n d i t i o n and s i z e .
i n f a n t r y came t o a s s i s t i n t h e
t.0
against t h e primary t h r e a t ,
Fragg s h o u l d a l s o t a k e t h e blame f o r n o t b e l i e v i n g ora c t i n q upon i n t e l l i g e n c e b r o u g h t .to him. When McCook was iro
I t accompli~he!+,
I.!LI
The
a network and. much i n f o r m a t i o n was l o s t upon him. Rragg f a i l e d t o keep a s i g n i f . i c a n t screen on t h e enemy s i d e o f t h e Tennessee R i v e r . Even though t h e c a v a l r y t h e army was
n o t we1 1 served by long-range s ~ i r v e i l 1 a n c e . ~ ' - l a Bragg ' s own ng a p a r t . sco~~ network t was f a1 1i
'
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy t o a s c e r t a i n h i s i n . t e n t i o n s , Bragg
Small
F o r r e s t ' s success r a t e w i t h most i n t e l l i g e n c e m i s s i o n s , a1 1 he needed was an o r d e r and he s u r e l y would have c r e a t e d a system. F o r r e s t o p e r a t e d b e h i n d t h e l i n e s enough . t o know I n s t e a d , Bragq gave F o r r e ~ t o t t ; ~ never-
made an e f f o r t t o g e t t o know h i s enemy. 'l Prayg'c, h e a d q u a r t e r s s e n t n u m e r o ~ ~ messages s .for- c i l v a l r y u n i t s t o go here, mid-September. and f o r t h , .there, and everywhere d u r i n g e a r l y t o
as t h e y d i d M a r t i n ' s .
consolidate,
send s u b - u n i t s
go t h r o u g h t h e c o r p s commandgrs, we&
scouting mission.
~ I s Jo r n e t h i . n y
else.
& g a i n , Ecragg
'!;
c o n . f u s i o n and i n a b i 1 : i t y
t o d e v e l o p a n d f o l l o w t h r o u g h o n a p l a n were q u i t e
evident.
l J
r e c o r d e d i n Union r e p o r t s , m i sconcepti.on!j
a web o f i n a c c u r a c i e s a h d
plans.
Some ncrcw~~n.?.;
tool.:: r o o t i n H r x j e c i - a n s '
claim Hragg p l a n t e d t h e s e d e s e r t e r s h i m s e l f , w h i l e o t h e r
s o w c e s c l a i m t h e men were m e r e l y t i r e d o f R r a g g a n d h i s
constawt re.kreating. IJnion offi.cer!;, W h i l e r e a d i n g t h e o f f i c i a l . r e p n r t s n-f
t h e l e v e l of d e t a i l and t h e developmerit of
were c o a c h e d b e f o r e l e a v i n g t h e S o u t h e r n c a m p s .
1.f t h e s e
which r e a l i z e d t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f d e s e r t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e . S u c h i s t h e make-up of s i n g u l a r e v e n t s i n t h e d e c e p t i o n
',=
Bragg removed s e v e r a l s e n i o r ,
H e reor-ganized u n i t s and
including Forrest, away f r o m t h e
When B r a g g l a t e r r e s i g n e d f r o m command
of t h e army a f t e r t h e d i s a s t e r a t M i s s i o n a r y R i d g e , h e went
I n t h i s p o s i t i o n , h e c o n t i n u e d t o s u p p r e s s ,the
In
careers nf h i s e n e m i e s , most n o t a b l y t h a t o f F o r r e s t .
1877, a t F o r r e s t ' s f u n e r a l , a g r i e v i n g J e f f e r s o n D a v i s
a d m i t t e d t h a t F o r r e s t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s were k e p t f r o m h i m
~ w i t i l too l a t e b y j e a l o u s a n d s e l f - s e r v i n g
officers.
Uragq
So, i s F r a g g t o b l a m e ?
General Fragg is q u i t e
He failed to
or l e a r n e d a b o u t c a v a l r y o p e r a t i o n s and
on C e r t a i n l y , t h i s is t h e f a i l u r ~
u s a y e s o f h i s own d a y s . h i s part.
However, e v e n i f h e must a c c e p t t h i s b l a m e d u e t o
hl ~ m o
A s accepted i n
i s enmeshed i n v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e l a w of w a r and v i o l a t i o n s
o f human r i g h t s . T h i s c a t e g o r y d i d n o t arise i n t h i s s t u d y .
t a k e n t o t h e extreme.
si t u a . t , i o n w h i c h w a s unknown t o a s e n i o r - commander i r ; s u i n a
orders,
tt1r.n t h e o n - s c e n e
0f.f i c e r i s r e q u i r e d t o i n c l ~ ~ d dc l .I.
p r e p a r e d t o j u s t i f y and d e f e n d h i s d e c i s i o n s .
i n t o K e n t u c k y a n d , f i n a l l y , a f t e r much w h i n i n g , r e c e i v e d i t . In h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s , Ohio.
the
h e g o t h i s u n i t s h o t up a n d c a p t u r e d . Confederacy as a whole,
H e w a s n o t 0verj.y
I n another
incjtance,
Wheeler l e f t i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s on t h e f l a n k and
He
d i s o b e d i e n c e was n o t j u s t i f i e d . Rlso,
i t has been seen t h a t t h e c a v a l r y u n i t s suf-feu-ed
Rather t h a n s h u t t l i n g o r r o t a t i n q
f o r an a b n o r m a l l y l o n g r e s t
Wheeler p o s i t i o n e d h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s p o o r l y and
caused undue and extended t r i p s f o r r e p o r t s o f a c t i o n a l o n g t h e river-. h i s troops, Rather t h a n b e i n g p l a c e d t o e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l gather information, and pass r e p o r t s , he was t h e
I t was a b o ~ r ts i x weel.;s
f r o m t h e end of
the
Tullahoma campaign t o t h e t i m e when Union f o r c e s crossed t h e river. When Union f o r c e s crossed, Wheeler had no more s i x weeks e a r l i e r ,
t r o o p s on guard t h a n he d i d . t h a t day,
wltprl
t..le
-f a
i 1ed t o
as oyclcrmd I
again,
w i t:h no j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
Even when Pragg c a l l e d him f o r w a r d t o s c o u t and guard a g a i n s t Union f o r c e s s o u t h o f t h e r i v e r , and l a c k e d i n i t i a t i v e . Wheeler was slow
excuses t o f a i l o r t o cover h i s f a i l u r e s .
f a i l e d t o c o n . j o l i d a t e and move f o r w a r d w i t h any speed wi~~:+ri t h e s i t u a t i o n and o r d e r s demanded i t . One o f Wheeler's l e g i t i m a t e excuses was contmon ' t o a].! Southern c a v a l r y u n i t s . Sowthern s u p p l y l i n e . Cavalry' was on t h e wrong wid of
t:hc
I f another v i a b l e
t h e n .those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Given t h e
a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e was h a r d l y p o s s i b l e .
Wheeler w r o t e a l e n g t h y r.r?por-!: He e x p l a i n e d t h a t hc
l ~ t r o rt h a n
He a l s o e x p l a i n e d t h a t he would bc!
f o r not f o l l o w i n g orders.
c u r r e n t assessmen't o f t h e s i t u a t i . on. Major General Wheeler was a c o n v e n t i o n a l cavalryman who was adept a t p r o t e c t i n g t h e army, and f i g h t i n g i n t h e more
b u t n o t always w i l l i n g .
A t a t i m e when
a f u l l view o f
t h e whole p i c t u r e c o u l d n o t be g a t h e r e d because u n i . t s were n o t working t o g e t h e r w h i l e t h e i r commanders feuded. t h e blame f o r t h i s predicament l a y w i t h a l l i n v o l v e d . Gqail.~, Bragg
d i d not 'I.ily owt: .r ~..tles and mandate coordilna'ted a c t i o n , . Wheel. er. was t o o unsure o.F Ihimsel f t o a5ser.t e f -f e c t i v a
c o n t r o l over a l l c a v a l r y u n i t s and t h e i r commanders. F o r r e s t was so i n t e n t on m a i n t a i n i n g h i e independence t h a t he d i d n o t work as a member o f t h e team f o r t h e g r e a t e r qood of all.:2m However, Forres't: s t i o ~ t l dbear t h e p r i m a r y b l nme for' internal. cavalry discontent. g e t a l o n g w i t h everyone, W h i l e Wheeler d i d h i c i b e s t t o t h e war n u t
F o r r e s t spent most of
He f a i l e d t o w,:!rl.::
even c o n c e n t r a t i n g on h i s p r e s e n t m i s s i o n .
energy was b e i n g expended t r y i n g t o go west t o t h e Mississippi River. Because o f h i s i n a b i l i t y t o work w e l l as a team member, he was o f t e n l e f t t o t a k e c a r e of s h o u l d have been a s s i s t e d . problems h i m s e l f when he
i t would have
been v e r y easy f o r t h e Confederate command t o have a s s i s t e d him and d e f e a t e d t h e whole Union column. However, due t o
he was a t h o r n i n ,the
and he somet:ime.;
caused
f l a w s i n t h e p l a n n i n g and e x e c u t i o n o f t h e o v e r a l l e f f o r t . However, when t h e r e was a . f i g h t , F o r r e s t and h i s men were always i n t h e t h i c k o f Chickamauga, infantry! ) it. O n day two of t h e B a t t l e of
t h e y f o u g h t so h a r d as dismounted c a v a l r y ( a s
L i e u t e n a n t General D.
Hill.
H i l l was a staunch
b e i n g pre.jctdiced a g a i n s t c a v a l r y and had pub1 i c n l I. y c l a i m c d t o have never seen a dead cavalryman. fight, However, d w i n q khj.:;
when i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e u n i t f i g h t i n g so f i e r c e l y he
b e s i d e h i m was n o t i n f a n t r y b u t r a t h e r F o r r e s t ' s c a v a l r y , made a p e r s o n a l and d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t t o seek o u t F o r r e s t and compliment h i s command. and went back t o t h e f i g h t . F o r r e s t accepted t h i s p r a i s e H i l l ' s reports of the b a t t l e
r e c o u n t t h i s f i g h t as w e l l as s e v e r a l o,ther r e f e r e n c e s t o F o r r e s t and h i s t r o o p e r s as g a l l a n t and g e n t l e m a n l y o f f i c e r s and men who d i d yeoman's work d u r i n g t h i s f i g h t . c e r t a i n l y l e f t h i s i m p r e s s i o n on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . " l B r i g a d i e r General F o r r e s t t h e n was n o t a team p l a y e r . He was h i g h l y competent as i l l ~ t s t r o t e d by h i s many expltii.tcj. He was j u s t as gotid i n a head-to-head r a i d i n g and o t h e r independent a c t i o n s . f i g h t as he was a t The B a t t l e o f H i s major Forrest
H e w a s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s a n d West
H e w a s j u s t as h a r d t o w o r k :
H e c e r t a i n l y s h a r e d t h e blame
w a s o n e of l e a d e r s h i p .
conceived plan.
Rragg d i d n o t h a v e a thouroughly
H e h a d p i c k e d h i s c o i n m a n d e r s well. b u t d i d
n o t a d h e r e t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of w a r c a l l i n g f o r " U n i t y o f Command".
'"H e
allowed p e t t y d i f + e r e n c e e between .
H i s o p e r a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s were
T h e s e c o m m a n d e r s were h i g h l y c o m p e t e n t
the
a n d , t o d a y , a r e l o o k e d u p o n as h e r o e s a n d t h e masters o f
art.
But, t h e y e a c h h a d t h e i r f a i l i n g s a n d d e m o n s t r a . t e d
HHT
q6
0 WO
EM TOTAL
1
CAV TROOP
+-
TANK CO
ARlY BTRY
0 WO EM 18 2 213
0 WO EM 6 0 122
0 WO EM 5 0 69
0 WO EM 8 0 127
@
0 WO
EM TOTAL
187
0 W O EM 3 12 19
0 WO EM 1 0 52
0 WO 1 0
EM 19
'PENDING APPROVAL
They a r e n o t c a p a b l e of
1 i k e t h e s e h o r z e n r e n , . t o d a y ' s c a v a l r y m e n get t i r e d a n d
T h e y t o o need t o .fa:[1 b a c k t o r e f
it:,
recoup,
Given t h e l i g h t , s i n y l e - t i e r e d c a v a l r y , f o r c e t h e v i t a l m i s s i o n p e r f o r m e d b y t h e s e modern
a v a i l a b l e today,
T e n n e s s e e w a s i n 1865.
arm';,
a we~l:.t:r-
m d w e a k e r c a v a l r y f o r c e i s i n t h e c a r d s f o r . t h e 1J.S.. future. I t is q u i t e . f r i g h t e n i n g t o s p e c u l a t e on t h e
flrmy's
r a m i f i c a t i o n s of battleground.
a d e f u n c t c a v a l r y arm o n a n y f u t u r - e
it takes a
Today, as i n t h e 1 9 t h C e n t u r y ,
l o n g t i m e ' t o t r a i n a n d e q u i p c a v a l r y m e n a n d l e a d e r s i n !;i.~ch
~n v i frnl ,I:~.~nc.tj. un
klcrpl:?~l:~..~l. !y , sorna!orie
: i r.1
chi:wqe,
. I : I i e
of s t h e past b e f o r (2 leadership, will learn Srom the l e ~ ~ o n they go down in disgrace, like General Bragg did after his failures.
C a v a l r y Onerations,
February
"Dyer,
pp.
140-141.
- T h i s f a u l t r e s t s upon t h e s h o u l d e r s o f everyone involved. The Confederate H i g h Command knew o f t h e problem but f a i l e d t o act. When t h e y d i d a c t a f t e r t h e B a t t l e o f Chickamauga, t h e P r e s i d e n t merely s i d e s t e p p e d t h e i s s u e t r y i n g t o d i f f u s e i t . O.K., 1, X X X , p a r t 4, p.742, 744-745. Bragg and h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s were g r o s s l y g u i l t y o f l e t t i n g p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s overshadow t h e needs o f t h e army.
im02R,, X X X ,
p a r t 4,
p.
596..
l " ~ d n n e l l y , pp.
162-163. Griffith
%=Sun Tzu, T h e A r t of War, t r a n s . Samuel B. (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), p. 84. 130.R.,
14U. S.
XXX, Army,
p a r t 4,
pp.
634,
642. October
F M 90-2,
E a t t l e f i e l d Decention,
1988.
, . .R.O ='
XXX,
p a r t 3, p.
179.
'"Horn,
p.
233.
p a r t 4, p. 614. p. 938.
lVO.H., X X X ,
XXIII,
p a r t 2,
2'O.R.
JJiJ. 5 . 175-174,
XXX,
Army,
part 2 , pp.
F M IDD-5,
143-146.
Q~.g.r..&ti.orls_, May 1 9 8 6 % P p .
CIPPEI\IDI CES
JUNE 2 1 3
--
JlJLY 7,
186.3.
--The
Iviiddle 'Tennessee.
or
Tul 1ahoma
Campaign.
.:I
1-1 r k?
,,T .::.-a,
1863.
---
24,
1865.
24-26, 24-27,
---
25,
----
26,
1863. 1863.
S k i r m i s h a t Beech Grove. Action a t Shelbyville. S k i r m i s h e s a t F o s t e r v i l l e and Guy's Gap. Skirmish a t F a i r f i e l d . Occupation u.f Manchester by The IJni on Forces.
27,
28, 29,
1863. 1869.
--
20-3L3, 3 1 2 1 ,
1863. 186:s.
--
JLI y~
1 , 1803.
O c c u p a ' t i o n o+ 1'1.1llahoma b y t h e U n i o n
Elk
S k i r m i s h n e a r Hobo's Cross-Roads.
2 , 1863.
B r i dqe:
5,
186:J.
S k i r m i s h a t H u i l i n q Fcri:.. nearWinchester-.
4,
1863.
---
7 , 1869.
S o u r c e : Q,=,Fi_ ,., X X I I I , p a r t 1 , p.
399.
August
16
--
September 22,
1863.
--
The Chickamauga
Campaign.
CIIJ~LIS%
16-17,
1863.
--
the A r m y o.f 1 : h e
17,
1863.
---
21,
lah3.
S k i r m i s h a t M a y s v i l l e . bila.
, mound, A c t i o n a t She1 1
T!mn.
22-24,
1863.
--
E x p e d i t i o n f r o m Tracy C i t y , t o t h e Tennessee R i v e r .
Tenn.,
24,
1863.
--
near
26-27,
1863.
----
27-28,
1863.
near
28-31,
1863.
29,
3PI-31,
1863. 1863.
--
nla.
---
Term
Ala.
31,
1863.
196
.--. S L i r m . i . j h e s Davis
'
~3.t
M i11
' 5 ,
'5 C ~ r r e I . .a.~id a:
Tap
a n d Itleal
' 5
Gap.,,
A 1 a.
---
Skirmish near Alpine, Ga. R e c o n n a i s s a n c e f r o m W i n s t o n ' s Gap i n t o Hroom.town V a l l e y , S k i r m i s h at: L e b a n o n , A:La. Skirmish near Alpine, Ga. Des.truction of salt-works Kawlinqsville,
Ala.
d l :
Ala.
--
S l c i r m i s h a t S t e v e n ' s G a p , G.A. Skirmishes a t Summervillc. Skirmish at Stevenson, A l a . R e c o n n a i s s a n c e toward Chat'kanooc~a and s k i r m i s h i n Lookout Vall.ey, Tenn.
6a.
--
--
---
occupied by
( : a .
-. - R e c o n n a i . j s a n c e frum A 1 , p i n e kowar-d
Rome,
La F a y e t t e , a n d
S u m ~ n e r vl i l e , Ga. s1:irmish
and
a t Summervi l l c .
S k i r m i s h e s a t P e a V i n e Creek a n d
Ga.
--
Heconnai ssance toward Home, Ga. S k i r m i s h near B l u e B i r d Gap, Ga. S k i r m i s h a t D a v i s ' Cross-roads D a v i s ' House) Ga. S k i r m i s h near Rossvi! l c , S k i r m i s h near R i n g g o l d ,
Ua.
(or
Ga.
11-13,
186.3.
--
12, 186.3.
--
Skirmish a t Alpine.
Ga.
S k i r m i s h a t D i r t Town,
Ga.
or
Ga.
--
15,
---
Ga.
Cidp,
---
Reconnaissance .from Rossvi 11e and s k i r m i s h a t Rinqgold. Slcirmish at-. Neal 's Gap, S k i r m i s h a t Owen's Ford, Chickamauga Creek, Ga.
A ~ A .
West
Ga.
--
S k i r m i s h e s a t Pea Vine R i d q e , A 1 exander ' s and Reed ' 5 R r i dye-, Dyer ' s Ford, Spr-inq Cruel: and near S t e v e n ' s Gap.
.!
Ga.,
---
B a t t l e o f Chickamauga,
S k i r m i s h e s a t Rossvi 1 l c , Church,
and Dry V a l l e y ,
--
--
Tenn.
Source:
[3,,.R .,
XXX,
p a r t 1, pp.
27-28.
FIBLIOGRWHY
Hoatner Mark Mayo, 111. The Clv11 War D i c t i o n a r y . . York: David IvlcKay Co., I n c . , 1987.
. .
New
Brown, D. Alexander. "The B a t t l e o f B r i c e ' s Cross Roatls". N.a_t.I~vt~.?-..?~B~ Forre"j:.t_.. Jamestown, V i r g i n i a : E a s t e r n Acorn F'ress, 1987, pp. 2-12. C o n n e l l y Thomas L. R~~.y..~.f,-_t,he ,.,, k$.eea_rL1-aanr_j,. Baton Rouge: L o u i s i a n a S t a ' t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 19h7.
Connel 1y,
C o ! n n n _ c J .
Thomas L. and Archer Jones. T~..&ol..j-~,l_c.~,. ,.of Baton Rouge: L o u i s i and S t a t e Uni ver'si t y Press, 1973.
Cooke, P h i l i p S t . George. "Scenes and Rdventures i n t h e Army, o r , Rymance of M i l i . t a r y L i f e " . Philadelphia: L i n d s a y and B l a k e s t o n , 1857. Crane Step hen. T-l.g-R.ed Badse-of,,_Co~t~agg. Har r i son b u r g VA: Penguin Books, 1983.
C r u te
, ,
., .
Nottingham-
Iienry
Jamieson,
~ork:
J o h n s t o n e , H. M. R e e s , LTD.,
Lytlo,
Cu-mpxly.
Arldrew Nelson. L < . e d . f 0 . r . d . _ F . orrcs L... &n.d..Hiz..cni.t:.tE~: New Yorl:: Minton, Halch ?< Co., 1931. Harvey.
Mathes, J. 1902.
G-eeer?eral F o r r e s t .
New York:
Appleton,
IYcWhiney, Grady C. " R r a r t o n Hragg." j:~~,e,H,~&tle.,.g:f,,,,S~!;!n!~ Fib.yc.r. Jarnestown, VA: E a s t e r n Acorn Press, 1987.
,,,,. D I . ~ ? , . L!ni-,McWhiney, G. and Per-ry D. Jawieson. R,~t.fi~Ir;-_:?nd U n i v e r s i t y o f Rlabama Press, 1982. v e r s i t y , AL.:
Morelock, J e r r y D. "Ride t o t h e R i v e r of Death: Cavalry O p e r a t i one i n .the Chi ckamauga Campaign, " PlYJ-i.&-t~y_ Review, 64 (OCT 1984) : 2-21.
Pointt.
New York:
Duammen, David. "The I n e f f a b l e Union o f Man and Horse," M H Q : ?~eBu,arterLy--1~~1rna_1.-o~f~ Militau.M-$-tor-.Y,, 1,3, ( S p r i n g 1909) : 36-45.
Schaef e r James A . "The ' T a c t i c a l and S t r a t e g i c Evolt.rtion o f C a v a l r y D u r i n g t h e Rmerican C i v i l War". Doctor 0 . F P h i l o s o p h y D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f Toledo, 1982.
--
--- .
Jarnestawn,
VA:
-------- .
" U n t ~ ~ t o r eGenius d of t h e War". Na-than-.XL, F o r r e s t . Jamestown, VA: E a s t e r n Acorn Press, 198'7, pp. 13-20. Chicago: F e r g c ~ sP r i n t i n g
Sun. The A r t o f War.. T r a n s l a t e d b y Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y F'ress, 1971. The U n i t e d Sta,tes C a v a l r y Yfljx.-Il 1~1s-. New York: S t e r l i n g F'ubl i s h i n g Co.
Washington,
DC:
Depart-
U S Army. ST 22-3, S e n i o r - L e v e l Leadership. Ft. Leavenworth, ES: U S Army Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1988. U S Army. S v l l a b ~ t sF913. Fundamentals o f Senior-Leyg.l.,, L e a d e r s h i n i n F'eace and War. F t . Leavenworth, KS: U S Army Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e , 1989.
Wilson, George S. " W i l d e r ' s B r i g a d e o f Mounted I n f a n ' t r y i n TuLl ahoma- Chickarnauga Campaigns". Individual U.S. Army I n f a n t r y and Report, F t . Leavenworth, ES: C a v a l r y School, 1891. W e l l e r , Jac. "Nathan B e d f o r d F o r r e s t : An A n a l y s i s o f u n t u t o r e d M i 1i t a r y Genius". Tennessee ~ i s t o r i c & f i u a r t e r l v , 18, 3 (Sep 1959): 213-251.
1.
Combined Arms Research L i b r a r y U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 Def ense Technical I n f o r m a t i o n Center Cameron S t a t i o n A l e x a n d r i a , V i r g i n i a 22314 W i l l i a m G. Robertson, Ph.D. Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e USACGSC F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
2.
3.
( 6 copies)