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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTERS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
CHARLES D. COLLINS, JR., MAJ, USA B.A., Southwest Missouri State University Springfield, Missouri, 1977
Name of Candidate: Maj Charles D. Collins, Jr. Title of Thesis: Historical Simulation and the American Civi 1 War Approved by:
A d & 5 h . i M + E
Member
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT HISTORICAL SIMULATION AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by MAJ Charles D. Collins, Jr.. 199 pages. This analysis examines the validity of using miniature wargaming to study the American Civil War. The analysis specifically examines the miniature wargame rules, s to determine whether Civil STARS*N*BARS 111. The goal i War combat can be accurately simulated with miniature wargaming. The study first examines the simulation's rule mechanics to determine their historical soundness. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery combat are each examined in three sections: unit organization, maneuver, and firepower. Each section is subdivided into three areas for analysis: First, an overview of how the section is simulated; Second, an historical overview of the section; and, finally, a determination of historical accuracy. The rules are then applied in simulating two historical Civil War battles. The battle of New Market is gamed as a controlled reenactment the results of which are compared against the actual battle. The battle of Cedar Mountain is executed as a free-flowing wargame to evaluate historicity. The overall conclusion of the study is that, although not exact, acceptable accuracy can be achieved in simulating Civil War combat. Wargaming can be used to study history. In historical simulations, gaming and history complement each other in building a more complete understanding of the period's warfare.
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Unit Organizations . . . . . . . . Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Firepower . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 4 . The Supporting Arms Thecavalry Unit Organization Maneuver . . . . Firepower . . . TheArtillery . . . Unit Organization Maneuver . . . . . Firepower . . . . Summary . . . . . . .
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. 113
The Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 . . . . . . . . . 119 Historical Overview . Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Chapter 6 . The Battles
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Conclusions
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185
Appendix C .Order of Battle at Cedar Mountain . . . . . 188 Casualties at the Battle of Cedar Mountain . 193 Appendix D . Bibliogaphy
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Initial Distribution
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LIST OF FIGURES Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure
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9 . CAVALRY MANUEVERS
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Figure 17 . NEW MARKET. 2:30PM TO 3PM . . . . . . . . 148 Figure 18 . CEDAR MOUTAIN 5PM . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Figure 19 . CEDAR MOUNTAIN 5PM TO 6PM . Figure 20 . CEDAR MOUNTAIN 6PM TO 7PM .
. 158
. . . . . . 160
SOURCES Figures 1, 8, 11, 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 0 , and 21 drawn by David Collins. Fiqures 2, 3 , 4 . 5 , 6 , 7 , 9 , 1 0 . 1 2 . and 13: Scotty s 3owden-, STARS*N*BARS I11 (Arlington: Empire Press ~ a m e .
1985). VII/2, VIII/7, I X / 3 1 , IX/32, IX/35. VIII/12, IX/14, IX/15, IX/20. IX/28.
Figures 1 4 , 1 5 , 16 and 1 7 : William Davis, The Battle of New Market (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
1983)
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63 108 133
175
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viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Here was the war that went closer to the bone and left a deeper imprint on the national spirit than any other war we ever fought. How did we approach it, how did we fight it, and what did we do with the baffling combination of triumph and defeat with which the war left us? Bruce catton'
The American Civil War was the largest and most costly war ever fought on the American continent. Countless
volumes of literature are available to the student of history who wishes to study the conflict. Our nation has also
preserved many Civjl War battlefields as National Historical sites providing an additional student resource. Amateur and
professional historians alike can walk and study the grounds where history was made. Military historians have devoted countless hours to t,he study of the Civil War. Their efforts range in nature
from an extensive study of leadership to a detailed analysis of the evolution of warfare in the War Between the States. Even though the war was fought more than one hundred years ago, it still captivates interest and offers valuable lessons for today's professional soldier.
This analysis examines the validity of using miniature wargaming to study the American Civil War. The analy-
sis specifically examines Scotty Bowden's miniature wargame rules, STARS*N*BARS 111, a simulation for the American Civil
be accurately simulated with miniature wargamir~g. Although many wargame rules are available for the American Civi1,War. only STARS*N*BARS I11 by Empire Game Press allows the wargamer to simulate corps or army level battles while still retaining regiments and batteries as separate maneuver units. Most designers who provide simu-
lations for tactical combat restrict the players to a brigade or possibly one division per side. STARS*N*BARS I 1 1 is widely accepted as presenting the best simulation for the period.3 Bowden proclaims that STARS*N*BARS 111, more than
a mere game, provides a useful simulation of history. Overall, his goal is to have the participant within the simulation feel as if he has gone back in time and space and is actually contending with the problems his historical counterpart faced. Empire Games believes that a study of
history i s absolutely vital prior to participation in its simulations. They strive to provide not only a game but a tool with which the wargamer can create a model of a battle from the American Civil War.4 The purpose of this study is to examine the historrcal accuracy of the "Stars and Bars" simulation. The reader
Chapter five provides an overview of battlefield command and morale on the Civil War battlefield. Command
hindered the execution of the commander's orders including the professional skills and abilities of the commander and his staff. The capabilities and current circumstances of the unit receiving the orders must also be considered. This
study will examine how well these factors are incorporated into the game simulation? Chapter six will examine two historical simulations. The purpose of this chapter i s to assess whether "Stars and Bars" provides an accurate simulation of the battles of New Market (1864) and Cedar Mountain (1862). These battles were selected because. in each, the infantry, cavalry and artil-. lery all played distinct and significant roles. Addition-
ally, both battles are small enough to allow for a detailed examination. The battle of New Market will not be simulated as a regular free-flowing game. Instead. the actions of the
units will be executed as closely to the historical events as possible. The simulation action and results will then ke The battle of The
simulation actions and results will then be compared with the historical battle. clusions of the study. Chapter seven will state the con-
INTRODUCTION NOTES
(1)Bruce Catton, Americn Goes to War(Midd1etown. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1958). 13. (2)This study specifically examines Scotty Bowden's, STARS*N*BARS 3RD EDITION, A SIMULATION FOR THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (Arlington. Texas: Empire Games Press. 1985). The simulation analysis refers to the 3rd edition (copy right 1985). The analysis may not apply to any subsequent reprints and revisions of the simulation. (3)Bill Sessions. "The American Civil Wargame In Miniature, A Review," The Courier Vol. 1. No. 6 (May 1980):3-8.: Jeff Jonas, "American Civil War-Gaming", Military Modeler Vol. 7, No. 9. (Sept 1980) :.41, 70-71. (4)Scotty Bowden and Rob Smith, STARS*N*BARS 3rd Edition, A Simulation For The American Civil War, (Arlington,Texas: Empire Games Press, 1985). PI-P3.
CHAPTER 2 WARGAMING
How much better is this amiable miniature than the Real Thing! here is a homepoathic remedy for the imaginative strategist. Here is the premeditation, the thrill, the strain of accumulating victory or disaster- and no smashed or sanguinary bodies, no shattered fine buildings nor devastated country sides, no petty cruelties, none of that awful universal boredom and embitterment, that tiresome delay or stoppage or embarrassment of every gracious, bold. sweet, and charming thing, that we who are old enough to remember a real modern war know to be the reality of belligerence. H.G. Wells "Lit le Wars"
1913
Wargaming is a system which allows the diverse elements of war to be quantified and organized mathematically so that they can be easily manipulated to simulate actual combat. Wargaming can be played on a two dimensional
terrain map with cardboard markers representing units (board gaming) or on a three dimensional terrain map with scale model units (miniature wargaming). Many computer simula-
tion wargames are also available and are very similar to board gaming.3 The hobby of wargaming began in 1900 with H. G. Wells' book. Little Wars. However, wargaming is almost as
small, wooden soldiers in Egyptian tombs, clay figurines from Alexander's era, and small, lead legionaries made during the days of the Roman Empire. Most historians con-
sider the game of chess to be one of the first wargames. Ancient Iraqians played a chess-like game as early as 5000 years ago. Military leaders in ancient India also played a chess-like game called "Chatuianga". Chatuianga used a stylized terrain map. The playing pieces incorporated the
four basic arms of India's Army: elephants, chariots, cavalry and infantry. Chess continued to be a limited and abstract simulation of warfare through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
created an army of miniature wooden soldiers and used them to provide military instruction to the boy who would become Philip IV of ~ ~ a i nIn . the ~ late eighteenth century a Scotsman named Jame Clerk, used ship models to work out naval manuevers. His writings were said to be highly reRodney credited Clerk
with devising the tactics that defeated the French fleet of Admiral de Gr.asse at the battle of the Saints.5 Modern wargaming probajly began around 1812 in Pruusia. Von Reissiwitz developed a wargame called "Krieg-
game decided the outcome of combat using historically-based tables from the Napoleonic Wars. In 1824, Von Reissiwitz's
son, then a lieutenant in the Prussian Guard Artillery, convinced the Chief of the German General Staff that Krieg-spiel was more than a child's game. He believed that warEventual-
ly, the German General Staff became staunch advocates of the Kriegspiel. As used by the Prussian Army, the object of Kriegspiel was not to win or lose but to teach sound tactical techniques. The General Staff also expanded the role of . wargaming to formulate and evaluate war plans. Von Molke
used Kriegspiel to test his mobilization plans for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.6 The United States Military continues to make extensive use of wargaming. Wargames are used to train leaders
in decision making. and are still used to formulate and evaluate war plans. Several years ago, the U.S. Army used
a game called, "Dunn Kempf" as a tactical trainer for company grade officers. Dunn Kempf used terrain boards and miniature lead vehicles to teach company/team tact: 7 cs. Today, most of the Army's wargames use computer simulation. One of the best known examples is the Battle Command Training Program(BCTP). Using BCTP, brigade and division com-
manders are trained in the art of tactical and operational decision making. Another example is the Armor School's use
of a networked simulation system called "SIMNET." In SIMNET, individual tank and infantry fighting vehicle crews occupy mock-up vehicles. The crews view battle simulations on computer monitors. Exercises at the National Training
The Air
Force's "Red Flag" and the Navy's "Top Gun" are other examples of elaborate wargame models used for training.7 Unfortunately, the military makes little use of
wargaming as a medium of study to rekindle interest in military history. The United States Military Academy does
use a wargame to study the Vicksburg campaign. The simulation complements the military history studies course. Upon completion of the game, the cadets conduct a detailed,
after action review to discuss why certain decisions were made and how they affected the outcome of the battle. The
Air Force Academy also uses a commercially produced wargame, "Empire in Arms" by the Avalon Hill Game Company, to demonstrate examples of history course.8 As noted earlicr the actual "hobby" of wargaming began around 1900. However, the English credit Robert Louis Stevenson as being .the first person to play a wargame simply "for the fun of it." Mr. Stevenson designed a wnrgame in campaign strategy in their Napoleonic
difficult convalescence.
large terrain map of roads. rivers, and towns chalked onto the attic floor. Stevenson and his stepson moved toy solrepresenting a day.
They inflicted casualties by physically throwing lead weights at the toy soldiers. Stevenson reported that his
Stevenson
of always allocating the wobblier soldiers to young Osbourne.9 H.G. Wells is considered the founder of wargaming as a hobby because of his book, Little Wars. Wells' game used a toy gun firing wooden bullets to inflict casualties.
His tactics involved positioning of guns, proper use of cover, and the use of combined arms (cavalry moved at a ratio of two feet to the infantry's one). Mr. Wells also He
based his melee rules solely upon the numbers of soldiers involved. Little -W also offered suggestions for a more He provided rules for shell
burst, rifle range, engineering, and leadership. Unfortunately, there is no evidence indicating that the British Army paid any attention to Mr. Wells' game.10 Wargaming remained a little known hobby from 1900 to 1950. The influence of the two World Wars probably had a significant affect on the failure of the hobby to grow.
Ir.
the 1930s. a Captain J.C. Sachs did update the Little Wars rules. Peter Young (later Brigadier General Young), Charles Grant and Don Peatherstone all began wargaming with Sach's version of Little Wars.
the best known writers on the subject of wargaming.11 America's foremost wargamer during the 1930s was the journalist and military historian, Fletcher Pratt. His naval war game rules were used by wargamer hobbyists as well
as by the navy for training purposes. Pratt's rules are still available today because wargamers continued to update them through the years. Despite the efforts of these noted individuals, wargaming remained a little known hobby and. almost exclusively, an English pursuit until the 1950s.12 In 1952, an American infantry officer, Charles S. Roberts, designed the first, commercially produced, board game of war. His game, Tactics, launched wargaming into a
well recognized and practiced hobby enjoyed by thousands around the world. Game Company. In 1958, Roberts founded the Avalon Hill
In 1966, three U.S. Air Force officers pooled their resources and founded a magazine called Strateqy and Tacu s . This magazine was geared to the wargamer and concenIn the 1970s. Stratecry and
Tactics formed a subsidiary company called Simulations Publications. Inc. This company eventually produced thousands of board games on everything from ancient warfare to future war in space. By the early 1970s. wargaming had
grown from a small special interest hobby in Britain to a large, world- wide hobby. In the United States, most war-
gamers played board games while miniature wargaming was predominant in Britain.14 Miniature wargaming was imported from Great Britain to the United States during the 1970s. Initially, the
small figures used in tabletop gaming were only available from Great Britain. However, it wasn't long before many
wargame shops were available in the United States as well. Scotty Bowden, author of STARS*N*BARS 111, was instrumental in establishing one of the first wargame shops in the United States. Bowden later established the Empire Game Company
which became well known for the historical accuracy of its games.15 The story of American Civil War wargaming goes back to 1958 with Charles S. Roberts' Avalon Hill Game Company Two of the company's first games were "Gettysburg" and "Chancellorville." Both games, capitalizing on the upcoming centennial of the American Civil War, were financially successful. The two games are still available today. The
success of the "Gettysburg" and "Chancellorville" games started a wargaming boom in the United States.16 Today, there are more than 250.000 confirmed board-gamers in the United States and another 75.000 miniature wargamers. Wargaming periodicals state that most hobbyists are, "Lovers of history who dare to ask the question, rrhat if...?" Hundreds of board games focusing on the American Civil War are available for these gamers. Tliey deal with Their
complexity ranges a span from those taking less than an hour to complete to those taking hundreds of hours to complete.17 One of the best known Civil War games, "The Terrible Swift Sword" is a grand tactical simulation of the
battle of Gettysburg by Simulations Publications. Inc.(SPI). Using "The Terrible Swift Sword" rules, SPI developed the "Greatest Battles of the Civil War" series. This series is credited with having the most different games developed from one basic set of rules. Currently, the "Great Battles"
series consists of: Gettysburg, Kernstown, Wilson's Creek. Monocacy Junction, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Cedar Mountain. Corinth, Cross Keys/Port Republic, Antietam, Pleasant Hill, Brice's Cross Roads and Tupelo. The "Great Battles" series provide a grand tactical game where individual. cardboard counters represent one regiment or artillery battery. Individual counters also represent brigade leaders and above. SPI acknowledges that the rules for the game are lengthy. However, they state that rather than being complex ,they are merely larger to accommodate historical accuracy.18 Several battles of the Civil War are not offered in board- game format. In addition many garners prefer the
visual appeal of ranks of butternut and gray fighting to overcome the ranks of blue. As a result, battles of the
American Civil War period are some of the most popular periods in miniature wargaming.19 Nany different sets of miniature wargame rules are available to those wishing to simulate American Civil War battles on the wargame table. As with board game simula-
tions. the wargamer may choose wargame rules to simulate either tactical or grand tactical actions. In the tactical
of a
brigade or division commander. Tactical rules offer a detailed simulation of the regimental actions within a brigade. The game scale usually has one inch representing
20 yards and one model figure representing 20 men.2 0 Examples of tactical games are Rally Around The Flag by S. Craig Taylor and the Complete Briqadier by John Grossman. Both simulations are designed for the player to assume "Rally" is a simple set. The author's
intent, however, was to provide a game concerned more with the flavor of the period than with historical accuracy. The "Brigadier", focuses the gamer on the complexity and impor-. tance of battlefield leadership. The gamer must provide detailed directives in order to control the drill of each regiment within a brigade. Grand tactical simulations allow a gamer to play the role of a division, corps or army commander. The scales vary according to the rules being used. An inch can repre-
sent anything from 20 yards to hundreds of yards. Figure scales can range from one figure representing as few as 20 men all the way up to hundreds of men. Many grand tactical games have blocks of men representing entire brigades or divisions.22 Examples of grand tactical simulations are On to Richmond and Johnny Reb. "Richmond" is an army level game
spectrum, using a figure scale of 1 to 20, "Reb" has its player assume the role of a division commander.2 3 Scotty Bowden's STARS*N*BARS I11 is a grand tactical simulation of the American Civil War. The wargamer plays the role of a corps or army commander while still moving individual regiments as maneuver elements. The game scale The rules
aspect focuses on command decisions rather than on regimental drill.2 4 Scotty Bowden is best known as one of the leading authorities on the armies of Napoleonic France. He possesses one of the largest collections of Napoleonic archival materials outside of France.
Bowden's work represents a major contribution to th55 historical literature on Napoleonic France. -Military Review By relying on primary documents, Bowden has produced a work that c ! -ifies many elements ignored $6 by other historians". -Military Affairs Scotty Bowden has also written several books on the American Civil War including: Armies at the First Manassas, Armies at Gettysburq, and Armies at Chickamauqa & Chattanoo-
the game to yield realistic results without sacrificing the tactical exercises of individual regiments. Bowden states that the fundamental task of the game designer is to control time within the simulation. He believes that the more closely he is able to pattern the events in a game after those of historical events the better job he has done in simulating history.27
Lane" at Antietam to demonstrate this concept. The fight lasted for three hours with attacking at a time. never more than a division
tactical movement of operational reserves that decided the final outcome of the fight at "Bloody Lane." However, the
tactical battles provided the reason for the grand t.actica1 maneuver. 2 9 The simulation is played in what are called hourly rounds. One complete turn represents the movements and
actions which might occur during an hour of actual time. Each hourly round is divided into several distinct phases. The initial phase of an hourly round begins with command and control functions. First, the gamer attaches ieaders to units. Then, after issuing orders, he determines the unit's
reactions to those orders. The next phase consists of grand tactical movement. Units may move up to the distance
they could accomplish in one hour of marching.3 0 Following grand tactical movement, any units within
13" of the enemy may participate in tactical combat.
Tacti-
cal combat is conducted in four, separate sub phases, with each representing 15 minutes of battle time.
STARS*N*BAXS I11 provides the wargamer with a medium
which blends the tactical and grand tactical battles intc one. wargame simulation. The next three chapters will
examine the mechanics or rules of the simulation to derermine if they are historically sound.
CHAPTER 2 NOTES
(1)Peter Perla, The Art of Warqaminq land: Naval Institute Press. 1990). 3.
(Annapolis. Mary-
(2)Dane Ridenour. How to Get Started In Warqaminq (Arlington. Texas: Empire Games Press, 1975) , 5-8. (3)Mark Serravalle. "The Arm Chair General." Civil Way Times Illustrated vol. XXV. No. 7 (November 1986) : 30-37. (4)Edward W. Girard, "History of Wargaming." Secone Warqarninu Symposium :(Washington D.C. : Washington 8-12. Operations Research Council. 1964)
(5)Donald Featherstone, Naval Waruames (London: Stanely Paul, 1965). 12.; Perla. Art of Waruaminu. 16. 20-21. i6)George Gush,A Guide to Warqaminq(New York: Books, 1980), 22-24. Hippocrene
(7)Gary C. Morgan. "Wargaming and the Military." Fire & Movement No. 66 (June/July 1990): 31-36. ; Eric M. Walters, "The Right Tool Wrongly Used." Fire & Movement No. 66 (June/Juiy 1990): 36-39. (8)Morgan. "Wargaming and the Military." 31-34. ters, "The Right Tool Wrongly Used." 36. (9)Gush. A Guide to WarqamA~q,24-26. (lO)Ridenour, How To Get Started, 5. )Gush. A Guide. 24-26. jIbid.,26-27. )Serravalle, "Arm Chair", 30-32. (14!Ridenour, How to get Started, 6-7
; ;
Wal-
18
(15)Gush. A Guide, 31-36. (16)Serravalle. "Arm Chair", 30-33. (17)Serravalle. "Arm Chair", 31.
;
(18)Bill Sessions,"The American Civil Wargame In Miniature, A Review," The Courier Vol. 1, No. 6 (May 1980):
)
8 )
Ibid Ibid
) J . F. Grossman. ThcComplete Brlcradier, Introduction to Miniature Warcraminq, (St Paul. Minnesota: Adventure Games. Inc.. 1982). 1-3.
(24)Scotty Bowden and Rob Smith, STARS*N*BARS 3rd edition, A Simulation For The American Civil W q , (Arington, Texas: Empire Games Press, 1985). vii, 1/1-1/3. (25)Rob*rt Doughty, review of A.rm_ies & t _Wntsrloo_, by Scotty Bowden, In Military Rev(January 1985) : 93-94.
( 2 r i ) R n l ~ r t . Epstein, review of Armies at Waterloo, by Scotty Bowden, In Military Affairs, vol. XLVIV. No. 4. (October 1985): 215.
CHAPTER 3
THE INFANTRY
"We marched forward, elbow to elbow, into the very jaws of death." Private Ned Hampton 18th Tennessee, battle of ~urfreesborol
The infantry bore the brunt of the fight in the American Civil war. This chapter wi 1 1 discuss infantry
combat and how closely STARS*N*BARS 111 simulates Civil War infantry combat. Specifically, the simulation mechanics of
infantry combat will be examined in three sections: unit organization: maneuver; and firepower. Each section will be further subdivided into three areas for analysis: First, ,an
overview of how "Stars and Bars" simulates the area being discussed; Second. an historical overview of the area: and,
finally, an analysis of the historical accuracy of the simulation. It is important to note that the overview of
the simulation mechanics is only meant to provide a basic understanding of "Stars and Bars".
alone, will not entirely validate the historical eccuracy o f the infantry combat procedures in "Stars and Bars". Howev-
er, it will provide a background of information necessary for understanding the historical simulations reviewed in chapter six.
wargdmer, in "Stars and Bars" uses metal militdry miniatures to conduct simulated battles of the Civil War. Military
miniatures are available in different scales from 5mm to 54mm for simulating the war. of the military miniature. The scale refers to the heiqht
the most common scales used for simulating the Civil War. In "Stars and Bars" all scale ranges and distances are listed in 25mm scale with the 15mm scale appearing imqediately following in parenthesis. All scale ranges and dis-
tances listed in this study will be in 15mm scale.3 The ground scale for "Stars and Bars is one inch equals 40 yards. Each terrain contour represents about 16 Each military miniature. usually re-
feet in elevation.
ferred to as a casting or figure in wargaming, represents 40 actual men. Individual infantry castings are mounted either per movement stand. The infantry
A
regiment is represented by a grouping of figures on adjacent stands. A 480 man regiment would have 12 figures mounted.
four each, on three stands or four stands with three figures each (Figure 1). Normally, wargamers have an officer fig-
ure, a standard bearer and a musician on the center stand. This i s strictly for visual appeal in representing the regimental commander, his staff and the color party. It has
no bearing on the simulation. The simulation places no importance on individual companies within the regiment. However, a stand or stands of figures may be placed to the front of the regiment to represent skirmish companies. 4
Figure 1
A 480
Historical Overview
Reguiar
regiments of the United States Army consisted of from 2 to 4 battalions. Each battalion had a theoretical strength of eight infantry companies. Rarely
fought in ad hoc battalions formed from several companies of one or more regiments.6 Volunteer regiments did most of the fighting on hoth sides during the war. a single battalion. Most volunteer regiments consisted of
regiments were known by their sequential number and state of origin such as the 14th Indiana or 17th Virginia. On paper,
each regiment consisted of about 1000 men divided into ten companies. U.S. Army Regulations dictated that each company would consist of 97 men and
L!lr-cc
officers.
A company had
one captain, a first. lieutenant, a s e c o ! d lieutenant.. a first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two municians, one wagoner and eighty-two privates. A colonel
usually a lieutenant), a
quarter master : usually a lieutenant), a surgeon and an assistant surgeon.7 The regimental headquarters also had several enlisted personnel. These included a sergeant major. a regimental quartermaster sergeant. a commissary sergeant, a hospital steward, two principal musicians and twenty-four bandsmen The army dropped Sandsmen from the table of organization
Units seldom achieved or maintained the regulation strength of 1000 men once on campaign. The 36th Illinois started the war with 1,151 men. men. The 14th Indiana had 1,134
losses, sickness. stragglers, absentees and deserters. regiments seldom numbered over 400 men in the field.9 The North had a very poor replacement system. Many
states gave priority to forming new regiments rather than sending replacements to the field. This caused many Federal regiments to dwindle down in number to less than 200 effect i v e ~ . The 13th Massachusetts mustered on ly 107 men in May, 1864. The 20th Maine, of Little Round Top fame. possess.ed a These very smal 1 regiments would
often be broken up to provide replacements for other regiments. The average strength for a Union regiment was 700
men in 1861, 500 in 1862, 320 in 1863, 400 in 1864 and 500 in 1865.10 The South also experienced difficulty in providing replacements for their units. Many Confederate regiments
fought at Antietan with fewer than 100 men in their ranks. The 17th Virginia began the battle with only 55 soldiers.1 1 Private Hampton's regiment, the 18th Tennessee, began the war with 1000 men and in less than a year was down to 527 men. l2 Confederate regiments throughout the war averaged
600 in 1861, 450 in 1862. 450 in 1863. 250 in 1864 and only 150 in 1865.13
Commanders found the small size of the units a tactical advantage as the war progressed.
to be
A regiment of
two or three hundred veteran troops was very manageab!e. Unit leaders could easily control the regiment by verbal command and personal example.14 Briaades, Divisions and C o r ~ s . The Army organizations of both the North and South were very similar. This was probably because most of the senior officers, for both sides, were educated at the same military institution, West Point. Additionally. most of these officers had greviously
served together many times in the same regiment.15 Regiments were grouped into brigades. Usually, two
to six regiments of infantry combined to form a brigade. Early in the war, mixed brigades of foot and mounted troops. such as Hampton's Legion, served tagether. was not usually seen after 1861. l6 Divisions consisted of three or four brigades joined together. This practice
were combined. Then. two to four corps under a single commander made up an army.17 Ana lvsis No specific guidance is provided within the simulation on how to organize units for simulating the American Civil War. Bowden states. "9ecause units in the American
Civil war underwent so many, rapid changes in leadership, organization, ComFosition and eliteness of forces, it is
He recommends
that wargamers consult existing books on the war for determining orders o ' f battle. The term order of battle refers
to the structure of an army at the time the battle was fought. He highly recommends the "Official Records" as providing detailed information on brigade, division, corps and army organizations.18 "Stars and Bars" does closely parallel history when dealing with an average regimental strength of 400 men.
The
instructions for mounting figures on movement stands offers three example regiments: a 360 man unit. a 400 man unit and a 480 man unit. Additionally, all the examples provided
within the rules to illustrate key points use regiments of around 400 men. For building orders of battle the gamer is expected to have a working knowledge of history. The actual organi--
zation procedure requires the player to research the battle being simulated. The manpower of a unit is determined by
dividing the historical strength by 40. An example would be Brigadier General John Echol's Confederate brigade at the battle of New Market. Echol's had the 22nd Virginia Infan--
try with 580 men, the 23rd Virginia with 579 men and the 26th Virginia with 425 men. Based on using movement stands
with either three or four figures the wargamer could repre-. sent Echol's brigade with 40 miniature figures. Both the
22nd and 23rd Virginia would each have five stands of three figures each. The 26th Virginia would have ten figures
based on three stands. Overall the historical accuracy of unit organizations within "Stars and Bars" depends on how much research the gamer applies toward building historical orders of battle.
Maneuver
cal movement allows a brigade which is not engaged in combat to move up to the distance that could be accomplished in one hour of marching. Tactical movement represents the tactical
maneuvering of a unit (a regiment or brigade) in contact with the enemy. Each of these movements will be discussed
in detail in the foilowing paragraphs.19 An important consideration in movement is the formation of the moving unit. The formation is the determining. The predominant forma-
regiment to deiiver maximum firepower to the front. However, it is also the slowest formation for movement. Regiments can also form road columns, field columns or place stands in skirmish order.
the road column to make administrative marches during grand tactical movement or to move reserves in tactical movement. The field column is formed with a frontage of two or more stands having the remaining stands in ranks to the rear. The field column has the advantage of having good cross country movement and also has some frontal firepower. Several field columns attacking side by side also have the potential of overwhelming an enemy defending in line format ion. Skirmish order resembles the line formation. However, the stands, instead of being adjacent, must be separated by four to seven inches ( 1 6 0 to 280 scale yards). This
represents the loose formation adopted by men in skirmish order. Individual suidiers would spread out. to take advan-
tage of whatever cover is available. Units move as a brigade in grand tactical movement (Figure 2 ) . Because grand tactical movement represents the
administrative marching of a unit over the period. of an hour, formations are grouped into two broad movement categories. Line, column and skirmish formations are grouped as The road column is separate because of its
field movements.
ability to move quickly on roads. An infantry line can move 5 0 " ( 2 0 0 0 scale yards! cross country. yards). A road column could move 6 0 " ( 2 4 0 0 scale
GRAND-TACTICAIMOWRENT TABLE
MAXIMUM GRAND.TACTICAL MOVEMENT DISTANCES UNIT N P E Inlanlry 6 Fool Andlery. Cavalry. Mta. l l a n q . and norre ~ n w e r y FIELD MOVEMENT ROAD COLUMN
7 5 (60")
LIGHT WOODS
"r mv
H mv
DENSE WOODS..
.I. mv
SWAMPS..ANO MARSHES..
6T'(50")
7 5 160")
%move
NO, allowed
90" (72")
H mv
'.'
..
or to ME a,-ro
Figure 2
Units within 13" of the enemy are considered to be engaged in tactical combat. These units must use the Tactical Movement Table (Figure 3). An infantry unit in road column can move up to 16" (640 scale yards). in line 10". (400 scale yards), or in skirmish order. 15" (600 scale yards).
If a brigade moves
T A C l l C M MOVElrlEPCT DISTANCES
UNIT
N P E
tnfrn~and o,unwn,ea cavalry
FIELDIROAD COLUMN
UNE
CHARGE
20"(16")
12W(10")
SKIRMISH ORDER
18'h"(15")
H -
Artll1.n;
Light Mealurn
*OI"-",M""OIw---
LgiiL
OR FENCE
Idanw,
Dllrnld Cavalry
- Maneura
0,
Sl,*#,r
ACROSS
%
Up ONE
CONTOUR
-WlWI
.*yl~")
Charge
Wlllil
Figure 3
drill and tactics availabie to American Civil War infantry. These manuals were almost direct translations of the most current French drill manuals of the day. The primary purpose of drill and tactics was to maneuver soldiers to and across a battlefield in the quickest and most organized manner possible.
Prior to the Civil War, the foremost American military writer was Winfield Scott. His 1835 work. Infantry
Tactics or Rules f o r t h e Exercise and Maneuver of the United States Infantry was a direct translation of a French drill manual released in 1791. volume work. Scott's "Tactics" was a three
individual soldier and his movements within the company. Volume 2 provided instruction on the maneuver of a regiment and instructions on skirmish tactics. Scott's third volume
dealt with the maneuver of brigades, divisions and corps. The United States Army adopted Scott's "Tactics" as its
official drill manual in 1840 and continued to use it until 1855.21 Scott's manuals emphasized control and order over speed and elan. musket. He understood the. inaccuracies of the
stressed the need for infantrymen to remain elbow to elbow while in close order formations. He firmly believed thls
was t.he only way the regiment could stay aligned and prevent gaps from appearing.23 In the mid 1850s. the rifle replaced the musket as the primary infantry weapon. The musket had a limited The rifle extended the
effective range of around 100 yards. kill zone out to 550 yards. 1852. 1857. 1860, and 1861.
When Actinq
As Licrht Infantry Or Riflemen partially superseded Scott's works in 1855. Hardee's "Tactics" provided an update of Scott's first two voiumes. Hardee's primary contribution
had to do with increased rates of march and greater emphasis on skirmish tactics. Hardee based his works on the French doctrine of the "Chasseurs a Pied" (infantrymen who jogged around the battlefield as if they were light cavalry). The
"Chasseur" doctrine acknowledged the increased range of the rifle and was an attempt to move men more quickly through the kill zone.25 Both the North and the South widely accepted Hardee's work. The biggest criticism was that he failed to Northern politi-
cians and military leaders also disapproved of their soldiers drilling with a manual credited to a Confederate general. Brigadier General Silas Casey of the Union Army
solved this prohiem and updated Scott's third volume in 1862 when he published Infantry Tactics, For The Instruction, Exercise. and Maneuver of the Soldier, Company, Line of Skirmishers, Battalion. Briqade. or C o r ~ s D ' Armee.27
was the best known tactical theoretician of the time. writings favored offense over defense.
His
book. Summary of the Art of War, stated there were five methods of forming troops: in deployed lines, columns, deep
masses, skirmish order, and in small squares. most part, these formations remained
'*
For the
In the
line of battle. the standard, 10 company regiment aligned itself two men deep with companies abreast of one another Early in the war. a typical battle formation had six cornpa-nies on line. The regiment held two companies in reserve roughly 300 yards to the rear. The two remaining companies formed a skirmish line across the front of the unit. Nor-
mally, the skirmish line deployed 300 to 500 yards to the front.31 Later in the war, the skirmish line became heavler
and more important. Regiments could deploy as great as haif the regiment as skirmishers. In brigade and division ac.. tions. i r wes also comnon to deploy entire regiments as
skirmishers to the front of the parent brigade or division.32 An important aspect of the infantry line was the frontage that it covered. Hardee's "Tactics" specified that
times the number of files. Hardee directed that soldiers should "feel lightly the elbows of his neighbors" when advancing in line of battle.33 Many historians believe the soldiers tended to bunch together in combat and that the frontages of infantry regiments were far less than those stated by the period drill manuals. Jack Coggins in Arms and Equipment of the Civil
that a brigade of 1500 men might occupy a frontage of less than 500 yards.35 Before the Civil War, the c o l m n was the standard formation i l s e r l
1 . 0
The purpose of the column was to place maximum force of penetration against a narrow front. Regiments normally
formed a column with a frontage of one or two companies. Later in the war, there were examples of brigades forming massive columns with the regiments on line stacked one behind the other. One of the best known column attacks was
used at Spotsylvania Court House on November 7 . 1864. This attack used a division column with one brigade on line and three others stacked in line behind the first.36 These
brigade and division columns make up the deep masses Jomini spoke of in his Sunvnarv of the Art of War. The advantage c f
the column was its greater mobility and ease of control (especially in rough terrain). The disadvantage was it
produced a dense target in which only the front line units could return fire.37 Skirmish formations were used to cover both llne and column formations. The standard skirmish tactic was to drive o f : enemy skirmishers and probe the enemy's main line,
Rarely were skirmish units used to assault enemy positions. Little specific information is available on skirmish frontages.38
Hardee states: The interval between skirmishers depends on the extent of the ground to be covered but in general it is not proper that the groups of four men should be removed more than 40 paces from each other. The habitual distance between men of the same group in open ground will be 5 pac in no rase w i ! l thcy lose sight of each other.3.3 :
Basically, this means that skirmishers would cover four tinics t i h e not-ma1 frontage. However. Ha3rdee goes on to s a y that a company depioyed as skimishers should occupy the S a i I I F : rronl-ayo as the reyiment. This would employ six to eight times the normal frontage.40
=tic&
attack formation was for regiments to deploy in successive iines one behind another. The interval between regiments This aliowed successive
ample maneuver room for regiments to swing right or left if threatened from the flank.41 The theory of using successive lines or "wave"
attacks was to apply continuous pressure against a defender. If enemy fire slowed or stopped the first line, the following line could pass through and continue the attack. In reality, however, the "wave" attack rarely worked. succeeding lines tended to bunch up to
25 yards of the front line.
The
as close as within
a giant column rather than successive lines. The ensuing regiments had no room to maneuver. Rifle and cannon fire
passing over the first line would often strike the second line. The second line usually became disordered as it attempted to pass through the crippled first line. The intermingling of lines destroyed the formation and hampered command and control. defeat .n2 Divisions used variations of the successive lines nttack. Sometimes, brigades would deploy their regiments One or two brigades formed the The The ensuing chaos usually resulted in
reserve regiments usually remained in a column formation. There were also examples of divisions imitating Napoleon's favorite "mixed order" formation. In this formation, a
brigade would deploy its wqiments on line with one regiment skirmishing to the front. Dn both flanks the division The Union used this formatic,n
Both sides used a small scale version of the French tactic, the "Zouave Rush". The Americans called it the "Indian Rush."
-. lnis
the same regiment) would advance side by side using alternating bounds. One unit advanced while the other took cover and returned fire. Despite the success of this tactic. it being used above the
regipental level. This is probably because it required special training and was difficult to coordinate even in small units.44 Grand Tactical and Tactical Movement. Although
railroads and steamships could be used for strategical movement, the primary means of movement for the infantry was still the foot march. On good roads. the infantry could However, the
effects of weather conditions such as heat. mud, ice or snow could reduce the rate of march to below two miles per hour. Two and a half miles per hour, to inciude rest. As is still t h e
Jackson took about 12 hours to complete his famous flank march at the battle of Chancellorsville.47 It took
almost three hours to get all 15 brigades of his corps on the road. The lead units needed six and a half hours to complete the 12 mile march. Trail elements needed three
more hours to close in and assume their attack positions.48 The distance troops under fire could move was less predictable. The drill manuals prescribed several different march steps for tactical movement. Hardee's "Tactics"
retained Scott's direct step of twenty-eight inches and hi:s "common time" rate of 90 steps per minute. He also retained However.
Hardee did provide provisions for a faster rate of march. He proposed a "double quick" step of 33 inches at a "double quick" rate of 165 steps per minute in addition to a "run" of 180 steps per minute. These new steps. theoretically.
allow a man. in one minute, to cover 70 yards at common time, 86 yards at quick time and 109 yards at double quic5 time . 49 Analysis Formations. The line formation is the basic battle.In keeping with the
drill manuals of the period either an entire regiment or any number up to half of a regiment may be placed in skirmish order. The rules closely parallel historical data and do
not allow skirmishers to be placed more than 520 yards to the front of a formed unit. The simulation does not allow for the drill manual's guidance that each regiment should hold two companies in reserve. it is important to remember.
however, that the intent of "Stars and Bars" is for the wargamer to assume the role of a division or corps comrnander. Commanders at division and corps level are concerned
with brigade or division reserve rather than company reserves. In addition, the drill manuals were designed for a As noted earlier, battlefield losses
quickly reduced the regiments to an average strength of 400 men. The smaller units discontinued the practice of holdTherefore, the presence of a
3owden be! ievss that, with mi 1 itary mir~iatures formation frontages are crucial to the accurate simulation of the American Civil War. In "Stars and Bars", infantry
figures are mounted either three or four figures per stand. Each stand is one inch wide and represents 40 yards of scale frontage. The three figure stand corresponds to Coggins and Grifflth's estimations of two feet per soldier. The four figures per stand represents a frontage of 18 inches per man. Bowden based his denser formation on the Army Officer
Pocket Companion, published in 1862. The "Pocket Companion" allows for 18 to 20 iaches per front rank man in the formation. The wargamer may choose to use three or four fig-
ures per stand. Different stands also may be mixed, which permits greater flexibility in building regiments of different historical strengths.52
The simulation requires units in skirmish order to occupy a minimum frontage of four times the normal frontage or a maximum of up to seven times the normal frontage. These frontages are very much in line with the guidelines provided by Hardee.53 Tactics. "Star and Bars" provides no guidance on The wargamer
The mechanics of the simulation allow the wargamer to use all the formations and tactics discussed. The difficulty in
passing through other units is simulated by not allowing units to move through other friendly units in motion (formed units not in skirmish formation). This accurately simulates
the difficulty in coordinating a successive "wave" attack. The second wave unit must wait until the lead unit has stopped before moving througl~its ranks. The penetrating
unit is then subjected to the same enemy fire that stopped the lead unit.54 Grand Tactical and Tactical Movement. "Stars and
Bars" uses grand tactical movement to simulate extended marches. As noted earlier, grand tactical movement repre-
sents the marching a unit could accomplish in one hour's time. In almost all battles, more time is spent marching
A simula-
tion of Jackson's march at Chancellorsville requires 1 2 hour!y rounds ia game time representation of 12 hours) to
complete. movement.
One hourly round is spent forming the corps for Seven more hours are used to move 12 miles with Stili
the trail units being 3 hours behind the lead units. another hour is needed to deploy the corps for the
attack.
Overall a very accurate simulation of Jackson's march.56 "Stars and Bars" tactical phases basically represent about 15 minutes of battle time. Using the above rates, a
man should be able to cover 1300 to 1600 yards in 15 minutes. Kowever "Stars and Bars" only allows a movement of
400 to 643 yards per 15 minutes of battle time. The theoretical movement rates laid out in the period drill manuals do not take into account many of the factors affecting battlefield movement. The terrain, as well as many other
factors, such as unit fatigue and motivation affects movement. Additionally. the nature of the threat greatly influ-
ences how much ground can be covered. The actual determination of historical accuracy of movement rates will be e m m ined in the si-mulations of the battles of New Karket and Cedar Mountain.5 7 Fire
Power
The Sixulation
Tactical combat is the most detailed phase of the "Stars and Bars" simulation. The tactical combat phase consists of alternating move counter-move sequences divided into four sub-phases. and fire twice. Each side has the opportunity to move
the enemy, and then returns fire on the enemy. follows the same sequence. side B.
Side B then
tactical combat. Each time a unit fires, the results are determined on the small arms table (Figure 4). These fires are considered a series of volleys or discharges rather than a single volley.58 "Stars and Bars" makes provisions for four basic
types of infantry weapons: rifled muskets; smoothbore muskets; breech-loading rifles; and repeating rifles. Infantry
fire is divided into three range categories: close range (120 yards or less); medium range (200 yards); and long range (out to 480 yards). beyond 480 yards. No infantry fire is allowed
moderately effective while smoothbores are only partially effective. At long range, rifle fire will only produce
random casualties with smoothbores being almost totally ineffective.5 9 To issue small arms fire, a unit must follow these steps :
1. Determine the morale classification of the firing troops. (Morale and training plays an important role in the effectiveness of infantry fire. Morale will be examined in chapter 5).
and
3. Multiply the number of figures firing by the fire power factor shown on infantry small arms chart. The resulting number is percentage chance needed to inflict casting casualties.
4. Modify the full percentage by the appropriate modifiers to arrive at6 he net percentage to inflict casting casualties. Examp 1 e . A Confederate "Veteran Regular" infantry regiment fires at a long range target. The Confederate unit has eight figures in a line formation. The target is a Union regiment in line formation behind a rail fence (light cover). The "Veteran Regular" unit has a 32% base chance to inflict a hit on the target unit (4% per casting X 8 firing castings = 32%). However, since the target unit is behind light cover (multiply by .9. from modifiers on small arms chart), the 32% is modified to 29% ( 32 X . 9 = 28.8%). A die roll of 30 or higher would result in no casting casualty for the target unit.
SMALL ARMS TABLE For Rined Muskets. Smoothbore Muskets. Breechloading Rifles. and Repeating R i n u
RANGE:
............................
0 4"(3")
FIRE TABLE I "CLOSE RANGE"
4.1 6 ( 5 )
FIRE TABLE I 1 "MEDIUM RANGE"
6.1
- 15(12")
6 5
4
........................... ..: ELITE ........................... . ..: VETERAN REG ................... : REGULAR ......................... : GREEN .............................: MILITIA ........................... ..:
CRACK
30 28
24
18 15 12 10 8
20
16
2
1
10
MODIFIERS
~ m n on g me nan* 01 any vmt omor man sksrmama. a l~mm umt m column lormauon - .. a momred un,t omer man smew F#r#ng vntl is tssung "Unrurprerred Flre" ., 81 '01sorderM ..........................................................................................x Firmg umtarmed entwely w m rmootnLwn, muskets breecmoaa~ng rl~e~ lepeallng rllles Firing unll 8 s mounted
ir
"
....
.. 05 x 0.75 . . . . . . . . . ................................................................... x 15 . . . . . . . . . . ....................................................................... 2 ............................................................................................. x 0.5 Target unit m akvmmn wder and in m e open ...................................................................... x 02 " order an4 ~nany ~ p of ecover . . . . . . rkmmrn lhmberm an8Ilew. or unlimoerea rntllew
i
" "
x x x x
2
15
I5
....
Targe!
is vnllmbeled anj)lewlm superheavy co . . . D.r m .m . lor .. ... ~nhears corer . . . . . . . . . .. in medwm Cover ............ llghl cover
81
" "
8"
N O .
11 r o m ~ l ~ l o n - . n
m a n lo. manon : n ~ . ~ , . . ~ o m a m m m , ~ ~ . u m . ~
lUII
Figure 4
The first edition of STARS*N*BARS used a record keeping system to track casualties in units. The wargamer,
in lieu of removing casualties recorded points for each unit that represented the loss of unit effectiveness. STARS*N*BARS 111. to increase playability represents casualWhen a unit x f f e r s a
hit from small arms fire, the unit's effectiveness is reduced by one casting. The casting casualty does not repre-sent 40 men killed in the unit. It represents a loss in Using the system
used in the first edition of "Stars and Bars" and Paddy Griffith's firefight model in Battle in the Civil War (page
39) each infantry or cavalry casting casualty represents
are stragglers and skulkers not actively participating in the battle. Casualties against artillery figures represent
approximately . 5 dead and 4 wounded. The Firefight and Close Action Resolution Table (Figure 5 ) is used to simulate the intense combat that occurred when units closed to within 200 yards of each other. Firefights occur whenever opposing units are between 2.1"(80 yards) and 5 " (200 yards). This represents the Fire-
3.
4. Side A rolls percentage dice, needing the number indicated or less to win the firefight combat. The victor then rolls on the Firefight Results Chart. (Figure 6 )
AVERAGE .ELITENESS OF SIDE 'W Is: . " = m ? SIOE'A' IS: 8 CRACK 5.5 5
45
6 CRACK
5.5
5 ELITE
4.5
3.5
V.R.
3 REGULAR
2.5
2 GREEN
1.5
1 MILITIA
urn
VETREG.
3.5
3
2.5 2 1.5 1
REGULAR
GREEN
MILITIA
10
15
20
25
30
35
45
.........................................
LEADERSHIP ~nrp~ra!tona~ ImpeDon81 untnspmp APPROACH.. P a n d enilladem FYI1 enltlade* ram flan* From rear
.................. ..................
YOU
OPPONENT
-30
-80
*30
re4
Cnatirmrbc
..................... S u p e t H e w .................
H-s""
< , ..
*20
.5
5 -10
.qc -,-
-5
-a
-20 - 5 '10
-20 5 -50
OPPONEHT -20
............. .........
...
-50
U~~~~"ODIIUI.(~~",DCI~AI"O~(I.U*UYIYI
.mew
ma#"*.r .
.........
..... ........
...
+20
. a
. W
+80
4
-W
-80
W0.C.W
Figure 5
45
F l R m G M RESULTS CHART
The~~w~nner"ollhol~ref~gnlroll~andsonsultsfneIo1I0w0ngr~~ulls.Ilthecnancelow~n!hslrel~gnt~aa0l loIW.rolllandconrullbelow. MOOlFlED OIE ROLL 40 01 less 41-90 RESULT DESCRIPTION mtn sdes stand thew ground.
LOSCI ~ D Y D D ! P .I ~
Draw
Minor h l m t
II the Chance to wsn the l~rel~ght was over 100. roll and sonsdl Wow:
MODIFIERS
Figure 6
Close action combat is the term used to describe the intense fire and sometimes hand to hand combat that occurs if units close to within 2" (80 yards) of each other. The
same procedure is used as with firefight resolution. except that the results are determined on the close action results chart (Figure 7 ) .
20 o r ess
LOW rsseau 1 2 v i ' ~ O " ln asotoered rtatrr lac ng 101111ds enemy Lose, a so osca 1 cantns carvsllr oer
91 and up
I1 me chance I 0 wm
5 or less 6 LO 41 and up
..................... -50
on a sabra snarge'
............................. -20
Figure 7
Historical Overview
The Rifle.
The rifled musket was the basic infantry Several armies had adoptBoth the
French and British had used large numbers of the weapon in the Crimean War (1853-1856). However. the American Civil War was the first major war where both antagonists fouqht predominantly with rifled muskets.61
Before the adoption of the rifled musket in the mid 1850s. the rifle had been a specialized weapon for specialized troops. Rifles were slow and difficult to load.
Riflemen had to load tight fitting lead balls by forcing them down the barrel with a small mallet. In the mid 1853s
Captain Claude-Etienne Minie, of the French Army, invented a pointed bullet with a tapered hollow in the base. fitted the hollow with a small iron cap. He
In prjnciple, tho
explosion of the rifle charge would drive the iron cap into the base of the bullet. The resulting expansion of the
bullet would then grip the rif 1 ing grooves of the weapon. ':' Both the British and the American armies immediately adopted the Minie system. The Americans also adopted a program to rifle out some of their old, .69 caliber. snoot;?bore muskets. Many units used these substandard rifles
during the early stages of the war.63 The most common rifles used during the war were the Union's .58 caliber Springfield rifle and the South's .577 caliber Enfield rifle. However, there were many other
substandard rlfles (2nd class weapons) and specialized rifles used during the war. These included the muzzle-
loading Brunswick, Lancaster, Jacobs and Whitworth rifles. and the breech-loading Sharps rifle. There were also sever-
al repeating rifles and carbines used mostly by mounted units. They will be discussed in chapter four.6 4 The Brunswick rifle had two spiral grooves in the barrel and fired a belted ball. The belts on the ball fit
weapon quickly became fouled making it very difficult to load. The belted ball also tended to be very erratic in flight.
As
the Erunswicks were quickly passed down to home guard and militia units.6 5 The Jacob rifle. except for having four grooves instead of two, was similar to the Brunswick. rifle had no grooves. bullet. Both The Laricaster
of the Jacob bullets were manufactured with hollow points and filled with explosive charges.6 6 . The most common specialized rifles were the Whitworth and the Sharps rifle. The English Whitworth rifle
used a twisted hexagonal bore and fired a six-sided bullet. Whitworth also manufactured a long range cannon using the same principle. Despite difficulty in !oading, its superior
accuracy made it very popular with many sharpshooter units. Major General Cleburne's units used the Whitworth very effectively in the eariy stages of the Chickamauga campaign.57
I had no ammunition to spare and did not reply to the continual fire of the enezy except with five Mhitworth rifles, which appeared to do good service. Mounted men were skguck at distances ranging from 700 to 1.300 yards.
The Sharps breech-loading, .52 cali5er rifle also was very popular with some sharpshooter units. Eerdan's
Berdan's men
were expert shots and well known for their skill at dropping a man at 700 yards or more.6 9 The key advantages of the
breech-loading rifle were its rate of fire: three times tiat of a muzzle-loading rifle; and the capability of being loaded while prone.7 0 The rifled musket was best loaded while standing. The soldier tore the paper cartridge with his teeth and poured the powder down the barrel. He then pressed the
bullet into the barrel and drove it home with a ramrod. After the weapon was cocked a percussion cap was placed over the nipple. The weapon was then ready to be fired.
trained infantryman could fire three rounds per minute. 7 1 However, black powder causes extensive fouling of the barrel and seriously reduces the rate of fire. Modern experiments have shown it is rare for muzzle-loaders to achieve thirteen aimed rounds in thirty minutes.72
had a published effective range of 500 yards, the actual ezfective range was closer to 200 yards. Federal armories
manufactured over 800,000 Springfields during the war and contracted 670.000 more from private industry.73
The Confederate infantry's primary firearm was the English M-1858 Enfield rifle. This weapon was essentially The North and South
combined purchased mere than 800.000 Enfields.74 The third most common infantry arm was the .69 caliber smoothbore musket (M1842). The Federal government had 140,000 on-hand at the beginning of the war.75 Another interesting feature of the Civil War was that many units went into battle with several different weapons within their ranks. The 1st Minnesota. -at the
battle of Gettysburg. had a mixture of .69 caliber smoothbores and rifles, .58 caliber Springfields, and some .52 caliber Sharps rifles. About 90 Union regiments at Gettys-
burg (36% of the total present) were armed with more than one type of weapon. It is easily conceivable that many
Confederate regiments had equally diverse mixtures cf weapons.76 Another example of mixed weaponry was provided in
L
A mixture of Hallz
rifles, Belgian rifles. Spencer repeaters and an odd assortment of shotguns and squirrel guns accounted for lass than
3% of the Army's total armament.
vidually scattered throughout the Army's total of 49,303 armed men. The majority of regiments were armed with one Fifty-six percent used either Springfields Only
Weapons Effectiveness.
replaced the smoothbore in the American Army in the late 1850s. However, smoothbore muskets were still used in large The 18th Tennessee. in 1862. was armed with flint-
numbers.
lock muskets.78 Confederate soldiers fought more with .69 caliber smoothbore muskets than rifles in the first year of the war. The Army of Tennessee still had 36% of its sol-Even the Union had Ten percent
of the Union soldiers at Gettysburg went into battle with smoothbores.7 9 At 50 yards. the musket was almost as accurate the rifle.
as
Most shooters could place their shots in an leThe common pract.ice of using buck and ball
inch circle.
ammo gave the firer a good chance of hitti~~y a man-size target at 100 yards. A buck and ball was a cartridge of This
shotgun type round made the smoothbore more deadly than the rifle at close ranges. The accliracy of the smoothbore
decreased rapidly when firing at anything past 100 yards. It was virtually impossible to hit a target at 200 yards.83 Much has been written aSout the range and accuracy of the Civil War rifle. Today, even with marksmanship
training and high powered rifles, most soldiers require extenxive training to hit a man-size target at 300 yards. Our M-16 rifle qualification ranges are conducted with mas,: of the targets at 175 meters (191 yards) or less. The
black-powder rifle of the Civil war was anything but a high powered weapon.61 The Springfield and Enfield rifles were deadly accurate as far out as two hundred yards. At 500 yards,
there was a 50% chance of hitting a man-sized target under ideal conditions. Special sniper rifles, such as the Whitworth. could be depended upon to hit targets at 1000 yards." The !ow velocity and corresponding high trajectory of the Sullet was what made hitting a target so diffisult with black powder weapons. estimated and the Ranges had to be correctly
diagram and description of Civil War rifle fire in his book. Arms and Equi~ment
A bullet fired by a kneeling man at the belt buckle on a man running toward him at an estimated range of 300 yards would just pass over the head of a man 100 to 250 yards away. Thus if the shooter had overestimated the ran e by as little as 50 yards he would have missed.82
Becituse of t.his. Civil War commanriers tended t~ reserve their fire until the enemy had closed to within 209 yards. Bell Wiley, in The Life of Silly Yank recorded a
common cormand, "Hold your fire until the Rebels are in easy range, then aim low and fire deliberately". 84 Paddy Gri f-
fith, in his "Battle Tactics" provided the results of an ?xtensive study of 113 firefights in the Civil War. He
engage in serious rifle fire until the enemy had closed to within 130 yards. With an increased percentage of rifles
being available after 1863, this range extended to 141 yards. The results of the rifle fire was far less than what
would be expected given the capahiljties of the weapons. Griffith's research indicates that, in 1862, a 400 man
regiment could expect to achieve 1.5 to 1.8 hits per minute of firing. 'l'hc same 400 man unit would only achieve .7 The
reduced casualties were caused by the tendency to fire over longer ranges and by both sides making better use of available cover.85 One important aspect of the rifle not yet discussed
i s the use of the bayonet.
cite the small number of bayonet wounds t.reated during the war as a testimony to its uselessness as a weapon.86 Jack
Coggins states. " It was used as an entrenching tool, can opener, roasting spit, and for a great many other purposes, but seldom as a weapon." He also discusses the low number of bayonet wounds treated and closes his discussion with. "The day of the bayonet was over. 87 One must, however, give some credit to the bayonet as a psychological weapon of shock. The purpose of the
t t 2
bayonet charge was not necessarily to kill the enemy but cause disorder and chase hin away. nets" signified a determination to
the enemy.3 8
Close steadily on the enemy and when you get within charge distance, rush on him with t ' e Sayonet. If you do this, we are sure to win.8 ti There are several examples of successful bayonet charges in the Civil War. These include John 9 . Hood's
attack at Gaine's Mill and Chamberlain's famous charge at Gettysburg. The bayonet charge, when used by well led.
determined troops could sti 1 1 achieve decisive results." However, most times the bayonet charge failed. The defender's rifle fire usually stopped the attacking force. Once stopped, the tendency was to engage in prolonged musketry duels. The duel would continue until one side decid-
Hampton of the 18th Tennessee claimed in his memoirs to have fired thirty-four cartridges in a single charge at Murfreesboro . 9 2 However, he wrote his memoirs twenty-seven years The Confederate Ordnance Department
estimated the average southern soldier fired 25 to 26 rounds in the Gettysburg Campaign ( 3 .June-July 11, 1863). The Northern counterpart fired an average of 40 rounds during the same campaign. Using these estimations, it should have
been rare for a unit to expend all its ammo in one days fighting.93 However, there are several documented cases of units running out of ammunition. Some Confederate units. at the
Second Manassas, threw rocks when they exhausted their ammunition supply.94 At the battle of Chickamauga, Clay-
ton's Confederate brigade withdrew from the fight because of a lack of ammunition. Clayton then resupplied and moved his
Field Fortifications.
of Civil War small arms fire was tge increased reliance or battlefield entrenchments. Field fortifications were not Grant built no
fortifications at Shiloh and Lee, although given ample opportunity did not entrench at Antietam.9 6 Common sense did eventually prevail with the
Amy!--
can fightingrnan. Entrenching became part of almost all subsequent battles. In 1 8 6 3 . entrenchments had significant
impacts on the Sattles of Chancellorville, Gettysburg. Vicksburg an2 Chickaxauga. 8y 1 8 6 4 , extensive and sophisti-
cated field entrenchments appeared in most major Sattles.9 7 When on the defense, a cormon practice was for a regiment to keep the front rank in the line of battle.
Ths
second rank gathered logs, brush and rocks to build hasty breastworks. These "hasty" breastworks could be constructed in less than an hour. An offensive tactic used in the
latter part of the war was for a heavy skirmish line to advance to within 200 yards of the enemy. The men would
then lie down. and dig shallow pits, and wait. for night. During the hours of darkness, the shallow pits would be expanded into a continuous trench line. Most units could
The Rifle.
is based on the standard infantry rifles, either the Springfield or the Enfield.
Modifications for Setter weapons
(breech loading and repeating rifles) and less effective weapons (smoothbore muskets) are applied against the base factors for standard rifles. "Stars and Bars" allows individual units to be armed with a mixture of weapons. However, the rules clearly imply
through examples that. for ease of play, units should be armed with only one type of weapon. This simplification of
history is easily justifiable. Out of the 90 Union regiments using mixed armaments at Gettysburg, only 38 required different a~munitions. Mcst units had a mixture of . 5 8 Springfields ant .577 Enfields. Both weapons used the same
cartridge and had similar characteristics. Units requiring two different ammunitions were usually armed with smoothbores or 2nd rate rifles. The flank companies, comprising
only 1/10 to 2/10 of the unit, were sometimes armed with Springfields or Enfields for skirmishing. The smail number
of soldiers firing better rifles could not be accurately represented when dealing with a scale of 1 to 40.9 9 Bowden also neglected to allow for the use of substandard or 2nd class rifles (any infantry rifle other than the Springfield or Enfield). Paul Stevenson, in his book,
Warqaminq H i s t o a recommends that any Civil War simulation should recognize two grades of rifled muskets. First and
second class rifles had similar capabili.ties out to 200 yards. On the other hand, the 2nd class rifles had greatly Bowder!s generalizs-
tion of classing all rif:es together would, therefore, cause historical inaccu:'acies in simulating long range fire.
However, because the simulation produces only random casualties in long range fire. as was also the result in history. historical accuracy is not significantly affected. Addi-
tionally, by the second year of the war. few units other than home guard units were even using the 2nd rate rifles. LO0
W e a ~ o n sEffectiveness.
for only four types of infantry weapons: rifled muskets. smoothbores, breech-loading rifles and repeating rifles. Bowden's range categories appear to provide an accurate reflection of the capaSilities of most Civil War infancry weapons. However there are some minor exceptions. Bowden's
infantry five model has smoothbores being 25% less effective than rifles at close range. This doesn't allow for the
historical data showing that muskets were as effective as rifles out to 50 yards.
effective, as with the wounding of Major General Warren and the killing of Brigadier General Weed at Little Round Top, most times sniper fire was more of a nuisance and had little affect on the battle. Because of the grand tactical scale
used in.the simulation, the lack of sniper fire should have minimal eftect on historical accuracy. The firefight resolution seems to simulate very well the indecisiveness of most Civil War infantry fights.
The
ability tc win a firefight is primarily influenced by the number of casualties inflicted. Normally, the side that. inflicts the most casualties will win the firefight. However, winning the firefight usually accomplishes very little. There is a 40% chance that both sides will simply stan<?. their ground and continue with the firefight in the next turn. There is a 50% chance that the loser will fall back. However. if the loser has a supporting line nearby, the winner has accomplished very little. The winner of the firefight only has a 10% chance of breaking the losing unit. Overall, the firefight resolution appears to be historically accurati! in simulating the pmlonrjed inf.:-;.ltry due 1s. Significant casualties can be inflicted. Yet, decis ive tacl-i-
Market will allow the opportunity to compare historical firefights to those of the simulation. The close action results procedure represents combat at a very close range. It is interesting to note that the
traditional concept of wargaming represents close action combat with opposing units that are in direct contact with each other. Only those movement stands within the regiment which are actually touching enemy stands take part in the combat resolution. However, in "Stars and Bars", movement
Any unit
within 2 " ( 8 0 yards) of the enemy is automatically designates to be participating in close action combat. Close combat
was usually a contest of wills rather than actual bayonet fighting. Another interesting feature of the close combat in "Stars and Bars" is that there is no differentiation made between rifles and smoothbores. The equality of the two weapons in the close combat procedure helps to compensate for the historical inaccuracy already mentioned in not recognizing the close range capabilities of the smoothbore. The close action results determination is much more decisive than the firefight resolution. Historically, this
close-in fighting was very intense. Because of this. few units could continue the fight for very long. One side or the other would usually break and run from the fight.1 0 2 The simulation will always res~ult in one retreating. There
is at least a 70% chance that the retreat will deteriorate into a rout. The close action results procedure simulates those rare instances when units closed to very close range. However. it doesn't properly recognize that most charges were stopped by the defender's firepower before decisive results could be achieved. Once stopped, the charge trsns-
formed into a firefight. This could possibly be a significant flaw in the simulation and will require further examination in chapter six. Ammunition Shortaqes. "Stars and Bars" also makes
no provision for infantry units to run out of ammunition. Paddy Griffith makes the case that not all documented cases of units running out of.ammunition should be accepted at face value. He suggests many may have used "ammanition
shortages" as an excuse for not being able to hold or take a difficult position. Whether- or not Griffith is correct.
Bowden does hanclle arnmclnition shortages in an abstr.art manner. Units accunulate fatigue points for each hour of
ccmbat: tkus, units that remain in the fight for severai hours become less effective. Shortage of amunition would
have been onc of the reasons for reduced effectiveness. Units can reduce fatigue points by resting. As well as
simulating the unit catching its breath, filling canteens and tending to wounds, the fatigue factor could allow for
Field Fortifications.
the construction of field fortifications. Light field works consisting of felled logs and brush can be constructed in one hourly round.
Mcciiunl field works consisting of shalloii
ElaSorata
trenches require the assistance of engineers and take more than 8 hours to complete. Bowden's simulation of engineer-
ing tasks portrays realistic time requirements and construation capabilities. One possible way to enhance the historical accuracy would have been to make it more difficult to construct entrenchments prior to 1863. This would better simulate the absence of field entrenchments on early battlefields.1C 4
The following chart summarizes the analysis of infantry combat in the "Stars and Bars" simulation. YES -"Stars and Bars" provides the means for a historically accurate simulation.
The Infantry
Unit Organization The Regiment Bde, Div, and Corps YES Yes
Maneuver
Formations/Frontage Tactics Grand Tactical Movement Tactical Novemenk Fire Power Types of Weapons Weapons Effectiveness Small Arms Fire Firefight Resolution Close Action Resoiution YES YES YES YES
?
Field Fortifications
CHAPTER 3 NOTES
(1)Hampton. N.J., An Eyewitness to the Dark Days of 1 8 6 3 65 - (Nashville: 1889). 26. (2)Bell Wiley. The Life of Billy Yank (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co.,l943) 6 6 .
(Arlington. Texas:
(5) 0.3. War Department, Reaulations for the Army of t ? ~ U.S. 1857 , ( New York: Harper and Brothers. 1857) 13. : (Also see): William Hardee. Rifle and Liaht Infantrv T a c z tics (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1847) vol 1. , 5-7.. : William Craighill, The Army Cfficers Pocket Comwanion (New York: D. Van Nostrand . 1862). 65. (6)Paul Stevenson, in History (New York: - Waraaminq ling Publishing Co. inc.. 1990) , 6-7.
Ster-
(7:lack Coggins, Arms and Eauipment of the Civil War (Yew 10-11. 21. YorX: Ooubleday and Company, : 5 5 2 )
Hardee, Infantry
tics, vol
Tat=
l . , 5-8.
u,
(9)Paddy Griffith. Battle Tactics of the Civil War !First Published in the United Kingdom under the title Rally : 3 n ( : & the Crowood Press. 1987, reprint London: Yale ijniversity Press. 1989). 91-94.
(14)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 91-93 (15)Coggins. Arms and Equipment. 10-13 (16)Brigadier General Silas Casey, Infantry Tactics, (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862) , vol 1. , 5-6. : U.S., Reaulations 1857, 63. ; Coggins. Arms and Equipment. 10-12. ; Griffith, Generalshin and Tactics. 10-12.; Craighill, Pocket Companion 1862, 65-67.
appendix B.
(21)Thomas F. Moselev. "Evolution of American Civil W,zr Infantry Tactics." ( Ph. D . diss., University of North Carolina, 1957). 256. (22)Perry D Jamieson, "The Development of Civil War Tactics" (Ph. D. diss.. Wayne 5tat.e ::niversity, 1979). 7 -7. (23)Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil War Mi1itaryJTactic.s and the Southern Heritaqg (Ala--bama: Aiabama UP. 1982) , 31-33. ; (also see): wlnfield Scott, Infantry Tactics: or Rules for the Exercise and Maneuvers of the United States Infantry, vol. I . , 5 , 7, 910, 80-81, 124. (24)Hardee. Infantry Attack a.nd Die, 44749. Tact-. vol I. , 3.
:
Picwhiney
(25)Hardee, Infantry Tactics, vol I., 24--28.; McWhiney, Attack and Die, 49-51. : Mosely, "Evolution of Tactics", 255-267. ; Ccggins, Arms and Eaui3ment. 23-24. (26!Xoseley. "Evolution of Tactics.
"
26. 270.
;
McWhiney,
(28)A. Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War trans. Winship and Xclean, (Philadelphia: J. E. iippinrott & Cwnpany. 1862: reprint. Westport. Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 1977). 207,292. (29)Paddy Griffith. Battle In The Civil War, Generalshio and Taztics (Kottinghamshire, England: Field-Books. 1S85l. 13. (30!McWhiney, Attzck and Die, 4 4 .
(33)William Hardee, Rifle and Liaht Infantry Tactic?, (New York: Harper and arothers, 1847) Vol 2. , 90. (34)Coggins. Arms and Eauipment, 21. (35)Coggins. Arms and Eaui~ment,21. (36)Mcwhiney, Attack and Die. 34 .89. (37)Griffith. Battle Tactics. 152-153 (38)Mosely. "Evolution of Tactics," 335 (39)McWWhiney. Attack and Die. 52.
!41)McWhiney, Attack and Die, 81-90. : Coggins. Arms ard Ecwi~rnent. 23-25. : Griffith, Battle Tactics, 150. : Mose13i, "Evolution of Tactics", 367--359. : Craighil! Pocket C o i ~ panion, 174.
(42)Coggins. Arms and Equipment, 23-25. (43)Mosely. "Evolution of Tactics", 367-369. (44)Griffith, Battle Tactics, 154-155. : Griffith. Genera l s h i ~ and Tactics. 30. ; Mosely "Evolution of Tactics". 367-369. !45)Coggins. Arms and Eaui~ment,23 (46)Craighill, Pocket Companion 1862, 91-93. (47)Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Suel, ed. . Rattles and Leaders of the Civil War. 4 vol. (New York: The Century Company, 1884-1887) . 205-208. (48)Thomas Griess, The American Civil War. A West Poinc Militarv K i s t o r ~Series (New Jersey, Avery Publishing group 136 ,140. INC., 1987)
(49)Coggins. Arms and Eauioment. 23. (50)3owaen, gTARS*N*BARS 111, 111. IX/5, VII/3. (51)Craighill. Pocket Com~anion1852. 65. !52)Eowden, STARS*N"BARS 111, :/I-1/3.
(59)Bowden. STARS*N*BARS 111, IX/14. (6O!Bowden. STARSW*BARS 111, IX/13. (61)Coggins. Arms and Equi~ment.25. (62)Mosely, "Evolution of Tactics", 92-95
- 1 War Dictionary. (69)Mark ?I. 3oatner 111, T'il-ee " \,lvi York: David McKay Company. INC. ,1959). 61.
(70)Coggins. Arms and Eauiment. 27. (71)Hardee. hfantrv Tactics. Vol. 1. 101 (72)Griffith. Battle T6ctics. 207.
(New
Mosely, "Evclx-
(79)Bell Wiley, The Life of Johny Reb (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1978) , 289-290. (80)Coggins. Arms and Equipment, 38. (81)U.S. Army, F1.I 23-9 M16A1 and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanshill (1939) : 2-3, appdenix G. (82)Mosely, "Evolution of Tactics", 126-127. (83)Coggins. Arms and Eauloment, 39. (84)Wiley. Silly Yank, 67. (85)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 144-149. fith. Generalship and Tactics. 39. (86)McWhiney, Attack and Die, 77-78. (87)Coggins. A~ins and Equipment, 29. (88)Griffith. _General&ip..a_nd (89)Wiley. Billy Y?&,
67.
;
Tactics. 4 1 7
XXX, Ft 2, 362.
(100)Stevenson. Waraaminq in Histury. 5 ' 7 . (101)Ibid.,IX/33-34. (102lGriffith. Generalshio and Tactics. 47. (103)Griffith, Battle Tactics, 82-83.
;
Wiiey.
Bill.{
Yar.k, 67.
CHAPTER 4
The fact i s that we have no genera1 who has shown himself able to handle infantry, artillery and cavalry so as to make them co-operate together. Artillery Captain Army of the ~otomac'
Today's Armor Branch (descendent of the horse cavalry) is the Combat Arm of Decision while Artillery is the King of Battle. Both branches served primarily in supporting roles during the Civil War. Many Civil War soldiers
belittled the capabilities of the cavalry with jeering remarks such as, "who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Others thought that the role of the artillery on the battlefield had become obsolete with the introduction of the rifledmusket. This chapter will examine the roles cavalry and artillery played on the battlefield and how accurately those roles are simulated in "Stars and Bars". The examination
will proceed in the same format as used in the previous chapter. looking at the cavalry first.
THE CAVALRY
The road was soon, and for several miles, thickly dotted with the wounded and slain a number of whom had been cut down by the sabers of the untrained but heavy- handed Confederates. Nathan Bedford Fo rest December 28, 1 8 6 15 Unit Oraanization
The Simulation
In "Stars and Bars", the cavalry organization is very similar to that of the infantry in almost every respect. Each cavalry figure represents 4 0 men. The wargamer Although
large units can break down into independent battle groups, the regiment remains the basic maneuver unit (Figure 8). Cavalry regiments with 1 0 to 1 4 figures can separate into two battle groups. Units with more than 15 figures can
divide into three battle groups.3 Dismounted cavalry troopers are mounted in the same way as are infantrymen. Three dismounted cavalry figures are required for each four mounted figures. the fourth man represents the horse The absence of The simula-
holder^.^
tion, as with the infantry, places no importance upon indi-vidual cavalry companies. However, individual stands, mounted or dismounted, can be taken from the regiment and used as separate skirmish units.
Historical Overview
The Reuiment. The primary building block for cavalry organizations was the regiment.' Before the war, the Army organized cavalry according to the 1841 regulation. Volun-
teer regiments (North and South) and Regular Army units were composed of five squadrons of two companies each. company had a strength of 80 men.5 Each
A colonel, assisted by a
lieutenant colonel and two majors, commanded the regiment. The regimental staff was similar to that of the infantry. Regimental strength, including the staff, was usually around 800 men.6
Figure 8
rons each. Confederate regiments retained the 10 company organization. The new Federal organization had an authorCavalry regiments were
decreased, the battalion replaced the squadron as a tactical organization. Confederate regiments retained the squadron structure but reduced the number of squadrons in the regiment. Cavalry regiments in both armies averaged 500 men i:n In 1864, Union units usually fielded
about 250 men, while most Rebel units were down to about 200 men.8
cavalry organization existed above the regimental level. the war progressed, however, both sides grouped cavalry
units together into higher tactical organizations. Two to six regiments were grouped to form a cavalry brigade. Both
North and South grouped 2 to 6 brigades into cavalry divisions as well. Eventually the Union Army also formed cavalAn example is
Analysis
The already provided analysis for infantry organizations also applies to the cavalry. Once again, the wargamer
of battle.
great deal of flexibility in constructing historical cavalry units. The cavalry battle groups represent the common prac
tice of operating in Union battalions and Confederate squadrons. Overall, the simulation provides a good mechanism for representing historical organizations.
Maneuver
The Simulation
Cavalry uses the same types of movement and formations as previously discussed in chapter 3. Terrain and formations have the same type of effect on movement capabilities. Figures 2 and 3 show that mounted soldiers are
capable of moving farther than infantry in grand tactical and tactical movements. Cavalry has two, additional special movement capabilities. First, they can expand or contract formation The simulation refers to this as
"doubling". This allows units using a road column formation to move into a field column or line formation during movement (Figure 9).l o Cavalry units also may execute an "opportunity charge" during the opponent's movement turn. The gamer may a cavalry unit opportunity charge against any enemy unit that moves within 8" ( 3 2 0 scale yards) of the friendly cavalry unit.11
lsi Double in
2nd Double in
I n Double wl
publication of the "41 Tactics" or "Poinsett Tactics". Translated the '41 Tactics from the most current French cavalry manual.
He
drill, they offered little useful guidance for the development of American cavalry doctrine.12 Europeans based their doctrine on the traditions of massed cavalry charges. Countless brigades and divisions of
cavalry had charged across the battlefields of Europe. However, cavalry traditions were much different in America. There was no established cavalry organization above regiment in America. In fact, units rarely even operated as com-
plete regiments. Cavalry normally operated in company size units as part of the frontier police force. When operating with a field army, they performed scout, reconnaissance and screen duties.13 Colonel Philip Cooke, recognized as the foremost authority in American Cavalry, published a new cavalry manual in 1861. His manual too was almost a direct copy of the newest French manual. Just as the '41 Tactics, it
stressed the use of battle cavalry and massed cavalry charges. Major General Wheeler used the same French Manual to develop a tactics manual for the South. Both armies officially adopted their respective manuals. l4 American
cavalrymen used Poinsett's, Cooke's and Wheeler's manuals to teach drill. Because the manuals stressed European type tactics, cavalry leaders would rely upon wartime experience to develop an American cavalry doctrine and tactics.15
into a line for the charge. However, the manuals acknowledged that it took two or more years to effectively train a cavalry unit. American cavalry units were mobilized and sent into combat in a matter of months. Not until late in
the war could they match the training and discipline of European cavalry.16 Poinsett's Tactics required a double rank formation. Each squadron had to form its two companies one behind the other.
A regiment on line had five companies in the first
line and five in the second. Cooke's Tactics dropped the two rank requirement and adopted the battalion as the primary maneuver element. two rank requirement.17
A regiment normally approached the battle in column
of fours.
In battle, each squadron formed a line and moved If the terrain permitted, the As the war
continued, more often than not, cavalry fought dismounted. The tactical situation usually dictated how to deploy dismounted troops. The most widely used formation consisted of four parts. Six to Eight companies dismounted and formed a One or two additional dismounted companies
line of battle.
The
regiment retained a mounted reserve of one or two companies positioned on each flank. The horse holders made up the fourth part of the formation. One out of every four men acted as horse holders. Cavalry brigades used the same
horses. 'They suffered many humiliating defeats from Rebel horsemen. However, this generally deplorable situation did
contribute to the development of American cavalry .tactics. 20 At first, the Union did not concentrate cavalry units together. McClellan had 14 regiments of cavalry during the Needing only a few regiments for recon-
Peninsula Campaign.
naissance, he allowed the remainder to be parceled out for courier, picket and escort duties.21 The Fifth U.S. Cavalry It was a
did conduct one saber charge at Gaines' Mill. small affair with
Confederate division. The attack was a total failure with a 20% casualty rate among the charging cavalrymen.22 pope,
commander of the "Federal Army of Virginia". concentrated his cavalry into brigades. One of those brigades fought
gagement successfully delayed a Confederate cavalry force and initiated the development of a new cavalry doctrine.2 3 The battle of Gettysburg prompted the birth of American Cavalry doctrine. On the first day of the battle, Federal cavalrymen endured four hours of fighting against vastly superior numbers and still held. From that day
forward Federal cavalry doctrine emphasized dismounted tactics. On rare occasions. when faced in the open by enemy cavalry, they remained mounted in battle. However, they
fought dismounted in almost all other circumstances.24 Soon after Gettysburg, the Confederate cavalry also adopted dismounted tactics.2 5 Rebel cavalry began the war in the western campaign operating as mounted infantry units. As time went by, they
perfected the same basic skills the Union was building in the West. Federal cavalry in the West followed the same
evolutionary process as their compatriots in the east.2 6 Grand Tactical and Tactical Movement. The Cavalry's On a
long march, a column of cavalry, alternating between walk and trot, could average over six miles in an hour. day's march was around 35 miles.
A norma!
tained for several days without undue strain on the men or horses.27 There were several cases of much longer marches.
in 35 hours. However, these difficult marches severely fatigued both men and horses.28 The normal maneuver speed If the tactical situa-
tion required it, they could maneuver at 12 MPH in a gallop and charge at 16 MPH.29
Analysis Formations. The simulation accurately portrays Civil War cavalry formations. The two figure stand represents 40 horsemen deployed on line with another 40 deployed behind them. This was the basic cavalry company formation.
of fours was only used for road marches and not in combat, it should not affect the tactical simulation. All other historical tactical formations are possible in the simulation. The wargamer can form the Poinsett double line by Cooke and Wheeler's single
line can be formed by putting all figures in a single line. The doubling technique allows the wargamer to execute historical cavalry movement. One can simulate a unit's
deployment from a road column to squadrons in column all in one turn. The same simulation mechanics that govern infantry skirmishers also apply to the cavalry. Cavalry troops can
deploy mounted or dismounted skirmishers. This allows the simulator to accurately portray the standard, four part, dismounted formation. Craighill's Army Officers Pocket Companion states that a double rank of 80 cavalrymen would occupy 53 yards ."O "Stars and Bars" has the same formation occupying 60 yards. Craighill based his frontage on the space needed for disci-. plined cavalrymen maintaining proper formation with horses close enough to be almost touching each other. More than likely, American formations were actually less dense than this. Nevertheless. the seven yard difference should not historical accuracy of
Tactics. The simulation mechanics governing formations and movement allow the wargamer to execute historical cavalry tactics. The cavalry can fight mounted or dismounted. However, there is no mechanism to account for the pooiThis is
odd as the first edition of "Stars and Bars" did contain such a rule for horsemanship. In STARS*N*BARS I all Union
cavalry raised in the eastern states and used in battles set during 1861 and 1862 had to comply with special restrictions. Their movement rates were reduced by 25%. They
could only cross walls and fences at very slow speeds. Mounting and dismounting consumed an entire turn. These
special restrictions helped to simulate the superiority of the Confederate cavalry early in the war. Bowden probably
deleted the special cavalry rules in the third edition in favor of playability against accuracy and additional complexity. Grand Tactical and Tactical Movement. The grand
tactical movement allowance for cavalry (Figure 2 ) does not appear accurately portray the outstanding mobility capabilities of mounted units. Historically, mounted units could However, the
average six miles an hour on a large march. movement table only allows for 1.6 MPH.
battles took place in a relatively small area. The Union line at Gettysburg was less than 8 miles long. The distortion of cavalry movement may not be noticeable over such a small area. However, it will require further examination in chapter 6. ~actidalmovement for cavalry is also questionable. Cavalry should be able to maneuver at three times the rate
of infantry.
rate.
examination.
Fire Power m e Simulation The cavalry in "Stars and Bars" uses a fire model almost the same as the one already discussed for the infan-
try.
.............................
0 4"(3")
FIRE TABLE l "CLOSE RANGF'
4 . 1
- 66")
14 12 10 8
6 . 1
.lO(8")
4
CRACK EUTE
22 20 18 14 12 8
................................
2
2 1 1
..........................
6
4
..............................
MODIFIERS
B n k o l any untt other man sk8msnars Finng ., on Ulo a lotmea vmf m column lormanon a movn~wuntt otnerthanan~llery Firing unmtis luving 'Unrurpmred Fire" Diaoraerea' " " armw entwely -8th smoomWre c a r m e " " breecloadmg carbmes ,mcluaes me C repeating crrb8ne.l ism~untw
. . . ...
.................................................................
...........................................................................
Targel unot 8 s in skumtsh o m a and m me wen any w e 01 s o w IlmWrM anlllw. or unllmberw anllcry on a sompraua front " un18mbtlred anllle~ not on asompreas~ltront Taam 81 fonncd far rn unlimMrea a n l l w l m rumrneaw cover .~ heavy cover " mm4um cover 18sntcover
................
. . . ..... ..
...................................................................... ..............................................................
02
............ ..........
....
...........
-. . . ...
r 01
Figure 10 The cavalry uses the same basic procedure for conducting small arms firing as does the infantry. There are two notable exceptions. First, mounted units fire with a
50% reduction in effectiveness. Second, fire against m0un.Ced units is increased by 50%. The firefight resolution is the same as for infantry. Close combat resolutions are basically the same.
However, the cavalry does have the option of declaring a saber charge. This simulates an attempt by the cavalry to The saber
charge does not enhance the opportunity to close with the enemy, but does increase the damage inflicted if they do close successfully. Historical Overview The Carbine. It was the carbine that revolutionized
mounted warfare in North America. Over thirty different types were used in the war. Many, such as the Henry and
Spencer, were outstanding weapons and contributed significantly to the development of Civil War cavalry doctrine. Others, like the Sharps and Short Enfield, were more than adequate in getting the job done. Union cavalry began the
war poorly armed. Volunteer units had sabers and perhaps one carbine for every 10 men. The armaments reflected the
contemporary belief that the cavalry would only perform screen and reconnaissance duties. The Confederate cavalry initially preferred pistols and shotguns. By 1863, almost all cavalry had some sort of carbine.31 The Sharps carbine was a cut down version of the single-shot, breech-loading rifle. Its rate of fire was
twice that of a Springfield or Enfield rifle. This weapon served throughout the war with the U.S. Army Regular cavalry units. It was also very popular in the South because it
used non-metallic cartridges (Southern Industry could not manufacture metallic cartridges).32 Most considered the Spencer Repeater the best weapon of the war. It had a seven shot, tubular magazine and was
However, the
Union Army did not issue it in large numbers until after Gettysburg. Although popular with Confederate units, they had to rely on captured metallic cartridges for resupply.33 The 15-shot Henry Repeater was another excellent weapon. It had a higher rate of fire than the Spencer, but Ironically, the North did
not issue Henry carbines to its soldiers during the war. However soldiers did privately purchase over 10,000 Henries.34 The "Short Enfield" was not really a carbine, but rather a cut down rifle. Nathan Bedford Forest made this
weapon famous as the official weapon of his unit. The Confederate cavalry could meet the Union cavalry on somewhat equal terms because the "Short Enfield" had better range and stopping power than true carbines. Early in the war, Con-
federate cavalry in the west used shotguns in lieu of carbines. The favorite tactic, perfected by Terry's Texas
Rangers, was to load heavy gauge buck shot for close quarter fighting.35 At twenty paces the Confederates gave a volley with their shot-guns, a formidable weapon at distance, and rushed in with pistols and sabers.
t g 3 ! '
Other weapons common to the cavalry were sabers and pistols. The U.S. Cavalry issued sabers as an official part
enjoyed in Europe.
engagements with the saber, such as Winchester (1864) and Five Forks, to warrant its continued existence.37
The Intrepid Devin, with his gallant brigade, burst like a storm of case shot in their midst, showering saber blows on their heads and shoulders, trampling them under his horses' feet, and routing them in droves in every direction. The brigade emerged from the fray w'th three stand of colors and over 300 prisoners.3Q
Many. especially in the South. preferred the pistol to the saber. Federal authorities officially listed close
to 400,000 revolvers, of 14 different makes, purchased during the war. However, the Colt Company, alone, claims to have supplied 380,000 revolvers to the government and private individuals. Altogether, historians estimate that both sides combined used about one million pistols in the war. Most were Colts and Remington revolvers.3 9 Weapons Effectiveness. Carbines were excellent weapons for cavalry operations. Their shorter barrels made them handier than rifles. Because mcst were breech loaders, and many were repeaters, their rate of fire was very good. Accuracy and hitting power was sufficient considering that the average length was only 38" (rifles averaged 5 8 " ) . The
better weapons were capable of hitting targets at 500 yards. However, most carbines had an effective range of only 150 to
200 yards.
barrel and the corresponding weak loads of the cartridge. Poor hitting power was one of the major reasons the Army did not purchase the Henry Repeater. Most cavalrymen believed
the rapid rate of fire more than made up for its deficiencies.40 The breech loaders could fire twice as fast as the standard infantry rifle. The repeaters, like the Spencer Bragg, at Chick+
mauga, believed that the fire he heard coming from wilder':^ Union brigade armed with Spencer carbines, was that of an entire division. However. the faster rates of fire caused difficulties with ammunition supplies. Many times cavalry units had to withdraw because they ran out of ammunition. By 1864, the Union cavalry was confident in their ability to use their rapid fire carbines to stop twice their numbers. Sheridan's valley campaign also showed that the cavaIry with rapid fire carbines could sometimes attack dismounted and defeat entrenched infantry.41 The effectiveness of the saber must be described in two parts. First, against the infantry (or dismounted
cavalry) it proved to be almost useless. The cavalry made very few charges against the infantry. Of the few, most failed. In almost every case, Infantry armed with rifles
would break-up the charging cavalry long before it reached the infantry line. Sheridan, in the 1864 Valley Campaign.
infantry. However, in most cases the infantry were weak and demoralized units.42 In cavalry versus cavalry, the saber still proved to be an effective weapon. saber over the pistol. The Federal cavalry favored the General Custer, after a skirmish at
Opequan Creek, Virginia, remarked: The enemy relied wholly upon the carbine and the pistol; my men preferred the saber. A short but closely contested struggle ens , which resulted in the repulse of the enemy.
E i d
By 1863, the Rebels also began to emphasize the use of sabers in cavalry versus cavalry actions. stated: Jeb Stuart
Other cavalry leaders favored the use 05 the pistol. o 4 5 Mosby stated, "The saber is of no use against gunpowder. t Forrest also preferred the pistol to the saber for his units.46 Interestingly, dismounted cavalry were also quite The 2nd U.S. Cavalry
used pistols in a dismounted attack to drive the enemy from their entrenchments. 4 7 Forrest's men also used pistols while dismounted. His tactics were to close in quickly so
that his pistols could match the firepower of the Federal's repeating carbines.4 8 Analysis
The Carbine. The fire model is based on singleshot, muzzle-loading, rifled carbines. As with the infantry
fire model, modifications for better weapons and less effective weapons are applied against the base factors.
At
first, this seems strange because the cavalry used so few single-shot, muzzle-loading, rifled carbines during the war. As stated earlier. the "Short Enfield" was a rifle, not a carbine. Bowden probably based his methodology for carbine By using the same basic fire model as
fire on playability.
the infantry, the wargamer only has to familiarize himself with one set of modifiers. The small arms table does not account for pistols s because they were primarily melee and shotguns. This i weapons for close combat. They did play a significant role
Weaoons Effecj&veness.
four types of cavalry carbines: rifled muzzle-loading; smoothbore; breech-loading; and repeating. The range categories accurately reflect that carbines were only effective out to a maximum range of 200 yards. Although the Sharps carbine had a rate of fire three times as fast as a standard infantry rifle, the fire model only provides for a 50% increase. The Spencer had six times the rate of fire of a standard rifle. model only doubles the rate. However, the fire
reduced rates on several factors. First, the rapid fire weapons had the potential of running out of ammunition very quickly. Spencer armed cavalrymen only carried 75 rounds.
weapon stoppages and failures greatly reduced the total volume of fire. In one intense firefight, the 1st Pennsyl-
vania cavalry fired an average of 12-18 rounds per man per hour. The Spencer carbine should have been able to fire 12-18 rounds per minute.5 0 Overall the fire model appears to be somewhat inaccurate in its representation of the capabilities of breechloading and repeating carbines. One brigade of Union caval-
weapon had a better chance of hitting the man or his horse than an infantryman. Cavalry units have a better chance of closing when charging against disordered infantry or against an open flank. If the mounted unit does manage to complete its
charge, the results can be devastating to the defending infantrymen. By comparing the modifiers on the close action results chart (Figure 7). one sees that a cavalry unit completing a saber charge will automatically defeat the defending infantry. The Confederate cavalry armed with
shotguns also have a devastating effect if they are allowed to close with the enemy. The chances of the two, charging, mounted units closing with each other is very good. When both sides have equal numbers, the advantage will go to the side with the higher eliteness rating (explained in chapter 5).
The Artillery
Repeatedly the rebels attempted infantry charges in front of us, from the point of the forest, but our artillery, playing over our regiment with grape and canister, cut them down as a mower cuts grass. Frederic Denison 1st Rhode Island cavalry5'
Unit Oraanization
The Simulation
The "Stars and Bars" artillery organization is much different than its infantry and cavalry organization. Each
gunner figure, instead of representing 40 men, signifies the number of crewmen needed to operate two guns. gun represents two guns. Each model
gun and two gunner figures representing an artillery section with two guns and the crew members to man the guns. The
simulation groups two or three stands adjacently to represent a four or six gun battery (Figure 11). There is no requirement for the battery to have one standard type of gun. The simulation encourages the wargamer to use histori-
cal battery organizations and allows up to 3 different types of guns in the same battery.52
Figure 11
lery.
tions are outside the scope of this study and will not be examined.53 Field Artillery maneuvered with and supported the troops in the field. two sub-parts: The Field Artillery was divided into
cavalry; and mounted artillery providing support to the infantry.54 Horse and mounted artillery are organized very similarly with one major difference. ized Regulations author-
horse artillery to have additional horses for the In mounted artillery, the gunners either The artillery
gunners to ride.
regiment was strictly an administrative headquarters. Each regiment was composed of 12 batteries. These batteries
served as the basic tactical organization in the war. Before the war, six to eight was considered the ideal number of guns for a battery. Early combat experience soon proved
the best organization to be four or six.55 Numerous types of guns and howitzers were common before the war. At that time, U.S. Army Regulations speci-
fied a six gun battery would contain four guns and two howitzers. itzers.56 A four gun battery had three guns and one howUnion batteries eventually standardized by allot-
The Confederate artillery had no official organization. Batteries could consists of as few as two guns or as The Rebels, because of .the blockade and
a limited industrial base used whatever guns they could acquire. Many times this resulted in batteries of four guns
containing as many as three different calibers.5 8 The Union six gun battery had an authorized strength of five officers and 150 men. battery.
sergeant commanded each gun platoon consisting of 15 gunners and drivers and the gun with its limber and caisson. All totaled the mounted artillery battery contained 155 men and
110 horses.
The horse artillery had an additional 12 men Confederate four gun batteries contained
and 72 horses.59
about 90 men and 9 0 horses.6 0 Battalions and Briuades. At the start of the war,
artillery batteries were attached directly to infantry brigades. However, experience soon demonstrated that the
artillery was more effective when concentrated for massed fires. Both sides grouped artillery batteries into larger tactical organizations. The Federals grouped three batterThe Rebels grouped four
batteries into an artillery battalion.61 Analysis The scale of one model gun representing two actual guns permits the wargamer to form most historicai organizations. For example, the typical prewar battery had ( 4 ) six
pound (6pdr) smoothbore guns and two twelve pound (12pdr) howitzers. The wargamer would represent this battery with three stands. Each stand would have two gunner figures.
Two stands. would have a model 6pdr gun and the third stand would have a model 12pdr.howitzer. It is important to
remember that the six crew figures represent six functioning guns and their crews (approximately 155 men) not 240 men.
Maneuver
The Simulation
Artillery has two types of formation and movement. The guns are either in a limbered formation for movement or a unlimbered formation for firing. In a limbered status,
artillery has movement capabilities similar to those of infantry and cavalry.62 The grand tactical movement allowances for foot artillery are the same as for infantry. Horse artillery The
movement factors match those of cavalry (see Figure 2). tactical movement allowances for artillery are also very
similar to the infantry and cavalry.63 However, the limitations for restricted terrain are much more severe (see Figure 3 ) . Artillery also has limited capability of movement while in an unlimbered status. The gunners either pulled the guns with ropes or pushed them by hand.
Historical Overview Doctrine. After the First Bull Run, both sides
attempted to develop more effective artillery organizations. Major William Barry, Chief of Artillery for the Army of the Potomac, devised a set of principles meant to overcome previous deficiencies in artillery organization. Barry
concentrated individual batteries into artillery brigades and created an artillery reserve for both the corps and army. Divisions usually had four batteries, one U.S. Army Regular battery and three volunteer batteries. The corps then designated part of the divisional artillery as the Corps Reserve Artillery.6 4 The Confederate Army also reorganized their artillery to obtain more centralized control. However, only for special tactical considerations did they concentrate guns above the corps level. This was probably because the South had fewer guns and had a more pressing need to provide direct fire support to the infantry. Formations. Civil War artillery had two basic In the limbered forma-
tion, the guns are attached to the caissons for movement. The batteries normally moved in a column and then deployed their guns on line. A well trained crew could unlimber and
fire a round in 30 seconds. Regulations required the battery to deploy with 14 yards between guns. Each gun occupied 2 yards. of 82 yards. Therefore, a six-gun battery had a frontage A four-gun battery had a frontage of 50 yards.
The depth of the formation was also extensive and required the battery to take up a significant amount of room. cluding guns, limbers, and caissons. a six-gun battery required a rectangle 82 yards by 47 yards to deploy.65 In-
Tactics.
American war had shown that artillery could be effective in both the offense and the defense. However, early experi-
ences in the Civil War seemed to suggest that artillery could not be employed in the offense. Craighill's Pocket
Companion advised that artillery should not approach closer than 300 yards to the enemy.66 At the First Bull Run, two Union batteries moved forward close to the Confederate lines. Thinking they were the promised infantry support, the batteries mistakenly allowed a Confederate regiment to close within 70 yards One close range volley from the infantry hit 40 gunners and
75 horses effectively putting two batteries out of action.
At Malvern Hill, the Confederates also tried to use artillery in the offense. Longstreet wanted to mass 60 guns to However, because the
Rebel moved the guns forward in a piecemeal fashion, the defending Union artillery fire was able to destroy them. Because of these experiences and others, many Civil War commanders discounted the offensive capability of artillery.67
One reason for the vulnerability of artillery was the nature of its formation. The large frontage and depth of the artillery battery made a very good target for enemy rifle fire and counter-battery fire. The gunners were well dispersed within the formation and usually did not suffer terrible casualties. However, the horses were concentrated on the limbers and caissons and sometimes suffered grievous casualties. Lieutenant Metcalf of Battery C, 5th U.S. Artillery, provided a description of his unit's experience when fighting at close range Every horse was killed. 7 of the men were killed outright, 16 wounded; the gun carriages were so cut with bullets as to be of no further service, 27 balls passed through the lid of the limber chest while the number six was getting out ammunition. the sponge bucket on my @ n had 39 hoes in it being perforated like a sieve. Metcalf's casualties of about 15 percent were unusually high for artillery. Normally, a battery could expect
to lose 5 to 10 percent or no more than two men per gun. Even on those rare occasions when casualties were more severe, most batteries managed to stay in the fight. One Union battery at Chancellorsville lost 46 out of 120 men. Another battery at Spotsylvannia lost 50 percent of its men. However, both batteries withdrew only after they had expended all their ammunition.6 9 Grand Tactical and Tactical Movement. Craighill's
"Pocket Companion" provides no specific guidance for calculating the march capabilities of artillery. His guidance
is that field artillery should march with the infantry and the horse artillery with the cavalry. The theoretical speed of field or horse artillery was the same as for the cavalry. Artillery %arched at a walk, maneuvered on the battlefield at a trot and could gallop in emergencies.7 0 However, rough
terrain had a greater degradation on artillery movement than with the other arms. The artillery often could not keep up with their respective branches in difficult terrain. The
1861 Artillery regulation devotes several pages to marches.
It provides instructions on how to cross rough terrain and how to negotiate hills. Normally, on steep hills the gun-
ners doubled the teams. They would then push and pull the guns to the top.71 The gunners also could move unlimbered guns a short distance. They could push the guns by hand. This method
was usually used to adjust firing positions or for moving in light woods.72 The gunners could retire the guns by prolong (a long rope) when fighting rear guard actions. They would
attach the gun to the limber with the prolong. The horses would then pull the guns slowly to the rear. The gunners
could load the guns while they were moving only stopping long enough to aim and fire.73
Analysis Formations.
In order to maintain historical accura-
cy in spacing, the simulation sacrifices visual appeal by not having horses or limbers. Each artillery movement stand has 3/4" frontage and 1 1 / 4 ' depth. The 3 / 4 " frontage
provides a reasonable representation of the regulation frontage. The simulation has a six-gun battery occupy 90 yards frontage in comparison to the historical 82 yards. The simulation frontage is partially dictated by the minimum
simulation also allows the defender to fire first in almost all circumstances. Therefore, the artillery would. probably be more effective on the defense than the'offense. However, this area cannot be fully examined in this portion of the paper. Both the battles of New Market and Cedar Mountain
have significant amounts of artillery. Artillery tactics will be examined in the analysis of the two simulations.
and 3) refers to both retiring by prolong and the act of pushing the guns by hand. This area will also require
Fire Power The Simulation The "Stars and Bars" simulation divides artillery into two fire class groups. All U.S. Army regular batteries
and all Union volunteer batteries above the "green" morale classification are class I artillery. "Elite" and "crack"
Confederate batteries are also i.ncluded in this class. All. other batteries are class I1 artillery.74 The simulation further categorizes artillery as rifles or smoothbores. and then divides the guns into four different calibers: light; medium; heavy; and siege.75 For
the most part. the simulation follows the 1861 regulations for determining weapon caliber. Weapon caliber will be explained in the historical overview of this section. The artillery fire model (see Figure 12) is very similar to the infantry fire model and is probably best understood through an example.
A Confederate infantry regiment moves up to within range "El" of a Union artillery company of six medium smoothbores. When the infantry finishes its movement. the artillery issues opportunity fire. Class I medium smoothbores have a 75% chance per gun to inflict a casualty at this range. The battery o six guns has a 450% chance to inflict a casua 1 ty . 6
......... .............
..8"
3.1 . C ( P ) 8 . 1
- "C"
lPH'(l0'
CALIBER
Cllnl
Smoothbol..
MMIurn Upht
30 2P
12 10 20 15 10 8
40 30
ro
6
5
4
8 6
4
3
18
10 8
12
6
14
30
25 18 10 I
10 8 4
F nng on tnell~nkolanr r n 4 o m n man n.cm.mecr ................................................................ i2 a I o m e a ~ i.n n coumn lormaton x 8 5 u r ng ' U n % r c ~ r w F re- .............................................................................x 2 F i.np m I s o nm.en( ~ m 1 . orm O m m e w s nabs ~ 0 1 . c . n o*w
...
.....................................................................
................................................................
nrgttt un81is in iklrmmh oraer and m m a o n any fypa 01 cover Targ~IirllmbarM an~llay.orunl~moorearnllley on a normal tronege Target is llnlmbered amllery on a compre. Target is lorme4 lor a unltmbsrea i r " m n e w cove^ " e n mfflum cwel
. . . . .." . . . .
.. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . . ...
wm
Figure 12
much lighter and shorter. They could fire a heavy shell a:nd usually fired along a high trajectory. Guns could either :3e
rifles or smoothbores. All howitzers were smoothbores. Before the war, the 6 pdr smoothbore was the most common gun. By the start of the Civil War. the 1 2 pdr smoothbore
gun, called the Napoleon, had replaced the 6 pdr in most regular army units. Eventually, the Napoleon became one of Its popularity was due to
its ability to function as either a gun or a howitzer.77 The caliber of the gun was designated by the weight of the solid shot or by the diameter of the bore in inches. Light caliber guns included 6 pdr's, 10 pdr Parrotts. 3" Rodman rifles, and 1 2 pdr howitzers. Medium calibers in-
cluded 1 2 pdr Napoleons, 12 pdr rifles, and 20 pdr Parrots. Heavy caliber guns included 24 pdr and 32 pdr guns and howitzers.78 The Union Army standardized their artillery and primarily used the 3" Rodmans, 1 0 pdr Parrots and 1 2 pdr Napoleons.7 9 The South favored the 3" Rodmans and Napole-
ons. However, because of supply problems, they also had a variety of other weapons. The most common weapons were the
12 pdr howitzer, 6 pdr rifle and smoothbore, and the 10 pd:r
Parrott. Whenever possible, the Confederate used captured Union guns. One Confederate soldier captured at the battle
of Antietam paused to read the "U.S." markings on a Union gun and remarked, "You-all has got as many of these US guns as we'uns has".8 0
Weapons Effectiveness.
had two schools of thought concerning the merits of smoothbores and rifles. The smoothbore was a better weapon for defending against infantry attack. Because of its wider
round.
Therefore , the rifles were more effective against long range targets and especially suited for firing against enemy artillery.81 The 12 pdr Napoleon had a maximum range of
1680 yards. The 3" Rodman and 10 pdr Parrott could fire out to almost 3000 yards. The effectiveness of artillery fire
was primarily based on the type of ammunition fired. There were four main types of ammunition used during the war: canister; shell: case; and shot. Smoothbores fired spheri-
cal ammunition and rifles fired a cylinder type round that closely resembled a modern-day artillery shell.82 The artillery's most lethal load was the canister round. Canister was a light tin can filled with several cast iron shots. about the size of golf ball. Canister
acted much like a large shotgun. A Napoleon canister cnntained 27 balls, while a rifled canister had only 18 balls.
A trained crew could fire three rounds per minute.
The It was
also common for the gunners to load double of triple canister rounds in desperate situations. Double canister was only effective out to 200 yards.83
Shell was a hollow cast sphere or cylinder-filled with explosives. Smoothbores used a time-fuse, while rifles
used either a time fuse or impact fuse. When the shell exploded it would burst into about seven large chunks. Gunners normally fired shell at massed targets from 500 yard out to 1500 yards.84 Case shot was similar to shell except The!
that the hollow cast was filled with small iron balls.
gunners tried to time the fuses so as to burst overhead the target. Normally, the artillery fired case at targets Shot was solid metal balls or
cylinders used for knocking down fortifications or buildings. It also could also be used in lieu of shell or case
when the time was not available to cut the fuses.8 6 A well trained crew could fire 38 rounds against a infantry regiment advancing from 1500 yards out. In the
first 10 minutes they would fire 20 aimed rounds of case or shell against the infantry. During the 10 minute interval the infantry would advance to within 650 yards of the battery. At that time the infantry would switch to a quick
step march for the next 300 yards, which could be covered in about 3 . 5 minutes. The gun crew would then switch to solid The ammunition switch would be made
because it was to difficult to adjust the fuses for the rapidly advancing infantry. At 350 yards the infantry would increase their pace to a double-quick march and then charge the final 100 yards, all of which could be covered in less
than 4 minutes.
The lack of available technology created many problems with the artillery ammunition and guns. The uncertain
fuses caused many shells (and case) to fail to explode or to burst prematurely in the air. Even when they did explode,
the shells were far less destructive than modern day artillery. Other than canister fire, most artillery fire had more of a psychological affect rather than causing casualties.88 The Rebel gunners were equal to their Yankee counterparts. However, because of the lack of good equipment, the Confederates were never able to compete on even terms with the Union Artillery.89 complained: There must be something very rotten in the Ordnance Department. Our shells burst at the mouth of the gun or do not burst at all. The metal of s of most flimsy which the new guns are made i brittle character, and the casting is very bad.9and In the South poor manufacturing capabilities resulted in unreliable guns and ammunition. Confederate fuses rarely worked properly and poorly cast guns were sometimes woefully inaccurate. Many of their problems were also due to a poor quality of powder. Confederate batteries also
had difficulty obtaining proper battery support equipment and the right type of ammunition. lieu of shell and case. Shot was commonly used in
artillery firing chunks of railroad'iron. The gunners a l s ~ manufactured their own canister rounds using chains, nails and glass.91 Analysis The Guns. The artillery fire model represents all The caliber
determination is the same as listed in the historical overview with only one exception. In "Stars and Bars" the 12 light gun when firing
round as the Napoleon, therefore, at close range, they were equivalent weapons. The procedure of combining all the
different guns into only four calibers is primarily to balance the simulation between playability and historical accuracy. Nevertheless, many of the guns fired the same
Most 12 pdr guns and howitzers also fired the same ammunition. Weaoons Effectiveness. The ranges shown on the fire chart.closely correspond to the effective ranges of Civil War artillery. 100 yards. Triple canister could only be fired out to
Normal canister was effective to 400 yards. above ranges corresponds closely
the fire model within which artillery is most effective. Beyond 400 yards the probability of causing casualties is significantly reduced. The division of artillery into class I and I1 does not represent crew quality. Instead, it is used to repre-
sent a difference in the quality of equipment and amrnunition, and the efficiency of the supply system. Overall,
this provides an effective system of portraying the marked superiority of Union Artillery while still allowing the Confederate Artillery to have high morale ratings for the crews. The simulations of New Market and Cedar Mountain will be used to determine the Historical accuracy of the artillery fire model.
The following chart summarizes the analysis of the supporting arms in the "Stars and Bars" simulation. YES -"Stars and Bars" provides the means for a historically accurate simulation.
Unit Organization
The Regiment/Battery Bde, Div, and Corps YES YES
Maneuver
YES Tactics Grand Tactical Movement Tactical Movement YES
? ?
YES YES
?
?
Fire Power
Types of Weapons Weapons Effectiveness Fire Resolution Firefight Resolution Close Action Resolution Ammunition Shortages YES YES
Chart 2
CHAPTER 4 NOTES
(1)Paddy Griffith. Battle Tactics of the (London: Yale University Press, 1989) , 65-66.
Civil
War
(2)Alonzo Gray, Cavalry Tactics (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1910) , 19. (3)Scotty Bowden, STARS*N*BARS I11 Games Press, 1985). 11/2. (Arlington: Empire
1855)
1.3
(Philadel-
(6)Paddy Griffith, Battle In The Civil War, Generalship and Tactics (Nottinghamshire, England: Field-Books, 1986) , 42. (7)James A. Schaefer, "The Tactical Evolution of Cavalry During the American Civil War" (Ph. D. diss. University of Toledo, 1982) , 34-36. (8)Paul Stevenson, Waraaminq in History (New York: Sterling Publishing Co. Inc. , 1990) , 11. (9)Griffith. Generalship and Tactics. 42 (10)Bowden. STARS*N*BARS 111, VIII/7. (11)Bowden. STARS*N*BARS 111, VIII/11. (12)Gray. Cavalry. 9. (13)Griffith. Generalship and Tactics, 42. (14)Gray. Cavalrv, 10. (15)Griffith. Generalship and Tactics, 42. (16)Stevenson. Warqaminq in History, 36-37
(19)Jack Coggins. Arms and Equipment of the (New York: Doubleday and Company, 19621 , 50. (20)Schaefer. Evolution of Cavalry, 76.
Wet
(21)The War of Rebellion: Official Records of the U n i c ~ and Confederate Armies (hereafter O.R.), (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1890-1901) XI, Pt. 1, 279-294. (22)Rober.t Johnson, Battles and Leaders of The Civil 4 Vols. (New York: The Century Company, 1984-1887) Vol. 2, 46. ( 2 3 ) O . R . . Series 1. XII, Pt. 2, 140-141. Wsx
(27)William Craighill, -Army Officers Pocket C o m ~ a n i c ~ (New York: D. Van Nostrand. 1862). 115. (28)Coggins. Arms and Equipment. 51. (29)War Dept,1841 Tactics. 3. 107. (30)Craighill. Pocket Companion, 66. (31)Stevenson. Warqamina in History, 54. (32)Ibid.. 54. (33)Coggins. Arms and Equipment, 35 (34) Ibid., 36.
(36)Gray, Cavalw, 20 (37)Coggins. Arms and Equioment, 49. (38)Series 1, XL. Pt. 1.. 444.
(41)Gray. Cavalry, 50-60, 154-156. (42)Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and (Alabama: Alabama Up, 1982) , 127. (43)Gray. Cavalry, 17.
(44)O.R. XXVII, Pt.2, 720.
Die
(45)Stevenson. Warcraminq in History. 82. (46)Gray. Cavalry, 20-22. ( 4 7 ) O . R . . XXXVI, Pt. 1, 805. (48)Gray. Cavalry, 16-17. (49)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 219 (50)Ibid. (51)Fredric Denison, Sabers and Spurs (Cedar Falls: Rhode Island Cavalry Veteran Association, 1876) , 124. 1st
(53)U.S. War Department. Instructions for the Field Artillery (New York: J.B. Lippencott & Co., 1861), 1-3. (54)Ibid. (55)John Gibbon, Artillerist Manual (New York: Nostrand, 1860). 388-389. (56)1861 Instructions, 3. (57)Coggins. Arms and Equipment, 63-64. (58)Ibid. (59)Craighill. Pocket Com~anion,68-69. (60)Griffith. Generalship and Tactics, 26. (61)Ibid. (62)Bowden. STARS*N*BARS 111, VII/2. (63)Ibid., V111/12. ( 6 4 ) O . R . . Series 1, Vol. XIV, Part 1, 67.
Van
(66)McWhiney. Attack and Die, 112. (67)lbid.. 116-117. (68)Coggins. Arms and Equipment, 62. (69)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 173-174. (70)Craighill. Pocket Companion, 114-115. (71)1861 Instructions, 53-65. (72)Ibid.. 118.
(73) Ibid., 331.
(77)Coggins. Arms and Esuiment. 61. (78)Gibbon. Artillerist Manual. 65. (79)1861 Requlations, 2-3
. (80)Bell Wiley,Life of Johny Reb (Baton Rouge: State University Press, 1978) , 298.
Louisiana
(83)1861 Requlations, 11. (84)Ibid. 11-12. (85)Ibid. (86) Ibid. (87)Coggins. Arms and Equipment. 76-77. (88)Wiley. (89) Ibid. (90)0.R,,Series (91)Wiley.
m, 300.
I. XI. Pt. 3, 461.
302.
m.
My plans are perfect and when I start to carry them out, may G d have mercy on General Lee. for I will have none.7 Joseph Hooker Chancellorsville Campaign
The ability of a commander to control his units plays a key role in the outcome of a battle. Today's com-
manders have no more guarantee that their orders will be carried out than did Civil War commanders. There are many factors which assist or hinder the execution of orders. These include the professional abilities of the commander and his staff. One must also consider the morale of the
The Simulation.
Command and Control. Empire Games' intent is to
provide a simulation that stresses the exercise of proper command and control in the application of a realistic battle plan.' The simulation attempts to portray the impact that
army. corps, division, and brigade commanders had on their units during Civil War combat.
In "Stars and Bars", the wargamer plays the role of a commander and his staff. Bowden specifically designed the
simulation for the wargamer to assume the role of a corps commander. However. the simulation works equally well for
small battles when the wargamer assumes the role of a division or even a brigade commander. to represent brigade and division Single figures are used commanders. Two figures.
usually a horse mounted command figure and a dismounted staff officer, represent the corps commander and his staff. Before beginning the simulation the wargames participants assign each division commander and above a rating for professional skill. Professional skill is the commander .~ and his staff's ability to issue and execute ~ r d e r s The simulation provides for six different levels of professional skill: Superior; Excellent; Good: Mediocre; Poor: and Despicable. The wargarner has two methods that he can use for In the first method the
wargarner must research the commander and make a subjective decision on how well the commander controlled his unit. Appendix A provides the order of battle for the New Market reenactment. Included in the order. ef battle is a brief
discussion on how and why ratings are assigned. The second method uses existing wargame scenarios. Wargames periodicals many times contain simulation scenarios were other garners have already done the research. Also boardgames can
be adapted into simulation scenarios. Appendix C is the order of battle for the Cedar Mountain scenario. The sce-
Simulations Publications. The appendix also provides a brief discussion on how the boardgame was converted into a miniature game. Each commander must, at the beginning of each hourly round, issue orders to his units. Possible orders are: Specific
Attack; Defend: Maneuver: Withdraw; and Redeploy. criteria govern each order. the following paragraph.
move its divisions within engagement range of the enemy. division with a defend order may not move its brigades toward the enemy more than 13"(620 yards).
A brigade with a
maneuver order may never voluntarily come closer than 17" (.680yards) to the enemy. The issuance of an order is no will be carried out. guarantee that it
-they can be executed. m e commander's professional skill and his location influence the ability to activate an order.
sion commander has a command radius of only 13"(520 yards) and a 30% chance of activating his orders. The other skill ratings range between these two extremes. Corps and army
commanders have the same measures of chance for activating orders, but with much wider command radiuses. A superior commander has a 50" (2000 yards) command radius and a des-
picable leader only a 28" (1120 yards) radius. The issue and activation process is best understood by reviewing an example provided in "Stars and Bars" Major General McClellan, who is rated mediocre. decides to change the orders of I1 Corps from DEFEND to ATTACK. On hourly round five, he writes the ATTACK order and dispatches it to Major General Sumner, the corps commander. Sumner is within McClellan's command radius of 40" (1600 yards). As a mediocre leader, McCellan has only a 50% chance to transmit the order. Percentile dice are rolled with the result of "67". the orders are not received and Sumner cannot go over to the attack. On round six the orders are rolled again at the same 50% chance, they need not be reissued. On the sixth hour McClellan rolls a " 3 6 " and Sumner receives his new orders. Sumner may then issue new orders to his divisions. He issues ATACK orders to his subordinates. If the orders are transmitted successfully, the division commanders may issue orders to their Brigades, which may act upon them immediately.4
Leaders also run the risk of becoming casualties when they lead units in combat. The procedure for determining this risk is based upon how many casualties the commarder's unit suffers. The higher the casualties, the higher the chance the commander has of being wounded or killed When
s
their previous orders for one more turn. At that time, a subordinate takes command of the unit.5
the wargamer assigns each regiment and battery a morale level, referred to as the unit eliteness rating. The Morale
table (Figure 13) provides for six different eliteness levels. The Morale table also offers basic guidelines on which morale level to assign to units and brigades. Wargam-
ers use the same two methods already discussed for assigning commander ratings to determine unit morale. Basically, the
MORALE TABLE
UNITEUTENESS RATING BASICST0 FAIL MORALE FEDERAL Only ve* m l o c w unnd. such sr m o m ot me lron Sngads. e r . CONFEDERATE %estea bngaaes such as the tlw S t m a a l l and Texas DllgadCr efc
Crack
-5
Veteran Regular
Mililia
20
selecrea u r t s and bllgaam s h c n Selulea Souman mlllda o l s o m ~ l e t d r were comptafely raw or d e s p c a ~ l e raw a n a m vnfrmea ommr voluntemr tomamms ot note. MODIFIERS
Formed traopsor ammqlormg on your nmkor rear wtmln 10"18") Unll lestmg mas lor! lmenecaves. but no! yet 25% Unlt teslmg has :or1 255 cnesttver. but not yet 50% Unll m w g has lor! 50% enectivea, but not yet 75%
-20 - 5
*lo
-30 *SO
Figure 13
The eliteness rating interfaces with three differer.t procedures in the simulation: small arms fire, morale
checks. and firefight and close combat situations.6 In the small arms firing procedure. the first step is to determine the morale classification of the firing unit (see Figure 4.). The importance of the eliteness rating should be apparent when one compares a "Crack" regiment to a "Militia" regiment. The "Crack" regiment, at close range.
generates three times the firepower of the "Militia" unit. At medium range, the "Crack" regiment continues to fire at three times the level of the "Militia" unit. Basically, the
higher the morale class the firing unit has, the better its chances become.of inflicting casualties on the enemy. The morale check is used to determine how a unit reacts to adverse circumstances. Each unit begins the . simulation in a good morale status. It will remain in good Units must make a
its
original
Whenever the unit's brigade, division or corps leader is killed.7 Wnenever a unit is in a panic situation.
5.
age die roll exceeds the base morale number adjusted by the modifiers on the morale table. One of the significant
modifiers to the morale table is the inspirational impact of the leader. Each division commander and above is assigned an inspirational impact rating at the beginning of the game (see Appencies A and C). The inspirational rating reflects
the commander's motivational influence on the men in combat. The simulation provides for four levels of inspirational impact: Charismatic; Inspirational; Impersonal and Uninspiring. Charismatic, Inspirational and sometimes imperson-
al leaders have the ability to inspire units to fight harder. Whereas, the uninspiring leader has a negative effect
on the unit.8 Firefights and close combat situations as well, can be influenced by a leaders direct involvement in the fight (see Figure 5.). The procedure for determining the results
of such encounters in the simulation is very similar to what
has already been described for morale checks. The presence of leaders in "Stars and Bars" is very important. The leader figures are key to the simulation
process for command and control, and can serve as significant combat multipliers in the battle.
Historical Overview
The leadership qualities of different Civil War commanders varied greatly from individual to individual. Some had a tremendous inspirational impact on their units
Others were well known for their lack of professional skill such as General McClellan at the battle of Antietam. De-
spite being greatly outnumbered, General Lee chose to accept battle at Antietam. He knew that McClellan and his staff
would be incapable of coordinating the actions of their larger Union Army against his smaller Confederate Army.9
The Commanders. Brigadier Generals comanded Southern brigades while Colonels commanded brigades in the Union army.l o Brigades normally deployed over a frontage of less than 500 yards. Because of this, the brigade was the high--
est level of command over which the commander could still see most of his troops.l1 The brigade commander led from
the front. His role was to personally supervise the execu-tion of orders and provide tactical advice to his regimental commanders.
five Confederate brigade commanders fell while leading the attack.l2 Major Generals commanded divisions in the South. Brigadier Generals commanded Federal divisions. Although
the division commander was near the firing line, his perso.7a1 involvement in the battle was rare and usually limited . : o desperate situations. His primary role was to transform t : ? e corps commander's guidance into action.l3 Once in battle
coordinate the activities of the division artillery.14 Corps commanders were the senior and supposedly most experienced generals in the army. Lieutenant Generals commanded Rebel corps while Major Generals commanded Union Army corps. They were usually positioned well behind the battle line. The expanse of the corps area of operations usually prevented the corps commander from being able to see all of his units. Most times, he had to direct the battle based on the sounds of the battle and reports from his subordinates. His role was to direct the general movements and tactics of his divisions, and coordinate the activities of the corps reserve artillery.15 Full Generals commanded the Southern armies while Major Generals commanded the armies in the North.
S.
Ulysses
Grant was the only Northern commander to achieve the rank Even'he didn't receive this promo-
of Lieutenant General.
tion until March of 1864.16 Each brigade commander or higher had his own staff. The staff was usually divided into military and administr-ative units. The Chief of Staff, or Adjutant General, was in
charge of both groups. He was responsible for all army correspondence, movement, and personnel administration. The Chief of Staff also kept track of operations. Some were in charge of intelligence as well. His primary role was to
coordinate the activities of the entire staff.17 The military staff usually included the Chief of Artillery. Inspector of Cavalry. Chief of Engineers, Provost
The administrative
staff included the Chief Quartermaster, Chief Ordnance Officer, Commissary Officer, Chief Paymaster and the Medical Director. Usually, the Quarter Master General served as nominal head of this group and answered directly to the Chief of Staff. His role was to coordinate all aspects of supply and transportation.18 Ail commanders had Aides-de Camp
(
ADCs
attached
to their own staff. They usually served as personal couriers. ADCs were the commander's chief means of communication with his subordinates.19 Staff sizes varied at the different levels of command. Many times, the heads of services could be omitted. The Chief of Artiliery In small organiza-
tions, such as brigades and divisions, the ADCs executed most staff duties. General Sherman described the ideal
brigade.staff as having an Adjutant. a Quartermaster Officer, a Commissary Officer, a couple of medics and a pair of ADCs. In contrast, General Meade's headquarters at the This did not
include the staff members for Army Engineers or Artillery.2 0 Directinq the Battle. Senior commanders (division
cnmm:nders
and above) had 1 imited means of directing the They wouid attempt to control the
battle.
At times they may even personally direct parts of the battle.21 The commander had four chief means of passing orders
on battlefield: field telegraph; the Wig Wag; couriers; and personal intervention. Early in the war, the telegraph was However,
it wasn't long before field telegraphs were available for tactical use. The Federal Army excelled at connecting corps By 1864. the Army The
Confederacy, having fewer resources, was normally able to maintain telegraphs only at the army headquarters.23 The Wig Wag was a signal flag system. Different
movements of the flags represented letters, numbers, or phrases. Torches and beacons augmented the system at night.
Signal stations were set up on high points of land (like Little Round Top at Gettysburg) or on wooden towers.24 Signal stations had the added intelligence value of being able to see the enemy lines. At the First Bull Run, Confed-
erate signalers used the Wig Wag to warn of the Union flanking movement. Federal signalers at Antietam used it to
direct long range artillery fire.25 Couriers were the chief means of tactical communication. They were usually young officers attached directly to the commander's staff as ADCs. Couriers were better suited As
disadvantages. Many times, couriers could not find the intended recipient of their message. The courier's only
recourse was to move to his recipient's area of operation and seek directions. If the recipient commander was moving
along his own battle line, the courier's task could be both difficult and dangerous.26 Bragg's grand assault at Chicka-
mauga failed to initiate on time because his couriers couldn't find D.H. Hill, the corps commander, who was to lead the attack.27 The Federal counterattack at the battle
of Corinth also failed because of difficulties with the couriers. The first courier carried only a oral message,
which the counter attack commander, General Hamilton, refused to accept. The follow-on courier, with the written message, was killed en route.2 8
A commander could choose to direct the battle in
person.
Unfortunately, this would take the commander away Couriers from key
subordinates may not be able to find the commander who is leading at the front. Leading at the front also placed the commander at great personal risk. McWhiney and Jamieson state in Attack and Die, that the Confederate code of loyalty actually required officers to lead from the front. During the war 235 of the 425 Confederate generals were killed or wounded in battle. Seventy percent of those killed lost McWhiney and Jamieson
They
provide no statistics on how many Union generals and colonels died in battle. Union losses were probably not much Overall, the cost of
commanders leading from the front was very high.30 Morale. In August 1861, a Southern newspaper made
the comment, "One Southern man was equal to twenty Yankees." Few Sout.hern leaders placed any credence in this statement. They did acknowledge that morale could be a major force multiplier in battle. They also believed that the morale
advantage lay with the Southern armies.31 Most will agree that the average Rebel regiment fought better than the average Federal regiment. cultural difference was not the cause. Rebs" were hardened farm boys. A basic
causes for the Southern supremacy in morale was their expectations to always win and their greater combat experience.32 Both sides went into First Bull Run with equal chances to win. The Rebel army won the day primari!~ beIt could have easily
soldiers confidence in themselves and in their leaders. The battles of Bull Run and Wilson's Creek, and Jackson's Valley Campaign established a trend of victories for the South. Union soldiers came to believe that the Rebeis could fight
better.
same conclusion.33 Discounting the psychological value of self confidence, there are still other reasons why the Rebels may have fought better. First, because they had fewer units, they There.-
fore, Confederate regiments saw more action than their Union counterparts. In the Second Bull Run Campaign, Bank's
Union Corps fought at Cedar Mountain against Jackson's wing of the Army of Northern Virginia. After the battle, General
Pope pulled Bank's corps back for a rest leaving it unavailable for the battle of the Second Bull Run. participated in both battles.34 The South also had a more efficient replacement system in which green replacements were put in with combat veterans. The North tended to form new regiments in lieu 3f Jackson's units
sending replacements to the field. The Southern system gave the recruit a better opportunity to prepare and train for combat.35
men fought. The war had equally countless examples of valor and cowardice. In general, it seems that the better drilled
and disciplined units. when competently led, were the better fighting units. Veterans were less likely to panic or
become carried away with enthusiasm. Well trained troops could usually be counted on to continue fighting under difficult circumstances. Still, there are several instances of combat veterans being overcome with panic. The vaunted
Stone Wall Brigade broke and ran when threatened in the flank at Cedar Mountain. Yet again, Confederate veterans in
a supposedly impregnable position at Missi onary Ridge broke and ran to the rear after offering a mere token resistance.37 1864. Union troops fled at Brice's Cross Roads in
field at Cedar Creek.38 Unit morale played a key role in all Civil War bat tles, significantly influencing the outcome of every fight. It was Analysis The Commanders. Command figures, referred to as a factor no successful commander could ignore.
command stands, primarily represent the commander, his chief of staff and the ADCs. Because the remaining staff members
play supporting roles in the battle. they are not represented by figures on the game board. The wargamer, in his role
as the commander, must still ensure that their supporting roles are carried out.
quartermaster and his staff might be collectively represented by a supply train. Keeping in mind the simulation scale
of 1 figure to 40 men, the one or two figures used on cornmand stands do provide reasonable representations of commanders and their battle staff.3 9
ical capability of a Civil War commander is going to be somewhat subjective. The "Stars and Bars" command system offers a method of quantifying the capabilities of commanders into a process that can be simulated. The professional skill rating for each commander limits the capabilities of the wargamer to those of a historical counterpart. The best example is once again general McClellan at the battle of Antietam. Any simulation of Antietam that did not place
constraints on McClellan's capabilities would probably result in the total destruction of the Confederate Army. This could prove to be a good game for the Union player bu.t would not be a historical simulation of Antietam. The professional skill rating represents more than professional competence of the leader. McClellan was undoubtedly a highly trained professional. The skill rating also represents other leadership qualities. McC1e:lan was a superb trainer and organizer. However. he was not willing to take risks. He also seemed unable to coordinate the maneuvers of a large military organization.
Establishing a mediocre skill rating for McClellan limits his ability to command in two ways. command radius is only 19" ( 7 6 0 yards). First, his
It is unlikeiy that
all his corps commanders would be within the 7 6 0 scale yards. Therefore, some corps commanders would have to wait In the meantime,
their corps would be unable to contribute to the battle. Second, mediocre commanders such as McClellan have only a 50% chance of activnt.ing orders. As a result out of
arlivate them.
The yuidelines for receiving and activating orders
also limits the ability of units to take unrealistic advantage of good circumstances. An example would be the Confederate Army defending at the First Bull Run. If the Union
army were to flee the field in a simulation, as historically they did, the Rebel army would have difficulty organizing an effective pursuit. The Confederates would need a minimum of one hour to change orders over from defense to the attack. Meanwhile the Union army would have ample opportunity to escape. The simulation also provides the commander the opportunity to lead from the front. Corps and division commanders can attach themselves directly to brigades or even individual regiments. The "follow me" order allows units to execute almost any action. In this situation,
however, being away from his staff, the commander can only issue orders to the unit to which he is attached. Overall, the command system in "Stars and Bars" is very good. However, for the command procedure to work
properly the simulator must attempt to simulate history and not just play a game.
it is very unlikely that anyone was able to maintain this rate under combat conditions. fear and unable to return fire. Some would be overcome with Others would render their
weapons inoperative by improper loading. After the battle of Gettysburg, many recovered weapons were found to be improperly loaded:
12,000
from two to ten unfired cartridges; and one was loaded with
23 charges.4 0
The eliteness rating in "Stars and Bars" represents the effect of experience and training. Higher class units
would have more men returning effective fire and fewer men dri Vting way
fvnm
a r m s ilre.
cl-..!:-I:-<? to
::
:! 1
: d ! e .
' 1 1 1 1 : : 3 e
units would also be less hardened to the experience of combat. More than in other units, these men would be firing wildly, seeking cover or findjng reasons to retire from the firing line. The niorale check represents the willingness of a unit to cont,inue the fight in the face of occilrring casu(31ties. The volatile nat.ure of units in the Civil War is well represented in the simulation. Experienced and we1 1 trained
. ! ! r ~ l of pkm ishnlent
l!dr-rrl
could
cause a raw unit wiLh little training to break. Each unit does have a specified breaking point in the simulation. The modifiers on the morale chart represent those threatening factors that could possibly push a unit beyond its breaking point. The more casualties a unit takes Unexpected events, such as
fire from the flank have a significant shock on units. The morale chart also provides for external factors that enhance a unit's ability to continue the fight. Units fighting in some type of cover are more likely to continue fighting than those fighting out in the open. The presence of senior leaders also serves as a motivating influence. The simulation also provides a mechanism for representing mass panic. Regiments must conduct a morale check
whenever two other regiments within 5 " ( 2 0 0 yards) break and run away. Brigades also take a morale check when adjacent
morale chart to represent the influence of seeing adjacent units run away, which does not seem to represent accurately the possibility of mass panic. In general, morale plays a very important role in the simulation. Bowden's emphasis on unit eliteness ratings
allows small, well trained and experienced units to overcome larger raw and untrained units. Determining the ultimate
historical accuracy of the morale system will require further analysis in the simulation of New Market and Cedar Mountain.
Summary
The following chart summarizes the analysis of battlefield command in the "Stars and Bars" simulation. Yes -"Stars and Bars" provides the means for a historically accurate simulation. No -"Stars and Bars" is not historically accurate in this area.
? -Further analysis required, determination historical accuracy will he examined in the simulations of New Market and Cedar Mountain
Battlefield Command
The Commanders
YES
Directing The Battle Command Skills Command Compliance Command Casualties Mora 1e Experience and Training Morale Checks Mass Panic YES
?
YES
? ?
Chart 3
133
CHAPTER 5 NOTES
(1)Scotty Bowden and Rob Smith, STARS*N*BARS I11 (Arlington, Texas: Empire Press Games, 19851 V/8.
(9)Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the (London: Yale University Press, 1989) , 36.
Civil
Way
(10)Jack Coggins. Arms and Equi~mentof the Civil (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962) , 10-12. (11)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 55
Way
(12)Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Diei Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Hertiaqe (Alabama: Alabama University Press, 1982) , 15. (13)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 53 (14)Paddy Griffith, Battle in the Civil War. Generalshi~ and Tactics in America 1861-65 (Nottinghamshire: Fieldbooks. 19861, 22.
(16)Coggins, Arms and Equipment, 10-11 (17)William Craighili. The Armv Officers Pocket Companic~ -(New York: D. Van Nostrand.1862). 45-46. 50-51.
(20)Ibid. (21)Griffith. Battle Tactics. 62. (22)Griffith. Generalship andTactics, 10. (23)Coggins. Arms and Equipment, 106-107. (24)Coggins. Arms and Eauipment. 107. (25)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 71. (26)Griffith, Generalship and Tactics, 10. (27)The War of the Rebellion: A Complation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.:Government Printing Office, 1880-1901 , Series I. vol. 30, 140-141. (28)Griffith. Battle Tactics, 56. (29)Griffith, Generalship and Tactics, 56 (30)McWhiney. Attack and Die, 15. (31)Griffith. Battle and Tactics, 31. (32)Ibid.
(35)Ibid (36)Ibid. (37)Bell Wiley, The Life of Johny Reb ( Louisiana State University Press, 1978). 85. (3A)Bell Wiley The Life of Biilv The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1943) , 90. Baton Rouge:
Yank
(Indianapolis:
The three previous chapters have dealt with the "Stars and Bars" rules mechanics. This chapter will reflect
and examine observations made during the application of those rules in two historical simulations. These simulations will serve three specific functions. First, the simulations serve as a means for validating areas already deemed historically accurate. Second, they provide a tool for examining those areas that required further study. Third, the simulations offer an opportunity to justify areas of questionable accuracy. The first simulation is a controlled reenactment in miniature of the actual battle of New Market. The partic:!-
pants are restricted to maneuvering their units in exact correspondence to how the historical units maneuvered with free agency to employ tactical options. The purpose of the
reenactment is to determine if the rule mechanics of "Stars and Bars" will allow the simulation to yield the same results as the actual battle. The second simulation, the
battle of Cedar Mountain, is executed as a true wargame. The participants are not constrained to mimicking historically recorded actions: As a result the simulation events and outcome may not be exactly like those recorded for the actual battle. However, it does provide the opportunity to
examine whether or not the results demonstrate the historical characteristics of the troops. weapons and leadership involved in the battle.
Battle of New Market This morning, two miles above New Market, my command met the enemy, under gencrdl Sigel, advancing up the Valley, and defeated him with heavy loss. The action has just closed at Shenandoah River. Enemy fled across North Fork of the Shenandoah, burning the bridge behind him.
10,000 combatants.
fought bitterly over this small town and, together, suffered almost 1400 casualties. The active participation of the Virginia Military Institute (V.M.I.) cadets also made it unique among Civil War battles and ensured the battle a lasting place in American Military History.3
New Market offers an excellent scenario for wargam-ing. Most wargamers can easily construct the small armies involved. These particular armies contained an interesting The battle gives a
good representation of the three major branches, infantry, cavalry and artillery. Many special troops were also present at the battle including mounted infantry, horse artillery and even a company of Confederate engineers. Appendix A, shows the order of battle used for the simulation. The appendix also provides the different unit eliteness and commander skill ratings used as well as a justification for those ratings.4 In May of 1864, Major General Sigel moved into the Shenandoah Valley with a 9,000 man Federal Army. His mis-
sion was to threaten the Confederate railhead at Stanton, Virginia. Major General Breckinridge moved from southwest Virginia with a small Confederate Army of 2500 men to stop Sigel.' On the 15th of May, 1864 the two armies met at the Sigel, because of mismanage-
ment of forces and several unsuccessful engagements with Confederate Cavalry, now had only slightly over 6,000 men. On the morning of the battle, the Federal Army was also spread over several miles of road north of New Market.6 Breckinridge concentrated his army just south of New Market. Several reinforcements had joined him, including
the V.M.I. cadets, bringing his army up to 5,335 men. Initially, Breckinridge planned to fight a defensive battle.
However, when the Federals refused to attack, he changed his plan and stated: "We can attack and whip them here, and I'll do it".7
The Waraame
The simulation narrative begins here with Breckinridge's decision to attack. Unit actions are based on four sources: the Official Records [Series 1, Vol 3 7 , part 1 ) ; two articles in Battles and Leaders (The Battle of New Market. by John Imboden, commander of the Confederate cavalry at the battle, and Siqel in the Shenandoah Valley, by Franz Sigel); and William C. Davis' book, The Battle of-New Market. The following narration represents both the histor-
ical battle and the simulation. Notation is made for comparison where the simulation differs from the actual battle. The simulation was executed in four game turns representing the four respective hours of battle at New Market. Breckin-
ridge began his attack at 11AM and Sigel withdrew from the field at 3PM.
Game Turn One ( 1 1 A M . t o 12PM.1.
The
began with the units positioned as shown in figure 14. Breckinridge had his entire army concentrated and ready for battle. The advance guard was the only Union unit already The remainder of the Union Army
was still several miles to the north moving towards the battlefield.' Most of the units shown on the map were in
The
26th Va. and the cadets, being held in reserve, were in column formation. The 18th Conn. had one stand of infantry
(representing companies A and B ) skirmishing to the front. The Rebels had the 30th Va. skirmishing to the front. 9
Figure 14.
Colonel Moor, commanding the Union advance guard, issued orders for all units to d e f e n d . ' ' Breckinridge
ordered the Confederate Army to maneuver and take up positions along the road separating Shirley Hill and Manor Hill. This would put them in a good position to assault Manor Hill within the next hour. It also allowed time for the artilBoth
lery to fire preparation fires on the Union forces. sides successfully activated their operation orders. General Imboden described this phase of the battle:
The battle began in earnest. Mclaughlin was working his guns for all they were worth under a tremendous fire from the other side. For a hour, perhaps, no small arms were used. Breckinridge was steadily advancing his infantry line in splendid order. Neither side suffered very many casualties in the first hour of battle. In the simulation, the long rang
Union artillery fire did inflict minor casualties among the Confederates. Both the 51st Va. and the cadets suffered one
casting casualty each. Historically, the Union shell fire caused most of the casualties among the cadets.l 2 Confederate artillery fire remained ineffective.
Moor to fall back to a new position just north of New Market.l3 Once again, this game-turn contained very little
fighting. Both sides successfully activated their orders The Confederates quickly advanced up the hill and spent the
remainder of the hour repositioning to attack the new Union position. Breckinridge also dispatched General Imboden with most of the Confederate cavalry and McClanahan's horse artillery on a wide flanking maneuver to the east. Colonel
Moor moved to a new position 800 yards to his rear along the valley pike. 14 Both sides exchanged ineffective, long-range, artillery fire. Because no units closed to within 480 yards of each other, there was no small arms fire in game-turn two.
enemy instead of terrain, the Rebels would be able to continue the attack if the Federals fell back again. Sigel
issued orders for all units to defend their position.15 The Confederates initiated the game-turn by concentrating the fire of 14 guns against Kleiser's 6 gun battery causing one casting casualty. At the actual battle, Kleiser
did lose one gun in this artillery exchange. The Union return fire was ineffective. Meanwhile, McClanahan's Confederate battery brought in flanking fire on Wynkoop's and Tibbit's cavalry brigades. magical. Imboden claimed, "The effect was
body of cavalry into confusion." In the simulation, the Union cavalry suffered only one casting casualty. This loss was not serious enough to force the unit to withdraw.
Figure 15 However, in keeping with the historical action the two cavalry brigades did withdraw. As in the actual situation. The Confederate
artillery battery was out of range of the cavalry's carbines and they could not turn to face the artillery without flanking themselves to the on-coming Rebel infantry. Their only choice was to withdraw or continue to take casualties from the artillery.16 The battle continued with Moor's new line retreating without becoming seriously engaged. In the simulation, bcth
the 18th Conn. and 123rd Ohio suffered one casting casualty each from medium range skirmish fire. The Rebels suffered no losses. As with the cavalry the losses were not serious enough to force a withdrawal. However, Moor had little
choice in making his decision. His two regiments, aided by only one artillery battery, were facing almost the entire Confederate Army. Any attempt to hold his position would
have resulted in serious casualties and ultimately in wit?.drawal anyway. Game-turn three ended with the Confederate Army moving up to the vicinity of the Bushong House.17
tactical combat at the battle of New Market occurred in this hourly round (Figure 16). Therefore, the hour will be divided into four separate tactical phases for discussion. In the first phase, the Rebel left made a general assault against Sigel's right. In the simulation, as with
the actual battle, close range infantry and artillery fire caused serious casualties among the attacking Rebels. Kleiser's battery of 12pdr Napoleon guns was especially destructive.l8 Both sides suffered numerous casuaities.
with the Confederates suffering the greatest. Massed Union artillery fire against the Rebel center caused the 51st Va. to break and run. Historically, the fire broke both the 51st and the 30th Va. Lieutenant Colonel Shipp, commander
of the V.M.I. unit, stated: The enemy's batteries, at 250 or 300 yards, opened upon us with canister and case-shot, and their long lines of infantry. The fire was withering. It seemed impossible that any living creature could escape; and here we sustained our heaviest loss, a great many being wounded and numbfss knocked down, stunned, and temporarily disabled. In the second phase, the Union cavalry charged against the Confederate right. This charge was a total failure.20 Interestingly, none of the Union Cavalry units
gave reports of the failed charge in the Official Records. The charge wasn't even mentioned in the histories of two units whose regimental histories were available. In the simulation, the cavalry division declared a saber charge. The rule for "doubling" allowed them to move
through the cedar woods and then deploy into a line for a charge. Due to the lack of available frontage, the Union cavalry could only mass about 400 cavalrymen in the first line. These cavalrymen were charging directly into 10 guns and over 1000 steady Rebel infantry. Furthermore, the Rebels were firing McClanahan's four guns into the flank of the charge.21
Figure 16 The lead cavalry regiment suffered six casting casualties and routed to the rear. Secause, the Federals
fire passed through its lead regiment and into the follow-on regiment causing three casting casualties. When the lead unit broke, its routed cavalrymen, in their haste to get away, broke through the ranks of the following unit causing that unit to also break for the rear. which ended the charge. Phase three consisted of the Confederates pushing the 26th Va. and the cadets forward to stabilize the line.22 Small arms fire had significantly degraded the effectiveness of the Union Artillery. The continuing firefight caused several casualties on both sides. However, each side also passed their morale and firefight checks. and held their positions. In phase four General Sigel ordered the Union right to charge (Figure 17). By this time, the Rebel reserves had stabilized the line and were ready for the attack. Confederate fire stopped the Union advance. Two Union
regiments routed to the rear. The other two were forced to fall back 400 yards. Historically, the 1st W. Va. barely
to advance at all. The 34th Mass. and 54th Penn. pushed forward against overwhelming odds until forced to fall back.23 At this point the Union artillery, having no remaining infantry support. also abandoned the field. Because of casualties among men and horses in the simula-
P.M.
Figure 17
148
Game Analysis
Overall, the reenactment produced results very similar to the actual battle. The mechanics of the simula-
tion allowed the wargame to proceed with very little deviation from the actual events. The wargame validated all Some discus-
sion of those areas will follow in the proceeding paragraphs. areas However, most of the analysis will concentrate on identified in chapters 3, 4, and 5 as "not histori-
cally accurate" or "requiring further examination". Formations and Frontases. Units were always able to There
were no difficulties with spacing or making units fit in the allocated area. Tactics. Previous research already confirmed this
area to be historically accurate. The simulation especially demonstrated the difficulty of coordinating a wave attack. The cavalry charge in turn 4 showed historical results for a charge against artillery and steady infantry. More importantly it demonstrated the danger of the supporting lines following too closely. ReSel defensive fire caused serious several
casualties in the follow on line. The corresponding rout of the first line then created a domino affect causing the entire cavalry division to retreat. These results were
question in chapter 4 of the cavalry grand tactical movement allocation not being great enough proved to be unfounded. In fact, Imboden's flank march with the cavalry and horse artillery on game-turn two proved the allocation to be quite sufficient. Imboden's unit made the march and was in the
correct position to provide artillery fire when needed. This also provided a better understanding of the purpose of grand tactical movement. Grand tactical movement represents
long marches near and on the battlefield such as flank marches and movements of reserves. It is not meant to
represent operational movements, i.e. multi--day strategic marches. Tactical Movement. The tactical movement allowance
repeatedly proved adequate for each unit to mimic its historical counterpart's actions. The Rebel Army took four
hours to move from the southern edge of the battlefield to the northern edge. Using the drill manual movement rates,
units could have covered this distance in less than an hour. The simulation demonstrated that the tactical situation, more than a unit's own marching capability, will control the unit's ability to move. Overall, the combination of grand
tactical and tactical movement provided an accurate historical simulation of troop movement in the Civil War
Weaoon Characteristics and Effectiveness. ~ 1 1 infantry units at Ner Market had rifles. Interestingly, the
cadets had Belgian rifles which would be considered a second rate rifle. The cadets fired their first volley at Bushong However, when fired at medium
range, as they were here, the characteristics of the Belgian rifle were the same as for Enfields and Springfields. Therefore, no deviation from historical accuracy occurred in the simulation. The Union cavalry made very little use of their carbines at New Market. battle. Muskets were not used at all in the
the simulation of Cedar Mountain. Close range artillery fire was devastating which accurately portrayed the effectiveness of canister fire. Long range fire caused very few casualties. This accurately portrayed the unreliability of the artillery fuses. Confed-
erate long range fire was especially ineffective, thus demonstrating the poor quality of the Confederate ammunition and equipment. Both firefight and close combat resolution produced results very close to the actual events. All simulation charges produced the same results as recorded in the actual event. However, in most cases. the outcome was fairly
obvious due to poor execution by one side or the other. Therefore, close combat resolution will require further examination in the next simulation.
The best validation of weapon's effectiveness is demonstrated through a comparison of actual casualties to those of the simulation. Overall, the simulation casual ti?^ were remarkably similar to the actual casualties (see appendix B). Ammunition Shortacres. There are no recorded problems with ammunition supply at New Market. However, there
were several major lulls in the battle. This provided ample opportunity for resupply. In the simulation, the units us,sd
3
these lulls to regain fatigue points representing in part resupply of ammunition. Command and Control. Breckinridge, an "excellent"
commander, experienced no difficulty activating orders. Because his army was small and concentrated, command and control was not a problem historically or in the simulation. Interestingly, Sigel a "mediocre" commander, also had no difficulty activating orders. However, this was primarily due to the way he fought (and lost) the battle. Although he
had two brigades of infantry, he fought them one at a time. In the simulation this allowed him to attach himself to his brigades, almost guaranteeing activation of orders. Much
larger tactical organizations fought at cedar Mountain. This will allow a better examination of the command and control system. Morale. The morale system worked very well in the
During
the simulation, it seemed that units could take excessive punishment and still hold their positions. The 30th Va.. only eight figures strong, lost four casting casualties in turn four. However, translating the casting casualties into killed and wounded provides a better understanding of the situation. The unit did not actually suffer 50% casualties. The four casting casualties in this 320 man unit represent only 8 dead and 72 wounded, rather than 160 killed and wounded. The 80 man difference represents those soldiers
caring for the wounded, stragglers, and others simply cowering behind the rail fence and returning ineffective fire.
Battle ofcedar
Mountain
Rally brave men, and press forward! Your general will lead you. Jacksonwill lead you. Follow me ! Thomas Jackson at the battle of Cedar Mountain Historical Overview The battle of Cedar Mountain was the first engagement in what would become the Second Bull Run Campaign. Pope's "Army of the Virginia" was moving south from the vicinity of Fredericksburg to support the main Union Ariny in the Peninsula. General Lee dispatched Jackson to strike
Jackson had three divisions of infantry numbering about 24,000 men. Shortly after noon, on 9 August, 1863,
the Confederates bumped into the advance guard of Pope's army at Cedar Mountain. General Banks commanded the ad-
vanced guard consisting of two infantry divisions of the Union I1 Corps (about 9000 men). The order of battle for . ~ ~
Jackson's lead division, commanded by General Ewell, secured Cedar Mountain, the Confederate center and the Confederate right. Winders division then secured the left
flank. The Federals deployed their right division in the open and hid their left division in the woods. Unaware of
the division hidden in the woods, Jackson only anticipated action on his right. Winder positioned two of his brigades, one of which was the Stonewall Brigade, to support the Rebel right. As a result. their flank was exposed to the Union
division hidden in the woods.28 The Confederates were slow to deploy and didn't get into position until about 3 PM. Both army commanders seri-
ously miscalculated the strength of the opposing force. Jackson believed he faced a much larger portion of Pope's army than was actually on the field. Banks believed he faced only the advanced guard of Jackson's corps. He also believed he would receive support in his attack from the balance of Pope's army. which was only a few miles away.29
Banks attacked at 5 PM. Crawford's Union brigade overwhelmed and routed portions of Ronald's, Garnett's, and Taliafero's brigades. Geary's Union brigade also pushed the Confederate center 'back. 30 At this point, the Confederate Army was on the verge of total collapse. However, Banks had no reserves to exploit the success. Jackson desperately brought reserves forward and rallied troops to stabilize the crumbling Rebel line. A.P. Hill's division was committed brigade by brigade as fast as they could reach the battlefield. Thomas' brigade stabilized the Rebel right. Branch's brigade stopped Crawford's attack. Eventually. overwhelming Confederate numbers began to force the Union Army back.31 Hill then committed two more brigades and threatened the Union left. All across the battlefield, the Yankees were slowly and stubbornly falling back.
At one poiut.
Crawford's brigade was almost surrounded and trapped. The 1st Pennsylvania cavalry charged into the Rebels to buy time. All but 71 of the 164 Union cavalrymen were killed or Finally, sometime be-
tween 6:30PM and 7PM. the Union line collapsed and gave up the fight. Both sides had fought courageously, even if
their commanders had mismanaged the battle. The Confederates had 1,276 killed and wounded. General Banks, the
The Waruame
Game Turn One (5PM to 6PM). The simulation began with the units positioned as shown in Figure 18. The initial set-up represented the historical dispositions of the armies as of 5 PM. The Confederate player could not deploy his reinforcements until their historical arrival times. Other than the historical deployment and times of
arrival for the reinforcements. the wargamers were free to make their own tactical decisions. The Union player issued attack orders for the entire corps. The Confederates elected to defend their positions until the lead elements of Hill's division were available to support an attack. The initial attack went very well for the Union Army (Figure 19). Both Crawford's and Gordan's brigades massed against the Rebel left. Dismounted skir-
mishers from Bayard's cavalry brigade also supported the attack. Rebel defensive fire stopped most of the Union units to their front. However, Gordan's brigade outflanked the Rebel line to the north and eventually routed most of Ronald's and Garnett's brigades. In the center, Geary's and Prince's Union brigades moved forward and exchanged medium range fire with Early's brigade. Neither side suffered serious casualties in this exchange. In the south, Greene exchanged ineffective long
Figure 18
157
Figure 19
158
Game
20 shows the
had the advantage of being sheltered behind a rail fence which enabled them to inflict more casualties than they received. Eventually, most of Taliafero's brigade withdrew from the battle because of serious losses. Gordan's and
Bayard's brigades tried unsuccessfully to slow Branch's advance. However, Branch had a large numerical advantage and succeeded in overwhelming and routing Gordan's brigade. Bayard continued to fall back in face of the advancing Confederates. The increased rate of fire of the cavalrymen's carbines did allow them to inflict several casualties on Branch's lead units. Crawford then fell back to the east
side of the fenced field to avoid being flanked by the Rebels. In the center, Geary's brigade attacked twice before breaking through Early's line. Confederate defensive fire stopped the first attack. The second attack broke through
routing three Rebel regiments and capturing a battery. However. Geary's units suffered numerous casualties during the two attacks and were in turn routed by Thomas's brigade advancing from the west. Prince's brigade was unable to
support the Union attack because artillery fire from Cedar Mountain threatened their flank. Trimble's and Forno's
Confederate brigades were unable to activate their orders and remained idle on the hill.
Figure 20
160
~i~~~~
21 shows the
of Hill's brigades into the battle. Trimble and Forno were also able to activate their orders and advance down the hill. The Union player recognized the hopelessness of his In
situation and issued orders for all units to withdraw. the north, Bayard slowly continued to fall back.
The added
firepower of breach-loading carbines allowed him to inflict several casualties on Archer's brigade. However, the small
Union cavalry brigade had insufficient numbers to do any serious damage to the Confederates. Crawford made a brief stand along the rail fence. He then fell back to avoid being surrounded by Archer and Pender. In the south, Prince's brigade quickly withdrew in the face of three Rebel brigades. The Union player massed three artillery batteries in the center to slow the Confederate advance. The guns stopped both Thomas and Branch
buying time for the Union infantry to escape. The Union artillery then withdrew ending the battle at around 7:30PM.
Figure 21
162
Game Analysis
Like the New Market reenactment, this simulation produced results very similar to the original battle. The
wargamers, though not constrained to mimicking historical actions, executed the simulation in much the same manner as the actual battle. This similarity may have occurred be-
cause both garners studied the battle and either intentionally or unintentionally followed the actions of their histor-
ical counterpart. There were two differences between the simulation and the actual battle. First, the Union player
elected to commit Gordon's brigade to the initial assault. Historically, Banks had held Gordon's unit in reserve. Second, the Union player decided to switch from the offense to the defense when large numbers of Rebel reinforcements began to enter the battle. In the actual battle, the Union
forces continued to attack and over extended themselves. Switching to the defense earlier in the simulation put the Union Army in better condition to resist the initial Confederate counterattack. The added strength of Union resistance was probably the main reason the simulation lasted 30 minutes longer than the actual battle. The following analysis concentrates on those areas identified in the New Market reenactment as requiring additional analysis.
quickly closed to medium or close range to engage in fire combat. The rifle armed units had the advantage of having a
higher probability of causing casualties over musket armed units. Therefore rifle armed units won almost all the
firefights. In close combat situations of rifle versus the musket, the rifle again had a slight advantage as it still had a higher chance of causing casualties. However, the
decisive advantage usually occurred when one unit held the better position, i.e. some type of cover or a position on the enemy's flank. The Union cavalry had breach-loading carbines, mostly Sharps carbines. Carbine fire proved to be very
effective considering the small numbers of dismounted cavalrymen involved in the fights. Because of the added bene-
fits of breach-loading carhines. the cavalry units were, in effect, equivalent to units 50% greater in size. If the
Union player had concentrated all the cavalry together they would have been much more effective. Together, they could
have dismounted 22 figures, which would have been equivalent to 33 infantrymen armed with rifles. Twenty-two "veteran
regular" infantry can cause 5.28 casualties at close range. The same number of cavalrymen can cause 5 . 9 4 casualties. If
Bayard's men would have ha? repeating carbines. they could have caused 7 . 9 2 casualties. A replay of Branch's attack on Gordon's and Bayard's brigades produced interesting results when the cavalrymen were given repeaters. Unlike the original simulation, in the replay, the added firepower of the
repeaters stopped Branch and caused heavy casualties on the attacking Rebels. Both sides were reluctant to charge into close action combat unless they believed they had a very good chance of winning the fight. The wargamers usually interpreted "a good chance" as having a major numerical advantage; the enemy side already having several casualties and therefore being very prone to a morale failure: or being on the enemy's flank. The garners' reluctance to charge without
advantage paralleled the Civil War soldiers' preference to firing over charging in with bayonets. The wargamers were
just as reluctant as their historical counterparts to subject their units to the unpredictable risks of a close action combat. Instead, they relied upon the less decisive,
but more predictable firefight resolution process. In the simulation, Crawford's and Gordon's initial actions in the north were very similar to the events of the actual battle. Several flank charges and many firefights,
although not executed exactly like the actual events, did produce the same results as the historical engagements. Again, the best validation of weapon's effectiveness is shown through a comparison of actual casualties to those of the simulation (see Appendix D). It is difficult to establish an absolute qualification that the "Stars and Bars" fire models, firefight and close combat resolutions are historically accurate. However, based upon the results of both simulations. there is
justification in saying that "Stars and Bars" does provide a historically accurate simulation of fire combat in the Civil War. Command and Control. The Union player only issued two orders in the entire simulation. He first issued attack orders to all his units. The simulation allowed a very high probability for activation of orders on the first game-turn which represented pre-battle coordination between units.
three, the Union player issued orders for both divisions to withdraw. Both divisions were within Bank's command radius
and successfully activated their orders. The Confederate player had to react to Union actions for the first two game-turns. Initially, all Rebel units The command and
control problems started when the Confederates tried to adjust based on the Union attack. The Confederate player
issued orders for Hill's two lead brigades to attack. He also ordered the remainder of Ronald's brigade and Ewell's division on Cedar Mountain to attack. Based on Jackson's "excellent" rating, each of his units had a 70% chance to activate. Hill's units activated, and Ewell's division and. Ronald's brigade failed to activate. Each unit was within
Jackson's command radius. The failures to activate were primarily due to chance (a poor die roll). However, the
dl.lri!-ig
mWil
of the battle because he received no orders to advance. Problems with slniuldtion command and control can be likened to many modern day command and control problems. Most units attempt to execute their pre-battle plan to the best of their abilities. However, problems can and do occur
when the commander attempts to adjust the plan to meet unforeseen battle situations. The simulation models this
situation by giving a high probability of activation for pre-battle orders. Units have their orders and are usually able to plan their initial actions. The changes in the plan are then subjected to chance. The better commanders have a better chance of carrying out a new plan. The commander also has the opportunity to enhance his "chance" by personally ensuring that orders are carried out. However, his
personal presence and concentration on one area of the battle increases his risks in other areas of the battlefield. Very few simulations can accurately portray the "fog
of battle". However, the "Stars and Bars" simulation does provide a reasonable representation of battlefield command in the Civil War.
The New Market reenactment proceeded almost exactly like the actual battle. The end results were also very similar to the historical outcome. The reenactment validat-
ed the historical accuracy of unit organizations, formations, frontages, tactics and weapon characteristics. All
of which had been previously deemed historically accurate in chapters 3 and 4. The reenactment also showed that grand tactical, tactical movement, morale, and, for the most part, weapons effectiveness and ammunition shortages provided a historically accurate simulation. The reenactment did not provide sufficient data for analysis of several other areas such as musket and carbine fire, close combat, and battlefield command. Each of these areas were then emphasized in the Cedar Mountain simulation. The Cedar Mountain simulation, executed as a freeflowing wargame, also produced results very similar to tho:3e of the actual event. Surprisingly, the conduct of the
battle closely followed the historical actions. The simulation validated a 1 1 areas previously deemed historim 1 ly accurate. The wargame also demonstrated that carbine fire was historically accurate. The simulation also demonstrated
that the historical accuracy of close range musket fire could be enhanced. Close combat and battlefield command
were both difficult to quantify. However, in both simulations. these areas closely paralleled the actual events and are therefore judged as providing an accurate historical Over-
both battles.
Chapter 6 Notes
(1)Larry Brom, The Sword and the Flame (Dallas: Yaquinto Publications, Inc.. 1979). 22. (2)The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. in 128 oarts (Washington D.C.: Government Printinq Office, 1880-190i). series 1 , vol 37, 87. (3)John D. Imboden, "The Battle of New Market", Battles and Leaders 4 Vols. (New York: The Century Company. 18841887). Vol. 4, 491. (4)William C. Davis, The Battle Of New Market (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1983) , 193-196. (5)Imboden. "New Market", 481. ( 6 ) O . R . . Series 1, vol. 37, 76.
(7)Imboden. "New Market", 483. 491. (8)Ibid.. 483. (9)Davis. New Market, 87-99. (10)O.R.. Series 1, vol. 37. 80.
(11)Imboden. "New Karket". 483. (l2)Davis. New Market, 92-93. (13)O.R.. Series 1, vol. 37, 80.
(18)Ibid. (19)O.R..
( 20 )
(23)Ibid.. 84. (24)Davis, New Market. 135-141. (25)Davis. New Market, 120-121. ( 2 6 ) O . R . . Series 1, vol. 12, 178.
(27)Ibid.. 136-139, 179. (28)Ibid.. 178-179. (29)Ibid. , 178. (30)Ibid. , 189, 201. (31)Ibid.. 214-216. (32)Ibid. , 141. (33)Ibid. , 179-180.
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS
It (History) provides us the opportunity to profit by the stumbles and tumbles of our forerunners.
By studying history, we become observers and analysts of historical events and trends. In 1971 the Army
Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, established an ad hoc committee to determine if there was a need for the Army to study military history. The committee, under the chairmanship of Colonel Thomas E. Griers. United States Military Academy, concluded that a study of military history would help
history provides a foundation in military problem solving and also helps to compensate for deficiencies in individual experiences.2 The Army's study of history took a major step forward with the reinstatement of the "Staff Ride" program in
the early 1970s. The "Staff Ride" became part of the Command and General Staff College curriculum in 1982. The CGSC "Staff Ride" concentrates on the battle of Chickamauga from the American Civil War. The theme of the Chickamauga "Staff a detailed study of the cam-
paign and battle can reveal why events occurred as they did. However, even with the "Staff Ride", which encourages active student participation and group discussion. the student can only remain an observer of history.3 The wargame provides the additional opportunity for a student to actually participate in an experience of history . 4 Perhaps the wargame can serve as one of the "imagina-
tive training aidsu5 encouraged in the Army's p a m p h l e t . 2 ~ Staff Ride. Many Threat instructors use hundreds of small Similar-
ly, history instructors could use tabletop battlefields to replicate historical battles. The wargamer has the opportu-
nity to gain a better understanding of the problems associ.ated with battlefield command. An historically accurate simulation, using the formations, tactics. and weapons of a particular period, provides the wargame participant with a glimpse of the military thinking of the time.6 The wargamer
is not limited to analyzing Nathan Bedford Forrest's actions at the battle of Brice's Cross Roads or Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain's defense of Little Round Top at the battle of Gettysburg. Instead, the wargamer is placed in a situation
consider the ranges of his weapons and the size and capability of his force and then decide where to defend and how to attack. In short, the wargamer faces many of the same
decisions his historical counterpart faced.7 The intent of this thesis was to examine miniature wargaming as a valid medium of study for the American Civil War. ~~ecificall the ~ , study analyzed Scotty Bowden's
miniature wargame rules, STARS*N*BARS 111, to determine if the rules provided a historically accurate simulation of Civil War combat. The study first examined the mechanics or rules of the simulation to determine if they were historically sound. Chapters three and four looked at the infantry and the supporting arms: cavalry and the artillery. These chapters provided an overview of many different areas under the broad headings of organization, maneuver and firepower. Chapter five then examined the aspects of battlefield command concentrating on three areas: the commanders; directing the battle; and morale. In some areas, the historical accuracy was easily quantified as in the following example. Historically, an
infantry regiment of 480 men in line formation occupied a frontage of about 160 yards. The simulation also requires a regiment of 480 men to occupy 160 scale yards. Therefore, in this sub-area of maneuver, the simulation is historically accurate. In other areas, such as with the resolution of
could not establish a position on historical accuracy strictly based on an examination of the simulation mechanics. The wargaming of two Civil War battles was used to
determine the historical accuracy of the area in question. The following chart provides an overview of the different areas examined and how the study proceeded. Unfortunately, there is a price to be paid for historical accuracy. One of the key tasks of a wargame designer is to balance accuracy and playability in a simul.2tion. In most simulations accuracy equates to complexity.
The wargame designer strives to achieve enough detail within the simulation to ensure the wargame portrays the period accurately. However, he does not want the wargame partici-
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY YES- "Stars and Bars" provides the means for a historically accurate simulation. NO- "Stars and Bars is not historically accurate in this area.
?- Further analysis required, determination of historical accuracy will be examined in the simulations of New Market and Cedar mountain.
Conclusions Ch.7
Ch.3 Ch.4 Ch.5 (Inft.1 (Cav.)(Arty. l (Battlefield Cornandl Unit Organization Regt . 1 Battery Bde, Div Corps
YES YES YES YES YES YES
V
V
YES YES
Formations1 Frontage Tactics Grand Tactical Movement Tactical Movement Fire Power Weapons Weapons Effectieness firing f iref ight close action Ammunition Shortages
YES YES
?
YES YES
?
YES YES
V V
YES
YES
YES
YES
? ? ? ? ?
YES
YES
The Cmdrs.
Directing the Battle Cmd. Skills Cmd. Conpliance Horale
Experience
V
?
YES YES
YES
? ?
YES YES
YES YES
Chart 4
The Avolon Hill Game Company rates their games with a four step complexity scale: low; medium; high; and very high. On the same scale. "Stars and Bars" would receive a rating of "very high". This does not mean that Scotty
Bowden has failed to balance accuracy and playability. Bowden did achieve his goal of providing a realistic simulation of history. He also provided the wargaming community
with a playable simulation. One can interpret the term playable in varying degrees. The card game "Old Maids" is
playable even to a young child. While the game of "Bridge" may not be playable to the same young child, members of Bridge clubs all over the world most definitely consider the game "playable". Skill levels and experience are the dif-. ferentiating factors. The "Stars and Bars" simulation is The mechanics of the
simulation are detailed, somewhat complex, and require extensive study to be mastered. Most wargamers cannot
master the system in only one or two games. Because of the complexity, the wargamer must invest a substantial amount of time to complete a historical simulation. Even with experienced wargamers, both the New Market and Cedar Mountain simulations, required more than four hours each to complete. The "Stars and Bars" simulation generally requires one hour of game time to complete one hour of historical battle.
Despite its complexity, the "Stars and Bars" simulation can still be adapted to the classroom situation. It is not necessary for each wargame participant to have a full understanding of the rules. A common practice in wargaming is the use of an umpire. The umpire controls the applica-
tion of rules in the simulation. This frees the wargame participants to concentrate on their command responsibilities in the simulation. The wargamer decides what his units will do and the umpire determines the outcome of the action. In the classroom, the instructor could fulfill the role of the umpire. The question of available time also requires a compromise in classroom wargaming. devote several hours to wargaming. Very few classes could Obviously, class time
would not be sufficient to permit the 20 hours of wargaming during the Staff Ride study phase. However, the New Market
reenactment offers a plausible alternative. Even though the battle lasted for several hours, the key segment of the battle occurred between 2PM and 3PM. A simulation of this part of the battle would only require one hourly round or one hour of game-time. Similarly, instead of gaming the entire battle of Chickamauga. a wargame could be structured around key segments of the battle. The wargamers/students could place ail units in their historical positions. Then, instead of
wargaming, they could discuss the actions of their units. During the discussions, the students would move these units
At select times
during the battle, key actions could be wargamed to provide more insight into why events occurred as they did. Another option for classroom study would be to use a less complicated simulation system. The recent PBS documen-
tary on the American Civil War has spurred the development of a plethora of new wargame simulations. Even though this study has dealt specifically with the "Stars and Bars" system, the same methodology could be applied against other simulation systems. Wargaming has come a long way since
continually developing more playable systems without sacrificing historical accuracy. More than likely, STARS*N*BARS
m, will
The overall conclusion of this study is that STARS*N*BARS 111, does accurately simulate battle in the American Civil War. Wargaming can be used to study history,
either in the classroom or by small groups of hobbyists and historians. In the historical simulation, gaming and histo-
ry cannot be separated. One complements the other in building a more complete understanding the period.
Chapter 7 Notes
(1)John E. Jessup and Robert W. Coakley, eds. A Guide to the Study and Use of Military Histow (Washington: Center of Military History, 1979). ix. (2)Jessup. A Guide to the Study and History, ix, xi, 14-32. Use of Military
(3)William E. Roberston,The Staff Ride (Washington: Center of Military History.1987). 3-5, 12-13, 22. (4)Paddy Griffith, A Book of Sandhurst Waraarnes York: Coward. Mccann and Geoghegan, 1982) , 9. (5)Roberston. The Staff Ride, 22 (6)Donald Featherstone, eaters st ones' Complete (Newton. England: David and Charles, 1988) , v. Warqaminq (New
(7)J. F. Grossman, The Complete Briqadier, Introduction to Niniature Waraaminq(St. Paul, Minnesota: Adventure Games. Inc., 1982). 1-3.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A ORDER OF BATTLE AT THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET Union Army1 Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel (Inspirational/Mediocre) 1st (Infantry Division) 1st Brigade- Col. August Moor 18th Conn. (350)-veteran regular3 123rd Ohio (700)-regular 2nd Brigade- Col Joseph Thoburn 1st W. Va. (700)-regular 12th W. Va. (929)-regular 34th Mass. (500) -regular
1. The field reports from the battle of New Market never made it into the Official Records. William Davis' book on the battle does provide a comprehensive order of battle (page 193). He based the Union order of battle on a official Federal report published in the New York Tribune on 27 May 1864. He built the Confederate order of battle from many different diary entries of participants in the battle. 2. InspirationalBefore the battle of New Market, Sigel was respected and admired by the common soldier. Sigel was a brave man and could generally inspire the troops to carry out his orders. Mediocre-Sigel was a political general. He had a large following of loyal German-American supporters. Because of this, he quickly obtained high rank in the Union Army. 3. All the infantry eliteness ratings are based on the morale chart provided in "Stars and Bars". Most of the North's combat tested units are rated as "regular". The 18th Conn. and 34th Mass. performed better than most Union units at the battle. They are therefore given a slightly higher rating.
54th Pa. (566)-regular 1st (Cavalry Division) Maj. Gen. Julius Stah 1 7w e (Imper-sona 1i b b d i ~ ~ I~ 1st Brigade- Col Wm. Tibbetts 1st Veteran NY. (500)-regular2 1st Lincoln NY. (550)-regular 21st NY. (500)-regular 2nd Brigade- Col. John Wynkoop 15th NY. (130)-regular 20th Penn. (170)-regular
B, Maryland light Artillery -Capt Snow: six 3" Rodmansveteran regular 30th New York Battery-Capt Kleiser: six 12pdr. Napoleons-veteran regular D, 1st W. Va. Artillery-Capt Carlin: six 3" Rodmansveteran regular G, 1st W. Va. Artillery-Capt Ewing: four 3" Rodmansveteran regulars
1. Stahel performed very poorly at the battle. Hi:= division responded slowly to his commands and he was unable to inspire his men during the cavalry charge or rally the units after the charge.
2. Rating justification same as for the infantry 3. Overall the Union artillery performed much better than the infantry at the battle. Therefore they were given a slightly higher eliteness rating.
Infantry Division 1st Brigade-Brig. Gen. John Echols1 22nd Va. (580)-veteran regular 23rd Va. (579)-veteran regular 2nd Brigade-Brig. Gen. Gabriel Wharton2 30th Va. (347)-elite 51st Va. (700)-elite 62nd Va. Mtd. (448)-elite 23rd Va. Cav(dstmd) (315)-elite A, 1st Mo. Cav (62)-elite Reserve V.M.I. (226)-regular3 26th Va. (425)-veteran regu ar -elite Hart's Engineers (37)
Cavalry, Valley District- Brig. Gen. John Imboden 18th Va. Cav (615)-elite 2nd Ma. Bn. (40)-elite McNeil's Partisans (60)-elite Mosby's Raiders (20)-elite
1. The morale chart in "Stars and Bars" assigns "veteran regular" as the standard rating for Confederate units. Units that performed significantly above average would receive higher ratings. 2. Wharton was an outstanding brigade commander and would be recommended for promotion after the battle. His unit was highly respected and fought extremely well at the battle.
3. The cadets were highly trained but untested in battle. Therefore their eliteness rating is one step below standard Confederate infantry.
4. The small specialty units were usually highly trained and better equipped.
Arti 1lery Chapman's battery: four 12pdr. howitzers and two 3" Rodmans - veteran regular Blain's battery: three 12pdr. Napoleons and one 10pdr Parrott-veteran regular McClanahan's battery: four 3" Rodmans and two 12pdr howitzers-veteran regular V.M.I. section: two 3" Rodmans-regular
Federal Army
Infantry Division 18th Conn . 123rd Ohio.
1
30 32
73
prisoners
and
Wounded
Total
Killed
Wounded
Total
2 2 2 20
18 18 18 180
20 20 20 200
16 21 107
1
17
5 52
B. Md
Light
0
D. 1st W. Va.
G. 1st W. Va.
Artillery Total Army Total
1
6
96
Confederate Army
Infantry Division
Killed 26th Va . 30th Va . 51st Va . 62d Va. Mtd Co. A 1st Mo. Hart ' s Engineers 3 1 2 11
5
0
Wounded 21 45 90 81
35
Total 24 46 103 92
40
Killed 2
8
Wounded 18
72
Total 20
80
14
8
2
126
72
140
80
18
0
20
0
10 36 45 467
4
10
41
0 0
4 42
0
3 6
0
4 0
V.M. I.
Infantry. Total Artillery Chapman ' s Blain's McClanahan's V.M. I. Artillery Total Army Total
10 42 1 0
0
55 523 5 1 0 2
8
378
4
0
504
5 0
0
0 1
43
1 0 2
7 4 7 4
1 0 0 0 1
43
0 0
0 5 509
4
382
531
APPENDIX C ORDER OF BATTLE AT THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN Chapter two of this thesis reviewed the "Great Battles of the American Civil War" series. One of the games provided by the series is the battle of Cedar Mountain. The "Great Battles" series is highly respected in the wargaming community as providing historically accurate orders of battle. The series. because of the great amount of detail i s easily convertible into a miniature wargame scenario.
Leaders. All brigade commanders and above are represented by individual counters. Each leader has a command radius and a rally rating printed on the counter. The command radius reflects the ability of the leader to control his units. Superior leaders have a wider radius than poor leaders. The "Great Battles" series provides for a command radius range of 3 to 8 hexes. The system easily converts to the "Stars and Bars" system (superior, excellent, good, mediocre, poor and despicable). A leader with a command radius of 5 in the "Great Battles" system would be a excellent leader in the "Stars and Bars" system. Each leader counter also has a rally rating which represent the number of units a leader may rally in a given turn. The "Great Battles" series provides for a rally rating of 1 through 4. Once again, the system can be easily converted to the "Stars and Bars" system (charismatic, inspirational, impersonal, and uninspiring). A rally rating of 1 would represent an "uninspiring" leader and a 4 would be a charismatic leader. An example of the leader conversion is shown below:
,
"Great Battles"
A.P. Hill
command radius (8) rally rating (3) Christopher Augur command radius (5) rally rating ( 1 )
Unit Strength and Weapons Type. The counters in the "Great Battles" series represent individual regiments or batteries. The counter shows the unit's strength and their type of weapon. R4 represents 400 men armed with rifles. 3M would be 300 men with muskets. The wargamer converts the unit strength to the 1 to 40 scale of "Stars and Bars". The unit strengths provided in the "Great Battles" Cedar Mountain game were checked against the Official Records (O.R., series 1, vol. 12, part 2). All the unit strengths in the boardgame were validated by the Official Records (pages 140-170 for the Union Army and pages 188-238 for the Confederate Army).
Morale. Each unit counter in "Great BattlesUhas a unit morale printed on the counter. The series use a moral rating of 1 to 6 with 6 being the highest morale. "Stars and Bars" also has a six level morale system (crack, elite, veteran regular, regular, green and militia). Therefore a "Great Battles" morale rating of 4 becomes a "veteran regular" in the "Stars and Bars" simulation.
Union Army Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks (Inspirational/Good) I1 Corps, Army of Virginia 1st Division - Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams
(inspirational/excellent)
1st Brigade - Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford 28th NY. (335) - veteran regular 5th Conn. (424) - veteran regular 46th Penn. (481) - veteran regular 10 Xe. (435) - veteran regular 3rd Brigade - Brig. Gen. - George Gordon Penn. Zouaves (200) - regular 27th Ind. (600) - regular 3rd Wisc. (600) - green 2nd Mass. (474)- veteran regular 2nd Division - Brig. Gen. (uninspiring/mediocre) Christopher Augur
1st Brigade - Brig. Gen. John Geary 7th Ohio (307) - veteran regular 5th Ohio (300) - veteran regular
29th Ohio (189) - veteran regular 66th Ohio (250) - veteran regular 2nd Brigade - Brig. Gen. Henry Prince 102nd NY. (300) - green 3rd PId. (300) - regular 8th & 12th U.S. Inft. (200) 111th Penn. (300) - green 109th Penn. (300) - green
regular
3rd Brigade - Brig. Gen. George Greene 1st DC Bn. (200) - regular 78th NY. ( 457) - regular Army Artillery
M, 1st NY. Artillery: six 10pdr Parrotts - veteran regular L, 2nd NY. Artillery: six 3" Rodmans - veteran regular 4th Me. Artillery: six 3" Rodmans - regular 6th Me. Artillery: six 3" Rodmans - regular E, Penn. Artillery: six 10pdr Parrotts - veteran regular F, 4th U.S. Artillery: six 12pdr Napoleons - Crack
I'
Confederate Army Gen. Thomas Jackson (Inspirational/Excellent) Left Wing, Army of Northern Virginia 1st Division - Brig. Gen. Winder (uninspiring/mediocre) 1st (Stonewall) Brigade - Col. Charles Ronald 27th Va. (130) - veteran regular 5th Va. (300) - veteran regular 2nd Va. (200) - veteran regular 4th Va. (200) - veteran regular 33rd Va. (150) - veteran regular 2nd Brigade
42nd Va. (200) - veteran regular 1st Va. (100) - veteran regular 21st Va. (200) - veteran regular 48th Va. (200) - veteran regular
3rd Brigade - Brig. Gen Taliaferro 37th 48th 10th 23rd 47th Va. (300) - veteran regular Al. (300) "muskets" - veteran regulars Va. (200) "muskets" - veteran regulars Va. (200) - verteran regulars Al. (300) "muskets" - veteran regulars
Division Artillery Alleghany Artillery: four 12pdr Napoleons - veteran regu 1 ar Rockbridge Artillery: four 10pdr Parrotts regular Hampden Artillery: four 3" Rodmans - veteran regular La. Guard Artillery: four 12pdr Napoleons - veteran regu 1 ar 3rd Division
-
veteran
1st Louisiana Brigade - Col Henry Forno 5th La. (400) "muskets" - veteran regular 14th La. (600) "muskets" - veteran regulav 7th La. (600) "muskets" - veteran regular 8th La. (600) "muskets" - veteran regular 6th La. (600) "muskets" - veteran regular 4th Brigade - Brig. Gen. Jubal Early 13th 52nd 58th 12th 25th 31st Va. Va. Va. Ga. Va. Va. (400) - elite (120) "muskets" (300) "muskets" (400) - elite (200) "muskets" (200) "muskets" elite elite veteran regular veteran regular
7th Brigade
21st Ga. (600) "muskets" - veteran regular 15th Al. (700) - veteran regular 21st N.C. (700) "muskets" - veteran regular Division Artillery 1st Md. Artillery: four 12pdr Napoleons regular 4th Md. Artillery: four 6pdr rifles - veteran regular Courtney Artillery: four 3" Rodmans - veteran regu 1 ar Bedford Artillery: four 12pdr Napoleons - veteran regu 1 ar veteran
3rd Brigade - Col Edward Thomas 14th 35th 45th 49th Ga. Ga. Ga. Ga. (500) - elite (500) - elite (500) "muskets" - elite (500) "muskets" - elite
4th Brigade - Brig. Gen. O.B. Branch 37th N.C. (400) "muskets" - veteran 33rd N.C. (400) "muskets" - veteran 28th N.C. (400) "muskets" - veteran 18th N.C. (400) "muskets" - veteran 7th N.C. (400) - veteran regular 5th Brigade - Brig. Gen. James Archer 1st Tenn. (500) - veteran regular 7th Tenn. (400) "muskets" - veteran regular 14th Tenn. (400) "muskets" - veteran regular 14th Ga. (500) "muskets" - veteran regular 5th Al. (200) - veteran regular 6th Brigade - Brig. Gen William Pender 38th 34th 22nd 16th Division N.C. (500) N.C. (500) N.C. (500) N.C. (500) Artillery "muskets" "muskets" "muskets" "muskets" veteran veteran veteran veteran regular regular regular regular regular regular regular regular
Purcell Artillery: two 10pdr Parrotts - veteran regular Middlesex Artillery: two lOpdr Parrotts - veteran regu 1 ar
Historical Ki 1 led ederal Army Sank ' s Escort 1st Div Crawford's 97 Bde Gordon ' s Bde
2nd Div
74
Wounded
16
397
191
867
56 22
504 198
840 330
344
Geary ' s Bde Prince's Bde Greene ' s Bde Army Artillery
61
384
465
26
234
390
58
311
452
30 2
270 18 4 36 1264
450 30 30 60 2130
27
45 1365
40 61
1
4 141
2277
Wounded
'
8 28 32
Garrnett's 91 Bde Taliafero's Bde Ewell's Division Early's Bde Trimble 's Bde Forno ' s Bde A.P. Hill's Division Branch ' s Bde Archer ' s Bde Thomas ' s Bde Pender ' s Bde Army Artillery Army Total
2 229
182 38 28
193 45 34
22 4 4
83 89 133 6 18 1047
1. Confederates did not report missing in action. does not include missing or prisoners.
Tota!.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS U.S. Army. FM 23-9 M16A1 and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanship. Washington: GPO , 1989. U.S. War Department. Cavalry Tactics, 1841. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co., 1955. U.S. War Department. War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and the Confederate Armies. 70 Vols. in 128. in 128. Washington: GPO, 1880-1901. U.S. War Department. Requlations for the Army of the U.S. 1857, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1857.
U.S. War Department. Instructions For Field Artillerv, New York: J.P. Lipponcott & Co., 1861.
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Halleck, Wager, H. Military Art and Science: or Course of Instruction in Strateqy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, & Embracina the Duties of Staff. Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery. and Enqineers. 3d ed. , New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1862. Hampton, N. J. An Eyewitness to the Dark Days of 1861-1865:or, A Private Soldier's Adventures and Hardshi~sDurin,~ the War. Nashville: 1889. Hardee, William. Rifle and Liaht Infantry Tactics. 2 Vols. New York: Harper and Brothers.1847, 1861.
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Faust, Patricia, ed. Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1986. Featherstone, Donald F. Featherstone's Complete Warqaminq. Newton Abbot: David & Charles,.1988. .Naval Warqamn.London: Stanely Paul, 1965 Girard. Edward W. "History of Wargaming," Second Warqaminq Symposium. Washington D.C.: Washington Operations Research Council, 1964. Griess. Thomas. The American Civil War. The West Point Military History Series. New Jersey, Avery Publishing group INC.. 1987. Griffith, Paddy. Forward into Battle: Fiahtinu Tactics from WATERLOO to Vietnam. Sussex, Great Britain: Antony Bird Publications LTD. 1981. .Battle in the Civil War: generals hi^ and Tactics in America 1861-65. Nottinghamshire, England: Field-books, 1986. .Battle Tactics of the Civil War. First Published in the United Kingdom under the Title. Rally Once Again. The Crowood Press, 1987, reprint, London: Yale University Press. 1989. .A Book of Sandhurst Waraames. New York: Coward, Mccan, and Geoghegan. 1982. Grossman, J. F. The Compete Briaadier, Introduction to Miniature Waraaminq. St Paul, Minnesota: Adventure Games, Inc., 1982. Gush, George. A Guide To Warqaminq. New York: Hippocrene Books. 198G. Hubbell. John, T. Battles Lost an Won: Essays From Civil War History. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975. Jamieson, Perry. "The Develo~mentOf Civil War Tactics." Ph.D. diss., Wayne State University, 1979. Jessup, John E. and Robert W. Coakley. eds. A Guide to the Study of Military History. Washington: Center of Military History. 1979. Jonas, Jeff. "American Civil War-Gaming," Military Modeler. Vol 7. No. 9 (Sept 1980). 41. 70-7:.
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Combined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027 Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria. Vlrginia 22314 LTC Robert E. Gillespie Combat Studies Institute (CSI) U.5 Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 (2 coples) Mark K . Megehee Frontier Army Museum Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 LTC Lowdens F . Stephens. P h . D .
443 Brooks'lre Drlve Columbia. South Carollna 21210-4205
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4.
5.