A S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s of U.S.

Special Operations

d u r i n g t h e Korean C o n f l i c t , 1950-1953

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y of t h e U.S.

Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND S C I E N C E

by
STEVE A.
FONDACARO, M A J ,
USA

B.S.,

United S t a t e s M i l i t a r y Academy, 1 9 7 6

F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 1988

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u n l i m i t e d .

88-3205

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND S C I E N C E

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

N a m e of c a n d i d a t e Major S t e v e A.
T i t l e of t h e s i s

Fondacaro

A S t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s o f U.S.

S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e Korean C o n f l i c t , 1950-1953 Approved by:

, Thesis
i

Committee C h a i r m a n

, Member
MAJ R i c h a r d V. B a r b u t o , M.A.

Graduate Faculty

Member G r a d u a t e F a c u l t y

Accepted t h i s t h i r d d a y o f J u n e , - 1 9 8 8 by:

P h i l i b J.

J T $ k Brookes,
Ph.D

, Director,

G r a d u a t e Degree Programs

The o p i n i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s expressed h e r e i n a r e t h o s e of t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s o f t h e U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r governmental agency. (References t o t h i s s t u d y i n c l u d e the foregoing statement.)

ii

ABSTRACT
A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONDUCTED DURING THE KOREAN CONFLICT, 1950-1953, by Major S t e v e A. Fondacaro, USA, 143 pages.

C o n f l i c t from 1950 t o 1953. Each o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s d e t e r m i n e d by examining t h e a r e a s of s t r a t e g y , organi z a t i o n and o o e r a t i o n s . S u e c i a l o D e r a t i o n s a s d e f i n e d i n J o i n t C h i e f s bf S t a f f P u b l i c a t i o n h m b e r 2 , U n i f i e d A c t i o n Armed F o r c e s (UNAAF) was t h e s t a n d a r d by which o p e r a t i o n s were selected f o r examination. The s t u d y answers f o u r quest i o n s : 1) What were t h e U.N. Command s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s w i t h i n t h e Korean t h e a t e r , and how d i d t h e s e change?, 2 ) How t h e s e changing s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s development and c o o r d i n a t i o n of special o p e r a t i o n s o b j e c t i v e s , f o r c e s and headquart e r s ? , 3) What d i d U.S. s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea accomplish s t r a t e g i c a l l y ? 4) What c o n c l u s i o n s c a n be drawn from U.S. s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s ' e f f e c t i v e n e s s or i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n Korea?
FECOM s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s were l i m i t e d t o p a r t i s a n o p e r a t i o n s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s . The p a r t i s a n s c o n s i s t e d of anti-communist North Koreans o r g a n i z e d and l e d by U.S. c a d r e

T h i s study analyzes t h e s t r a t e g i c e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s conducted by t h e Far E a s t Command (FECOM) and t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency ( C I A ) i n Korea d u r i n g t h e Korean

b e g i n n i n g i n J a n u a r y , 1951. P s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s were conducted c o n t i n u o u s l y from J u l y , 1950 by a s e p a r a t e s t a f f e l e m e n t whose c a p a b i l i t i e s expanded d r a m a t i c a l l y d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e c o n f l i c t . C I A o p e r a t i o n s w i t h i n Korea c o n s i s t e d of i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g and s p e c i a l (or c o v e r t ) a c t i v i t i e s c o n t r o l l e d from h e a d q u a r t e r s i n Japan. C I A o p e r a t i o n s remained autonomous o f FECOM c o n t r o l t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n f l i c t . The c o n t r o l i s s u e was t h e s o u r c e o f b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n f l i c t t h a t i n h i b i t e d o p e r a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n between FECOM and C I A t h r o u g h o u t t h e conf 1i c t .
The s t u d y c o n c l u d e s t h a t l a c k of s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s and l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t y r e n d e r e d FECOM o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . C I A o p e r a t i o n s were w e l l planned and

s u c c e s s f u l l y achieved well-defined s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s i n s u p p o r t of t h e war e f f o r t i n Korea. T h i s e x p e r i e n c e h i g h l i g h t s e x i s t i n g o p e r a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n problems between m i l i t a r y and C I A s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e u s e of i n d i g e n o u s f o r c e s i n Korea foreshadow problems t h a t r e s u r f a c e on l a r g e r s c a l e i n Viet-Nam, and may a p p l y t o c u r r e n t o p e r a t i o n s i n C e n t r a l America.

iii

Acknowledgement

I owe a g r e a t d e a l of t h a n k s t o m y t h e s i s committee,

whose p a t i e n t s u p e r v i s i o n throughout a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t w r i t i n g phase is, i n l a r g e p a r t , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s u c c e s s f u l l y f i n i s h e d product. I n p a r t i c u l a r , I am i n d e b t e d

t o Dr. J a c k J . G i f f o r d f o r h i s f r a n k c r i t i q u e s and q u a l i t y analysis. Majors Richard V. Barbuto and T e r r y A. Griswold

provided i n s t r u c t i v e comments and s u s t a i n e d encouragement t h a t saw m e through t h e most d i f f i c u l t p e r i o d s .

I wish t o thank M r . Yoseph C. Goulden, a u t h o r of Korea:

The Untold -

Story of the War, and COL Rod P a s c h a l 1 and -

Dr. Richard J. Somers of t h e Army M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y I n s t i t u t e

f o r t h e v a l u a b l e t i m e t h e y s p e n t over t h e phone p r o v i d i n g c r i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n and a d v i c e . I would a l s o l i k e t o thank m y academic e v a l u a t o r , Major Richard McKenney whose t i m e l y a s s i s t a n c e and genuine concern a t c r i t i c a l moments k e p t t h e r e s e a r c h p r o c e s s going. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e t o thank m y w i f e , I n S u k , and m y s o n , David, for t h e i r p a t i e n c e , u n d e r s t a n d i n g and encourage-

ment throughout t h e y e a r .

iv

T a b l e of C o n t e n t s

......................................... 2 . Survey of L i t e r a t u r e ................................ 3 . S t r a t e g y ............................................ 4 . O r g a n i z a t i o n ........................................ 5 . O p e r a t i o n s and C o n c l u s i o n ........................... B i b l i o g r a p h y ...........................................

1 Introduction

1 12

18
41
84

127

List of Figures

Figure 4-1.

Central Intelligence Agency Organization, 1 9 5 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 CIA/FECOM Relationship, 1 9 5 1 5 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 Psychological Warfare Division, 9 5 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0 G 3 , EUSAK, 1 Psychological Warfare Section, Special Staff, FECOM, 1 9 5 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1 Attrition Section, Miscellaneous Division, 0 3 , EUSAK, (January, 1951). Miscellaneous Group, 8240 AU, G-3, EUSAK (May, 1 9 5 1 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8 Far East Comaand/Liaison Detachment (FEC/LD (K), 8240 AU (December, 1951).........70 Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities (CCRAR), 8242 AU, FECOM (October, 1 9 5 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Figure 4-2. Figure 4-3.

Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-5.

..................65

Figure 4-6.

Figure 4-7.

Figure 4-8.

.............72

Figure 4-9.

CCRAK, 8242 AU, Army Forces Far East (AFFE), 74 FEC/UNC (December, 1 9 5 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . .

..........

Figure 5-1.

Operational Plan One, 1 9 5 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8

vi

L i s t of F i g u r e s ( c o n t i n u e d )

F i g u r e 5.2

. .
.

P e r c e n t a g e s of P a r t i s a n A c t i o n s by Grid S q u a r e s . 1951-1953 O p e r a t i o n a l Areas for FECOM P a r t i s a n P l a n s . 1953

......................

100

F i g u r e 5.3

.........................

104

F i g u r e 5.4

FECOM P a r t i s a n Airborne O p e r a t i o n s . 1951-1953

................................

1 0 6-107

vi i

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION We don't need to g o back andllook at things that happened two years ago. Gen. David C. Jones Chmn, JCS, 1982

The purpose of this study is to analyze the United Nations Command (UNC) strategy for the conduct of special operations and the subsequent creation and use of.specia1 operations forces (SOP) during the Korean Conflict from 1950 to 1953. Research into the subject of special operations is unique for a number of reasons. First, relatively little

primary and secondary literature and data was available to researchers until a large scale declassification of Korean Conflict era Far East Command (FECOM) documents took place as a result of the Freedom of Information Act in 1980. Second, though some records, classified or otherwise, do exist, there are relatively few historical works that directly address special operations. Third, the definition

of exactly what comprises "special operations" changed continuously over the years after World War I1 when the term

first appeared officially to describe operations conducted by the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS).

It was then that

a need to differentiate between "special" and "conventional" operations first appeared. Finally, from its early

beginnings in the OSS, there developed a reluctance on the part of military and political leaders to associate themselves with special, or "black" operations as they were sometimes referred to. This is understandable since these

leaders were responsible for explaining these activities, to Congress and the American public if and when exposed. Given the fact that by their very nature, these operations lie well outside the boundaries of public law and the international laws of war, this responsibility is considered political suicide. this. President Carter is a recent example of

This discourages study of lessons learned or

development of a comphrehensive doctrine for the use of special operations in the future. This attitude remains prevalent as the quote at the beginning of the chapter reflects. General Jones was

responding to a reporter's question concerning the appointment of the Holloway Commission to investigate the planning and conduct of the failed Iran Hostage Rescue attempt in April, 1980. Unlike the,former JCS chairman, I

believe that the only way to preclude recurrences of this disaster is to dissect past special operations to a degree at least commensura'te to that of conventional operaions. The lessons learned from past U.S. conduct of special

operations constitute the foundation of any coherent reform program. Therefore, frank confrontation and resolution of

U.S.

planning and execution failures must be the objective

of any reform-oriented study. Faced with a future where unlimited use of military power will, for the most part, not be an option, special operations provide leaders with a strategic option whose results are potentially great while expending limited assets. The Korean Conflict was America's first experience

with limited war, and as such, is an appropriate vehicle through which to predict what the modern effects of limited war on military operations will be. During the mobile phase of the Korean Conflict, after the Inchon landing, large guerrilla forces would have been invaluable in ambushing, harrassing and maintaining contact with retreating North Korean forces.
A n indigenous

force would have been in a much better position to detect and pinpoint Chinese concentrations, thereby enabling a slower, more controlled advance by FECOM forces, possibly

, /'

a v o i d i n g t h e d r a m a t i c d e f e a t of November, 1950.

The s t r a t e g i c

stalemate t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e l a s t two y e a r s o f t h e conf l i c t precluded t h e u s e of l a r g e - s c a le o f f e n s i v e s designed t o force a b a t t l e f i e l d solution.

The c o n t e s t s e t t l e d down t o

one o f e n d u r a n c e between t h e communists and t h e U.N.

forces.

A l a r g e , well organized g u e r r i l l a f o r c e operating i n t h e

enemy r e a r a r e a was a n o t h e r means by which t h e U.N. c o u l d have h a r a s s e d t h e enemy.

Command

T h i s s t u d y w i l l f o c u s on t h e s t r a t e g y behind t h e

campaign p l a n s i n Korea and a n a l y z e how t h i s s t r a t e g y i n t e g r a t e d t h e u s e of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s ( S O F ) . Accordingly, t h i s p a p e r c o v e r s o n l y s e l e c t e d o p e r a t i o n s conducted by FECOM and t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency ( C I A ) i n order t o highlight the analysis a s appropriate.

A detailed

s t u d y o f a l l t h e f o r c e s i n v o l v e d and a l l o p e r a t i o n s conducted i s o u t s i d e t h e scope of t h i s s t u d y . Additionally, t h i s study

w i l l a n a l y z e how commanders c o o r d i n a t e d o p e r a t i o n s and

o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s throughout t h e c o n f l i c t
U.S.

s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea d i d n o t r e c e i v e

wide c o v e r a g e a f t e r t h e c e a s e - f i r e went i n t o e f f e c t i n 1953. H i s t o r i a n s and a n a l y s t s , c o n c e n t r a t i n g on o t h e r unique a s p e c t s of t h e war, p a i d l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e r o l e of special operations. However, u n i t r e c o r d s show t h a t s p e c i a l

o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s i n Korea c o n t r o l l e d by E i g h t h U.S.

Army,

Korea EUSAK/FECOM c l a i m e d t h e y accounted f o r 69,000 enemy casualties.2

T h i s t o t a l does n o t include c a s u a l t i e s in-

f l i c t e d by similar c o v e r t o p e r a t i o n s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e C I A . S t a f f s c o n d u c t i n g a f t e r - a c t i o n r e v i e w s of these u n i t s ' r e c o r d s q u e s t i o n t h e a c c u r a c y of t h e s e c l a i m s .

While a t t r i t i o n

a l o n e i s n o t normally n o t s t r a t e g i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , i t

was t h e s t r a t e g y pursued by E i g h t h Army a f t e r J a n u a r y , 1951

when G e n e r a l Ridgway i n i t i a t e d O p e r a t i o n KILLER. Special

o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e ' s a b i l i t y t o i n f l i c t c a s u a l t i e s made i t capable of a f f e c t i n g t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n t o t h e e x t e n t of o p e r a t i o n a l or s t r a t e g i c impact.

t h e determining f a c t o r s .

L o c a t i o n and t i m i n g a r e

T h i s i s a n o t h e r a r e a worth exami-

nation i n t h i s study.
A s w i t h t h e OSS i n World War 11, t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of

these f o r c e s i s d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n .

Y e t , General

Eisenhower d e s c r i b e d t h e work of t h e French R e s i s t a n c e p r i o r t o t h e Normandy l a n d i n g s a s "worth 1 5 d i v i s i o n s t o t h e

A l l i e ~ . " ~ I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o remember t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

of F r e e F r e n c h f o r c e s a t t h e c r i t i c a l time and p l a c e i s what made t h e i r e f f o r t s t r a t e g i c a l l y v a l u a b l e .

t h e v a l u e of c o o r d i n a t i o n .
This highlights

Employed i n i s o l a t i o n a g a i n s t special operations forces are a t

large conventional forces,

a d i s a d v a n t a g e , and over time, w i l l be e l i m i n a t e d , a l l e l s e

b e i n g e q u a l . But when combined w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n s , t h e i e impact i n c r e a s e s e x p o n e n t i a l l y , dependent upon t h e l e v e l of f o r e s i g h t and s k i l l of t h e commander a p p l y i n g them. In

d e s p e r a t e s i t u a t i o n s t h e y c a n make t h e d i f f e r e n c e between

success or f a i l u r e .

Low c o s t o p e r a t i o n s t h a t c a n degrade

enemy f o r c e s t o t h i s e x t e n t a r e of u n q u e s t i o n a b l e v a l u e t o f u t u r e commanders. E s p e c i a l l y when l e a d e r s a r e f a c e d w i t h

s e v e r e l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e u s e of o v e r t c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y force. I n g e n e r a l , t r a d i t i o n a l b u r e a u c r a t i c and p o l i t i c a l m i s t r u s t of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s u n i t s by c o n v e n t i o n a l u n i t s , c o n t r i b u t e d t o a l a c k of c o o r d i n a t i o n a t t h e s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l s . T h i s i s e x a c e r b a t e d by an e q u a l l y

t r a d i t i o n a l m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and misuse of these u n i t s , d a t i n g from World War 11.. I n t h e post-World War I1 e r a , i n

t h e wake of t h e h a s t y dismemberment of OSS, i t s a c t i v i t i e s

received l i m i t e d coverage i n the o f f i c i a l h i s t o r i e s , f u r t h e r reflecting t h i s disdain.

T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l a r e a of s p e c i a l

o p e r a t i o n s were more popular d u r i n g t h e war, b u t t h e War Dep a r t m e n t n e g l e c t e d t h e i r development a f t e r 1945.

A t t h e out-

break of war i n 1 9 5 0 , a s m a l l Army u n i t formed a t F o r t R i l e y , Kansas, i n J u n e , 1947, known a s t h e T a c t i c a l I n t e l l i g e n c e

Detachment was t h e o n l y m i l i t a r y PSYOP u n i t i n t h e f o r c e

structure. 5
The U.S., and s u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e U.N., found i t s e l f

unprepared t o u n d e r t a k e s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea i n 1950.

Yet h e a d q u a r t e r s were formed, f o r c e s o r g a n i z e d and e q u i p p e d ,

and o p e r a t i o n s undertaken. T h i s s t u d y w i l l i n v e s t i g a t e how

w e l l t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s were c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c
objectives within the theater. Study w i l l f o c u s on t h e f o l strategic objectives
2 ) Row d i d

lowing q u e s t i o n s : 1) What were t h e U.N.

w i t h i n t h e Korean t h e a t e r ? Row d i d t h e s e change?

t h e s e changing s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s a f f e c t development and c o o r d i n a t i o n of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s o b j e c t i v e s , f o r c e s and headquarters? strategically? 3 ) What d i d s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea a c h i e v e

4 ) What c o n c l u s i o n s

can be drawn from t h e i r

s t r a t e g i c success or f a i l u r e ? Chapter 2 c o v e r s t h e p e r t i n e n t l i t e r a t u r e used i n t h e development of t h e s t u d y . development of U.S. Chapter 3 d e a l s w i t h t h e

s t r a t e g y toward Korea, and t h e

s u b s e q u e n t e v o l u t i o n of s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s f o r t h e U . N . Command. C h a p t e r s 4 c o v e r s how t h i s s t r a t e g i c guidance l e d

t o t h e development of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s w i t h i n t h e theater. Chapter 5 examines s e l e c t e d o p e r a t i o n s and

e v a l u a t e s SOF s t r a t e g i c impact.

W i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h i s s t u d y , s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s a r e d e f i n e d a s i n J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f (JCS) P u b l i c a t i o n Number 2 , Unifed Action Armed Forces (I3NAAF) d a t e d 1 December, 1986 : 4-53. G e n e r a l

a. S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s (SO) a r e o p e r a t i o n s conducted by s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d , equipped, and o r g a n i z e d DOD f o r c e s a g a i n s t s t r a t e g i c or t a c t i c a l t a r g e t s i n p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , economic, or p s y c h o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . These o p e r a t i o n s may be conducted d u r i n g p e r i o d s of peace or h o s t i l i t i e s . They may s u p p o r t c o n v e n t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n s , or t h e y may be p r o s e c u t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y when t h e u s e of c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i s e i t h e r i n a p p r o p r i a t e or i n f e a s i b l e . (YCS Pub 1)
b. SO may i n c l u d e u n c o n v e n t i o n a l warlfare, counterterrorism, collective security (including foreign internal) defense), psychological operations, d e c e p t i o n , d i r e c t a c t i o n m i s s i o n s , and i n t e l l i g e n c e ( s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l ) c o l l e c t i o n and r e p o r t i n g and, when d i r e c t e d by t h e NCA, s p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . S p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s (covert operations) a r e subject t o t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o u t l i n e d i n Executive Order 12333.

c. S p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s (SOF) provide a v e r s a t i l e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o defend v i t a l U.S. n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and m u s t be c a p a b l e of c o n d u c t i n g m i s s i o n s i n p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , economic or p s y c h o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . They a r e an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e t o t a l d e f e n s e p o s t u r e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and a r e a s t r a t e g i c i n s t r u m e n t of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . T h e r e f o r e , t h e United S t a t e s . m u s t m a i n t a i n

the capability t o conduct SO at all levels in all regions of the world when the use of conventional forces would be undesirable or infeasible, or when SO would substantially enhance other military operations. SO can provide substantial leverage at a retsonable expenditure of resources and effort. Though lengthy, this definition was an attempt by the JCS to specifically identify exactly what special operations are. Within the government and the military, inconsistent use of terms contributed to the dysfunction caused by the inter-agency struggle for control of special operations, and hindered coordination prior to and throughout the Korean Conflict. Modern day parallels are easily drawn.

CEAPTER 1 ENDNOTES

'Scott Armstrong, George C. Wilson and Bob Woodward, "Debate R e k i n d l e s on F a i l e d I r a n R a i d , " Washingt o n P o s t 25 A p r i l , 1982.

L F r e d e r i c k W. Cleaver and o t h e r s , UN P a r t i s a n Warfare i n Korea, 1951-1954 (U). (Chevy Chases Md.: O p e r a t i o n s Research O f f i c e , The J o h n s H o-g k i n s U n i v e r s i t y, 1 9 5 6 ) , ORO-T-64, 4. Two t h i n g s a r e i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e h e r e : 1) Sheer body c o u n t a s a measure o f s t r a t e g i c or o p e r a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s is a questionable technique u n l e s s t h e s t r a t e g i c or o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e i s merely a t t r i t i o n of enemy f o r c e s . I n Korea, a t t r i t i o n was a n o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e f o r p a r t i s a n f o r c e s , b u t a g a i n s t t h e Chinese who e a s i l y r e p l a c e thousands of c a s u a l t i e s , i t was s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 2 ) According t o American a d v i s o r s a s s i g n e d t o l e a d and t r a i n p a r t i s a n f o r c e s , t h e c a s u a l t y f i g u r e s r e p o r t e d were p r o b a b l y i n f l a t e d by a f i g u r e o f 3 t o 7. (See M i l i t a r y E i s t o r i c a l Detachment 3, Army F o r c e s Far E a s t , "UN P a r t i s a n F o r c e s i n t h e Korean C o n f l i c t " J a n u a r y , 1953)

3R. E a r r i s Smith, OSS: The Secret H i s t o r y of America's F i r s t C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency, ( B e r k a e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1 9 7 2 ) , 364-65; Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & Co, 1 9 7 0 ) , 314, 343; Edward Bymoff, The OSS i n World War 11, ( N e w York: B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1 9 7 2 ) , 341-42; S t e w a r t Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The OSS and American E s p i o n k r ( N e w York: Reynal & H i t c h c o c k , 1 9 4 6 ) , 233; A l l e n D u l l e s , The C r a f t of I n t e l l i g e n c e , ( N e w York: Harper & Row, 1 9 6 3 ) , 43; OPD M e = No. 6168, 30 September 1945, s t a t e s t h a t G e n e r a l Magruder ( t h e n head of S t r a t e g i c S e r v i c e s U n i t , War Dept) was i n s t r u c t e d " t o c o n t i n u e l i q u i d a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s and p e r s o n n e l n o t needed f o r peacetime p u r p o s e s , " CCS 385(2-84 2 ) , S e c t i o n I , PT. 1 0 , box 8 7 , N a t i o n a l Archives. A memorandum by t h e Chief of S t a f f , U S Army, a s p a r t of J C S 965/2, 28 August 1945, "Withdrawal of A l l S e r v i c e P e r s o n n e l w i t h OSS," i n d i c a t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 , 0 0 0 US Army o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men on d u t y w i t h OSS i n J u l y , 1945, CCS 385 ( 2 8 - 4 2 ) , S e c t i o n I , PT. 1 0 , box 37, N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , q u o t e d

--

-----

--

10

in Alfred H. Paddock, US Special Warfare: Its Origins, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), 34, 167. 'Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pierce, 1954), 301, quoted in Alfred 8. Paddock, US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, Washington, D.C.: N a t G n a l Defense University Press, 1982), 59, 163.

5Paddock, 94. 6Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Publication 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), (Washington D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff 1986), 4-36 71bid., 4-14

11

CHAPTER 2

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

S o u r c e s of l i t e r a t u r e f o r t h i s s t u d y c o n s i s t p r i m a r i l y o f p u b l i s h e d s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s , a c c e s s i b l e o f f i c i a l primary s o u r c e s , and p e r i o d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . s e p a r a t e l y , i n some d e t a i l . P u b l i s h e d works on t h e Korean War or Korean C o n f l i c t abound and were p r i m a r i l y u s e f u l - i n d e a l i n g w i t h s t r a t e g y . R e f e r e n c e s t o U.N. Each w i l l be d i s c u s s e d

special o p e r a t i o n s or s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s
Works produced by t h e

f o r c e s were few b u t h i g h l y v a l u a b l e .

O p e r a t i o n s Research O f f i c e of t h e J o h n s Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y

were t h e b e s t s o u r c e s of d e t a i l e d d a t a on t h e t o p i c .

Johns

Hopkins conducted these s t u d i e s under government c o n t r a c t e i t h e r d u r i n g or s h o r t l y f o l l o w i n g t h e c o n f l i c t .

The t o p i c s
The

a r e e x t r e m e l y narrow and t h e r e s e a r c h v e r y d e t a i l e d .

Combined Arms Research L i b r a r y (CARL) a t F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas c o n t a i n s a l a r g e number of t h e s e s t u d i e s on a wide v a r i e t y of t o p i c s and was t h e s i n g l e most u t i l i z e d r e s e a r c h center. O f f i c i a l documents d e a l i n g d i r e c t l y w i t h s p e c i a l

o p e r a t i o n s by FECOM were v e r y few and, i n t h e c a s e o f t h e CIA,

12

nonexistent except in the classsified vaults of the National Archives. Secondary source references fill these gaps adequately. The l i b r x y at the Army War College was of great assistance in providing copies of their Oral Histories Collection which included interviews with some of the primary participants. They

also were very helpful in providing secondary sources unavailable in CARL. While published books solely addressing United Nations or United States Forces special operations in Korea, are very limited, a small number of key books address the subject and were a major source of primary material listings. Among the best are A Psychological Warfare Handbook by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz; U.S. Warfare: Its Origins by Alfred H.Paddock, Warfare

-Army

Special

and Airpower in Korea,

and Guerrilla

1950-53 by Lawrence V.

Schuetts.

The recent massive declassification of previously

restricted FECOM records and cable traffic resulted in new research studies whose quality, readability, and breadth are unprecedented. They include Korea: The Untold Story of the

War by

Joseph C. Goulden; Perilous Missions: Civil

-Air

Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia by William M. Leary, both of which cover CIA operations in the theater.

--

13

An even l a r g e r number of works a d d r e s s t h e Korean

C o n f l i c t , or f o c u s on s e l e c t e d p h a s e s of t h e war.

The f i n e s t

m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s of t h e l a s t f o u r d e c a d e s have covered t h e s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l a s p e c t s of t h e war i n g r e a t d e t a i l . Among t h e most v a l u a b l e works a r e T h i s Kind of War by T.R. Fehrenbach; The R i v e r And t h e G a u n t l e t by S.L.A.

----

--

Marshall;

The Korean War by Matthew B. Ridgway; and -From t h e Danube t o t h e Y a l u by Mark W. C l a r k . A l l c o n t a i n f i r s t hand ac---

c o u n t s of t h e e v e n t s from a U.S.

viewpoint.

Less well known

b u t e x t r e m e l y well w r i t t e n f o r e i g n p o l i c y h i s t o r i e s of U.S.Korea r e l a t i o n s were The R e l u c t a n t Crusade: American Foreign' P o l i c y i n Korea, 1941-1950 by James I r v i n g Matray and U.S.Korea R e l a t i o n s , 1882-1982 e d i t e d by Tae-Ewan Kwak. Strat-

egies of Containment by J o h n L e w i s Gaddis p r o v i d e s a con-

c i s e c r i t i q u e of t h e impact of containment s t r a t e g y and

NSC-68 on U.S. conflict.
T h e s e r v i c e s ' o f f i c i a l h i s t o r i e s o f f e r t h e most com-

involvement i n Korea b e f o r e and d u r i n g t h e

p r e h e n s i v e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n s i n g l e volumes.

South

to the -

Naktong, North --t o t h e Yalu by Roy E. Appleman;

Policy and D i r e c t i o n : T h e F i r s t Year by James F . Schnabel;

The United S t a t e s Air Force i n Korea by Robert F . F u t r e l l ; Manson, United S t a t e s The Sea War i n Korea by Frank ---A.

14

Marine Corps O p e r a t i o n s i n Korea, 1950-1953 i n 3 volumes by Lynn Montross and N i c h o l a s A. Canzona a r e s o u r c e s t h a t cover t h e s e r v i c e components' c o n t r i b u t i o n s . These volumes

d e t a i l t h e development and s u b s e q u e n t changes i n s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n f l i c t , and t h e e f f e c t s t h e s e changes had on t h e u n i t s ' a b i l i t y t o conduct o p e r a t i o n s .

T h e s e works a r e q u i t e r e a d a b l e and o f f e r t h e b e s t l i s t s of

o f f i c i a l primary sources.

They a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e i n

d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h p e r i o d i c a l r e f e r e n c e s t o f o c u s upon.
O f t h e O p e r a t i o n s Research O f f i c e s t u d i e s , t h e s i n g l e

most p e r t i n e n t t i t l e i s U.N.Partisan

Warfare i n Korea, 1950I t i s an

-1954 ( U )

by F r e d e r i c k W. C l e a v e r and o t h e r s .

e x h a u s t i v e a c c o u n t of t h e p a r t i s a n w a r f a r e h e a d q u a r t e r s , f o r c e s and o p e r a t i o n s of E i g h t h Army/FECOM.
I t i s unsurpassed i n

d e t a i l and i n c l u d e s a l l p e r t i n e n t o f f i c i a l documents.

Others

of p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e a r e FEC P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare O p e r a t i o n s : T h e a t e r S t a f f O r g a n i z a t i o n ; and E i g h t h Army P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare i n t h e Korean War by Willmore Kendall and o t h e r s ;
U.S.

Psywar O p e r a t i o n s in t h e Korean War by George S. P e t t e e .

Two p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e c l a s s i f i e d works u s e d s p a r i n g l y i n
t h i s s t u d y t o avoid c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a r e A Study

of

Internal

Warfare ( U ) by John A. McGee and Evasion

&

Escape R e p o r t s (v)

by t h e D i r e c t o r of I n t e l l i g e n c e , Far E a s t e r n Air F o r c e s . Both

15

a r e a v a i l a b l e i n CARL.
a c c o u n t of t h e U . N . commander.

McGee's work i s a p e r s o n a l , u n p u b l i s h e d

p a r t i s a n w a r f a r e s t o r y by i t s f i r s t

I t i s u n s u r p a s s e d a s a primary s o u r c e . The FEAF

work i s a c o l l e c t i o n of f i r s t - h a n d d e b r i e f i n g s of r e s c u e d p i l o t s t h a t p r o v i d e s a n i n s i g h t i n t o FECOM-CIA-FEAF c o o r d i n a t i o n t h a t i s n o t covered anywhere e l s e . O f f i c i a l r e c o r d s m a k e a d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n toward answering t h e t h e s i s q u e s t i o n s . Among t h e most p e r t i n e n t of

t h e s e - a r e t h e S t a t e Department S e r i e s : F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s

of the

United S t a t e s , E a s t Asia/Korea,

1950-53, Far E a s t

Command (FECOM) D a i l y I n t e l l i g e n c e Summaries and Monthly S i t u a t i o n r e p o r t s of t h e G2 o f f i c e . The o r a l h i s t o r i e s con-

d u c t e d by t h e a t e r h i s t o r i c a l detachments a r e v a l u a b l e f i r s t hand s o u r c e a c c o u n t s compiled w h i l e t h e o p e r a t i o n s were ongoing or s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r .

U.N. P a r t i s a n -

The most v a l u a b l e h i s t o r y was

F o r c e s i n t h e Korean C o n f l i c t conducted by

--

M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y Detachment Three, Army F o r c e s Far E a s t i n t h e f a l l of 1952. P r i m a r i l y s t a t e m e n t s by t h e American servicemen

and Korean p a r t i s a n s t h a t made up t h e s e f o r c e s , t h i s p r o j e c t i n c l u d e s a number of p e r t i n e n t U.S. documents. and Korean Armed F o r c e s

I t g i v e s an i n s i g h t i n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n s themselves

t h a t i s n o t d u p l i c a t e d elsewhere.

16

P e r i o d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e of t h e time r e f l e c t s c i v i l i a n i m p r e s s i o n s a b o u t e v e n t s i n Korea.
A

common

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s t h e g e n e r a l i n n a c c u r a c y and b i a s these

articles display.

Undoubtedly h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e War

Department P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n Branch, t h e y a r e r e m i n i s c e n t of t h e a r t i c l e s of t h e world War I1 e r a t h a t r e f l e c t a p o s i t i v e s i t u a t i o n f o r U.S. q u i t e desperate. f o r c e s , when i n r e a l i t y i t was

As t h e l i t e r a t u r e d i s t a n c e s i t s e l f i n time

from 1950, t h e t o n e becomes more a n a l y t i c a l and c r i t i c a l .

A r t i c l e s of any r e a l v a l u e t o t h e s t u d y a r e v e r y few.

Colonel

Rod P a s c h a l l ' s a r t i c l e i n C o n f l i c t (Volume 7,Number 2 , 1 9 8 7 ) , " S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s i n Korea" remains one of t h e most v a l u a b l e contributions. Shaun M. D a r r a u g h ' s a r t i c l e i n Army ( 3 4 , 11
The War of t h e Donkeys" d e a l s

November, 19841, "Hwanghae-do:

s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h FECOM p a r t i s a n e f f o r t and i s p a r t i c u l a r l y relavant t o the thesis questions. P u b l i s h e d secondary works s u p p o r t e d by a number of p e r t i n e n t o f f i c i a l primary s o u r c e s make up t h e b u l k of t h e l i t e r a t u r e upon which t h e s t u d y i s b u i l t .
I t i s more t h a n

s u f f i c i e n t t o d e a l w i t h t h e t h e s i s q u e s t i o n s a s long a s the

f o c u s remains a t t h e s t r a t e g i c l e v e l .

Given more time and

a c c e s s t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a r c h i v a l f i l e s , and a c c e s s t o t h e few key i n d i v i d u a l s from t h e e r a s t i l l a l i v e , a much more comprehensive and in-depth s t u d y c a n be conducted.

17

.CHAPTER 3

STRATEGY
International Arbitration does not differentiate between the source or origin of all wars, and their precipitating causes...Disputes or disagreements between nations, instead of being the source or cause of war, are nothing more than the first manifestations of approaching combat... To remove them by arbitration, or any other means, is at best but procrastination. Eomer Lea, 1909

This chapter examines the development of U.S.

strate-

gic objectives in Korea and how they changed during the con flict. It covers the development of U.S. national strategy

after World War 11, and examines its application in Korea prior to hostilities. Finally, it contrasts the special

operations objectives that guided the theater special operations organizations during the conflict.
A s will be shown in

chapters 4 and 5, strategic objectives significantly affected the eventual development of special operations forces in Korea and the operations they undertook. This chapter identifies

the strategic situation from which these organizations and their operations emerged.

18

U.S.

s t r a t e g y toward Korea d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f of

t h i s c e n t u r y , e v o l v e d from v i r t u a l i n d i f f e r e n c e u n t i l t h e 1943

C a i r o Conference, t o r e l u c t a n t involvement through t o t h e end of t h e Korean C o n f l i c t i n 1953.

P r i o r t o 1943, America saw

Korea a s r e l e v a n t o n l y t o t h e s t r u g g l e between R u s s i a , China, and J a p a n i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a . Following t h e d e f e a t o f t h e

J a p a n e s e i n 1945, t h e r e s u l t i n g power vacuum renewed t h e b a l a n c e o f power s t r u g g l e i n N o r t h e a s t Asia. Korea was, once

again, a p i v o t p o i n t , i n s p i t e of t h e A l l i e d d e c l a r a t i o n i n C a i r o t h a t a f f i r m e d a f r e e and independent Korean N a t i o n " i n due c o u r s e . The s i t u a t i o n i n A s i a p a r a l l e l e d t h a t i n

Europe a s t h e S o v i e t s c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r h o l d over t h e E a s t e r n European c o u n t r i e s . b r o a d , post-war

T h e U.S.

perceived i t s e l f confronting a For t h e

f r o n t o f world communist expansion.

f i r s t time, t h e U.S.

d e f i n e d g l o b a l d e f e n s e a g a i n s t communism Bow t h e U.S. policy

a s one o f i t s p r i m a r y s t r a t e g i c g o a l s .

makers i n t e r p r e t e d t h e communist t h r e a t d e t e r m i n e d t h e s t r a t e gy t h e c o u n t r y adopted.

I t was t h i s h i s t o r i c a l l y new p o l i c y

of g l o b a l d e f e n s e t h a t produced t h e postwar c o n t a i n m e n t s t r a t egy o f t h e Truman D o c t r i n e and NSC-68, t h e Korean C o n f l i c t i n 1950. and l e d t h e U.S. into

19

The foundation of the Truman Doctrine was George F. Kennan's containment ~ t r a t e g y . ~It formed the basis of U . S . foreign policy in the 1950's. It pursued national security

by carefully balancing international power, fears, and interests. It consisted of three stages: 1) restoring a stable

balance of power in the vacuums created by the defeats of Germany and Japan, and by the rapid expansion of Soviet influence, 2) attempting to create fragmentation within the communist movement, and 3) attempting to change the Soviet concept of international relations, i.e. to accept the via-

bility of peaceful coexistence in a diverse world as opposed to remaking it on the communist model.4 This approach

outlined a strategic effort on a broad front using economic, diplomatic, and military measures. The focus was on

the development of self-sufficient, strong, non-Communist nations, independently capable of withstanding Soviet infiltration and subversion. The primary means was U.S. Kennan's strategy to

diplomatic influence and economic aid.

counter Soviet expansion, in an environment of limited resources, was meant to eliminate the need for a large, prohibitively expensive U.S. military force capable of meeting Kennan hoped the

multiple threats worldwide simultaneously.

U.S.

could selectively apply its limited assets to a broad

20

f r o n t s t r a t e g y d e s i g n e d t o a c h i e v e t h e most economic, y e t ,

most e f f i c i e n t s o l u t i o n .
I n c o n t r a s t t o Kennan's approach, t h e P o l i c y P l a n n i n g S t a f f of t h e NSC under P a u l N i t z e , who r e p l a c e d Kennan a s d i r e c t o r i n 1949, produced NSC-68 i n 1 9 5 0 , a s a comprehensive s t a t e m e n t of U.S. containment s t r a t e g y f o r t h e 1 9 5 0 ' s . NSC-68

drew a worldwide p e r i m e t e r around communism, and viewed a t h r e a t anywhere a l o n g t h i s p e r i m e t e r a s a t h r e a t t o U.S i n t e r e s t s t h a t r e q u i r e d a U.S. c r e d i b l e t h r e a t of i t . m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s e , or t h e vital

I n s t e a d of g e n e r a t i n g a d d i t i o n a l means

t o e c o n o m i c a l l y d e f e n d these i n t e r e s t s , t h i s p o l i c y , i n e f f e c t ,
expanded U.S. commitments by d e f i n i n g them i n terms of per-

c e i v e d communist

threat^.^

A t the

same time, i t l i m i t e d t h e

U.S.

s t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s e t o communist e x p a n s i o n t o t h e m i l i t a r y
A s a r e s u l t , an emergency i n Korea, or anywhere e l s e

arena.

i n 1 9 5 0 , presumed a U.S.

m i l i t a r y response.

Unfortunately,

i t was t h e m i l i t a r y o p t i o n t h a t t h e U.S.

was l e a s t p r e p a r e d t o

e x e c u t e i n 1950. I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e a s o n s behind t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of U.S. m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y by 1950, i t i s n e c e s s a r y

t o review e v e n t s b e g i n n i n g p r i o r t o t h e end of World War 11. L a t e 1943 found t h e A l l i e s l o o k i n g ahead t o t h e d e f e a t of t h e

21

A x i s powers and t h e r e d e s i g n of t h e world b a l a n c e of power.

P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t was i n t e n t upon r a i s i n g t h e i s s u e of t r u s t e e s h i p f o r former c o l o n i a l n a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g Korea, w i t h a view toward e v e n t u a l independence. B r i t a i n , China and t h e

U.S.

issued a d e c l a r a t i o n during a conference i n Cairo t h a t

November a f f i r m i n g Chinese s o v e r e i g n t y over Formosa and Manchuria, and d e c l a r i n g t h a t Korea would become a f r e e and independent n a t i o n . 6
T h i s represented t h e f i r s t genuine

commitment by t h e A l l i e s t o Korea's post-war independence. Though a v o i d i n g s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o t r u s t e e s h i p , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s was always t h e A l l i e d i n t e n t .

Not u n t i l t h e

Y a l t a Conference i n F e b r u a r y , 1945 was a f o r m a l A l l i e d prop o s a l f o r a j o i n t t r u s t e e s h i p under A l l i e d ( B r i t i s h , Russian, Chinese and U.S.) c o n t r o l made.

S u s p i c i o u s of S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s a f t e r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o honor t h e Y a l t a agreements i n E a s t e r n Europe, Truman wanted t o assume a h a r d l i n e w i t h t h e S o v i e t s a f t e r h e became p r e s i d e n t

i n A p r i l , 1945.

However, when approving p l a n s f o r t h e invahad i n s u f f i c i e n t t r o o p s

s i o n of J a p a n , he found t h a t t h e U.S. t o occupy Korea.

Russian a s s i s t a n c e i n accepting t h e Japanese A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e War De-

s u r r e n d e r i n Korea was a n e c e s s i t y .

p a r t m e n t , G e n e r a l MacArthur and t h e J C S f e l t t h a t S o v i e t

22

c o n t r o l o f Manchuria and Korea was a post-war and commitment o f U . S .

inevitability,

f o r c e s t h e r e would o n l y p r o l o n g t h e

war.7

The S t a t e Department s t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e d , p r e d i c t i n g

S o v i e t d o m i n a t i o n of A s i a i f t h e U.S.

did not militarily 8 c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i c A s i a n a r e a s by t h e end of t h e war.

T r u s t e e s h i p a p p e a r e d t h e o n l y v i a b l e s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem w i t h o u t l o s i n g Korea t o t h e S o v i e t s . t h e t i m e was t h e a t o m i c bomb.

t h e U.S.

An unknown f a c t o r a t

I t opened a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t

c o u l d f o r c e a n e a r l y s u r r e n d e r of J a p a n and a v o i d

a n i n v a s i o n , e n a b l i n g a preemptive A l l i e d o c c u p a t i o n of Korea b e f o r e R u s s i a c o u l d r e a c t . The S o v i e t announcement t h a t

i t c o u l d n o t d e c l a r e war p r i o r t o August 1 5 , 1945 s u p p o r t e d

t h i s a s s u m p t i ~ n . ~I t a l s o c a u s e d t h e U.S.

t o d e l a y produco c c u p a t i o n of

t i o n of d e t a i l e d p l a n s f o r j o i n t Soviet-U.S. Korea.

The e x p l o s i o n o f a t o m i c bombs on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 , r e s p e c t i v e l y , l e d t o t h e e x p e c t e d e a r l y J a p a n e s e s u r r e n d e r i n August.

The U.S.

scheme f o r

occupying Korea, however, b a c k f i r e d b a d l y when t h e S o v i e t s d e c l a r e d war on J a p a n on August 8 , f o r c i n g t h e U.S. t o pro-

duce a j o i n t o c c u p a t i o n p l a n t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would a g r e e t o . l o A s S o v i e t t r o o p s poured i n t o Korea, t h e State-WarNavy-Coordinating Committee (SWNNC) produced G e n e r a l Order Number One l a t e on August 1 0 , d i v i d i n g Korea a t t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l . 11

23

The U.S.

t r a n s m i t t e d t h e p l a n t o Moscow on August 1 5 ,

where, a f t e r some a n x i o u s moments i n Washington, S t a l i n agreed t o a l l p r o v i s i o n s , including t h e concept of t r u s t e e s h i p . 12 L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l John R. Hodge, commander of t h e 2 4 t h Corps

on Okinawa, a r r i v e d a t Inchon w i t h t h e 7 t h D i v i s i o n on Septemb e r 8 , and a c c e p t e d t h e s u r r e n d e r of J a p a n e s e forces s o u t h of t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l from Governor G e n e r a l Nobuyuki Abe on S e p tember 9, 1945."

.-

G e n e r a l Bodge's immediate t a s k was t o and t h e S o v i e t s

m a i n t a i n o r d e r i n South Korea u n t i l t h e U.S.

d e v e l o p e d d e t a i l e d p l a n s f o r c r e a t i n g a Korean government. T h i s p l a n n i n g took place d u r i n g t h e Moscow Conference of December, 1945 which e s t a b l i s h e d a J o i n t U.S.-Soviet Com-

m i s s i o n " t o a s s i s t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a p r o v i s i o n a l Korean gove r n m en t

The Commission c o n s i s t e d of members of t h e

U.S.

and S o v i e t m i l i t a r y commands i n Korea.

The p a r t i c i p a t i o n

of Korean p a r t i e s i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e new government was t h e key U.S.-Soviet

p o i n t o f d i s a g r e e m e n t , and remained so The S o v i e t s r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e p a r t i c i p a -

throughout 1946.

t i o n of any p a r t y i n p u b l i c o p p o s i t i o n t o t r u s t e e s h i p , which,
. -.
..-

by l a t e 1945, was e v e r y o r g a n i z e d Korean p o l i t i c a l g r o u p i n

- . ..

existence.

However, communist o r g a n i z a t i o n s q u i c k l y r e v e r s e d

t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , and e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h e t r u s t e e -

24

ship plan.

T h i s i s s u e c a u s e d t h e c o m p l e t e breakdown of t a l k s Meanwhile, t h e S o v i e t s c o n s o l i d a t e d a s t r o n g ,

by l a t e 1946.

c e n t r a l government, and equipped and t r a i n e d a powerful army i n North Korea. By 1947, t h e U.S. r e a l i z e d progress toward a

u n i f i e d Korea was a t a s t a n d s t i l l and s o u g h t a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t h a t would e n a b l e a n h o n o r a b l e U.S. withdrawal.

: .i
: '

~..

Following t h e breakdown of J o i n t Commission t a l k s ,

a S t a t e Department p r o p o s a l recommended h o l d i n g e l e c t i o n s i n
t h e South and t u r n i n g t h e r e u n i f i . c a t i o n q u e s t i o n o v e r t o t h e

United Nations.

Approved by t h e S W N C C and t h e P o l i c y P l a n n i n g

S t a f f , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , George C. M a r s h a l l a d d r e s s e d t h e
U.N.

G e n e r a l Assembly i n September, 1947 and added t h e Korean

q u e s t i o n t o t h e agenda. On November 1 4 , 1947, t h e U.N. G e n e r a l Assembly

e s t a b l i s h e d t h e United N a t i o n s Temporary Commission on Korea

(UNTCOK)

t o s u p e r v i s e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

of a new government. l 5 T h e S o v i e t s r e j e c t e d t h e commission and d e n i e d i t p e r m i s s i o n t o p a s s n o r t h of t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , b l o c k i n g t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of North Korea i n any U.N. spon~...

sored general election.

-. . - ~

_.

-.

s o u t h i n May, 1948.

-'-'

-.--

- . . . . - .: . The-Synghman R h e e . f a c t i o n won a
..

UNTCOK organized e l e c t i o n s i n the . . .

... .

~.

l a n d s l i d e v i c t o r y , and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e R e p u b l i c of Korea

25

(ROK).

Foundation of t h e ROK i n J u l y , 1948 was q u i c k l y f o l -

lowed by t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n of t h e Democratic People's Republic

of Korea (DPRK) i n Pyongyang, by K i m 11-Sung.

c l a i m e d j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e e n t i r e p e n i n s u l a .

Both r e p u b l i c s

For Truman,

t h e ROK r e p r e s e n t e d a f o r e i g n p o l i c y s u c c e s s i n which t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s f u l l y s u p p o r t e d U.S. s t a g e f o r a n h o n o r a b l e U.S. objective. o b j e c t i v e s , and s e t t h e

withdrawal, t h e u l t i m a t e policy

By March, 1949, Truman approved NSC-8/2,

a defin-

i t i v e p l a n f o r U.S.
ROK.

s u p p o r t f o r , and disengagement from, t h e f o r c e s by June,

I t c a l l e d f o r t h e removal of a l l U.S.

1949.

Despite e f f o r t s by t h e ROK t o d e l a y t h i s timetable,

U . S .

troops d e p a r t e d Korea on J u n e 29, 1949.

UNCOK remained

i n Korea t o o b s e r v e t h e American d e p a r t u r e , and m a i n t a i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s e n c e t h e U.S.

DPRK a g g r e s s i o n .

sought as assurance against

Korea was supposed t o b e t h e U.S.

example t o Asian

n a t i o n s t h a t communist a g g r e s s i o n c o u l d be p r e v e n t e d w i t h o u t

a g u a r a n t e e of U.S.

m i l i t a r y support.

T h e communists viewed

t h e d e p a r t u r e a s a U.S.
. . . . . . . . .~.

d i s t a n c i n g i t s e l f from Korea.

Dean
. -

Acheson's c e l e b r a t e d N a t i o n a l Press C l u b speech i n J a n u a r y ,

. . . . 1950- followed c l o s e l y b y - - C o n g r e s s i o n a l - d ef. e a t o f t h e Korea

..

a i d b i l l f o r f i s c a l 1950 s u p p o r t e d t h i s impression.

Though

26

t h e a i d b i l l e v e n t u a l l y p a s s e d , i t c a u s e d much t u r m o i l i n t h e shaky, r e p r e s s i v e government o f Synghman Rhee, t r a n s m i t t i n g i n d i c a t i o n s of i n s t a b i l i t y t o t h e North. Rhee's s u p

p o r t e r s suffered major l o s s e s i n t h e n a t i o n a l assembly elec-

t i o n of May, 1950, and a prominent U.S.

senator publicly

s t a t e d t h a t l o s s of Formosa and Korea t o t h e communists was i n e v i t a b l e and c o u l d occur a t t h e S o v i e t s ' convenience. 1 8 These e v e n t s s u g g e s t e d t o t h e DPRK t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k i n g r e a t s t r e n g t h d e s i g n e d t o s h a t t e r t h e ROK

i n a brief campaign.
T h e North Korean a t t a c k on t h e ROK, on J u n e 25, 1950

was a d i r e c t c h a l l e n g e t o t h e Truman D o c t r i n e .

I t was a l s o

t h e f i r s t t e s t of t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s i n r e s o l v i n g h o s t i l i t i e s t h r o u g h a c o l l e c t i v e m i l i t a r y response.
The s w i f t n e s s of t h e i n i t i a l s t r i k e , and i t s r a p i d p r o g r e s s

n e c e s s i t a t e d a n e q u a l l y s w i f t answer.

G e n e r a l MacArthur went S e c u r i t y Coun-

a s f a r a s h i s a u t h o r i t y a l l o w e d , w h i l e t h e U.N.

c i l convened.

U.S.

i n f l u e n c e i n t h e Council coupled with t h e

c o n v e n i e n t a b s e n c e of t h e S o v i e t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e e n a b l e d t h e h a s t y p a s s a g e of r e s o l u t i o n s t h a t s a n c t i o n e d a c o l l e c t i v e U.N. m i l i t a r y response. l 9 The U.N. r e s o l u t i o n of June-27;--1950

.is i m p o r t a n t a s i t s a n c t i o n e d t h e i n i t i a l m i l i t a r y a c t i o n by
U.N.

f o r c e s . I t s f i n a l paragraph s t a t e d :

21

Recommends t h a t Members o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s f u r n i s h such a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e Republic of Korea a s may be n e c e s s a r y t o r e p e l t h e armed a t t a c k and t o r e s t 0 5 8 i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e and s e c u r i t y t o t h e area.
T h i s l a s t s e n t e n c e e n a b l e d U.N.

Command t o i n t e r p r e t what

c o n s t i t u t e d "...peace

and s e c u r i t y

..."a s b e i n g

anywhere a l o n g

a broad spectrum of s i t u a t i o n s from simple c e s s a t i o n o f

h o s t i l i t i e s i n p l a c e t o m i l i t a r y r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f Korea under t h e U.N. T h i s broad s t a t e m e n t c o n t r i b u t e d t o a s e r i e s of Command d u r i n g t h e f i r s t

s t r a t e g y s h i f t s on t h e p a r t o f U.N. y e a r o f t h e war.

FECOM s t r a t e g y i n Korea underwent f o u r major s h i f t s

during t h e c o n f l i c t .

I n t h e i n i t i a l p h a s e , U.N.

f o r c e s con-

d u c t e d a n a c t i v e d e f e n s e o n t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a u n t i l t h e y b u i l t up s u f f i c i e n t combat power t o i n i t i a t e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t ions. The o b j e c t i v e was r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e border a t t h e 38th

T h i s phase l a s t e d from J u n e 25 t o September 11,

parallel. 1950.

The second p h a s e began when t h e U.S.

and U.N.

sanc-

t i o n e d t h e c r o s s i n g o f t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l by U.N.

forces t o

c o n t i n u e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s and e f f e c t t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea under t h e Rhee government.

11 t o November 29, 1950.
T h i s l a s t e d from September

T h e t h i r d p h a s e began w i t h t h e

i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h e Communist Chinese and t h e d e f e a t of

28

E i g h t h Army and X Corps.

The U.N.

conducted r e t r o g r a d e

o p e r a t i o n s t o d e f e n s i b l e t e r r a i n t o save t h e f o r c e from d e c i -

sive defeat.

M a i n t a i n i n g a f o o t h o l d on t h e p e n i n s u l a and
U.N.

a v o i d i n g a n n i h i l a t i o n was t h e primary o b j e c t i v e .

Command

s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d e v a c u a t i o n t o J a p a n a s d e f e n s e of J a p a n

was t h e o v e r r i d i n g r e g i o n a l o b j e c t i v e .

T h i s phase covered t h e The f i n a l

p e r i o d from November 29, 1950 t o J a n u a r y 25, 1951.

p h a s e began w i t h t h e resumption of o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t h a t e v e n t u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d a l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e n o r t h of t h e 3 8 t h parallel. T h i s l i n e remained f a i r l y s t a t i c t h r o u g h o u t t h e The u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of t h e U.S.

remainder of t h e c o n f l i c t .

became a n e g o t i a t e d end t o h o s t i l i t i e s t h a t r e s t o r e d t h e prec o n f l i c t border. R e u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea by m i l i t a r y means strategy.

was no l o n g e r p a r t of U.N. The O.N.

r e s o l u t i o n of J u n e 27, 1950, i n i t i a t e d t h e s t r a t e g y t o r e s t o r e t h e 38th p a r a l l e l i n

f i r s t phase of U.S. Korea.

On J u n e 30, Truman a u t h o r i z e d t h e employment of a U.S.

On J u l y 5 , Task Force

r e g i m e n t a l combat team from Japan. Smith was t h e f i r s t U.S. Army (NKPA) f o r c e s .

u n i t t o engage North Korean P e o p l e ' s

On J u l y 7 , 1950, t h e S e c u r i t y Council Command under U.S.

p a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n c r e a t i n g t h e U.N.

ex-

e c u t i v e c o n t r o l . 21

ROK f o r c e s , though n o t members of t h e

29

U.N.,

were under E i g h t h Army c o n t r o l .

The U.S.

now had U.N.

s a n c t i o n and s u p p o r t t o u n d e r t a k e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s t o res t o r e t h e 38th p a r a l l e l . The U.N. Command's d e s p e r a t e , b u t

s u c c e s s f u l , d e f e n s e of t h e Pusan Perimeter through August, 1950 f o r c e d t h e NKPA p a s t i t s c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t . c e s s f u l U.N.

The s u c -

amphibious l a n d i n g a t Inchon i n September s h a t T h i s dramatic success l e d

t e r e d t h e e x i s t i n g NKPA s t r u c t u r e .

t h e Truman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o a s i g n i f i c a n t s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n , and i n i t i a t e d t h e second s t r a t e g i c phase. M i l i t a r y success' o f f e r e d t h e White House a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e s o l v e t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n problem permanently. informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e U.N. Advisors

r e s o l u t i o n s provided t h e Truman d i d n o t
As-

l e g a l b a s i s f o r a t t a c k i n g North Korea. 2 2

want t o widen t h e war t o i n v o l v e e i t h e r R u s s i a or China.

s u r e d t h a t Chinese or S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n was improbable, o n September 11, 1950, Truman approved N S C 81/1 g i v i n g MacArthur freedom t o pursue t h e NKPA n o r t h of t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , a s l o n g a s no Chinese or S o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n appeared. 23
U.N.

The

General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n of October 7 , f u r t h e r a u t h o r f o r c e s "...throughout Korea..." and

i z e d t h e o p e r a t i o n of U.N.

s p e c i f i c a l l y c a l l e d f o r t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea under U.N. auspices. 24

U.N.

f o r c e s moved r a p i d l y n o r t h t h r o u g h o u t Sep-

30

tember and October, 1950, d a n g e r o u s l y e x t e n d i n g t h e i r l i n e s of communications, r e f l e c t i n g t h e d e s i r e of t h e U.N. t o reach t he

Yalu R i v e r and end t h e war b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e y e a r .

In

t h i s atmosphere of a n t i c i p a t i o n , i t may have been e a s y f o r

FECOM t o c o n c l u d e t h a t C I A r e p o r t s of Chinese t r o o p c o n c e n t r a -

t i o n s a l o n g t h e b o r d e r were i s o l a t e d and u n c o r r o b o r a t e d .

The

i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d by Chinese p r i s o n e r s captured i n e a r l y November v a l i d a t e d FECOM's c o n c l u s i o n . 25

T h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of Chinese " v o l u n t e e r s " i n November

i n i t i a t e d t h e t h i r d s t r a t e g i c phase of t h e c o n f l i c t . marked a major U.S.

It

s h i f t i n s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n from m i l i t a r y

r e u n i f i c a t i o n t o m a i n t a i n i n g a f o o t h o l d i n Korea, and a v o i d i n g decisve defeat. Japan. The r e g i o n a l p r i o r i t y remained t h e d e f e n s e of f a c e a n en-

MacArthur r e p o r t e d t o t h e J C S t h a t "...We
B e saw a U.N.

t i r e l y new war. n 2 6

e v a c u a t i o n of Korea a s

d i s a s t r o u s t o t h e f u t u r e of J a p a n , Formosa and t h e P h i l i p pines. A d d i t i o n a l l y , MacArthur p e r s o n a l l y d e s i r e d r e t a l i a t i o n d e f e a t a t t h e hands of t h e Chinese. MacArthur saw

f o r t h e U.N.

t h e Chinese a t t a c k a s f o r m a l e n t r y i n t o t h e war, f u l l y opening

t h e mainland t o U.N.

attack.

H e f a v o r e d blockade,

strategic

bombing a n d u s e of N a t i o n a l i s t Chinese t r o o p s t o open second f r o n t a g a i n s t t h e communists.

T h e s e c o n c e r n s a r e key t o un-

31

d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t i n i t i a t e d t h e r i f t between MacArthur and Truman. 2 7 MacArthur's p r o p o s a l s f o r widening t h e war caused

r i s i n g c o n c e r n among t h e A l l i e s whose e n t h u s i a s m f o r t h e con28 f l i c t waned a f t e r Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n . The p o s s i b i l i t y of e v a c u a t i o n of Korea appeared a s a s t r a t e g i c o p t i o n i n l a t e November. 29 d e c l a r e d a n a t i o n a l emergency. On December 1 6 , Truman

His c o n c e r n a f t e r Chinese
f o r c e s while maintaining

i n t e r v e n t i o n was t h e s u r v i v a l of U.N.

a f o o t h o l d i n Korea and l i m i t i n g t h e c o n f l i c t t o t h e Korean peninsula. of t h e U.N.

T h i s i n v o l v e d a p u b l i c r e t r e a t from t h e o b j e c t i v e s

r e s o l u t i o n of October 7 , 1950. 3 0

By e a r l y Janu-

a r y , 1951, t h e c r i t e r i a t o b e g i n e v a c u a t i o n of Korea was when t h e U.N. Command was pushed back i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l Pusan P e r i The overwhelming pessimism s u r r o u n d i n g t h i s

meter a r e a .

p e r i o d i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e t o n e of M a c A r t h u r ' s correspondence t o t h e J C S . 31 However, t h e d e a t h of G e n e r a l Walker and a s -

sumption of command of E i g h t h Army by General Matthew B. Ridgway had a major impact on t h e conduct of o p e r a t i o n s , and u s h e r e d i n t h e f o u r t h s t r a t e g i c phase of t h e c o n f l i c t . J a n u a r y , 1951, marked t h e f i n a l s h i f t i n s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n for t h e U.S. and t h e U.N. Command. The s u r v i v a l of

h i s f o r c e s no l o n g e r t h r e a t e n e d , Ridgway undertook o f f e n -

32

s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t o r e s t o r e t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l and s e t t h e s t a g e for a negotiated settlement. By March, E i g h t h Army reoccupied

Seoul and i n A p r i l , i t reached t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , b a d l y mauli n g t h e Chinese f o r c e s e n r o u t e . R e o r i e n t i n g o p e r a t i o n s from

t e r r a i n o b j e c t i v e s t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of Chinese f o r c e s , G e n e r a l Ridgway i n i t i a t e d a n a t t r i t i o n s t r a t e g y i n E i g h t h Army w i t h " O p e r a t i o n KILLER." Coming s t r a i g h t from Washington

where h e was t h e Army Deputy Chief of S t a f f , Ridgway p r o b a b l y knew t h a t m i l i t a r y r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea was i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . 3 2 Re-

s t o r a t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l border w h i l e b r e a k i n g t h e enemy's
w i l l t o c o n t i n u e f i g h t i n g became Ridgway's primary emphasis.
A t t h i s p o i n t , G e n e r a l MacArthur's c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n o f f e n s i v e

o p e r a t i o n s t o r e u n i f y Korea came i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h Truman's d e s i r e t o seek a n e g o t i a t e d peace. Upstaging Truman's

imminent o f f e r t o t h e Chinese of s e t t l e m e n t t a l k s , MacArthur d e l i v e r e d an ultimatum t o t h e Chinese Army on March 2 4 , 1951 i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n t o Truman's i n t e n t i o n s , and s e t t h e s t a g e for h i s r e l i e f i n A p r i l . 33 B e t w e e n March 2 7 and A p r i l 1, U.N. forces forced the

communists back a c r o s s 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , and i n two w e e k s had s e c u r e d a l i n e s e v e r a l miles n o r t h of i t . D e v i a t i o n from

33

t h i s l i n e was minimal f o r t h e n e x t two y e a r s .

M i l i t a r y re-

u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea was no l o n g e r a n o b j e c t i v e of t h e U.N.

I t was d u r i n g t h e t h i r d and f o u r t h s t r a t e g i c p h a s e s of

t h e c o n f l i c t , t h a t o r g a n i z e d s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s w i t h i n Korea expanded. O r g a n i z a t i o n and e x p a n s i o n of p a r t i s a n f o r c e s ,

PSYOPS u n i t s , d i r e c t a c t i o n and r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u n i t s o c c u r r e d
b o t h i n FECOM and t h e C I A . U n t i l t h i s p o i n t FECOM l i m i t e d i t s
Its i n t e l l i g e n c e

s p e c i a l operations t o psychological warfare.

g a t h e r i n g a c t i v i t i e s were s t r i c t l y c o n v e n t i o n a l i n n a t u r e , . a n d l i m i t e d t o i n t e r r o g a t i o n of l i n e c r o s s e r s and r e f u g e e s , a e r i a l and ground r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , r e p o r t s from u n i t s i n c o n t a c t , and The s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e of

s h a r e d ROK Army i n t e l l i g e n c e . 3 4

i n t e r d i c t i n g t h e enemy r e a r a r e a d i d n o t appear i n FECOH p l a n n i n g u n t i l J a n u a r y , 1951. 3 5 The C I A m a i n t a i n e d i t s

p a s s i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s t h r o u g h o u t Asia a f t e r 1948. I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e c o n f l i c t i n Korea, i t

added c a p a b i l i t i e s d e s i g n e d t o a t t a c k communist t a r g e t s througho u t A s i a 36

The o v e r l a p p i n g s t r a t e g i c g u i d a n c e t h e y r e c e i v e d from

t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e h e a d q u a r t e r s , h i n d e r e d t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of
C I A and FECOM e f f o r t s i n Korea.

FECOM focused on h o s t i l i t i e s

i n s i d e Korea and c o u l d n o t conduct o p e r a t i o n s o u t s i d e of t h a t

34

geographic area.

I t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f

h o s t l i t i e s on t h e p e n i n s u l a , and s p e c i f i c a l l y p r e c l u d e d widening t h e c o n f l i c t . The C I A conducted i t s o p e r a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t

o f a n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e p o l i c y t h a t t r a n s c e n d e d FECOM's boundaries.
I t o p e r a t e d t h r o u g h o u t E a s t e r n Asia, w i t h v i r t u a l -

l y no g e o g r a p h i c or f u n c t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n . 37

Operating

under t h e a u t h o r i t y of NSC 10/2, C I A s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n r e f l e c t e d t h e n a t i o n a l view o f Korea a s a sideshow, and f o c u s e d on i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g , g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e , s a b o t a g e , and e s p i o n a g e i n China, R u s s i a , and I n d o c h i n a , a s w e l l a s Korea. 38
C I A o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea were o n l y p a r t o f t h e l a r g e r s t r a t e g i c

e f f o r t i n A s i a and beyond t h e purview and, hence, c o n t r o l of

FECOM. FECOM, w h i l e a t t e m p t i n g t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t r o l over t h e

C I A , f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h c l e a r s t r a t e g i c g o a l s f o r i t s own

special operations units.

FECOM p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e u n i t s

r e p o r t e d "a l a c k of l o g i c f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e war" a s a l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i n i t s o p e r a t i o n s . 39
FECOM developed p a r t i s a n f o r c e s t o c o n d u c t i n t e r d i c -

t i o n and a t t r i t i o n o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e enemy r e a r a r e a i n s u p p o r t of a n a n t i c i p a t e d U.N. o f f e n s i v e i n t o North Korea.

As

t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h i s e v e n t waned a n d d i s a p p e a r e d , FECOM

undertook no r e a p p r a i s a l of t h e g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s ' o b j e c t i v e s . 4 0

35

T h i s f a i l u r e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e o v e r a l l i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e
FECOM p a r t i s a n w a r f a r e program.

FECOM's own i n t e r n a l s t r a t e -

g i c u n c e r t a i n t y , and i t s s t r a t e g i c i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h t h e
C I A , doomed i t s attempts t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e special o p e r a t i o n s

e f f o r t i n Korea under i t s c o n t r o l .

The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f these

s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s and how t h e y were employed i n conj u n c t i o n w i t h t h e t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y w i l l be c o v e r e d i n C h a p t e r s

4 and 5 .
U.S.

s t r a t e g i c g o a l s i n Korea t r a n s i t i o n e d from r e s t o r -

a t i o n o f t h e 3 8 t h P a r a l l e l , t o m i l i t a r y r e u n i f i c a t i o n , t o pres e r v i n g t h e U.N. f o r c e s and a f o o t h o l d on t h e p e n i n s u l a , and

I t is i m p o r t a n t t o keep
T h e Truman

back t o r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e b o r d e r .

Korea i n p r o p e r p e r s p e c t i v e f o r t h i s t i m e p e r i o d .

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was s t r a t e g i c a l l y f o c u s e d on t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t i n Europe.
I t c o n s i d e r e d a communist t h r e a t t o J a p a n a

r e g i o n a l sideshow.

To t h e U.S.

Korea was always a sideshow

w i t h i n t h a t sideshow.

T h i s a t t i t u d e contributed t o the stra-

t e g i c s h i f t s t h a t took p l a c e i n Korea.

While containment of

t h e communist t h r e a t was c r i t i c a l , t h e U . S .

could n o t a f f o r d

t o widen a war i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a i t was i l l - p r e p a r e d t o f i g h t a t t h e expense of Europe.

T h e s e s h i f t i n g o b j e c t i v e s i l l u s t r a t e d t h e U . S . 's

d i f f i c u l t y i n assuming i t s new r o l e o f superpower and i t s un-

36

f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h l i m i t e d war.

The s h i f t s had a marked e f f e c t

The s t r a t e g i c

upon t h e f o r c e s a c t u a l l y c o n d u c t i n g t h e f i g h t .

c o n f u s i o n of 1950-51 had a r i p p l e e i f e c t upon t h e f i g h t i n g u n i t s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e FECOM special o p e r a t i o n s u n i t s , most of which were North Korean p a r t i s a n u n i t s s e e k i n g r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea. P o l i c y changes d e e p l y a f f e c t e d t h e i r s t r a t e g i c

effectiveness.

I n Korea, t h e U.S.

m i l i t a r y a t t e m p t e d , under

emergency c o n d i t i o n s t o r e l e a r n t h e lessons of t h e World War

I1 s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s .
Viet-Nam.

I t f o r g o t them a g a i n b e f o r e

As t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s show, l a c k of c o o r d i n a t e d

s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s robbed t h e s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s program i n Korea of d i r e c t i o n , c o o r d i n a t i o n , and coherence.

37

CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES 'Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance, (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 19421, 53. 'Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 9 4 3 United States: The Conferences g& Cairo and Tehran, 1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 404.

-_

3George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV, (July 1947), 566-582. 4John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 89-126. 51bid. 6FRUS: Cairo and Tehran, 404.

7Summer Welles __._.___ -~~~~ Dress conference comments. March 2 . 1942, FRUS, 1942, I, 864, quoted in James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Eonolulu: University of Hawaii PressT1985), 34.

---

8James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy & Korea, 1941-1950 (Eonolulu: University of Eawaii Press, 1951), 35. 'FRUS 1942, China, 738-739, quoted in James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 19851, 39-40. "Matray, 'IIbid. 46.

, 44.

l2Conference notes, November 30, 1943, FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, 566 quoted i n James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1 9 8 5 r 46.

38

131bid.,

50-53.

14Frank Baldwin, Without Parallel: The AmericanKorean Relationship Since 1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 75.

"Robert A . Lovett to Warren R. Austin, September 18, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 794-795 quoted in James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii PressT1985), 126.

16Matray, 148. 171bid., I8Ibid.,

U.S.

183-185. 221-235.

"Department of State, FRUS-1950 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 155. "Ibid., 'lIbid.,
I .

211. 329.

Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold S t o r y of the (New York: MacMillan, 1982), 234. 23FRUS-1950, 712-721. 241bid., 904-906.

LL

25Goulden, 287. 261bid., 382.

27James F. Schnabel, "Policy and Direction: The First Year." U.S. Army in the Korean War. (Washington D.C.: Government P r m n g O f f z e , 9 7 3 ) , 365-317. 28Martin Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back" In American Civil-Military Decisions, ed Harold Stein (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 19631,618. Goulden, 398. 29FRUS-1950, 211.

39

301bid., 1361. On December 4, 1950, during a meeting with Prime Minister Atlee (Britain), Truman first discussed objectives short of military reunification. It is important to remember here that the U . S . strategic focus is on Europe first and Japan second. Preserving forces to defend these areas are more important than Korea. The U.S. would evacuate its forces before it would accept a defeat in Korea. 31Goulden, 430-432, 4 41- 447. 321bid. 432, 459-462. 331bid. 478-482. Lichterman, 628-629. Schnabel, 365377. 34General Eeadquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, 0 erations of the Military Intelligence Section, GEQ SWPA FEC SCAP (Tokyo: Far East Command, 19511, 145-165.

+----

35Frederick W. Cleaver, and others, U.N. Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951-1954 (U) (Washington D.C.: The Johns Eopkins Kiversity/ORO-T-64 AFFE, 1956), 29-30.

36Goulden, 462-475. John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War 11, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1986), 6 1 7 8 , Leary, 124-126.

--

of the

37William R. Corsen, Armies of Ignorance: The Rise American Intelligence Empire p e w York: The Dial Press, 1977), 303-306.

38William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia, (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 1113-143, 156-168. Pr ados, 6 1-78

--

in the 39George S. Pettee, U.S. Psywar Operations Korean War (Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University/ORO-T-3 FEC, 1951), 15. 40~leaver, 10.

40

CEAPTER 4
ORGANIZATION

An e l i t e g r o u p h a s always appeared w i t h i n t h e Army d u r i n g e v e r y war i n which t h e United S t a t e s h a s been engaged. ..As s u r e l y a s such g r o u p s a r o s e , t h e r e a r o s e a l s o t h e g r i e v a n c e s of t h e normally c o n s e r v a t i v e m i l i t a r y men who r e j e c t e d whatever was d i s t i n c t i v e or d i f f e r e n t or s p e c i a l .
COL F r a n c i s J. K e l l y

1973

T h i s c h a p t e r examines t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of U.S. o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s (SOF) i n Korea from 1950 t o 1953.

special I t s pur-

pose i s t o a n a l y z e how s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s a f f e c t e d t h e development and c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e SOF t h a t o p e r a t e d i n Korea during the c o n f l i c t . I n i t i a l l y , t h e h i s t o r y of t h e develop-

ment of U . S .

SOF h i g h l i g h t s c e r t a i n b u r e a u c r a t i c and o r g a n i z a -

t i o n a l problems t h a t o r i g i n a t e d i n t h e World War I1 and p o s t -

war p e r i o d , and t h a t r e s u r f a c e d t o a f f e c t t h e development of

SOF d u r i n g t h e Korean C o n f l i c t .

Next, the CIA organization

t h a t o p e r a t e d i n Korea i s examined a g a i n s t i t s s t r a t e g i c f o c u s

as o u t l i n e d i n NSC 4 / A and 10/2.'

Finally, t h e organization

of FECOM's o r g a n i c SOF i n Korea i s examined a g a i n s t t h e f o u r s t r a t e g i c p h a s e s of t h e Korean C o n f l i c t covered i n Chapter 3 .

41

FECOM c r e a t e d s e v e r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o c o o r d i n a t e a l l

special o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea, y e t t h e C I A remained autonomous

of FECOM c o n t r o l t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n f l i c t . The p r i m a r y r e a s o n

was t h a t t h e C I A pursued a broad n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e p o l i c y

under NSC c h a r t e r t h a t encompassed f u n c t i o n a l and g e o g r a p h i c

areas t h a t were beyond t h e purview of FECOM.

FECOM's a r e a of

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was l i m i t e d t o t h e Korean p e n i n s u l a and w i t h i n one y e a r s ' t i m e pursued s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s t h a t changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y f o u r times. The s t r a t e g y t h a t i n i t i a t e d t h e

c r e a t i o n and o r g a n i z a t i o n of i t s g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s , changed by t h e time t h e y were ready t o b e g i n o p e r a t i o n s .

Within the

f o u r p h a s e s t r a t e g i c framework of t h e c o n f l i c t c o n s t r u c t e d

i n Chapter 3, FECOM s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s o n l y became

a v a i l a b l e a t t h e end of t h e t h i r d and t h r o u g h o u t t h e f o u r t h phase when s t a l e m a t e was t h e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n . Once

c r e a t e d , t h e p u r p o s e of these f o r c e s were n o t r e a p p r a i s e d and

t h e i n i t i a l s t r a t e g i c g u i d a n c e t h e y r e c e i v e d i n e a r l y 1951

guided t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s through 1953.

These o p e r a t i o n s , a s

w e l l a s t h o s e of t h e C I A a r e t h e theme of Chapter 5.
T h e f i r s t , t r u e U.S.

special operations capability

began w i t h t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e O f f i c e o f S t r a t e g i c S e r v i c e s
(OSS)

on J u n e 1 3 , 1 9 4 2 .

I t s a r c h i t e c t , and o n l y d i r e c t o r was

W i l l i a m J. D ~ n o v a n . ~ Two y e a r s p r i o r , i n 1 9 4 0 , P r e s i d e n t

42

R o o s e v e l t s e n t Donovan t o c o n d u c t a s e r i e s of s e n s i t i v e meeti n g s w i t h t h e B r i t i s h government.

E i s p r i m a r y m i s s i o n was

t o become i n t i m a t e l y f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e British intelligence services, specifically the Special O p e r a t i o n s E x e c u t i v e (SOE), and t h e S e c r e t I n t e l l i g e n c e Serv i c e (SIS), w i t h a view toward c r e a t i n g s i m i l a r c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h i n t h e U.S. go~ernment.~ T h i s e x p e r i e n c e exposed Donovan

t o a g e n c i e s o r g a n i z e d t o p r o v i d e a broad spectrum of s e r v i c e s t h a t included psychological operations, d i r e c t a c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s , g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e , and d e e p r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , a l l were c o o r d i n a t e d t o s u p p o r t c o n v e n t i o n a l theater operations. With a mental b l u e p r i n t f o r a s i m i l a r

American o r g a n i z a t i o n , and t h e e n t h u s i a s t i c s u p p o r t of P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t , Donovan o r g a n i z e d t h e OSS i n 1 9 4 2 , under t h e newly created J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f (JCS).5

OSS remained

a " c i v i l i a n " government agency i n t h a t most of i t s o p e r a t i o n s

f e l l o u t s i d e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l laws of war.

OSS's c l a n d e s t i n e a c t i v i t i e s p r e c l u d e d a g e n t s ' a b i l i t y t o
c l a i m combatant s t a t u s i n t h e e v e n t of c a p t u r e .
T h i s neces-

s a r i l y p r o h i b i t e d i t s c o n t r o l by c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y t h e a t e r commands.
I t s s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s were determined a t n a t i o n a l

l e v e l and beyond t h e purview of t h e m i l i t a r y t h e a t e r commanders.6

T h i s i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c was d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e

43

t o t h e C I A i n 1950 i n E a s t Asia.

T h i s l a c k of c o n t r o l by t h e

t h e a t e r commander, of a c i v i l i a n agency c o n d u c t i n g c l a n d e s t i n e , paramilitary operations within t h e t h e a t e r could not help but b r e e d m i s t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y .

Despite i t s remarkable accomplishments d u r i n g t h e war, t h i s m i s t r u s t c h r a c t e r i z e d t h e U.S.

m i l i t a r y ' s view of

t h e OSS, and l e d t o b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e war. Because of Donovan's d i r e c t

a c c e s s channel t o t h e P r e s i d e n t, Roosevelt c o n s i s t e n t l y aided t h e OSS i n m a i n t a i n i n g i t s b u r e a c r a t i c and o p e r a t i o n a l freedom of a c t i o n . ' P r e s i d e n t Harry S. Truman was n o t of

l i k e mind, and f o l l o w i n g t h e war, h e d i s s o l v e d OSS on October

1, 1945.'

Donovan r e t i r e d , and t h e OSS s e c r e t i n t e l l i g e n c e

and special o p e r a t i o n s f u n c t i o n s t r a n f e r r e d t o t h e War Department S t r a t e g i c S e r v i c e s U n i t (SSU), "a c a r e t a k e r body formed

t o p r e s i d e over t h e l i q u i d a t i o n of t h e OSS e s p i o n a g e network. "9

Truman t r a n s f e r r e d r e s e a r c h and a n a l y s i s f u n c t i o n s t o t h e S t a t e Department. Highly t r a i n e d e x p e r t s d r i f t e d away w i t h l i t t l e

e f f o r t t o r e t a i n or r e c o r d any OSS h i s t o r y or o p e r a t i o n a l procedur es.

''

However, a few key members of t h e remarkably

t a l e n t e d g r o u p of p e o p l e t h a t made up t h e OSS provided a valua b l e r e p o s i t o r y of e x p e r i e n c e t o draw upon for l e a d e r s h i p w h e n Congress c r e a t e d t h e C I A .

44

OSS

was the first and last U.S.

agency organized with

OSS

an exclusive and complete charter for special operations. operated under the JCS, when the JCS performed most of the current NSC function, but maintained direct access to the President.

It represented a merging of civilian and military

capabilities that would never be duplicated. With the creation of the OSS, a government organization assumed, for the first time, operational responsibility in a field. ..ignored and scorned by.many diplomats and military professionals. 11 This event was significant for two reasons: 1) it was the only unified special operations command in U.S. history. (The present day USSOCOM created by Congress through the DOD Reorganization Act will never encompass CIA operations thereby never becoming completly unified.) and 2 ) the U.S. government authorized the creation of an agency chartered to conduct activities that were clearly outside the boundaries of its own national laws and those of the international community. Military commanders o r political leaders linked to these activities jeopardize not only their careers, but the organizations and nations they represent. Public exposure

could result in the fall of a government and corresponding worldwide loss of national prestige and credibility, threaten theater relations with Allies, and cause deterioration of the

45

t r e a t m e n t of m i l i t a r y p r i s o n e r s .

M i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l

l e a d e r s d i d n o t look f a v o r a b l y upon these a c t i v i t i e s and agenc i e s f o r l o g i c a l , r e a l i s t i c reasons; not i r r a t i o n a l i t y , jealousy or s t u p i d i t y . I n most i n s t a n c e s , s p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s r e -

p r e s e n t a g r a v e n a t i o n a l r i s k , and r e q u i r e d i r e c t Presidential authorization. P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t d e c i d e d t h e y were n e c e s s a r y d u r i n g

World War 11.

P r e s i d e n t Truman d i d n o t , a t l e a s t , immediately The r e a l i t i e s of t h e "Cold War" changed h i s A g a i n s t communist

f o l l o w i n g t h e war.

mind r e s u l t i n g i n t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e C I A .

a d v e r s a r i e s whose i d e o l o g y s a n c t i o n e d a l l a c t i v i t i e s , Truman

saw t h a t U.S.

r e s t r a i n t o n l y s e r v e d t h e communist c a u s e .

The

grave r e s p o s i b i l i t y f o r s u c h o p e r a t i o n s n e c e s s a r i l y l a y a t

P r e s i d e n t i a l l e v e l , and, a s a r e s u l t p r e c l u d e d c o n t r o l by any
lower governmental l e v e l . Following t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e OSS i n October, 1945, t h e myriad of i n t e l l i g e n c e r e q u i r e m e n t s g e n e r a t e d by t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h S o v i e t s , caused P r e s i d e n t Truman t o c e n t r a l i z e U.S. c o v e r t c a p a b i l i t i e s by c r e a t i n g t h e

C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Group ( C I G ) on J a n u a r y 22, 1946 under t h e War Department. l 2 I n 1 9 4 7 , t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A c t c r e a t e d t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency ( C I A ) a s a s e p a r a t e governmental agency. Also c r e a t e d was t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y

46

Council (NSC) which p l a y e d a major r o l e i n t h e c o n t r o l of t h e

CIA.

The N S C r e p l a c e d t h e J C S . a s t h e p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r y
A t t h i s point t h e

agency w i t h d i r e c t access t o t h e P r e s i d e n t .

JCS l o s t i t s a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l C I A o p e r a t i o n s .

The scope of

J C S r e s p o n s i b i l i t y narrowed t o s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y m a t t e r s ,

w h i l e t h e NSC covered t h e f u l l spectrum of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y , f o r e i g n and domestic.

I n l a t e 1947 and 1948 t h e NSC c o d i f i e d

The former gave t h e

two major d e c i s i o n s : NSC 4/A and 10/2.

C I A r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o v e r t p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s and

t h e l a t t e r broadened t h e s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o i n c l u d e a l l covert operations, t o include preventitive d i r e c t action, p o l i t i c a l , economic, and p a r a m i l i t a r y w a r f a r e . l 3

AS

s e p a r a t e government agency, t h e C I A undertook t h e s e respons i b i l i t i e s under t h e s t r a t e g i c g u i d a n c e of t h e Truman D o c t r i n e , and l a t e r NSC-68. To conduct t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s , t h e C I A formed Headed by Frank Wisner,

t h e O f f i c e of P o l i c y C o o r d i n a t i o n ( O P C ) .

a h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l former OSS o p e r a t i v e i n Europe, i t r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t o t a l U.S. 14 through 1950. c o v e r t o p e r a t i o n s c a p a b i l i t y from 1948

J u s t p r i o r t o h o s t i l i t i e s , i n May, 1950, t h e C I A D i r e c t o r of Far E a s t O p e r a t i o n s , Colonel Richard G.

Stilwell,

succeeded, w i t h d i f f i c u l t y , i n g a i n i n g G e n e r a l MacArthur's a p p r o v a l f o r t h e CIA/OPC o p e r a t i o n i n Japan.

. .

The

47

suspicion of FECOM for the CIA can be attributed to the historic mistrust of MacArthur for OSS-type organizations operating in his theater, but not under his control. The Allied

Intelligence Bureau (AIB) under MacArthur's direction in World War I1 conducted clandestine operations throughout the Southwest Pacific that duplicated those of the OSS in Europe. The difference was that special operations other than psychological operations were run primarily by the Australians in a small agency known as the Inter Allied Services Departmentment (ISD). The AIB focus was intelligence gathering,

not special activities, and completely under MacArthur's control. l6 Be had no need of OSS, partly because he had

his own clandestine capability, and partly because OSS answered to General Marshall, not MacArthur. In Korea, this situation was

recreated except that MacArthur no longer had the AIB or any other duplicate capability to hold out the CIA. By NSC charter,

CIA conducted worldwide special activities, and operated routinely in Russia, China and elsewhere in the Far East. These areas were clearly outside of FECOM authority and precluded the superior-subordinate relationship MacArthur sought to establish, severely inhibiting operational coordination.

I n 1950, t h e C I A , f u n c t i o n e d through two s u b o r d i n a t e

o r g a n i z a t i o n s : t h e O f f i c e of S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s (OSO) and t h e O f f i c e of P o l i c y C o o r d i n a t i o n ( O P C ) .
OSO was r e s p o n s i b l e

for passive i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering a c t i v i t i e s , i.e.

espionage/

c o u n t e r e s p i o n a g e o p e r a t i o n s . OPC was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l co-

v e r t a c t i v i t i e s a u t h o r i z e d by NSC 4/A and 10/2 i n c l u d i n g

p r e v e n t i t i v e d i r e c t a c t i o n , g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s , and subvers i o n a g a i n s t h o s t i l e s t a t e s . l 7 I n 1952, t h e s e two o r g a n i z a t i o n s merged t o form t h e D i r e c t o r a t e of P l a n s w i t h Wisner a s D i r e c t o r . l8 Under Wisner, was C o l o n e l S t i l w e l l

a s d i r e c t o r of Far E a s t o p e r a t i o n s , who e s t a b l i s h e d a Far

E a s t OPC element i n J a p a n under t h e c o n t r o l of Hans V. T o f t e ,

i n J u l y , 1950 ( F i g . 4 - 1 ) .

T o f t e was, l i k e W i s n e r and S t i l w e l l ,

a former OSS o p e r a t i v e , w i t h e x p e r i e n c e i n Manchuria and North Korea. The u n d i s g u i s e d m i s t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n of t h e

C I A by G e n e r a l MacArthur's h e a d q u a r t e r s , took on a p e r s o n a l

dimension between T o f t e and G e n e r a l C h a r l e s A. Willoughby, t h e FECOM G-2. 2 o T h i s p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t , however, l a s t e d

o n l y u n t i l May, 1951, and t h e d e p a r t u r e of MacArthur and willoughby, and d i d l i t t l e t o i n h i b i t t h e growth of T o f t e ' s agency. The C I A was r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e FECOM S p e c i a l S t a f f
TO

by t h e Documents Research D i v i s i o n ( D R D ) . 2 2

specifically

c o n t r o l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea, C I A e s t a b l i s h e d t h e J o i n t A c t i v i t i e s Commission, Korea ( J A C K ) .

J A C K was p a r t of

49

CENTRAL
(SMITH

WTEUGENC E
AGENCY

OFFICE OF
(WSNER)

OFFlCE OF

POLICY. CWRDINATION
~

SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

(TOFTE)

OPT, JAPAN

F i g . 4-1

C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1 9 4 8 2 3

50

a n o t h e r FECOM agency, t h e Combined Command f o r Reconnaiss a n c e A c t i v i t i e s , Korea (CCRAK), which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r (Pig. 4-2). Throughout t h e c o n f l i c t , t h e s e a g e n c i e s Though i t s o p e r a t i o n s

remained autonomous from FECOM.

e x t e n d e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e Far E a s t , C I A i n t e r e s t s i n Korea from l a t e 1950 onward, c e n t e r e d around g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s , i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g and e s t a b l i s h i n g a v i a b l e e s c a p e and e v a s i o n ( E & E ) a g e n t network f o r r e c o v e r y o f downed A i r Force fliers. By e a r l y 1951, T o f t e e s t a b l i s h e d a h e a d q u a r t e r s n e a r
H i s s t a f f in-

A t s u g i A i r Force Base, j u s t s o u t h o f Tokyo. 2 4

c l u d e d members o f a l l t h e m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s on " d e t a c h e d d u t y " , making i t e a s i e r t o access m i l i t a r y assets i f needed, and t o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g c a d r e f o r C I A g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s , and E & E b r i e f i n g teams. E v e n t u a l l y , t h e C I A employed a f o r c e o f o v e r m i l i t a r y c a d r e on

1,200 Korean g u e r r i l l a s , t r a i n e d by U.S. Yong-do I s l a n d , i n Pusan Bay. 2 5

G u e r r i l l a l e a d e r s received

s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g a t s i t e s near C I A / O P C h e a d q u a r t e r s i n Chigas a k i , Japan. Although t h e C I A , t h e o r e t i c a l l y , c o o r d i n a t e d

Air Force s u p p o r t through FECOM, T o f t e r e g u l a r l y u t i l i z e d

a s s e t s of t h e C i v i l A i r T r a n s p o r t (CAT) o r g a n i z a t i o n .

CAT was

a c i v i l i a n commercial a i r l i n e u t i l i z e d by t h e C I A t h r o u g h o u t
Asia.

Made up of v e t e r a n s of G e n e r a l C l a i r e C h e n n a u l t ' s

" F l y i n g T i g e r s " o f World War 11, t h e y were among t h e most c a p a b l e and d a r i n g f l y e r s a v a i l a b l e . 26 Tofte a l s o created

51

w
CINC,

Fig. 4-2

CIA-FECOM Special Operations Relationship, 1951

27

52

two s e p a r a t e i n d i g e n o u s f i s h i n g f l e e t s a s c o v e r f o r C I A o p e r a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t Korea. 28
T h e s e f l e e t s were a c o l l e c t -

i o n o f Korean j u n k s and f i s h i n g b o a t s manned by h i r e d Korean f i s h e r m e n who conducted a bona f i d e f i s h i n g b u s i n e s s f o r a market p r o f i t . Agents o p e r a t e d w i t h i n t h e f l e e t , u s i n g i t s

o p e r a t i o n s a s a c o v e r for m i s s i o n s above t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l i n Korea, or e l s e w h e r e i n Asia.

C I A was w e l l funded, w e l l

o r g a n i z e d and d i v e r s i f i e d i n i t s s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s c a p a b i l i -

ties.

Though t e c h n i c a l l y p a r t o f t h e FECOM s p e c i a l s t a f f a s

the'Documents Research D i v i s i o n , i t s i n s t r u c t i o n s came from

C I A h e a d q u a r t e r s i n Washington, through t h e d i r e c t o r of Far

East o p e r a t i o n s .

DRD t h e n p r o v i d e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t o i t s

o p e r a t i n g a g e n t s through J A C K , f o r C I A o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea. 2 9
C I A p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e FECOM s t a f f was p r o b a b l y more f o r t h e

purpose of s t a y i n g informed o f FECOM o p e r a t i o n s t h a n a n y t h i n g

else.

The b u r e a u c r a t i c a n i m o s i t y between FECOM and t h e C I A

A

q u i e t e d f o l l o w i n g t h e Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n i n l a t e 1 9 5 0 .

v i s i t t o MacArthur by G e n e r a l Walter B e d a l l Smith, t h e newly a p p o i n t e d C I A D i r e c t o r , i n J a n u a r y , 1951, marked t h e a l m o s t t o t a l c e s s a t i o n of a t t e m p t s by FECOM t o assume c o n t r o l of C I A o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e ~ o n f l i c t . ~ ' MacArthur's i n t e l l i g e n c e f a i l u r e i n l i g h t of a C I A r e p o r t t h a t warned of
t h e Chinese b u i l d u p , coupled w i t h t h e appointment of Smith,

s p e l l e d t h e end of t h e FECOM i n t e l l i g e n c e dominance i n t h e

53

Far East.

MacArthur's departure in April, and Willoughby's

in May, completed this cycle of events. This did not usher in a new CIA monopoly, however. Military special operations were

under way by this time and continued throughout the conflict. It did establish the CIA'S autonomy in the Far East for the remainder of the conflict. CIA growth continued unimpeded.

Both Generals Ridgway and Clark supported this autonomy undoubtedly understanding the world wide scope of the CIA mi ssion. Apart from the OSS, the Army created and employed its own psychological warfare capability during World War 11. 31 The first real attempt at creating a capability

did not occur until 1941, when Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy, pushed the Army staff into creating the Psychologic Branch in the War Department G-2 on June 25, 1941. 3 2 The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) appeared in 1942, ostensibly to plan psychological warfare operations directed against the enemy. 3 3 Due to continual bureau-

cratic in-fighting, primarily resulting from resentment of the OSS by the military departments, the JCS dissolved the JPWC and the Psychologic Branch in 1942, and OSS became solely responsible for the psychological warfare program. 3 4 This

resulted in the dissolution of all remaining redundant agencies

54

w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y departments.

T h i s assumption of t h e psy-

c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e f u n c t i o n by t h e OSS c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e growi n g b u r e a u c r a t i c a n i m o s i t y between OSS and t h e m i l i t a r y d e p a r t -

ments t h r o u g h o u t t h e war, and r e s u r f a c e d d u r i n g t h e Korean

C o n f l i c t . 35 The u s e of o r g a n i c p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e u n i t s by t h e a t e r commanders d u r i n g World War 11, was u n a f f e c t e d by t h e s e e v e n t s and h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l . The l a r g e s t was t h e

P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare Branch a t A l l i e d F o r c e s H e a d q u a r t e r s

i n North A f r i c a .

T h i s l a t e r became t h e P s y c h o l o g i c a l

Warfare D i v i s i o n of t h e Supreme H e a d q u a r t e r s , A l l i e d Expedit i o n a r y F o r c e s (PWD/SHAEF) under B r i g a d i e r General Robert A. McClur e. 36 Under McClure, PWD s u c c e s s f u l l y j o i n e d t h e e f -

f o r t s of t h e Army, t h e OSS, t h e O f f i c e of War I n f o r m a t i o n

(OWI)

, the

P o l i t i c a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Department of t h e B r i t i s h

F o r e i g n O f f i c e and t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n i n Europe, c r e a t i n g a t r u l y c o o r d i n a t e d s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t y . 3 1

I n the P a c i f i c t h e a t e r , psychological operations i n

MacArthur's Southwestern P a c i f i c Area/Far E a s t e r n Command (SWPA/FEC) was conducted by t h e Far E a s t e r n L i a i s o n O f f i c e
( F E L O ) , an A u s t r a l i a n agency under t h e A l l i e d I n t e l l i g e n c e

Bureau ( A I B ) which c o n t r o l l e d a l l c l a n d e s t i n e a c t i v i t i e s i n the theater. Formed i n J u n e , 1 9 4 2 , FELO p r i m a r i l y conducted

55

l e a f l e t d r o p s and r a d i o b r o a d c a s t s up u n t i l t h e SWPA/FEC
a s s a u l t upon t h e P h i l i p p i n e s .

I n J u n e , 1 9 4 4 , MacArthur

formed t h e P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare Branch (PWB), a p r i m a r i l y American u n i t , under FELO.

I t focused on l e a f l e t d r o p s ,

a r t i l l e r y d e l i v e r e d l e a f l e t s , newspaper d r o p s and r a d i o broad-

c a s t s t o t h e P h i l i p p i n e s and, l a t e r , Japan.

An A l l i e d e f f o r t

from t h e b e g i n n i n g , SWPA/FEC enjoyed g r e a t success from FELO/ PWB o p e r a t i o n s a s p r i s o n e r i n t e r r o g a t i o n s a t t e s t e d . 3%

A s a r e s u l t of t h e s u c c e s s of s u c h e f f o r t s , t h e

need f o r a n o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e War Department r e s u r f a c e d , r e s u l t i n g i n t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e Propaganda Branch, G-2, November 1 2 , 1943. 39

T h i s branch s u r v i v e d t h e post-war

on

d e m o b i l i z a t i o n and was i n e x i s t e n c e when h o s t i l i t i e s broke o u t i n Korea, making t h e d i f f i c u l t t a s k of r e s t o r i n g t h e Department of t h e Army l e v e l s t a f f agency easier. ganda Branch moved t o t h e P o l i c y S e c t i o n of G-3,
The PropaP a n s and

O p e r a t i o n s , i n November, 1946, t r a n s f e r r i n g t o t h e G-3, s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r psychological operations. 40

Stil

re-

merely

a p l a n n i n g s t a f f , no r e a l c a p a b i l i t y e x i s t e d u n t i l J u n e , 1 9 4 7 , when t h e Army a c t i v a t e d i t s f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l u n i t s i n c e t h e war, t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l T a c t i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n Detachment. Con-

s i s t i n g of a t o t a l of 2 0 p e r s o n n e l , i t s loudspeaker and l e a f l e t

teams p a r t i c i p a t e d i n Army t r a i n i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e U.S.

over

56

the next three years. 41

In the wake of hostilities in Korea,

the Army created the Psychological Warfare Division within the Special Staff with General McClure as director. Within four

months, McClure expanded his organization's responsibilities to encompass all psychological warfare, cover and deception operations, and guerrilla warfare, becoming the Office of the Chief

of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) on January 15, 1951.

Its three

subdivisions, Psychological Operations, Requirements, and Special Operations, created a coordinated special operations agency at Department of the Army level for the first time. 4 2 McClure hoped that the staff organization at DA level would be the model for the theater level organizations. was disappointed. The OCPW exercised no formal organizational or supervisory control over the psychological warfare organizations within FECOM. Eowever, beginning in early 1951, General McClure In Korea, he

aggressively pursued a campaign to induce FECOM to organize its special operations capabilities simililarly to the model established by OCPW. 43 Eis purpose regarding FECOM was four-

fold: 1) to establish psychological operations under a separate staff section, 2) to transfer unconventional warfare operations from G-2 control t o this new staff section's control, 3 ) to create a separate a i r section, dedicated to aerial psywar under

57

t h e psywar s e c t i o n , and 4 ) t o p l a c e C I A o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea under FECOM o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . 4 4 S e c r e t a r y of t h e Army Frank

An e n t h u s i a s t i c supporter

Pace, J r . a i d e d h i m i n t h i s e f f o r t .

of p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e , S e c r e t a r y Pace j o i n e d G e n e r a l McClure

i n t h e e f f o r t t o i n f l u e n c e t h e s i t u a t i o n i n FECOM.

General

Ridgway r e c e i v e d Pace's d e t a i l e d memoranda f a v o r a b l y and i n J u n e , 1951 c r e a t e d t h e P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare S e c t i o n a s a s e p a r a t e special s t a f f section. 45 However, FECOM s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d

McClure's e f f o r t s t o i n c l u d e u n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e under t h e
psywar s t a f f s e c t i o n , t o c r e a t e a d e d i c a t e d psywar a i r s e c t i o n , and a f t e r A p r i l , 1951, s u p p o r t e d C I A ' S p o s i t i o n t h a t i t maint a i n i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e g r i t y and o p e r a t i o n a l independence. G e n e r a l McClure remained c r i t i c a l of t h e FECOM g u e r r i l l a warf a r e program r e s u l t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n f l i c t n o t i n g a l a c k of organizational coordination. Both Gener a 1 Ridgway and

l a t e r , G e n e r a l C l a r k s u p p o r t e d C I A autonomy i n t h e Far E a s t .
OCPW had no f o r m a l c o n t r o l over s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea.

However, p r i m a r i l y through t h e a g g r e s s i v e p e r s o n a l i t y of G e n e r a l McClure, i t i n f l u e n c e d t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and conduct of p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea.

T h e P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare Branch was p a r t of t h e

M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n of FECOM a t t h e o u t break of h o s t i l i t i e s . C o n s i s t i n g of a h a n d f u l of o f f i c e r s and

..

5a

men, i t conducted t h e f i r s t l e a f l e t d r o p on North Korean f o r c e s on J u n e 29, 1950.

T h i s e l e m e n t r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t o t a l FECOM

special o p e r a t i o n s e f f o r t d u r i n g t h e f i r s t and second s t r a t e g i c

p h a s e s of t h e c o n f l i c t .
I t w a s n o t u n t i l November, 1950 t h a t t h e f i r s t psycho-

l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s u n i t t o conduct m i s s i o n s i n Korea, t h e T a c t i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n Detachment from F o r t R i l e y , a r r i v e d i n Korea. R e s p o n s i b l e f o r t a c t i c a l l e v e l propaganda, i t w a s r e d e s i g n a t e d t h e 1st Loudspeaker and L e a f l e t Company and a s s i g n e d

t o t h e P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare Branch, G-2,

t i c a l operations. 47

FECOM t o b e g i n t a c -

FECOM r e a s s i g n e d t h e 1st Loudspeaker and

L e a f l e t Company t o E i g h t h Army upon c r e a t i o n of t h e Psychol o g i c a l Warfare D i v i s i o n (PWO) i n t h e EUSAK G-3 i n J a n u a r y , 1951 ( F i g . 4 - 3 ) . T h e , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare S e c t i o n , FECOM,

c r e a t e d i n J u n e , 1951 was a s p e c i a l s t a f f s e c t i o n of t h e General H e a d q u a r t e r s , and focused on t h e a t e r - l e v e l , o p e r a t i o n s . ( F i g . 4-4) 4 8 strategic

Not u n t i l t h e a r r i v a l of t h e 1st

Radio B r o a d c a s t i n g and L e a f l e t Group from F o r t R i l e y i n August, 1951, d i d f u l l - s c a l e s t r a t e g i c o p e r a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e .

This u n i t

had t h e c a p a b i l i t y for l a r g e s c a l e p r o d u c t i o n of newspapers and l e a f l e t s , a s w e l l a s r a d i o broadcasting.

I t a l s o produced t h e

Voice of t h e United N a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n f l i c t . 4 9

The

a r r i v a l of t h e s e u n i t s , caused b o t h EUSAK and FECOM t o c r e a t e

59

EUSA K

G3, EUSAK

WARFARE

Fig. 4-3

P s y c h o ~ o g i c a ~ 5 ~ a r f aDivision re (EUSAK), January, 1951

60

Fig. 4-4

PsychologiSfl Warfare Section (FECOM), June, 1951

61

a i r l i a i s o n s e c t i o n s w i t h i n PWD and P W S t o coordinate the A i r

Force a s s e t s needed f o r i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e r a e r i a l propaganda o p e r a t i o n s , b o t h l e a f l e t and loudspeaker. Though no d i r e c t

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l command r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d between t h e two h e a d q u a r t e r s , PWD/EUSAK t e c h n i c a l l y f u n c t i o n e d a s a s u b o r d i n a t e agency under PWS/FECOM. The FECOM Weekly P l a n f o r Psy-

c h o l o g i c a l Warfare O p e r a t i o n s was a d e t a i l e d d i r e c t i v e t h a t i n c l u d e d l e a f l e t d e l i v e r y s c h e d u l e s which EUSAK adhered t o r ou t i n e l y 5 2

I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of
PWD/EUSAK

i n J a n u a r y , 1951 and PWS/FECOM i n June, 1951 coin-

c i d e s w i t h t h e assumption of command of t h e s e two s e n i o r h e a d q u a r t e r s by G e n e r a l Ridgway. With h i s r e c e n t e x p e r i e n c e

a s t h e Army Deputy Chief of S t a f f , G e n e r a l Ridgway undoubtedly had a n a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e v a l u e of p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e .

A t t h e time he l e f t Washington, p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e o n t h e

Army S t a f f was o r g a n i z e d under t h e G-3.

T h i s probably e x p l a i n s

why t h e PWD was c r e a t e d under EUSAK G-3 i n s t e a d of t h e G-2. A d d i t i o n a l l y , upon assuming command of FECOM i n A p r i l , 1 9 5 1 , Ridgway was p r o b a b l y t h e c a t a l y s t behind c r e a t i n g PWS a s a s p @ c i a l s t a f f s e c t i o n , a g a i n m i r r o r i n g OCPW On t h e Army S t a f f .
A s w i l l be s e e n l a t e r , Ridgway's appearence i s a l s o c o i n c i -

d e n t a l w i t h t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e FECOM p a r t i s a n e f f o r t .

62

Not u n t i l t h e end o f t h e t h i r d s t r a t e g i c p h a s e d i d EUSAK become aware of l a r g e numbers o f anti-communist g u e r r i l l a s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e Western p r o v i n c e of Hwanghae-do.

ROK p a t r o l b o a t f o r c e s w i t n e s s e d a

series of b a t t l e s involving

l a r g e bands o f g u e r r i l l a s r e s i s t i n g communist f o r c e s sweeping s o u t h f o l l o w i n g t h e r e t r e a t i n g U.N. f o r c e s . 53 Unable t o main-

t a i n b a s e s on t h e mainland, t h e g u e r r i l l a s e v a c u a t e d t o new

bases o f f - s h o r e on t h e w e s t e r n i s l a n d s .

The g u e r r i l l a s were

armed p r i m a r i l y w i t h o l d J a p a n e s e and c a p t u r e d R u s s i a n weapons.

T h e ROK Navy r e q u e s t e d a s s i s t a n c e from EUSAK t o r e s u p p l y and

s u s t a i n t h e s e e l e m e n t s i n t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t t h e communists. 54
The s t r a t e g i c r e v e r s a l s u f f e r e d by t h e U.N.

forces

i n November-December,

1950, caused p l a n n e r s t o t a k e advantage

o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t h i s ready-made g u e r r i l l a f o r c e o f f e r e d t o h a r a s s enemy f o r c e s from t h e r e a r . Throughout t h e c o n f l i c t , t h e g u e r r i l l a or " p a r t i s a n " o p e r a t i o n s command r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n FECOM underwent a c o n f u s i n g s e r i e s o f changes.
T h e f o l l o w i n g chronology

c o v e r s t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e s e h e a d q u a r t e r s : a ) J a n u a r y , 1951 t o May, 1951

on J a n u a r y 1 5 ,

W i t h FECOM a p p r o v a l , EUSAK e s t a b l i s h e d t h e

A t t r i t i o n S e c t i o n , M i s c e l l a n e o u s D i v i s i o n , G-3,

63

1951, w i t h primary p l a n n i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p a r t i s a n activities. John A. Two d a y s l a t e r t h e new s e c t i o n commander, Colonel

McGee, a r r i v e d i n Tokyo t o c o o r d i n a t e w i t h FECOM f o r

McGee s o u g h t

j o i n t s e r v i c e s u p p o r t of p a r t i s a n o p e r a t i o n s . 55

t o c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s under t h e FECOM 0 3 or under t h e s e p a r a t e

s p e c i a l s t a f f d i v i z i o n f o r Psychological Operations. 56

H e wanted t h e p a r t i s a n s t o o p e r a t e under a j o i n t h e a d q u a r t e r s

o u t s i d e of FECOM 6-2 c o n t r o l .

T h i s arrangement would e n a b l e

t h e p a r t i s a n s t o access j o i n t m i l i t a r y assets and avoid having i n , t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g t a s k s t a k e p r i o r i t y over t h e i r operations.

H i s e f f o r t s d i d n o t succeed.

The A t t r i t i o n S e c t i o n ,

though p a r t of t h e EUSAK 6-3,

coordinated i t s operations G-2,

w i t h t h e Far East Command L i a i s o n Group ( F E C / L G ) ,

GHQ ( F i g . 4 - 5 ) .

By F e b r u a r y , 1951, t h e p a r t i s a n s o r g a n i z e d

t h r e e o p e r a t i o n a l u n i t s : WILLIAM ABLE BASE ( l a t e r known a s

LEOPARD BASE) h e a d q u a r t e r e d a t Paengnyong-do

I s l a n d b u t occu-

pying numerous i s l a n d s a l o n g t h e Korean west c o a s t a s f a r n o r t h a s t h e Yalu River E s t u a r y , BAKER S E C T I O N l o c a t e d n e a r Pusan p r i m a r i l y a t r a i n i n g and s t a g i n g base f o r a i r b o r n e / s p e c i a l m i s s i o n s , and l a t e r i n A p r i l , TASK FORCE K I R K L A N D , o p e r a t i n g on i s l a n d s o f f t h e e a s t c o a s t , n e a r Wonsan.

The

d e c i s i o n t o o r g a n i z e t h e s e g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s came a t a time when t h e major emphasis a t EUSAK was on mounting a c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n s u p p o r t of a g e n e r a l U.N. offensive.
A s noted p r e v i o u s l y ,

64

Fig.

4-5

A t t r i t i o n S e c t i o n , Miscell9feous D i v i s i o n , G-3, EUSAK (January, 1 9 5 1 )

65

General Ridgway was t h e new EUSAK commander a t t h i s t i m e .

His

f o c u s w a s on a t t r i t i o n of communist f o r c e s , hence t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e " A t t r i t i o n " S e c t i o n . The f a c t t h i s s e c t i o n remained

under 0 3 c o n t r o l r e f l e c t e d Ridgway's f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e

special o p e r a t i o n s control s t r u c t u r e on t h e Army S t a f f a s previously discussed.

G-2

C o n t r o l of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s under t h e

a t FECOM d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d r e f l e c t s t h e p e r s o n a l p r e f e r The guer-

ences of General Willoughby, and G e n e r a l MacArthur.

r i l l a s undoubtedly were a n a d d i t i o n a l means by which Ridgway c o u l d increase enemy a t t r i t i o n w i t h r e a r a c t i o n s , w h i l e E i g h t h Army a t t r i t e d t h e enemy head-on i n t h e conduct of a l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e ( O p e r a t i o n KILLER) t o r e ' s t o r e t h e 3 8 t h para-

llel.

Not u n t i l May, however, were p a r t i s a n f o r c e s p r e p a r e d t o

undertake o p e r a t i o n s . By t h i s time, however, E i g h t h Army r e t o o k Seoul and r e s t o r e d t h e 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l a t g r e a t expense t o t h e enemy.

Armistice t a l k s , which began i n J u l y , were i m m i n e n t and t h e

major f o c u s s h i f t e d t o m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s t a t u s quo w h i l e awaiting a n e g o t i a t e d settlement. The s t r a t e g i c c o n d i t i o n s t h a t However, t h e

caused t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e p a r t i s a n s had changed.

s t r a t e g i c g u i d a n c e t h e y r e c e i v e d i n J a n u a r y , 1951, c o n t i n u e d t o g u i d e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s u n t i l t h e end of t h e c o n f l i c t .

66

b)May, -1951 t o December, 1951

G e n e r a l Ridgway became t h e new FECOM commander and G e n e r a l Van F l e e t assumed command of E i g h t h Army i n A p r i l . On May 5, 1951, Van F l e e t d i s s o l v e d t h e A t t r i t i o n S e c t i o n and r e o r g a n i z e d i t a s t h e M i s c e l l a n e o u s Group, 8086 Army U n i t
(AU).

T h i s was p r i m a r i l y due t o a EUSAK SOP w h i c h p r o h i b i t e d

A s a numbered Army

s t a f f a g e n c i e s from c o n d u c t i n g o p e r a t i o n s .

U n i t , t h e M i s c e l l a n e o u s Group was a u t h o r i z e d a T a b l e of D i s t r i b u t i o n and Equipment (TDE) which p r o v i d e d b a d l y needed equipment and p e r s o n n e l . I n J u l y , a r ' m i s t i c e t a l k s began a t Kaesong w h i l e h o s t i l i t i e s c o n t i n u e d a l o n g a s t a b i l i z e d l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e . On J u l y 26, 1951, Ridgway r e d e s i g n a t e d FEC/LG a s FEC/LG, 8240 AU. On t h e same d a t e , h e c r e a t e d t h e Far E a s t
(K)],

Command/Liaison Detachment, Korea [FEC/LD

8240 A U , under

FEC/LG c o n t r o l t o conduct i n t e l l i g e n c e o p e r a t i o n s s e p a r a t e

from p a r t i s a n o p e r a t i o n s ( F i g . 4 - 6 ) .

C o n t r o l of s p e c i a l

o p @ r a t i o n s s t i l l remained under G-3 s u p e r v i s i o n a t E i g h t h Army, and under G-2 s u p e r v i s i o n a t FECOM.

c)December, 1951, t o October, 1952 On December 1 0 , 1951, FECOM assumed d i r e c t c o n t r o l of a l l p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t y from EUSAK. Under FEC/LG,
8 2 4 0 AU,

67

G3

1
EIGHTH

F
---- - - STAFF CoORDlNATlON
OPERATlONAL CONTROL

Fig. 4-6

M i s c e l l a n e o u s Group, 8240 AU, G - 3 , (May, 1 9 5 1 )

EUSAK 5 9

68

FEC/LD

(K), 8240 AU, absorbed t h e 8086 AU, assuming c o n t r o l

of g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y i n Korea a s w e l l a s r e t a i n i n g i t s o r i g i n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e function.
A new o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

t h e Com-

b i n e d Command f o r Reconnaissance A c t i v i t i e s , Korea ( C C R A K ) , 8240 AU, was c r e a t e d and a s s i g n e d t o FEC/LG. Ostensibly,

CCRAK c o o r d i n a t e d t h e c o v e r t a c t i v i t i e s o f a l l a g e n c i e s

o p e r a t i n g i n Korea.

FEC/LG and CCRAK remained under t h e s t a f f

FECOM ( F i g . 4-7).

s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e G-2,

A l s o , p a r t of

CCRAK was J A C K ( C I A ) and t h e A i r F o r c e Air-Sea Rescue S e r v i c e

who f o c u s e d on t h e r e s c u e of downed f l i e r s .

CCRAK was FECOM's

answer t o t h e problem of c o o r d i n a t i n g s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea. sented.

JACK.

Every agency c o n d u c t i n g o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea was r e p r e However, CCRAK had no e x p l i c i t command a u t h o r i t y o v e r

JACK was e x p e c t e d , b u t n o t r e q u i r e d , t o c o o r d i n a t e C I A FECOM a p p o i n t e d t h e CCRAK d i r e c t o r , and t h e DOCU-

operations.

ment Research D i v i s i o n a p p o i n t e d t h e d e p u t y d i r e c t o r .

In fact,

b o t h took i n s t r u c t i o n s from t h e i r own p a r e n t h e a d q u a r t e r s .

While CCRAK p r o v i d e d t h e s t r u c t u r e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n , i t d i d

n o t p r o v i d e t h e m o t i v a t i o n , and i n f a c t , d i d n o t r e s u l t i n c o o r d i n a t i o n e x c e p t where and when t h e C I A d e s i r e d t o do so. 60 By t h i s time, i t was a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e a r m i s t i c e t a l k s were n o t going t o l e a d t o a r a p id s e t tl e me n t. G e n e r a l Mark C l a r k

r e p l a c e d G e n e r a l Ridgway a s Commander i n C h i e f , Far E a s t

(CINCFE) i n J u n e ,

1952, and asked FEC/LG f o r comprehensive

69

CHQ,
FECOM

63

I
FEC/LG

r-I

--

G2
CCRA K

8240

w 4 0 Au

FC/LD (K)

GUERRILLA
SECTlOrJ

P~RTISAN
UrJITS

. 6240 AU
OPERATIONAL

CONTROL

-__ - --

STAFFCGORDINAT\ON

F i g . 4-7

FEC/LD

Far East Command L i a i s o n Detachment, Korea 6 1 (K), 8240 AU (December, 1 9 5 1 )

70

plans for the use of guerrilla forces o n a broad front in 1953, including support of a major U.N. offensive. 6 2 Partisan strength was just over 7,000 men by this time. CCRAK planned to double this strength by March, 1953

and redouble it to 40,000 men by July, 1953, through intensive recruiting. 63 From the records available, it is not

possible to determine clearly what FECOM's immediate objectives were at the time it ordered the recruiting drive, but they can be surmised from the plans that appeared in early 1953.
64

Briefly, the objective was t o build a large enough guerrilla force by mid-1953 to significantly push the communists toward a n armistice agreement. The FECOM recruiting goals

were not be achieved, however, before another change in direction for guerrilla forces occured. d)October, 1952 to July, 1953

In a n attempt to establish a single, controlling headquarters for all special operations units in Korea, General Clark redesignated CCRAK, 8240 AU, the 8242 AU and gave it operational control of FEC/LD (K) in September, 1952. FEC/LG reverted back to a staff agency of FECOM, G-2 providing staff supervision and administrative support for CCRAK (Fig. 4-8). 6 5 In December, 1952, FECOM became a joint

71

Fig. 4-8

Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities CCRAK, 8242 AU, FECOM (October, 1952)

66

72

h e a d q u a r t e r s , and Army F o r c e s , Far E a s t (AFFE) became t h e Army component command.

CINCFE, General Clark designated t h e

CG, AFFE, Major G e n e r a l Thomas S. A a r r o l d , t h e e x e c u t i v e a g e n t

for a l l c o v e r t , c l a n d e s t i n e , and r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s i n s u p p o r t
of combat o p e r a t i o n s i n Korea.
T h i s p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e redesig-

n a t i o n of FEC/LG t o Support Group, 8240 AU, and a S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n (SOD) was formed i n AFFE, G-2 t o p r o v i d e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t , and assume s t a f f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r CCRAK ( F i g . 4 - 9 ) . 67. P a r t i s a n u n i t s were r e d e s i g n a t e d United N a t i o n s P a r t i s a n F o r c e s , Korea (UNPFK) and a l l t h e area commands renamed a s r e g i m e n t s . T h i s caused no By December

a c t u a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l u n i t s .
p a r t i s a n s t r e n g t h was over 16,000 men. 68

By A p r i l , 1953, t h i s s t r e n g t h reached i t s h i g h e s t p o i n t a t 22,227 men. 6 9 The f i n a l rearrangement of t h e m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s command and c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e took p l a c e i n August, 1953.
T h i s was'done p r i m a r i l y t o a s s i s t i n a smooth t r a n s i t i o n T h e ROK government was

of t h e p a r t i s a n s i n t o t h e ROK Army.

e x t r e m e l y s u s p i c i o u s of t h e p a r t i s a n s ' North Korean o r i g i n and wartime a c t i v i t y . Though f i g h t i n g f o r t h e U.N. Command,

t h e p a r t i s a n s were c o n s i d e r e d " s t a t e l e s s " i n d i v i d u a l s of dubious

l o y a l t y by t h e Rhee government. Through U.S.

influence, t h e

p a r t i s a n s were a c c e p t e d i n t o t h e ROK Army s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a r m i s t i c e was s i g n e d . R e c r u i t i n g t e r m i n a t e d i n A p r i l , 1953

73

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Fig. 4-9

70 CCRAK, 8242 AU, Army Forces, Far East (AFFE) Far East Command/United Nations Command (FEC/UNC) (December, 1952) 74

due to the imminent armistice and pressure from the ROR government

I I

In addition to the struggle with the CIA, FECOM was involved in an inter-Army conflict with General McClure, Chief of OCPW in Washington. General Willoughby steadfastly

maintained control over all military special operations in Korea, in opposition to pressure from General McClure to place them under the 6 3 or under PWS, on the Special Staff. This concept of staff control, endorsed by Donovan, was based upon OSS World War I1 experience. General McClure strongly

asserted that special operations in Korea would be subordinated to intelligence activities under G-2 control. This command

relationship with a staff agency exacerbated the operational problems symptomatic of FECOM special operations units. CIA and FECOM special operations forces were organized along parallel lines toward overlapping, though not totally identical objectives. FECOM objectives developed with offensive in e a r l y

a view toward supporting a general U.N. 1951 that never materialized.

The need for these guerrilla

forces disappeared with the planned offensive, but the organization, once created, survived, and continued to justify its existence as long as the conflict continued. Bureaucratic

survival, self-justification and interagency competition played

75

as much a part in its development and survival as anything else. This is especially reflected in FECOM's year long struggle to settle upon a command and control structure. The quality of the The

partisan training and leadership also was questionable.

loss of reunification as a motivating factor, reduced incentives from political to material, i.e. managing rice rations.

The ability of partisans to provide their own operational assessments since U.S. personnel rarely accompanied them on

missions, combined with the obvious geographical focus on Ewanghae Province, raises questions concerning the motivation of the partisan organization. 72 The CIA always maintained its organizational autonomy from FECOM, and its immunity from whatever pressure General McClure brought to bear. Its charter was from the president

and its mission to lead the cold war campaign against worldwide communist expansion. By NSC charter, it was subordinate The

to none but the President In the conduct of its mission.

CIA matured during the Korean Conflict into an agency of formidable influence and capability. The CIA operations in Korea

from 1950 to 1953 were part of its larger, worldwide mission in support of U.S. national policy. NSC-68 stated that policy,

and NSC-$/A and 10/2 authorized the means through which the CIA pursued the policy objectives, i.e. special activities.

76

P u r s u i n g c l e a r and unchanging s t r a t e g i c g o a l s , w i t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h a t were worldwide i n s c o p e , t h e C I A n e c e s s a r i l y

remained autonomous o f FECOM c o n t r o l i n i t s o p e r a t i o n s i n

Korea.

I t was a n e f f e c t i v e s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s agency d u r i n g

t h e c o n f l i c t , whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s measurably a i d e d t h e war

effort. I n c r e a s e d c o o r d i n a t i o n between C I A and FECOM f o r c e s c o u l d have enhanced t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f p a r t i s a n o p e r a t i o n s within the theater. d i d not t a k e place.
T h i s i s not t o say coordinated operations

The r e s c u e o f downed p i l o t s t h a t took p l a c e

t h r o u g h o u t t h e war u t l i z e d FECOM p a r t i s a n s , C I A a g e n t s , A i r Force Air-Sea r e s c u e s e r v i c e e l e m e n t s and Navy assets. T h i s was a t r u l y c o o r d i n a t e d e f f o r t t h a t performed a c r i t i c a l l y valuable service. A l s o , C I A a g e n t s r o u t i n e l y o p e r a t e d among

t h e FECOM p a r t i s a n s t o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g i n downed p i l o t r e s c u e

procedures.

But i n l i g h t o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of

t h e command and c o n t r o l h e a d q u a r t e r s d e s i g n e d t o c o n d u c t coord i n a t i o n on a r o u t i n e b a s i s , no s i n g l e a u t h o r i t y c o n t r o l l e d

t h e a s s e t s and t h e f o r c e s .

Nevertheless, t h e operational u n i t s Mutual m i s t r u s t and

worked t h i s problem o u t on t h e ground.

s u s p i c i o n , b o t h b u r e a u c r a t i c and p e r s o n a l , permeated b o t h o r g a n i z a t i o n s a t t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s l e v e l , and p r e v e n t e d t h e c r e a t i o n of any t r u e o p e r a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n of e f f o r t u n t i l

77

a f t e r A p r i l , 1951.

From t h i s p o i n t onward, C I A and FECOM

The a r r i v a l

o p e r a t i o n s c o e x i s t e d and o c c a s i o n a l l y c o o r d i n a t e d .

of General Ridgway and t h e d e p a r t u r e of G e n e r a l s MacArthur and Willoughby p l a y e d a key p a c t i n t h i s change. be c o v e r e d i n more d e p t h i n Chapter 5. P r o b a b l y t h e most i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between t h e m i l i t a r y and t h e C I A i s t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e i r a c t i o n s under t h e laws o f war. The l i m i t e d n a t u r e of t h e Korean C o n f l i c t These e v e n t s w i l l

b l u r r e d t h i s a s p e c t t o a g r e a t e r d e g r e e t h a n any p r e v i o u s conflict.
T h e m i l i t a r y , by j o i n i n g t h e C I A i n a n o p e n l y co-

o r d i n a t e d e f f o r t , l e f t i t s e l f open t o l o s i n g i t s Geneva Convention p r o t e c t i o n s . Of a l l t h e f a c t o r s i n h i b i t i n g

c o o r d i n a t i o n , t h i s i s one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t , a s w e l l a s overlooked. With e x p l i c i t i n s t r u c t i o n s t o c o n f i n e o p e r a t i o n s

t o t h e g e o g r a p h i c l i m i t s o f Korea, FECOM c o u l d h a r d l y a f f o r d t o become i n v o l v e d i n t h e numerous C I A o p e r a t i o n s ongoing i n R u s s i a , China, and Indochina.

This inhibited

p l a u s i b l e d e n i a l i f t h e o p e r a t i o n s were compromised, r i s k i n g an e x p a n s i o n of t h e war. O p e r a t i o n of t h e FECOM p a r t i s a n

e f f o r t a s a c o v e r f o r CIA o p e r a t i o n s was c e r t a i n l y f e a s i b l e and p o s s i b l e .

When examined a g a i n s t t h e s u r e knowledge of

f o r c e s would n o t u n d e r t a k e a

G e n e r a l Ridgway t h a t t h e U.N.

g e n e r a l o f f e n s i v e a g a i n i n Korea, i t makes t h e c o n t i n u e d

7a

o p e r a t i o n of t h e p a r t i s a n s much more l o g i c a l .

This aspect

w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d f u r t h e r i n Chapter 5 which w i l l f o c u s

on t h e e f f e c t s o f s t r a t e g y , o r g a n i z a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n s on t h e s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s e f f o r t during t h e c o n f l i c t i n Korea.

I9

CBAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

'Francis (Washington D.C.:

J. K e l l y , U . S . S p e c i a l F o r c e s , 1961-1971, Department of t h e Army, 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 0 .

2 A l f r e d 6. Paddock, U.S. Army S p e c i a l Warfare: Its O r i g i n s (Washington D.C.: N a t i o n a l Defense U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , 72-76.

3 W i l l i a m R. Corson, The A r m i e s of Ignorance ( N e w Pork: The D i a l Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , 183-187.

41bid., 187.

51bid. Donovan o r g a n i z e d h i s agency i n t o t h r e e main b r a n c h e s : i n t e l l i g e n c e , s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s and t r a i n i n g . The t r a i n i n g branch h a n d l e d t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of new p e r s o n n e l and a s s i s t e d i n t h e i r placement. I n t e l l i g e n c e branch performed r e s e a r c h and a n a l y s i s , s e c r e t i n t e l l i g e n c e ( e s p i o n a g e ) , and c o u n t e r e s p i o n a g e , w h i l e t h e s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s branch performed p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e , g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e , and d i r e c t a c t i o n operations.
6 D r . J a c k J. G i f f o r d , of Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e , USACGSOC, F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas, i n t e r v i e w by t h e a u t h o r , A p r i l 1 8 , 1988.

'Paddock, 81bid., 'Ibid. "Ibid.,

32. 34. Corson, 245-247.

34-35.

"Earry Rowe Ransom,Central I n t e l l i g e n c e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 ) , 64-65. 12Corson, 274-275. 131bid, 295, 303-305. 1 4 1 b i d . , 306.

80

-and CIA Covert the Military

M. Leary, Perilous Missions: CAT Transport Operations in Asia (University: University of Alabama Press, 19841, 124.
' ' W i l l i a m

--

16Charles A. Willoughby, ed. Intelligence Section, 111. (Seoul: General Headquarters, Far East Command, 1950), 45-59. "Paddock, 72-77.

18Corson, 324.

"Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold S t o r y of the War (New York: MacGraw-Bill, 1982), 467-468. Paddock, 40-42. 7 5 - 7 7 . 201bid. 21Paddock, 103. 221bid. 23Paddock, 103. 24Goulden, 469. 25Goulden, 470. Leary, 113-126. 26Leary, 113-1 26. 27Paddock, 103. 28Goulden, 469. *'Paddock, 103.

--

30Corson, 319-320. 31Paddock 321bid., 9. 331bid., 10. 3 4 ~ b i d . 11-12. 351bid. 8-9.

81

361bid. , 14. The PWD fielded a self-contained unit known as a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC). It had a multitude of capabilities covering the full spectrum Of radio and loudspeaker broadcasting to leaflet production and distribution. Five MRBC's were fielded during World War 11, and developed the doctrinal procedures that would speed the hasty reconstruction of this capability during the Korean Conflict. 371bid. 38Willoughby , 45-59. 39Paddock, 15. 401bid., 17-18. 411bid., 59. 421bid. , 88-90. 431bid. , 93-94. Corson, 303. 441bid. , 93-107.. 451bid. , 92-93. 461bid.

, 108.
The

47Willmoore KendallF ,& Psychological War fare Operations: Theater Staff Organization (Washington D.C.: Johns Aopkins University//ORO-T-27, 1952) , 31-48. 481bid. , 31-48. 491bid. "Ibid.

51Willmoore Kendall, Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War (Washington D.C.: The Johns Ropkins University/ORO-T-17, 1951), 12-13.

--

'Ibid. 53Rod Paschall, "Special Operations in Korea," Conflict, 7, no.2, (1987): 157.

82

541bid. 551bid.,

.
158.

56Shaun M. Darraugh, "Bwanghae-do:The War of t h e Donkeys,n Army, 34, no. 11, (November, 1 9 8 4 ) , 72. General McClure, Chief of O C P W w i t h i n Department of t h e Army was campaigning u n s u c c e s s f u l l y toward t h e same g o a l i n Washington. 5 7 F r e d e r i c k W. Cleaver and o t h e r s , U . N . Partisan Warfare i n Korea, 1951-1954 0, (Washington D.C.:The J o h n s Iiopkins Eiversity/ORO-T-64, 19564, 32. 581bid., 591bid., 601bid. 61Paddock, 103. 36. 38.

6 2 C l e a v e r , 62-63. 631bid. 641bid., 651bid., 661bid. 671bid., 681bid., 691bid., 701bid., 711bid., 721bid.,

64.
66.

67.
77.

116.
67. 116-118.

4 4 , 51, 54-55,

76, 9 6 , 103, 134-135.

83

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONS r o a d t o s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s developarmed f o r c e s l e d through a m i n e f i e l d . Experience w i t h OSS r e v e a l e d t h a t many s e n i o r m i l i t a r y commanders c o n s i d e r e d t h e ' d i r t y ' t a c t i c s a s p r a c t i c e d by s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s u n i t s a s s i m p l y n o t p a r t of t h e m i l i t a r y a r s e n a l . V e s t i g e s of t h a t a t t i t u d e s t i l l e x i s t today." "...The

ment i n t h e U.S.

COL Roger M .

Pezzelle, r e t . Chief, Special Operations 5-3, JCS, 1983

This c h a p t e r examines t h e e f f e c t of s t r a t e g y and

o r g a n i z a t i o n upon s e l e c t e d s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s conducted d u r i n g t h e Korean C o n f l i c t by t h e C I A and FECOM.

T h i s examina-

t i o n s e t s t h e s t a g e f o r d e t e r m i n i n g what these s p e c i a l operat i o n s o r g a n i z a t i o n s achieved during t h e c o n f l i c t , a f t e r which, c o n c l u s i o n s c a n be drawn a s t o whether t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s were s t r a t e g i c a l l y e f f e c t i v e o r not. Having i d e n t i f i e d t h e s t r a t e g y

i n Korea, and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s d e r i v e d from t h i s s t r a t e g y , examination of t h e o p e r a t i o n s conducted by t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s

i s t h e f i n a l phase of a n a l y s i s .
B e f o r e d i s c u s s i n g o p e r a t i o n s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o ref e r b a c k t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of s p e c i a l - o p e r a t i o n s covered i n

84

Chapter 1, pages 8-9.

Although this lengthy definition was de-

veloped for application to. the modern international environment, it covers the entire spectrum of operations undertaken in Korea from 1950 to 1953. counterterrorism. The only area that does not apply is

While terrorism was certainly a threat during

the Korean Conflict, counterterrorism as a special operation in today's context refers to the specialized forces and techniques employed against the modern-day terrorist threat. modern threat is a sophisticated, well trained, and internationally organized paramilitary force and is fundamentally different from the local guerrilla threat of the 1950's faced by U.N. forces in Korea. NSC 4/A and 10/2 authorized the full spectrum of special operations and activities contained in this definition.2 U.S. strategic concerns were primarily EuropeThe government viewed any communist move This

oriented.

in Asia only as a strategic distractor aimed at Japan, and designed to set up a decisive Soviet move in Europe. Opera-

tions in Korea, though important, were a sideshow, in terms of relative worldwide strategic importance. After the Chinese

intervention in November, 1950, conventional operations in Korea soon assumed the strategic focus they would maintain until 1953, i.e. leading to a negotiated cease-fire at the

pre-conflict borders.

While t h i s d i d n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t

t h e d i r e c t i o n of C I A special o p e r a t i o n s , i t d i d a f f e c t t h e
FECOM p a r t i s a n campaign w h i c h was i n i t i a t e d t o s u p p o r t a

p o s s i b l e g e n e r a l U.N.

o f f e n s i v e i n e a r l y 1951.

When t h i s

p o s i b i l i t y d i s a p p e a r e d , FECOM d i d n o t r e a p p r a i s e i t s g u i d a n c e

t o t h e p a r t i s a n s p r e v e n t i n g t h e p a r t i s a n s from a c h i e v i n g any
degree of s t r a t e g i c success. Examination of these 0per.a-

t i o n s i n d e t a i l allows some c o n c l u s i o n s t o be drawn a b o u t how and why t h i s s i t u a t i o n o c c u r r e d .

C I A o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Far E a s t were underway l o n g be-

f o r e t h e o u t b r e a k o f h o s t i l i t i e s i n Korea.

A s brought o u t i n

Chapter 4 , s i n c e i t s c r e a t i o n i n 1947, t h e C I A conducted c l a n d e s t i n e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t communist e x p a n s i o n around t h e world. By 1950, t h e C I A was a key p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e "Cold viewed a s a n expanding b l o c o f I n A s i a , C I A conducted

War" a g a i n s t what t h e U.S.

S o v i e t - c o n t r o l l e d communist n a t i o n s .

a c t i v i t i e s i n R u s s i a , China, I n d o c h i n a and. Burma a s w e l l a s Korea.

J u s t p r i o r t o t h e outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s , C I A a c t i -

v i t y i n and around China c o n t i n u e d f o l l o w i n g t h e d e f e a t of Chiang Rai-shek's Nationalists. The c o n s o l i d a t i o n of t h e

Chinese communist government was f a r from complete i n 1 9 5 0 and t h e C I A d e v o t e d much a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c o n d u c t of a s e c r e t

86

war t o c r e a t e a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e N a t i o n a l i s t s or a democ r a t i c a l t e r n a t i v e t o t a k e power.

4

A s p a r t of t h e d r a m a t i c C I A growth from 1948 onward, OPC d i r e c t o r , Frank Wisner r e q u e s t e d Army s u p p o r t i n t h e

development of a C I A g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t y .

In

r e s p o n s e , t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e Army a u t h o r i z e d t h e G-3 t o conduct d i r e c t l i a i s o n w i t h OPC t o d e t e r m i n e t h e ground r u l e s governing C I A conduct of p a r a - m i l i t a r y active theater. a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n an

Records show c o n s i d e r a b l e agreement between

Army and C I A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h a t s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s i n war-

time would be b e s t conducted under a s i n g l e m i l i t a r y command,

such a s t h e JCS. With t h e C I A becoming preeminent i n t h i s

a r e a , t h e need f o r t h e Army t o d e v e l o p s u c h f o r c e s was cons i d e r e d u n n e c e s s a r y , and peacetime t r a i n i n g a s s i s t a n c e t o 5 t h e C I A l a i d t h e groundwork f o r wartime c o o p e r a t i o n .

The S e c r e t a r y of t h e Army approved s p a c e a t F o r t Benning,

Georgia i n 1949 f o r t h e OPC t o e s t a b l i s h i t s own g u e r r i l l a t r a i n i n g base. D e s p i t e t h i s atmosphere of c o o p e r a t i o n , Colonel

Richard G. S t i l w e l l , d i r e c t o r of Far E a s t O p e r a t i o n s , avoided committing t h e C I A t o any permanent command or c o n t r o l r e l a tionship with the military.
H e o n l y s t a t e d t h a t h e was "reason-

a b l y c e r t a i n " t h a t m i l i t a r y t h e a t e r commanders would be i n -

a7

formed of and c o u l d approve c o v e r t o p e r a t i o n s c a r r i e d o u t i n t h e i r theaters.6 The J C S informed i t s u n i f i e d commands

t h a t t h e C I A a g r e e d t o make l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s a v a i l a b l e t o coordinate unconventional warfare a c t i v i t i e s i n - th e a t e r desired. The Korean C o n f l i c t t e s t e d t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

if

r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e C I A w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y w i t h i n a wartime theater. The pre-war r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e C I A and t h e Army

p r o v i d e s a backdrop a g a i n s t w h i c h . s p e c i a 1 o p e r a t i o n s conducted i n Korea can be e v a l u a t e d . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e t h e c o n f l i c t

made t o t h e C I A was t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s w i t h a c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y e f f o r t , a l b e i t one of l i m i t e d scope, presented itself. S i n c e 1948, a t Yokosuka Naval

Base n e a r Yokohama, W i l l i a m Duggan conducted i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g t a s k s f o r t h e O f f i c e of S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s (OSO) branch of t h e C I A . 8

Hans V. T o f t e a r r i v e d i n J a p a n i n J u l y

of 1950 t o e s t a b l i s h t h e O f f i c e of P o l i c y C o o r d i n a t i o n ( O P C ) .
A t A t s u g i A i r Base, s o u t h of Tokyo, T o f t e c r e a t e d t h e C I A

s p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s c a p a b i l i t y i n N o r t h e a s t Asia. 9
One of t h e f i r s t o p e r a t i o n s undertaken i n l a t e 1 9 5 0

was O p e r a t i o n BLUEBELL. l o T h i s was e s s e n t i a l l y an e f f o r t t o

r e i n s e r t l a r g e number of CIA-trained, North Korean r e f u g e e s

aa

i n t o t h e North t o g a t h e r i n t e l l i g e n c e on Chinese and North Korean t r o o p movements. South a s b e s t t h e y could.

The r e f u g e e s t h e n made t h e i r way

Once i n t h e South, t h e r e f u g e e s
The

c o n t a c t e d C I A a g e n t s who conducted t h e i r d e b r i e f i n g .

exact number of r e c r u i t s i s n o t a v a i l a b l e b u t r e f e r e n c e s a r e
made t o "thousands.
n11

I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e r e c r u i t m e n t program f o r
BLUEBELL, T o f t e r e c r u i t e d q u a l i f i e d r e f u g e e s t o m a k e u p what

e v e n t u a l l y became a s e p a r a t e 1 , 2 0 0 man g u e r r i l l a f o r c e under

OPC c o n t r o l .
A Marine o f f i c e r on d e t a c h e d d u t y w i t h t h e C I A ,

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l "Dutch" Kraemer, t r a i n e d them a t a b a s e on Yong-do I s l a n d i n Pusan Bay.

T h e OPC u t i l i z e d these f o r c e s

for r a i d s , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , ambushes and o t h e r s p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n f l i c t , b o t h i n and o u t of Korea.

CIA

i n s e r t e d t h e s e e l e m e n t s e i t h e r by amphibious l a n d i n g o r a i r borne drop. l 2 Between A p r i l and December, 1951, OPC i n s e r t -

ed 4 4 g u e r r i l l a teams w i t h i n t e l l i g e n c e a t t a c h m e n t s i n t o North

Korea by p a r a c h u t e and amphibious l a n d i n g .

T h e s e teams oper-

a t e d j u s t s o u t h of t h e Yalu River s a b o t a g i n g t r a i n s and ambushing t r u c k convoys, d i s r u p t i n g t h e f l o w of s u p p l i e s from Manchuria and e a s t e r n S i b e r i a . T o f t e worked i n t h i s a r e a

t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1930's f o r t h e D a n i s h E a s t A s i a t i c Company and was i n t i m a t e l y f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e t e r r a i n .

T h i s experience

89

enabled T o f t e t o p l a c e h i s u n i t s i n t h e best p o s i t i o n s t o inf l i c t maximum damage.

T o f t e c o n s i d e r e d t h i s program " h i g h l y

s u c c e s s f u l " c i t i n g i n t e r c e p t e d Chinese messages c l a i m i n g

5 0 , 0 0 0 i n s u r g e n t s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e i r r e a r a r e a s from t h e

o p e r a t i o n s of h i s 1,200 g u e r r i l l a s . l 3 T o f t e f a i l e d t o mention t h a t FECOM g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y , i n s t r e n g t h o f up t o 20,000, undoubtedly c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s C h i n e s e a s s e s s m e n t , p l a c i n g t h e a b i l i t y of h i s small C I A g u e r r i l l a f o r c e t o s i m -

u l a t e 50,000 a c t i v e i n s u r g e n t s i n c l e a r e r p e r s p e c t i v e .
The C I A ' S i n f i l t r a t i o n , sustainmen't and e x f i l t r a t i o n o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d t h e support of a modern, t r a i n e d amphib i o u s f o r c e , whose main f o c u s was special o p e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t . To t h i s end, C I A o f t e n used a FECOM u n i t , t h e A l l i e d S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s Group (SOG) formed i n August, 1950.
r of a Navy f a s t t r a n s p o r t , t h e Horace C. -Bass

It consisted

modified t o

t r a n s p o r t 162 commandoes, and a submarine t r a n s p o r t , t h e P e r c h , m o d i f i e d t o c a r r y 1 6 0 commandoes. by

U.S.

These c r a f t were augmented

Marine r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t r o o p s , Navy underwater demoliT h i s element

t i o n teams and a squad o f B r i t i s h Royal Marines.

p r o v i d e d most o f t h e c o v e r t amphibious i n s e r t i o n and e x t r a c t i o n support f o r t h e CIA. l4 Together w i t h h i s C i v i l A i r T r a n s p o r t

( C A T ) a i r c a p a b i l i t y , T o f t e c r e a t e d an independent a i r - s e a

transport capability.

CAT a l s o p l a y e d a major r o l e i n t h e

90

c o n d u c t of C I A p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e l e a f l e t d r o p s . l 5 OPC had i t s own independent p r i n t i n g c a p a b i l i t y , and developed

i t s own themes s e p a r a t e l y from t h o s e of FECOM. O P C ' s psywar

o b j e c t i v e s were p r i m a r i l y o u t s i d e of Korea: China, J a p a n , and I n d o c h i n a i n p a r t i c u l a r . Numerous d e t a i l e d s t u d i e s of t h e FECOM psywar e f f o r t a t FECOM and EUSAK i n d i c a t e no i n t e r f e r -

ence w i t h , o r by, C I A psywar o p e r a t i o n s .

T h i s l a c k of i n t e r -

f e r e n c e was a f u n c t i o n of t h e d i f f e r e n t psywar t a r g e t s t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s were o p e r a t i n g a g a i n s t , n o t c o o r d i n a t i o n . These were s i m i l a r c a p a b i l i t i e s , w i t h d i f f e r e n t m i s s i o n s , employed a g a i n s t d i f f e r e n t t a r g e t s . Another major p r o j e c t of OPC was t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a n Escape and Evasion ( E & E ) network f o r downed U.N. f l i e r s and POWs. T h i s i n v o l v e d t h e r e c r u i t i n g and t r a i n i n g

of i n d i g e n o u s Korean a g e n t s s e e d e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e North t o e s t a b l i s h safehouses.

F l i e r s b a i l i n g o u t i n l a n d , and s u c c e s s The

f u l l y a v o i d i n g c a p t u r e , made c o n t a c t w i t h l o c a l a g e n t s . downed p i l o t s were guided through a s e r i e s of t h e s e s a f e houses, handed o f f from a g e n t t o a g e n t , and e v e n t u a l l y

reached a n o f f s h o r e i s l a n d , where one of t h e two i n d i g e n o u s , CIA-hired f i s h i n g f l e e t s made t h e p i c k up. l 6 I f t h e p i l o t c o u l d r e a c h t h e c o a s t b e f o r e b a i l i n g o u t , C I A a g e n t s or C I A t r a i n e d FECOM p a r t i s a n s based on t h e o f f - s h o r e i s l a n d s , pro-

91

v i d e d a s s i s t a n c e w h i l e g u i d i n g i n e l e m e n t s of t h e FEAF A i r Sea Rescue S e r v i c e by r a d i o t o make t h e p i c k up.

The u s u a l

FEAF package c o n s i s t e d o f 2 t o 4 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t t o engage

enemy ground e l e m e n t s , and a h e l i c o p t e r o r seaplane t o a c t u a l l y rescue t h e p i l o t . i n a couple of hours.

An example of t h e t y p e of m i s s i o n c a r r i e d o u t by OPC

They u s u a l l y completed t h e r e s c u e

o c c u r r e d i n l a t e 1950.

I n r e s p o n s e t o a q u e r y from t h e

N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Agency (NSA), OPC a g e n t s t r a c k e d down t h e whereabouts of t h e ocean cable t h a t c a r r i e d t h e m a j o r i t y of Chinese Bigh Command secure t r a f f i c between Peking and Korea.

One o f t h e f i s h i n g f l e e t s s e n t t o t h e a r e a i n t h e Yellow Sea,

c u t t h e c a b l e and c a r r i e d t h e s e v e r e d e n d s many miles i n opposite directions.
T h i s caused a dramatic i n c r e a s e i n r a d i o T h e o v e r a l l impact

t r a f f i c w h i c h t h e N S A monitored w i t h ease.

o f t h e w i r e c u t t i n g was t o s i g n i f i c a n t l y enhance t h e a b i l i t y of t h e U.N. Command t o p r e d i c t enemy m i l i t a r y i n t e n t i o n s on t h e p e n i n s u l a . 17 Another s i g n i f i c a n t d e c l a s s i f i e d C I A o p e r a t i o n was O p e r a t i o n STOLE.

A C I A agent, highly placed

i n t h e Indian

government r e p o r t e d i n e a r l y 1951 t h a t t h e Nehru government was p r e p a r i n g t o c l a n d e s t i n e l y s h i p c r i t i c a l l y needed medical

92

s u p p l i e s and p e r s o n n e l t o t h e Communist Chinese F o r c e s i n Korea.

T h e cover was a Norwegian f r e i g h t e r .

The a i d package

amounted t o more t h a n t h r e e f u l l f i e l d h o s p i t a l s , t o n s of d r u g s , and a f u l l s t a f f of d o c t o r s , n u r s e s and t e c h n i c i a n s .

OPC, under

T o f t e ' s g u i d a n c e , i n t e r c e p t e d t h e f r e i g h t e r , a s s i s t e d by e l e m e n t s of t h e N a t i o n a l i s t C h i n e s e Navy p o s i n g a s renegade Chinese p i r a t e s . S u p p l i e s and p e r s o n n e l were t u r n e d over t o This

t h e N a t i o n a l i s t s and were never h e a r d from again.18 non-delivery alties.

r e s u l t e d i n l i t e r a l l y t h o u s a n d s of Chinese casu-

The C I A , a c i v i l i a n agency, conducted t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s under i t s f u l l y e n a b l i n g s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s c h a r t e r , and c o n s i s t e n t l y developed i t s o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s from t h e s t r a t e g i c guidance r e c e i v e d from t h e NSC. I n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e c o n f l i c t

i n Korea, t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s were r a r e l y , i f e v e r , a t odds w i t h

t h o s e of t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s .

I t is important t o note t h a t C I A

operations during t h i s period a r e not a s subject t o d e t a i l e d s c r u t i n y and a n a l y s i s a s a r e t h o s e of FECOM. But t h e few

o p e r a t i o n s o u t l i n e d above i n d i c a t e a h i g h l y e x p e r t and e f f i c i e n t organization following a c l e a r s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n . P l a n n i n g took p l a c e a t t h e v e r y t o p , w h i l e e x e c u t i o n was d e c e n t r a l i z e d t o h i g h l y t r a i n e d , well-led, expert units.

L i n e s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y were c l e a r and a l l a c t i v i t i e s con-

93

tained within a centralized organizational structure.

No

sub-agency o p e r a t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y even though s t r i c t l y compartmentalized. The f i r s t s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s a c t u a l l y conducted by

FECOM i n Korea took p l a c e

on J u n e 2 8 , 1950 when t h e h a n d f u l

of p e o p l e comprising t h e P s y c h o l o g i c a l Warfare Branch, G-2,

FECOM i n Tokyo began l e a f l e t a i r d r o p s and r a d i o b r o a d c a s t s

i n Korea. l 9 FECOM conducted p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s

(PSYOPS) t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o n f l i c t , a s f u n c t i o n a l l y indepen-

d e n t from t h e r e s t of i t s s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s e f f o r t .

This

independence i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s e p a r a t i o n of t h e s e f u n c t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y covered i n Chapter: 4.

From J u n e 28 through December 28. 1950, over 50% of

a l l l e a f l e t d r o p s were a g a i n s t f r i e n d l y c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s and t r o o p t a r g e t a u d i e n c e s .
The p r i m a r y c o n c e r n of t h e ROK

government d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l months of t h e c o n f l i c t was b o l s t e r i n g t h e morale of t h e South Korean p e o p l e and s o l d i e r s . Only. i n September and November, a f t e r t h e d e f e a t of t h e North Korean Army, d i d t h e enemy s o l d i e r s become t h e c h i e f psywar target. From J a n u a r y through September, 1951, FECOM and By t h i s

Eighth Army a i r d e l i v e r e d 48 m i l l i o n l e a f l e t s a month.

20

time, a l o n g a s t a b i l i z e d f r o n t , enemy f r o n t l i n e and r e s e r v e

t r o o p s became t h e c h i e f t a r g e t audience.

94

EUSAK f l e w a i r b o r n e l o u d s p e a k e r m i s s i o n s b e g i n n i n g i n J a n u a r y , 1951 and c o n t i n u i n g through J u l y , 1951, when t h e loud-

speakers went u n s e r v i c e a b l e a f t e r a t o t a l of 231 m i s s i o n s .

o v e r a l l i m p r e s s i o n of EUSAK psywar p e r s o n n e l was t h a t loud-

The

s p e a k e r o p e r a t i o n s were h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e i n o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t enemy p e r s o n n e l . Loudspeaker o p e r a t i o n s reached 1 0 0 % of t h e

t a r g e t a r e a a t once, and c o u l d n o t be blocked by enemy a c t i o n . Enemy s o l d i e r s d i d n o t need t o r e a d t o r e c e i v e t h e message. i l l i t e r a t e , t h e enemy s o l d i e r was n o t s u b j e c t e d t o t h e danger o f p o s s e s s i n g a U.N.
i t t o him.

If

l e a f l e t and t h e n a s k i n g a comrade t o r e a d

Newly a d a p t e d s p e a k e r s e n a b l e d c l e a r t r a n m i s s i o n s

a t a l t i t u d e s of 7 , 0 0 0 f e e t , r e n d e r i n g a i r c r a f t r e l a t i v e l y f r e e of a n t i a i r c r a f t f i r e . 21
L a t e r i n t h e war, t h e 1st Loudspeaker and L e a f l e t Company, PWD, f u r n i s h e d ground l o u d s p e a k e r teams t o each f i e l d division. Audible a t a range of up t o one m i l e under good con-

d i t i o n s , these teams r e q u i r e d s u f f i c i e n t p r o t e c t i v e c o v e r ,

a s u f f i c i e n t l y q u i e t environment, and a r e l a t i v e l y s t a t i c
s i t u a t i o n i n o r d e r t o be e f f e c t i v e .
The d i f f i c u l t y i n identify-

i n g t a r g e t s and c r e a t i n g t h e p r o p e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e teams t o o p e r a t e r e s u l t e d i n a n e x t r e m e l y low b r o a d c a s t r a t e : l e s s t h a n

95

one p e r team p e r w e e k from J u n e through August, 1951. 2 2 i d e a l t a r g e t s were h a r d - h i t , continuous pressure.

The

i s o l a t e d enemy s o l d i e r s under

The s t a b i l i z e d c o n d i t i o n s a l o n g t h e

m i l i t a r y l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e produced few such t a r g e t s and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e low b r o a d c a s t r a t e .

I n 1951, FECOM and EUSAK undertook a s u b s t a n t i a l

e f f o r t t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of these o p e r a t i o n s . Seven s e p a r a t e s t u d i e s of t h e psywar e f f o r t were produced by t h e O p e r a t i o n s Research O f f i c e of t h e J o h n s Aopkins U n i v e r s i t y i n January-February, 1951. These s t u d i e s examined

s t a f f o r g a n i z a t i o n , p r i s o n e r of war i n t e r r o g a t i o n s , and s u r r e n d e r s , and e v a l u a t e d t h e impact of o p e r a t i o n s i n each category. One s t u d y e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e U.N. leaflet lives The s t u d i e s

campaign p r i o r t o November, 1950 saved 1,200 U.N. and r e s u l t e d i n 12,000 North Korean s u r r e n d e r s .

r e p o r t e d a i r mounted loudspeaker o p e r a t i o n s were s u p e r i o r t o l e a f l e t s , because of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o cover 1 0 0 % of t h e t a r g e t a r e a and comparative e a s e of d e l i v e r y . 23

T h i s study

made e x t e n s i v e recommendations t o improve t h e psywar program.

I n a l l c a s e s , t h e y based t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n of o p e r a t i o n s

e f f e c t i v e n e s s on e x t e n s i v e p r i s o n e r i n t e r r o g a t i o n .

96

The A t t r i t i o n S e c t i o n , M i s c e l l a n e o u s D i v i s i o n , G-3,

EUSAK produced t h e f i r s t p l a n s t o use g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s i n J a n u a r y , 1951, w h i c h f o c u s e d upon t h e t r a i n i n g of g u e r r i l l a c a d r e s f o r l a t e r i n s e r t i o n i n t o t h e enemy r e a r . 2 4 These

c a d r e s were c a p a b l e of o r g a n i z i n g a c e l l u l a r r e s i s t a n c e movement which c o u l d l a t e r be employed i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a g e n e r a l U.N. o f f e n s i v e planned f o r t h e s p r i n g of 1951.

In

J a n u a r y , 1951, t h i s c a d r e t r a i n i n g program formed t h e b a s i s of Operational P l a n Number One ( F i g . 5-1). 2 5

The p l a n as-

sumed a n enemy f a l l b a c k t o a d e f e n s i v e l i n e a l o n g t h e 3 9 t h p a r a l l e l , a f t e r a t t a c k by I (U.S.) Corps. P a r t i s a n elements

would s e i z e c o n t r o l of t h e Ewanghae P e n i n s u l a i n t h e west w h i l e o t h e r elements would mass s o u t h of Pyongyang and n o r t h

west of Eamhung t o i n t e r d i c t enemy t r o o p movements. 26

U.N.

The

o f f e n s i v e upon which t h e p l a n was based never m a t e r i a l i z e d , r o u t i n e of i n t e r -

and p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t y s e t t l e d i n t o a two-year

m i t t e n t h a r r a s s m e n t o p e r a t i o n s on t h e mainland t h a t sometimes l a s t e d f o r t h i r t y days.

T h e g u e r r i l l a s never e s t a b l i s h e d a
T h i s was a combined

permanent g u e r r i l l a base on t h e mainland.

r e s u l t of t i g h t communist r e a r a r e a c o n t r o l measures and t h e l o s s of a f l u i d m i l i t a r y environment once t h e l i n e of r e s i s t a n c e s t a b i l i z e d i n mid-1951. The g u e r r i l l a s s t a g e d a l l opera-

t i o n s from i s l a n d s o f f t h e e a s t and west c o a s t s .

97

Fig. 5-1

Operational Plan One (ABLE)27 (January, 1951)

Large shaded areas represent DCODOSed areas f r o m w irh . .h .--__ ~ partisans were to stage guerrilla operations when the general offensive occurred. -.-.-.-.-.-outlines the boundary of Hwanghae-do Province

- -

98

The preponderance of a l l a c t i o n s from 1951 through 1953 took p l a c e i n Hwanghae P r o v i n c e ( F i g . 5-2). 28 T h i s was because

most of t h e g u e r r i l l a s on t h e west c o a s t were o r i g i n a l l y from t h i s area and t h i s p r o v i n c e was t h e c l o s e s t t o t h e i r o p e r a t i n g bases. Since operational planning w a s l e f t mostly u p t o t h e

u n i t s themselves, i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e y f o c u s e d on
t h e a r e a s w i t h which t h e y were most f a m i l i a r . o p e r a t i o n s were d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t enemy t r o o p s . Over 50% of a l l

Guerrillas
The

claimed over 15,000 enemy c a s u a l t i e s by December, 1951.

n e x t most f r e q u e n t o p e r a t i o n was d i r e c t i o n of n a v a l g u n f i r e . 29
These were pre-planned o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t known enemy t a r g e t Other m i s s i o n s were i n t e l l i -

w i t h i n r a n g e of n a v a l b a t t e r i e s .

gence g a t h e r i n g , r a i d s a g a i n s t t a c t i c a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s , s u p p l y and t r a n s p o r t d e p o t s , and s a b o t a g e of t h e c i v i l administration. The B r i t i s h Navy p r o v i d e d t h e m a j o r i t y of

t h e g u n f i r e support.

In 1952, over 93% of g u e r r i l l a a c t i o n s

took p l a c e i n Hwanghae P r o v i n c e , a l i t t l e over 1% on t h e e a s t c o a s t and t h e remaining 5% throughout t h e r e s t of North Korea. 30

P s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e was i n t e g r a t e d i n t o p a r t i s a n a c t i o n e a r l y i n 1951. G u e r r i l l a s dropped what t h e y c a l l e d

" L e o p a r d ' s Claw" l e a f l e t s o n t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s f o l l o w i n g r a i d s

99

F i g - 5-2

P e r c e n t a g e s of P a r t i s a n A c t i o n s by G r i d 3 1 S q u a r e s : May. 1 9 5 1 thru J u l y , 1953

100

t h a t i d e n t i f i e d t h e r e s p on s ib l e g u e r r i l l a element with t h e purpose of t e r r o r i z i n g t h e enemy.

Later, they u t i l i z e d "black"

These were p r i n t e d t o

propaganda c a r d s i n much t h e same way.

look a s i f produced by t h e DPRK, and blamed t h e Chinese f o r

a c t s of wanton c o l l a t e r a l damage. 3 2
o u t s i d e of t h e Kaesong-Pyong-yang

Iiwanghae P r o v i n c e ,

r a i l w a y and highway which

r a n through i t , d i d n o t p r e s e n t t a r g e t s of m i l i t a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e U.N. Command f o r c e s .

P l a n n e r s assumed t h e

a b i l i t y of t h e p a r t i s a n s t o o p e r a t e i n l a r g e numbers f o r l o n g p e r i o d s d e e p i n c e n t r a l North Korea i n t h e i n i t i a l operations plans. capability. The FECOM p a r t i s a n s never developed t h i s

The s t a b i l i z a t i o n of t h e f r o n t e n a b l e d t h e The r i g i d

communists t o c o n c e n t r a t e on r e a r a r e a c o n t r o l .

rear a r e a c o n t r o l measures t h e y a p p l i e d , combined w i t h

i n c r e a s e d r e a r a r e a t r o o p u n i t s , and t h e u n f a m i l i a r i t y of t h e p a r t i s a n s w i t h t h e i n t e r n a l a r e a s , r e n d e r e d t h e i r a b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h even temporary i n t e r i o r b a s e s extremly d i f f i c u l t . There was no marked change i n enemy
T h e l a c k of major t a r g e t s i n

a c t i v i t y during t h i s period.

t h e a r e a of o p e r a t i o n s i n d i c a t e l i t t l e , i f any, s t r a t e g i c or o p e r a t i o n a l e f f e c t by g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y . 3 3

I n December, 1 9 5 1 , when FECOM assumed d i r e c t c o n t r o l

of o p e r a t i o n s from EUSAK, even though t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a

101

renewed U.N.

o f f e n s i v e was remote, no major review of s t r a t e Operations

g i c d i r e c t i o n f o r t h e p a r t i s a n s took p l a c e . 3 4 c o n t i n u e d a s t h e y had under EUSAR.

During 1952, t h e improba-

b i l i t y of a c h i e v i n g a r e u n i f i e d Korea permeated t h e p a r t i s a n command and may have a f f e c t e d t h e i r i n c e n t i v e f o r t h e r e s t of t h e c o n f l i c t . 35

A s i n d i g e n o u s North Koreans,

t h e ROR gov-

ernment was n o t a b o u t t o a c c e p t t h e p a r t i s a n s a s c i t i z e n s

or e v e n a s members of a l e g i t i m a t e f i g h t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Rhee government opposed t h e i d e a of a c c e p t i n g thousands of

The

t r a i n e d North Korean g u e r r i l l a s a s members of t h e ROK Army. 3 6 However, under U.S. p r e s s u r e , t h e ROK government a c c e p t e d t h e

p a r t i s a n s i n t o t h e ROK Army s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a r m i s t i c e .

In

J u n e , 1952, General Mark C l a r k assumed command

of FECOM from General Ridgway.

a major U.N.

H e f o r e s a w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of

o f f e n s i v e i n t h e summer of 1953.

I n conjunction

w i t h t h i s , FECOM i n c r e a s e d p a r t i s a n r e c r u i t i n g w i t h a view of r e a c h i n g a manpower g o a l of 4 0 , 0 0 0 by mid-1953. 37

In

J a n u a r y , 1953 General C l a r k d i r e c t e d p l a n n i n g f o r t h e u s e of p a r t i s a n f o r c e s o n a broad f r o n t l a t e r t h a t y e a r . The p l a n s

covered two p h a s e s , t h e f i r s t , from J a n u a r y 2 8 t o March 1 5 and t h e second, from March 1 5 t o September 15. Phase I of

the plan e s s e n t i a l l y instructed the partisans t o i n s e r t cadres i n t o t h e i n t e r i o r who would o r g a n i z e i n d i v i d u a l c e l l u l a r

102

r e s i s t a n c e g r o u p s i n Hwanghae Province.

These g r o u p s would

c o n d u c t h a r r a s s m e n t o p e r a t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o cause t h e enemy t o employ i n c r e a s i n g numbers of t r o o p s i n c o u n t e r p a r t i s a n operations. Phase I I A merely expanded t h e g e n e r a l a r e a of o p e r a t i o n s

a s o u t l i n e d i n P h a s e I , emphasizing a n i n c r e a s e d e f f o r t from t h e i n t e r i o r of North Korea, and g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d t h e a r e a of o p e r a t i o n s on t h e e a s t coast. 3 8 Both Phase I and I I A

assumed t h a t E i g h t h Army would m a i n t a i n a n a c t i v e d e f e n s e r o l e (Fig. 5-3). Phase I I B assumed a n E i g h t h Army g e n e r a l

o f f e n s i v e . However, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e E i g h t h Army'mission, t h e m i s s i o n s a s s i g n e d t h e p a r t i s a n s were no d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h o s e i n Phases I and I I A .

The p l a n a l s o i n c l u d e d ] f o r t h e

f i r s t t i m e , POW camp p e n e t r a t i o n s , a s s a s s i n a t i o n s of Communist

o f f i c i a l s , use of Chinese p a r t i s a n s a l o n g t h e Yalu, and t h e c a p t u r e of M I G a i r c r a f t . Never e x e c u t e d ] FECOM dropped t h e s e

p l a n s by A p r i l , 1953 a s e i t h e r u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y conceived o r l a c k i n g n e c e s s a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e . 39
T h e s e proposed m i s s i o n s
A t t h i s time, OPC was

were h i g h l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d o p e r a t i o n s .

t h e o n l y agency t r a i n e d , equipped and a u t h o r i z e d t o c a r r y o u t such a m b i t i o u s o p e r a t i o n s . The a b i l i t y of t h e p a r t i s a n s

t o c a r r y o f f t h i s t y p e of o p e r a t i o n , and t h e a b i l i t y of
FECOM i n t e l l i g e n c e t o produce t a r g e t d a t a i n s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l

d i d n o t w a r r a n t t h e r i s k s involved.

T h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e

pl a n simply surpassed t h e p a r t i s a n s l , a b i l i t i e s .

103

F i g . 5-3

O p e r a t i o n a l Areas P l a n n e d f o r P h a s e I I A 4
(February, 1953)

A A A

West Coast:

C i r c u l a r a r e a from C H O N J U (XD9095) o n t h e N o r t h , t o KANGDONG ( 8 0 4 8 3 7 ) o n t h e E a s t , t o KYOMIPO (YC3090) on t h e S o u t h .

E a s t Coast: The AUNGNAM-PANDOK-KOJO complex, e x t e n d i n g i n a c i r c u l a r a r e a from HONGWON (DV1032) o n t h e N o r t h , t o YANGDOK ( 8 0 9 7 4 4 ) o n t h West, t o t h e c o a s t l i n e t e n (10) miles s o u t h of KOTO (DU0311) o n t h e South.
HWANGAAE P r o v i n c e : E a s t t o l i n e SINGYE (BT8664)KUMCHON (BT8026).

104

It is d i f f i c u l t t o assess t h e planners'

intent a t the
I t appears t h a t

time t h e s e p l a n s were developed and approved.

whatever t h e s c e n a r i o a t t h e a t e r l e v e l , FECOM p l a n n e r s t a c i t l y a c c e p t e d t h e p a t t e r n o f p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t y e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1951.

T h e a b i l i t y o f t h e p a r t i s a n s t o e s t a b l i s h i n t e r i o r bases and

o r g a n i z e c e l l u l a r i n t e r i o r r e s i s t a n c e i n e a r l y 1953 was much

l e s s t h a n i t was i n e a r l y 1951, due t o i n c r e a s e d enemy r e a r

t r o o p s and c o n t r o l measures employed o v e r t h e two y e a r i n t e r i m .
T h e f a c t t h a t t h e a r m i s t i c e t a l k s were n e a r c o m p l e t i o n , a s

w e l l a s a g e n e r a l l a c k o f command i n t e r e s t may have c o n t r i b u t e d

t o FECOM's i n a b i l i t y t o e f f e c t i v e l y o r g a n i z e t h e a c t i v i t i e s of these f o r c e s . While p l a n n i n g and r e c r u i t i n g took p l a c e i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of major o p e r a t i o n s i n e a r l y 1953, p a r t i s a n a c t i o n s i n 1952 more t h a n doubled. Conducting a n a v e r a g e o f

over 220 a c t i o n s monthly, p a r t i s a n s c l a i m e d over 4 0 , 0 0 0 enemy c a s u a l t i e s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d from J a n u a r y , 1952 t o J u n e , 1953. 41

T h e c a s u a l t i e s c l a i m e d by t h e p a r t i s a n s c o n s i s t e d of

r e a r a r e a m i l i t a r y , q u a s i - m i l i t a r y and l a r g e numbers of civilians. From March, 1951, t o A p r i l , 1953, U.N. partisans

mounted 1 9 a i r b o r n e o p e r a t i o n s ( F i g . 5 - 4 ) .

Most were a g a i n s t Except

major enemy r a i l w a y s and enemy t r o o p c o n c e n t r a t i o n s .

105

Fig. 5-4

FECOM Partisan Airborne Operations, 1951-53

42

106

KEY TO NUMBERED POINTS ON FIG.

5-4 Mission

Point
1
2 3
4

Code name Virginia I Spitfire Mustang 111 Mustang I V Mustang V Mustang V I Mustang VII Mustang V I I I

Date 1 5 Mar 51 18 Jun 51 22 J a n 52 1 6 Mar 52

1 4 May 52

No. of Men
24

Sabotage of r a i l / highway t r a f f i c Establish a guerril-

16

l a base 19
16 20 5 Sabotage of r a i l traffic Sabotage of r a i l traffic Sabotage of r a i l and highway t r a f f i c Sabotage of r a i l and highway t r a f f i c Sabotage of r a i l and highway t r a f f i c Sabotage of r a i l and highway traffic Establish a guerrilLa b a s e from which t o stage interior operations Sabotage of r a i l t r a f f i c on e a s t coast i n conjunction w i t h TF 95.2 Establish a guerrill a base Sabotage r a i l traffic

5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12

3 1 O c t 52 3 1 O c t 52

6
10 10 10
97

Jesse James I Jesse James I1 Jesse James I11

Green Dragon

30 Dec 52 28 Dec 52 28 Dec 52

25 J a n 53

13 14 15
16

Boxer Boxer Boxer Boxer

I I1 I1 IV

7 7 9 11

Feb Feb Feb Feb

53 53 53 53

12 12 12 12 5
40

17

Hurricane Rabbit I R a b b i t I1

3 1 Mar 53
1 Apr 53 6 Apr 53

18 19

6
389

Total

107

i n two cases, however, t h e m i s s i o n s were never accomplished,

t h e elements compromised and never h e a r d from a g a i n , presum-

a b l y l o s t t o enemy a c t i o n .

I n one i n s t a n c e , a p a r t i s a n fliers.

e l e m e n t r e p o r t e d l i n k i n g up w i t h 5 downed U.S.

An a t t e m p t t o p i c k up t h e f l i e r s was a b o r t e d a f t e r rescue
a i r c r a f t r e c e i v e d heavy enemy ground f i r e . e l e m e n t was l o s t and never r e e s t a b l i s h e d . Contact w i t h t h e
T h e American f l i e r s

never appeared i n any l a t e r p r i s o n e r exchanges. 4 3

Partisan

a i r b o r n e o p e r a t i o n s were i n e f f e c t i v e and i n s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e o v e r a l l U.N. effort. T a r g e t e d a g a i n s t major enemy l i n e s of

communication, FECOM employed i t s . p a r t i s a n s a g a i n s t t a r g e t s t h a t t h e e n t i r e Far East A i r Force had f a i l e d t o s u c c e s s f u l l y interdict. P l a n n e r s g r o s s l y m i s c a l c u l a t e d t h e a b i l i t y of t h e

p a r t i s a n s t o d e a l w i t h these t a r g e t s , s e t t i n g t h e m u p f o r f a i l u r e . I n a d e q u a t e t r a i n i n g may have been a n u n d e r l y i n g c a u s e , a s a l l e l e -

m e n t s r o u t i n e l y had t o conduct long-range ground e x t r a c t i o n

on t h e i r own.
T h i s meant e s c a p e and e v a s i o n f o r up t o a month

or l o n g e r i n a n a t t e m p t t o r e a c h t h e e a s t or west c o a s t where
a r e s c u e c o u l d be a t t e m p t e d .
T h e p a r t i s a n o p e r a t i o n s conducted i n 1953 c o n t i n u e d

t o h a r r a s s enemy r e a r a r e a t r o o p s .

However, d u e t o s t a b i l i -

z a t i o n of t h e f r o n t d u r i n g t h e a r m i s t i c e t a l k s t h e enemy

108

devoted more troops to rear area protection, increasing partisan losses. The partisans were never able to interdict

the Kaesong-Pyongyang line of-communication as specifically called for in Phases I and IIA. 4 4 Throughout this period

the partisan activities had little military significance, other than to inflict enemy casualties and cause the employment of greater numbers of enemy units in the rear aeeas for counter partisan operations. The overall effect o n the manpower-rich

CCF was minimal, and did not effect operations along the main military line of resistance. The scope of FECOM's operations were self-limited to psychological operations and guerrilla warfare. Intelligence

gathering within FECOM was limited to prisoner/refugee interrogation, ROK Army intelligence, aerial photo reconnaissance, and unit battlefield reports collected by the Military Intelligence Services Division of the G-2. FECOM did not develop an Between the CIA

agent capability during the Korean Conflict.

and the ROK Army intelligence, this capability was thoroughly developed elsewhere. FECOM special operations were controlled

by separate staff elements, as evidenced by PWD/PWS and CCRAK. The command and control structure diffused authority and blurred lines of responsibility, rather than centralizing it.

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With CCRAK, t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a b i l i t y e x i s t e d f o r FECOM t o coordinate i t s s p e c i a l operations along a u n i f i e d s t r a t e g i c direction. Eowever s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n was n o t forthcoming.

Without c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e a t e r o p e r a t i o n s and s u p p o r t by t h e a t e r a s s e t s , FECOM p a r t i s a n u n i t s c o u l d n o t s u c c e s s f u l l y mount a n y t h i n g b u t h a r r a s s m e n t o p e r a t i o n s .

The r i s k e n t a i l e d rendered deep i n s e r t i o n , p r o h i b i t i v l y

e x p e n s i v e , a s shown by t h e p a r t i s a n a i r b o r n e o p e r a t i o n s .
FECOM's i n i t i a l e f f o r t s i n 1 9 5 1 t o c o n t r o l t h e

e n t i r e s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s e f f o r t i n Korea d i d n o t succeed f o r s e v e r a l reasons.

F i r s t , FECOM a t t e m p t e d t o c o n t r o l

t h e s o p h i s t i c a t e d o p e r a t i o n s of t h e CIA w i t h a s t a f f w h i c h

had v i r t u a l l y no e x p e r t i s e .

FECOM c o u l d n o t comprehend t h e

c o m p l e x i t y and s e n s i t i v i t y of t h e CIA m i s s i o n , much l e s s command a n d c o n t r o l it. Second, CIA o p e r a t i o n s r o u t i n e l y t r a n s c e n d e d t h e FECOM a r e a of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , b o t h o p e r a t i o n a l l y and g e o g r a p h i c a l l y . Korea was a s m a l l s t r a t e g i c sideshow,

w i t h i n a l a r g e r s t r a t e g i c sideshow, t h e communist t h r e a t t o

J a p a n , w h i l e t h e s t r a t e g i c main e v e n t was t h e communist t h r e a t t o Europe, a s f a r a s t h e CIA was concerned. T h i s accur a t e l y r e f l e c t s t h e view of t h e n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p a t t h e

time a s e x p r e s s e d i n NSC-68. FECOM focused much t o o narrowly

110

on i t s "minor" c o n f l i c t i n Korea t o e x e r c i s e any a c c u r a t e p e r s p e c t i v e i n t h e c o n t r o l of s t r a t e g i c s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s . T h i r d , t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c and p e r s o n a l b i a s e s t h a t permeated b o t h a g e n c i e s d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d assumed an a d v e r s a r i a l n a t u r e , p r e c l u d i n g t h e development o f a s u b s t a n t i v e d e g r e e of mutual c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n . The m i s t r u s t MacArthur and Willoughby had for s p e c i a l u n i t s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e i r t h e a t e r b u t n o t under t h e i r e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l caused FECOM and C I A u n i t s t o i n i t i a l l y d e v e l o p a l o n g s e p a r a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l

lines.
MacArthur's s t r a t e g y for t h e c o n f l i c t , a t odds w i t h
t h a t of t h e n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , guided FECOM, and a l i e n a t e d t h e CIA.

A f t e r MacArthur's d e p a r t u r e , t h e c o m p l a i n t s of

G e n e r a l McClure a b o u t FECOM's l a c k o f c o n t r o l over C I A o p e r a t i o n s f u e l e d t h i s c o n f l i c t and m a i n t a i n e d t h e bureaucratic rift. G e n e r a l Ridgway c e n t r a l i z e d t h e m i l i t a r y ' s con*

t r o l o v e r i t s own s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e r e c o g n i z i n g t h e autonomy of t h e C I A . I n t h e absence of any c o r r o b o r a t i n g

evidence, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o s p e c u l a t e whether, c o n s i d e r ing Ridgway's f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p and t h e C I A ' S s t r a t e g i c r o l e , h e o p e r a t e d t h e FECOM p a r t i s a n program a s a cover f o r C I A o p e r a t i o n s .

T h e c r e a t i o n of CCRAK e n a b l e d t h e C I A t o c o o r d i n a t e i t s o p e r a t i o n s

111

where i t needed t o w i t h no b i n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

A l s o worth

c o n s i d e r i n g i s t h e dilemma f a c e d by m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s who formed a North Korean p a r t i s a n f o r c e of thousands, armed and t r a i n e d i t , b u t no l o n g e r had a m i s s i o n f o r i t . Turning t h e s e

men l o o s e i n South Korea was c e r t a i n l y n o t a n o p t i o n t h a t t h e

Rhee government s u p p o r t e d .

In t h i s situation,

p r o v i d i n g a cover f o r C I A o p e r a t i o n s , w h i l e t a k i n g advantage of a t r a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t y f o r U.S. d o e s n o t seem a t a l l i n f e a s i b l e .

special o p e r a t i o n s p e r s o n n e l ,

I n t h i s somewhat f a r - f e t c h e d

s c e n a r i o , i t i s . q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e FECOM s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s program was d e s i g n e d t o be no more t h a n i t was. O u t s i d e of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , t h e U.S. military's

f i r s t e x p e r i e n c e i n l i m i t e d w a r f a r e h i g h l i g h t e d new l e s s o n s
i t a t t e m p t e d t o f o r g e t , b u t was f o r c e d t o l e a r n a g a i n i n

Viet-Nam.

The d e a c t i v a t i o n of OSS f o l l o w i n g World War 11

r e p r e s e n t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s e x p e r i e n c e and d o c t r i n a l p r o c e d u r e s . D i s t a n c i n g i t s e l f from s p e c i a l operam i l i t a r y could not

t i o n s d u r i n g t h e i n t e r war y e a r s , t h e U.S.

hope t o r e b u i l d t h a t knowledge i n time t o a p p l y i t e f f e c t i v e l y

i n Korea,
T h e FECOM p a r t i s a n program was more a r e s u l t of c i r -

cumstances t h a n of d e l i b e r a t e p l a n n i n g .

The o f f e n s i v e s t r a -

112

tegy that resulted in the creation of FECOM partisan forces, changed by the time partisan units were ready for operations.

As a result, in early 1951, fully knowing no general U.N.

offensive to unite Korea would take place, FECOM found itself with thousands of armed, trained and organized North Korean guerrillas recruited to militarily reunify Korea. While

anticommunist, these elements were not necessarily supporters of the Rhee government, and were not trusted by him. This

prevented FECOM from disbanding the units in South Korea. Disbanding them in the North would either provide trained replacements t o the already massive communist manpower pool,

or subject them to capture by communist forces.

FECOM was

forced to keep the partisans organized and occupied with meaningful tasks until their future could be negotiated. Therefore these forces remained focused on harrassment operations of tactical impact designed in conjunction with a general U.N. offensive that FECOM knew would never take place.

The stated mission of causing the enemy to employ troops to the maximum in counterpartisan operations, was probably accomplished since the term "maximum" is difficult to quantify. The secondary mission of interdicting military

supply routes was not accomplished due not only to a lack of operational concentration far enough inland, but more

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p r o b a b l y because t h e m i s s i o n was u n r e a l i s t i c .

FECOM had f o c u s e d

i t s a i r f o r c e s a g a i n s t t h e s e r o u t e s i n a massive e f f o r t t h a t

dwarfed any t h e p a r t i s a n s c o u l d m o u n t .

It is d i f f i c u l t

t o u n d e r s t a n d how p l a n n e r s f e l t t h e p a r t i s a n s could succeed where

t h e Far E a s t A i r F o r c e had n o t .
I t is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e how t h i s

environment l e d t o o p e r a t i o n a l n e g l e c t a t FECOM l e v e l . The r e s u l t i n g o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g a t p a r t i s a n u n i t l e v e l l e d t o a heavy c o n c e n t r a t i o n of a c t i o n s i n s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t Bwanghae P r o v i n c e since i t was t h e home a r e a of most of t h e p a r t i s a n s .

T h i s made o p e r a t i o n s e a s i e r , l e s s r i s k y ,

and more l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n minimum f r i e n d l y c a s u a l t i e s .

In

addition, these operations d i d not i n t e r f e r e with C I A a c t i v i t i e s

t h a t may have been t a k i n g p l a c e .

Furthermore, t h e y provided a n
CIA representation,

e f f e c t i v e cover C I A c o u l d t a k e advantage o f .

(Documents Research D i v i s i o n , J A C K , Deputy D i r e c t o r of CCRAK, a s w e l l t h e a g e n t s c o - l o c a t e d on t h e o f f - s h o r e i s l a n d s ) l e n t

i t s e l f t o t h i s arrangement.
T h e ambushes, r a i d s ,

intelligence-

g a t h e r i n g , and downed p i l o t s u p p o r t a l l had t a c t i c a l v a l u e , b u t

were s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t t o t h e U.N.

effort.

Neither

FECOM's p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s nor i t s g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e

c f f o r t s c a n be c o r r e l l a t e d w i t h any s t r a t e g i c e f f e c t , f a v o r a b l e

o r o t h e r w i s e , upon t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n Korea.

114

FECOM p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p e r a t i o n s were f o c u s e d upon s u r -

r e n d e r of enemy t r o o p s , and t h e c r e a t i o n of c o n f l i c t between . N o r t h . K o r e a n s and Chinese. Though somewhat e f f e c t i v e , t h e

massive manpower p o o l a v a i l a b l e t o t h e communists and t h e r i g i d rear a r e a c o n t r o l , b o t h p h y s i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l , prec l u d e d any a p p r e c i a b l e s t r a t e g i c impact of t h i s e f f o r t . The

a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t n e i t h e r t h e Chinese nor t h e North Korean governments e v e r c o n s i d e r e d t h e i r s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s t h r e a t e n e d i n any way by t h e FECOM s p e c i a l operations effort.
The g r a d u a l a c c e p t a n c e by t h e communists of

t h e s t r a t e g i c s t a l e m a t e s i t u a t i o n i n 1951 was c l e a r l y a r e s u l t

of t h e FECOM c o n v e n t i o n a l e f f o r t b e g i n n i n g i n J a n u a r y of t h a t year. The communist f i n a l agreement t o a n a r m i s t i c e i n 1953 was

due more t o t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of t h i s same c o n v e n t i o n a l e f f o r t over two y e a r s combined w i t h t h e d e a t h of J o s e f S t a l i n t h a t y e a r t h a n a n y t h i n g else.

The FECOM s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s

e f f o r t was never t a r g e t e d a g a i n s t a n enemy s t r a t e g i c c e n t e r of g r a v i t y . Furthermore, t h e e f f o r t s of t h e FECOM p l a n n e r s

i n d i c a t e s t h a t l i t t l e e f f o r t was made t o i d e n t i f y an enemy c e n t e r of g r a v i t y commensurate w i t h t h e p a r t i s a n s ' capabilities.

I n s i m p l e terms, t h e FECOM s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s program

d u r i n g t h e Korean C o n f l i c t was s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t .

115

Though t a c t i c a l l y e f f e c t i v e , i . e .

they i n f l i c t e d c a s u a l t i e s ,

damaged or d e s t r o y e d a s s e t s , induced s u r r e n d e r s and r e s c u e d downed airmen, t h e e f f e c t of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l or s t r a t e g i c l e v e l was n o n e x i s t e n t .

FECOM SOF i n

no way degraded t h e enemy's a b i l i t y or w i l l t o c o n t i n u e t h e war.

T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t FECOM chose t o a t t a c k t h e

enemy's g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h a t t h e l e a s t e f f e c t i v e time.

FECOM

PSYOPS were d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a massive m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , t i g h t l y c o n t r o l l e d and i n d o c t r i n a t e d on a c o n s t a n t b a s i s . Though c a u s i n g some s u r r e n d e r s , t h e numbers were r e l a t i v e l y minimal.

FECOM p a r t i s a n s a t t e m p t e d t o c a u s e s i g n i f i c a n t

a t t r i t i o n a g a i n s t a m i l i t a r y f o r c e of over a m i l l i o n t r o o p s and a t a time when t h e n a t u r e of t h e war s h i f t e d from f l u i d t o static. G u e r r i l l a i n f l i c t e d c a s u a l t i e s never a f f e c t e d t h e

enemy a b i l t y t o o p e r a t e a l o n g t h e m i l i t a r y l i n e of resistance G u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s were e f f e c t i v e l l y r e -

s t r i c t e d t o Hwanghae-do p r o v i n c e by t i g h t enemy r e a r a r e a c o n t r o l and t h e s t a t i c m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n e n a b l i n g c o u n t e r partisan forces t o increasingly i n h i b i t g u e r r i l l a e f f e c t i v e n e s s over t i m e .

T h e environment f a v o r e d t h e commu-

n i s t s , a t moment t h e g u e r r i l l a s became o p e r a t i o n a l .

There i s one c a v e a t I would l i k e t o make t o t h i s assessment t h a t i s dependent upon t h e i n t e n t of General

116

Ridgway i n e a r l y 1951. I f Ridgway c o n s c i o u s l y i n t e n d e d t h a t

t h e FECOM p a r t i s a n program e x i s t a s a cover for C I A

o p e r a t i o n s , t h e n by t h e i r v e r y e x i s t e n c e , t h e p a r t s a n e f f o r t

c o u l d be s a i d t o been s t r a t e g i c a l l y e f f e c t i v e .

I t is im-

p o s s i b l e a t t h i s p o i n t t o c o n f i r m Ridgway's i n t e n t and whether C I A o p e r a t i o n s c o v e r e d by t h e p a r t i s a n s t h a t were strategically significant. Eowever, i t remains a remote

p o s s i b i l i t y worthy of c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s more i n f o r m a t i o n i s d e c l a s s i f i e d and becomes a v a i l a b l e .

C I A o p e r a t i o n s , a t times c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h FECOM, were

well planned and e x e c u t e d .

C I A planned i t s o p e r a t i o n s i n

l i n e w i t h a broad n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y f o r N o r t h e a s t A s i a , which i n c l u d e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y enhancing t h e U.N.

w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e enemy.

military posture

O p e r a t i o n STOLE i s p a r t i c u l a r l y Though i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o

i n d i c a t i v e of t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n .

d e t e r m i n e any k i n d of s u c c e s s r a t e f o r C I A o p e r a t i o n s , i t i s c l e a r t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r o p e r a t i o n s was sound.

The

c r e a t i o n of t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n was made e a s i e r by t h e broad c h a r t e r provided t h e m by N S C d i r e c t i v e s w h i c h p r o v i d e d a l i b e r a l budget, e s t a b l i s h e d C I A ' S b u r e a u c r a t i c p r i o r i t y over o t h e r governmental a g e n c i e s , and a u t h o r i z e d t h e C I A t o conduct a c t i v i t i e s o u t s i d e l i m i t s imposed on o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e p r e s e n c e of G e n e r a l Ridgway from 1 9 5 1 on,

117

s i g n i f i c a n t l y improved t h e working r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e

C I A and t h e t h e a t e r m i l i t a r y command.

Ridgway's thorough

knowledge o f t h e s t r a t e g i c . p r i o r i t i e s of t h e n a t i o n a l command a u t h o r i t y , a s w e l l a s t h e C I A m i s s i o n , was undoubtedly res p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s development. I n view o f t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r

m i s s i o n i n t h e Far E a s t , C I A o p e r a t i o n s were d e s i g n e d t o , and

i n f a c t d i d , a c h i e v e f a v o r a b l e s t r a t e g i c impact on U . N .

o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e Korean C o n f l i c t . Though a n o b s c u r e c h a p t e r i n t h e h i s t o r y o f s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s , t h e U.S. e x p e r i e n c e i n Korea i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n

t h a t i t h i g h l i g h t s s e v e r a l i s s u e s key t o t h e c o n d u c t of s p e c i a l

o p e r a t i o n s i n a l i m i t e d war s c e n a r i o .

Most s i g n i f i c a n t

h i s t o r i c a l l y , i s t h e f a c t t h a t Korea marked t h e f i r s t U . S . e x p e r i e n c e w i t h l i m i t e d war.

I t was i n t h e "Cold War"

environment t h a t s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s became r e c o g n i z e d a s a n e c e s s a r y t o o l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s .
The g e o g r a p h i c ,

o p e r a t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e environment f o r c e d p l a n n e r s t o d e v e l o p a d d i t i o n a l means t o a t t a c k t h e enemy.

T h i s caused t h e U.S.

t o d e v e l o p c o v e r t u n i t s which

c o u l d o p e r a t e o u t s i d e t h e s e new l i m i t a t i o n s , and n o t s u f f e r t h e p o l i t i c a l consequences a s l o n g as i t s o p e r a t i o n s were n o t compromised. Once convinced t h e communists would n o t h e s i t a t e

t o o p e r a t e c o v e r t l y , t h e U . S . exhumed t h e o l d OSS o r g a n i z a t i o n
and c r e a t e d t h e C I A , However, t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y had d i s t a n c e d

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i t s e l f so f a r from s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s a f t e r 1945, t h a t i t was

b a n k r u p t by 1950. A s a . r e s u l t of t h e Korea e x p e r i e n c e t h e Army

made e f f o r t s t o r e c r e a t e a s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s c a p a b i l i t y i n
t h e e a r l y 5 0 ' s r e s u l t i n g i n t h e S p e c i a l Warfare Center a t

F o r t Bragg and t h e c r e a t i o n of S p e c i a l Forces.

The competition

i n l a t e 1950 and e a r l y 1951 between

G e n e r a l MacArthur and t h e C I A r a i s e s a n i s s u e p e r t i n e n t t o t o d a y ' s environment: c o n t r o l of C I A o p e r a t i o n s by m i l i t a r y t h e a t e r commanders. MacArthur had s u c c e s s f u l l y r u n h i s own c l a n d e s t i n e o p e r a t i o n s i n World War I1 and d i d n o t t r u s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s which answered t o a n o t h e r commander. H i s c o n f l i c t w i t h Truman's s t r a t e g i c f o c u s e v e n t u a l l y l e d t o h i s
d i s m i s s a l and replacement by G e n e r a l Ridgway. Ridgway

understood t h e worldwide f o c u s of C I A and accommodated i t s o p e r a t i o n s a s needed.

T h i s worldwide f o c u s i s no d i f f e r e n t
CIA strategic

t o d a y , even w i t h t h e c r e a t i o n of USSOCOM.

o b j e c t i v e s s t i l l t r a n s c e n d those of a l l m i l i t a r y commanders i n c h i e f ( C I N C ) , and p r e c l u d e t h e i r c o n t r o l of C I A o p e r a t i o n s even w i t h i n t h e i r t h e a t e r . USSOCOM i s s t i l l a m i l i t a r y command and a s such i s a l s o l i m i t e d i n i t s l e g a l s p a n of c o n t r o l . T h e

C I A c o n d u c t s a c t i v i t i e s o n l y t h e P r e s i d e n t c a n a u t h o r i z e , and

t h e r e f o r e , m u s t be c o n t r o l l e d a t t h a t l e v e l . However, t h e m i l i t a r y SOF a d d i t i o n a l l y have a r e q u i r e m e n t t o perform s p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s w i t h NCA a p p r o v a l . T h i s i s an o v e r l a p of

119

r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t c a n o n l y be c o o r d i n a t e d a t NSC l e v e l .

c o o r d i n a t i n g agency w i t h i n t h e NSC r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e C I A , DOD,

t h e S t a t e Department and USSOCOM i s n e c e s s a r y t o r e s o l v e any

conflict.
An e f f e c t i v e agency a t NSC l e v e l c o u l d t u r n s p e c i a l

o p e r a t i o n s i n t o a c o o r d i n a t e d government e f f o r t : something t h e y have r a r e l y been. A d d i t i o n a l l y , i t s e x i s t e n c e would

c r e a t e a h i g h e r d e g r e e of v e r t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t a c t between these o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o e n s u r e c o o r d i n a t e d e x e c u t i o n and feedback.

I t i s n o t enough f o r DOD a l o n e t o r e o r g a n i z e

by c r e a t i n g a j o i n t s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s command i f i t s o p e r a t i o n s a r e n o t p a r t of a c o o r d i n a t e d governmental e f f o r t commensurate

w i t h t h e h i g h d e g r e e of s t r a t e g i c s e n s i t i v i t y and r i s k t h e s e

o p e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e . P e r s o n a l i t y and b u r e a u c r a t i c c o m p e t i t i o n p l a y s a c r i t i c a l p a r t i n t h i s arrangement. The c o m p e t i t i o n between s t r o n g w i l l e d l e a d e r s competing i n a t u r f b a t t l e c a n e a s i l y over r ide common o b j e c t i v e s .

W i lloughby s c o m p e t i t i o n

w i t h T o f t e i n l a t e 1950 i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s p o i n t . T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n

t h a t developed between G e n e r a l McClure and Frank Wisner over t h e development of Army s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s c a p a b i l i t i e s i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 5 0 ' s a s a r e s u l t of Korea i s a l s o p e r t i n e n t . 4 5 T h e t y p e of i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t make up these o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s a f a c t o r t h a t l e a d e r s must remain c o g n i z a n t of i f p r o g r e s s i s t o be made.

120

The American e x p e r i e n c e i n Korea p o i n t e d o u t t h e c r i t i c a l importance of m a i n t a i n i n g r e a d y s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e s

t h a t can conduct o p er atio n p r i o r t o a s w e l l a s a f t e r t h e

i n i t i a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s .

S t r a t e g y h a s t o d r i v e t h e d e s i g n of

SOP u n i t s , c a p a b i l i t i e s , and o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g t h a t e n a b l e
a n a t i o n t o e f f e c t i v e l y p r o t e c t i t s i n t e r e s t s i n war or peace. SOF a r e s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s which c a n be c r i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t , i f t h e y a r e a l o g i c a l p r o d u c t of a c l e a r n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y .
T h i s was n o t t h e case i n Korea.

Both FECOM and C I A had t o

FECOM s t r a t e g i c g o a l s

build c a p a b i l i t i e s during the conflict.

s h i f t e d s e v e r a l times p r i o r t o c r e a t i o n of i t s p a r t i s a n f o r c e s . I n t h e end FECOM c r e a t e d a f o r c e i t d i d n o t need, b u t c o u l d n o t disband. T h i s i s a s i g n i f i c a n t l e s s o n i n t h e u s e of i n d i g e nous f o r c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n e n s u r i n g t h a t U.S. f o r c e o b j e c t i v e s a r e , and remain, i n a l i g n m e n t . and i n d i g e n o u s Organizing

and f r a i n i n g an armed f o r c e t h a t h a s d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s c a n
be a n e x t r e m e l y dangerous u n d e r t a k i n g and must be t h o r o u g h l y

considered p r i o r t o t h e i r creation.

Even more i m p o r t a n t , i s

a thorough a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e i n v e s t m e n t b e i n g made by
these indigenous f o r c e s .

More o f t e n t h a n n o t , these s o l d i e r s

gamble t h e i r l i v e s and t h o s e of t h e i r f a m i l y , on t h e s u c c e s s o r f a i l u r e of these programs. From t h e s t a n d p o i n t of c r e d i b i l i t y

a l o n e , t h i s t y p e of program m u s t p r o v i d e f o r t h e i n d i g e n o u s

121

s o l d i e r and h i s f a m i l y i n any e v e n t u a l i t y .

The U.S.

failure t o

g r a s p t h i s i s s u e based on i t s e x p e r i e n c e i n Korea h e l p e d p r e c i p i t a t e a p a r t i c u l a r l y b i t t e r end t o U.S. f o r c e s i n Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. t r a i n e d indigenous

Along w i t h t h e development of s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s c a p a b i l i t i e s based upon s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s i d e n t i f i e d e a r l y on, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e n e c e s s a r y joint/combined command and c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e f o r these f o r c e s i s a l s o c r i t i c a l .

This

s t r u c t u r e d e f i n e s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e a t e r and i s key t o p r e v e n t i n g d u p l i c a t i o n o f e f f o r t or independent e f f o r t s toward d i f f e r i n g o b j e c t i v e s .

FECOM

s t r u g g l e d over two y e a r s from 1951 t o 1953 a t t e m p t i n g t o d e s i g n a s t r u c t u r e t h a t would e f f e c t i v e l y c o o r d i n a t e i t s efforts. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a l a c k o f c o o r d i n a t i o n f o r a time,

although. G e n e r a l Ridgway improved t h i s c o n d i t i o n a s p r e v i o u s l y discussed.

T h i s problem p o t e n t i a l l y e x i s t s t o d a y between t h p
SOF and a l l i e d

C I A and each m i l i t a r y C I N C , and between U.S.

n a t i o n s w i t h which t h e U.S.
t h e 1985 U.S.

may have t o o p e r a t e .

FOK example,

forcedown i n I t a l y of t h e a i r l i n e r c a r r y i n g t h e

A c h i l l e Lauro h i j a c k e r s , and t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n on t h e ground between U.S.

SOF and I t a l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s r e s u l t e d i n t h e e s c a p e

of t h e h i j a c k e r s .

S i n c e t h e force-down i n I t a l y was uncoordiT h i s is

n a t e d , I t a l y demanded j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e h i j a c k e r s .

a modern example of t h e n e g a t i v e impact which a l a c k of t h i s

122

coordination can have.

It is a coordination issue that is

dynamic and must be monitored constantly by SOF operations and plans officers. While Korea is not normally associated with the conduct of U.S. special operations, this study has highlighted key issues

and events that impact upon today's special operations forces. Koeea was an early example of many lessons that would be applied, misapplied and not applied in Viet-Nam. Hopefully, this study

will provide the catalyst for further study in any one of many

SOP related areas by other researchers.

Special operations is

the fastest growing, but probably the least understood area in the military today. The key to understanding and appreciating

its full potential lies in careful study of its history as a basis for internal critique, review and reform.

123

CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

'Frank R. Operations in U.S. Defense University Special Operations

--

Barnett, ed. and others, Special Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Press, 1984) "Military Capabilities and in the 1980's" by Roger M ; Pezzelle, 149.

'Alfred El. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: It9 Origins (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 19821, 73. 3Frederick W. Cleaver, and others, U.N. Partisan Wafare in Korea, 1951-1954 (U),(Washington, D.C.: The Johns HopkinsTniversity/ORO-T-64, 1956), 32. 'John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since W o m r m N e w Y o r k : William Morrow and Company, 1986), 6 2 - 6 5

'Paddock, 77-81. In developing the theme of Army/CIA discussion of JCS control of CIA operations during wartime, Colonel Paddock references: Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Washington, D.C., Memorandum f o r Record, subject: Department of the Army Assistance to the CIA in the Field of Guerrilla Warfare, 21 November, 1949, and Notes on Meeting of Representatives of CIA and NME Joint CIA/NME Tarining Program, Record Group 319, Army Operations, 1949-52, box 10, Hot Files, P & 0 370.64 T S (21 November, 19491, National Archives.
'

'Prados,

65-66.

7Paddock, 77-78. *Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: War (New Y o r k : MacMillan, 1982), . 7 6 4 The Untold Story of the

'Prados, 69. Special Activities as defined under NSC 10/2 were conducted by the OPC branch, which was not established in Northeast Asia until 1950 when Tofte arrived. "Ibid. l1Ibid.

124

'hilliam M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air . J Asia (University: TKanSpOSt and CIA Covert Operations j University of Alabama Press, 1984), 125-

--

I3Ibid. 1 4 P r a d o ~ l68. 15Leary, 72. 16Goulden, 468-469. l71bid, , 473-474. l8IbiB. , 462-464, 474; Prados, 69-70. 19Paddock, 3 4. 20Willmoore Kendall, and others, Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War (Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins University/ORO-T-17 F E C 1 9 5 1 1 , 1. 211bid. 221bid., The

,.

107-115. 119-129.

23Kilchoon Kim, Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets Early North Korean Prisoners of War (Washington D X : The Johns Hopkins University/ORO-T-4 EUSAK, 1951), 8. 24Cleaver, 6 4 . 251bid., 32-33. 261bid. 271bid.

281bid., 46, 82. "Ibid., 86, 124. American advisors attached to the partisans admitted that the accuracy of these reports amounted to approximatly one-third of that reported at best. 301bid., 82-84. 311bid., 47.

125

126

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Sheldon, Richard C. and Henry Senft. Preliminary Evaluation of Psywar Leaflets and Broadcasts --from IPOR POW Interrogations. Chevy Chase, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University/Operations Research Office ORO-T-6 (EUSAK), 1951. Smith, Myron J., Jr., ed. The Secret Wars: A Guide to Sources in English, Volume 11, Intelligence, PropagandaTand Psychological Warfare, Covert Operations, 1945-1980. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Books, 1982.

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Smith, R. Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence A g m B e r k e l e y : University of California Press, 1972. Stone, I.F. _ The . Hidden History of the Korean Monthly Review Press, 1952.

s. New York:

Thompson, Annis G. The Greatest Airlift. Tokyo: Dai Nippon Printing Co, 1954. Voorhees, Melvin B. Korean Tales. New York: Simon and Schusterr 1952. Warner, Denis. Out of the Gun. London: Hutchinson Publishers, 1956. Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous New York: Knopf, 1956.

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vith History.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS Kesaris, Paul, ed. CIA Research Reports: Japan, Korea, and the Security of Asia, 1946-1976. Frederick, MD: Univerity Publications of America, 1983. Microfilm. Reel 1, 3.

. Documents of the National Security Council. University Publications of America, Washington, D.C.:
1980. Microfilm. Reel 1,2,3. Department Intelligence and Research Korea, Southeast Asia, a n d t h e Far East Generally: 1950-1961 Supplement. Washington, D.C.: - v University Publications of America, 1979. Microfilm. Reel V. McGee, John 8. "A Study of Internal Warfare (U)." Seoul: Far East Command, 1952. Typewritten. (SECRET) Director of Intelligence, Far East Air Force. "Evasion and Escape Reports (U)." Seoul: Far East Air Force, 1952. (CONFIDENTIAL).
U.S.

. OSS/State Reports: Japan,

Department of State. Foreiqp Relations of The United States, 1950, Vol 6, East Asia and the Pacific. Washington, D.C., 1976.

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Foreign R e l a ti o n s of t h e United S t a t e s , 1951, Vol 1, N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s , Washington, O.C. 1976.

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. .

Foreign R e l a ti o n s of t h e United S t a t e s . 1951, Vol 6 ( 2 p t s ) , A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c , Washington O.C., l 3 7 r

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M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y Detachment T h r e e , Army F o r c e s Far E a s t , U.N. P a r t i s a n f o r c e s in t h e Korean C o n f l i c t , J a n u a r y , 1953. ( M i c r o f i l m )

U.S.

Congress. S e n a t e . Armed S e r v i c e s and F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Cornmiittee, M i l i t a r y S i t u a t i o n --i n t h e Far E a s t . 82nd Congress, F i r s t S e s s i o n , (Washington, O.C.: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 5 1 ) .

J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f , Unifed A c t i o n Armed F o r c e s (UNAAF), JCS P u b l i c a t i o n Number 2 , (Washington O.C.: J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f , 1 9 8 6 ) .

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Beebe, J o h n E . , J r . , " B e a t i n g t h e G u e r r i l l a . " M i l i t a r y Review, 25, (December, 1 9 5 5 ) .

B u r k e , R o b e r t L., " M i l i t a r y C i v i c A c t i o n . " ( O c t o b e r , 1 9 6 4 ) , 62-71.

M i l i t a r y Review, 4 4 ,

C h a p e l l e , Dickey "Our Secret Weapon i n t h e F a r E a s t . " R e a d e r ' s Digest, 76, (June, 1 9 6 0 ) . Oarraugh, Shaun M. , "Hwanghae-do: 34, (11 November, 1 9 8 4 ) .
c

The War of t h e Donkeys. "Army,

H a r t , Henry C. "United S t a t e s Employment o f Underground F o r c e s . " M i l i t a r y Review, 26, no. 3 , (March, 1 9 4 7 ) . L a r r a b e e , E. "Korea: t h e M i l i t a r y Lesson." H a r p e r ' s , (November, 1 9 5 0 ) , 51-57. 201,

P a s c h a l l , Rod. " S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s i n Korea." C o n f l i c t , 7 , (November 2 , 1 9 8 7 ) , 155-178.

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Smithl Beverly. "Why W e Went t o War i n Korea." S a t u r d a y Evening P o s t , (November 1 0 , 1 9 5 1 ) .

INTERVIEWS G i f f o r d , J a c k J., h i s t o r i a n , Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e . I n t e r v i e w by t h e a u t h o r , 1 8 A p r i l , 1988, F o r t Leavenworth. Transcript. Goulden, J o s e p h C., a u t h o r of Korea: The Untold S t o r y of t h e War N e w York: MacGraw-Hill Books, 1982. Telephone i n t e r v i e w by t h e a u t h o r , 1 1 January , 1988, F o r t Leave nwor t h ,
L

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P a s c h a l l , Rod., D i r e c t o r , U.S. Army M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y I n s t i t u t e , Telephone i n t e r v i e w by t h e a u t h o r , 18 September, 1987, F o r t Leavenworth. Vanderpool, J a y D. O r a l h i s t o r y i n t e r v i e w by John R. McQuestion, 1983. USAMEI O r a l H i s t o r y T r a n s c r i p t .

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