Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. 190G.R. No.

78780 (July 23, 1987)Chapter XI, Page 447, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Pet itio ners submit that any tax withheld from their emolum e nts andcompensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Sec. 10, Art. 8 of the Constitution mandating thatduring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased, even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. HELD: Yes. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. According to Perfecto vs. Meer, income taxes are part of the diminutiono f jud ges salaries because th e independence o f judges is o f far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Endenciavs. David confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i.e. Fox, Concepcion, and Bernas), asthe alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms themeaning of Sec. 10 Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; that is, to make the salaries of themembers of the judiciary taxable. Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan Case No. 106G.R. No. 79543 (October 16, 1996)Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.80 FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court f or the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. Upon the capture of his co-accused, he was pointed out as the mastermind. When Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. On May 30, 1982, Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened), without the presence of a counsel. The1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Petitioners extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel.2. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. HELD: 1. Yes, it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible.2. No. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution

J.M. Tuason & Co. Vs Land Tenure AdministrationGR No. L-21064Where: Tatalon Estates, Quezon City When: February 18, 1970 Organic Law: 1935 Constitution (As amended in 1940)1935 Constitution: Article XIII, Sec. 4The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.Republic Act 2616 An act providing for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City and for the sale, at cost, of the lots therein to their present bona fide occupants, and authorizing the appropriation of ten million pesos for the purpose. Facts: Petitioners are the owners of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City, the land being expropriated by Congress in RA 2616. The land is being expropriated by the state to its current occupants in the exercise of the states power of eminent domain. The petitioners sought to nullify Republic Act 2616 and challenged its constitutionality. According to them, the Constitution clearly said lands and not landed estates, therefore, Congress has no power to expropriate the Tatalon Estate which is considered as a landed estate. Issue: Is RA 2616 unconstitutional? Held: No, RA 2616 is valid and constitutional. The words used in the constitution should be given their ordinary meaning, unless it is a word that has acquired technical interpretation. The word lands has a broad sense, enough to cover even landed estates. The intent of the framers of the constitution to grant Congress the power of eminent domain as a tool for social justice cannot be frustrated by bad construction.

Civil Liberties Union V. Executive Secretary When: February 22, 1991 Operative Statue: 1987 Constitution Facts Executive Order 284 was issued stating the following Section 1 : Even if allowed by law, a member of the cabinet cannot hold more than two positions in the government and receive corresponding compensation thereof Section 2: If a member of the cabinet holds more than two positions, he must relinquish the excess position to the one next in rank Section 3: At lease 1/3 of the boards of GOCCs should be cabinet members Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion stating that cabinet members may hold other public office when a.) allowed by the constitution b.) allowed by law c.) allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions, citing Section 7, paragraph 2 of article 9 of the constitution. The said provision states that unless otherwise provided by law or by the primary functions of their office, no

appointed official shall hold any other office or employment in the government..Petitioners allege that this E.O. is unconstitutional as it runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the constitution which prohibits cabinet members from holding any other office, profession or employment during their tenure. Issues: W/N E.O. 284 is unconstitutional Held: Yes. it is contrary to the constitution in the sense that it allows cabinet members to hold an extra position when the constitution generally does not allow them to do so. Cabinet members are only allowed to hold extra positions when it is specifically provided in the constitution. Latin Maxims: 1.)(9a) Ratio Legis est Anima Legis = The reason of the law is the soul of the law The intent of the framers was to make the restrictions stricter for the executive branch2.)(B2) Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verification excluditur = a patent ambiguity can be cleared up by extrinsicevidence The ambiguity of the two seemingly contradictory provisions can be clarified by looking at the records of the discussions of the framers of the constitution 3.)(6c) Verba legis non est recedendum = From the words of the statue there should be no departure(43a) Strictissimi Juris = Follow the law strictly(36d) Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum = the best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself The constitution is clear that cabinet officials cannot hold any other position in the government or practice any other profession during their tenure.4.)(12a) Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret = that the interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice(37) Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat = the law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it To declare the E.O. as constitutional and to follow the interpretation of the Secretary of Justice would render the stricter limitations on the executive department inoperative and would defeat the purpose of preventing cabinet members from using government positions as cash cows Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary Case No. 64G.R. No. 83896 (February 22, 1991)Chapter XI, Pages 443, 450 and 454, Footnotes No. 41, 51 and 71 FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows membersof the Cabinet, the ir undersecreta rie s and ass istant secretarie s to ho ld o ther government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. This runs counter to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2. HELD: No . A fo olproo f yar dstick in co nstitutio na l co nstructi on is the intentio n underlying the provision. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of selfenrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. The qualifying phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution of Sec. 13, Art. 7 cannot po ssibly refer to the broad except io ns o f Sec . 7 , Art. 9 -B o f the 19 87Constitution. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and

meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O.284 is therefore declared null and void

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. et al. v. Ramos et al. 27 January 2004

Background: Nature and Case History25 July 1987 EO 279 authorized DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-ownedcorporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistancefor large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendationof the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, thePresident shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country thatwill be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will bepromoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scalemining, fo r purpo se of this Sectio n, shall mean those pro po sals fo r co ntracts or agreements for m ineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single miningunit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000. 00) 3 March 1995 RA 7942 signed into law 30 March 1995 Government entered FTAA with WMCP 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato . 9 April 1995 30 days after publication on 10 March 1995, RA 7942 took effect 20 December 1996 DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued DAO 96-40 10 January 1997 counsels for petitioner sent letter to Ramos demand ing DENR to stop implementing RA7942 and DAO 96-40. No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary injunction(denied) claiming that petitioner Ramos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the assailedConstitutionality of RA 7942 [1], of DENR Administrative Order 96-40 [2], and of the Financial and TechnicalAssistance Agreement entered into on 30 March 1995 between the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines) , Inc.. 23 January 2001 Manifestation of respondents that WMCP is no longer foreign-owned as WMC has sold100% of its equity to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is 60% owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is renamed as Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation. 18 December 2001 DENR approved the transfer and registration of FTAA to Sagittarius from WMCP. Supreme Court said that this manifestation and transfer does not render the issue moot since the question of validity of the FTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius. Facts of the Case -Stated in case historyIssue/s Preliminary Issue: Standing of Petitioners 1WON EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days before President Aquinos legislative powers expired with the convening of Regular Congress and having thus took effect after which.2WON RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and consequently the FTAA entered pursuant to abovestated laws is invalid Ratio Decidendi Preliminary Issue: Petitioners have standing since they are residents of the land covered by the FTAA. Sincethe petition if for mandamus and prohibition and the issue is of constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme is nolonger concerned whether or not petitioners are real parties of interest to the contract/agreement. 1NO. EO 279 is valid and whether or not the laws effectivity date lies beyond the

expiration of the Presidentslegislative power is irrelevant since it was still enacted when the president held such power. It does not runcounter to EO 200 requiring laws to have 15 days after publication requirement before its effectivity since EO200 also provides unless it is otherwise provided, EO 279 having stated its own effectivity as shall take effect immediately. In addition, the 15-day post-publication requirement was for the information of the public and does not in any way affect the date of enactment and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279 nonetheless was published on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987. 2Yes. The 19 87 Co nstitution prov ides Th e P resident m ay enter into agreem ent s wit h fo reign-ow nedcorporations involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based o n real co ntributio ns to the eco nom ic growth and general welfare of the co untry. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.*3+ The Co nstitutio n prov ides fo r fo ur mo des by which the States m ay explo re, dev elo p, and Utilize Natural Resources(1) State may directly undertake such activities(2) State may enter into co-production, jointventure or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations (60% Filipino owned)(3) Congress may allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens(4) For the large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils,the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporation for technical or financial assistance. The framers of this Constitution expressly omitted the phrase service contracts that was provided for in the1973 Constitution which allowed foreign companies to manage and operate mining activities and replaced it with technical or financial assistance only. RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP allows for the management and operation of the foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. Although counsel for respondents claim that technical is a very bro ad term that m ay cover the m anagement and o peration of such activities, it is still clear from the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to limit the utilization of the natural resources for the sole enjoyment of the Filipinos. Decision Petition Granted. Certain provisions of RA 7942 are declared null and void. So are all provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc. Appendix: [1] Philippine Mining Act of 1995[2] Implementing Rules and Regulations pursuant to RA 7942 issued by the DENR[3] Cont. Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 4 Const. Art. XII Sec. 2.All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by theState. Wit h the exceptio n o f agricultural lands, all other natural reso urces shall n o t be alienated. Theexploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centumof whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-fiveyears, renewable for not mo re than twenty -fiv e years, and under such term s and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than thedevelopment of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. The State

shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusiveeconomic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well ascooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, andlagoons. The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical of financialassistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineralo ils acco rding to the genera l terms and co nditions prov ided by law, based o n real co ntri but io ns to theeco nom ic growth and general w e lfare of the co untry . In suc h agreem ent s, the State shall promo te the devel opment and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within

Sarmiento v. Mison Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court held that the President has the authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full authority and functions of the office and receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and the petition in intervention, without costs. Issue: Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. in unconstitutional? Held: No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution empowers the President toappoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration ofsubjects excludes others not enumerated. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to

presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Under the 1935 Constitution,the commission was frequently transformed into a venue of horse- trading and similar malpractices. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition. The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of

the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Sarmiento vs Mison(Dec 17, 1987)

Petitioner: Ulpiano Sarmiento and Juanito ArcillaRespondent/s: Salvador Mison (Commissioner of Bureau of Customs) andGuillermo Carague (Sec. of Dept of Budget)Ponente: Padilla Petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin Mison from performing functions of the Office of the Commission of the Bureau of Customs Facts: Petitioners filed this motion for prohibition to bar Mison from performing the duties of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin Carague as Sec of Budget from effecting the disbursement of Misons salary and emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment is unconstitutional by reason of its being not confirmed by the Commission on Appointment. Because public interest demands, the Court will set aside technicalities like petitioners lack of standing and whether prohibition is the proper remedy. Commission on Appointment filed a motion for intervention. Issue: Is the appointment of Mison to his position constitutional? Held: Yes. Petitions for prohibition and intervention are DISMISSED.Constitution Construction:Abad Santos (in Gold Creek Mining Corp vs. Rodriguez)- Fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it.---in other words, provisions must be construed not in accordance with how the executive or legislative wants but in accordance with what they say. Sec 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, bylaw, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The P resident shall have the pow er to make appo intm ents during the recess o f the Co ngre ss, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Presidential Appointees are divided into 4:1.Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of AFP from the rank of colonel and naval captain and

others whose appointment are vested in him by the Constitution2 . A l l o t h e r o f f i c e r s o f t h e G o v t w h o s e a p p o i n t m e n t a r e n o t o t h e r w i s e provided for by law3.Those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint 4. Officers lower in rank whose appointment the Congress may by law vest in the President alone First category needs confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. What about the other three categories? J Abad Santos (in Gold Creek) In deciding this point, it should be borne inmind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and ado pted in the light and understanding of prio r and existing laws and with reference to them.19 35 Co nstitution say s ALL presidential appo intme nts are subjec t to the a p p r o v al of the Commission on Appointments. 1973 Constitution saysP r e s i d e n t m a y a p p o i n t o f f i c e r s , w i t h o u t a c o n d i t i o n a l a p p r o v a l f r o m Commission on Appointments. 1987 seeks a middle ground because 1935Consti turned commission into a venue of horse - trading and malpractices while 1973 Co nsti was form ed in the autho ritarian pattern. Co urt say s 1 st gro up requires approv al of comm issio n while the latter three do not need approv al. (this is supported by the quoted proceedings o f the Co nCom of 1986 where it proposed to delete the words and bureaus after departmentsamong other revisions)Senator Neptali Gonzales contend that the word also in the second sentence of Section 16 Article 7 implied that President shall in like manner appoint o fficers m entioned in 2 nd sentenc e. In o ther words, P res ide nt sha ll also appoint officers with approval of Commission. ---Court said the fact that only 1st sentence spoke o f appo intm ent with approval o f comm issio n while 2 nd sentence spoke only of appointment meant that approval only applied to 1 st category.Power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character solim itatio ns and qualificatio ns o n suc h power sho uld be strictly co nstrued against them. Limitations should be clearly stated to be recognized.W o r d a l o n e i n p o w e r m a y b e v e s t e d i n t h e P r e s i d e n t alone, is slip in dra ftsm anship and doe s no t mean that o therwise the power is vested in President and another body otherwise. Third sentence could have dropped the word alone.11 concur. 2 dissent, voting to grant petition