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World Development Vol. 27, No. 7, pp. 11151128, 1999 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0305-750X/99/$ see front matter

PII: S0305-750X(99)00058-3

Expected Failures and Unexpected Successes of Land Titling in Africa

KATHRYN FIRMIN-SELLERS and PATRICK SELLERS * Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
Summary. The imposition of market-oriented economic reforms throughout Africa in the 1990s has sparked renewed debate over the desirability of state-sponsored land titling programs. Proponents argue that land titling is an essential foundation for economic growth. Opponents contend that titling programs are unnecessary and premature at best, or detrimental at worst. This paper addresses these concerns through an examination of Cameroon's 1974 Lands Ordinance. Using both quantitative and qualitative data, we nd that the 1974 Lands Ordinance has not introduced Western-style private property rights in Cameroon's agrarian sector. Nevertheless, the ordinance is not irrelevant to rural farmers. Rural farmers have used the ordinance to obtain concrete boundary markers on their land, enhancing their tenure security. In addition, administrators have used the ordinance to register underdeveloped land, reducing the contradictions between state law and customary law. These ndings suggest that policymakers could fruitfully redesign their land tenure policies to render them more attractive to rural farmers, and thereby give the state a more constructive role in enhancing tenure security, and in promoting economic growth. 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. INTRODUCTION The imposition of market-oriented economic reforms throughout Africa in the 1990s has sparked renewed debate over the desirability of state-sponsored land titling programs. Proponents argue that land titling is an essential foundation for economic growth. The security titling provides is a precondition for long-term capital investment, the availability of credit, and the development of land and labor markets. For this reason, the state must play an active role in administering, and perhaps promoting, individual titling. Conversely, opponents contend that titling programs are unnecessary and premature at best, or detrimental at worst. Though tenure security is essential to economic growth, titling programs do little to promote such security. As a result, the state should not interfere with communal land tenure arrangements. In this paper, we argue that the debate about titling programs is ill-conceived. Critics argue that titling has not worked as envisioned. As we will demonstrate, there is merit to their critique. The majority of rural farmers have not received

private title to their land, and there is little apparent connection between private title and increased capital investment on the land. It would be erroneous to infer however that all state-sponsored eorts to enhance tenure security are inherently awed. Our evidence also demonstrates that rural farmers have selectively used components of one country's titling programnotably the placement of boundary markersto enhance their security. The farmers' actions suggest, rst, that farmers are troubled by insecure tenure; and second, that farmers believe state intervention may alleviate that insecurity. Thus, our ndings suggest that policy makers could fruitfully redesign their approach to land tenure and so give the state a more positive role in promoting economic growth. We develop this argument in three stages. First, we outline the theory guiding most titling programs and review the major critiques of that

* This

research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9601138. Final revision accepted: 22 December 1998.

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theory. Second, we look at one country's experience with land titlingCameroon's application of the 1974 Land Ordinanceand nd that the critics' charges are at least partially valid. Titling has not worked as intended in Cameroon. Third, we seek to move beyond the critiques. We show that farmers and bureaucrats have adapted the formal programs to better serve their immediate needs. In our conclusion, we review our ndings and discuss their implications for property rights theory and for future policy formulation.

2. THE LAND TITLING DEBATE The theoretical basis for most titling programs lies in what Platteau (1996) calls the evolutionary theory of property rights (see also Alchian, 1965; Barzel, 1989; Demsetz, 1967; North and Thomas, 1973; Ruttan, 1978). According to this evolutionary theory, communal property rights systems evolve in response to a change in relative factor prices. The change in relative factor prices may be caused by technological innovation, population pressure, or commercialization. In any case, the price change generates valuable economic rents that are not assigned under the extant property right system. To capture these rents, individuals demand a move toward a more narrowly dened property rights system, typically understood as private property rights. The state can facilitate the move toward this new property rights system through titling programs. Titling ends disputes among competing claimants and precludes future disputes. Titling therefore ensures that an individual's productive resources are not diverted to unproductive, rent-seeking behavior (World Bank, 1989). Critics attack this evolutionary theory on multiple fronts.1 Economists, for example, concede that a change in relative factor prices prompts a change in property rights. But they argue that state-led titling programs aimed at accelerating or reinforcing that change are premature because complementary markets have not yet developed. Thus, titling will not enhance a farmer's access to credit because credit markets simply are immature. In addition titling does not ensure that land will go to the most valued use because a market for land often does not exist (Barrows and Roth, 1989; Bruce, 1986; Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; MigotAdholla et al., 1994).

Likewise, students of public policy accept the fundamental premise of the evolutionary theory, but oppose titling programs nonetheless. They believe that most developing country bureaucracies are undernanced, poorly trained, and often corrupt. Bureaucrats therefore lack the technical capacity to survey land, adjudicate disputes, and maintain adequate recordsall prerequisites to a successful titling program (Feeny, 1988; Migot-Adholla et al., 1994; Shipton, 1988). Other scholars oer more fundamental critiques. Anthropologists, for example, assert that the evolutionary theory misapprehends the very nature of customary tenure. Across Africa, customary land tenure is complex because multiple users hold rights to a single resource (Bromley, 1989). For example, women, men, and traditional authorities may all hold rights to a single piece of land. Women may hold usufruct rights to cultivate food crops; men hold usufruct rights to plant tree crops; and traditional authorities have the right to harvest the ``fruits of the forest''wild game, timber, etc. The Western notion of private property rights cannot accommodate this complexity. As a result, titling programs inevitably disinherit a substantial portion of the population (usually women, migrants, and youths), increasing, rather than decreasing, overall insecurity of tenure (Atwood, 1990; Bruce and Fortmann, 1989; Goheen, 1988; Watts, 1993). Sociologists and political scientists target the evolutionary theory's conception of individual actors and of property rights. Evolutionary theorists see individuals as autonomous and isolated. Individuals make choices without reference to other actors; and individual rights are juridical constructs enforced by the centralized state. In reality, individuals are members of larger communities. Individuals make choices contingent upon the preferences and actions of other community members; and their property rights are socially constructed by that community (Eggertsson, 1993; Platteau, 1996). Rights exist in a meaningful sense only when community members recognize and accept them as legitimate. Private property rights are often viewed as illegitimate precisely because they disinherit so many community members, as noted above. Thus, community members respond to the introduction of private property with ``determined resistance,'' ignoring, violating, and violently opposing those rights (Platteau, 1996, p. 57). Such actions make private property

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rights dicult, if not impossible, to enforce and greatly diminish their value. Recognizing this, farmers may never demand a move toward private property rightseven when relative factor prices changeand state eorts to impose private property rights will fail. Regardless of their theoretical perspective, critics of the evolutionary theory agree that titling programs are inappropriate, and that the state should do little or nothing to eect a change in property rights. Customary tenure is believed to provide an adequate foundation for development within the given economic, political, and sociological context. Empirical research regarding land tenure and titling programs is ambiguous and has done little to end this ongoing debate. Titling's proponents point to evidence that, though customary land tenure persists across Africa, customary law has evolved to grant increasingly narrow, more specic rights to land holders (Bates, 1989; Berry, 1984; Bruce, 1986; Downs and Reyna, 1988; Feder and Noronha, 1987; Migot-Adholla et al., 1991). That is, customary law has come to approximate Western private property rights more closely. Moreover, land transfersthrough mortgage and unregistered sales, for exampleoccur with increased frequency, suggesting that community norms blocking titling programs are weakening (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991). Meanwhile, titling's opponents highlight evidence that programs have not increased tenure security because so few farmers have taken advantage of those programs. Farmers nd these programs unattractive because they do not oer increased access to credit; because they are prohibitively expensive; and because they do not allow the applicant to respect customary obligations (e.g., protecting his descendants' rights to land). Consequently, most land titles are awarded to politicians and businessmena fact that only increases farmers' resentment of, and resistance tothe titling programs themselves (Bayart, 1989; Feeny, 1988; MacKenzie, 1993; Shipton, 1988). Given the contradictory nature of the existing evidence, it behooves us as scholars to reformulate our theoretical questions and return to the data. Rather than ask whether titling programs have failed, we should ask how programs have succeeded. We should ask how farmers and administrators have modied titling programs to satisfy their current needs, and what their actions imply about customary

tenure and about the appropriate design of future land policy. To this end, we examine the farmers' and administrators' response to the imposition of the 1974 Lands Ordinance in Cameroon. The 1974 Lands Ordinance stipulates that all farmers who have peacefully occupied and productively used a given parcel of land prior to 1974 may step forward to register and receive legal title to that land. An individual's title request proceeds through several stages. First, the individual deposits his or her application at the local lands department oce. Second, a consultative commission inspects the land and, if the land has been developed and no one objects, places concrete boundary markers on the land. A technical team surveys the land to delineate formally the parcel's size and location. In theory, the consultative commission and technical survey team's work coincide. In practice, because few bureaucrats possess the necessary technical expertise, farmers often receive the boundary markers before their land has been surveyed (Fisiy, 1992, p. 94). Third, the local lands department forwards the application to the provincial, then national lands oces for review and approval. If each oce grants its approval, the national oce will award a certicate of title, which it forwards to the provincial oce. At each stage, applicants pay a new set of fees, and other individuals may voice their opposition to the title request. To assess the impact of the 1974 Ordinance, we chose to work within two Bamil ek e kingdoms in the western and northwestern provinces: Bab et e and Akum. We chose to work among the Bamil ek e because, historically, the Bamil ek e region is one of the most densely populated areas in Cameroon, and because the region is heavily involved in commercial coee production and in cattle rearing (Dongmo, 1981). These factors have created a severe land shortage, making the region an ideal test case for evolutionary based theories and policy. If titling programs are appropriate anywhere in Africa, they should be appropriate here. We compiled information on all title requests in Bab et e, the rst of the traditional kingdoms, over 197496. We included all requests initiated and abandoned, partially completed, blocked by opposition, and completed. We were unable to collect comparable data for Akum, the second kingdom, and so compiled information about completed title requests only.2 In both kingdoms, we gathered information about the claimants' gender, occupation, and place of

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residence; about the land's location, level of development, and type of use. In addition, we gathered information about the stage at which the titling process had been abandoned or opposed, and about how farmers used their title once it had been awarded. Finally, we conducted interviews with government bureaucrats administering the ordinance and with farmers in each kingdom. We contend that Cameroon's 1974 Lands Ordinance has not achieved policy makers' stated aims: it has not brought Western-style private property rights to Cameroon's rural areas, and it has not generated an agrarian middle class. Nevertheless, the ordinance has not been irrelevant to rural farmers, because both farmers and state ocials have modied the law to satisfy farmers' perceived needs. Rural farmers used the ordinance to receive concrete boundary markers, rather than formal title. The markers grant no legal right or protections, and they do not give access to credit markets. Yet farmers believed the markers enhanced their tenure security because community members recognized the markers as symbols of an individual's eective occupation of the land. At the same time, administrators have modied the ordinance to protect customary land tenure. The 1974 Ordinance prohibits the titling of under or undeveloped land. Bamil ek e custom, however, obligates the family head to preserve land for his family members' future use. Administrators have resolved this contradiction in favor of customary law by selectively registering underdeveloped land. In so doing, administrators have made the ordinance more attractive to rural farmers. This theoretical argument generates the following hypotheses:
(a) Politicians, businessmen, and urban residents are more likely to apply for and receive title than are farmers and rural residents. (b) Farmers in rural areas are more likely to apply for and receive boundary markers, and then stop the titling process, than are politicians, businessmen and urban residents. (c) Landowners who have not yet developed their land are as likely to receive boundary markers or title as are landowners who have developed their land.

Ordinance. The subsequent section provides empirical support for the second and third hypotheses and, in so doing, assesses the ordinance's potential successes.

3. THE FAILURE OF THE 1974 LANDS ORDINANCE With the passage of the 1974 Lands Ordinance, Cameroon's government hoped to encourage the formation of an agrarian middle class, a group of farmers capable of managing large, mechanized farms in the rural areas (Fisiy, 1992, p. 187). Titling was an integral part of the process. Private title would enhance individual tenure security (because private property rights trumped customary rights), giving farmers an incentive to invest. Moreover, private title would give farmers access to credit markets (because land could now be used as collateral for loans), giving farmers the capacity to invest. Has the 1974 Ordinance achieved these stated goals? A cursory analysis of the titles granted since 1974 suggests not. First, the majority of titles to land have been awarded to state elites (politicians and bureaucrats) and businessmen. In his analysis of titling in the Northwest Province, for example, Fisiy found that state elites and businessmen claimed nearly 83% of all titles (Fisiy, 1992, pp. 9495). The data from Bab et e and Akum echo these ndings. As presented in the top half of Table 1, farmers obtained only 22.08% of all titles granted in Akum during 197496. In Bab et e, farmers received less than one-quarter of all titles; businessmen and politicians obtained the remaining 75%.

Table 1. Land titles granted during 197496 in Akum and Bab et e, by occupation and location Akum Occupation Farmers Businessmen Politicians Location Urban Peri-urban Rural Bab et e

17 35 25 0 61 18

22.08% 45.45% 32.47% 100.00% 0% 77.22% 22.78% 100.00%

49 125 23 147 42 8

24.87% 63.45% 11.68% 100.00% 74.62% 21.32% 4.06% 100.00%

The next section investigates the rst of these hypotheses. More generally, it seeks to document the apparent failure of the 1974 Lands

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Second, the majority of titles have been awarded in urban and peri-urban aras, rather than in rural areas. Again, Fisiy calculates that 79% of all titles in the Northwest Province were awarded in the Mezam division, home to Bamenda, the province's urban center. The bottom half of Table 1 suggests that similar patterns occurred in Akum and Bab et e. In the former region, over 77% of all titles were awarded in urban or peri-urban areas. The corresponding gure in Bab et e was even higher, reaching nearly 96%.3 Third, and by extension, a large percentage of the population has been unaected by the ordinance, or has found its claims jeopardized. This is most evident in the case of women. According to Bamil ek e custom, men exercise ownership rights to tree crops, women exercise ownership rights to food crops. Both have access rights to land (Goheen, 1988; Ouden, 1981). With commercialization, women's rights have been threatened. As male farmers seek to expand their economic prot, planting larger numbers of coee trees, they make it impossible for women to continue with food crop cultivation. The titling program has accelerated this process by giving men additional leverage for ignoring women's traditional claims. In theory, women could strengthen their claims by applying for title themselves, but few women have the resources for such an action. Indeed, only 3.2% of all titles in the Northwest Province went to women (Fisiy, 1992, p. 106). Women applied for only 6.36% of all titles in Bab et e, and received only 7.58% of all titles granted in the region. In Akum women won only 5.06% of all titles. Fourth, few successful applicants have used their title to mortgage and/or sell their land, and so gain access to the nascent credit market. Individuals using their titles for further commercial transactions made up 9.03% of all title recipients in Akum and in Bab et e. Threequarters of the title holders obtained mortgages, while the remainder sold their land to other parties. What explains the apparent failure of the 1974 Ordinance? Certainly, some of the criticisms levied against all titling programs are relevant to the Cameroon case. First, Cameroon's rural credit market is underdeveloped (Gurgand, Pederson and Yaron, 1994; Lubin, 1995). Second, titling is a long, uncertain process. Nationally, only 6% of all applicants successfully navigate the titling process. In Bab et e, 18.80% of all applicants eventually re-

ceived title. Those who did waited an average of 6.3 years between their initial application and the actual receipt of title. Third, the current titling program is expensive and corrupt. Originally, the 1974 Lands Ordinance required applicants to pay few of the costs associated with land titling. Applicants paid the cost of placing boundary markers on their land, and they nanced the technical team's survey and mapping of the land. In 1989, with the imposition of structural adjustment programs, the Cameroonian government revised this fee schedule. Henceforth, all title applicants paid an initial fee of 3,000 FCFA. With this, the consultative commission could visit the land and place the concrete boundary markers. Applicants paid an additional 27,000 FCFA when lands department ocials surveyed the applicants' land. In addition, applicants paid when the received their ocial title: 10 FCFA/ square meter of titled land in urban areas, and 3 FCFA/square meter of titled land in rural areas (Interview with civil servants in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 3, 1997). In Bab et e and Akum, the latter averaged 270,941 FCFA in urban areas and 208,294 FCFA in rural areas. In addition to these legal expenses, title applicants also paid a host of unocial fees. In 1989, again as part of new structural adjustment programs, Cameroon's central government slashed funding for the lands department. Lands department ocers, no longer able to provide basic services, shifted the burden to private citizens. Thus, applicants were required to pay the cost of transporting the lands department's consultative commission and technical survey team to the applicant's land, and of feeding the two groups when their work was complete (Interview with civil servants in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 3, 1997). Moreover, applicants were asked to pay for all materials and supplies, from the paper booklet in which the title was recorded to the envelope and stamps used to mail the application to Yaound e. Many applicants made additional contributions to lands department ocers to hasten their requests (Interview with civil servants in Lands Department, Bafoussam, April 7, 1997). Fisiy (1992, p. 149) argues that the expense involved makes titling a ``spare tyre,'' a form of insurance that most farmers cannot aord. The relevance of other explanations, however, is less certain. For example, it is not clear that community norms explain the program's failure. In both Bab et e and Akum, traditional authorities support the land titling program,

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and recognize their citizens' rights to buy and sell land.4 They insist only that they be apprised of all such transactions (so that they might collect the fees associated with those transactions). Similarly, it is not clear that citizens believe customary tenure provides adequate security, and that state titling programs are superuous. In both Bab et e and Akum, all of the farmers interviewed believed that their land rights had been threatened, either by family members trying to sell family land, or by neighbors who trespassed established boundaries. Nearly all of the traditional authorities stated that land disputes were common in their own regions or in neighboring regions.5 Judicial and administrative ocials conrm the land disputes' prevalence. Land disputes comprised 50% of all cases brought before the Akum Village Council during 196776, and 33% of all cases during 198496 (private archives of Akum village council member). A western province court clerk estimates that land cases constitute onethird of all cases brought before the provincial courts (Interview with court clerk, Mbouda, April 9, 1997). Finally, lands department ocials complain that the western and northwestern provinces are the most litigious in the country, and that nearly all title requests are opposed at some stage (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 10, 1997; Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Bafoussam, April 7, 1997). The evidence from Bab et e and Akum, then, is somewhat ambiguous. While farmers have not taken advantage of the 1974 Ordinance to claim private title to their land, neither do they nd the current system entirely satisfactory. In light of these ndings, we argue that it is more useful to shift our analytical focus not ask whether the program has failed, but rather how has it succeeded. That is, how have farmers and administrators in the western and northwestern provinces adapted the letter of the 1974 Ordinance to satisfy current demands? What does their action imply for our understanding of property rights, and for the design of future land tenure policy? 4. THE SUCCESS OF THE 1974 LANDS ORDINANCE (a) Rural farmers We argue that rural farmers have used the ordinance to establish a visible, public mani-

festation of their land claims. Farmers initiate the title process and pay the fees necessary to have state agents place concrete boundary markers on their land. They then abandon their application and pay no additional fees. By formal law, the boundary markers have little signicance. But, because community members believe that the markers are placed by state agents, and are backed by state authority, they respect the markers as powerful symbols of an individual's land claims. The markers therefore enhance the farmers' tenure security. If our theoretical argument is valid, then we would expect the following relationship: farmers in the rural areas will be more likely to receive boundary markers, but no title to their land. Businessmen and politicians in urban areas, where community norms are weaker, will be more likely to receive title to their land.6 Certainly, other theories might explain why a large number of applications fail before title is awarded. First, applicants might abandon the process because their application encountered opposition. In this case, we would expect to see a strong positive correlation between recorded opposition and partial applications. Second, applicants might abandon the titling process due to the signicant and unexpected fee increase imposed in 1989. If valid, this dynamic suggests that applications led in the years immediately before the fee increase would be less likely to be completed and receive title, since those caught in the midst of the titling process when fees were imposed would be least able to bear the unexpected expenses. We tested our hypothesis and the two alternative expectations using the dataset of titling activity in Bab et e. In this analysis, the unit of observation is each individual title application. Our dependent variable has two categories: 0 designates applications that received boundary markers but no titles, and 1 is assigned to applications that received boundary markers and titles. We used four independent variables in the analysis. The rst is whether the land plot in an application is located in a rural area (1) or in a peri-urban or urban area (0). If our argument is correct, then this variable will produce a signicant and negative coecient, suggesting that applications from rural areas are less likely to result in both boundary makers and titles. An insignicant coecient would indicate that titling activity does not vary across dierent locations.

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The second independent variable is whether the applicant for a title is a farmer (1) or a businessman or politician (0). The specic expectations for this variable are identical to those presented in the previous paragraph. A signicant and negative coecient will support our argument that farmers are less likely to obtain both boundary markers and titles. An insignicant coecient will indicate that occupation is not related to titling activity. The third independent variable captures whether a title application faced opposition (1) or no opposition (0). If the alternative explanation is correct, this variable will produce a signicant and negative coecient. This result would suggest that opposition to an application lowers the likelihood that the application will result in both boundary markers and a title. The nal independent variable measures the eects of the 1989 fee increases on titling activity. The variable equals 1 for all applications initiated during 198589; it equals 0 for applications initiated in other years. We expect this variable to produce a signicant and negative coecient, because we expect applications initiated during 198589 to be less likely to receive both boundary markers and title. The logic for this coding and expectation is as follows. Before 1989, a successful title application (resulting in both boundary markers and title) averaged ve years in length.7 We therefore assume that applications initiated before 1985 were unlikely to be aected by the 1989 fee increase. Applications led during the ve-year period during 198589 were more likely to be aected. If the ve-year average cited above is accurate, these applications were unlikely to have been completed in 1989. The fee increase in that year may have discouraged applicants from moving to nish their uncompleted application. After 1989, the higher fees may have discouraged any new applications for title. But among those individuals who did le, the 1989 fee increases were unlikely to aect whether the post-1989 applications received boundary markers alone, or both boundary markers and title. Since the latter two alternatives make up our dependent variable in this model, we coded the application ling variable as 0 for cases initiated after 1989. Since the dependent variable in this model is dichotomous, we used logit to estimate the effects of the independent variables on titling activity. The estimated results are presented in Table 2. Overall, the chi-squared and pseudo R2 statistics suggest that the model explains a

good portion of the variation in titling activity. The signs and signicance of the four independent variables' coecients t our expectations. The opposition variable produces an insignicant coecient8; the remaining three coecients are signicant and negative. The exact substantive eect of each variable is dicult to determine from the coecients (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). We therefore calculate the eect of each independent variable on the probability of a particular value of the dependent variable (obtaining boundary markers and a title).9 These probabilities are presented in Table 3. First, the probabilities involving location provide further support for our earlier arguments. In nonrural areas the probability of obtaining boundary markers and a title is 0.47. The probability falls to 0.20 in rural areas. Applications from rural areas are more likely to receive only boundary markers and not result in the awarding of a title. Second, the estimated eects of occupation also support our argument. Nonfarmers appear equally likely to
Table 2. Logit model of obtaining boundary markers and title (standard error) a Independent Variable Rural Farmer Opposition Application Filed Between 1985 and 1989 N v2 Pseudo R2
a

Coecient 1.24 (0.49) 0.75 (0.29) 0.32 (0.97) 3.23 (0.29) 412 211.26 0.37

The model's dependent variable is dichotomous: 0 is assigned to cases where markers and no title were obtained, while 1 designates cases where both markers and title were obtained. Accordingly, we estimated a logit model. The Rural variable equals 0 for urban and periurban areas, and 1 for rural areas. The Farmer variable equals 0 for non-farmers, and 1 for farmers. The Opposition variable equals 0 if there was no opposition to the application, and 1 if there was opposition. The Application Filed variable equals 0 if the application was led before 1985 or after 1989, and 1 if the application was led between 1985 and 1989. For each coecient in the right-hand column, the corresponding standard error is reported beneath it in parentheses. p < 0.05; p < 0.001.

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a

Obtain boundary markers but not title Obtain boundary markers and title Nonrural Rural Nonfarmer Farmer Application during 198589 Application before 1985 or after 1989 0.53 0.80 0.50 0.68 0.88 0.23 0.47 0.20 0.50 0.32 0.12 0.77

a The probabilities in this table were calculated using the coecients in Table 2. In the left column, for example, each probability represents the likelihood of obtaining markers but not a title, for a particular combination of the independent variables. The top cell suggests that in nonrural areas there is a 0.53 probability of obtaining markers but not a title. By extension, there is a 0.47 probability of obtaining both markers and a title in these same nonrural areas. These probabilities are reported in the right column. See note 9 for further details on the calculation of probabilities.

obtain both boundary markers and a title (0.50), and to stop with only boundary markers (0.50). But, farmers are much more likely to win only boundary markers (0.68). Finally, the 1989 fee increase exerts the strongest eect on titling activity. If an application is led during 198589, there is only a 0.12 probability that the application will result in the awarding of a title. But if the application is led before 1985 or after 1989, the probability of a title jumps to 0.77. The fee increase appears to have discouraged individuals with pending applications from further pursuing their titles. In sum, a number of dierent factors appear to aect the titling process. The 1989 fee increase was the strongest inuence on discouraging completion of an application. But after controlling for this eect, the probabilities in Table 3 illustrate that location and occupation were also tied to completion of a titling application. Specically, nonfarmers in nonrural areas were more likely to win both boundary markers and title. Rural farmers were also more likely to obtain only boundary markers. The qualitative evidence bolsters our quantitative ndings by illuminating farmers' intentions, and their perceptions of the titling process. The interviews suggest that many farmers apply for title in order to receive the concrete boundary markers, and nothing more. For example, Pierre, one of the largest farmers in Bab et e, applied for title to his land in the late 1980s. State agents surveyed his farm and erected the concrete pillars several years later. At that point, Pierre abandoned the titling process, declining to pay the fees necessary to advance his case. Pierre explained his actions:

I had boundary markers placed on all my land... I did that 12 years ago. I am still waiting for title, but I haven't asked for it yet... My older brother had the boundary markers placed on his land, so I had to do it to avoid any unevenness. My neighbors could come and uproot the traditional boundaries and trespass on my land... But now [that I have the boundary markers] I am no longer at risk... [Getting title] would be useful. Title would give me absolute rights to my land. But I don't have any worries now, because my neighbors have accepted these boundaries (Interview with farmer, Bab et e, March 26, 1997).

Note that Pierre did not act out of ignorance: He understood that the markers were not the legal equivalent of title. But he also believed that the boundary markers would provide him with ample security and that he would have no further worries. Lands department administrators believe that Pierre's is not an isolated case. One ocial in the western province complained that farmers routinely paid the fees necessary to receive boundary markers and then abandoned the process. To illustrate his point, he pointed to his large bureau lled with partially completed applications, many dating to the early 1980s (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 10, 1997). Why are farmers willing to pay to receive concrete pillars, in spite of the pillars' legal insignicance? We argue that the concrete boundary markers are contemporary manifestations of Bamil ek e cultural norms. According to custom, an individual establishes his or her rights to land by planting traditional boundary markersraphia, avocado, or banana trees on virgin forest land. The trees are of marginal economic value but great political value be-

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cause they provide evidence of occupation. The concrete pillars carry the same symbolic weight. In the farmers' minds, that symbolism is backed by the state's coercive authority: Recall Pierre's statement that the concrete pillars eliminated all worry. The markers are placed by state agents, and are therefore backed by state authority.10 Neither they, nor the claimant, can be displaced. To illustrate, consider the example of an ongoing dispute between Max and Tanyi, two farmers in the western province. Both Max and Tanyi had applied for title to the same parcel of land. In 1997, they invited lands department ocials to their village to resolve the conict. Both expected lands department ocials to rule in their favor. But, following a brief investigation, ocials sided with Max. Tanyi refused to accept the judgment and vowed to continue his ght. Unable to persuade him that their decision was legitimate, lands department ocials decided to place the concrete boundary pillars to mark the ruling.11 Their actions devastated and silenced Tanyi. In his mind, the markers signaled defeat. Though Tanyi legally retained the right to appeal, Lands Department personnel left the village convinced that Tanyi would not pursue the case (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Babadjou, April 3, 1997; participation in dispute resolution proceedings, Babadjou, April 3, 1997). The power farmers endow on the concrete pillars is perhaps most evident in their very language. In discussing the 1974 Ordinance, very few farmers speak of titling (titrage), the program's ostensible goal. Rather, farmers speak incessantly of marking boundaries (bornage). Where titling sparks little interest, boundary markers provoke heated discussionevidence of the great practical relevance such markers have in farmers' daily lives. (b) State agents Like farmers, local level administrators have modied the 1974 Lands Ordinance. They have used the ordinance to register under or undeveloped land, allowing applicants to gain either boundary markers or titles. According to the 1974 Ordinance, the state will award title only to the individual who has invested in the land, and only when that investment is suciently large (une mise en valeur susante). This legal requirement contradicts

Bamil ek e custom, which obliges a family head to hold vacant land in trust, distributing parcels to family members (brothers or sons). Though the strength of this customary obligation has weakened over time, it remains important. And, if the 1974 Ordinance were applied strictly, the obligation would be impossible to fulll since vacant land cannot be protected. Administrators in the west and northwest province have resolved this contradiction in favor of customary law. In so doing, they have made the ordinance more attractive to, and relevant for, the region's landowners. If our argument is valid, then we would expect no relationship to hold between the probability that an applicant receives either boundary markers or title and the level of development on the land. Ideally, we would test this hypothesis using the Bab et e dataset, which consists of all titling requests: applications that did not go forward, applications resulting in boundary marker, and applications resulting in title. This trichotomous dependent variable would then be regressed against an independent variable measuring the level of development on each parcel of land. Unfortunately, such analysis was not possible. The Bab et e dataset consists of all title applications, but those applications falling into the rst category (applications that did not go forward) contain no information about the level of development. Those applications falling into the second and third categories (those receiving boundary marker or title) contained information about the level of development only for a small subset of cases. These omissions made it impossible to test the original hypothesis. Several factors might account for the missing data. Omissions from the rst category are unremarkable. Applications may have failed before the consultative commission or technical survey teams visited the land and recorded the needed information. Omissions from the second and third categories are more perplexing, since the consultative commission and/or technical survey team visited each of these sites and was legally required to complete forms containing information on the level of development. One could attribute the administrators' failure to complete the necessary forms to bureaucratic ineciency. Alternatively, one could argue that administrators intentionally omitted the information because they were reluctant to document their willingness to

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WORLD DEVELOPMENT chief managed all land himself. We cannot eliminate the chief so abruptly (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 14, 1997).

modify the 1974 Ordinance and register under or undeveloped land. To discern between these possible explanations, we attempted a more rudimentary analysis of the remaining quantitative data. Using the applications for which development information was available, we constructed a measure of the level of development. Where administrators stated that the land contained permanent buildings or coee plantations, we considered the level of development to be high. Where administrators recorded that the land contained semi-permanent structures or eucalyptus trees, we coded the level of development as moderate. Where administrators listed only subsistence crops or raphia trees, we assumed a low level of development. Using this measure, we then calculated the percentage of applications with low or moderate levels of development that received either boundary markers or title. If the ordinance were strictly applied, such cases should not exist. Yet in Bab et e, nearly one in ve applications fell into these categories. The nding is remarkable, given that administrators had an incentive to camouage their willingness to register underdeveloped land by augmenting the recorded levels of investment on the land (or by omitting such information entirely). The qualitative evidence lends further support to our interpretation. In interviews, administrators acknowledge that rigorous application of the 1974 Ordinance would create ``much unhappiness'' and provoke resistance within the populationan outcome presaged by critics of evolutionary theory (Interview with civil servant, Lands Department, Mbouda, March 25, 1997). As a result, administrators explicitly work to accommodate customary law to ensure that community members will respect their decisions. One department head, for example, instructs his subordinates to weigh both state law and customary law when resolving disputes, choosing a solution that balances the two mandates (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Bamenda, June 2, 1997). Another administrator adopts a more extreme approach, opting to respect custom in all cases, deferring to state law only where custom is silent (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 10, 1997). A third explains the logic:
The [state] administration is still young here in Cameroon. And before this administration, the

Oftentimes, bowing to custom means registering underdeveloped land. The 1974 Ordinance leaves the precise denition of sucient investment undened. Administrators have exploited this ambiguity to register under and undeveloped land (for boundary markers as well as for title). In the northwest province, for example, a lands department administrator volunteered that, by law, he should reject fully 90% of all title requests because investment is insucient. In reality, he rejects only 30% because he recognizes that applicants hold family land, and the family's rights to preserve land for future use most be protected (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Bamenda, May 27, 1997). In the western province, a second administrator conceded that he looked for a minimum level of investment before registering land, but that his oce did not apply rigorous standards. The occupant who planted trees along the perimeter of his customarily held land, for example, could qualify (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 14, 1997). His colleagues concurred, and oered the following illustrations:
There is a student, his father's successor. He's leaving to go and study in the United States, and he knows that if he leaves without title, not a single piece of land will remain [when he returns]. Or there's a father who lacks capital, but has many children. We help these people because we want the positive publicity for boundary markers. There's no precise mathematical formula to apply (Interview with civil servant in Lands Department, Mbouda, April 10, 1997).

Clearly, then, those responsible for administering Cameroon's 1974 Land Ordinance recognize the law's limitations. Their willingness to modify the law to accommodate custom can only make the law more attractive to the region's landowners. 5. CONCLUSION Cameroon's 1974 Lands Ordinance does not stand as a shining example of the benets of state-sponsored titling schemes in sub-Saharan Africa. As we have shown, relatively few people have received private title to their land

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since the Ordinance was introduced. Those who did were typically male businessmen and politicians resident in urban centers. Thus, the titling program did not foster the emergence of a Westernized agrarian bourgeoisie. At the same time, Cameroon's 1974 Lands Ordinance is not wholly irrelevant to rural farmers. Rural farmers and local administrators modied the ordinance, and so rendered it more attractive to rural residents. Farmers used the law to obtain concrete boundary markers, rather than title. Though the markers confer no formal rights, community members have accepted them as evidence of the applicant's eective occupancy of the land. Administrators have used the ordinance to register underdeveloped land. The action that is legally prohibited, but it has helped to reduce the conict between state law and customary law. Cameroon's experience teaches us much about how property rights change. Bamil ek e farmers in the west and northwest provinces possess customary rights to land. As evolutionary property rights theory predicts, those customary rights are not static. They evolve and change in response to changes in relative factor prices. These changes have made farmers' tenure insecure. As land becomes more valuable, farmers nd themselves threatened by family members seeking to claim private title to jointly held land, by neighbors encroaching on customarily dened boundaries, and by businessmen and politicians seeking to claim undeveloped land. Evolutionary theory cannot explain the continued importance of community norms, however. Community norms shape the way in which customary laws change, and the speed at which they change. Thus, among the Bamil ek e, a lineage head's application for boundary markers is valid, because the lineage head is merely formalizing lineage rights held under customary law. But a lineage head's application for title may spark opposition, because it allows the lineage head to ignore his future descendants' claims to land. These theoretical lessons have important implications for future policy design. Most importantly, the case study suggests that a centralized state cannot impose private property rights outright. State law cannot eliminate

or replace customary law because community norms remain important, even after custom begins to evolve in response to economic pressures. Nevertheless, the state can play a constructive role in enhancing tenure security. Policy makers should aim to register and record extant property rights, rather than promote Westernstyle private property rights. In so doing, they must remain sensitive to the possibility that multiple actors enjoy rights to a single parcel of land. They must also seek to build upon existing community norms and institutions. In Cameroon's west and northwest provinces, for example, policy makers might exploit a community norm legitimizing claims protected by boundary markers. Elsewhere, policy makers might build upon norms respecting rst occupancy. To ensure that community members accept and enforce these registered claims, and that the register remains current even as custom evolves, policy makers must encourage community members to play an active role in the register's maintenance. For example, community membersincluding women, migrants, and representatives of other disadvantaged groupsshould be invited to sit on the board that oversees registration, and that arbitrates disputes arising from the registration process. Finally, policy makers must ensure that any program is simple and inexpensive. Cameroon's farmers did seek to extract positive benets from the 1974 Lands Ordinance, but that adaptive behavior ceased in the face of the prohibitive fees imposed in 1989. These policy recommendations reect our belief that neither evolutionary theorists nor their critics adequately explain the complex nature of African land tenure. With evolutionary theorists, we argue that the state can and should play a role in enhancing individual tenure security. Customary norms alone are no longer sucient. But, with evolutionary theory's critics, we argue that policy makers cannot adopt a one-size-ts-all policy for all areas, and in all nations. Rather, in deference to the continued salience of community norms and customary law, policy makers must tailor their policy recommendations to Africa's many regional, ethnic and cultural groups.

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NOTES
1. This section draws heavily on Platteau (1996). 2. Lands department records in Bamenda were not well organized. As a result, lands department ocials were unable to locate the appropriate les. 3. In Akum, the town of Santa was coded as periurban. In Bab et e, quarters in Mbouda were coded as urban areas; adjacent quarters were coded as peri-urban. 4. Indeed in Akum, the fon (king) himself holds three separate land titles. 5. Previous research suggests that farmers and traditional authorities are unwilling to admit that they personally have experienced land disputes, fearing the admission may exacerbate such disputes. Instead, interview subjects ascribe their own problems to friends and neighbors. See Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1994). 6. One might predict the same pattern by arguing that the high cost of titling has aected rural residents more than urban residents: rural residents possess fewer resources and are, therefore, more likely to abandon the titling process. Such an explanation assumes that farmers are not rational decision-makers, however. A farmer applying for title possessed full information about the cost of titling. If the farmer began the titling process, only to abandon the application unwillingly, then we must infer that the farmer was unable to incorporate this information into his or her decisionmaking. Studies of peasant rationality argue against such a conclusion (see, for example, Bates, 1984; Ellis, 1988; Popkin, 1979; Schultz, 1964). Rather, these studies would lead us to believe that farmers start the titling process, even if they lack the resources to nish, because they value partial success. That is, they value the boundary markers received midstream. 7. All cases in the titling data set contain the date on which the application was initially led. In addition, the subset of successful application cases contains the date on which each actual title was granted. For this subset of cases, we were able to calculate the average length of a successful application. During 197496, completing a successful application required slightly more than six years, on average. But for all titles awarded before 1989, the application period averaged slightly more than ve years. 8. Opposition does not prevent applications from proceeding, but administrators insist that the west and northwest provinces are among the most litigious in Cameroon. What explains this paradox? Administrators explain that most opposition is voiced and resolved during the consultative commission's original visit to the applicant's land. Thus, land disputes are endemic, but are rarely recorded formally, and are not fatal to title requests. Moreover, many landowners apply for title in the aftermath of a land dispute in the hopes that receiving boundary markers and/or title will prevent the dispute's reoccurrence. 9. To calculate the probability for nonrural areas, for example, we held the three other independent variables at their means. We then assigned the rural variable a 0. With the combination of these values and the coecients, we calculated the probability obtaining boundary markers and a title. The probability (0.47) is reported in the upper-right cell of Table 3. For more details on the calculation of probabilities, see King (1989). 10. The boundary markers' symbolic import is reinforced by a measure of substantive coercive force. The markers do not grant legal title, but the farmer who displaces the markers without following established procedure (ling a grievance with the lands department), faces a ne and/or six months incarceration. Moreover, the fee for ling a protest is 3,000 FCFA, an amount many poor farmers nd prohibitive. It is not clear, however, that these sanctions weighed heavily in farmers' decision making, since no farmer mentioned these sanctions when interviewed. 11. Note that their actions were inappropriate according to the letter of the law, since boundary markers should be placed only if there is no opposition to the applicant's claims.

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