Cuba Neg

Human Rights Advantage

Castro=Root Cause
The plan does nothing-the Castro regime will continue violating HR Ros-Lehtinen 2k13 [Ileana, US Rep (Fl)-- http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/pressrelease/human-rights-abuses-cuba-are-rising-some-lawmakers-wrongly-seek-reward-castroregime - March 21, 2013]
These latest efforts by Castro apologists are a sober reminder that there are those in Congress who refuse to see the obvious that

the Castro dictatorship has no intention of letting up its iron grip over the Cuban people. Just this week, Castros state security agents surrounded and stoned the home of a leader of the Ladies in White and caused many women to have to be hospitalized due to their injuries. The regime will continue to hide behind so-called reforms in an effort to distract the attention from its atrocious and systematic violation of real basic freedoms and human rights.
50 plus years later,

Turn
Oppression DA-Newest studies prove-Castro tyranny only gets worse as the US eases sanctions-turns the aff Darby 2k13 [Brandon, reporter for Breidbart-- http://www.breitbart.com/BigGovernment/2013/01/05/Cuba-Human-Rights-Abuses-Increasing-Despite-US-Sanctions-Easing Jan 3, 2013--SR] Cuba was singled out by Human Rights Watch in 2011 as being the only Latin American country that represses virtually all forms of political dissent. It is difficult to understand how such tyranny could get worse. Both Reuters and the Miami Herald report that Cuban Security agents broke their previous records of government political repression in 2012 with 6,602 confirmed detentions of political dissidents. In 2011 there were 4,123 confirmed political arrests which was even higher than the 2,704 arrests from 2010. Both Reuters and the Miami Herald based their data on a 2012 year-end report from the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation. To understand what Cuban political repression consists of, the Human Rights Watch 2012 World Reports section on Cuba describes: In 2011 Ral Castros government continued to enforce political conformity using short-term detentions, beatings, public acts of repudiation, forced exile, and travel restrictions." Illumination into Cubas political repression can be seen in the Miami Heralds January 4, 2013 article titled Human Rights Activist Says Dissident Arrests Up In 2012, that quotes Cuban human rights activist Elizardo Snchez Santa Cruz as stating: ...the number of political prisoners, which dropped to about 40 after ruler Ral Castro freed more than 120 in 2010-2011, climbed again last year with the trials and convictions of about 30 Cubans on political charges. Those releases were due to an
agreement with the Catholic church in 2010 pushing for an ease on US sanctions against the Castro regime. Other Latin American nations, political leaders like Senator Kerry and Congressman Collin Peterson, as well as a letter by 74 Cuban dissidents calling for ending the US travel ban on Cuba all supported easing sanctions. US

sanctions have eased substantially, though

still stringent in many regards. The pace of the sanctions easing increased substantially after then presidential
candidate Barack Obamas May 23, 2008 speech in Miami, Florida, in favor of rolling back Cuban American travel to Cuba.

Human Rights Watch stated in their 2012 World Report on Cuba that the US was a Key International Actor in the human rights abuses in Cuba and went further in blaming the US
and Israel for preventing a decrease in human rights abuses in Cuba. The report states: The United States' economic embargo on Cuba, in place for more than half a century, continues to impose indiscriminate hardship on Cubans, and has failed to improve human rights in the country. At the United Nations General Assembly in October, 186 of the 192 member countries voted for a resolution condemning the US embargo; only the US and Israel voted against it.

After placing blame on the US and Israel for Fidel and Raul Castros decisions to abuse their citizens, Human Rights Watch reports that Barack
Obama has taken actions to ease the sanctions, and thereby ease the suffering of the Cuban people. The report states: In January 2011 US President Barack Obama used his executive powers to ease people-to- people travel restrictions, allowing religious, educational, and cultural groups from the US to travel to Cuba, and permitting Americans to send remittances to assist Cuban citizens. In 2009 Obama eliminated limits on travel and remittances by Cuban Americans to Cuba, which had been instituted during George W. Bushs administration.

Unfortunately, the data presented by Human Rights Watch and the

the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and National Reconciliation seems to disprove the analysis of Human Rights Watch that the US was a major player in the human rights abuses in Cuba due . Human Rights Watch was correct to identify that Barack Obama seriously reduced the bite of US sanctions in
2011 .

This would make 2012 the first complete year to benefit from the reductions in US

sanctions. Regardless of 2012 being a complete year of eased sanctions, the human rights abuses have increased substantially.

Plan Does Nothing

Change in embargo policy wont deter the Castro regime Sabitini 2k9 *Christopher, analyst for Americas Quarterly-http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/454 --February 23-] What effect does the U.S. embargo have on human rights? Its clearly done little to improve them. Human
rights today are certainly no better than when the initial embargo was slapped on the regime by the administration of President Kennedy in 1962. In fact theyve gotten worse. But

does an immediate change in policy bring real change? Unlikely. And this is something that quite frankly rankles me. The argument used by those who want to lift the embargo that the policy has failed for 50 years so lets try something new doesnt hold any logicor at least a very lazy one. There are a number of things that dont mean that the inverse automatically makes them true. Sure, maybe the embargos failed on its primary goal; but reversing it doesnt necessarily mean success.

Util First
Util outweighs liberty Taylor 3 (Robert, professor of philosophy @ Princeton, Rawls Defense of the Priority of
Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction. Princeton University Press. Philosophy & PublicAffairs 31, No. 3, Pg 24. Project MUSE) HD
Note that although the Priority of Liberty cannot be the focus of a realistic overlapping consensus, something analogous to it might be the focus of a constitutional consensus, that is, a "consensus on constitutional principles . . . rather than on a conception of justice." 27 Specifically, adherents of radically different reasonable comprehensive doctrines might be able to agree on a constitutional analogue of the Priority of Liberty (civil libertarianism) that effectively disallowed violations of the basic liberties under any circumstances ; this approach might be institutionalized in part through a combination of written bills of rights and judicial review. Kantian liberals and others who endorse the Priority of Liberty [End Page 269] could be expected to support such a constitutional practice for obvious reasons. Liberal utilitarians (who support "special priority" for the basic liberties) might also support it: if they thought that basic liberties would otherwise be severely eroded through legislative encroachment, then they might endorse such civil libertarianism as a "second-best" corrective. Perhaps the other major comprehensive doctrines would sign on for similar reasons. This constitutional consensus would be unlikely to evolve into an overlapping consensus, however, for the reasons noted above: adherents of some reasonable comprehensive doctrines (e.g., liberal utilitarianism) are simply unable to

endorse the Priority of Liberty, and neither their objections nor their doctrines are likely to disappear with the passage of time.

Science Cooperation Advantage

Bilateral Cooperation Advantage Counter-Plan

The Republic of Cuba should-Minimize delays in getting approval visas for NGOs -Expedite permits for all components of projects -Approve multiple entry visas of NGO representatives

Counter-plan uniquely solvesempirics prove Their Author-Boom 2k12 [Brian, analyst for the Advance Science Serving Community-http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/biodiversity-without-borders_science__diplomacy.pdf -September 2k12] The ecological stakes are too high for Cuba and the United States to rely on anything short of a government-to-government accord to formalize, catalyze, and facilitate cooperation on environmental problems of mutual concern. Various models for such an agreement exist: the United States has joint statements on environmental cooperation with Spain and Italy, an agreement on air quality with Canada, and a memorandum of understanding on environmental protection with India, among others. Such a bilateral agreement could logically take advantage of the
collective experiences of the U.S.-based environmental NGO community in conducting collaborative initiatives with Cuban counterparts over many years and, in some cases, decades.

The focus of such a bilateral agreement should be on helping to facilitate the activities by NGOs that are currently underway and encouraging new initiatives by NGOs in consultation with and the approval of Cuban authorities. The elements of such an agreement should take into account the difficulties mentioned above and the following considerations: Project Approvals: Before cooperative projects can begin, one or more Cuban agencies need to approve. It would be ideal to have this process more clearly defined and streamlined to minimize delays in getting approvals visas for representatives of NGOs conducting approved projects should be expedited and ideally approved for multiple entries into Cuba, perhaps renewable annually for the duration of the project. Permits: Permits for all the components of projects (e.g., to collect specimens, to enter and collect or monitor in protected areas, to import research equipment, to export biological specimens, etc.) should be expedited for approved projects.

Easing Regs Advantage Counter-Plan/PIC

Text: The United States federal government should adopt measures to ease regulations restricting academic and scientific exchanges This solvesempirics prove Johnson 2k12 [Stephen, senior for Center for Strategic and International studies-http://csis.org/files/publication/120821_Johnson_U.S.-CubaExchanges_Web.pdf -- August 2012- SR] In 1974, the Nixon administration adopted measures to ease regulations restricting academic and scientific exchanges, measures that the Carter administration took even further.8 Thus, aca- demic and scientific exchange between U.S. researchers and Cuban counterparts grew during this period: In 1977, the first participation of Cuban scholars in the Congress of the Latin American Studies
Association (LASA), took place in Houston, Texas. In 1978, two Cuban intellectuals, researching literature, linguistics and law, visited Yale, Har- vard, Princeton, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1979, a

delegation from the School for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, funded by the Ford Foundation, visited the University of Havana; that trip initiated a regular exchange between the two institutions. In the1980s and 1990s, U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration cruises entered Cuban waters to perform marine research.9 This period of relatively increased cooperation in the realm of scientific and academic ex- changes
culminated with a memorandum of understanding signed by the Cuban Academy of Sci- ences and the Smithsonian Institution in 1980.10 Subsequently, the United States tightened policies toward Cuba, and in October 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed legislation making visits by Cuban intellectuals to the United States more difficult, based on the fact that their employer was the Cuban government. That year, all Cuban scholars from the Centro de studios de Am rica were denied visas to participate in the LASA Congress in Albu uer ue, ew Mexico.11 Subse uent scholarly meetings of Cubans and Americans took place in Mexico, Canada, and Cuba.12

SQUO Solves
Scientific exchange is high-despite the embargo AAAS 2k12 [Advance Science Serving Societyhttp://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2012/0501cuba.shtml -2k12- SR] They are next-door neighbors, sharing all the amenities and challenges of the neighborhood oceans teeming with life, the risk of tropical diseases, a changing climate that may be giving rise to bigger and more frequent hurricanes. And yet, because the neighbors are barely on speaking terms, they cannot share the opportunities and the responsibilities that come with solving the challenges. Today, however, scientists in both Cuba and the United States are exploring whether a thaw in relations between the two nations could allow for a range of new or expanded joint research projects that could bring benefits to both nations and others in the Caribbean Basin. Recent visits and consultations facilitated by AAAS and the
Academia de Ciencias de Cuba (Academy of Sciences of Cuba) underscored that both sides see potential for substantive science collaboration. The recent visits showed that the Cuban mindset is really ready to reach out , said Peter Agre, a Nobel laureate in chemistry and a former president of AAAS, who returned in March from his third visit to the nation. The

scientists would have no trouble working together... The Cubans are understandably proud of their science, and they see us very positively. I would anticipate if we could normalize relations and
do science as a starting point, then really good things could happen.

A2 Environment Cooperation
Their Machlis evidence-just says there are a few strains to science collaboration-not that there isnt any now-Squo sufficiently solves A. US is already cooperating with Cuba on the environment-recent easing of restrictions and NGOs solve Their Author Boom 2k12 [Brian, analyst for the Advance Science Serving Community-http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/biodiversity-without-borders_science__diplomacy.pdf -September 2k12] Fortunately, some NGOs in the United States have had success over the years in working collaboratively with their Cuban counterparts on shared environmental issues. The experiences of such NGOs can inform a way forward in structuring an enhanced mechanism for bilateral cooperation . Also fortunately, on January 14, 2011, the Obama administration announced new rules that ease some restrictions on U.S. citizens travel and remittances to Cuba, which will collaterally encourage more bilateral environmental collaboration as well .

B. US-Cuba is already cooperating on marine life bio-d Ordonez 2k12 [Francoreporter for McClatchy-http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/21/149603/scientists-work-to-bridgepolitical.html#.UfB2SGTwJJw -May 21, 2012SR] VINALES, Cuba Cuban and American scientists have joined forces in an effort to protect baby sea turtles and endangered sharks. Theyre studying Caribbean weather patterns that fuel the hurricanes that have devastated the Southeastern United States. In the process, theyre chipping away at a half-century of government feuding, helping to bring the nations together for talks on vital matters, such as what to do in case of an oil spill. The two countries are so geographically close, and the environmental concerns so similar, that scientists
say its crucial to combine forces. If were going to have any hope of protecting our environment in the future, from climate change to our shared resources in the Gulf of Mexico, we have to collaborate, said Dan Whittle, the Cuba program director at the nvironmental Defense Fund.

C. Cubas top environmental official is cooperating with the US now Haven 2k13 [Paul, reporter for the Associated Press- http://news.yahoo.com/under-radarcuba-us-often-together-182659594.html -April 10, 2013-- SR] HAVANA (AP) Cuba and the United States may be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with grievances, but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two kidnapped children in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable cooperation on many issues. Indeed, diplomats and observers on both sides of the Florida Straits say American and Cuban law enforcement officers, scientists, disaster relief workers, Coast Guard officials and other experts work together on a daily basis, and invariably express professional admiration for each other. "I don't think the story has been told, but there is a real warmth in just the sort of dayto-day relations between U.S. and Cuban government officials," said Dan Whittle, who frequently brings scientific groups to the island in his role as Cuba program director for the Environmental Defense Fund. "Nearly

every time I talk to American officials they say they were impressed by their Cuban counterparts. There really is a high level of mutual respect." Almost none of these technical-level interactions make the headlines, but examples are endless. Just last week, Cuba's top environmental official Ulises Fernandez and several island oil experts attended a conference

in New York of the International Association of Drilling Contractors after the State Department expedited their visas .

Too many alt causes to environment cooperation-bureaucracy, delays, and technical problems Boom 2k12 [Brian, analyst for the Advance Science Serving Community-http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/files/biodiversity-without-borders_science__diplomacy.pdf -September 2k12] Environmental projects conducted in collaboration with Cuban organizations must be approved by an array of Cuban agenciesand at various levels within those agenciesdepending on the nature of the project. This can be a daunting procedure for U.S.-based NGOs attempting to initiate collaborative activities in Cuba, but even NGOs experienced in the process of project approval can have delays and frustrations. Some of the impediments are related to technical problems (e.g., spotty Internet connections and difficulty transmitting large file attachments via email) or to changes in key administrative personnel at agencies. The most important Cuban
agency for most projects is the Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnologa y Medio Ambiente (CITMA), but depending on the situation other entities must give high-level approval for environmental projects. For example, the Jardn Botnico Nacional (JBN) reports administratively to the Ministerio de Educacin Superior, so projects with the JBN need to be approved by that ministry, in addition to CITMA.

Projects taking place in Cubas numerous protected marine and terrestrial areas must be approved by the Centro Nacional de reas Protegidas (CNAP), which is part of CITMA. The major impediment with respect to conducting collaborative environmental projects in Cuba is what can be a complex, nonlinear, and slow approval process.

No Impact: Bio D
The environment is resilient Easterbrook 96 (Gregg, sr editor, The New Republic, former fellow at the Brookings Institute,
A Movement on the Earth, p. 25, JM)
"Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape . Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

No extinction The Economist, 09 (The conomist, January 15, 2009, Second life: Biologists debate the
scale of extinction in the worlds tropical forests, http://www.economist.com/node/12926042, Hensel) A RARE piece of good news from the world of conservation: the global extinction crisis may have been overstated. The world is unlikely to lose 100 species a day, or half of all species in the lifetime of people now alive, as some have claimed. The bad news, though, is that the lucky survivors are tiny tropical insects that few
people care about. The species that are being lost rapidly are the large vertebrates that conservationists were worried about in the first place. This new view of the prospects for biodiversity emerged from

a symposium held this week at the

Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, but the controversy over how bad things really are has been brewing since 2006.
That was when Joseph Wright of the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute in Panama and Helene Muller-Landau of the University of Minnesota first suggested that the damage might not be as grim as some feared. They reasoned that because

population growth is slowing in many tropical countries, and people are moving to cities, the pressure to cut down primary rainforest is falling and agriculturally marginal land is being abandoned, allowing trees to grow. This regrown secondary forest is crucial to the pairs analysis. Within a few decades of land being abandoned, half of the original biomass has returned. Depending on what else is nearby, these new forests may then be colonised by animals and additional plants, and thus support many of the species found in the original forest. Dr Wright and Dr Muller-Landau therefore reckon that in 2030 reasonably unbroken tropical forest will still cover more than a third of its natural range, and after that date its areaat least in
Latin America and Asiacould increase. Much of this woodland will be secondary forest, but even so they suggest that in Africa only 16-35% of tropical-forest species will become extinct by 2030, in Asia, 21-24% and, in Latin America, fewer still. Once

forest

cover does start increasing, the rate of extinction should dwindle.

A2 Biotech
Biotech inevitable. D'Haeze, 7
[Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University, Senior Technical Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory Board, http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html] Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is still expanding booming in the United States and Europe, but also in major Asian countries such as India, China, and Japan. A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major location in the United States or Europe while branching elsewhere in the United States, Europe, and/or Asia.
Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the drug development pipelines and on how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed. Research and Development hubs are located at the East coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but multinational

companies have been or are stepping on land in countries throughout Asia as well. Reasons for the latter development may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place. During recent years, India, for example, has become the home of a few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g.,
production of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk, Aventis Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced Biochemicals are all represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues annually and representing one million jobs by roughly three years from now. The

government tries to achieve this goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for investors by centralizing the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010, financially supporting new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting small biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up companies.

Solvency
No scientific exchange-Cuban government is too suspicious-not a two way street Johnson 2k12 [Stephen, analyst for Center for Strategic and International studies-http://csis.org/files/publication/120821_Johnson_U.S.-CubaExchanges_Web.pdf -- August 2012- SR] Pursuing exchange opportunities with Cubans follows this logic, but with a twist. Current U.S. rules allow purposeful travel on the part of academics, students, medical professionals, and journalists. Over the past
decade, as many as 2,500 American students a year have studied in Cuba. However, travel for Cubans to the United States is extremely limited. Since the revolution that replaced a petty dictator with a repressive, totalitarian government in 1959, the population has served as a captive labor force in which all able adults were expected to work for the state. In the past two years, that situation has begun to change as a result of the shift in leadership from Fidel Castro to his brother Ra l. The

twist is that Cuban authorities remain deeply suspicious of any U.S. government involvement in exchanges and still worry about letting citizens travel to countries where they may be tempted to stay. More private and less U.S. government involvement in U.S.-Cuban exchanges may be a way to ease that logjam and make U.S.-Cuban exchanges more of a two-way street.

Too many alt causes Johnson 2k12 [Stephen, analyst for Center for Strategic and International studies-http://csis.org/files/publication/120821_Johnson_U.S.-CubaExchanges_Web.pdf -- August 2012- SR] The absence of adequate communication channels poses another obstacle. At present, stu- dents
looking for opportunities to study abroad must deal with restrictions on Internet access that limit what ordinary Cubans can see, notwithstanding that Cuba has the third-lowest Internet penetration rate in the Western Hemisphere.44 Visiting

the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to find out about them could risk government harassment. If such barriers look too onerous, potential participants may not make the effort to gather information and identify themselves to the school or work authorities who may be in a position to choose travelers. Ideological competition raises barriers. During the Cold War, U.S. Fulbright
Exchanges sought to attract foreign scholars to the United States to expose them to democratic values and counter Soviet international communications. In 1985,

when the Soviet Union and Cuba were recruit- ing underprivileged Latin American youth to attend Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow for Communist indoctrination alongside regular coursework, the United States established the Central American Peace Scholarships (CAPS) program, offering opportunities to study at U.S. vocational, community college, and university campuses. The objective was to instill attitudes and beliefs of
self-responsibility and self-initiative, taking aim at Communist teachings that exhorted subservience to the state.45 Probably as a consequence, the Cuban People Act of 2001, that, in effect, would

Cuban regime has long opposed any of- ficial U.S. proposal, such as the Bridges to the have offered scholarships resulting in similar exposure.

Cant solveCuba feels threatened by technological exchange Johnson 2k12 [Stephen, analyst for Center for Strategic and International studies-http://csis.org/files/publication/120821_Johnson_U.S.-CubaExchanges_Web.pdf -- August 2012- SR]
Many former exchange participants agree that medicine, science, and technology are highly beneficial discussion areas. However, technology can be touchy. On

the part of the Cuban regime, discussions on the use of smart phones and social media, and even new media technology, could be interpreted as threatening. For example, senior Cuban officials might find a dialogue on the power of social media to liberate citizens in the Middle East a threat to their hold on power.

Lifting the embargo doesnt do anythingalt causes overwhelm Johnson 2k12 [Stephen, analyst for Center for Strategic and International studies-http://csis.org/files/publication/120821_Johnson_U.S.-CubaExchanges_Web.pdf -- August 2012- SR] First, the most common mistake is failure to anticipate hot-button issues that prevent exchanges from taking place or could stop them midstream. U.S. foreign service officers who have served in Havana warn that anything openly political in Cuba will be immediately stopped. Moreover, U.S. official participation is not generally welcome in Cuba and, should it become apparent during an event, would immediately raise tensions. Events held in the United States, or even in a third country, are subject to scrutiny. Cuban authorities can easily misconstrue the appearance of politi- cal motives or even political side conversations among program participants. Institutions that are
developing exchange programs to bring Cubans to the United States should closely monitor media reporting, as sensational publicity can negatively affect current and future endeavors. Second, U.S.

or third-country civil society groups might express concerns over the wisdom of inviting and donating airline tickets to scholars from a state governed by a hostile dictatorship. Likely areas of collaboration such as the arts, business administration, and science and technology may not be politically dangerous topics on their own, but the intent of exchanges is often in the eye of the beholder. A complicating factor is that host
organizations would need to establish close relationships with regime officials, for now in the foreign affairs and possibly the interior minis- tries. That effort requires careful handling and knowledge of U.S. laws.

Sugar Cane Advantage

Air Pollution DA
Air Pollution DA- sugar cane ethanol production causes air pollution-and prevents future production UC Merced 2k11 [University of California Mercedsenior researchers analysis-http://www.ucmerced.edu/news/study-shows-sugarcane-ethanol-production-causes-airpollution -December 15, 2011-SR] The burning of sugarcane fields prior to harvest for ethanol production can create air pollution that detracts from the biofuels overall sustainability, according to research published recently by a team of researchers led by scientists at the University of California, Merced. UC Merced graduate student ChiChung Tsao was the lead author on the paper and was aided in the study by UC Merced professors Elliott Campbell and Yihsu Chen. The study published online this week in the Nature Climate Change journal focused on Brazil, the worlds top producer of sugarcane ethanol and a possible source for U.S. imports of the alternative fuel. There

is a big strategic decision our country and others are making, in whether to develop a domestic biofuels industry or import relatively inexpensive biofuels from developing countries, Campbell said. Our study shows that importing biofuels could result in human health and environmental problems in the regions where they are cultivated.

That causes extinction Driesen 2003 Professor of Law, Syracuse, Buffalo Environmental Law Journal (David,, Fall,
2002 / Spring, 2003, p. LN) Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and present generations. The Rio Declaration
articulates six key principles that are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs [*27] that is worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals. The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are Between them, they aid understanding of sustainable development's meaning for air quality. "at the center of concerns for sustainable development." n3 While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also reflects a concern about the natural environment. n4 Since

air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air quality implicates both of these concerns.

Water Pollution DA
Water Pollution DA- Sugarcane production causes water pollution Zuurbier and Vooren. 2008 [Peter Zuurbier and Jos Van De Vooren. "Contributions to Climate Change Mitigation
and the Environment." Sugarcane Ethanol. Wageningen Academic P U B L I S H E R S, 2008. Web. 6 July 2013. <http://www.baff.info/english/rapporter/SugarcaneBook_Wageningen.pdf>. SR]

Water pollution has been a severe environmental problem in sugarcane production regions
until early 80s in Brazil when legislation was implemented to ban direct discharge of vinasse (Martinelli and Filoso, 2008; Smeets et al., 2008). The main

industrial sources of pollutants of sugarcane industry are wastewater from washing of stems before processing and vinasse produced during distillation. These by-products have a large potential of water contamination due to a high concentration of organic matter, which increases the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD5) of water bodies receiving such effluents (Gunkel et al., 2007). While the Brazilian standards for wastewater
emission are BOD5 of 60 mg/l, values for wastewater from cane washing are up to 500 mg/l and > 1.000 mg/l for vinasse (Gunkel et al., 2007; Smeets et al., 2008). In addition, agro-chemicals residues have been found as a important component of water pollution in areas of intense sugarcane production (Corbi et al., 2006; Silva et al., 2008).

Water pollution turns the aff and causes extinction Khan & Haq, 12- Department of Zoology, Abdul Wali Khan University, Department of Botany, Hazara University International Journal of Recent Scientific Research- Pollution load in industrial effluent and ground water due to marble industries in district buner, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan
Water pollution is a major global problem which requires ongoing evaluation and revision of water resource policy at all levels. It has been suggested that it is the leading worldwide cause of deaths and diseases (Pink and Daniel, 2006) and that it accounts for the deaths of more than 14,000 people daily (West and Larry, 2006). Surface and groundwater have often been studied and managed as separate
resources although they are interrelated (Denver, 1998). Surface water seeps through the soil and becomes groundwater.

Industrialization plays a vital role in growth and development of any country. In Pakistan industrial
estate establishment was started with the introduction of 1st five years plane 1955-1960, which laid emphasis on the establishment of large estates in the country (Nasrullah et al., 2006). The rapid

industrialization has direct and indirect adverse effect on our environment as it discharges untreated effluents which cause air, water, soil and soil solid waste pollution (Reston, 2001). Untreated water near the point of disposal, create foul smell and bad odor (Kulkarni, 1979). This bad odor is due to decomposition of floating solids present in untreated sewage. The net result is large scale pollution of the water bodies which may act as a source of water supply for domestic use of inhabitants of localities. This loss of water quality is causing health hazards and death of human, livestock and death of aquatic lives, crop failure and loss of aesthetics (Anonymous 1992).

Solvency
No piece of evidence that indicates-the US would even trade Sugar Cane Ethanol-post plan Cuba doesnt even have an ethanol industry Their Author-Specht 4/24 (Jonathan, professor at the University of California at Davis, Raising Cane: Cuban
Sugarcane thanols conomic and nvironmental Effects on the United States, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf, pg.172-173) To speak of a

Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry is, at this point, largely a matter of speculation.46 Because of the anti-ethanol views of Fidel Castro (who has said that ethanol should be discouraged because it diverts crops from food to fuel),47 Cuba currently has almost no ethanol industry . In the words of Ronald Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings Institution, Despite the fact that Cuba is dependent on oil imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of Brazil in using ethanol to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it has not embarked on a policy to develop a larger ethanol industry from sugarcane.

Worker shortage-means they dont solve Their Author-Specht 4/24 (Jonathan, professor at the University of California at Davis, Raising Cane: Cuban
Sugarcane thanols Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf, pg.172-173)

Like all new capitalist industries to emerge in the post-Castro era, whatever ethanol industry arises will have to deal with the painful transition from socialism to capitalism. The Cuban sugarcane ethanol industry will face similar challenges to other private sector industries that arise in the post-Fidel era. One of these challenges will be simply a lack of people with skills necessary for any industry. According to Edward Gonzalez and Kevin McCarthy of the RAND Corporation, *A+s a result of 40-plus years of
communism, the labor force lacks the kinds of trained managers, accountants, auditors, bankers, insurers, etc., that a robust market economy re uires.53

No demand for a sugar ethanol industry Their Author-Specht 4/24 (Jonathan, professor at the University of California at Davis, Raising Cane: Cuban
Sugarcane thanols conomic and nvironmental Effects on the United States, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf, pg.172-173)

Given that the Cuban sugar industry lived and died by its ties with the Soviet Union for several decades of the Twentieth Century,50 Cuba will likely be quite wary of investing too much in the creation of a sugarcane ethanol industry that it perceives as being largely a creature of U.S. energy and agricultural policy. Therefore, the creation of a significant sugarcane ethanol industry in Cuba will require a large increase in domestic demand for ethanol.

A2: Food Crisis

Food wars are a myth theres zero empirical evidence Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science University of North Texas, The New
Myth About Climate Change, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)
First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and l ed to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

Wont go to war over food - empirics

Chang 2/21/11 Gordon G Chang, Graduated Cornell Law School Global Food Wars http://blogs.forbes.com/gordonchang/2011/02/21/global-food-wars/ In any event, food-price increases have apparently been factors in the unrest now sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. The poor spend up to half their disposable income on edibles, making rapid food inflation a cause of concern for dictators, strongmen, and assorted autocrats everywhere. So even if humankind does not go to war over bad harvests, Paskal may be right when she contends that climate change may end up altering the global map. This is not the first time in
human history that food shortages looked like they would be the motor of violent geopolitical change. Yet amazing agronomic advances, especially orman Borlaugs Green Revolution in the middle of the 20th century, have consistently proved the pessimists wrong. In these days when capitalism is being blamed for most everything, its important to remember the power of human innovation in free societiesand the efficiency of free markets.

Relations Advantage

Cuba Doesnt Want Relations

Cuba doesnt want cooperation Padgett 7/3 [Tim, reporter for WRN-- http://wlrn.org/post/why-summer-offers-hope-betterus-cuba-relations -- 2013-SR]
Like a lot of idealistic U.S. presidents, Barack Obama took office in 2009 hoping to establish better dialogue with communist Cuba. Remember his plan to pursue direct diplomacy with Havana? Then he uickly discovered what most U.S. presidents find out: First, communist Cuba

really doesnt want improved dialogue with Washington, since conflict with the U.S. offers more political payoff on the island. Hence Cuban leader Ra l Castros 2009 Christmas gift to Obama: the arrest of U.S. aid subcontractor Alan Gross on dubious espionage charges. Second, the hardline U.S. Cuban exile lobby doesnt want improved dialogue with Havana, since conflict with Cuba offers (or has traditionally offered) more political payoff here. Hence the Cuban-American congressional caucus efforts in 2011 to keep Obama from letting convicted Cuban spy Ren Gonzlez return home to finish his probation, a fairly benign gesture that might have enhanced the chances of Gross release.

Alternative Causes
A. North Korea is a stronger alt cause to relations OReilly 7/18 [Andrew, reporter for Fox News Latino-http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/18/north-korean-ship-puts-us-cuban-relationson-ice-experts-say/ -2013 SR] North Korea and Cuba have had steady diplomatic ties for decades, but these relations picked up steam in 2001 when a Cuban delegation visited the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. Cuba is also one of the few countries globally to maintain close ties to the government of Kim Jong-un and is one of the four countries along
with China, Iran and Syria to reject the weapons embargo that the UN Security Council ordered against the Asian nation in 2006.

Cuba might have much to lose over soured relations with the U.S., but North Korea doesnt appear concerned if it angers the U.S. or not. From a number of controversial missile tests to closing the border for
time with U.S. ally South Korea, Pyongyang has traditionally drawn both the ire of the United States and much of the international community. Some experts worry that the

latest incident involving Cubas dated weaponry is a sign of the North Korean cozying up to the U.S.s traditional backyard neighbors. The very fact of the relationship
between Cuba and North Korea argues for a better look at whats going on in Havana, said Susan Kaufman Purcell, the director if the University of Miamis Center for Hemispheric Policy. It

means that North Korea has projected itself into the Western Hemisphere and is only 90 miles from the U.S. The reaction from Washington has been mixed, with the State Department holding back any formal condemnation until more information is released by
Panamanian authorities while anti-Castro lawmakers have denounced the incident as another reason that Cuba is a dangerous nation.

B. Political incompatibility Hanson and Lee 2k13 [Stephanie and Brianna, analysts for the Council for Foreign Relations- http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 -January 2013-- SR] A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say . While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

C. Guantanamo Bay Hanson and Lee 2k13 [Stephanie and Brianna, analysts for the Council for Foreign Relations- http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 -January 2013-- SR] Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22,
2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period.

A2: Terror
Even if terrorists want to strike they cannot chances of success are about 1 in 3 billion Mueller 1/1/2008 [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center
Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008

Even if there is some desire for the bomb by terrorists (something assessed more fulfillment of that desire is obviously another matter. Even alarmists Bunn and Wier contend that the atomic terrorists' task "would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out" or "one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try" (2006, 133-34,
Evaluating the likelihood fully below), 147). But, stresses George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is "possible" or "not beyond the realm of possibility" (Tenet and

It might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how "difficult" or "not impossible" their task is, or how distant the "realm of possibility" might be. After
Harlow 2007, 266, 279). more importantly, ever attempted--in real life. Or

all, lots of things are "not impossible." As I recall, there is a James Bond movie out there someplace in which Our Hero leaps from a low-flying plane or helicopter and lands unruffled in the back seat of a speeding convertible next to a bemused blonde. Although this impressive feat is "not impossible," it may not have ever been accomplished--or perhaps

it is entirely "not impossible" that a colliding meteor or comet could destroy the earth, that Vladimir Putin or the British could decide one morning to launch a few nuclear weapons at Massachusetts, George Bush could decide to bomb Hollywood, that an underwater volcano could erupt to cause a civilization-ending tidal wave, or that Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of mafioso hit men from Rome

to have himself publicly crucified.20 In all this, Brodie's cautionary comment in the 1970s about the imaginative alarmists in the defense community holds as well for those in today's terrorism community, both of which are inhabited by people of a wide range of skills and sometimes of considerable imagination. All sorts of notions and propositions are churned out, and often presented for consideration with the prefatory works: "It is conceivable that..." Such words establish their own truth, for the fact that someone has conceived of whatever proposition follows is enough to establish that it is conceivable. Whether it is worth a second thought, however, is another matter (1978, 83). At any rate, experience thus far cannot be too encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. One group that tried, in the early 1990s, to pull off the deed was the Japanese apocalyptic group, Aum Shinrikyo. Unlike al-Qaeda, it was not under siege, and it had money, expertise, a remote and secluded haven in which to set up shop, even a private uranium mine. But it made dozens of mistakes in judgment, planning, and execution (Linzer 2004). Chagrined, it turned to biological weapons which, as it happened, didn't work either, and finally to chemical ones, resulting eventually in a somewhat botched release of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that managed to kill a total of 12 people. Appraising the barriers. As noted earlier, most discussions of atomic terrorism deal rather piecemeal with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. But, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, building

a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges" and requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished. The process requires obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon "that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart," and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less

powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered (Gilmore 1999, 31, emphasis in the original). Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating Allison's "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these--all of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In assembling the list, I sought to make the various barriers independent, or effectively independent, from each other, although they are, of course, related in the sense that they are sequential. However, while the terrorists must locate an inadequately-secured supply of HEU to even begin the project, this discovery will have little bearing on whether

they will be successful at securing an adequate quantity of the material, even though, obviously, they can't do the second task before accomplishing the first. Similarly, assembling and supplying an adequately equipped machine shop is effectively an independent task from the job of recruiting a team of scientists and technicians to work within it. Moreover, members of this group must display two qualities that, although combined in hurdle 9, are essentially independent of each other: they must be both technically skilled and absolutely loyal to the project. Assessing the probabilities. In seeking to carry out their task, would-be atomic terrorists effectively must go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even dispiriting. To bias the case in their favor, one might begin by assuming that they have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of these obstacles even though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the

chances they could successfully pull off the

mission come out to be worse than one in a million, specifically they are one in 1,048,567. Indeed, the
odds of surmounting even seven of the twenty hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one

three billion--specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (entirely realistic) level one in ten boggles the
mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same--or even smaller. For example there may be a few barriers, such as number 13, where one might plausibly conclude the terrorists' chances are better than 50/50. However, there are many in which the likelihood of success is almost certainly going to be exceedingly small--for example, numbers 4, 5, 9, and 12, and, increasingly, the (obviously) crucial number 1. Those would be the odds for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front (2004, 29), he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults (2004, 29-42).21 Putting aside the observation that few, if any, of these appear to have interest in hitting the United States except for al-Qaeda (to be discussed more fully below), the odds would remain long even with multiple attempts. If there were a hundred determined efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one one-hundredth of one percent at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three it would be about one in 50 million. If there were 1000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be less than one percent at the 50/50 level and about one in 50,000 at the one in three level.22

in well over

Even if terrorists acquired a bomb delivery would be extremely difficult simple human error would cause failures. Ayson 10 Centre for Strategic Studies @ Victoria University
Robert Ayson, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. After a Terrorist uclear Attack: nvisaging Catalytic ffects. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7 July 2010 , pages 571 593. InformaWorld In the event that a terrorist group does acquire a nuclear weapon, there are additional hurdles to cross before detonation becomes a reality. The group must be able to ready and deploy the weapon: it needs an effective delivery system to get the weapon to its intended
target. This delivery system does not need to be especially sophisticated or expensive. A nuclear-armed terrorist group would be unlikely to regard an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as its preferred mode of delivery, and might favor the combination of a shipping container to bring the weapon into a port and then a truck to bring the weapon to a midtown location for detonation. But even crude and everyday delivery systems need to be effective. Just as an ICBM needs to be able to launch successfully, and survive the outer atmosphere before returning to the earth's lower layers, evading

any military countermeasures that might be in its way, the terrorists' nuclear weapon needs to be loaded in the container of a ship that needs to transit and dock successfully, evading law enforcement, customs, and similar countermeasures in place as Ferguson and Potter note.16 The weapon would then need to be transferred to the truck, which needs a competent driver and crew, and that then needs to evade even the most elementary obstacles on its way to the center of the city. Something as simple as a defective tail-light or some nervous driving that alerts the attention of traffic police might be enough to stop the attempt late in its tracks. But let it be assumed that
the members of a terrorist group have transferred their weapon to the very place to which they wish to detonate it, or at least to a place where the detonation can occur with very serious consequences. They then need to do this successfully. They

need to understand any firing mechanism, which itself needs to work. They could well require mastery of any launch codes, fail-safe keys, or other such security devices that are attached to a bomb if this has been obtained off the shelf,17 unless Allison's concerns that

such protections are only maintained in some of the world's arsenals18 apply in the given situation. If

the terrorist group has only one nuclear weapon (remembering that obtaining one and only one nuclear weapon would still be quite an achievement) the pressures on them would still be immense. In this example of what the nineteenth-century military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz famously referred to as friction,19 simple human error could result in a dud explosion. A mass casualty attack could still result from an incomplete explosion:
Zimmerman and Lewis estimate that A failed detonation, one that produced only a few tens of tons of yield, could kill 10,000 people in just a few hours if the device exploded in a crowded financial center.20 But it would still represent the group's failure to maximize the physical impact of a genuine weapon of mass destruction. All

of this is not to suggest that the acquisition, deployment, and detonation of a nuclear device can be ignored as a complete impossibility. It is simply to be reminded that like all other strategic actors, terrorists will be faced by a series of potential obstacles in each link of the chain. Despite the images of inscrutability, determination, and sheer mendacity, terrorists are fallible human beings, and the groups to which they belong are also prone to the serious organizational errors found in other social systems.

A2: Proliferation
No widespread prolif Hymans 12Jac ues . C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC *April 16, 2012, orth
Korea's Lessons for ( ot) Building an Atomic Bomb, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-fornot-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show] Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown . Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25
years of the nuclear age. As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the proliferation slowdown is

key reason for the great the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling
proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

Prolif is super slowempirics disprove their fear mongering. Hymans 12Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012,
Botching the Bomb, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacquese-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]
The chronic problem of nuclear proliferation is once again dominating the news. A fierce debate has developed over how to respond to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear activities, which most experts believe are aimed at producing a nuclear weapon or at least the capacity to assemble one. In this debate, one side is pushing for a near-term military attack to damage or destroy Iran's nuclear program, and the other side is hoping that strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic will soften it up for a diplomatic solution. Both sides, however, share the underlying assumption that unless outside powers intervene in a dramatic fashion, it is inevitable that Iran will achieve its supposed nuclear goals very soon. Yet there is another possibility. The

Iranians had to work for 25 years just to start accumulating uranium enriched to 20 percent, which is not even weapons grade. The slow pace of Iranian nuclear progress to date strongly suggests that Iran could still need a very long time to actually build a bomb -- or could even ultimately fail to do so. Indeed, global trends in proliferation suggest that either of those outcomes might be more likely than Iranian success in the near future. Despite regular warnings that proliferation is spinning out of control, the fact is that since the 1970s, there has been a persistent slowdown in the pace of technical progress on nuclear weapons projects and an equally dramatic decline in their ultimate success rate. The great

proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a
common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies -- Iran's political leaders -- to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves. NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED "Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the

more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion . Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

Shunning DA

1NC
Cuba is still one of the largest human rights abusers-recent actions prove HRW 2k13 [Human Rights Watch, April-- http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universalperiodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba -SR] Cuba remains the only country in Latin America that represses virtually all forms of political dissent. In 2012 the government of Ral Castro continued to enforce political conformity using short-term detentions, beatings, public acts of repudiation, travel restrictions, and forced exile. During its first UPR review, Cuba rejected all recommendations addressing the arbitrary detentions of political prisoners, the lack of protection of human rights defenders, and restrictions on freedom of
expression. Since then, Human Rights Watch has continued documenting cases of serious abuses of these rights. The Cuban government released dozens of political prisoners in 2010 and 2011 on the condition that they accept exile in exchange for their freedom. Yet while the overall number of political prisoners has declined,

the government has increasingly relied upon arbitrary arrests and short-term detentions to restrict the basic rights of its critics, including the right to assemble and move about freely. Meanwhile, the government continues to sentence dissidents to long-term prison sentences in closed, summary trials, or hold them for extended periods without charge.

Reject engagement with human rights abusers moral duty to shun. Beversluis 89 Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College,
holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of ducation from orthwestern University, 1989 (On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and conomic Sanctions, Public Affairs Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)
A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there

is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order . Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights . Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects
people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain

types of behavior constitute a direct attack on

the moral order . When the violation of human rights is flagrant , willful , and persistent , the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior
into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When

someone flagrantly , willfully , and repeatedly violates the moral

order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order . How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action . This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction , whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order , of "purifying the community" after it has been made
"unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it

is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful , persistent , and flagrant immorality .

Block Overview
Vote against any invasion of human rights every instance is key Petro 74
[Sylvester, Professor of Law at NYU, Toledo Law Review, Spring, p. 480, 1974 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200304/0783.html]
David Hume's observation: "It However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway - "I believe in only one thing: liberty." And it is always well to bear in mind

is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no importance because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Dijas. In sum, if one believed in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

Focus on magnitude masks everyday instances of violence you should place a disproportionately high value on structural violence. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, Professors of Anthropology @ Berkeley & UPenn, 2004 (Nancy and Philippe, Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)
This large and at first sight "messy" Part VII is central to (his anthology's thesis. It encom- passes everything from the (outinized, burcaucrattzed, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil {Schcper-Hughcs, Chapter 33) ro elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly's version of US apartheid in Chicago's South Side I'Klincnberg, Chapter 38) to the racializcd class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the "smelly" working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdctcr- mine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US "inner city" to be normalized iBourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada. Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between

Close attention to the "little" violences produced in the structures, habituscs, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of "violence studies" that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a
wartime and peacetime violence. multitude of "small wars and invisible genocides" (see also Schcpcr- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons,

The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soulmurder. We realize that in referring to a \ iolenci* and a genocide continuum we arc flying in the face of a tradition of
detention centers, and public morgues. genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (seeKuper l985;Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary,

it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential

leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in
ovcrextending the concept of "genocide" into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might noc ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by "ordinary" good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impover- ished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the "small wars and invisible genocides" to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are "invisible" genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu's partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as

including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of "normal" social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression. Similarly, Basaglia's notion of "peacetime crimes" - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship
well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibil- ity that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on "illegal aliens" versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee "Trail of Tears." Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal "stability" is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied "strangle-holds." Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic "peace" possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindusrrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man. the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the "normative" socializing experience for ethnic minority

it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among Otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participa- tion in genocidal acts and policies possible {under adverse political or economic
youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end conditions). perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dchumamzjtion. depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and rcification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin's view of late modem history as a chronic "state of emergency" (Taussig, Chapter 31). We arc trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Krving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twcnricth-ccntury radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other "total institutions." Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce gcnocidal-likc crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to "pseudo- speciation" as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human-a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes

Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are
thai precede the sudden, "seemingly unintelligible" outbreaks of mass violence. formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Schcper-Hughes Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of "angel-babies,"' and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized

forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by "symbolic violence," the violence that is often "mis-recognized" for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls "terror as usual." All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and "peace-time crimes." Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and

Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies "mcconnaissancc" as the prerequisite of the social. The
culinary taste- the various uses of culture. exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family- farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42: see also Schcper Hughes, 2000b; FavrctSaada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the

we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of "controlling processes" (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to
expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reificarion, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that

mass

violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often

experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early "warning signs" (Charncy 1991), the "priming" (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the "genocidal continuum" (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable "social parasites" (the nursing home elderly, "welfare queens," undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

Links
A. Travel restrictions HRW 2k13 [Human Rights Watch, April-- http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universalperiodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba -SR] The Cuban government forbids the country's citizens from leaving or returning to Cuba without first obtaining official permission, which is often denied to those it views as detractors. For example,
acclaimed blogger Yoani Snchez, who has been critical of the government, has been denied the right to leave the island at least 19 times since 2008, including in February 2012, after she had been granted a visa to travel to Brazil for a documentary screening.

The Cuban government uses forced family separation to punish defectors and silence critics . The government frequently bars citizens engaged in authorized travel from taking their children with them overseas, essentially holding children hostage to guarantee their parents' return. The government restricts the movement of citizens within Cuba by enforcing a 1997 law known as Decree 217. Designed to limit migration to Havana, the decree requires Cubans to obtain government
permission before moving to the country's capital. It is often used to prevent dissidents traveling to Havana to attend meetings and to harass dissidents from other parts of Cuba who live in the capital.

B. Prison Conditions HRW 2k13 [Human Rights Watch, April-- http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universalperiodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba -SR] Before implementing the accepted recommendations made by China and Iran to share experiences and good practices regarding the treatment of prisoners, the Cuban government should address the dire conditions of its overcrowded, unhygienic, and unhealthy prisons, which
are currently leading to extensive malnutrition and illness. Prisoners who criticize the government, refuse to participate in ideological "reeducation," or

engage in hunger strikes and other forms of protest are often subjected to extended solitary confinement, beatings, restrictions on family visits, and denial of medical care. Prisoners have no effective complaint mechanism to seek redress, giving prison authorities total impunity.

C. Forced Exile HRW 2k13 [Human Rights Watch, April-- http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/18/universalperiodic-review-hrw-submission-cuba -SR] The death of political prisoner Orlando Zapata Tamayo in February 2010, which followed his 85-day hunger strike, and the subsequent hunger strike by dissident Guillermo Farias created pressure on the Cuban government to release the remaining political prisoners from the group of 75 (the 75 human rights defenders, journalists, and other dissidents who had been sentenced to long prison terms in a massive crackdown in 2003). Yet while the final prisoners from the group of 75 were released in 2011, the majority were forced to choose between ongoing prison sentences and forced exile. Since that time, dozens of other prominent dissidents, journalists, and human rights defenders have been forced to choose between exile and ongoing harassment or even imprisonment.