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Reforms are solving the economy now Sweig and Bustamante 13 (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Michael Bustamante, Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University, Cuba After Communism <http://internalreform.blogspot.com/> 6 -27
The reforms have yielded several modest successes thus far . After facing sharp liquidity and balance-of-payments crises in the wake of the 2008 global financial meltdown, Cuba has succeeded in restoring a modicum of financial stabilit y, resuming its debt payments, sharply cutting its imports, and beginning the arduous task of reducing public expenditures. Several key strategic investments from international partners -- most notably, the refurbishing of Mariel Harbor, with the aid of Brazilian capital, to transform it into a major container shipping port -- are moving forward on schedule. Meanwhile, a new state financial accountability bureau has begun the hard task of weeding out endemic corruption.
New migration laws magnify the impact of remittances Sweig and Bustamante 13 (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Michael Bustamante, Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University, Cuba After Communism <http://internalreform.blogspot.com/> 6 -27
making it easier for Cubans to travel, work abroad, and then return home, Cubas new migration law is also meant to stimulate the economy. At an estimated $1 billion a year, remittances have been big business since the late 1990s, helping
Indeed, by Cubans compensate for low salaries and take advantage of what few opportunities have existed for private enterprise. Now that the government has undertaken a wider expansion of the small-business sector, ties between the diaspora and the island are bringing an even greater payoff. Cubans abroad are already helping invest money in the window-front cafeterias, repair shops, and other small businesses popping up across the country. Some islanders are also sending their own money out of the country so that relatives can buy them consumer goods abroad.
The economy is growing in all sectors HT 7-7 (Havana Times, Cuban Gov. Presents Favorable Stats <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=95985> 7 -7-13)
The economy showed an overall a favorable performance, said Yzquierdo. Almost all sectors recorded growth, including trade, transport, communications and manufacturing, he noted. Yzquierdo said the Cuban trade balance was positive at the end of the first quarter and pointed to a similar trend for year-end. At the same time, he spoke of a slowdown in the global economic situation. Cuba recently reduced its forecasts for annual growth in 2013 from the 3.6 percent initially estimated to somewhere between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. He emphasized that the evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) has been influenced by the crisis in the international arena. In the first semester, the islands economy grew 2.3 percent, according Yzquierdo, despite external stress, the internal weaknesses and the effects of Hurricane Sandy, which swept across the east of Cuba in
October 2012. Sandy affected 11 provinces and caused losses of almost 7 billion dollars, according to the minister. The inaugural session of the eighth legislature of the National Assembly of Peoples Power closes on, Sunday. Raul Castro is expected t o pronounce in a speech to the parliament. In a Communist Party Central Committee meeting last week, Castro came down hard on what he called indiscipline and illegalities in the State apparatus. He will most likely refer to the fight against corruption, one of the banner efforts of his administration.
Status quo solves trade with other countries Seaman 10 (David Seaman, Prof., Social Science, U. Osnabruck, Germany, U.S. Democracy Promotion: The Case of
Cuba, <http://www.blissfieldschools.us/downloads/justin_pooley/casebook_2_inherency_2013_20130611_075447_1.pdf> 2010)
While the U.S. embargo creates an extremely difficult economic situation in Cuba, the island is able to find relief from much of the economic pressure in several ways. Firstly, the lack of international support for the embargo has made it possible for Cuba to continuously find substitute trading partners and adapt to new and changing circumstances, helping fill the void created by the end of the massive Soviet subsidies and aid. Cuba enjoys trade with several Western capitalist states, foremost Canada, Spain, and the Netherlands, Cuba's three largest Western trading partners. Most recently, the country has developed
close trade relations with Venezuela and China, which together now make up more than 50% off all trade for Cuba.
The economy will grow Morris 11 (Emily Morris, Research Associate and Lecturer in Economic Development of Latin America and the
Caribbean, FORECASTING CUBASECONOMY <http://www.cubaproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/CubaForecastingWEB.pdf> 4-2-11)
The private sector has grown to account for around a quarter of the economy, an increase in the rate of investment has expanded productive capacity and is beginning to generate new employment opportunities. There has been neither recession nor runaway inflation, average living standards have improved a little and the welfare safety net has been retained. The new private sector has broadened the range of goods and services available in the domestic market, food import
dependency has diminished and trade concentration has been slightly reduced through an expansion of medical exports, pharmaceuticals licensing and the sale of professional services to countries other than Venezuela. An increase in the rate of investment in productive capacity, together with an improvement in the incentives structures, has begun to ease the supply side constraints on growth
Remittances solve growth larger than all other factors Chavez 13 (Juan Carlos Chavez, Remittances from Cubans abroad drive the islands economy
<http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/12/3448098/remittances-from-cubans-abroad.html> 6-12-13)
Cash remittances to Cuba in 2012 surpassed all revenue coming from the main components of the Cuban economy
while becoming the largest element of support to the retail market, according to a study by a Miami-based analysis group. The study, titled Remittances to Cuba: the Most Powerful Engine of the Cuban Economy, was done by The Havana Consul ting Group. It concludes that in 2012, remittances reached $2.605 billion. The number represents an increase of more than 13 percent compared to the previous year of nearly $2.3 billion. Today remittances to the island reach 62 percent of Cuban homes, support close to 90 percent of the retail market and allow employment of tens of thousands of people , the study says. The remarkable upward trend has also been a common denominator in goods (electrical appliances, clothes and consumer items, among others) that Cubans abroad ship to relatives or friends in Cuba. This category amounted to $2.5 billion in 2012, according to the study. Both categories (money and goods) together surpassed $5.105 billion. The remittances have left behind the powerful sugar industry ($391 million) which by 1993 had entered its biggest crisis and it is still in decline they surpass tourism ($2.613 billion) in volume and performance, provide more revenue than nickel exports ($1.413 billion) and the pharmaceuticals produced by the Cuban biotechnological industry ($500 million), the study says. And this without subtracting costs in each category, wh ich would make the difference significantly larger. The injection of remittances has been a powerful pillar for the countrys ec onomy, which has been practically stagnant and with high levels of unemployment. But its role has now been strengthened because of the deteriorating economy, according to experts familiar with the issue. In October 2010, the Cuban crisis forced Ral Castros government to launch market reforms and other emergency initiatives. The reforms, which a large part of the opposition calls insufficient and cosmetic, include a larger participation of foreign investment, self-employment and services in dozens of labor categories.
Remittances are still increasing Whitefield 13 (Mimi Whitefield, writer for the Miami Herald, IDB: Remittances sent to Latin America and the
Caribbean on the upswing <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/29/3370094/idb-remittances-sent-to-latin.html> 4-2913)
Remittances sent to Latin America and the Caribbean grew less than 1 percent in 2012 but showed larger increases in
countries more dependent on money sent home by migrants living in the United States, according to an Inter-American Development Bank study released Monday. Last year, the region received $61.3 billion in remittances the money sent by migrants to sustain family and friends in their homelands. Thats $300 million, or 0.6 percent, more than in 2011. The tally doesnt include countries, such as Cuba, which arent IDB members. What were seeing is a continued stabilization in remittances and that has been the trend for the last few years as weve come out of the global economic crisis, said Natasha Bajuk, an IDB remittance specialist who worked on the report. Remittances had been growing steadily, reaching a high of $65 billion in 2008, but falling by 15 percent in 2009 as the effects of the financial crisis took hold. The trend once again turned positive in 2010, but there have been very small increases for the past few years.
Domestic reforms solve now CDA 11 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, Cubas New Resolve: Economic Reform and its Implications for
U.S. Policy <http://www.democracyinamericas.org/cuba/cuba -publications/cubas-new-resolve/> Copyright 2011)
Cubas government is taking extraordinary steps to address its economic crisis . Its effort, to update Cuban institutions and reshape how Cubans earn their living and lead their lives, contains the biggest economic changes Cubans have seen in over two decades and offers a greater prospect for realigning the relationship between Cuban citizens and their state than has seemed possible since 1959. In a process that one analyst has called relentless gradualism, Cubas government is relying on private sector solutions, loosened restrictions on the Cuban people, painful cuts in guaranteed employment and social benefits, and aspirations for wealth-creating industries that offer goods and services for export in a competitive global marketplace. Their goal is simple but unprecedented: to preserve the communitarian ethos of Cubas society and maintain its commitments to education and public health, while building a competitive economy that can honor these obligations in a sustainable way over time.
Foreign exchange with other countries causes economic growth Laverty 11 (Collin Laverty, Cubas New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy
<http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf> Copyright 2011)
The emergence of Hugo Chvez as president of Venezuela in 1999 and the formation of an alliance between the two countries is the prime factor in Cubas economic growth over the last decade. Venezuela provides Cuba with roughly two-thirds of its daily oil requirement. In return, Cuba exports medical, educational, and other services to Venezuela, an arrangement that has helped keep Cuba afloat without making significant market reforms.17 Today, Cubas economy is still largely statecontrolled, with the government owning almost all productive capital assets and employing over 80% of the labor force. Increased investment from Brazil, Canada, China, Spain, Venezuela, and other countries has benefited the economy.18 In addition to the export of professional services, mainly doctors, teachers and sports trainers, Cuba receives over 2 million
tourists each year which, together with nickel and cobalt mining, and a growing biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector, help generate foreign exchange .19
Revenue from medical services solves Ravsberg 6-10 (Fernando Ravsberg, writer for Havana Times, The Locomotive of Cubas Economy: Health
Services Abroad <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=94374> 6-10-13)
HAVANA TIMES Contributing
some US $5 billion to Cubas economy every year, the 40,000 Cuban health professionals currently offering medical services in 60 countries around the world have become the islands chief source of revenues, well above the tourism sector, family remittances and the nickel industry. According to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Cubas global brigade of health professionals is currently made up of 15 thousand physicians, 2,300 ophth almologists, 15 thousand med-school graduates, 5,000 health technicians and 800 assistants. In exchange for the services offered by those medical professionals based in Venezuela, Cuba receives 100 thousand barrels of oil a day. Cuban doctors are also working in other countries in the region, and there are some 4,000 in Africa, over 500 in Asia and Oceania and 40 in Europe. What makes Cuban health
professionals an attractive asset for many Third World countries is the fact they are willing to work in places that locals avoid, such as bad neighborhoods or rural areas that are difficult to access, where the lowest-income populations are concentrated.
Cubas economy is stable even with the embargo Planas 12 (Roque Planas, Writer for Fox News, US Embargo on Cuba Turns 50
<http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/02/07/us-embargo-on-cuba-turns-50/> 2-7-12)
The Communist Partys smooth transition to a post-Fidel Cuba in which his brother Raul Castro is liberalizing the state-run economy while maintaining one-party rule also keeps the embargo from becoming a priority for U.S. policymakers. Cuba under Raul Castro is very stable. Theres no national security or foreign policy crisis , Sweig says. It becomes easier to just tread water and keep doing the same thing. The policy survives despite the fact that most of the world wants the United States to
change course.
Alt causes
Alt causes large services sector, low productivity, and global forces Sweig and Bustamante 13 (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Michael Bustamante, Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University, Cuba After Communism <http://internalreform.blogspot.com/> 6 -27
Nevertheless, Cuba faces serious obstacles in its quest for greater economic vitality. Unlike China and Vietnam at the start of their reform efforts, Cuba is an underdeveloped country with developed-world problems. Not only is the population aging (18 percent of the population is over 60), but the countrys economy is heavily tilted toward the services sector . When Vietnam began its doi moi (renovation) economic reforms in 1986, services accounted for about 33 percent of GDP, whereas the productive base represented nearly 67 percent. By contrast, services in Cuba make up close to 75 percent of the islands GDP -- the result of 20-plus years of severe industrial decay and low rates of savings and investment. Service exports (mainly of health-care professionals), combined with tourism and remittances, constitute the countrys primary defense against a sustained balance-of-payments deficit. Cuban officials and economists recognize this structural weakness and have emphasized the need to boost exports and foster a more dynamic domestic market. Yet so far, the state has not been able to remedy the imbalance. In the sugar industry, once a mainstay, production continues to flounder despite a recent uptick in global prices and new Brazilian investment. Meanwhile, a corruption scandal and declining world prices have weakened the nickel industry, leading to the closing of one of the islands three processing facilities. More broadly, Cuban productivity remains anemic, and the country has been unable to capitalize on its highly educated work force . Although important, the expansion of the small-business sector cannot resolve these core issues. There are now 181 legal categories for self-employment, but they are concentrated almost exclusively in the services sector , including proprietors of independent restaurants, food stands, and bed-and-breakfasts. Start-up funds are scarce, fees for required licenses are high, and some of the legal categories are senselessly specific. It also remains unclear whether the chance to earn a legitimate profit will lure black-market enterprises out into the open.
Alt causes to economic decline Hurricane sandy, structural problems, and the surrounding economies Tamayo 7-1 (Juan O. Tamayo, writer for Miami Herald, Report says Cuban economic growth hasnt quickened
despite reforms <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/01/3480625/report -says-cuban-economy-is.html> 7-1-13)
Yzquierdo blamed the shortcomings on a broad range of factors that went from last years Hurricane Sandy it caused an estimated $2 billion in damages to what Granma called the deficiencies that are part and parcel of the Cuban economy. Granma and Yzquierdo ticked off a list of reasons for the economic stagnation, from delays in projects to broken contracts and the low productivity and shortage of the labor force as well as the economic situation in Latin America and the rest of the world. Spending on social services remained stable for the first semester of this year, Yzquierdo declared, and many parts of the economy grew at a 2.9 percent clip or better. But the sugar harvest fell 192,000 tons short of goal and bean production fell 6,000 tons short. Government spending on construction and other capital projects was 16.6 percent higher than in the first semester last year but 9 percent short of goal because of delays and others issues, the minister said. Exports grew by 5 percent, Granma reported, and lower prices on imported food meant savings of $168 million. But shortcomings in Cuban farming forced the government to import an unplanned $46 million worth of fo od. Cuba must import more than 70 percent of the food
items it consumes, at a cost of more than $1.5 billion a year. Underlining Cubas economic stagnation, Vice President Marino Murillo, in charge of implementing the Castro reforms, told the Cabinet that the government will promote the use of bicycles to cover gaps in public transportation, according to Granma. We will evaluate the sale at cost of parts for their maintenance, Murillo was quoted as saying in the lengthy Granma report summing up the Cabinet meeting. The government sold Cubans more than 1 million bicycles, most of them made in China, after the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s and halted it massive cash and oil subsidies to the communist-ruled island. But by 1996 about one-third of Havana residents had stopped using their bikes because of the lack of spare parts, the bad state of Cubas streets and lack of night lights, according to a report in 2011 by the Agence France Press news agency. The AFP report noted that Havana authorities had already decided to cut the price of spare parts by 30 percent, guarantee the work of 105 repair shops and 110 air pumping stations and try to create about 100 miles of bike lanes. Murillo also listed a series of problems with the public transportation system bus passengers not paying their fares and bus company employees stealing the money, and a black market for fuel and spare parts mostly stolen from state enterprises. The government plans to use plastic cards to control fuel purchases by public transport employees the principal source of black market fuel crack down on the theft and offer higher salaries to sector workers, he said, without raising prices.
Ties with Venezuela overcome U.S. influence Mesa-Lago 13 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuban economist, author and distinguished professor, On Cuba's Economy
<http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/06/on-cubas-economy-freethecuban11million.html> 6-11-13)
Mesa-Lago: Cuba's
economic relationship with Venezuela is vital: 42% of the island's commercial trade in merchandise, 44% of the total deficit in the balance of trade, the provision of 62% of the oil consumed by Cuba, the purchase of Cuban professional services for nearly $5 billion per year and substantial direct investments . In total, it's equivalent to nearly 21% of Cuba's GDP, similar to its relationship with the USSR at its best times. The acceleration of the reforms since October 2012 could have been influenced by the gravity of Chavez's sickness. The controversial election of Nicolas Maduro and the subsequent political instability, aggravated by the severe deterioration of the economy, could affect this relationship with devastating effects for Cuba. Faced with these risks and problems, the logical thing would be to deepen and accelerate the reforms.
Alt causes reforms, globalization, and Venezuela Morris 11 (Emily Morris, Research Associate and Lecturer in Economic Development of Latin America and the Caribbean,
FORECASTING CUBASECONOMY <http://www.cubaproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/CubaForecastingWEB.pdf> 4-2-11)
Even in the absence of political collapse, there remain substantial risks of economic instability and weakness. The reform process, which includes the removal of subsidies and extensive realignment of relative prices and incomes, will create inflationary pressures that will be hard to contain. The forecast of a steady rise in average productivity is derived from an
expectation that the positive impact of the introduction of market signals and improvement in incentives will outweigh the disruption costs. The slow rate of average real income growth would imply continued pressure on the government to maintain subsidies for basic goods and extend welfare provision to households struggling to adapt to the new conditions, draining fiscal resources and increasing the temptation to raise taxes on productive activity to levels that discourage innovation and enterprise, or push activity back from the formal economy to the informal sector. If Cubas reform wave were to coincide with deteriorating external conditions, rather than the relatively benign scenario presented in the EIUs global assumptions, the political and economic risks would be greater. The danger of upsets in the global economy remains heightened by concerns about high debt levels and sluggish growth in the EU and Europe, and inflated asset prices among the rapidly-growing economies of the developing world. A deterioration in global conditions might feed through to Cuban economic performance through collapse in the nickel price or surge in oil or food prices, or a sudden contraction in tourist arrivals. The single event that would have the greatest negative impact on Cubas economic prospects, however, would be the replacement of Hugo Chvez with a hostile regime in Venezuela, particularly if this were to coincide with high international oil prices. A similar degree of shock, but on the positive side, would arise from the lifting of the US travel ban, opening of the US market to Cuban exports or removal of restrictions on US and multilateral financial flows to Cuba.
Cant solve
Removal wont solve the economy only the government gets money Bustillo 13 (Mitchell Bustillo, writer for International Policy Digest, Hispanic Heritage Foundation Gold Medallion
Winner, and a former United States Senate Page, Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/> 5-9-13)
Still there
is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution. From the annual throng of
American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere S ubcommittee Hearing that an estimated, $4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region. These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands. After all, the authorities were
already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans
by non-American foreign investors, states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate. Lifting the
trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.
The embargo is not the cause of poverty the Cuban government withholds wealth
Cruz 12 (Alberto de la Cruz, Managing Editor of Babal Blog, Cuba, USA: Blogger Perspectives on the Embargo's
50th Anniversary (Part 1) <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/02/29/cuba-u-s-a-blogger-perspectives-on-the-embargos50th-anniversary-part-1/> 2-29-12)
Alberto de la Cruz (AC): It is hard to argue the US embargo against the Castro dictatorship hurts the Cuban people when in 2010 (the latest figures available), the Cuban government imported over $400-million in food from the US. While the embargo limits trade, it allows food to be sold to the Cuban government on a cash basis. If that food is not reaching the average Cuban and is instead being sent to the Cuban military owned hotels and resorts to feed tourists , that is not because of the embargo, it is because of the Castro regime [which] ultimately controls the distribution of all food on the island. It is interesting to note that none of those who suggest the trade embargo against the Castro dictatorship hurts only the average Cuban can explain why the vast majority of Cubans continue to live in abject poverty when the Castro government, according to their own figures, had over $8-billion dollars in imports in 2010. While Cubans struggle to feed their families, Cuban children are denied milk once they turn six, the most basic items are nearly impossible to find, and ration books are still in use. In Cubas tourist hotels and resorts, which again, are owned by the Cuban military, there is no shortage of food, soap, milk, or anything else. If an embargo is hurting the Cuban people, it is the embargo placed upon them by the Castro regime.
The embargo has no effect Cuba trades with other countries Chapman 10 (Steve Chapman, Staff writer, Cuba and the Death of Communism
<http://www.ww.creators.com/opinion/steve-chapman/cuba-and-the-death-of-communism.html> 9-18-10)
The regime prefers to blame any problems on the Yankee imperialists, who have enforced an economic embargo for decades. In fact, its effect on the Cuban economy is modest, since Cuba trades freely with the rest of the world. How potent can the boycott be when we're the only participant? Cubans have had to pay for their meager economic gains by surrendering their
political liberties. In its latest annual report, Human Rights Watch says, "Cuba remains the one country in Latin America that represses virtually all forms of political dissent."
Structural problems prevent growth Laverty 11 (Collin Laverty, Cubas New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy
<http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf> Copyright 2011)
Economists contend that Cuba
needs to develop policies to attract increased foreign investment in productive sectors and adjust domestic investment schemes so that more funds are directed toward farms and factories . CubAS NE W RESOLvE: ECONOm iC REFORm AND iTS imP LiCATiONS FOR u .S . PO LiCy 42 Productive sectors of the economy will become more competitive and efficient only if state-owned enterprises are given greater autonomy in labor and pricing policies, and forced to go under when unprofitable. The government has acknowledged the challenge of reigniting productive sectors of the economy to some degree in the Guidelines, but has yet to introduce concrete policy solutions to get this underway. Although the Guidelines call for increased investment in productive sectors and participation of foreign capital, they do not
outline clear policy steps to make those goals reality. Current Cuban law allows for foreign investment in nearly any sector of the economy and the document calls for seeking increased investment in the sugar industry and developing special economic zones. However, aside from development of golf courses and accompanying villas, and large infrastructure projects, no significant new joint-venture projects
Improving the Cuban economy wont lead to democracyChina and Vietnam prove Azel Sep-08 (Jos, How to Think About Change in Cuba: A Guide for Policymakers, Jos Azel is currently a
Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/Article-Azel-FINAL.pdf) We can retain a residual curiosity about this topic, but the core principle of this variant is that changes in the economic sphere will lead to changes in the political one. The policy prescription derived from this is that all constituencies should support economic changes in Cuba even in the absence of political ones since those are sure to follow. Supporters of this view often point to China and Vietnam as two countries that have embraced, albeit selectively, a market economy. It is noted that these countries have shown remarkable economic growth and that their peoples are measurably wealthier. In this sense they are correct. But the argument begins to falter when we look for the expected and anticipated political changes in the direction of democracy. After decades of market reforms these countries are far from democratic. Arguably, democracy may still follow, but it is now legitimate to ask: When? And what empirical support is offered for this claim?
The only way to spur democracy in Cuba is to introduce political and economic reforms simultaneouslysimply improving the economy now wont helpempirical studies prove Azel Sep-08 (Jos, How to Think About Change in Cuba: A Guide for Policymakers, Jos Azel is currently a
Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/Article-Azel-FINAL.pdf) In contrast to China and Vietnam, as will be shown below, other former communist countries followed a different course and are today both more prosperous and democratic. The Czech Republic and Estonia, for example, introduced political rights and civil liberties from the very beginning. Why then should Cuba settle for the unproven path of insular economic reforms without reference to experience hoping against the evidence that such reforms will lead to democracy at a much later date? What case can be made to delay democracy in Cuba if the evidence shows that the most successful transitioning countries have embraced democracy first or simultaneously with economic 6 reforms? Before proceeding, lets briefly review the empirical evidence of these alternative paths to support the statements just made and the questions raised. In order to provide a comparative snapshot of the relationship between political and economic freedoms the graph below plots these variables for some representative countries that are often discussed as distinct transition models. The bars from the horizontal axis measure current economic freedoms in each country. The corresponding line indicates the level of political freedoms in each country.3 It is interesting to note that in former socialist countries that have experienced real transitions such as the Czech Republic and Estonia, political freedoms plot higher than economic freedoms. On the other hand, countries that have introduced economic reforms without concurrent political reforms such as China and Vietnam show a persistent lag of political freedoms decades after the initiation of economic reforms. For Cuba and North Korea the index of political freedoms is zero and both countries also map the lowest in economic freedoms. Although a static snapshot in time, this comparison suggests that the most hospitable environment for a genuine transition is one in which political freedoms are introduced hand-in-hand with economic reforms. The graph also shows that political freedoms do not follow inexorably -or on a timely fashion- the introduction of economic freedoms as demonstrated by the China and Vietnam indicators.
No impact
Instability doesnt spillover empirics Mesa-Lago and Vidal-Alejandro 10 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago, distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of
Economics and Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh; and Pavel Vidal-Alejandro, Centro de Estudios sobre la Economia Cubana, The Impact of the Global Crisis on Cubas Economy and Social Welfare <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=7957006&jid=LAS&volumeId=42&issueId=04&aid=7 957004> November 2010)
The global nancialeconomic crisis that began in 2008 generated transmission mechanisms from developed to developing economies that were in turn conditioned by domestic factors that might attenuate or accentuate the economic and social eects of the recession. Cuba is a special case, however. It is an open economy in the sense that it is exposed to trade-growth transmission mechanisms, but its socialist centralised economy and widespread free social services may attenuate the eects of the crisis.1 The Economic
Latin America and the Caribbeans (ECLAC) preliminary 2009 report noted that the strongest eects of the global crisis on the region were channelled not through the nancial sector but through the economy, by a decline in exports, commodity prices, remittances, tourism and foreign direct investment. The Latin American countries nancial systems did not deteriorate, currency markets were relatively calm, and external obligations were met: The emergence from this crisis has been quicker than expected, largely thanks to the ramparts that the countries of the region had built through sounder macroeconomic policy management _ The Latin American economies went into the crisis with unprecedented liquidity and solvency_ The positive stimulus of scal policy action was one of the distinctive features of economic management in 2009.2 The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) report on the impact of the global crisis concluded that the region avoided the currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global nancial turbulence thanks to the strength of its macro-economic fundamentals: low ination, twin external and scal surpluses, a sound banking system, a large stock of international reserves, and more exible exchange rate regimes. These strengths allowed governments to respond with counterCommission for cyclical monetary, scal and credit policies to mitigate the adverse impact of the global crisis. In addition, a key innovation in this episode of global nancial turbulence was the readiness of the world community to act as an international lender of last resort by providing assistance to emerging markets.3
No collapse external sources of stability Morris 11 (Emily Morris, Research Associate and Lecturer in Economic Development of Latin America and the
Caribbean, FORECASTING CUBASECONOMY <http://www.cubaproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/CubaForecastingWEB.pdf> 4-2-11)
The external conditions used for this forecast are taken from the EIUs global assumptions, with a pattern of relatively slow OECD growth accompanied by stronger expansion of emerging economies. Within this, it is assumed that China and Brazil will continue to provide strong markets and sources of new finance for Cuba. Their growth will also underpin commodity prices, so that Cubas high oil import costs will be balanced by continued strong prices for its commodity exports (mainly nickel and sugar).
opportunities not paid for by China, but beneficial to the Asian country nonetheless. In January 2011, Peru completed work on a road that connects the mountainous country to Brazil. This has the potential to boost Peruvian and Brazilian trade with Asia. Peru itself has had a free trade agreement with China since 2008.
Infrastructure investment is key to growth in the region Caldern and Servn 10 (Csar Caldern, Senior Economist at the Regional Chief Economist Office for Latin
America and the Caribbean Region at the World Bank and Luis Servn, Research Manager for Macroeconomics and Growth in the Development Research Group, Infrastructure in Latin America <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3801/WPS5317.pdf?sequence=1> May 2010)
Poor infrastructure is commonly viewed as a key obstacle to economic development. Across Latin America, there is an increasing perception that inadequate infrastructure is holding back growth and poverty reduction. As a result,
infrastructure has become a major priority in the policy agenda. This paper has offered an overview of the trends in Latin Americas infrastructure sectors over the last quarter-century, and an evaluation of the potential contribution of improved infrastructure to growth in the region. We document the evolution of infrastructure availability, quality and accessibility across the region, in comparison with other benchmark regions. This is done for four basic infrastructure sectors: telecommunications, electricity, land transportation, and water and sanitation. In spite of the progress made in some specific cases, on the whole Latin America and the Caribbean still lags significantly other MICs and East Asian countries both in terms of quantity and quality of infrastructure . The same holds for the universality of infrastructure access in the region: it is still well behind that of East Asia and other MICs. We also offered an empirical evaluation of the potential contribution of infrastructure to growth in the region. The quantitative assessment is based on the estimation of infrastructure-augmented growth regressions using a large time-series cross-country data set. The empirical approach encompasses different core infrastructure sectors, considers both the quantity and quality of infrastructure services, and employs 36 instrumental variable techniques to account for the potential endogeneity of infrastructure and non-infrastructure determinants of growth. Overall, there is robust evidence that infrastructure development measured by an increased volume of infrastructure stocks and an improved quality of infrastructure services has a positive impact on long-run growth. Also, the evidence suggests that these effects are not different in Latin America vis--vis other regions. In short, given the gap in terms of infrastructure availability, quality and accessibility between the region and comparable country groups , the conclusion is that infrastructure
development offers a considerable potential to speed up the pace of growth and poverty reduction across Latin America.
Additional spending on infrastructure is needed WB 05 (The World Bank, Latin America: A Need to Boost Spending on Infrastructure
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20632565~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~th eSitePK:4607,00.html> 8-31-05)
August 31, 2005 Latin American countries need to substantially boost their spending on infrastructure so the region does not lag behind China and other dynamic Asian economies. Thats one of the central findings of a new World Bank report, titled Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Developments and Key Challenges. The report says Latin American firms are losing competitiveness because of poor infrastructure, with its lackluster performance having severe consequences for the regions ability to grow, create jobs and alleviate poverty. Today Latin America is falling behind other countries such as China and Korea, in part due to the lack of investment in infrastructure, says Marianne Fay, World Bank Lead Economist in In frastructure for Latin America and the Caribbean. When infrastructure services are not good, the poor always suffer the most , says Fay, a co-author of the report. Overall, Fay says in the past 10 years, there were some important improvements in infrastructure in water and sanitation and cell phones in the region. But progress in general has been lower than in other middle income countries, notably China. The result is that Latin America is falling behind in areas such as electricity, roads, and fixed phone lines.
Chinese investment in infrastructure is key BBC 12 (BBC, China proposes $10bn loan for Latin America countries <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business18605450> 6-26-12)
China has offered to set up a $10bn (6.4bn) credit line for Latin American countries to support infrastructure projects in the region. The proposal was made by China's Premier Wen Jiabao as he wrapped up his visit to the region. He also proposed a free trade
pact between China and South American trade bloc Mercosur, which includes Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. China has been keen to increase its trade with the region's economies. "The Chinese government... will continue to offer economic assistance to countries in the region that are interested," Premier Wen was quoted as saying by the Reuters news agency. Win-win? Continue reading the main story Start Quote China is also considering the possibility of negotiating and signing agreements for local currency swap agreements... and increasing the reciprocal creation of bank branches Wen Jiabao Chinese Premier Many of the Latin American countries are still at a development stage and are building new infrastructure in a bid to boost growth in their economies. Meanwhile, China, which has the world's largest foreign exchange reserves, has been looking to for new areas invest some of its cash. At the same time, China's infrastructure development companies have been keen to tap into new markets to expand their business. Analysts said that the offer of a credit line by China, may turn out to be a win-win situation for both sides. They explained that Latin American nations could benefit from Beijing's expertise, while Chinese firms may play a big role in developments of these projects. "China has the manpower and the technical skills required to undertake massive infrastructure projects and also the deep pockets to fund them," Charles Chaw of China Knowledge Consulting told the BBC. "They have proven their ability with success in their own country."
U.S. infrastructure investment isnt enough USAID 13 (United States Agency for International Development, INFRASTRUCTURE
<http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/economic-growth-and-trade/infrastructure> 4-17-13)
USAID finances the design and construction of energy, roads, communications and water infrastructure, as well as schools and health facilities in more than 60 countries. Particular emphasis is placed on construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure in conflict and disaster-affected countries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Haiti, where improved infrastructure improves stability and fuels economic recovery. While USAID spends about $1 billion on infrastructure projects annually in conflict and crisisaffected countries, this meets only a small portion of their overall infrastructure needs . To ensure that infrastructure
investments are economically viable, USAID helps to create sustainable local institutions to finance and manage infrastructure and sound legal and regulatory environments to govern its operation.
U.S. investment cant match Chinas Gallagher 13 (Kevin Gallagher, associate professor of international relations at Boston University, where he
coordinates the Global Development Policy Program, Time for a U.S. Pivot to Latin America <http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?storyid=10035> 6-18-13)
Since 2003, thus over the past decade, China's
policy banks have provided more finance to Latin America than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. If anything
ought to awaken the United States from its past slumber and taking Latin America essentially for granted, that comparison ought to do it. Simply put, the United States and the array of largely Western-dominated international financial institutions have been outgunned by China's financial muscle. Welcome to the brave new world! But it's not just a matter of sheer numbers. Unlike U.S. trade treaties or the finance from the international financial institutions largely under U.S. control, China offers up its loans come with few strings
attached.
Infrastructure is key to Latin American economic growth Caldern and Servn 10 (Csar Caldern, Senior Economist at the Regional Chief Economist Office for Latin
America and the Caribbean Region at the World Bank and Luis Servn, Research Manager for Macroeconomics and Growth in the Development Research Group, Infrastructure in Latin America <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3801/WPS5317.pdf?sequence=1> May 2010)
An adequate supply of infrastructure services has long been viewed as a key ingredient for economic development, by both academic economists and policymakers. Indeed, transport infrastructure played a central role in Adam Smiths vision of economic development. Over the last two decades, starting with the work of Aschauer (1989), academic research has devoted considerable effort to theoretical and empirical analyses of the contribution of infrastructure development to growth and productivity; see for example Snchez-Robles 1998; Canning 1999; Demetriades and Mamuneas 2000; Rller and Waverman 2001; Esfahani and Ramirez 2003; Caldern and Servn 2004b, 2010). More recently, increasing attention has been paid also to the impact of infrastructure on poverty and inequality (Estache, Foster and Wodon 2002, Caldern and Chong 2004). While the empirical literature on these two topics is far from unanimous, on the whole a consensus has emerged that, under the right conditions, infrastructure development can play a major role in promoting growth and equity and, through both channels, helping reduce poverty. From the policy perspective, the renewed concern with infrastructure can be traced to two worldwide developments that took place
over the last two decades. The first one was the retrenchment of the public sector since the mid 1980s, in most industrial and developing countries, from its dominant position in the provision of infrastructure, under the increasing pressures of fiscal adjustment and consolidation. The second was the opening up of infrastructure industries to private participation, part of a worldwide drive towards increasing reliance on markets and private sector activity, which has been reflected in widespread privatization of public utilities and multiplication of concessions and other forms of public-private partnership. While this process first gained momentum in industrial countries (notably the U.K.), over the 1990s it extended to most developing economies, with Latin America leading other developing regions in terms of both speed and scope of private involvement in infrastructure industries. Against this background, there is a growing perception that poor infrastructure has become one of the key barriers to growth and development across Latin America. Such perception is found among policy-makers and observers, as well as in surveys of infrastructure users in the region. The underlying concern is that private sector 3 participation has not offset the decline in public infrastructure spending under the pressures of fiscal consolidation, thus resulting in an inadequate provision of infrastructure services, with potentially major adverse effects on growth and welfare. As a result, infrastructure has become a priority theme in Latin Americas policy debate; see for example Fay and Morrison (2005) and Corporacin Andina de Fomento (2009).
Infrastructure is key to the economy best studies prove Caldern and Servn 10 (Csar Caldern, Senior Economist at the Regional Chief Economist Office for Latin
America and the Caribbean Region at the World Bank and Luis Servn, Research Manager for Macroeconomics and Growth in the Development Research Group, Infrastructure in Latin America <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3801/WPS5317.pdf?sequence=1> May 2010)
These trends
in the quantity, quality and accessibility of infrastructure are of interest because, as an extensive theoretical and empirical literature has argued, infrastructure is a key ingredient for growth and development. There is abundant theoretical work on the contribution of infrastructure to output, productivity and welfare. Much of it is concerned with the
effects of public capital expenditure on output and welfare under alternative financing schemes. Arrow and Kurz (1970)
were the first to include public capital as an input in the economys aggregate production function, in the context of a Ramsey model with long-run exogenous growth. Barro (1990), on the other hand, developed the endogenous growth version of this model where it was assumed that the governments productive expenditures drive their contribution to current production. Over the last fifteen years, this analytical literature has grown enormously.12 The empirical research, in turn, took off recently. It has boomed over the last fifteen years after the seminal work of Aschauer (1989). Literally, hundreds of papers have been devoted to assess the effects of infrastructure on growth, productivity, poverty, and other development outcomes, using a variety of data and empirical methodologies . Caldern and Servn (2010) offer a partial account of the literature on the growth and 12 See for example Turnovsky (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), Baier and Glomm (2001), and Ghosh and Roy (2004). 13 inequality effects of infrastructure; more comprehensive surveys include Estache (2006), Romp and de Haan (2007) and Straub (2007). The bulk of the empirical literature on the effects of
infrastructure has focused on its long-run contribution to the level or growth rate of aggregate income or productivity. It all starts with Aschauers (1989) finding that the stock of public infrastructure capital is a significant determinant of
aggregate TFP in the U.S. However, his estimate (based on time-series data) of the marginal product of infrastructure capital as much as 100% per year was implausibly high. The massive ensuing literature on the output effects of infrastructure has employed a variety of data, empirical methods and infrastructure measures. The most popular approaches include the estimation of an aggregate production function (or its dual, the cost function) and empirical growth regressions. Infrastructure is variously measured in terms of physical stocks, spending flows, or capital stocks constructed by accumulating the latter. The majority of this literature finds a positive long-run effect of infrastructure on output, productivity, or their growth rate . This is mostly the case with the studies using physical indicators of infrastructure stocks, but results are more mixed among studies using measures of public capital stocks or infrastructure spending flows (Straub 2007).
Infrastructure is also key to poverty reduction Caldern and Servn 10 (Csar Caldern, Senior Economist at the Regional Chief Economist Office for Latin
America and the Caribbean Region at the World Bank and Luis Servn, Research Manager for Macroeconomics and Growth in the Development Research Group, Infrastructure in Latin America <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3801/WPS5317.pdf?sequence=1> May 2010)
Another strand of recent literature has examined the effects of infrastructure on income inequality. The rationale is that infrastructure provision may have a disproportionate effect on the income and welfare of the poor by raising the value of the assets they hold (such as land or human capital), or by lowering the transaction costs (e.g., transport and logistical
costs) they incur to access the markets for their inputs and outputs. These effects may occur through a variety of mechanisms documented in the empirical literature see for example Estache, Foster and Wodon, (2002), Estache (2003), and Caldern and Servn (2010). Of course, for infrastructure development to reduce income inequality, the key ingredient is that it must help expand access by the poor, as argued for example by Estache et al. (2000).13 13 There may be two-way causality in this relationship, that is, income inequality may prevent the access of poorer people to infrastructure services. For example, Estache, Manacorda and Valletti (2002) show that income inequality adversely affects access to internet, while Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) argue that more unequal societies devote less effort to the provision of public goods, including infrastructure. 14 Among the empirical studies that have tackled directly the inequality impact of infrastructure are those of Lpez (2004) and Caldern and Servn (2010), both of which use cross-country panel data. In both cases, the finding is that, other things equal, infrastructure development is associated with reduced income inequality. Combined with the finding that infrastructure also appears to raise growth, the implication is that , in the right conditions, infrastructure
Solving poverty is a moral obligation Andre and Velasquez 92 (Claire Andre, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics Associate Director; and Manuel
Velasquez, Charles J. Dirksen Professor of Business Ethics, World Hunger: A Moral Response <http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v5n1/hunger.html> Spring 1992)
Finally, it is argued, all human beings have dignity deserving of respect and are entitled to what is necessary to live in dignity, including a right to life and a right to the goods necessary to satisfy one's basic needs. This right to satisfy basic over the rights of others to accumulate wealth and property. When needs takes precedence people are without the resources needed to survive, those with surplus resources are obligated to come to their aid. In the coming decade, the gap between rich nations and poor nations will grow and appeals for assistance will multiply. How peoples of rich nations respond to the plight of those in poor nations will depend, in part, on how they come to view their duty to poor nations--taking into account justice and fairness, the benefits and harms of aid, and moral rights, including the right to accumulate surplus and the right to resources to meet basic human needs.
Donna Hrinak, member of the Inter-American Dialogue's board and president of Boeing Brazil, and John F. Maisto, member of the Advisor board and director of U.S. Education Finance Group, Is the United States Losing Influence in Latin America? <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3179> 12 -17-12)
Q: The
trope that the United States is losing influence in the region is not only wrong, but misses the "the actual complexity (and yes, maturity) of U.S. diplomacy in the region today," former State Department official William McIlhenny argued in a Nov. 26 article for America's Quarterly. McIlhenny cited a number of positive developments in Latin America that have been advanced by a U.S. foreign policy that is "relevant to practical needs widely felt by other peoples-the way it should be." Is it time to rethink what U.S. "success" and "influence" in the region means, as McIlhenny suggests? Or are fears that the United States
doesn't pay enough attention to the region and has lost its prominence well-founded? In addition to government, how do private sector and civil society initiatives factor in?
would be a mistake to regard Latin Americas broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign
investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40% of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the USs fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is Americas second-largest foreign market (valued at $215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94% over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87%. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent . American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy one that recognizes the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Irans nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obamas recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Piera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after. Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran . Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence in Latin America or anywhere else. A world
power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect , particularly when it comes to applying these
advantages in its immediate vicinity.
U.S.-Latin American ties are still bound by structural improvements Valenzuela et al 12 (Arturo Valenzuela, , founding director of the Center for Latin American Studies at
Georgetown University and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, president of Otto Reich Associates LLC and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Donna Hrinak, member of the Inter-American Dialogue's board and president of Boeing Brazil, and John F. Maisto, member of the Advisor board and director of U.S. Education Finance Group, Is the United States Losing Influence in Latin America? <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3179> 12 -17-12)
A: Arturo Valenzuela, founding director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs: "As the administration prepares for its second term and evaluates how it should proceed in the hemisphere, Bill McIlhenny's piece is of singular importance. A curious cacophony of voices have argued that the United States has lost influence in a region that it once dominated , to the detriment of vital U.S. interests. Behind these arguments is a woeful lack of understanding of the extraordinary changes that have taken place in Latin America over the last quarter century. A continent once plagued by authoritarianism and coup d'tats is gradually consolidating democratic stability. A continent that invented stagflation successfully implemented macro-economic stabilization and structural adjustment policies while adopting innovative policies to reduce extreme poverty, largely insulating the region from the world financial crisis and ushering in an era of export-led growth. The United States, which played a key role in encouraging these trends, is now benefitting
from them, both in terms of greater security and increased economic opportunities. To advance its interests in this new context, the United States must avoid reverting to the hegemonic presumptions of the past-and seek to consolidate genuine partnerships based on shared interests. This means addressing in a cooperative fashion the challenges such as those posed by assaults on democratic
governance or drug-fueled criminal violence while seeking constructive approaches to ensuring sustainable development. But it also means encouraging the enormous opportunities that U.S. investors and exporters have in Latin America. Neither the United States government nor the private sector is neglecting a continent vital to U.S. interests."
Massive engagement with Latin America still exists Valenzuela et al 12 (Arturo Valenzuela, , founding director of the Center for Latin American Studies at
Georgetown University and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, president of Otto Reich Associates LLC and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Donna Hrinak, member of the Inter-American Dialogue's board and president of Boeing Brazil, and John F. Maisto, member of the Advisor board and director of U.S. Education Finance Group, Is the United States Losing Influence in Latin America? <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3179> 12 -17-12)
A: John F. Maisto, member of the Advisor board and director of U.S. Education Finance Group: "McIlhenny's observations are on the mark in substance and tone. U.S. interest in the region has been constant since the end of the Cold War, when policies based on U.S. values became paramount. Spanning Republican and Democratic administrations, they have had bipartisan support. U.S. engagement continues through
trade agreements; Plan Colombia; investment; Peace Corps; dependable U.S. Southern Command; and hosts of government, NGO and civil society relationships. They are an integral part of today's vibrant but still problematic democratic era in the hemisphere. But the region is not a uniform place. Ties with South America are complex. The linkages with Brazil are 'sui generis' and on the Pacific side trade pacts point toward a Trans-Pacific Partnership with the northern giants. Engaging selectively, U.S. interest in South America is hardly fading; it is mature and smart. Diplomacy works. The challenge is with Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean. This immediate 'neighborhood' needs more policy focus and resources to support major U.S. interests-stable democracies, growth, youth opportunities, cooperation to combat narco-trafficking and criminal terrorism. The Mexico relationship is healthy due to Plan Mrida, but more is needed. Central America, particularly the northern tier of Guatemala, Honduras and Belize, needs significant policy and resource attention, such as that given to El Salvador. If not, Central America could surprise us negatively. So could the Caribbean. It is reboot time, particularly with progress in Central America."
The U.S. has five times as much trade as China in the region Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey Mallen, writer for the International Business Times, Latin A merica Increases Relations
With China: What Does That Mean For The US? <http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-chinawhat-does-mean-us-1317981> 6-28-13)
Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. Chinas share of the regions trade was less th an 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As
impressive as that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to $560 billion in 2008. Notably,
though, Americas trade participation in Latin America has remained static, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in some countries, including powerhouse Brazil.
Alt causes
Alt cause focus on the Middle East distracts U.S. engagement Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey Mallen, writer for the International Business Times, Latin America Increases Relations
With China: What Does That Mean For The US? <http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-chinawhat-does-mean-us-1317981> 6-28-13)
The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in Latin America going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, as Michael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. [The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and Latin America fell lower and lower on Americas list of priorities . China has been all too willing to fill any void, Cerna said.
Latin Americas independence decreases U.S. hegemonic control Valenzuela et al 12 (Arturo Valenzuela, , founding director of the Center for Latin American Studies at
Georgetown University and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, president of Otto Reich Associates LLC and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Donna Hrinak, member of the Inter-American Dialogue's board and president of Boeing Brazil, and John F. Maisto, member of the Advisor board and director of U.S. Education Finance Group, Is the United States Losing Influence in Latin America? <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3179> 12 -17-12)
A: Donna Hrinak, member of the Inter-American Dialogue's board and president of Boeing Brazil: "Without the need to talk about 'losing' influence, it's clear the nature of U.S. influence in the region has changed-and that's largely a good thing. In fact, that change underlies what both Republican and Democratic governments in the United States have been saying we were seeking in
the hemisphere beginning at least with the 1994 Summit of the Americas: a
more assertive region that generates and implements its own creative initiatives to advance democracy and development. An objective look at how the United States exerts influence today also makes clear it's time to stop talking about 'Latin America' without acknowledging that the term is appropriate only as a linguistic convenience. U.S. relations differ so much in both breadth and intensity from one country to another that any general discussion of regional relations requires a series of footnotes specifying exceptions. At the same time, we should be thinking not in terms of relations between the United States on one side and the other countries of the hemisphere on the other, but about relations among various groupings of countries that share interests and want to make progress in specific
areas, more an Intra-American Dialogue. And the private sector, academia and civil society can all contribute to the discussion and must all be involved in implementation on issues which, again as the United States has been saying for nearly two decades, 'are too important to be left to governments alone.' The bottom line is that it's not a matter of the U.S. government's losing prominence, but of other actors stepping up to assume their roles, in terms of both rights and responsibilities."
Cant solve
They cant solve there are several things the plan doesnt do Johnson 05 (Stephen Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, Balancing China's Growing
Influence in Latin America <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing -chinas-growing-influence-inlatin-america> 10-24-05)
The United States and China have competing inter-ests in Latin America. Washington would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, demo-cratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In con-trast, China represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with broader alliances. Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presi-dents, and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and indus-trialization that might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty. America's strength is competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction. As a good neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests, the United States should: Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. pol-icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricul-tural and steel subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money . Improved U.S. trade relations with Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth. Adopt more comprehensive relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as counternarcotics, leaves vacu-ums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other powers can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism, expand public safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11] Cut red tape on assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Per-formance requirements are blunt instruments that do not cover every situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcot-ics cooperation and Article 98 letters that with-hold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions absolutely necessary, it should tai-lor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests. Press harder for reforms and use public diplomacy . Once Latin America had elected leaders and fledgling markets in the 1990s, U.S. support for democracy and economic reforms declined. Although each country is responsible for solving its own problems, exter-nal pressure can encourage progress. U.S. pub-lic diplomacy, which is mostly reactive toward Latin America, should be strengthened and more supportive of U.S. development goals.
Not zero-sum
The U.S. will never lose its influence Mallen 13 (Patricia Rey Mallen, writer for the International Business Times, Latin America Increases Relations
With China: What Does That Mean For The US? <http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-chinawhat-does-mean-us-1317981> 6-28-13)
Shlomo Ben-Ami, vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace and former Israeli foreign minister, takes a different stance. He argues that China's advancement in the region does not automatically equate with American loss of preeminence. U.S. exports to Latin America continue to rise (by 94 percent over the past six years), as do imports (87 percent in the same period), and
America continues to be the biggest foreign investor in the area. Perhaps even more crucial are America's cultural and historical ties to the region, Ben-Ami said. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos influence in the U.S., it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China, he said.
Trade is not zero-sum Cerna 11 (Michael Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University,
Chinas Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-theregion/> 4-15-11)
With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and
diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.
Cooperation instead of competition with China solves better Miller 09 (Stephanie Miller, consultant on U.S.-Latin America relations and was formerly the Research Associate for
the Americas Project at the Center, Cooperating with China in Latin America <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2009/06/03/6209/cooperating-with-china-in-latin-america/> 6-309)
It is clear that understanding Chinas spoken and unspoken motivations and priorities in Latin America and the Carib bean is a growing concern for the United States given that it, too, has policy goals for the region. But if the Obama administration actively pursues an agenda
that is truly strong, sustained, meaningful, and based on mutual respect, then it need not see Chinas growing presence in Latin America as a threat. Instead, the United States may find China to be a willing partner to cooperate in areas of mutual concern. One of these concerns is Latin Americas economic development . More than 400 Chinese companies are registered in Latin America and the Caribbean, operating in industries as varied as energy, agriculture, infrastructure, and telecommunicationsindustries in which U.S. companies also do business. As such, the two countries benefit from an institutionally strong and transparent region where the rules of engagement and competition are clear and democratic. The United States and China also benefit from a secure region in which to operate. Problems of crime and public insecurity are pervasive
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. During the last decade, approximately 1.2 million people have been killed in Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of crime, and each year 200 million peopleone third of the regions populationare victims of crime.[1] Whats more, the Inter-American Development Bank estimates that the regions gross domestic product would be 25 percent higher today if it had a cri me rate similar to the rest of the world. Thus, the United States and China, as important investors in the region, could find ways to work together on helping Latin American and Caribbean governments tackle crime and insecurity. And the United States should seek Chinas cooperation in the various institutions that comprise the Inter-American systema system that makes a fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights. The United States could use these multilateral forums to ask China to uphold its policy paper commitments to promote a more equitable economic world order, as well as democracy in the international system. Chinas
presence in Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to grow. So the sooner the Obama administration can find ways to cooperate with China in the region the better . Doing so would strengthen the United States standing in the region and
would foster trust with one of its most important global economic partnerswho happens to be evolving into a potential commer cial rival to it south. In sum, focusing on an agenda that fosters mutual respect and engages Latin America and the Caribbean and its associates in finding solutions to regional and global challenges will not only deliver on the United States promise of seeking a new era of partnership, but perhaps succeed in turning a rival into an ally.
Relations Advantage
Relations high
Relations improving Cuban domestic reforms Padgett 7-3 (Tim Padgett, WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America and the
Caribbean, Why This Summer Offers Hope For Better U.S.-Cuba Relations <http://wlrn.org/post/why-summer-offershope-better-us-cuba-relations> 7-3-13)
And yet, despite all that recent cold-war commotion, could this finally be the summer of love on the Florida Straits? Last month the Obama Administration and the Castro dictatorship started talks on re-establishing direct mail service; this month theyll discuss immigration guidelines. Diplomats on both sides report a more cooperative groove. New Diplomacy So what happened thats suddenly making it possible for the two governments to start some substantive diplomatic outreach for the first time in years? First, Castro finished crunching the numbers on Cubas threadbare economy, and the results scared him more than one of Yoani Snchezs dissident blog posts. To wit, the islands finances are held up by little more than European tourists and oil charity from socialist Venezuela. Hes adopted limited capitalist reforms as the remedy, and to make them work he has to loosen
the repressive screws a turn or two. That finally includes letting Cubans travel freely abroad, which gives them better opportunities to bring back investment capital. As a result, says Carlos Saladrigas, a Cuban-American business leader in Miami and chairman of the Washington-based Cuba Study Group, The timing is right for some U.S.-Cuban rapprochement. Cuba is clearly in a transitionary mode, says Saladrigas. They need to change to reinsert themselves in the global order, they need to
Recent talks improve relations Adams 6-19 (David Adams, writer for Reuters, U.S. to restart migration talks with Cuba: State Department
<http://www.wsbt.com/news/sns-rt-us-usa-cuba-immigrationbre95i1ft-20130619,0,2231731.story> 6-19-13)
MIAMI (Reuters) - The United States and Cuba have agreed to resume regular migration talks in a possible sign of thawing relations after more than three years of tensions over Cuba's jailing of a U.S. government contract worker. The announcement of the talks Wednesday came as Cuban and U.S. officials met in Washington for discussions exploring the restoration of direct mail service between the two countries after a 50-year ban. The new round of migration talks on July 17 "do not represent a significant change in U.S. policy towards Cuba," a State Department official said on condition of anonymity. Migration between the two countries has long been a thorny issue. Diplomatic relations have been frozen since soon after Cuba's 1959 revolution led by Fidel Castro, and hundreds of thousands of Cuban exiles fled their homeland for South Florida in the decades that followed. Migration talks were suspended in 2003 by President George W. Bush. The talks were briefly revived by the Obama administration in 2009, but were suspended again in 2011, when American contractor Alan Gross was sentenced to 15 years in prison for installing Internet networks for Cuban Jews in a U.S. program Cuba considers subversive. Gross' arrest in late 2009 and sentencing in March 2011 stalled a brief period of detente in U.S.-Cuba relations after President Barack Obama took office early in 2009 and quickly loosened restrictions on travel and remittances to the island for Cuban Americans with relatives in Cuba. Cuba relaxed its own restrictions on travel in January, increasing the number of Cubans able to travel legally to the United States and allowing several prominent dissidents to travel abroad freely since then. "In the past two months, a very slow thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations has been perceptible," said Geoff Thale, program director for the Washington Office on Latin America. "These are modest but sensible steps. What's significant is less the steps themselves than the fact that there is movement
Relations are stable new travel policies Dominguez 12 (Jorge I. Dominguez, Vice Provost for International Affairs in the Office of the Provost Dominguez
has published various books and articles on Latin America and, in particular, Cuba, Debating U.S. -Cuban Relations <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jidoming/images/jid_reshaping.pdf> 2012)
Yet, an alternative reading of U.S.Cuban relations was still possible as the centurys second decade opened. Reread the list at the start of this chapter. All of it remained true and small steps were under way in both countries to strengthen means of cooperation. The Obama administration had quietly but systematically changed the policy on granting visas to Cuban academics, artists, and performers. The Bush administration had stopped nearly all of those visits; in 2009, U.S. visa processes returned to what had prevailed at the start of the decade. In January 2011, the Obama administration reversed most of the Bush administration decisions taken in 2004 that had stopped nearly all academic and cultural group travel from the United States to Cuba. The new rules would make
Alt causes
Relations cant move forward Gross and the terrorist label French 12 (Anya Landau French, editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note, Alan Gross Wants U.S.
and Cuba to Negotiate His Release <http://thehavananote.com/node/1056> 12-4-12)
Three years ago, as he completed his 5th trip of the year to the island, Alan P. Gross was arrested and after a lengthy investigation, was found guilty of crimes against the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Cuba. Gross was hired on a $600,000 subcontract (his employer was USAID grantee DAI) to set up several wireless internet networks around the island which could be hidden from the Cuban government using an "alternative SIM card" often used by U.S. intelligence agencies. Three years and more than 100 pounds (lost during his incarceration) later,
Gross wants the U.S. and Cuba to sit down together and negotiate a non-belligerency pact. Given the history between our two countries, such a pact would mark a true turning point, but it may be as hard to come by as ever. The State Department is refusing to move its own agenda forward with Cuba while Gross remains in prison. But having tied its hands thusly, State has also not taken any (visible) steps to secure his release. Though former Governor Richardson made a private trip to Havana more than a year ago to seek Gross's release, and says he suggested "a process" to remove Cuba from the U.S. list of terrorist states, the Cubans rebuffed him, perhaps because they were unwilling to negotiate with someone who did not
represent the U.S. government, perhaps because he pushed too hard, too publicly - threatening not to leave until he saw Mr. Gross - and perhaps because Cuban officials were indignant about being offered, as a political trade, removal from a list on which they don't think they belong. Of Mr. Grosss activities, State officials have said little other than to claim that he was merely trying to connect the Jewish community across Cuba with better access to each other and to the world, and to insist on his immediate, unconditional release. The U.S. government has sought to paint Gross as nothing more than a humanitarian aid worker who broke no Cuban laws. Its hardly an invitation to a serious discussi on with Cuban authorities holding Mr. Gross when it is clear that Gross did break Cuban laws (more than one), and that the U.S. government sent him there specifically to do so. For its part, Cuba has not been much more cooperative. While Cuban officials have made very plain their position that Gross and the U.S. law that authorized his and other USAID activities on the island violated Cuban sovereignty, theyve dropped few and often contradictory clues as to whether Mr. Gross could hope for any early releas e. It could well be because there are dueling opinions in the highest ranks in Havana about whether to make a gesture which could go unanswered, or to extract something from the U.S. for his return.
Alt cause USAID programs destroy relations Laverty 11 (Collin Laverty, Cubas New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy
<http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf> Copyright 2011)
Cubans who receive funds or support are subject to great risk, as are American employees of the program, sadly demonstrated by the case of imprisoned U.S. subcontractor, Alan Gross. Aside from being wasteful, ineffective and dangerous to those involved in it, the USAID program actually heightens tensions and limits space for debate. It allows the Cuban government to label dissident thinkers as employees and pawns of the U.S. government, and increases fear among mainstream economists, politicians and everyday citizens who advocate positions similar to those of activists associated with the
U.S. Interests Section or otherwise funded by Washington.
No improvement in relations until Gross is freed Tamayo 6-20 (Juan O. Tamayo, writer for Miami Herald, State Department confirms resumption of migratio n talks
with Havana <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/20/3460271/state -department-confirms-resumption.html> 6-20-13)
Gross is serving a 15-year sentence for giving Cuban Jews sophisticated communications equipment paid for by the U.S. government in what Havana views as a thinly veiled effort to topple the communist-run government. Obama administration officials have said repeatedly that there can be no significant improvement in bilateral relations until Gross is freed. Havana has offered to swap him for four convicted Cuban spies in U.S. prisons, but Washington has rejected that deal. Opponents of warmer U.S. relations with Havana have decried the resumption of the migration talks as a unilateral Obama concession to Cuba at a time when Gross is being held in a Havana prison.
Alt cause the U.S. labels Cuba as a sponsor of terrorism Rausnitz 6-13 (Zach Rausnitz, Editor in the Government Publishing Group at FierceMarkets, Cuba's inclusion on
State Sponsors of Terrorism list bad for U.S., panelists say <http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/cubasinclusion-state-sponsors-terrorism-list-bad-us-panelists-say/2013-06-13> 6-13-13)
Cuba remains on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism for political reasons only, and there are downsides for the United States in leaving it there, panelists said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event June 11. Retaining Cuba on the list "feeds into and prolongs this climate of mistrust which the Obama administration claimed it wanted to overcome," said
Toms Bilbao, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Cuba Study Group, which promotes human rights and the rule of law in Cuba.
Cant solve
Cuba wont pursue an alliance with the U.S. anti-Americanism outweighs Suchlicki 13 (Jaime Suchlicki, Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti -American After Castro <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/> 34-13)f
Similarly, any
serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future . It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States . At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and
speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba. Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies. The issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.
Relations are a pre-requisite to the embargo not the other way around Maybarduk 08 (Gary H. Maybarduk, PhD - Consultant on Cuban and other Foreign Policy Issues, The US
Strategy for Transition in Cuba <http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/documents/Maybarduk12_001.pdf> 2008)
As a first step, we should reestablish full diplomatic relations with Havana. This would demonstrate our willingness to respond in measured steps to positive events in Cuba. Ral Castro has toned down the rhetoric against the US Government.
Cuba recently signed two Human Rights treaties. We could use these actions to justify the establishment of full relations. However, we do not really need this type of justification. US interests also require this step. Any coherent strategy requires good information. Today, we have far too little of the information needed to respond to events in Cuba. We need to give our diplomats in Havana the space to do their normal job of reporting on personalities, conditions, institutions, and attitudes in Cuba. This will require reducing restrictions on Cuban diplomats in the United States. Cuba has retaliated to those restrictions by preventing US diplomats from going outside of Havana or talking to any government employee other than those in the Ministry of Foreign relations. Cuban diplomats can of course learn almost anything they need to know about us by reading our newspapers and watching our television. Our diplomats do not have that luxury. We should lift our restrictions if the Cubans do the same, and then get on with the job of understanding
Unilateral action fails Lopez 13 (Vanessa Lopez, Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of
Miami, The Failure of U.S. Attempts at Unilateral Rapprochement with Cuba <http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue187.htm> 3-25-13)
Obama entered the Oval Office having made promises to liberalize Cuba policy. His Administration swiftly lifted restrictions on CubanAmerican travel to Cuba as well as remittances sent to the island. Cuba's response was to arrest a U.S. citizen. Alan Gross was working as a USAID subcontractor, providing Jewish groups in the island with communications equipment. He was tried and sentenced to 15 years in a Cuban jail. The U.S. government said Gross's incarceration would prevent further liberalization. Various notable personalities have travelled to Cuba seeking Gross's release, including President Jimmy Carter and Governor Bill Richardson, but these efforts have all failed. Despite Grosss continued incarceration, in 2011, Obama also liberalized people-to-people travel, allowing more university, religious, and cultural programs to travel to Cuba. History demonstrates that unilateral U.S. efforts have had, and are having, no impact on Cuba's leadership. On the contrary, the Cuban government has interpreted U.S. openings towards Cuba as
signs of weakness, which have resulted in Cuba's hostility towards the U.S. and in some instances, in reckless actions such as Mariel and the Balsero Crisis. Improved relations between the U.S. and Cuba is a laudable goal, but to be successful, Cuba must be a willing participant. Cuba has an unambiguous pattern of harming U.S. interests when the U.S. has engaged in attempts of unilateral rapprochement. If the U.S. would like to protect its interests, it should demand that Cuba take the first step in any future efforts to improve relations between the two countries and offer irreversible concessions.
Cuba wont pursue further dialogue Padgett 7-3 (Tim Padgett, WLRN-Miami Herald News' Americas correspondent covering Latin America and the
Caribbean, Why This Summer Offers Hope For Better U.S.-Cuba Relations <http://wlrn.org/post/why-summer-offershope-better-us-cuba-relations> 7-3-13)
Like a lot of idealistic U.S. presidents, Barack Obama took office in 2009 hoping to establish better dialogue with communist Cuba. Remember his plan to pursue direct diplomacy with Havana? Then he quickly discovered what most U.S. presidents find out: First, communist Cuba really doesnt want improved dialogue with Washington, since conflict with the U.S. offers more political payoff on the island. Hence Cuban leader Ral Castros 2009 Christmas gift to Obama: the arrest of U.S. aid subcontractor Alan Gross on dubious espionage charges. Second, the hardline U.S. Cuban exile lobby doesnt want improved dialogue with Havana, since conflict with Cuba offers (or has traditionally offered) more political payoff here. Hence the Cuban-American congressional caucus efforts in 2011 to keep Obama from letting convicted Cuban spy Ren Gonzlez return home to finish his probation, a fairly benign gesture that might have enhanced the chances of Gross release.
The U.S. wont pursue further relations either unless Cuba enacts reforms Allam 13 (Hannah Allam, writer for McClatchy Newspapers, Even if Raul Castro steps down in 2018, U.S. -Cuba
relations may not thaw <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/02/25/184135/even-if-raul-castro-stepsdown.html#.Udy2b_nVCSo> 2-25-13)
The State Department was publicly resistant Monday to calls for a softening of the U.S. stance toward Cuba, with a spokesman bluntly dismissing Raul Castros promise to step down as not a fundamental change for Cuba because it lacked concrete measures toward democratic rule. We remain hopeful for the day that the Cuban people get democracy, when
they can have the opportunity to freely pick their own leaders in an open democratic process and enjoy the freedoms of speech and association without fear of reprisal, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell told reporters Monday. Were clearly not there yet.
officials think that unipolarity will last forever will the United States have an incentive to reduce its commitments to a mutually agreeable, loosely multilateral international order.
Even if US hegemonic decline is inevitable, the liberal international order, including the economic growth and democracy that comes with it, can be maintained only if rules are maintained and entrance is based on democratization Ikenberry 11 (G. John, A World of Our Making: The international order that America created will endureif
we make the transition to a grand strategy based on reciprocity and shared leadership. G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princetons Center for International Security Studies. Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea. In 2013-2014 Ikenberry will be the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol College, Oxford. http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=2) Second, the character of liberal international order itselfwith or without American hegemonic leadership reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.
Including non-democratic institutions in the world order impairs the worlds ability to make decisions and dealsnon-democracies inherently undermine world decisionmakingrelative levels of cooperation have no impact sgeirsdttir and Steinwand Feb-28-12 Drawing the Line: The Use of Equidistance versus Equitable
Distribution in Demarcating Shared Ocean Areas, slaug sgeirsdttir is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics at Bates College, Martin Steinwand is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stony Brook University, http://mysbfiles.stonybrook.edu/~msteinwand/papers/AsgeirsdottirSteinwand.2012.pdf) At first glance, we see that the regime type variables are statistically significant, while variables related to relative power, and gains from cooperation through trade do not affect the probability of settlement. Signature of the Law of the Sea has a significant effect, as have territorial disputes. Looking at the regime type variables in more detail, we find that a pair of democracies has a slightly increased chance of coming to an agreement relative to the reference category (the reference category consists of all pairs of countries involving mixed regime types). The predicted increase in the probability of a settlement is 1.79 percentage points. The selection equation does not have a great fit. The highest predicted probability of reform is 18 percent. For our baseline configuration with all variables at their medians, the predicted probability is 3.21 percent. Thus, on this low basis, pairs of democracies increase the probability of reform relative to dyads involving mixed regime types by about a half. In contrast, pairs of autocracies and democratic-autocratic dyads suppress the probability of coming to an agreement. For two autocracies, the chances drop by 4.35 percentage points, and for democratic autocratic pairs by 2.96 percentage points. Thus, having an autocracy involved reduces the probability of agreement close to zero. Together, these finding provide evidence that in dealing with each other, democracies are better able to find mutually agreeable bargains. This relative efficiency disappears when one of the parties is a non-democracy. The dyadic nature of this effect is in line with theoretical approaches that highlight the role of domestic audience costs in facilitating international cooperation. However, we cannot distinguish audience costs from other causal mechanisms realize negative probabilities.20 operating on democracies, such as the role of domestic constraints. Still, our analysis shows strong evidence that democracies are better at bargaining with each other.
Including non-democracies undermines international cooperation sgeirsdttir and Steinwand Feb-28-12 Drawing the Line: The Use of Equidistance versus Equitable
Distribution in Demarcating Shared Ocean Areas, slaug sgeirsdttir is an Assoc iate Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics at Bates College, Martin Steinwand is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stony Brook University, http://mysbfiles.stonybrook.edu/~msteinwand/papers/AsgeirsdottirSteinwand.2012.pdf) This project advances the literature on international cooperation in two ways. First we use instances of cooperation and non-cooperation to test our model of international cooperation, overcoming the selection on the dependent variable common in studies of international cooperation. Second, we also measure the distributive outcome of the negotiations and systematically test hypotheses about how states reach distributional outcomes. To our 26 knowledge, this is the first such attempt in the literature. Several findings are worth highlighting so far to indicate where more research needs to be done. First, our preliminary findings fall in line with the literature on international cooperation in that we find that pairs of democracies are more likely to settle their boundaries than other combinations of regimes. In addition, we also find that the distributive outcomes joint democracies reach are systematically different than other regime pairs as democracies are more likely than other types of regime pairs to reach a division closer to the median line. This suggests that democracies cooperate systematically differently from autocracies. Logically this makes sense as democracies are negotiated processes, while more authoritarian states are less likely to accept the give and take necessary to reach a compromise than democracies.
International cooperation is key to a sustained economic recovery Lu Jan-13 (Yongxiang, The Role of International Cooperation in Science, Member, 17th CPC, Central
Committee; Vice-Chairman, 11th Standing Committee of the NPC; President, Chinese Academy of Sciences, http://www.kitpc.ac.cn/HELP/UploadFile/File/The%20Role%20of%20International%20Cooperation%20in%20Scie nce.pdf) We are in the world that was affected by the financial crisis and facing such global challenges as food security, energy shortage, environmental pollution and climate change. Only with acceleration of institutional innovation and science and technology innovation, can we fundamentally overcome bad effects of the global financial crisis and address the above-mentioned challenges. All the issues can not be responded and solved by one country or one nation alone. International cooperation provides us the best approach for systems solutions to the complicated problems humankind is faced with, and it is more important than ever before. International cooperation may help the world recover from financial crisis and global economic shrinkage through building an improved finance monitoring and warning system, promoting global economic restructuring, tackling protectionism of international trade and investment, and generating a new and essential driving force through S & T and innovation.
International cooperation is key to large-scale scientific effortsincludes pollution, energy, and food Moore 98 (John H. International Cooperation: A Scientific Imperative, John Hardman Moore (born May 7,
1954) is an economic theorist. He was appointed Professor of Political Economy at the University of Edinburgh School of Economics in 2000. Previously, in 1983, he was appointed to the London School of Economics, where in 1990 he became Professor of Economic Theory, a position he still holds. http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/pub/1998/4/international-cooperation-a-scientific-imperative) The witnesses in this hearing identified many reasons why international scientific cooperation is importantperhaps more than ever. Research in some subjects has become too costly for any nation to bear alone. Many problems whose solutions require scientific knowledge and expertise do not respect national borders transborder environmental pollution, health, energy, food, water, national security. Scientific talent and world-class facilities are located in many nations around the globe, and solving leading problems requires the best teams that can be assembled. Certain scientific problems require access to particular geographic sites (the tropics, the polar regions, and so forth, as Tom Ratchford pointed out in his testimony). In an age when technology is of great economic importance, it is in the national interest of many countries to cooperate in science and thereby gain access to new results and remain informed about the latest developments.j
Liberal norms and institutional constraints prevent democracies from going to war with each other Lynn-Jones Mar-98 (Sean M. "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy," International Security
Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html) Why there is a Democratic Peace: The Causal Logic Two types of explanations have been offered for the absence of wars between democracies. The first argues that shared norms prevent democracies from fighting one another. The second claims that institutional (or structural) constraints make it difficult or impossible for a democracy to wage war on another democracy. a. Normative Explanations The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument contends that liberal states do not fight other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already upholds the principles of liberalism. In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars between liberal democracies.59 A second version of the normative explanation claims that democracies share a norm of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully.60 b. Institutional/Structural Explanations Institutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. At the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two democracies confront one another internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will have more time to resolve disputes peacefully.61 A different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars.62 c. Combining Normative and Structural Explanations Some studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace.63 It might make more sense, however, to specify how the two work in combination or separately under
different conditions. For example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace.64 Liberal states are unlikely to even contemplate war with one another. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare. Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with internationalsystemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing international situations where war would be foolish. Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave according to realist (systemic) predictions.
Empirics prove democracies dont go to war with each other Lynn-Jones Mar-98 (Sean M. "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy," International Security
Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html) The Evidence for the Democratic Peace Many studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war with one another. In an important two-part article published in 1983, Michael Doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states.53 Doyle concludes that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."54 Subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance.55 Other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.56 Most studies of the democratic-peace proposition have argued that democracies only enjoy a state of peace with other democracies; they are just as likely as other states to go to war with nondemocracies.57 There are, however, several scholars who argue that democracies are inherently less likely to go to war than other types of states.58 The evidence for this claim remains in dispute, however, so it would be premature to claim that spreading democracy will do more than to enlarge the democratic zone of peace.
LA democracy insures peace BROWN 08 (ASHLEY, Carnegie Mellon University, Why the United States Should Promote Democracy in
Latin America, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Brown.pdf) Lastly, democracies are more peaceful. Encouraging a more stable, humane and peaceful world is in both the interest and maintains the values of the U.S. It is clear that if democracies produce stability and growth, then it is natural to assume that a more democratic world is not simply a more orderly and humane place: [but] it is a more peaceful and prosperous place. (Wollack, 434)
Democracies are inherently peaceful Lynn-Jones Mar-98 (Sean M. "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy," International Security
Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html) Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People. Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.27 These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence. The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.28 Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People''s Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the
Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.29 There are two reasons for the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: (1) Democratic political systemsespecially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely ... The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects."30 (2) Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.31
Democracies dont go to war with one another Lagon Feb-11 (Mark P. Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International
Community, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-internationalcommunity/p24090) Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracynamely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth. Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy realists advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.
Terrorism
LA democracy prevents extremism BROWN 08 (ASHLEY, Carnegie Mellon University, Why the United States Should Promote Democracy in
Latin America, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Brown.pdf) Democracy promotion also serves as a tool in combating extremism. Democracy increases the necessity and prospects for peace through the formation of civic groups, political parties and elections. Therefore, U.S. support can help promote those who advocate a third way that exists between two extremes. A third way that calls for freedom of speech and expression, fair elections that reflect the will of the voters, representative political institutions that are not corrupt and are accountable to the public, and judiciaries that uphold the law. (Wollack, 434)
Economy
Democracy spurs the economy Lagon Feb-11 (Mark P. Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International
Community, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights at the Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-internationalcommunity/p24090) There has long been controversy about whether democracy enhances economic development. The dramatic growth of China certainly challenges this notion. Still, history will likely show that democracy yields the most prosperity. Notwithstanding the global financial turbulence of the past three years, democracys elements facilitate long-term
economic growth. These elements include above all freedom of expression and learning to promote innovation, and rule of law to foster predictability for investors and stop corruption from stunting growth. It is for that reason that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference in Monterey, Mexico, embraced good governance as the enabler of development. These elements have unleashed new emerging powers such as India and Brazil and raised the quality of life for impoverished peoples. Those who argue that economic development will eventually yield political freedoms may be reversing the order of influences or at least discounting the reciprocal relationship between political and economic liberalization.
Democratic countries do better economicallydemocracy spurs market economies and increases investor confidence Lynn-Jones Mar-98 (Sean M. "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy," International Security
Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html) Democracy Enhances Long-Run Economic Performance A third reason for promoting democracy is that democracies tend to enjoy greater prosperity over long periods of time. As democracy spreads, more individuals are likely to enjoy greater economic benefits. Democracy does not necessarily usher in prosperity, although some observers claim that "a close correlation with prosperity" is one of the "overwhelming advantages" of democracy.32 Some democracies, including India and the Philippines, have languished economically, at least until the last few years. Others are among the most prosperous societies on earth. Nevertheless, over the long haul democracies generally prosper. As Mancur Olson points out: "It is no accident that the countries that have reached the highest level of economic performance across generations are all stable democracies."33 Authoritarian regimes often compile impressive short-run economic records. For several decades, the Soviet Union''s annual growth in gross national product (GNP) exceeded that of the United States, leading Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to pronounce "we will bury you." China has posted double-digit annual GNP increases in recent years. But autocratic countries rarely can sustain these rates of growth for long. As Mancur Olson notes, "experience shows that relatively poor countries can grow extraordinarily rapidly when they have a strong dictator who happens to have unusually good economic policies, such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one or two dictators."34 The Soviet Union was unable to sustain its rapid growth; its economic failings ultimately caused the country to disintegrate in the throes of political and economic turmoil. Most experts doubt that China will continue its rapid economic expansion. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati argues that "no one can maintain these growth rates in the long term. Sooner or later China will have to rejoin the human race."35 Some observers predict that the stresses of high rates of economic growth will cause political fragmentation in China.36 Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, democracies-especially liberal democraciesare more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run. Most of the world''s leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world''s population and 99% of the world''s wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world''s output even though they had only 17% of the world''s population.37 A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%.38 Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies. Second, democracies that embrace liberal principles of government are likely to create a stable foundation for long-term economic growth. Individuals will only make long-term investments when they are confident that their investments will not be expropriated. These and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. These conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that: "The guiding
mechanism of a free market economy ... is a bill of rights, enforced by an impartial judiciary."39 These conditions also happen to be those that are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. Mancur Olson thus points out that "the conditions that are needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are exactly the same conditions that are needed to have a lasting democracy. ... the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights."40 Thus liberal democracy is the basis for long-term economic growth. A third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms.41 This factor is particularly likely to be important in former communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions India and the Philippines have taken in recent years to pursue difficult economic reforms.42
LA democracy is good for their economy BROWN 08 (ASHLEY, Carnegie Mellon University, Why the United States Should Promote Democracy in
Latin America, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Brown.pdf) Democracies encourage stability. Democracies, by their very nature are representative of the people, which, in turn yields more stable physical and economic welfare for [the people] than [do] autocracies. (Fukuyama and McFaul, 33) Politically, democracies ensure the people a political voice while placing limitations on the government through systems of oversight and accountability. Democracies have also been found to better assure sustainable development. (Wollack) Steadier economic development rates on the whole are more prevalent under democratic systems when compared to other forms of government. (Fukyama and McFaul, 33)
Hunger
Democracy prevents hungerempirics Lynn-Jones Mar-98 (Sean M. "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy," International Security
Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html) Democracies Never Have Famines Fourth, the United States should spread democracy because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. The economist Amartya Sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press."43 This striking empirical regularity has been overshadowed by the apparent existence of a "democratic peace" (see below), but it provides a powerful argument for promoting democracy. Although this claim has been most closely identified with Sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. Joseph Collins, for example, argues that: "Wherever political rights for all citizens truly flourish, people will see to it that, in due course, they share in control over economic resources vital to their survival. Lasting food security thus requires real and sustained democracy."44 Most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world''s least democratic: the Soviet Union (Ukraine in the early 1930s), China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia and Sudan. Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy. Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity."45 On the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines. Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents. Second, the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities. A free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful.46 Inadequate
information has contributed to several famines. During the 1958-61 famine in China that killed 20-30 million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country''s grain reserves by 100 million metric tons. This disaster later led Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below."47 The 1974 Bangladesh famine also could have been avoided if the government had had better information. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food.48 The two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. These factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. A fullfledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines. The ability of democracies to avoid famines cannot be attributed to any tendency of democracies to fare better economically. Poor democracies as well as rich ones have not had famines. India, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. In fact, the evidence suggests that democracies can avoid famines in the face of large crop failures, whereas nondemocracies plunge into famine after smaller shortfalls. Botswana''s food production fell by 17% and Zimbabwe''s by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas Sudan and Ethiopia saw a decline in food production of 11-12% during the same period. Sudan and Ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of Botswana and Zimbabwe did not.49 If, as I have argued, democracies enjoy better long-run economic performance than nondemocracies, higher levels of economic development may help democracies to avoid famines. But the absence of famines in new, poor democracies suggests that democratic governance itself is sufficient to prevent famines. The case of India before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. Prior to independence in 1947, India suffered frequent famines. Shortly before India became independent, the Bengal famine of 1943 killed 2-3 million people. Since India became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a famine.50
accommodating of challenges to US power. Republicans mistake prudence for weakness . Obamas statecraft may lack the hard edges and black-and-white absolutes of his predecessors, but the abandonment of ideological excess in favour of principled pragmatism is, perhaps, the greatest asset of Obamas diplomacy. Washington is again embracing a brand of leadership based on engagement and persuasion rather than coercion and bravado. In this vein, Obamas readiness to talk to adversaries is not, as Republicans would have it, nave appeasement; it is savvy diplomacy aimed at taming longstanding rivalries. Obamas formula for exercising American leadership rests on striking a balance between power and partnership geared to
the dynamic nature of this 21st century world. The Bush administration relied too heavily on power and bluster alone a mistake that Romney seems all too prepared to repeat failing to understand that brute force and intimidation often do more to invite resistance than
acquiescence. Instead, Obama has adhered to a centrist brand of US internationalism that provides leadership through
teamwork and
consensus building, relying on coercion only as a last resort. Obamas embrace of multilateralism has shored up Americas alliances around the globe . Allies again feel like partners that matter, not objects of American power. Opinion
surveys reveal that in many countries, people hold much more positive views of the United States today than they did during the Bush era. Meanwhile, Washington has repaired its tarnished relationship with international institutions, including the UN and NATO. All told, one of
Obamas signature accomplishments is the reclamation, at home and abroad, of the legitimacy of American power and
purpose. While emphasizing the value of partnership, Obama has by no means dismissed the need for power; he is anything but gun shy, as made clear by the killing of Osama bin Laden and Washingtons regular use of drone strikes against terrorist targets. Indeed, when it comes to countering the terrorist threat, Obamas resort to smart power has proved far more effective and much less costly than George W. Bushs global war on terrorism. At the same time, Obama understands the limits of US power. He withdrew from Iraq on schedule, and is in the midst of handing over to Afghans responsibility for managing their country. The primary objective of the US military the effective elimination of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan has been achieved. The Afghan government and its security forces are admittedly not yet as developed as they should be, and the Taliban have proved more resilient than expected. But without more capable and co-operative partners in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, it makes little sense for the United States and its coalition partners to extend the military mission. Delaying the American withdrawal, as Romney has indicated he would do, is to divorce strategy from realities on the ground. As to Obamas readiness to engage adversaries, Washingtons outreach is neither appeasement nor an apology for American hegemony ; it is good diplomacy. Relations between Moscow and Washington have been more difficult of late, in no small part due to Russian President Vladimir Putins alignment with the Syrian government and his crackdown on the political opposition at home. But the reset between Russia and the United States has yielded significant progress on a number of important issues, including nuclear arms control, Afghanistan, and diplomacy with Iran. Patient engagement with Myanmar has paid off; diplomatic and commercial contacts have deepened in step with political liberalization.
Solvency/Misc Turns
Embargo Good
Human rights issues in Cuba can only be solved by maintaining the embargo Delgado Apr-13-13 (AJ, Bill Maher Ignorantly Rants Against The Cuban Embargo, Adding Himself To The
List Of Useful Idiots, Ms. Delgado is a frequent contributor to various political news sites. She holds a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School and worked for several years as a litigator in New York City. http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bill-maher-ignorantly-rants-against-the-cuban-embargo-adding-himself-to-the-list-ofuseful-idiots/) Few stop to realize that its the Cuban-Americans who are most anxious to see the embargo someday lifted and to visit their native land but only once the Cuban regime changes and institutes respect for its peoples human rights. In other words, it is precisely concern for the Cuban people that drives the embargo. Abandoning them for the sake of a sexy vacation spot seems particularly callous and selfish though one wonders if Bill wouldnt mind: after all, one can just ignore the dissident being cracked on his skull with a police baton, simply for demanding the right to read Dr. Martin Luther Kings works, and focus on the nightli fe, girls, and cigars instead. But lets not get bogged down in silly logic and facts to refuse Mahers points. While Maher and his crew seem to arrogantly speak on behalf of the Cuban people, lets instead defer to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Cubas leading democracy and human rights activist. Does he think the embargo should be lifted? Nope. National Reviews Jay Nordlinger interviewed Dr. Biscet on the matter: It is natural to ask Biscet what he thinks of a contentious issue in the United States: the longstanding sanctions on the Cuban regime, known collectively as the embargo. He says, The embargo has helped the Cuban people both politically and morally. He wishes that all free and civilized countries would boycott Cuba, the way they did racist South Africa. The world made South Africa a pariah state. The American embargo should be lifted, says Biscet, when the embargo against the Cuban peoples human rights, imposed by the dictatorship, is lifted. He believes that [countries in Europe, Latin Amer ica, and North America, such as Canada] have given the dictatorship life and oxygen for the past 20 years in other words, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. What hogwash, though! Who needs the words of Dr. Biscet, who has lived in Cuba his whole life and served 25 years in prison for his activism, when we have Bill Maher & Company, the expert panel of the uninformed, weighing in? After all, idiots may be idiots but, as Lenin reportedly remarked, they are (especially
when pontificating on Cuba) certainly useful. The Cuban propaganda machine is counting on you. Carry on, good soldiers.
Lifting the embargo wont promote democracy in Cubatheyre already exposed to democracyexposing them more wont have any effect Delgado Apr-13-13 (AJ, Bill Maher Ignorantly Rants Against The Cuban Embargo, Adding Himself To The
List Of Useful Idiots, Ms. Delgado is a frequent contributor to various political news sites. She holds a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School and worked for several years as a litigator in New York City. http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bill-maher-ignorantly-rants-against-the-cuban-embargo-adding-himself-to-the-list-ofuseful-idiots/) Ah, the tired, nave exposure argument that, if only Americans could freely travel to Cuba in droves, Cubans would see how marvelous and wonderful we are, overthrow their overlords, and democracy would flourish. Costas fails to ponder, however, why it is the constant tourism from Canada and other Western, democratic nations has failed to have this effect. Moreover, Cubans already have a massive amount of exposure to Americans (CubanAmericans travel frequently to visit immediate family members). Theyre well aware of how great America is its precisely why some brave Cubans (risking execution if caught) escape, even swimming in shark-infested waters to reach our shores.
Lifting the embargo wouldnt alleviate Cubas economic problemsthey have much more to do with Castro policy than anything else Delgado Apr-13-13 (AJ, Bill Maher Ignorantly Rants Against The Cuban Embargo, Adding Himself To The
List Of Useful Idiots, Ms. Delgado is a frequent contributor to various polit ical news sites. She holds a Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School and worked for several years as a litigator in New York City. http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bill-maher-ignorantly-rants-against-the-cuban-embargo-adding-himself-to-the-list-ofuseful-idiots/) Mention China, and youll soon here another embargo-opponent or simpleton (I know, I repeat myself) argument: Look how capitalism is crushing Communism in China! It would have the same effect in Cuba! I would advise proponents of this particular argument to back away slowly so as to preserve any future pretense of being somewhat well-read. Heres why: even the most cursory overview of Chinese policy denotes a strong contrast with Cuba: unlike the Cuban regime, the Chinese government tolerates and even encourages a booming, entrepreneurial domestic market. That is why China has been able to thrive, while Cuba has not. An American embargo has nothing to do with Cubas economic failures the regimes own Soviet-style policies have destroyed its economy and even decades of trading with a myriad of nations has not solved its problems.
Lifting the embargo would lead Cuba to flood the US with cheap cigars, rum, citrus, vegetables, nickel, seafood, biotechnology, and sugarthat kills US businesses especially in agriculture and manufacturing Suchlicki Jun-00 (The U.S. Embargo of Cuba, JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of
History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf) Trade - No foreign trade that is independent from the state is permitted in Cuba. - Cuba would export to the U.S. most of its products, cigars, rum, citrus, vegetables, nickel, seafood, biotechnology, etc. Yet, since all of these products are produced by Cuban state enterprises, with workers being paid below comparable wages, and Cuba has great need for dollars, the Cuban government could dump products in the U.S. market at very low prices, and without regard for cost or economic rationality. - Many of these products will compete unfairly with U.S. agriculture and manufactured products, or with products imported from the Caribbean and elsewhere. - If the U.S. were to buy sugar from Cuba, it would be to the detriment of U.S. or Caribbean producers.
The embargo pushes Cuba towards hard decisions towards democracy Purcell Jun-96 (Susan Kaufman, The Cuban Illusion: Keeping the Heat on Castro, Director, Center for
Hemispheric Policy, at University of Miami, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/52043/susan-kaufmanpurcell/the-cuban-illusion-keeping-the-heat-on-castro) Since the termination of Soviet aid to Cuba, the U.S. embargo on the island has been the key, often-ignored element pushing Castro toward economic and political reform. Lifting the embargo, as Smith suggests, would ease the pressure on Castro and allow him to avoid difficult choices, tighten his grip on power, and halt liberalization. Franco was, and Castro is, a Spanish-speaking dictator, but the similarities end there. Castro wields virtually absolute political power on the island, and todays Cuba has no private business sector of any significance. In contrast, Franco never obliterated the distinction between public and private life, permitting Spanish interest groups limited autonomy. Cuba is also far more militarized than was Spain under Franco. These differences have implications for U.S. policy toward Cuba. In Spain, nongovernmental groups c ould benefit from the countrys commerce with other nations. Trade increased the wealth and clout of the private commercial sector, facilitated contacts with democratic societies, and strengthened civil society against the state. In contrast, Castro has pursued only limited economic reform, and his regime, rather than the Cuban people, would be the big winner from looser U.S. restrictions. Cubas economy discriminates against its own citizens, who are forbidden to invest. Foreign capital is allowed in only a few sectors of the economy, and private investment in agriculture is unknown. The more relevant analogy for U.S. Cuba policy is Vietnam; Washington relaxed its sanctions against that communist dictatorship only after its economic reform had advanced considerably.
Democracy Turn
Democracy turn
Now is key only keeping the embargo pressures cuba to enact reforms Bustillo 13 (Mitchell Bustillo, writer for International Policy Digest, Hispanic Heritage Foundation Gold Medallion
Winner, and a former United States Senate Page, Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/> 5-9-13)
No doubt, it
has been a fruitless 50 years since the embargo was enacted. Little has changed as far as democracy and human rights are concerned. To maintain control, Cuba has managed to offset much of the effects over the years in large part because the Soviets subsidized the island for three decades, because the regime welcomed Canadian, Mexican and European capital after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and because Venezuela is its new patron, according to Llosa. However, Venezuela is
now undergoing a political transition of its own with the recent death of Hugo Chvez, its president for the past 14 years, and the controversial election of Nicols Maduro. Despite being Chvezs handpicked successor, Maduro only won by a narrow margin and will likely be forced to cut spending on social programs and foreign assistance in an effort to stabilize venezuelas dire economic problems. Therefore, now is the ideal time to take action. Without Venezuelas support, the Cuban government will assuredly face an economic crisis. Strengthening the embargo to limit U.S. dollars flowing into Cuba would place further
pressure on the Cuban government and has the potential to trigger an economic collapse. A change in the Cuban political climate is within reach. According to U.S. Senator Robert Menendez, Tourism to Cuba is a natural resource, akin to
providing refined petroleum products to Iran. Its reported that 2.5 million tourists visit Cuba 1.5 million from North America1 million CanadiansMore than 170,000 from EnglandMore than 400,000 from Spain, Italy, Germany, and France combined All bringing in $1.9 billion in revenue to the Castro regime. This behavior undermines the embargo, which is why the U.S. should urge other nations to adopt similar policies toward Cuba. A strong and unyielding embargo, supported by the U.S. and its allies, is necessary to incite political change. Furthermore, Sen. Menendez argues, Those who lament our dependence on foreign oil because it enriches regimes in terrorist states like Iran, should not have a double standard when it comes to enriching a brutal dictatorship like Cuba right here in our own backyard. If the policy of the U.S. is to challenge these behaviors, then it must also stand up to Cuba . It would be a disservice to squander the progress of the past 50 years when opportunity is looming.
The embargo must remain as a key bargaining chip for reform Montaner 03 (Carlos Alberto Montaner, MA, author and journalist exiled from Cuba, MA, author and journalist
exiled from Cuba <http://www.firmaspress.net/keep-us-embargo-on-cuba/> 10-2-03)
Why alleviate the Cuban governments economic situation when history has shown that every time Castro strengthens his power, he invests those resources to retract the few morsels of economic freedom granted to the people during
the periods of deep crisis? Thanks to crisis, the armed forces were reduced in half. Thanks to crisis, the regime was forced to allow farmers markets and dollar remittances from abroad. Thanks to crisis, Castro had to accept certain labor activities involving self-employment and the creation of family-run restaurants and hostels. But, as is now evident, as the government managed to overcome its worst moments, it began to regress into the most orthodox Stalinism. The conclusion is obvious: The Cuban peoples way of life improves as its government worsens. And vice versa. Considerations about the future also weigh a lot on White House policymakers. Castro, age 77, and the dictatorship, age 44, are in their final stages. Inside Cuba, especially within the power structure, the atmosphere is that of a regimes end. Everyone knows that Cubas absurd political model, a copy of the 1970s Soviet madhouse, will not survive long after the caudillo is dead, but the nomenklatura hopes to transfer authority and prolong its permanence in power. To achieve that succession without any trauma, however, it will have to reach an accord with the United States and Europe and normalize its economic and political relations with the First World. Thats the card that the United States is saving. Once Castro is dead, the Cuban ruling class is overwhelmed by the huge power vacuum and all economic activity suddenly stops as everyone waits to see what will happen, only then will the offer be made to lift the embargo and grant generous aid in exchange for democracy and freedoms for the Cuban people. Pedro Roig, a lawyer, historian and director of Radio and TV Mart, has said, If
the United States sacrifices its most valuable trump card right now, how will it stimulate the transition to democracy in Cuba once the time to negotiate actually arrives?
Lifting the embargo destroys democracy Radosh 13 (Ron Radosh, an Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. The Time to Help Cubas
Brave Dissidents Is Now: Why the Embargo Must Not be Lifted <http://pjmedia.com/ronradosh/2013/03/18/the -time-tohelp-cubas-brave-dissidents-is-now-why-the-embargo-must-not-be-lifted/> 3-18-13)
Ten years ago, Sanchez pointed out, there was no access to the internet for anyone in Cuba, it barely existed, and there were no flash drives to record information and no social networking sites to spread the word about the states repression. Now, bloggers like Sanchez who gains access to tourist hotels, posing as a Westerner so she can use their internet facilities have managed to get past the regimes ban on use of the internet and to freely reveal to the world the reality of life in Cuba. Many independent journalists and peaceful activists who began their work precariously have now resorted to blogs, for example, as a format to circulate
information about programs and initiatives to collect signatures, Snchez said. She and others have done just that, getting signatures on petitions to demand the release in particular of one well-known Cuban journalist. In addition, Sanchez is circulating a petition known as the Citizens Demand to pressure the Cuban regime to ratify the UN political rights agreements signed in 2008. The signers are calling for a legal and political framework for a full debate of all ideas relevant to the internal crisis facing the Cuban people on the island. In effect, this demand for democracy is nothing less than a call for creation of a political democracy that would , if implemented, lead to the collapse of the edifice of the Communist one-party state. As Sanchez put it: It is important to have initiatives for transforming the law and demand concrete public spaces within the country. Since a totalitarian state does not allow for such space and prohibits a real civil society from emerging, the actions of the dissidents are a mechanism for forcing such change from below. They are fighting what her fellow blogger Orlando Luis Pardo Lazo called a culture of fear over the civil society that the secret police seek to enforce. For liberals and leftists in the United States, the main demand they always raise is to lift the embargo. According to the argument they regularly make, the embargo has to be lifted for the following reasons: 1) it is not effective; 2) it gives the regime the excuse to argue to the Cuban people that the poverty they suffer is the result of not being able to trade with the United States and other nations honoring the embargo; 3) lifting the embargo would hence deprive Fidel and Raul Castro from their main propaganda argument, revealing that the reasons for a collapsed economy are the regimes own policies; and 4) trade and travel from the United States would expose Cubans to Americans and ot hers who live in freedom, help curb anti-Americanism, and eventually lead to slow reform of the system. What these liberals and leftists leave out is that this demand lifting the embargo is also the number one desire of the Cuban Communists. In making it the key demand, these well-meaning (at least some of them) liberals echo precisely the propaganda of the Cuban government, thereby doing the Castro brothers work for them here in the United States. And, as we know, many of those who call for this actually believe that the Cuban government is on the side of the people, and favor the Cuban Revolution which they see as a positive role model for the region. They have always believed, since the 1960s of their youth, that socialism in Cuba has pointed the way forward to development and liberty based on the kind of socialist society they wish could exist in the United States. Another brave group of Cuban opponents of the regime has actually taped a television interview filmed illegally in Havana. Young Cuban democracy leader Antonio Rodiles, an American support group called Capitol Hill Cubans has reported, has just released the latest episode of his civil society project Estado de S ats (filmed within Cuba), where he discusses the importance U.S. sanctions policy with two of Cubas most renowned opposition act ivists and former political prisoners, Guillermo Farias and Jose Daniel Ferrer. The argument they present is aimed directly at those on the left in the United States, some of whom think they are helping democracy in Cuba by calling for an end to the embargo. In strong and clear language, the two dissidents say the following: If at this time, the [economic] need of the Cuban government is satisfied through financial credits and the lifting of the embargo, repression would increase , it would allow for a continuation of the Castros society, totalitarianism would strengthen its hold and philosophically, it would just be immoral If you did an opinion poll among Cuban opposition activists, the majority would be in favor of not lifting the embargo. Next, they nail the claim that travel without restrictions by citizens of our country to Cuba would help spread freedom. The men respond: In a cost-benefit analysis, travel to Cuba by Americans would be of greatest benefit to the Castro regime, while the Cuban people would be the least to benefit. With all of the controls and the totalitarian system of the government, it would be perfectly able to control such travel. We know this, as I reported a few months ago, about how a group of Americans taking the usual state-controlled Potemkin village tour came back raving about how wonderful and free Cuba is, and how Cuban socialism works. Finally, the two
lift the embargo at this time would be very prejudicial to us. The government prioritizes all of the institutions that guarantee its hold on power. The regimes political police and its
jailers receive a much higher salary and privileges than a doctor or engineer, or than any other worker that benefits socie ty. Weve all seen municipalities with no fuel for an ambulance, yet with 10, 15, 20, 50 cars full of fuel ready to go repress peaceful human rights activists.
addition to precluding the US from becoming another victim of the Castro regimes propensity for borrowing money and not paying it back, the US embargo is the only leverage the US has against the Castro dictatorship. As history indicates, the countries that have normalized relations and business dealings with the Castro government are severely limited in their ability to demand respect for human rights on the island. When these countries have attempted to pressure the Cuban dictatorship into stopping their repressive tactics, their economic interests on the island are immediately threatened. Therefore, their decision to promote respect for human rights in Cuba ceases to be a moral one and becomes an economic decision instead. Since, because of the embargo, the US has zero investments on the island that can be threatened, it can maintain its firm stance on human rights and democracy for the Cuban people.
AC: In
Pressure allows reforms empirics Diaz-Balart 08 (Lincoln Diaz-Balart, former US Representative (R-FL), Keep the pressure on
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20080929/oppose29.art.htm> 9-29-08)
U.S. law and regulation not only allow unlimited humanitarian donations to the people of Cuba more aid reaches Cubans from the USA than from all other countries combined . Furthermore, the U.S. government has reiterated offers of massive humanitarian aid for the people, which Fidel Castro refuses. As to sanctions, let's review some history. During the decades-long dictatorships in Portugal and in Spain, or during the dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s in Greece, no one ever complained when the European Union's predecessor, the European Economic Community, made clear that there could be no entry by those countries until they were democracies. That position by Europe was decisive in the democratic transitions in those countries. Political prisoners were liberated. Political parties were legalized. And free elections were held. In other words, freedom returned. That precisely is why we maintain a trade and tourism embargo on the Cuban dictatorship. Because, first, it is in the national interest of the United States for there to be a democratic transition in Cuba , as it obviously is in the interest of the long-suffering people of Cuba. Second, just as in the previously mentioned democratic transitions, it is critical that external pressure be kept for a democratic transition to take place in Cuba once the dictator is no longer on the scene.
Pressure is key to reforms Ros-Lehtinen 12 (Ileana Ros-Lehtinene, U.S. Rep. (R-FL), Fifty Years Later, Cuban Embargo Demonstrates U.S.
Solidarity with Cuban People <http://babalublog.com/2012/02/07/fifty -years-later-cuban-embargo-demonstrates-u-ssolidarity-with-cuban-people/> 2-7-12)
In
addition to imposing economic pressure on the Castro regime and holding it accountable for actions against U.S. interests, the embargo is a moral stance against the brutal dictatorship . Over the last 50 years, the embargo has served as a constant form of solidarity with the Cuban people. I am ever hopeful that a Cuban Spring will arrive as long as we maintain and enforce policies which support the freedom-loving will of the Cuban people. The embargo will remain in place until free, fair
and transparent elections are scheduled, political prisoners are released, and freedom of expression and the press are established.
Castro regime continues to inflict substantial domestic political and economic oppression. The Cuban people suffer without the most basic human rights, and the government imprisons students,
journalists and anyone who speaks against the regime. For example, American Alan Gross has languished in a Cuban cell since December without access to medical care, for his "crime" of distributing cellphones to the Jewish community in Havana; Reina Luisa Tamayo, mother of a dissident who died this year of a hunger strike, is routinely beaten when she attempts to visit her son's grave. These examples represent only a fraction of Cuba's flagrant human rights violations. The Cuba Archive Project has documented more than 90,000 non-combat deaths including executions, extrajudicial assassinations, death in political prisons, and disappearances. Furthermore, 1.5 million Cubans are in exile, while the regime continues to trumpet a release of prisoners that only scratches the surface. Declaring the embargo a failure and using it as justification to reopen trade and relations ignores the fact that the Cuban economy is on its knees. The paltry changes we've seen (allowing Cubans to buy and sell some goods) have been necessitated by their economic crisis. Ending the embargo now not only ignores the atrocities perpetrated by the Castro regime, it also hands the Cuban government a huge financial boost at the exact moment they
need and want it most. Friendship and an economic relationship with our nation must be earned, and Cubans deserve the freedom, democracy and human rights they lack. Until Cuba has demonstrated meaningful progress, unilateral changes in American policy would undeniably reward horrific behavior.
Only removal of the embargo after Cuban reforms will solve relations and the economy Chang 08 (Gordon G. Chang, writer for Forbes, In Defense of the Cuban Embargo
<http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2008/02/20/in-defense-of-the-cuban-embargo/> 2-20-08)
Even if we lift the embargo, Castros successors will not allow their economy to be overrun by American tourists, investors, and corporate executives. Fidels legitimacy, we should remember, is largely founded on his ridding the island of foreign exploiters and his creating home-grown socialism. Cuban leaders, in any event, would allow only enough commerce to maintain their regime, just as North Koreas Kim Jong Il is doing today. It is a Fukuyama-induced fantasy to think that history has ended and that we can rid ourselves of despicable autocrats with just letters of credit and bills of lading. The Castro boys, Fidel and successor Raul, have survived just about everything during five decades and are not about to surrender to globalization. An embargo helped kill communism in Europe, and it can also end it in the Caribbean. One day we will establish normal trading relations with Cuba, but that should not be before the people there govern themselve s. The post-Fidel era is clearly at hand, and the Bush
administration has done almost nothing to prepare for it, the New York Times said. Prepare for what? The embargo has be en working all along, and it is up to the Cuban dictators to relax their grip, not us.
and its economy are run and completely controlled by a totalitarian military dictatorship. The Castro regime has taken a country and an economy that was once productive and vibrant, and whose standard of living in 1958 surpassed that of some Western European nations, and has turned it into a third-world country. A better question, I believe, would be what effects the economic policies and decisions of the Castro government over the past five decades have had on the Cuban economy. The only viable alternative that exists is for the Cuban people to rid themselves of the dictatorial regime that enslaves and represses them. History has shown that engagement with this brutal and criminal regime produces zero positive results. The entrenched dictatorship has no interest in true reform or limiting its power, let alone relinquishing it.
first and foremost benefactor of any lifting of the embargo would be the Castro dictatorship . Such an act would provide an economic boon to the regime, flushing them with cash and political capital, which history has proven time and again they will use to perpetuate their iron-grip on power and maintain the Cuban people enslaved. The second benefactors would be US corporations who would be given the opportunity to strike deals with the Cuban government that would give them exclusivity in the marketplace and eliminate any competition normally found in a free marketplace. The Cuban consumers, as always, will receive little to no benefit, as the regimes business deals with the rest of the world have clearly indicated. The first and foremost loser would be the Cuban people and democracy activists on the island. With the Castro regime given a new lease on life with cash revenues and political clout, the government will be free to repress and quash any dissent with impunity, while maintaining the rest of the population enslaved. If the US finally bowed to the Castro regime and removed the embargo, there would be no leverage left to demand the Cuban government respect human rights. The US would become like Canada, Spain, or the European Union: another country or union more interested in
protecting its economic interests in Cuba than protecting the human rights of the Cuban people.
Removing the embargo fails only a strong embargo leads to democratic reforms Bustillo 13 (Mitchell Bustillo, writer for International Policy Digest, Hispanic Heritage Foundation Gold Medallion
Winner, and a former United States Senate Page, Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/> 5-9-13)
Undoubtedly, Cuba
is capitalizing on this weakness by using the embargo as a scapegoat for all of its woes without any immediate fear of reinstated restrictions. Because the goal is to promote Cuban democracy and freedom through nonviolent and non-invasive means while refraining from providing any support to the current oppressive Cuban government, the current legislation regarding the embargo and travel ban against Cuba needs to be modernized and strengthened. The need for an embargo has never been more important or potentially effective , even considering the current human rights and economic arguments against the embargo. Washingtons goal in its dealings with Havana is clear: facilitate the introduction and growth of democracy while increasing personal freedoms. There are many who argue that the best way to spread democracy is by lifting the embargo and travel restrictions. U.S. Rep. Michael Honda argues that an influx of politically enlightened U.S. travelers to Cuba
would put Havana in a difficult place, leading to their own people calling for change. However, this is erroneous. Due to the fractured and weakened state of the embargo, over 400,000 U.S. travelers visited Cuba in 2011, making the United States the second-largest source of foreign visitors after Canada, according to NPRs Nick Miroff. Obviously, this influx of what has been theorized to be liberty-professing tourists has not resulted in an influx of such democratic ideals into this overwhelmingly federally controlled country. One example is the case of Alan Gross, an American citizen working for USAID. He
was arrested in Cuba in 2009 under the allegations of Acts against the Independence and Territorial Integrity of the State while distributing computers and technological equipment to Jewish communities in Cuba. He is currently serving the fourth of his fifteen-year conviction, is in poor health, and receiving little to no aid from the U.S., according to the Gross Family website. In light of this, it is hard to believe that the U.S. would be able to protect a large number of tourists in a hostile nation , especially when they plan to profess political freedom. This view is further promoted by the Ladies in White, a Cuban dissident group that supports the embargo. They fear ending it would only serve to strengthen the current dictatorial regime because the real blockade , they claim, is within Cuba. Allowing
American travelers to visit Cuba does not help propel the cause of Cuban democracy; it hampers it.
Cuba wont create ties if the embargo is removed during Castros rule Noriega 10 (Roger F. Noriega, former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin
America, and the Caribbean) and a former U.S. ambassador to the Or ganization of American States, Obama in the Americas: Searching for an Effective Strategy <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latinamerica/obama-in-the-americas-searching-for-an-effective-strategy/> 1-19-10)
This is no time for the Obama administration to be experimenting with unilateral concessions that might buy the Castro brothers one more day in power. It is clear that the regime is in no mood to bargain, probably because the Castros know they cannot
withstand any internal challenge. Knowledgeable policymakers note that Secretary of State Clinton is convinced nothing good will happen in Cuba while a Castro is in power. It is hoped that she can convince the president to preserve the U.S. embargo and the ban on tourism to use as leverage with a post-Castro transitional government. If the Obama team resists propping up the regime in a
false bid for a stable transition, it may have the honor of normalizing ties with a free Cuba.
Uniqueness
Now is key reforms are critical Rodriguez 7-9 (Andrea Rodriguez, writer for Associated Press, Cuba economy czar: Reforms entering critical
phase <http://news.yahoo.com/cuba-economy-czar-reforms-entering-critical-phase-163810483.html> 7-9-13)
HAVANA (AP) Communist-led Cuba's experiment with limited capitalism is entering a crucial and transformative phase this year with the decentralization of bloated state-run businesses, the island's economic czar said Tuesday. Marino Murillo said the goal is to improve efficiency of those businesses and let the successful ones keep more of their profits. Murillo said the next 18 months will be the "most complex" part of President Raul Castro's reform program, which has already seen limited openings to private entrepreneurship and a relaxation of many social restrictions. "The first stage of the reforms has so far, fundamentally, been the elimination of prohibitions in society," Murillo said in just his second face-to-face encounter with foreign journalists since he rose to prominence three years ago. "During what remains of the year 2013 and in 2014, we will work on ... the most profound transformations," he added. Castro's economic and social reforms, which began in 2010, aim to resuscitate a flagging economy with a smattering of free-market principles, though officials insist that a wholesale embrace of capitalism is not planned. After five decades of a statedominated economy, hundreds of thousands of people have legally gone into business for themselves, private farmers are cultivating land with the government's blessing and dozens of independent nonagricultural cooperatives were launched recently under a pilot program.
Change is soon Sanchez 12 (Yoani Sanchez, Award-wining Cuban blogger, 2013 May Be Cuba's Lucky Year
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yoani-sanchez/2013-may-be-cubas-lucky-y_b_2360827.html> 12-24-12)
I have the impression that for
Cubans the next twelve months will not be fatal. Looking ahead, I can predict they will be full of moments of change and great times. Much of the country we know will change, for the better, and a little for the worse; new names will emerge on the national stage and others will be finally inscribed in the marble of a headstone. An era will end, making the Mayans right this time. But all this depends, perhaps in the first place, on how we citizens handle the challenges presented to us,
how aware we are that we are living at a turning point in history. Beginning now I am already preparing and I repeat like a mantra: thirteen, thirteen, thirteen, thirteen, thirteen...
Democratic reform movements are gaining strength Batista 11 (Carlos Batista, writer for Agence-France Presse, Cuban dissidents push for opening to democracy
<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iZjQ73jg9157r7ybRKCdfddmInw?docId=CNG.ba9f54e0e6c83f59a766bc1cfb28d661.61> 6-13-11)
HAVANA Leading dissidents in Cuba have launched a reform plan seeking a democratic opening in the Americas' only one-party Communist-run state. More than 40 prominent members of a range of outlawed small parties and movements signed and
issued the document calling for new laws and a plebiscite as a transition to democracy after more than five decades of communism. They called upon their more than 11 million fellow Cubans to carry out a "genuine national dialogue and start the process of legal changes that exclude no one, so that Cubans can keep the positive things they have built, and change however they care to, the things
they want to change." Dubbed the "People's Path," the document was signed by dissidents including Guillermo Farinas, Laura Pollan, Martha Beatriz Roque, Hector Maceda, Elizardo Sanchez and Oswaldo Paya. It calls for Cubans to be restored their freedom of movement inside and outside Cuba; and for freedoms of the press, association, and religion to be guaranteed; and for all people to be eligible for elective office regardless of party affiliation. "When there is space in which people can participate that will be created by legal changes, citizens' rights to national dialogue will be respected and free elections will be called for all public posts and an assembly to rewrite the constitution," the plan text adds. "The document was drawn up by all of us who have signed, and I think it is viable and a necessary message to the Cuban people," said Paya, who won the 2002 Sakharov rights prize for an earlier initiative seeking democratic opening that he spearheaded.
The government listens to its citizens Sweig and Bustamante 13 (Julia Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies
and Director for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Michael Bustamante, Ph.D. candidate in Latin American history at Yale University, Cuba After Communism <http://internalreform.blogspot.com/> 6 -27
That is not to say that the reforms have been conducted without popular input. In the run-up to the 2011 Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, the government convened an unprecedented series of assemblies across the country to hear citizens grievances and proposals for change and to discuss Castros agenda. Although multiparty elections are not on the horizon, this undertaking allowed for widespread and often contentious public debate, albeit within broadly socialist conceptual parameters. Despite defending oneparty rule, Castro has also called on public officials to make themselves accessible to the state press , and he has asked the press, in turn, to drop its traditional triumphalism. In a similar vein, he has implored students to debate fearlessly and party members to look each other in the eyes, disagree and argue, disagree even with what leaders say whenever [ you] think there is reason to do so. More recently, Daz-Canel publically mentioned the impossibility of prohibiting the diffusion of news via social media and the Internet -- a sign that, for the
government, the strategic benefit of facilitating wider Internet connectivity may well outweigh the usefulness of controlling access.
Progressive reform movements are growing Gershman and Gutierrez 09 (Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy; and
Orlando Gutierrez, professor of political theory at Florida, Can Cuba Change? <http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Gutierrez-20-1.pdf> January 2009)
Spontaneous protests of this kind, along with the increased outreach of independent civil society groups and the greater international recognition that they are receiving, bespeak a civic movement that has established a permanent presence in Cuba and is slowly gaining strength despite severe repression. This trend is reflected in the Steps to Freedom reports published
annually by the Cuban Democratic Directorate (Directorio). The first report in 1997 documented 44 actions of civic resistance. Nine years later, in 2006, the report described 2,768 such actionsa 64-fold increase. Behind these skyrocketing numbers, moreover, lies a transformation in the character and scope of the movement. What were once small cells of dissident intellectuals are now independent civil society institutions, and an opposition once confined mostly to Havana has now spread across the country: Only 13 percent of recent civic-resistance actions have taken place in the capital. The central provinces, especially Villa Clara and Matanzas, now account for the bulk of the independent civic activity. Significantly, these were the very provinces where the most determined and protracted anti-Catro guerrilla uprisings occurred in the 1960s. As it has grown, the Cuban opposition has not become a vertical, centralized movement. Rather, it is more like a horizontal patchwork of overlapping centers of independent civic activity. It is not leaderless but it is multipolar, and its leadership, moreover, has multiple levels. It is this decentralized and plural organizational structure that has allowed the movement to survive campaigns of assault and subversion by the regimes formidable intelligence and state-security apparatus. Because the movement is not particularly hierarchical, the authorities normal tactic of trying to insinuate its own agents into key spots cannot defeat it. Indeed, even if whole groups are knocked out or subverted, Cubas civic movement as a whole is diverse and diffuse enough to carry on, often with new groups that arise to replace the neutralized ones. Interestingly, this pattern of organization follows a tradition of spontaneous resistance and rebellion that has roots in Cuban history, and especially during the three decades of resistance to Spanish rule that stretched from 1868 to 1895. The expansion of the Cuban civic movement has alarmed the regime. A year before his retirement, Fidel Castro called on the Cuban people to commit acts of repudiation against prodemocracy protests. He specifically referred to a 22 July 2005 government-sponsored mob attack against peaceful protesters just four days earlier, praising it as an expression of patriotic fervor. Once again, though, the civic movement demonstrated its resilience, this time organizing a noncooperation campaign across the 800-mile-long island and working with exiled activists to spread the word Carl Gershman and Orlando Gutierrez 45 abroad. The campaign started with fasts in dozens of homes and then built to a boycott, launched in October 2007, of the National Assembly elections (featuring one, Communist Partyapproved candidate per seat) that had been called as part of the plan to legitimize Ral Castros assumption of supreme power.
Economic reforms are coming now Chavezs death spurs Cuban reforms French 3-6 (Anya Landau French, editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note, Can Cuba Survive the
Loss of Chavez? <http://thehavananote.com/2013/03/can_cuba_survive_loss_chavez> 3 -6-13)
The younger Castros rhetoric has been consistent and tough on economic mismanagement and corruption, but his apparent desire for consensus building (and avoiding destabilizing shocks that could jeopardize power) coupled with his inability to rein in a reluctant bureaucracy meant that Cubas economic restructuring has been slow and largely ineffectual so far. Key reforms in real estate and migration, which offer many Cubans unprecedented potential economic empowerment and mobility, and also leverage an increasingly reconnected diaspora, offer hope of more and deeper reform, but other reforms, such as in expanding the non-state sector and reforming the tax code, have been too piecemeal or conservative so far. Not unsurprisingly, many in and out of Cuba now wonder if the loss of Chavez is the death knell of the Castros Revolution, or, perhaps could it inject urgent momentum into Raul Castros reform agenda, just in the nick of time? In some ways, the loss of Hugo Chavez, on its face so devastating for Cuba, might actually be a good thing for the island. With Nicolas Maduro a favorite to win the special presidential election a month from now, Cuba will likely retain significant influence. But Maduro is no Chavez. Hell have to focus on building up his own political capital, without the benefit of Chavezs charisma. While he surely wont cut Cuba off, to maintain power he will almost certainly need to respond to increasing economic pressures at home with more pragmatic and domestically focused economic policies. And that likelihood, as well as the possibility that the Venezuelan opposition could win back power either now or in the medium term, should drive Cuban leaders to speed up and bravely deepen their tenuous economic reforms on the island. And if there was any hesitancy among Cuba's leaders to open more space between the island and Chavez, they now have the opportunity to do so. Under Raul Castro, Cuba has mended and expanded foreign relations the world over. Particularly if it shows greater pragmatism in its economic policies, countries such as China will no doubt increase economic engagement of the island.
Reforms are coming now Maybarduk 08 (Gary H. Maybarduk, PhD - Consultant on Cuban and other Foreign Policy Issues, The US
Strategy for Transition in Cuba <http://w eb.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/publications/documents/Maybarduk12_001.pdf> 2008)
The economic reforms could be far-reaching or limited, but even limited economic reforms could have a major impact on Cubans standard of living. In economic terminology, Cuba is well within its production possibility frontier, and could substantially increase its production even with the countrys current stock of capital. At a minimum, it is likely that transition governments will return to the economic liberalization process of the special period of the early nineties, with the freeing of many prices, greater freedom for the farmers markets, and legalization of small enterprises. More farreaching reforms would include legalization of private imports, encouragement of foreign investment, decentralization of decision-making to state enterprises and requiring that state enterprises become self-financing. All of the above reforms would threaten the viability of state enterprises, which depend on captive markets for both buying and selling, but the new private sector would generate new employment opportunities. Based on the experience of the specialperiod, reform could rapidly increase personal incomes and be well received by most ordinary citizens. There would be several advantages for the U.S. in this scenario. The Cuban government would be able to maintain much of its current control over migration, while rapid economic growth and the expectation that such growth would continue could eventually decrease pressures to migrate.
Economic reforms will continue Morris 11 (Emily Morris, Research Associate and Lecturer in Economic Development of Latin America and the
Caribbean, FORECASTING CUBASECONOMY <http://www.cubaproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/CubaForecastingWEB.pdf> 4-2-11)
Domestic: economic policy. The government has now embarked on a substantial process of economic reform. The rationalisation of the state sector and expansion of the private sector announced in September 2010, together with the draft guidelines (lineamientos) document that has been debated in preparation for the 6th PCC Congress in April, indicate the scope of the reforms to the system of economic management we can expect in the next two years. The forecast assumes that the process of rationalisation will continue, even if it is slower than planned (with only around half of the 1.3m people shed from the public sector payroll), and that further economic reforms will be introduced in the next two years, along the lines of the lineamientos
too
deeply flawed to offer any kind of model. Cuba could use its pending transition from communism to escape the cultural pathologies of latinoamericanismo, just as several other nations did with the even more pernicious Central Europeanism of interethnic conflict, militarism, poverty and war. The only democracy east of Switzerland in the interwar period was Tom
Masaryks Czechoslovakia. However, today there are over a dozen functioning democracies in the regioncountries that took advantage of good leadership and a social consensus to dramatically reinvent themselves. The transition from communism provides this opportunity, if the elites take advantage of what Leszek Balcerowicz calls the window of opportunity, before the
honeymoon of extraordinary politics gives way to the restraining humdrum of ordinary politics. If a postauthoritarian Cuba decides to go further than a mediocre status-quo antetransition and finds the courage to model itself as a Caribbean Estonia, then the implications for the rest of the hemisphere will be profound. A Cuba with a Havel or a Mart Laar as president, that implements administrative reform, lustration, a flat tax, open trade, rigorous banking reforms, fiscal discipline, low indebtedness, property rights and fair privatisation, that maybe even joins NATOas a way to reform its bloated militarythis Cuba could see Asian-style growth rates and a dramatically better rank in the UNs Human Development Index (as happened with Estonia), thereby catapulting it from pariah to messiah status in the rest of the hemisphere. This is not to say that only in this exceptional case can a Latin American country reinvent itselfthere are also cases
worldwide of dramatic improvement through ordinary politics, such as Ireland in the 1990s. However, the type of political figures necessary to achieve something akin to the Irish miracle are few and far between here. Nevertheless, we should have faith in the domino effect a Caribbean Estonia could have. Probably the most constructive EU policy toward Latin America would be to use the soft power of its successful democratic transitions to train a cadre of dissidents in Cuba and Venezuela. The decisive economic reforms undertaken by several post-communist countries will be more relevant than those of Spain, whose reforms were mostly implemented during Franco.
this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will compromise progress elsewhere in the world.
Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet
Extinction
Diamond 95 - Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very
source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations , and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties
since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
These results suggest that democracy and education have a positive effect on environmental quality.
Extinction Takacs 96 (David, Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., Baltimore)
"Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology
and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished . And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war , which could extinguish civilization.""
environment assumes importance on the political agenda when such issues are seemingly beyond the scope of limited political resources? How do low-income communities maintain
levels of involvement sufficient to achieve their goals? And is there a relationship between participation in environmental arenas and the strengthening of citizenship? Through
comparative surveys of Brazilian and European respondents, this study attempts to uncover some of the roots of the awareness and activism on environmental issues encountered in areas of the urban periphery in Brazil. The conclusions suggest that this type of activity is related to a broader phenomenon of community-level participation; specifically, that higher levels of community participation are associated with environmental participation.
around 1% of its forests annually, while Paraguay, if it continues at its present rate of forest destruction, will have virtually no native forests left in 25 years from now.
Extinction
Tonn 7 - Bruce E. Tonn, Urban Planning Prof @ Tennessee, November 2007, Futures v. 39, no. 9, Futures Sustainability, ln The first principle is the most important because earth-life is needed to support earth-life. Ecosystems are composed of countless species that are mutually dependent upon each other for nutrients directly as food or as by-products of earth-life (e.g., as carbon dioxide and oxygen). If the biodiversity of an ecosystem is substantially compromised, then the entire system could collapse due to destructive negative nutrient cycle feedback effects. If enough ecosystems collapse worldwide, then the cascading impact on global nutrient cycles could lead to catastrophic species extinction. Thus, to ensure the survival of earth-life into the distant future the earth's biodiversity must be protected.
role of legitimacy as a source of political stability. Governments that are popularly elected and respect human rights and the rule of law are less dangerous to both their citizens and their neighbors. Nations which are substantively democratic tend not to go to war with one another. They are also less vulnerable to the threat of internal war provoked, in part, by government violence and illegality.(5) In short, democracy and economic integration are not simply value preferences, but are increasingly bound up with hemispheric security. To take just one example: The restoration of democracy in Brazil and Argentina and their increasingly strong and profitable relationship in Mercosur have contributed in no small degree to their decisions to foresake the development of nuclear weapons. Perceptions of threat have declined, and perceptions of the benefits of cooperation have grown, and this has permitted progress on a range of security issues from border disputes, to peacekeeping, environmental protection, counternarcotics,
and the combat of organized crime. CONTINUES Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each othermost notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agencyand have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . the military application of Brazils nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazils nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political
leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazils nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to
democracy than the military. The example of Perus Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil pote ntially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first p1ace.) In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the U nited States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help
rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of foreign intervention. Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a new Vietnam if developed countries tried to internationalize the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers.57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amaazon the threat to the regions ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupingsin particular, MERCOSURcontinues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military
Key to stop global prolif Beamont and Rubinsky 12 (Paul D. Beamont and Thomas Rubinsky, International Law and Policy Institute,
An Introduction to the Issue of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, December, http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1851) As the world continues to grapple with the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament, the experience of Latin America and the Caribbean in creating the Tlatelolco regime remains important. One should be careful not to generalise to
much from the experience of one disarmament regime in a region almost unique in its absence of serious armed conflict[128] Nonetheless, the Tlatelolco experience does provide some lessons that that advocates of nuclear disarmament would be wise to heed. The Latin American NWFZ demonstrates quite clearly the wisdom in creating a treaty with the long game in mind. The flexible entry-into force-requirements allowed the Treaty to gain vital impetus at its inception while it also kept the more reluctant countries tied to the treatys principles. Together with its flexible amendment procedure, this allowed it to pick up momentum when favourable changes in geopolitics and domestic conditions permitted it. Using this formula the Treaty of Tlatelolco created the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the inhabited world, and has successfully expanded to include every state in the region. With the successful product of ingenuity, dedication and above all patience, Latin Americas NWFZ has consolidated the regions reputation for peaceful co-operation. The Treatys permanent secretariat, OPANAL, is active in both building regional consensus and in enhancing the regions presence in international organizations. While it remains to be seen how future disarmament efforts will unfold, Latin American states are well
positioned to play a significant role in the continuing efforts aimed at reaching the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
New prolif ensures widespread nuclear conflict --- asymmetries Lyon 9 Program Director, Strategy and International, with Australian Strategic Policy Institute, previously a
Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland, A delicate issue, Asias nuclear future, December, online Deterrence relationships in Asia wont look like EastWest deterrence. They wont be relationships of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and there will be many asymmetries among them. Regional nuclear-weapon states will articulate a spectrum of strategies ranging from existential deterrence to minimum deterrence to assured retaliation; and sometimes doctrinal statements will outrun capabilities. The smaller arsenals of Asia and the absence of severe
confrontations will help to keep doctrines at the level of generalised deterrence. Extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be important to US allies in East Asia, although it is hard to imagine other Asian nuclear weapon states extending deterrence to their clients or allies. Alagappas propositions contain a picture of what a more proliferated Asia might look like. It could well remain a region where deterr ence dominates, and where arsenals are typically constrained: an Asia, in fact, that falls some way short of a nuclear chaos model of unrestrained proliferatio n and mushrooming nuclear dangers. An order in flux? Notwithstanding Alagappas more reassuring view, we shouldnt
understate the extent of the looming change from a nuclear relationship based on bipolar symmetry to a set of relationships based on multiplayer asymmetries. As one observer has noted, when you add to that change the relatively constrained
size of nuclear arsenals in Asia, the likelihood of further nuclear reductions by the US and Russia, and ballistic missile defences of uncertain effectiveness, the world is about to enter uncharted territory (Ford 2009:125). Some
factors certainly act as stabilising influences on the current nuclear order, not least that nuclear weapons (here as elsewhere) typically induce caution, that the regional great
powers tend to get along reasonably well with each other and that the region enters its era of nuclear pre-eminence inheriting a strong set of robust norms and regimes from the earlier nuclear era. But
other factors imply a period of looming change: geopolitical dynamism is rearranging strategic relationships; the number of risk-tolerant adversaries seems to be increasing; most nuclear weapons states are modernising their arsenals; the American arsenal is ageing; and the USs position of primacy is
increasingly contested in Asia. Indeed, it may be that dynamism which could most seriously undermine the Solingen model of East Asian nonproliferation. Solingen, after all, has not attempted to produce a general theory about proliferation; she has attempted to explain only proliferation in the post-NPT age (see Solingen 2007:3), when the P-5 of the UN Security Council already had nuclear weapons. In essence, though, its exactly that broader geopolitical order that might be shifting. It isnt yet clear how the Asian nuclear order will evolve. Its one of those uncertainties that define Australias shifting strategic environment. Its not too hard to imagine an order thats more competitive than the one we see now. The managed system of deterrence The second approach to thinking about the Asian nuclear order is to attempt to superimpose upon it William Walkers two key mechanisms of the first nuclear age: the managed system of deterrence and the managed system of abstinence. What might those systems look like in Asia? In Walkers model, the managed system of deterrence included: the deployment of military hardware under increasingly sophisticated command and control; the development of strategic doctrines to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint; and the establishment of arms control processes through which policy elites engaged in dialogue and negotiated binding agreements. (Walker 2007:436) It
isnt obvious that those core aspects of the managed system are all central features of Asian nuclear relationships. Perhaps most importantly, it isnt obvious that the world even has a good model for how deterrence works in
asymmetric relationships. Within the US, theres been something of a revival of interest in matters nuclear as strategic analysts attempt t o
reconceptualise how nuclear relationships might work in the future. Recent work on the problems of exercising deterrence across asymmetrical strategic contests, for example, suggests a number of problems: In
asymmetric conflict situations, deterrence may not only be unable to prevent violence but may also help foment it (Adler 2009:103). Some of the problems arise precisely because weaker players seem increasingly likely to test stronger players threatsas part of a pattern of conflict that has emerged over recent centuries, in which weaker players have often prevailed against stronger opponents.3 If we were to look at the case study of the IndiaPakistan nuclear relationshipwhich is
grounded in an enduring strategic rivalry, and therefore not typical of the broader nuclear relationships in Asiaits a moot point whether Pakistani behaviour has been much altered by the deterrence policies of India. Indeed, the case seems to show that Pakistan doesnt even accept a long-term condition of strategic asymmetry with India, and that it intends to use its nuclear weapons as an equaliser against Indias larger conventional forces by building a nuclear arsenal larger than the Indian arsenal arrayed against it. That would imply, more broadly, that
increasing strategic rivalries across Asia could be accompanied by efforts to minimise asymmetrical disadvantages between a much wider range of players. In short, in a more competitive Asian strategic environment, nuclear asymmetries that are tolerable now might well become less tolerable. Furthermore, we need to think about how we might codify deterrence in Asia. In the Cold War days, the MAD doctrine tended to be reflected in arms control accords that limited wasteful spending and corralled the competition. As Walker acknowledges, the agreements were important stabilisers of the broader nuclear relationship, but to what extent can they
be replicated in conditions of asymmetry? It might be possible to codify crisis management procedures, but designing (and verifying)
limitations on weapons numbers would seem to be much more difficult when the arsenals are of uneven size, and when the weaker party (perhaps both parties) would probably be relying on secrecy about the numbers and locations of weapons to minimise the vulnerability of their arsenals.
Nuclear war Cimbala 10 - Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, (Stephen, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8)
A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the others defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.
for Cuba if progress is made along a range of issues from development of true and honest representative institutions of governance to improvement of the Cuban peoples quality of life. Cubans will have to overcome the long
shadow cast by a culture of authoritarian one-man-rule where, for decades, individual initiatives have not been allowed to surface and prevail because Castro, the micromanager par excellence, had to either approve or direct them all. The overall post-Castro American
foreign policy objective should be to engage the succession regime and encourage a strong bias among Cuban elites for internally-generated democratization, the rule of law, and transparency in exchange for an across-the-board
normalization of relations with the island. U.S. military command will need to perform regular and timely updating of contingency planning to interdict vessels to and from the island and to protect and evacuate American diplomatic personnel and tourists in case of violent unrest. 78 As the 2006 report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba reflects , we must be at the ready to propitiate the
process, since in the final denouement, the vested military and civilian elites will inexorably begin a struggle for
power postponed by Castros longevity, and they will seek powerful allies. When that time arrives, in cauda venenum, preventing a bloodbath, avoiding a total economic collapse, foreign intervention, and massive uncontrolled migration to Florida will be the biggest challenges we will face from Cuba since January 1, 1959.
High probability major powers have huge interests in Cuba Wong-Diaz 6 - Francisco Wong-Diaz, attorney and professor of law, political science and international relations
at the City College of San Francisco, Member of the Committee on the Present Danger, the World Association of International Studies (WAIS), and the State Bars of California and Florida, December 2006, CASTROS CUBA: QUO VADIS?, online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB744.pdf External actors with significant interests in the ongoing succession process that will be contesting their agendas in a post-Castro regime include both states and nonstate actors. The main stakeholder in Cubas future is the United States. China, Venezuela, and Iran are countries with strategic, security, commercial, and ideological interests; the European Union, in particular Spain and England; as well as Canada, Mexico, Bolivia, and Brazil also have important commercial and financial interests on the island. Beyond their bilateral foreign policy considerations with Cuba, these countries also partake in the global competition for natural resources, markets, and access to a skilled labor force. Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela also are joined by the Bolivian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a trade and cooperation
agreement in opposition to the unsuccessful U.S. Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Nonstate American groups with direct or indirect interests in Cuba include the exiles, business, educational, artistic, and agricultural groups; NGOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch; think tanks like the Center for Defense Information; and news media outlets.
issues from development of true and honest representative institutions of governance to improvement of the Cuban peoples quality of life. The overarching American foreign policy objective should be to pressure the successor regime while encouraging a strong bias among Cuban elites for internally generated democratization ,
the rule of law, and transparency in reciprocity for graduated normalization of relations with the island.
Nuclear terror causes extinction Ayson 10 [Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld]
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive
nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an
act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early
1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long -standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to
dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to s upport Russias use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear
terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists . This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. Nuclear Terrorism Against Smaller Nuclear Powers There is also the question of what lesser powers in the international
system might do in response to a terrorist attack on a friendly or allied country: what they might do in sympathy or support of their attacked colleague. Moreover, if these countries are themselves nuclear armed, additional possibilities for a wider catastrophe may lie here as well. For example, if in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, a nuclear armed ally such as Israel might possess special information about the group believed to be responsible and be willing and able to take the action required to punish that group. If its action involved threats of the use of nuclear force, or the use of nuclear force itself (perhaps against a country Israel believed to be harboring the nuclear terrorists), how might other nuclear armed countries react? Might some other nuclear powers demand that the United States rein in its friend, and suggest a catastrophic outcome should this restraint not take place? Or would they wait long enough to ask the question? Alternatively, what if some states used the nuclear terrorist attack on another country to justify a majorand perhaps even nuclearattack on other terrorist groups on the grounds that it was now clear that it was too dangerous to allow these groups to exist when they might very well also be planning similar nuclear action? (Just as Al Qaedas attacks on 9/11 raised some of the threat assessments of other terrorist groups, the same and more might occur if any terrorist group had used a nuclear weapon,) If a nuclear armed third party took things into its own hands and decided that the time for decisive action had now come, how might this action affect the nuclear peace between states? But it needs to be realized that a catalytic exchange is not only possible if the terrorists have exploded a nuclear device on one of the established nuclear weapons states, including and especially the United States. A catalytic nuclear war might also be initiated by a nuclear terrorist attack on a country that possesses a nuclear arsenal of a more modest scale, and which is geographically much closer to the group concerned. For example, if a South Asian terrorist group exploded a nuclear device in India, it is very difcult t o see how major suspicions could not be raised in that country (and elsewhere) that Pakistan was somehow involvedeither as a direct aider and abetter of the terrorists (including the provision of the bomb to them) or as at the very least a passive and careless harborer of the groups perpetrating the act. In a study that seeks to reduce overall fears of nuclear terrorism, Frost nonetheless observes that if one of the nuclear powers in South Asia was thought to be behind a terrorist nuclear attack in the region, the risks of the incident escalating into a full nuclear exchange would be high. 43 Kapur is equally denite on this score, observing that if a nuclear detonation occurred within India, the attack would be undoubtedly blamed on Pakistan, with potentially catastrophic results. 44
Iranian proliferation causes nuclear war Bar 13 Shmuel Bar, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel, February 2013,
The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast, Hoover Policy Review, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/article/139416 Even ideologically, or religiously, highly charged leaderships may be aware of the dangers inherent in nuclear war and behave rationally. However, such awareness and rational decision-making processes are a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Nuclear confrontation may not be the result of some irrational but premeditated decision by leaders to initiate a nuclear strike, but of faulty intelligence, command, and control in escalatory situations. In such situations, it appears that the command and control structures that may develop in new nuclear states in the Middle East are likely to exacerbate the dangers inherent in escalation and brinkmanship, and to result ultimately in perennial nuclear instability or even nuclear war.
Cuba is an underdeveloped country with developed-world problems. Cubas reforms might appear frustratingly slow, inconsistent, and insufficient to address its citizens economic difficulties and desires for greater political participation. This lack of swiftness, however, should not be taken as a sign that the government has simply dug in its heels or is ignoring the political stakes. The response of Cuban leaders to their countrys vexing long-term challenges has involved strategic thinking and considerable debate. Indeed, the next few years will be crucial. As the 53-year-old Miguel Daz-Canel, the current vice president and Castros newly designated successor, recently noted, Cuba has made progress on the issues that are easiest to solve, but what is left are the more important choices that will be decisive in the development of [the] country.
Environment turn
Environment turn
Cubas environment is protected now, but removal of the embargo destroys it Dean 07 (Cornelia Dean, writer for New York Times, Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> 12-25-07)
Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. That is why many scientists are so worried about what will become of it after Fidel Castro and his associates leave power and, as is widely anticipated, the American government relaxes or ends its trade embargo. Cuba has avoided much environmental degradation in recent decades, but now hotel developments are seen extending into the water in Cayo Coco. More Photos > Cuba, by far the regions largest island, sits at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Its mountains, forests, swamps, coasts and marine areas are rich in plants and animals, some seen nowhere else. And since the imposition of the embargo in 1962, and especially with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, its major economic patron, Cubas economy has stagnated. Cuba has not been free of development, including Soviet-style top-down agricultural and mining operations and, in recent years, an expansion of tourism. But it also has an abundance of landscapes that elsewhere in the region have been ripped up, paved over, poisoned or otherwise destroyed in the decades since the Cuban revolution, when development has been most intense. Once the embargo ends, the island could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, eager to exploit those landscapes. Conservationists, environmental lawyers and other experts, from Cuba and elsewhere, met last month in Cancn, Mexico, to discuss the islands resources and how to continue to protect them. Cuba has done what we should have done identify your hot spots of biodiversity and set them aside, said Oliver Houck, a professor of environmental law at Tulane University Law School who attended the conference. In the late 1990s, Mr. Houck was involved in an effort, financed in part by the MacArthur Foundation, to advise Cuban officials writing new environmental laws. But, he said in an interview, an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it like a bulldozer when the embargo ends. By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, we can guess that tourism is going to increase in a very fast way when the embargo ends. It is estimated we could double tourism in one year, said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at the Cuban ministry of science, technology and environment.
Cuba is key to biodiversity that includes Bicknells thrush Dean 07 (Cornelia Dean, writer for New York Times, Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> 12-25-07)
Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. That is why many scientists are About 700 miles long and about 100 miles wide at its widest, Cuba runs from Haiti west almost to the Yucatn Peninsula of Mexico. It offers crucial habitat for birds, like Bicknells thrush, whose summer home is in the mountains of New England and Canada, and the North American warblers that stop in Cuba on their way south for the winter. Zapata Swamp, on the islands southern coast, may be notorious for its mosquitoes, but it is also known for its fish, amphibians, birds and other creatures . Among them is the Cuban crocodile, which has retreated to Cuba from a range that once ran from the Cayman Islands to the Bahamas. Cuba has the most biologically diverse populations of freshwater fish in the region. Its relatively large underwater coastal shelves are crucial for numerous marine species, including some whose larvae can be carried by currents into waters of the United States, said Ken Lindeman, a marine biologist at Florida Institute of Technology. Dr. Lindeman, who did not attend the conference but who has spent many years studying Cubas marine ecology, said in an interview that some of these creatures were important commercial and recreational species like the spiny lobster, grouper or snapper. Like corals elsewhere, those in Cuba are suffering as global warming raises ocean temperatures and acidity levels. And like other corals in the region, they reeled when a mysterious die-off of sea urchins left them with algae overgrowth. But they have largely escaped damage from pollution, boat traffic and destructive fishing practices. Diving in them is like going back in time 50 years, said David Guggenheim, a conference organizer and an ecologist and member of the advisory board of the Harte Research Institute, which helped organize the meeting along with the Center for International Policy, a private group in Washington. In a report last year, the World Wildlife Fund said that in dramatic contrast to its island neighbors, Cubas beaches, mangroves, reefs, seagrass beds and other habitats were relatively well preserved. Their biggest threat , the report said, was the prospect of sudden
and massive growth in mass tourism when the U.S. embargo lifts.
Bicknells thrush is a keystone species Kerchner et al 07 (Charles Kerchner, Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural Resources, The University of
Vermont; Honzk, Conservation International, Human Dimensions Program, Center for Applied Biodiversity Science; Robin Kemkes, Community Development and Applied Economics, The University of Vermont; Amanda Richardson, Community Development and Applied Economics, The University of Vermont; Jason Townsend, Conservation Biology Program, SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse; and Christopher C. Rimmer, Vermont Center for Ecostudies, Designing spatially explicit incentive programs for habitat conservation: A case study of the Bicknell's thrush wintering grounds <http://www.vtecostudies.org/PDF/Kerchner%20et%20al.%20BITH%20Ecol%20Econ%202010.pdf> 10-14-07)
Deforestation has a signicant impact on ecosystem integrity worldwide (Achard et al., 2002; Nepstad et al., 1999), including the Dominican Republic. Ecological consequences of disturbance have been well documented (Vitousek et al., 1997; Curran et al., 2004), which include impacts on keystone species, such as the Bicknell's thrush (Rimmer et al. 2001). Multiple studies have shown that winter habitat quality and availability limit populations of migratory songbirds and that alteration of winter habitat can lead to population declines (e.g., Sherry and Holmes, 1996; Marra et al., 1993; Norris et al., 2004), as may be the case for Bicknell's thrush Townsend et al., in press). Therefore, to stabilize or increase Bicknell's thrush populations immediate action must take place to
conserve winter habitat, especially on private property in the eastern Cordillera Septentrional of the Dominican Republic.
Keystone species are key to biodiversity Tews et al 04 (J. Tews, Institute of Biochemistry and Biology, Plant
Ecology and Nature Conservation, University of Potsdam; U. Brose, Department of Biology, Romberg Tiburon Center, San Francisco State University; V. Grimm, Department of Ecological Modelling, Center for Environmental Research Leipzig-Halle; K. Tielborger, Institute of Biochemistry and Biology, Plant Ecology and Nature Conservation, University of Potsdam; M. C. Wichmann, Institute of Biochemistry and Biology, Plant Ecology and Nature Conservation, University of Potsdam; M. Schwager, Institute of Biochemistry and Biology, Plant Ecology and Nature Conservation, University of Potsdam; F. Jeltsch, Institute of Biochemistry and Biology, Plant Ecology and Nature Conservation, University of Potsdam, Animal species diversity driven by habitat heterogeneity/diversity: the importance of keystone structures <http://www.mcwichmann.de/Documents/Tews%20et%20al.%20(2004)%20J.%20Biogeogr1.pdf> 2004)
The majority of studies found a positive correlation between habitat heterogeneity/diversity and animal species diversity. However, empirical support for this relationship is drastically biased towards studies of vertebrates and habitats under anthropogenic inuence. In this paper, we show that ecological effects of habitat heterogeneity may vary considerably between species groups depending on whether structural attributes are perceived as heterogeneity or fragmentation. Possible effects may also vary relative to the structural variable measured. Based upon this, we introduce a classication framework that may be used for across-studies comparisons. Moreover, the effect of habitat heterogeneity for one species group may differ in relation to the spatial scale. In several studies, however,
different species groups are closely linked to keystone structures that determine animal species diversity by their presence. Detecting crucial keystone structures of the vegetation has profound implications for nature conservation and biodiversity management.
Biodiversity loss leads to extinction Diaz et al 06 (Diaz S, Professor of Community and Ecosystems Ecology at Crdoba National University; Joseph
Fargione, lead scientist for The Nature Conservancy's North America conservation region; F. Stuart Chapin III, professor of Ecology at the Department of Biology and Wildlife of the Institute of Arctic Biology, University of Alaska; and David Tilman, Regents Professor and McKnight Presidential Chair in Ecology at the University of Minnesota, Biodiversity Loss Threatens Human Well-Being <http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0040277> 8-15-06)
The diversity of life on Earth is dramatically affected by human alterations of ecosystems [1]. Compelling evidence now shows that the reverse is also true: biodiversity in the broad sense affects the properties of ecosystems and, therefore, the benefits that humans obtain from them. In this article, we provide a synthesis of the most crucial messages emerging from the latest scientific literature and international assessments of the role of biodiversity in ecosystem services and human well-being. Human societies have been built on biodiversity. Many activities indispensable for human subsistence lead to biodiversity loss, and this trend is likely to continue in the future. We clearly benefit from the diversity of organisms that we have learned to use for medicines, food, fibers, and other renewable resources. In addition, biodiversity has always been an integral part of the human experience, and there are many moral reasons to preserve it for its own sake. What has been less recognized is that biodiversity also influences human
well-being, including the access to water and basic materials for a satisfactory life, and security in the face of environmental change, through its effects on the ecosystem processes that lie at the core of the Earth's most vital life support systems
(Figure 1).
There are downsides, though, to increasing tourism in Cuba. The environment, for one, could suffer greatly from an influx of foreign tourists. Cubas strict laws prevent even locals from entering some areas, thus keeping them pristine and beautiful. A tourist boomwhich seems inevitable if the US were to drop the travel embargo would encourage the Cuban government to ease restrictions to allow travelers access to these natural paradises, which would then, of course, not be
pristine paradises any longer. Additionally, as some have already noted, the increase in tourism just in the last 10 years has prettified some of the traditional Cuban landmarks, like the once-scruffy Dos Hermanos bar where Hemmingway reportedly drank. The Cuban Ministry of Tourism would have to work hard to ensure that Cuba retains the mystery and natural beauty that makes tourists so eager to visit, or else the tourism would
not be sustainable. Once the draw of visiting a formerly forbidden country wears off, the cultural heritage sites and beautiful beaches must be enough to encourage future tourism.
Cuban conservation laws fail Dean 07 (Cornelia Dean, writer for New York Times, Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> 12-25-07)
But there are people skeptical that Cuba will resist this kind of pressure. One of them is Mr. Houck. The environmental laws he worked on are a very strong structure, he said, But all laws do is give you the opportunity to slow down the wrong thing . Over time, you can wear the law down. That is particularly true in Cuba, he said, where theres no armed citizenry out there with high-powered science groups pushing in the opposite direction. What they lack is the counter pressure of environmental groups and environmental activists. As Mr. Rey and Daniel Whittle, a lawyer for Environmental Defense, put it in the book Cuban Studies 37 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), policymaking in Cuba is still centralized and top down. But, they wrote, much can be done to enhance public input in policymaking.
Gradualism DA
Gradualism---1NC
Raul would resist dramatic changethe US needs to engage gradually to ensure future breakthroughstheir author Colvin, 08 (Jake, fellow with the New Ideas Fund, a group that seeks new approaches and paradigms for U.S. national security and foreign
policy. He is also Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) and oversees the Cuba initiative of USA*Engage, The Case for a New Cuba Policy, 12/23/2008, http://web.archive.org/web/20120904201743/http://www.newideasfund.org/proposals/Colvin%20-%20Cuba%20-%20Master.pdf)
It can be frustrating.96 Given the checkered history of U.S. -Cuban relations, uncertainty surrounding Cubas economy in the wake of recent hurricanes, and t he governments resistance to sudden change, Havana may not be in a rush to engage vigorously with the United States. Pickering speculates that a dramatic shift would be resisted by Ral, who wants to keep any changes gradual.97 Still, presidents from John F. Kennedy to Reagan have demonstrated a willingness to engage with the Cuban government even at times of immense tension. Great presidents recognize that talking to the United States enemies is not appeasement. Part of [a diplomats] job is to maintain contact with people you wouldnt want to invite to dinner, advises Davidow.98 The United States should reengage to support its interests on issues such as migration and counternarcotics while laying the groundwork for more substantial discussions later. Even if a breakthrough is not possible today, reestablishing regular channels of communication will make gradual improvement more likely down the road.
Arguments that lifting the embargo would help Cuba are founded on false assumptions Cuba either wont let us in or will direct the funds it gets to only supporting the government Suchlicki Jun-00 (The U.S. Embargo of Cuba, JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of
History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf) Opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba claim that if the embargo and the travel ban are lifted, the Cuban people would benefit economically; American companies will penetrate and influence the Cuban market; the Communist system would begin to crumble and a transition to a democratic society would be accelerated. These expectations are based on several incorrect assumptions. First, that Castro and the Cuban leadership are nave and inexperienced and, therefore, would allow tourists and investments from the U.S. to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments in the island. Second, that Cuba would open up and allow U.S. investments in all sectors of the economy, instead of selecting which companies could trade and invest. Third, that Castro is so interested in close relations with the U.S. that he is willing to risk what has been upper-most in his mind for 40 years total control of power and a legacy of opposition to Yankee imperialism, in exchange for economic improvements for his people. During the Fifth Communist Party Congress in 1997, Castro emphasized We will do what is necessary without renouncing our principles. We do not like capitalism and we will not abandon our Socialist system.
Even if Cuba cooperates, lifting the embargo will result in Cuba taking tight control over any aid we offer themthat strengthens the regime and makes Cuba more oppressive and less democratic Suchlicki Jun-00 (The U.S. Embargo of Cuba, JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of
History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the
University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf) A change in U.S. policy toward Cuba may have different and unintended results. The lifting of the embargo and the travel ban without meaningful changes in Cuba will: - Guarantee the continuation of the current totalitarian structures. - Strengthen state enterprises, since money will flow into businesses owned by the Cuban government. Most businesses are owned in Cuba by the state and, in all foreign investments, the Cuban government retains a partnership interest. - Lead to greater repression and control since Castro and the leadership will fear that U.S. influence will subvert the revolution and weaken the Communist partys hold on the Cuban people. - Delay instead of accelerate a transition to democracy on the island. - Allow Castro to borrow from international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, etc. Since Cuba owes billions of dollars to the former Soviet Union, to the Club of Paris, and to others, and has refused in the past to acknowledge or pay these debts, new loans will be wasted by Castros inefficient and wasteful system, and will be uncollectible. The reason Castro has been unable to pay back loans is not because of the U.S. embargo, but because his economic system stifles productivity and he continues to spend on the military, on adventures abroad, and on supporting a bankrupt welfare system on the island. - Perpetuate the rather extensive control that the military holds over the economy and foster the further development of Mafia type groups that manage and profit from important sectors of the economy , particularly tourism, biotechnology, and agriculture. - Negate the basic tenets of U.S. policy in Latin America which emphasize democracy, human rights, and market economies. - Send the wrong message to the enemies of the U.S.: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the U.S.; espouse terrorismand anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the U.S. will forget and forgive, and reward him with tourism, investments, and economic aid.
Cuba will become a failed state if massive changes are implementedlarge economic changes in Cuba would lead to destabilization and the collapse of all governmental systems in the country Azel Sep-08 (Jos, How to Think About Change in Cuba: A Guide for Policymakers, Jos Azel is currently a
Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/Article-Azel-FINAL.pdf) But suppose that the U. S. government and the other constituencies - Cubans in the island and in exile, and the international community - are persuaded that economic changes per se represent an opening that should be rewarded in some fashion. A case in point is the argument that, in the case of Cuba, a very gradual approach to changes is called for in order to avoid the possible chaos resulting from more comprehensive and rapid changes. Cubas abysmal set of initial sociopolitical and economic conditions is such that the introduction of comprehensive massive changes could result in a failed state. Some may be tempted to dismiss this concern by noting that by some parameters (e.g. the pervasive informal economy, reluctance to participate in formal employment, etc.) Cuba is already a failed state. But technically Cuba is not a failed state.10 It is a stable closed state still able to implement and enforce government policy, albeit not uniformly particularly in economic matters. Therefore the gradualist argument deserves more serious considerations as it is always possible for conditions to get worse. The main concern hinges on the precarious balance between openness in a society and stability in that society. It is certainly the case that economic reforms particularly reforms to begin a transition from a command economy to a market economy are destabilizing. Decollectivization and desocialization create enormous social dislocations. They require a repositioning of the role of the state and a new model of social relationships between the state and its people. Whatever the specific strategies selected they will demand many difficult choices. As Ian Bremmer points out in The J Curve, for a country that is stable because its closed to become a country that is stable because it is open it must go through a transitional period of dangerous instability. These are thoughtful security considerations that must be weighted by policymakers. Unfortunately Cubas present politico-economic
system can not be the starting point for a serious development and reconstruction process. The countrys existing bureaucratic, institutional, and organizational framework is not conducive to the creation of a new state.
Uniqueness
Cuba is heading towards democracy in the squo Thale Feb-13-12 (Geoff, Misguided Efforts to Promote Democracy in Cuba, Geoff Thale is WOLAs program
director. Mr. Thale has studied Cuba issues since the mid-1990s and traveled to Cuba more than a dozen times, including organizing delegations of academics and Members of Congress. http://www.wola.org/commentary/misguided_efforts_to_promote_democracy) Most important of all, these programs fail to take into account realities on the ground in Cuba today. Cuba is, in fact, undergoing a series of important changes. There is a real process of political and economic opening taking place. The Cuban government recently allowed private home and auto sales and has begun a modest expansion of the private sector. The government has also released both political and common prisoners in the last year, and a recent Communist Party Conference affirmed the principle of term limits for government and party leaders, which will dramatically alter the political calculus of the next generation of Cuban leaders. It is moving slowly, but a process of change is underway in Cuba.
The world will inevitably move toward democracy in the squoassumes your ev Parker 13 (Hilary, Ikenberry explores liberal internationalism, crisis in American foreign policy,
http://wws.princeton.edu/news/ikenberry_09feature/) Further, in "The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail, published in the January/February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, Ikenberry and Johns Hopkins University Professor Daniel Deudney systematically argue against the emerging view that autocracies, such as those in China and Russia, are undergoing a revival and will present a viable alternative to liberal democracy. They acknowledge recent developments that support this hypothesis, including the rapid economic growth and modernization of China under the Communist Partys dictatorship and the strengthening of certain autocratic regimes by the energy crisis and rising oil prices. Yet, Ikenberry and Deudney argue that deep contradictions exist between authoritatian political regimes and capitalist economic systems, such as the increased demand for political participation that follows from increased wealth as well as the tendency of economic development to create diverse socioeconomic interests leading to calls for elections among differing political parties. While the authors contend that political transformation of these autocracies is likely to occur, the question of when such a shift will take place is unknown. There is nothing in the liberal vision that specifies the exact timing of political opening as a part of the socioeconomic transformation, they write. Capitalism creates the conditions for liberal democracy, but the trigger for actual political change is entirely unpredictable. Ikenberry and Deudney go on to refute the claims put forth by autocratic revival theorists that the 21st century will see increased power divides and the development of dangerous rivalries between autocratic and democratic states. Instead, they contend that economic globalization and shared problems in the current world order provide a set of constraints and opportunitiesof pushes and pullsthat reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving.
AT: Credibility
Their author concedes that gradualism is key to solve their advantage Kupchan and Mount, 09 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, and Adam, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, The Autonomy Rule, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring 2009, http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf)
Policies of impatient democratization, however, will do much more to impede than impel historys advance. From the Balkans to Iraq to the Palestinian territories, a rush to the ballot box has undercut moderates and stoked sectarian and ideological cleavages, not furthered the cause of political stability. Washington should continue to promote democracy by example and incentive. But if the United States insists on universal adherence to the Western order it oversees, it will only compromise its persuasive appeal and its ability to help ensure that liberal democracy ultimately wins the long struggle against alternative systems of government. Instead, the United States should take the lead in constructing a more pluralist international order. Were Washington to orchestrate the arrival of this next order, it would not denigrate the accomplishments of democracy, but rather demonstrate an abiding confidence in the values the West holds dear and in the ability of liberal forms of government to outperform and ultimately prevail against authoritarian alternatives. Cultivating new stakeholders, carefully devolving international responsibility to regional actors, and placing the international economy on a more stable footing will also allow 50 the autonomy rule the United States the respite needed to focus on rebuilding the foundations of its own prosperity. The United States will be better off if it gets ahead of the curve and helps craft a new order that is sustainable than if it fights a losing battle against tectonic shifts in global politics. As Kissinger observes, America needs to learn to discipline itself into a strategy of gradualism that seeks greatness in the accumulation of the attainable. The United States can steward the onset of this more diverse and inclusive world in a manner that remains consonant with the deepest American values. Doing so would help restore Americas moral authority as a leading member of the community of nations, in the end making it more likely that other nations would be as respectful of Americas preferences as America should be of theirs.
EXT: Say No
The Castro regime relies on Anti-AmericanismRaul would refuse to cooperate with the US over serious overtures like the plan SUCHLICKI MAR-4-13 (JAIME, Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro, JAIME
SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-willstill-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/) Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid.
Impact
Lifting the embargo just gives the regime funds and legitimacythat leads to more suppression and a more entrenched regime Azel Sep-08 (Jos, How to Think About Change in Cuba: A Guide for Policymakers, Jos Azel is currently a
Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research_Studies/Article-Azel-FINAL.pdf)
I have argued elsewhere,12 but it may be worth restating here, that economic reforms in the absence of democratic reforms need not lead inexorably, linearly, or in a timely basis to democracy. In fact their most likely outcome may be not democracy but a more sinister one. The Cuban leadership hopes to use economic reforms to finance its totalitarian politics. It is a fair guess that Ral Castro and his generals believe that if his government delivers even marginal prosperity, the Cuban people will allow his ruling elite to contro l Cuban political life. Cubas current leadership holds to the belief that demand for political change can be controlled or suppressed if necessary.13
Lifting the embargo would only put money in the hands of the government, not the people Suchlicki Feb-26-13 (Jaime, The Case for Cuba Sanctions, JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau
Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/02/the-case-for-cuba-sanctions.html) Lifting the ban for U.S. tourists to travel to Cuba would be a major concession totally out of proportion to recent changes in the island. If the U.S. were to lift the travel ban without major reforms in Cuba, there would be significant implications: - Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidels brother. - American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cubas efficient security apparatus. Most Americans dont speak Spanish, have but limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists. Penalties include jail terms. - While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most. - Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military.
Lifting the embargo would only strengthen totalitarianism in Cuba, not weaken it Suchlicki Feb-26-13 (Jaime, The Case for Cuba Sanctions, JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau
Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/02/the-case-for-cuba-sanctions.html) - The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best nave. As we have seen in other circumstances, U.S. travelers to Cuba could be subject to harassment and imprisonment. - Over the past decades hundred of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. - As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cubas limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the islands economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro.
Lifting the embargo now undermines our bargaining power in negotiating democracy later Suchlicki Feb-26-13 (Jaime, The Case for Cuba Sanctions, JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau
Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the
past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/02/the-case-for-cuba-sanctions.html) - If the travel ban is lifted unilaterally now or the embargo is ended by the U.S., what will the U.S. government have to negotiate with a future regime in Cuba and to encourage changes in the island? These policies could be an important bargaining chip with a future regime willing to provide concessions in the area of political and economic freedoms. - The travel ban and the embargo should be lifted as a result of negotiations between the U.S. and a Cuban government willing to provide meaningful and irreversible political and economic concessions or when there is a democratic government in place in the island.
Politics Links
Politics Links---Cuban Embargo
administration, consistent with the approach of the Bush administration, has made a political decision to subordinate foreign policy and national interest-based decisions to domestic politics with respect to its Cuba policy. There is a bipartisan group of members of Congress--Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate--who represent Florida, a state where there are many swing votes that deliver the electoral votes for any president. Those individuals not only deliver votes, but they deliver campaign finance, and generally make a lot of noise, and that combination has persuaded the White House that reelection is more of a priority than taking on the heavy lifting to set the United States on the path of normalization with Cuba for now.
Aho 13(Matthew Aho, Matthew Aho is a consultant in the Corporate Practice Group. He has significant international affairs experience working on issues throughout Latin
America, with a focus on Cuba, Venezuela, Central America, Peru, and Mexico. Matthew has particular experience with legal and regulatory frameworks comprising the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba, as well as with region-wide projects on issues ranging from insecurity and violence prevention to energy and policies affecting labor-markets. Previously, Matthew was Manager of the Policy Department at the New York headquarters of Americas Society and Council of the Americas (AS /COA) and editor of Americas Quarterly, What Does Obama's Second Term Hold for U.S.-Cuba Relations?, cuba study group, January 23, 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/ouropinions?ContentRecord_id=c20ad778-24cd-46df-9fb2-3ebc664ed58d&ContentType_id=15d70174-0c41-47c6-9bd5-cc875718b6c3&Group_id=4c543850-0014-4d3c-8f870cbbda2e1dc7)
While John Kerry's views on U.S.Cuba relations have favored engagement over isolation, ultimate authority rests with a White House that has proceeded cautiously on Cuba during President Obama's first term. Aside from easing some travel restrictions, there have been only two emergent themes on Cuba policy: support for private-sector efforts to increase the flow of information to the Cuban people; and support for private economic activity on the island. Cuba policy changes still require expenditures of political capital disproportionate to the island's strategic and economic importance . Barring game-changing developmentssuch as release of USAID subcontractor Alan Grossexecutive action during Obama's second term will likely focus on furthering goals laid out during his first. Here, however, John Kerry's leadership could prove vital and create new opportunities for U.S. business.
Current administration, the congress and the people hate the plan Williams 13(Carol J. Williams, Senior International Affairs Writer at Los Angeles Times, LA Times: Political calculus keeps Cuba
on U.S. list of terror sponsors, center of democracy in the Americas, May 3, 2013, http://www.democracyinamericas.org/blog -post/latimes-political-calculus-keeps-cuba-on-u-s-list-of-terror-sponsors/) On Wednesday, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said the administration has no current plans to remove Cuba
from the list to be released later this month. The island nation that has been under a U.S. trade and travel embargo since shortly after revolutionary
leader Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 is in the company of only Iran, Syria and Sudan in being branded with the state sponsor label. Kayyem laments the diluting of the terrorist designation based on political or ideological dis putes. We work with a lot of countries we dont like, but the imprimatur of terrorism has a ring to it in a way that can be harmful to us, she said. Collaboration between the United States and Cuba on emergency planning to respond to the mutual threats posed by hurricanes, oil spills and refugee crises are complicated by the set of trade and financial restrictions that comes along with the state sponsor censure, Kayyem said. There are some real operational impediments when we have a system that begins with no rather than why not? she said of the legally encumbered contacts between Havana and Washington. Politicians
who have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the Obama administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a South Florida Republican whose efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy throughout her 24 years in Congress, hailed the State Department decision as reaf firming the threat that the Castro regime represents. Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School, blamed the continued branding of Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians pandering for a certain political base. He also said President Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry have failed to make a priority of removing the impediment to better relations with Cuba . As much as Id like to see the Castro regime gone and an
open and free Cuba, it takes away from the State Departme nts credibility when they include countries on the list that arent even close to threatening Americans, Aramesh said. Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the state sponsor list, he said, pointing to Pakistan as a prime example. Although Islamabad very clearly supports terrorist and insurgent organizations, he said, the U.S. government has long refused to pro voke its ally in the region with the official censure. The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get exit visas before they could leave their country for foreign travel. There was talk early in Obamas first term of easing the 51 year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba a faint shadow. He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba that has manifestly failed for nearly
political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havanas refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay. Its a matter of political priorities and trade 50 years. The offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the governments list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime. Its
a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend, Aramesh said. President Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.
Plan unpopular, costs too much pc, and relations are horrible between the countries because of Cuban 5 and Alan gross issue Miroff 13(Nick Miroff, d earned a bachelor's degree in Spanish and Latin American literature at University of California Santa
Cruz. He holds a master's degree from the Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism and has won Pulitzer prize, Can Kerry make friends with Cuba?, global post, January 2, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/cuba/121231/kerry-cubasecretary-of-state-obama) Regardless of Kerrys record on Cuba policy in the Senate, analysts say he will face several obstacles to major change, not least
of which will be the man likely to replace him as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sen. Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey), a Cuban American. If Menendez becomes chairman, then the committee responsible for shaping US foreign
policy in the upper house will be led by a hardliner who wants to ratchet up not dial back the US squeeze on Havana. So while Kerry may have some latitude to adjust Cuba policy from inside the White House, Latin America experts dont expect sweeping change like an end to the Cuba Embargo which requires Congressional action. On Latin America, in general, I think Kerry has a longer and broader vision, said Robert Pastor, professor of international relations at American University. But when it come s to Cuba, he cautioned, Kerry is also a political realist. Changing US policy is not a high priority for him, but not changing US policy is the only priority for Bob Menendez, Pastor said. In 2011, Kerry delayed the release of nearly $20 million in federal funds for pro-
democracy Cuba projects run by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), questioning their effectiveness and insisting on greater oversight. There is no evidence that the democracy promotion programs, which have cost the US taxpayer more than $150 million so far, are helping the Cuban people, Kerry said at the time. Nor have they achieved much more than provoking the Cuban government to arrest a US government contractor . The US government contractor is Alan Gross,
jailed on the island since December 2009. Cuban authorities arrested Gross while he worked on a USAID project to set up satellite communications gear that would allow members of Cubas Jewish community to connect to the internet without going through gove rnment servers. Cuba sentenced him to 15 years in prison, but now says its willing to work out a prisoner swap for the Cuban Five, a group of intelligence agents who have been serving time in a US federal prison. The Obama administration has refused to negotiate, calling
on Havana to release Gross unconditionally, and even US lawmakers who advocate greater engagement with Cuba say no change will be possible as long as hes in jail. The Castro government insists its not willing to give up Gross for nothing. Carlos Alzugaray, a former Cuban diplomat and scholar of US-Cuba relations at the University of Havana, said a resolution to the Gross case and other significant changes in US policy would require a big investment of political capital by
if Kerry will be willing and able to convince Obama that he should push for change, and if they can neutralize Menendez, Alzugaray said. If that happens, then we will see change, he said. If not, it will be more of the same: minimal and timid changes but nothing big.
Plan not important and not popular, no one in congress is willing to push for it; its a waste to push for Brinkley 12(Joel Brinkley, a professor of journalism at Stanford University, is a Pulitzer Prize-winning former foreign
correspondent for The New York Times, Failing Cuba Embargo Not Going Away, politico, December 18, 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/) Cuba experts say many business leaders, particularly, are making the same case, especially now that the American economy has remained in the doldrums for so long. They add that it's an obvious second-term issue; Obama doesn't have to worry about winning Florida again. But for so many people in Washington, "Cuba doesn't matter any more now," said Ted Piccone, deputy director for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a former National Security Council official. "There's no political incentive" to change the policy -- even though the arguments for changing it are rife. Despite ample provocation, the U.S. doesn't impose similar embargoes on other authoritarian states.
Obama and congress wont push for it, Obama doesnt want to waste hpc on it Peters 10( Philip Peters, The author is Vice President of the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Virginia e has responsibility for
international economic programs with a focus on Latin America A Cuba expert holds degrees from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service (1978) and the Georgetown University Graduate Schoo l (M.A. 1986, National Security Studies), President Obama and Cuba, Lexington institute, March 15, 2010, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/cuba/cuban triangle/palabranuevamarch2010.pdf) President Barack Obama entered office with a promise of change. He follows an American president whose rhetoric for eight years expressed a strong desire to influence Cubas future but whose actions concentrated, paradoxically, on building walls rather than bridges between our nations. In his first year, President Obama has started building bridges. He allowed Cuban Americans to visit their loved ones in Cuba without restriction, set a new tone in Washingtons discourse toward the island, and opened the door to greater diplomatic contact between the two governments. These actions are significant, but they are very small in proportion to the fundamental change that many in Cuba and the United States would like to see. A poll taken in October 2009, for example, showed that 59 percent of Cuban Americans favor ending all U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. Yet considering Cubas place in United States
foreign policy and the large number of challenges that President Obama confronts, it may be that President Obamas modest initial actions toward Cuba are aligned with his own political possibilities and priorities. The American Presidency has large but limited power. Hence each Administration is forced to choose the issues and initiatives to which it will devote its energy, the way the President spends his time every day, the subjects on which he will address the American public, and how he will spend his political capital to influence public opinion and Congress. Some of these choices are determined by the president s campaign and the voters mandate. Many others are imposed, as President Obama learned with great clarity when he took office on January 20, 2009.
Plan will never be popular because a PAC that supports the embargo spends a lot of money to prevent over 400 congressman from voting against the embargo. Clark 09(Lesley Clark, Lesley Clark covers the White House for McClatchy Newspapers and Pulitzer prize winner, Money talks:
Report links donations, Cuba embargo support, Mc Clatchy newspapers, November 16, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/11/16/78884/money-talks-report-links-donations.html#.Ud2Q5Pm1Fsk)
Supporters of the U.S. embargo against Cuba have contributed nearly $11 million to members of Congress since 2004 in a largely successful effort to block efforts to weaken sanctions against the island , a new report shows. In several cases, the report by Public Campaign says, members of Congress who had supported easing sanctions against Cuba changed their position and got donations from the U.S.-Cuba Democracy Political Action Committee and its donors. All told, the political action committee and its contributors have given $10.77 million nationwide to nearly 400 candidates and members of Congress, the report says. The contributions include more than $850,000 to 53 Democrats in the House of Representatives who sent a letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi earlier this month opposing any change to U.S.-Cuba policy. The average signer, the report says, received $16,344. The top five recipients of the embargo supporters' cash: Miami's three CubanAmerican Republican members of Congress, 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain and New Jersey Democratic Sen. Robert Menendez, whose parents fled Cuba before his birth. The report comes as defenders of the embargo fend off efforts to repeal a
decades-old ban against U.S. travel to Cuba. Proponents of greater engagement with Cuba contend that they have the votes, and a hearing on the
issue is scheduled for Thursday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Critics of U.S.-Cuba policy long have suggested a link between campaign contributions and policy. Public Campaign which advocates for public financing of political campaigns says the contributions raise questions about the role that money plays in lawmakers' decision-making. "The pressure they get to raise money plays heavier in their decisions than it ought to," said David Donnelly, the national campaigns director for Public Campaign. "We think this is a damning pattern. We think these are good people caught in a bad system. If members of Congress have to spend too much time raising money, they have to listen to people who give money." The director of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, Mauricio Claver-Carone, defended the contributions as support for lawmakers who side with Cuban-Americans who think that easing sanctions against Cuba will only benefit the Castro regime. "I will not apologize for the Cuban-American community practicing its constitutional, democratic right to support candidates who believe in freedom and democracy for the Cuban people over business and tourism interests," Claver-Carone said. "Unions help elect pro-union candidates. The Chamber of Commerce helps elect pro-business candidates. AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) helps elect pro-Israel members. Who are we supposed to help? Pro-Castro members?" Public Campaign looked at the Cuba committee because of a seeming disconnect between congressional votes and public opinion polls that suggest most Americans support lifting a ban on travel to Cuba, Donnelly said. "On this issue there appears to be a clear distinction between what the American public appears to want and what some in Congress are advocating," Donnelly said, pointing to a World Public Opinion survey in April that found 70 percent of Americans support travel to Cuba. Rep. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., who backs greater engagement with Cuba, said the report wasn't a surprise. "I don't know how else you can explain how our current policy has survived for so long without yielding any meaningful results; it's all politics," Flake said. The report says that at least 18 House members including several from agriculture-rich districts received campaign
contributions from the PAC or its donors and switched their positions on Cuba, from voting in favor of easing travel restrictions to voting against any efforts to soften the embargo. Rep. Mike McIntyre, D-N.C., said his changed views came from
humanitarian interests and concerns about oppression in Cuba. He said he spoke with Florida Republican Reps. Lincoln and Mario Diaz-Balart about their family's experience in Cuba under Fidel Castro. "I thought, 'This is not right, and it's not humanitarian, and it doesn't promote democracy and I'm not going to support someone who is repressive and evil,' " McIntyre said. "Yes, I changed my vote. That's the reason I changed: the horrors they suffered." "They're really savvy people," Lars Schoultz, a professor of political science at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and the author of "That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution," said of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC. "They know one vote is one vote. They scratch around and see who might be open to their way of thinking." Claver-Carone, who started the PAC in 2003, said agricultural and business interests had heavily lobbied members of Congress before the committee was in operation. "The farm lobby came in and they were telling people, 'Cuba is like Costa Rica,' " Claver-Carone said. "We came in and started telling people, 'Hey, here's what's really happening in Cuba.' " Though hard-line embargo supporters traditionally have been
considered Republicans, the report shows the PAC shifting contributions to Democrats as they assumed control of the House and Senate in 2006. In the 2004 election cycle, the PAC gave just 29 percent to Democrats. By 2008, the Democrats' share was up to 59 percent.
Anti-Cuba lobby too strong, nothing related to Cuba will be popular- it will take to much pc to pass it
Wood 13(Roberta wood, peoples world journalist and reporter, Black trade unionists call for new Cuba policies, peoples world, July
10, 2013, http://peoplesworld.org/black-trade-unionists-call-for-new-cuba-policies/) The political difficulty, according to Rogers, is that the anti-Cuba lobby, based
in Miami, is strong in D.C. That lobby leverages the fact that Florida, with 29 electoral votes, is key to any presidential candidate's success, and has had a large anti-communist Cuban exile community, to block changes in current policy. Rogers says that the CBTU's resolution
will be forwarded to the upcoming AFL-CIO convention through those who are leaders in both bodies. The AFL-CIO will hold its national convention in September in Los Angeles. "We will also use this resolution as a basis for educational work and mobilization in our local chapters," added rogers.