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In Search of Pythagoreanism
Studia Praesocratica
Herausgegeben von / Edited by
M. Laura Gemelli Marciano, Richard McKirahan,
DenisOBrien, Oliver Primavesi, Christoph Riedweg,
David Sider, Gotthard Strohmaier, Georg Whrle
Band/Volume 4
Gabriele Cornelli
In Search of
Pythagoreanism
Pythagoreanism As an Historiographical Category
ISBN 978-3-11-030627-9
e-ISBN 978-3-11-030650-7
ISSN 1869-7143
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Pittagora volse che tutte fossero duna nobilitate, non solamente le umane, ma
con le umane quelle de li animali bruti e de le piante, e le forme de le minere; e
disse che tutta la differenza de le corpora e de le forme.
Dante Alighieri. Convivio IV xxi.
for Cissa Dani, Bibi and Dante
Foreword
Pythagoras is and will remain one of the most familiar names among the Greek
philosophers, one we are told very much and we know very little about, and con-
cerning whom there has been and continues to be the greatest disagreement. To
some he is a mathematician, to others a religious leader even a shaman, to oth-
ers a moralist, politician and founder of a distinctive vita Pythagorica pursued by
an elite group of initiates. Many adherents of one or another of these readings
deny the validity of the others. Ancient evidence supports all these (and more)
interpretations and over the past two centuries and more, attempts to locate
in it the genuine thought of Pythagoras have been marked by conflicting ap-
proaches and incompatible assessments of the testimonia have left a tangle
that Boeckh described already in 1819 as a labyrinthine confusion. That confu-
sion continues today with yet more versions of Pythagoras, some of them revolu-
tionary and deliberately provocative.
Professor Cornelli calls attention to this apparently hopeless state of affairs
and declines to add to the confusion. Rather, he seeks to understand how the
confusion both in the variety of modern interpretations and in the conflicting
ancient testimonia arose. His target is not primarily Pythagoras himself, who is
lost in the mist, but Pythagoreanism a term still in use and one which (along
with the associated adjective Pythagorean) is employed today as in antiquity to
refer to widely different things. Cornelli presents Pythagoreanism as a historio-
graphical category demanding a particular kind of historiographical approach.
The diversity of the source materials and the wide range of the subject matter
demand a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing on doxography, source criticism,
history, anthropology, religious studies and mathematics (to mention only the
most obvious fields) in addition to philosophy.
Cornelli begins with a valuable survey of Pythagorean scholarship from
Boeckh to Kingsley that showcases the variety and incommensurability of inter-
pretations presently available and the historical development that led to this sit-
uation. He then turns to the ancient testimony in texts composed over a time-
span of several centuries, emphasizing the contributions of Plato, Aristotle
and other relatively early authors. His aim is double. First, to trace diachronically
what the tradition reports: what Pythagoreanism meant for its ancient represen-
tatives and rapporteurs. Pythagoreanism, Cornelli contends, did not die in the
fourth century BCE (or, as Kahn asserted, in the 17th century CE); it has never
died. From this point of view, given the diversity and history of development
of the tradition, there can be no guarantee that beliefs and practices called Py-
thagorean reflect the actual beliefs and practices of Pythagoras himself or of the
proto-Pythagoreans. However, the sources provide materials that enable a partial
reconstruction of the history of Pythagoreanism and that enable us to under-
stand how the movement was able, uniquely among ancient philosophies, to
continue in existence for so very long.
Cornellis second goal is to detect in this later material evidence for what
may have been the case in the earliest period of Pythagoreanism. He focuses
on three strands of the tradition. The first is the distinctive Pythagorean way
of life attested as early as Plato and defined inter alia by prescriptions (symbola
or akousmata) and marked by secrecy, and recognition of the charismatic author-
ity of Pythagoras. The second strand comprises the twin doctrines of the immor-
tality and transmigration of souls, referred to already by Xenophanes and by
Plato and Aristotle. The third is the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, first men-
tioned clearly by Aristotle and related to the doctrines of Philolaus. All three
strands, he argues, go back to the earliest days of Pythagoreanism. The original-
ity of his approach lies in the way he deploys the source materials on these
strands to show how the history of reception by later sources contributed to
the construction of the category of Pythagoreanism.
The measure of Cornellis success is the extent to which he accounts for the
richness and variety of the tradition about Pythagoreanism and shows that its
diverse strands stem from the earliest period. Equally important are the range
of materials he treats, the variety of approaches he employs, and the fresh in-
sights he provides on subjects ranging from the relation between Pythagorean-
ism and Orphism to the Platonic and Aristotelian interpretations of Pythagorean
number doctrine.
The perspectives opened by this book and the discussion it is bound to pro-
voke mark it as an important and timely contribution to current literature on Py-
thagoreanism and ancient thought in general.
Richard McKirahan
VIII Foreword
Contents
Foreword VII
Acknowledgements XI
Note XII
Abbreviations XIII
Introduction 1
History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley 7
1.1 Zeller: the skepticism of the beginnings 8
1.2 Diels: a Zellerian collection 14
1.3 Rohde: the reaction to skepticism 15
1.^ Burnet: the double teaching of acousmatics and mathematicians 17
1.5 Cornford and Guthrie: in search of unity between science and
religion 19
1.6 From Delatte to De Vogel: Pythagoreanism and politics 23
1.7 Aristotles unique testimony and the uncertain Academic
tradition 33
1.8 From Burkert to Kingsley: the third way and mysticism in the Py-
thagorean tradition 40
1.9 Conclusion 49
Pythagoreanism as a historiographical category 52
2.1 Interpreting interpretations: diachronic and synchronic
dimensions 52
2.2 Pythagorean identity 55
2.3 The Pythagorean koinna 61
2.^ Acousmatics and mathematicians 77
2.5 Conclusion 83
Immortality of the soul and metempschsis 86
3.1 Is it the soul? (Xenophanes) 89
3.2 Wiser than all (Heraclitus and Ion of Chios) 94
3.3 Ten or twenty human generations (Empedocles) 97
3.^ Plato and Orphism 100
3.^.1 Understanding the lgos of their ministry 101
3.^.2 Hierarchy of incarnations 106
3.^.3 Sma-sma 107
3.^.^ Pythagorean mediation 116
3.5 Herodotus, Isocrates and Egypt 121
3.6 Legends on immortality 124
3.7 A Pythagorean Democritus? 127
3.8 Aristotle and the Pythagorean myths 129
3.9 Conclusion 134
Numbers 137
^.1 All is number? 138
^.1.1 Three versions of the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers 138
^.1.2 Two solutions 147
^.1.3 The Philolaic solution 150
^.1.3.1 One book or three books? 151
^.1.3.2 Authenticity of Philolaus fragments 153
^.1.3.3 The Doric pseudo-epigraphic tradition 155
^.1.^ The Aristotelian exception (Met. A 6, 987b) 159
^.1.5 The Platonic testimony (Phlb. 16c-23c) 167
^.2 The fragments of Philolaus 172
^.2.1 Unlimited/limiting 172
^.2.2 The role of numbers in Philolaus 178
^.3 Conclusion 184
Conclusion 189
Bibliography 197
Primary sources 197
Secondary sources 200
Index of Topics 214
Index of Passages 219
Index of Names 224
X Contents
Acknowledgements
This publication is the result of nearly a decade of research culminating in my
second doctoral thesis defended at the University of So Paulos Graduate Pro-
gram in Philosophy, in September 2010. Much of this work derives from that.
For this reason I wish to thank Roberto Bolzani Filho for his warmth and gentle
guidance. Over the years many colleagues contributed in many different ways to
the improvement of this monograph. In a special way, my friends Gianni Caser-
tano, Andr Chevitarese and Marcelo Carvalho, as well as Alberto Bernab,
Bruno Centrone, Franco Ferrari, Carl Huffman, Maura Iglesias, Fernando
Muniz, Loraine Oliveira, Christoph Riedweg, Dennys Garcia Xavier, Edrisi Fer-
nandes, Emmanuele Vimercati, Fernando Rey Puente, Fernando Santoro, Fran-
cisco Lisi, Franco Trabattoni, Gerson Brea, Hector Benoit, Jose Gabriel Trindade
Santos, Laura Gemelli Marciano, Livio Rossetti, Luc Brisson, Macris Constantin,
Marcelo Perine, Marcus Mota, Maurizio Migliori, Miriam Campolina Peixoto,
Pedro Paulo Funari, Thomas Szlezk, and Tom Robinson, were kind enough to
argue with me, in different circumstances, about parts of the research that result-
ed in this work. I also owe special thanks: to students of the Archai UNESCO
Chair, whose dedication and enthusiasm still surprise me and confirm the rea-
sons for my passion for ancient philosophy; to the Department of Philosophy
of the University of Brasilia, which gave me the time needed to complete this
project and a place where I can share it; to CAPES and CNPq, which provided
access to almost all relevant literature on the subject, and also let me do
some research internships; to Richard McKirahan and Daniel Moerner, for
their very accurate revision, not only of the English text, but of many passages
and ideas. And to Nicholas Riegel and Katja Flgel for his emergency rescue
in my very last revision.
Thanks, finally, especially for the patience and for the embrace of the one
who shares a life with me: Monique. For showing me every day, with sweetness
and strength, that half is a measure that overcomes itself.
Thank you.
Note
Greek alphabet is used only in footnotes, while Greek terms are translated in the
body of the text, in order to make the reading easier for non-specialists in an-
cient languages.
For modern Authors, Ive choosen to include a translation of the passage in
the text and the original language in footnote; for ancient sources, Ive included
only translations, because the texts are more readily available.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.
Abbreviations
Ael. Aelian
Aesch. Aeschylus
Against Acad. Augustine. Against Academicians
Anon. Phot. Anonymous by Photius. Thesleff
Arist. Aristotle
BCE Before the Common Era (= BC)
CE Common Era (= AD)
Crat. Plato. Cratylus
D. L. Vitae Diogenes Laertius. The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
De Abst. Porphyry. On abstinence from animal food
De an. Aristotle. De anima
De Comm. Mathem. Iamblichus. De communi mathematica scientia
Diod. Sic. Diodorus Siculus
Div. Inst. Lactantius. Divinarum Institutionum
DK Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Diels-Kranz
FGrHist Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker. Jacoby
Gell. Aulus Gellius. Noctes Atticae
Gorg. Plato. Gorgias
Heraclid. Heraclides Ponticus
Herodt. Herodotus
Hist. Nat. Pliny. Naturalis Historiae
Iambl. Iamblichus
Il. Homer. Iliad
In Metaph. Alexander of Aphrodisias. Comments on Aristotles Metaphysics
In salm. Ambrosius. Enarratio in Psalmos
Leg. Plato. Laws
lit. literally
Liv. Titus Livius
Men. Plato. Meno
Met. Aristotle. Metaphysics
Metam. Ovid. Metamorphoses
Mete. Aristotle. Meteorology
n note
NE Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics
Od. Homer. Odyssey
orig. From the original
P. Derv. Derveni Papyrus
Phaed. Plato. Phaedo
Phaedr. Plato. Phaedrus
Phlb. Plato. Philebus
Phot. Bibl. Photius. Library
Phys. Aristotle. Physics
PL Patrologia Latina. Migne
Pol. Aristotle. Politics
Porph. Porphyry
Proclus. In Tim. Proclus. Commentary on Platos Timaeus
Prom. Aeschylus. Prometheus
Quaest. Conv. Plutarch. Quaestiones Convivales
Rep. Plato. Republic
Retr. Augustine. Retractationes
Schol. In Hom. Odyss. Scholium on the Odyssey. Dindorf
Schol. In Phaedr. Scholia on the Phaedrus. Greene
Schol. In Soph. Scholia on Sophocles. Elmsley
Soph. El. Sophocles. Electra
Speusip. Speusippus
Stob. Stobaeus. Anthologium (Florilegium)
Syrian In Met. Syrian. Commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics
Theophr. Met. Theophrastus. Metaphysics
Tusc. Disput. Cicero. Tusculanae Disputationes
VH Aelian. Varia Historia
VP Porphyry. Life of Pythagoras or Iamblichus. Pythagorean Life
XIV Abbreviations
Introduction
According to Kahn 1974: 163, new theories of Pythagoreanism are not necessary
in our present day and age.
The history of criticism is littered with different and incompatible interpreta-
tions, to the point that Kahn suggests that, instead of another thesis on Pythagor-
eanism, it would be preferable to assess traditions with the aim of producing a
good historiographical presentation.
1 The opportunity to return to Kahns thesis was suggested by Casertano, who referred to it in his
latest book on the Presocratics (Casertano 2009: 56). Cf. Kahn 1974: 163 n6: Its hard enough to
satisfy minimal standards of historical rigor in discussing the Pythagoreans, without introducing
arbitrary guesswork of this sort where no two students can come to the same conclusion on the
basis of the same evidence. In fact, the direct testimony for Pythagorean doctrines is all too
abundant. The task for a serious scholarship is not to enrich these data by inventing new
theories or unattested stages of development but to sift the evidence so as to determine which
items are most worthy (or least unworthy) of belief. The context of Kahns own observation is
that of the criticism of the apriori in the reconstruction of Pythagoreanism from circumstantial
evidence by authors like Guthrie, as will be discussed below (1.5).
2 Canfora 2002: 89, orig.: Si tratta di prendere nozione della costante and consustanziale
relativit del mestiere dello storico. A seconda della distanza dallevento trattato, gli storici ne
danno um profilo e ne rileveranno delle facce volta a volta differenti: tutte in fondo in qualche
The first advantage of the historiographical approach to Pythagoreanism is thus
the initial awareness that none of the accounts of Pythagoreanism are exhaustive
in the words of Canfora , and not even the mechanical sum of them all should
result exhaustive, thus somehow leaving the historians hands free for a historio-
graphical articulation that may present Pythagoreanism in its complex diversity.
Perhaps this is the only real problem with Riedwegs excellent and recent mon-
ograph on Pythagoreanism (Riedweg 2002), which was rightly criticized in this
regard by Huffman 2008a: it approaches Pythagoreanism in general terms and
aligns itself with particular global interpretations of the movement. It is surely
right to note, of course, that this approach is an absolutely conscious one and
corresponds to the authors critical choice; it is a choice that follows, in a
more mystical and religious sense, for example, Detienne 1962 and 1963, Burkert
1972 and Kingsley 1995 or, in a more political perspective, von Fritz 1940 and
Minar 1942. Riedweg does not forget to deal with the fundamental question at
issue: the presence of a history of interpretation which, already in antiquity
witness the prologue of Iamblichus Pythagorean Life wanted to gather totally
different (if not even contradictory) experiences and doctrines under the histor-
iographic category of Pythagoreanism. But that same approach ends up in gen-
eral terms becoming unfocused: it fails to take more precise position within the
several competing trends in the history of interpretation. Thus, to think about Py-
thagoreanism as a historiographical category means above all, to methodologi-
cally overcome the illusion that it is possible to reach the thing in itself, the
true history, and instead to consciously accept that each interpretation is neces-
sarily mediated by its author.
The second comparative advantage of taking a historiographical approach
rather than developing yet another interpretation of this philosophy concerns
one of the central problems that characterizes Pythagoreanism more than
other ancient philosophical movements: the drastically shifting terrain of the
criticism of the sources. It is critical to face this problem with renewed interpre-
tative and philological effort, coming to grips with the central issue of the expan-
sion of the tradition (consider Zeller) and the corresponding skeptical drift that
this usually imposes on scholars.
The advantage of a historiographical approach is to embrace Pythagorean-
ism in its entirety, by using its sources to attempt to understand it through
and not in spite of its complex articulation across more than a millennium
of the history of ancient philosophy. While this perspective was first introduced
modo vere, e spesso tra loro complementari: nessuna esaustiva, come esaustiva non sarebbe
neanche la meccanica somma di tutte queste facce.
2 Introduction
by Burnet 1908, and then reaffirmed by Cornford 1922 and 1923 and Guthrie 1962,
it is possible to find an especially comprehensive approach, particularly in the
Italian historiographical tradition on Pythagoreanism, inaugurated by classic au-
thors like Rostagni 1922 and Mondolfo (in his revised and commented edition of
Zeller, 1938). The problem of the pre-Socratic sources (but not only them, see the
case of the traditio of Platos and Aristotles own texts in this sense), which is
based on the later generations of Pythagoreans, is particularly pressing. If it is
true as Burkert 1972: 1596 convincingly demonstrates that the existence
of a Pythagorean philosophy depends largely on the invention of a Pythagorean
vulgata (heavily transfigured) by the Academics, and even if it is likely that
Aristotles so-called Pythagoreans are fundamentally philosophers like Philo-
laus, who constitute a second (or third) generation of the movement, then it is
certainly appropriate to ask what reliable information later sources could tell
us about the original proto-Pythagoreanism, the doctrines of Pythagoras and
his early disciples.
One can also conclude, with Centrone 1996: 91, that ancient Pythagoreanism
would be an association based on following a particular lifestyle, following
the rules of a specific bos, expressed by essentially eschatological akosmata.
However, this koinona of life had already been recognized by ancient philos-
ophy (see Xenophanes and Heraclitus) as itself a way of doing philosophy and
was identified by a complex (though not always coherent, as will be shown) ser-
ies of characters and teachings that came to be called Pythagoreans. In other
words, the term Pythagoreanism was associated with a philosophy, not just
with a lifestyle.
3 The term proto-Pythagoreanism is introduced here as a new term because it is necessary to
distinguish between this first founding moment of Pythagoreanism, and the development of
Pythagoreanism during the fifth century BC, which is still pre-Socratic, but which is in writing
and corresponds to the era of the immediate sources of Plato and Aristotle. For the uses and
meaning of the analogous term proto-philosophy, see Boas 1948: 673684.
4 Zhmud 1989: 289.
Introduction 3
It is the identification of the category of Pythagoreanism that particularly
attracts the attention of the historian of philosophy. For these reasons, therefore,
a historiographical discussion of the category of Pythagoreanism will be the
purpose of this monograph.
The effort to trace a comprehensive and inclusive profile of the conditions
and possibilities for setting up what is Pythagorean, within a philosophical
movement of such historical and theoretical breadth, ends up overlapping
with the intention to contribute methodologically to an historiographical review
of ancient philosophy in general. Understanding Pythagoreanism is crucial to
understanding the origins of philosophy and, more generally, of Western
thought. The relevant elements of the Pythagoreanism historiography turn it
into a privileged locus for an exercise that aims to reach a deeper historiograph-
ical understanding of ancient philosophy. This ideal will be a subtext of this
study.
A good historiographical presentation will thus show how the sensitive points
that contributed to the formation of so many different lectiones of Pythagorean-
ism emerge from the history of the interpetation of the movement. One has to
agree with Huffmans claim that Pythagoreanism is an area of study that is
full of controversial issues.
Rather, the confused image of Pythagoras today is the result of invididually ac-
curate historiographical choices by generations of interpreters that built on an
understanding of what philosophy was in its origins (in genealogical perspec-
tive) and therefore reflect what philosophy is since its origins (in historical per-
spective). From the prologue to Iamblichus Pythagorean Life (Iambl. VP: 1), to
Hegels Lectures on the Philosophy of History, and the recent interpretations of
Kingsley 1995, it is possible to confront the presuppositions that led different au-
5 Huffman 2008b: 225.
6 Burkert 1972: Preface to the German edition.
4 Introduction
thors to favor one or another image and so conditioned their interpretations of
the Pythagorean question and the purported Pythagorean attempt to solve it
(Burkert 1972: I).
This work therefore seeks to follow the path of those interpretive choices,
checking wherever possible their assumptions and revealing their consequences
both for the interpretation of specific features of Pythagoreanism and also for the
very construction of Pythagoreanism as a category.
The First Chapter is therefore dedicated to an understanding of the guide-
lines that set the general framework of the modern history of the criticism of Py-
thagoreanism especially during the last two centuries. The image that will result
from it is one of an intricate series of controversies and rebuttals, alternating be-
tween skepticism and trust in the sources. (This alternation is characteristic of
the critical adopted during this period to the entire ancient philosophical tradi-
tion). The fundamental difficulty of studying Pythagoreanism, which emerges in
examining the history of interpretation, will show the importance of adopting a
careful methodology. A successful historiographical approach must consciously
allow us to describe the category of Pythagoreanism as constituted by an irredu-
cible diversity.
The Second Chapter intends to solve the above difficulties by exploring the
different modes of the definition of Pythagoreanism as a historiographical cate-
gory. By defining two dimensions, one synchronic and the other diachronic, it is
possible to provide criteria of identification for the Pythagorean community,
which would otherwise be incommensurable and heterogeneous. Even if one re-
mains aware that the hermeneutic puzzle about the traditions of Pythagoreanism
will always remain unfinished, some progress can be made by tracing a path
through the two themes that most decidedly contributed to the historical defini-
tion of the category of Pythagoreanism: metempschsis and mathematics. The
intention of this analysis will be, on the one hand, to examine the possibility
of attributing the origin of the two themes to proto-Pythagoreanism and Pytha-
goreanism in the fifth century BC, and on the other, to signal how these themes
contributed to the categorization of Pythagoreanism in the history of the tradi-
tion.
The Third Chapter, therefore, will examine the traditions about the immortal-
ity of the soul and its transmigration. The analysis will consider pre-Socratic,
Platonic and Aristotelian evidence as well as other types of ancient sources, in-
cluding Herodotus, the Orphic literature, recent archaeological evidence and the
tradition of tales recounting voyages into the afterlife. The Pythagorean tradition
will be found to lie in an intermediate position between the Orphic views of im-
mortality and the reworking of these views by philosophers of the fifth and
fourth centuries BC, particularly Plato. The most solid evidence for the existence
Introduction 5
of a proto-Pythagorean theory of the immortality of the soul will be found in Ar-
istotles reference to Pythagorean myths.
The Fourth Chapter begins by showing that mathematics and an interest in
numbers have been commonly assigned as fundamental characteristics of Pytha-
gorean philosophy, and submit such traditions to a historiographical review. As
in the third chapter, the analysis of Aristotles testimony will be crucial. His at-
tribution to the Pythagoreans of the thesis that all is number will be recog-
nized as simultaneously the source of mathematics for the ancient Pythagoreans
as well as a testimony to the extensive, and apparently decisive, Academic re-
working of Pythagorean doctrines. However, Aristotle will demonstrate some in-
dependence of the Pythagoreans from the Academics, mainly due to his access to
the independent pre-Socratic sources of the cryptically-named so-called Pytha-
goreans. I will show that these sources correspond mainly to Philolaus frag-
ments. The Philolaic question will be addressed by the comparative analysis
of a famous page of the Metaphysics A, a few pages of the Philebus, and surviv-
ing fragments of Philolaus own book. This analysis will both confirm the possi-
bility of attributing a numerical theory, if not to proto-Pythagoreanism, at least to
the Pythagoreanism of the fifth century BC, and will also illustrate the influence
of the nearly ubiquitous Academic mediation on the categorization of Pythagor-
ean philosophy.
6 Introduction
1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
In the labyrinthine confusion of the tradition of the Pythagorean wisdom and society that
largely has been transmitted by later and naive writers and compilers, like hidden by a sa-
cred darkness, the fragments of Philolaus were always a sparkling point to me.
Thus begins Boeckh in 1819, the work that marks the prehistory of modern criti-
cism of Pythagoreanism. A highly significant incipit, especially when considered
in the perspective of the following two centuries of interpretation that trace the
winding route of the history of the modern tradition of Pythagoreanism. It is a
beginning that reveals precisely two major loci of hermeneutic criticism: on
the one hand, the expression labyrinthischen Gewirre unmistakably captures
the common view of the difficulty of assimilating the Pythagorean literature;
on the other hand, the immediate individuation of a lichter Punkt, a shining
point in some part of this literature, often an author or a specific theme, that
illuminates the darkness of the historiographic labyrinth: a thread of Ariadne,
which allows one to get out of the confusion with which the historian of Pytha-
goreanism is traditionally forced to confront.
The perception of that same difficulty is not unique to modern criticism. The
beginning of Iamblichuss Pythagorean Life appeals to the gods, asking for assis-
tance in the difficult task of overcoming two obstacles to the development of his
historical biography: on the one hand, the strangeness and obscurity of the doc-
trines of the symbols, on the other, the number of spurious and perhaps even
intentionally misleading writings about Pythagorean philosophy that were in cir-
culation:
At the beginning of all philosophy, it is the custom of the wise to appeal to a god; this also
goes even more for the philosophy, it seems, that takes precisely the name of the divine
Pythagoras. This philosophy was indeed granted by the gods from the beginning and its
impossible to understand it if not with their help. Moreover, its beauty and its grandeur ex-
ceed human capabilities, so it is impossible to embrace it immediately and with just one
view. Therefore, only if a benign god guide us it will be possible to approach it slowly
and gradually to take over some part of it. For all these reasons, after having invoked
the gods as our guides and committed ourselves and our discourse to them, we will follow
them wherever they want to lead us. We should not give importance to the fact that this
school of thought has for some time been abandoned, or the strangeness of the doctrines
7 Boeckh 1819: 3, orig.: In dem labyrinthischen Gewirre der berlieferungen ber die Py-
thagorische Weisheit und Pythagorische Gesellschaft, welche grossentheils durch spte und
urtheilslose Schriftsteller und Zusammentrger wie in heiliges Dunkel gehllt zu uns herber-
gekommen sind, haben des Philolaos Bruchstcke sich mir immer als ein lichter Punkt darge-
stellt.
and obscurity of the symbols in which it is involved, nor the many false and apocryphal
writings that cast shadows upon it, nor the many difficulties that make access to it so hard.
A sense of panic always seems to follow the historians encounter with labyrin-
thine Pythagorean doctrine. Always accompanying it is an immediate attempt to
escape from the maze, to find order in chaos, to settle on a reference point which
allows for the historiographical discourse to achieve some hermeneutic stability.
The two centuries that have followed the inaugural work of Boeckh on Phi-
lolaus constitute the main object of the following pages.
My intention is to mon-
itor the course not always calm and reasonable of criticism, knowing in ad-
vance that this history will bring every fact and every witness into the discus-
sion, except perhaps the question of the very existence of the so-called Pytha-
goreans: In the scholarly controversy that followed scarcely a single fact re-
mained undisputed, save that in Platos day and then later, in the first century
B.C., there were Pythagreioi.
Zeller faces the problem without stalling, immediately wondering about the very
possibility of a philosophical Pythagorean system: one could raise the question
whether it is appropriate to speak of a Pythagorean system in general as a scien-
tific and historical complex.
Zeller thus concludes that the alleged Pythagorean doctrine that is not received
through the oldest testimonies is Neopythagorean.
Given Zellers methodology, the most relevant material for the history of Py-
thagoreanism are the testimonia that make it resemble pre-Socratic systems and
treats it as pursuing natural philosophy:
The object of Pythagorean science, based on what has been said so far, ends up being the
same as what was studied by every other system of pre-Socratic philosophy, that is, the nat-
ural phenomena and their principles.
Based on these thematic criteria, Zeller circularly argues that the Aristotelian and
Philolaic testimonia are most valid for a history of the earliest phase of Pythagor-
eanism. Excluding parti pris the mythical doctrines attributed to Pythagorean-
14 Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 299, orig.: Cos dunque la tradizione riguardante il Pitagorismo ed
il suo fondatore ci sa dire tanto di pi quanto pi si trovi lontana nel tempo dai relativi fatti
storici, e per contro essa nella stessa proporzione tanto pi taciturna a misura che ci avvici-
niamo cronologicamente al suo oggetto medesimo.
15 Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 300, orig.: la pretesa dottrina pitagorica, che non conosciuta dai
testimoni pi antichi, neopitagorica.
16 See extensive discussion at footnote 2 on p. 304. On that note, however (p. 307), Zeller stands
apart from Boeckh regarding the authenticity of the fragment on the soul-world (44 B 21 DK), for
considering it strange to Philolaus a theory of the soul divided into several parts, such as that
expressed in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Burkert 1972: 242243 and Huffman 1993: 343
will concur with him, afterwards. See Cornelli 2002 for a more extensive discussion of the
Zellerian theory of the expanding of the tradition.
17 Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 585, orig.: Loggetto della scienza pitagorica, in base a tutto ci
che si detto fin qui, risulta quel medesimo di cui si occupavano tutti gli altri sistemi della
filosofia presocratica, vale a dire i fenomeni naturali e i loro principi.
10 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
ism, Zeller cannot but declare his wholehearted agreement with Aristotles judg-
ment on the Pythagoreans:
There cannot be taken into account here the mythical doctrines of the transmigration of the
souls and the vision of life founded on this: these are religious dogmas, which, moreover,
were not exclusive to the Pythagorean school, and not scientific propositions. For what con-
cerns the Pythagorean philosophy, I can only agree with the opinion of Aristotle that it was
devoted entirely to natural research.
More specifically, if one cannot verify precisely how much of fifth century BC Py-
thagoreanism (Philolaus, Archytas) can be referred to Pythagoras himself, Zeller
suggests that the main doctrines must nevertheless derive directly from him: in
primis, the doctrine that all is number, which is the most general distinctive
characteristic of Pythagorean philosophy and which can be summarized in the
statement that number is the essence of all things, that is, everything in its es-
sence, is a number.
There fits into this same project the insistence on the deep relationship
of Magna Graecia with what Zeller calls the Dorian strain of character, which
was manifested by the institutions of the Doric Achaean cities that were the
stages for Pythagoras activities.
The privilege granted by Zeller to the Aristotelian lectio of the Pythagoreans be-
came a predominant historiographical trpos ever since, on definining Pythagor-
ean philosophy through the thesis that all is a number.
28 Centrone 1999: 426, orig.: Si ha limpressione che, per felice coincidenza, limmagine di
Pitagora ricostruita da Zhmud, depurata il pi possibile dalle componenti religiose e restituita a
dignit filosofico-scientifica, sia anche quella che egli predilige.
29 At least until the studies of Zhmud 1989: 272ff., 1997: 261 ff., as will be seen in more detail in
chapter four.
30 Nietzsche 1994: 3940.
31 Bechtle 2003 titles, for an unprecedented handbook job, his chapter on Pythagoras with the
question Pitgoras Philosophus?.
1.1 Zeller: the skepticism of the beginnings 13
1.2 Diels: a Zellerian collection
Diels organizes his selection of fragments and testimonies on the Vorsokratiker
on the Aristotelian-Zellerian premise that Pythagoreans must speak of numbers
(Diels 1903; Diels-Kranz 1951):
It was just this criterion which H. Diels used for selecting representatives of the Pythagor-
ean school in his edition of the fragments of the presocratics. The main source (but not the
only one) he had relied on was the well-known catalogue of Pythagoreans found in Iambli-
chus (Vit. Pyth. 267). Diels believed that this catalogue went back to the Peripatetic Aristox-
enus.
De Vogel 1964: 9 rightly shows that Diels collects from the later tradition
about Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans only certain types of material: (a)
what is directly related to Aristoxenus and his Pythagorikai apophseis (D), (b)
the akosmata and smbola (C), (c) the Aristotelian and Peripatetic school testi-
monies (B) and (d) some limited reference to the Pythagoreans of the Attic Mid-
dle Comedy (E). In so doing, Diels excludes virtually every reference to Pythago-
ras political activities. Even the revision of the collection made by Kranz 1951 for
the sixth edition of that work maintains Diels initial consideration: Kranz (DK
14 A 8a) decides indeed to insert, in the chapter on Pythagoras, Porphyrys tes-
32 Zhmud 1989: 273.
33 Diels 1903: 22, orig.: Da es keine Schriften des Pythagoras gab und berhaupt vor Philolaos
Zeit nur mndliche Tradition der eigentlichen Schule bestand, so gibt es hier keine Doxographie.
[] Die Zeugnisse des Xenophanes [11 B7], Heraklit [12 B40.129(?)], Empedokles [21 B129], Ion [25
B4(?)] ber P. s. bei diesen! In the VI revised edition, 1951, Kranz will qualify as entscheidend
und wichtig, important and decisive, die Zeugnisse of other pre-Socratics above mentioned. It
should also be noted that contrary to the assertions in the introductory note above Diels
ends up at the end arbitrarily inserting two doxographic testimonies (A 20 and 21) about the
discovery of the identity of the stars Espero and Lucifero and about calling t hlon as
ksmos. See for this Burkert 1972: 77, 307.
34 For an exhaustive review of the development process of the collection, see Calogero 1941.
14 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
timony (VP: 1819) about the Pythagoras political discourses at Croton. Howev-
er, De Vogel 1964: 9 notes, he hardly took it seriously, as demonstrated by his
decision to exclude the political speeches in Iamblichus (VP: 3757) and the
parallel ones of Pompeius Trogus. The few witnesses to politics that Diels-
Kranz collect 14 A13 on the marriage of Pythagoras, 14 A16 on the crisis of
the Pythagorean community (Iambl. VP: 248257) are included in the
Leben section. On the other hand, Kranz did not change anything in the chapter
on the Pythagoreische Schule (58). The material he cites on Pythagorass life is
carefully kept quite apart from the discussion of his philosophy, suggesting a lec-
tio that wants to separate the contents of this political material from the authen-
tic Pythagorean philosophy.
Among them,
we surely should first consider Delatte, who first in his work on Pythagorean lit-
erature (1915), and later in his work on Diogenes Laertius Life of Pythagoras
(1922b), was inspired by Rohdes methodology to collect the diverse sources of
these works in a broad chronological and interdisciplinary spectrum. Von Fritzs
work (1940) on Pythagorean politics relies on the same methodological approach
by seeking to identify materials that were recognizable in Aristoxenus, Timaeus
and Dicaearchus.
Therefore, there began to appear in modern critical literature authors names
almost as old as Aristoles as benchmarks for studies of the birth of Pythagorean-
ism. It should be noted, in this sense, that the Doxographi Graeci, by Diels 1879,
already indicated Theophrastus as the ultimate source of extensive, traditional
doxographic material. Thus, we will give a central role from here onwards to
37 Rohde 1872: 48, orig.: Hier zeigt Jamblich eine bei einem so elenden Stoppler schon be-
merkenswerthe Selbstndigkeit, indem er meist aus Brocken seiner Lektre ein buntes Allerlei
herstellt, an dem wenigstens die unruhige Unordnung der Reihenfolge und die das Einzelne
nothdrftig verknpfenden Betrachtungen sein eigenes Werk sind.
38 It is significant to note that only four years before the publication of Rohdes first article, on
the same Rheinisches Museum fr Philologie, Friedrich Nietzsche had published an article (1868)
dedicated to the same theme of the sources of late biographies, this time in Diogenes Laertius.
Nietzsche identifies the same way Rohde soon will, in authors from the first century BC (Fa-
vorino and Diocles of Magnesia) the sources of scattered biographical information in Diogenes
work. Thus, Rohdes work should be understood, alongside others distinguished colleagues, as
part of a broad effort to validate the later sources through the study of the Geschichte of these
works.
39 See Burkert 1972: 4. For a criticism of the articulation of Rohdes arguments in the two
articles cited, see Norden 1913 and later Philip 1959.
16 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
the reconstruction of Pythagoreanism according to the tradition that Diels calls
the ancient Peripatetic tradition (58 B DK).
1.4 Burnet: the double teaching of acousmatics and
mathematicians
Burnets Early Greek Philosophy (1908) initiated a brilliant tradition of Anglo-
Saxon scholars devoted to studies on the origins of ancient philosophy while re-
maining in debt to Zellers inaugural lectio. In fact, Burnet developed his theory
on the assumptions that Pythagoras religious doctrine was separate from the
subsequent development of the movement, and that the political activities of
the Pythagorean koinonai were unconnected with their scientific concerns.
These assumptions led Burnet to found his own lectio on the celebrated distinc-
tion within the Pythagorean movement between acousmatics and mathemati-
cians. This distinction, common throughout the history of interpretation, cap-
tures the difference between the interest of some in the traditional taboos of ar-
chaic religiosity (the akosmata and smbola) and the dedication of others to the
research into scientific principles, especially mathematical principles. This dis-
tinction is already present in the sources that mention the didaskala dtton
the double teaching of Pythagoras, such as Porphyry, and the distinction be-
tween Pythagreioi and the Pythagorista (the latter are imitators of the former
and correspond to the acousmatics) in Iamblichus (Porph. VP: 37, Iambl. VP:
80).
Instead, it is
exactly through the concept of purification that this connection is affirmed and
understood in its theoretical depth, beyond the concrete historical reality of the
movement.
The turning point of the matter of the sources takes place, in Burnet, with the
mathematician Aristoxenus, who originated the distinction between the schools
most enlightened group and the superstitious and from here on heretical parts
of Pythagoreanism (Burnet 1908). In Burnets own words:
in their time, the merely superstitious part of Pythagoreanism had been dropped, except by
some zealots whom the heads of the Society refused to acknowledge. That is why he rep-
resents Pythagoras himself in so different a light from both the older and the later tradi-
tions; it is because he gives us the view of the more enlightened sect of the Order. Those
who clung faithfully to the old practices were now regarded as heretics, and all manner
of theories were set on foot to account for their existence.
The gap that separates the two Pythagorases, the man of science and the reli-
gious teacher, is the core problem that has challenged historical interpretations
of Pythagoreanism ever since.
When Burnet asserts the need to bridge this gap, to find in Pythagoras the
origin of the two strands, he was in fact assuming their very existence. It is be-
cause there is a distance to be overcome between scientific and religious
thought, both in antiquity and today, that there is a problem. However, the as-
sumption needs to be proven. Thus, in the conclusion to his chapter on Pytha-
goreanism, Burnet admits to having reconstructed Pythagoras by having simply
assigned to him those portions of the Pythagorean system which appear to be the
oldest.
However, the definition of what is the oldest closely matches the en-
tire problem that has to be faced and cannot be succinctly solved with a positi-
vist chronology, as Burnet seems to wish.
Still, we must repeat: Burnets effort to hold together the various traditions
about Pythagoras is crucial to understanding the successive hermeneutical inter-
ventions in Pythagorean literature. From Cornford to Guthrie, these interventions
will slowly draw the path of the composition of the diverse traditions of both the
figure of Pythagoras as well as the immediate development of the movement.
1.5 Cornford and Guthrie: in search of unity between science
and religion
In a two-part article published in Classical Quarterly (in 1922 and 1923), signifi-
cantly titled Mysticism and Science in the Pythagorean Tradition, Cornford ad-
dresses the issue of the correct approach to the relationship between religious
and scientific interests in Pythagoreanism. Cornford avoids reductionism and
the anachronisms of a positivistic methodology, two approaches that Burnet ap-
parently could not avoid. The two articles closely follow the historiographic per-
46 Burnet 1908: 107108.
47 Burnet 1908: 123.
1.5 Cornford and Guthrie: in search of unity between science and religion 19
spective of Cornfords other work. In his first work on the complex relationships
between myth and history in Thucydides, Thucydides Mythistoricus (1907), Corn-
fords goal was to depart from the trends of modern history, which mostly fall
victim to the typical modernist fallacy by projecting Darwinian biology and
contemporary physics into the work of the Athenian historian.
With this theoretical background, Cornford faces the vexata quaestio of the
presence in the sixth and fifth centuries BC of two different and radically op-
posed systems of thought elaborated within the Pythagorean School. They may
be called respectively the mystical system and the scientific.
While the
other hermeneutic attempts of his time attempted to unite the two systems
into a coherent picture of the movement, Cornford recognizes that the two sys-
tems themselves are not clearly delineated. This confusion is already perceptible
in Aristotles works and needed to be unraveled. The solution proposed by Corn-
ford is to distinguish within Pythagoreanism two different and successive histor-
ical moments, whose turning point in the early fifth century BC was the Ele-
atic attack on the possibility of deriving the multiplicity of reality from a single
arch. Cornford summarizes his view as follows:
We can, in a word, distinguish between (1) the original sixth-century system of Pythagoras,
criticized by Parmenides the mystical system, and (2) the fifth-century pluralism con-
structed to meet Parmenides objections, and criticized in turn by Zeno the scientific sys-
tem, which may be called Number-atomism.
The most significant point here is the subtle shift in perspective that Cornford
represents: identifying the challenge of Eleaticism as the source of the distinc-
48 For a broader analysis of this work, as well as Cornfords historiographical position, see
Murari 2002.
49 Cornford 1922: 137.
50 Cornford 1922: 137.
51 Cornford 1922: 137.
20 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
tion between the two sides of Pythagoreanism eliminates the need for Burnets
postulate that religiousness preceded science. Indeed, when describing the mys-
tical side of the movement, Cornford says that it is not openly inconsistent
with philosophy:
Any attempt to reconstruct the original founder of the system must, I would urge, be based
on the presupposition that his philosophy and cosmology were not openly inconsistent
with his religion.
Therefore, Cornford argues unlike the first Ionian phase of philosophy, in which
the religious element was superseded by an evolving science, in this second Ital-
ian moment the religious dimension of philosophical life is recovered and inte-
grated with science:
It is obvious that the Italian tradition in philosophy differs radically from the Ionian in re-
spect of its relation to religious belief. Unlike the Ionian, it begins, not with the elimination
of factors that had once had a religious significance, but actually with a re-construction of
the religious life. To Pythagoras, as all admit, the love of wisdom, philosophy, was a way of
life. Pythagoras was both a great religious reformer, the prophet of a society united by rev-
erence for his memory and the observance of a monastic rule, and also a man of command-
ing intellectual powers, eminent among the founders of mathematical science.
This is exactly the reading suggested by Guthrie 1962, the last great scholar
belonging to the English tradition originating in Burnet. Guthrie refers directly to
Cornfords cited studies (1922; 1923) and then to his disciple Raven 1948, to illus-
trate what he calls an a priori method of the pre-Socratic history of philosophy.
The method mainly consists putting aside the direct or indirect testimonies and
trying to imagine what such philosophers would likely or not have said, given
the historical circumstances in which they stood. Guthrie points out that such
a methodology requires presupposing a grasp of some theoretical concepts in
Greek philosophy:
It starts from the assumption that we possess a certain general familiarity with other con-
temporary schools and individual philosophers, and with the climate of thought in which
the Pythagoreans worked. This general knowledge of the evolution of Greek philosophy
gives one, it is claimed, the right to make judgments of the sort that the Pythagoreans,
let us say, before the time of Parmenides are likely to have held doctrine A, and that it
is impossible for them at that stage of thought to have already evolved doctrine B.
These assumptions lead to the postulation of two schools of philosophy: the Ion-
ian and the Italian.
55 Raven 1948: 6. It is important to note that Cherniss 1977, by supporting Ravens effort,
attempts to controversially diminish the impact of the division suggested by Cornford on the
scholars outside of Cambridge: Raven was justified in feeling that the evidence does not
support Cornfords interpretation, which incidentally has never been so widely accepted outside
of Cambridge as he appears to believe (Cherniss 1977: 376).
56 Guthrie 1962: 172.
57 It is even the case of noting that this division goes back to the classic division between Ionic
and Italic philosophy in Diogenes Laertius (D. L. Vitae I. 13). The , the two beginnings
of philosophy, are identified by Diogenes Laertius, on the one hand in Anaximander as for the
Ionian strand, from which Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus will be part, and finally, So-
crates; on the other hand, in Pythagoras, the inventor of the term , for the Italic
strand, followed by his son Telauge, then Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Leucippus, Demo-
critus up to Epicurus (D. L. Vitae I. 1314). For a more detailed discussion of the historiogra-
phical models of the origins of ancient philosophy, see Sassi 1994.
58 For a vehement critique of this methodological apriorism within the studies on Py-
thagoreanism, see Kahn 1974: 163 n6.
22 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
In discussing this methodological approach, whose stated intention is to un-
derstand pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism under penalty of failing to understanding
Plato, Guthrie states the unity of Pythagoreanism:
This pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism can to a large extent be regarded as a unit. We shall note
developments and differences as and when we can, but it would be unwise to hope that
these, in the fragmentary state of our knowledge, are sufficiently distinguishable chrono-
logically to allow the separate treatment of earlier and later phases.
Guthrie thus agrees with Cornford that a distinction should be defined within
pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism, solely in chronological terms. This preserves
some kind of theoretic-doctrinal unity of the movement, at least within its vari-
ous historical phases.
Scholars influenced by the great histories of philosophy of the twentieth cen-
tury were concerned to understand that same unity and seek to account for Py-
thagorean philosophy as a whole. At the same time, critical studies dedicated to
the study of particular areas and specific problems of the Quellenforschung of Py-
thagoreanism began to emerge notibly studies on Pythagorean politics, on the
relations between Pythagoreanism and Plato and on the relations between the
Pythagoreans and the religious world around them. Unfortunately, one has to
say that after the Second World War, these two types of literature rarely show
awareness of one another: handbooks on the history of philosophy continue
still generally follow the Zellerian line, while monographs on Pythagoreanism re-
veal complexities unknown to the former.
1.6 From Delatte to De Vogel: Pythagoreanism and politics
Special attention has been dedicated to the political dimension of Pythagorean-
ism ever since Krisches 1830 monograph asserted, peremptorily, that the mark of
Pythagorean societas was eminently political: The scope of the Society was
purely political, not only to initially restore the failed power of the aristocrats,
but to enhance and amplify it.
Ultimately, Von Fritzs position does not differ substantially from that of his pred-
ecessors: the Pythagoreans political commitment should not be treated as phil-
63 Delatte 1922a: 21, orig.: la Socit dsire seulement la paix intrieure, qui lui assure sa
propre tranquillit, et le mantien des instituitions existantes, dont elle est devenue matresse.
64 Delatte 1922a: 18, orig.: On peut donc conclure que la politique tendances aristocratiques
qui, selon Time, caractrise la fin de lhistorie de la Socit, nest pas ne dune impulsion de
Pythagore, et mme que la politique tait, selon toute vraisemblance, trangre son plan de
reformes.
65 Von Fritz 1940: 95.
1.6 From Delatte to De Vogel: Pythagoreanism and politics 25
osophically important, but rather should be attributed to the personal choices,
perhaps religiously motivated, of a few isolated members of the koinna.
It is only Minars 1942 work dedicated to the politics of the early Pythagor-
eans that makes clear the dangers and historiographical presuppositions inher-
ent in separating Pythagorean philosophy from its political effects. In the preface
to this work, he describes the paradox of a philosophical movement simultane-
ously controlling the political sphere in which its work is interpreted:
That the Pythagorean Society exercised a political influence in the cities of southern Italy in
the sixth and the fifth centuries B.C. has long been a recognized fact. But the paradox of a
philosophical school being involved in political activity has brought a certain amount of
difficulty into the historical evaluation of the facts.
Minar acknowledges that several ancient authors explicitly claim that the Pytha-
goreans (and even Pythagoras himself) formally exercised government control in
Croton and other cities (Minar 1942: 16): Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry, Iambli-
chus, and Cicero, among others.
In several Ciceronian pages, the Pythagoreans, defined as our near fellow citi-
zens, they who were then called Italic philosophers (Cato Maior XXI. 78), be-
came a central chapter in the glorious history of Rome (Tusc. Disput. IV).
A fa-
mous passage of Ovids Metamorphoses (XV. 1447), as well as one from Plu-
tarchs Life of Numa (I. 8 and 11), reaffirm the connection between Numa and Py-
thagoras, consolidating, the earlier tradition of Pythagoras Romanness and Ital-
ianness.
Two Italian intellectual figures of the first order engaged with Pythagorean-
ism during this period: Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. Ficino attempt-
ed to situate Florence, city of the Medici, in Western intellectual history as the
successor to Athens and Rome and to position himself as continuing the Acad-
emy, undertakes the project of translating the Platonic corpus through the influ-
ence of Neopythagorean exegesis. In his introduction to the translation of Ploti-
nus, Ficino had previously summarized the place of Pythagoras in history:
The sacred philosophy was born under Zoroaster among the Persians, under Mercury
among the Egyptians, both in the one place and in the other consistent and coherent
with itself; then it grew among the Thracians under Orpheus and Aglaophemus, matured
among the Greeks and the Italians under Pythagoras, and became an adult in Athens,
under the divine Plato.
75 Augustine, Retr., PL 32: col. 589, orig.: me credidisse nullos errores in Pythagorica esse
doctrina, cum sint plures, iidemque capitales.
76 See, for these authors, the following pages: Tertullian, De Anima, PL 2: col. 697701; Lac-
tantius, Div. Inst., PL 6, col. 4059 and De vita beata, PL 6: col. 777; Augustine, Against Acad., PL
32: col. 954; Ambrosius, In salm., PL 15: col. 1275.
77 Cusano 1972: 68, orig.: Questa quella unit trina che Pitagora, primo tra tutti i filosofi,
gloria dItalia and di Grecia, ci ha insegnato ad adorare.
78 Ficino 1576: 1537, orig.: Divina providentia volente videlicet omnes pro singulorum ingenio,
ad se mirabiliter revocare, factum est, ut pia quaedam philosophia quodam et apud Persas sub
Zoroastre, et apud Aegyptios sub Mercurio nasceretur, utrobique; sibimet consonas: nutriretur
deinde apud Thrace sub Orpheo atque Aglaophemo: adolesceret quoque mox sub Pythagora
apud Graecos et: in Italos tandem vero a Divo Platone consumaretur Athenis.
1.6 From Delatte to De Vogel: Pythagoreanism and politics 29
In another work, Pythagoras again appears in a genealogy of ancient philosophy,
or rather of prisca theologia, from Hermes Trismegistus to Plato:
[Hermes] was succeeded by Orpheus, to whom have been attributed the following parts of
the ancient theology; later, Aglaophemus, who had been initiated into the sacred rites by
Orpheus, was succeeded in theology by Pythagoras, of whom Philolaus was a disciple,
the same who was Platos preceptor. Therefore, a single sect of ancient philosophy, every-
where coherent with itself, was established by six theologians, in a wonderful order, which
is inaugurated by Mercury and is fully accomplished with the divine Plato.
Thus, the scholium suggests that the Pythagorean speeches are genuine, and
confirms the politico-rhetorical vocation of Pythagoreanism. There is a parallel
between Pythagoreanism and the highly pragmatic model of the relationship be-
tween politics and philosophy that was adopted by the first sophists.
Likewise, the work of Zeno (as well as that of Xenophanes previously) was ad-
dressed directly against the Pythagorean theory of numbers, because he drew
brand new consequences, and those about the unity, the continuity, the motion-
lessness of the universe particularly contradict the doctrines of the Pythagor-
eans.
89 Tannery 1887b: 226, orig.: Jai dj dit que le dbut de Parmnide sur lopinion (v. 113121)
nous jette en plein pythagorisme. Le dernier vers surtout me parait digne dattention. Parmnide
veut faire connatre la science telle que la professaient ses contemporains; mais, en Italie, seuls
les pythagoriens avaient une rputation de science. Tant que nous naurons pas de preuve
dcisive que llate se proccupe des Ioniens, nous avons droit de penser quil ne vise que les
Italiques.
90 Tannery 1887b: 250, orig.: il tirait des consquences toutes nouvelles, et notamment celles
sur lunit, la continuit, limmobilit de lunivers contre-disaient les doctrines pythagoriennes.
91 Tannery 1887b: 250 (authors emphasis), orig.: Quel tait donc le point faible reconnu par
Zenon dans les doctrines pythagoriennes de son temps? De quelle faon le prsente-t-il comme
tant une affirmation de la pluralit des choses? La clef nous est donne par une clbre
dfinition du point mathmatique, dfinition encore classique au temps dAristote, mais que les
historiens nont ps considre assez attentivement. Pour les pythagoriens, le point est lunit
34 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
This Pythagorean position came to be known as numerical atomism and shares
several similarities with the atomism of the fifth and fourth centuries BC.
According to Tannery 1887b: 251, Zenos success must have been overwhelm-
ing, to the point that the Pythagoreans could not even sketch any attempt at a
refutation.
Although it is quite likely that many thinkers in Magna Graecia operated under
strong Pythagorean influence, a solid historical approach cannot be based on
possibility and plausibility, because only meticulous study of the internal and
external evidence can raise this possibility to a probability to say nothing of
certainty.
ayant une position, ou autrement lunit considre dans lespace. Il suit immdiatement de
cette dfinition que le corps gomtrique est une pluralit, somme de points, de mme que le
nombre est une pluralit, somme dunits. Or, une telle proposition est absolument fausse [].
92 For a more general discussion of the relationship of Pythagoreanism with Democritus and
atomism, see Mondolfo and Zeller 1938: 332335, Alfieri 1953: 3054; Gemelli 2007a: 6890.
93 Both Cherniss 1935: 215 and Lee 1936: 34.104 follow the main lines of Tannerys interpretation
of the Zenonian controversy.
94 Burkert 1972: 278.
95 Burkert 1972: 280. See Casertano 2007b: 4 for an example of a discussion of Pythagorean
influence on Parmenides.
96 See Diels-Kranz 1951: 226; Zeller and Mondolfo [1938: 326 in the note on Mondolfos sources
because Zeller, as well as Gomperz 1893, did not agree with this]; Burnet 1908: 183; Rey 1933: 183;
1.7 Aristotles unique testimony and the uncertain Academic tradition 35
Much of this history of criticism operates under the aforementioned assump-
tion that Aristotles unique testimony is valid. The works of Cherniss 1935 and
1944 played a central role in reassessing the validity of Aristotles (as well as Pla-
tos) testimony about the pre-Socratic philosophers. By painstaking analysis of
the sources (that has yet to be surpassed, in this authors view), Cherniss had
already come to the following conclusion in 1935:
Aristotle is not, in any of the works we have, attempting to give a historical account of ear-
lier philosophy. He is using these theories as interlocutors in the artificial debates which he
sets up to lead inevitably to his own solutions.
Limits of space do not permit going further into the issue of the val-
idity of the Aristotelian testimony, although such an examination would be
worthwhile, given its consequences for the historiography of the origin of philos-
ophy.
In this connection a recent article by Collobert 2002 deserves mention. Col-
lobert challenges Cherniss approach, by revealing how in his historiography of
the pre-Socratics Aristotle was following ante litteram the principles of an ana-
lytic (that is, non-continental) lectio. Therefore, to the question whether Aristotle
should be considered a historian of philosophy, she continues to answer no. Be-
cause
Aristotle did not write a history of philosophy in the modern sense or at least in a conti-
nental sense when he transmitted the thoughts of his predecessors. For this reason, one
can say with U. Wilamowitz that one does not have to blame the historian Aristotle, be-
cause Aristotle never was nor wanted to be a historian.
98 Cherniss 1935: 349 does not fail to note the dependence of Aristotles aporetic and agonistic
method of their masters: Socrates indirectly, but, above all, Plato.
99 Reale 1968: I, 151, orig.: il moderno concetto di storia della filosofia totalmente estraneo
ad Aristotele. Moreover, Mansfeld rightly argues that the first steps of a historiography of
philosophy are prior to Aristotle himself, and can be found in sophistic literature: the ru-
dimentary beginnings of the historiography of Greek philosophy may be dated to the period of
the Sophists (Mansfeld 1990: 27).
100 Laks 2007: 230, orig.: dsaristotlisation de lcriture des dbuts de la philosophie grec-
ques.
101 Collobert 2002: 294295. One should recognize Colloberts intent of considering the ques-
tion in more current terms (the terms of the analytic-continental querelle). However, much of his
hermeneutic solution is still dependent on the excellent work of Cherniss 1935 as, for example,
1.7 Aristotles unique testimony and the uncertain Academic tradition 37
Indeed, Aristotles Metaphysics seems not only to want to treat Pythagoreans
somewhat separately from the other pre-Socratics (985b 23ff.), but also constant-
ly pits Pythagoreanism against Platonism (Met. 987a 29ff., 989b 29ff., 990a 27ff.,
996a 4f.). Thus, Pythagoreanism serves as another chance to attack Platonic ar-
guments (Met. 1083b 8ff., 1090a 30), rather than a subject of interest per se.
Obviously, the results of this work on the indirect sources are far from non-
controversial. Indeed, Frank 1923, contrary to the aforementioned views, and in
some ways, more skeptical even than Zeller considers any attempt to access the
Pythagorean tradition before Plato to be impossible. His work is significantly ti-
tled Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer, in tribute to his argument on Aristo-
tles repeated reference to the Pythagorean kalomenoi: according to Frank, Ar-
istotle was referring to Pythagoreans of the fourth century BC, such as Archytas,
as well as to the Academics themselves, such as Speusippus (Frank 1923: 77).
the following statement he makes regarding the testimony contained in the Aristotelian corpus
shows: one cannot safely wrench them away to use as building-blocks for a history of Preso-
cratic philosophy. There are no doxographical accounts in the works of Aristotle, because
Aristotle was not a doxographer but a philosopher seeking to construct a complete and final
philosophy (Cherniss 1935: 347). This is still a good ante litteram description of Colloberts
analytical Aristotle.
102 On the Aristotelian lectio of ancient Pythagoreanism, the case will obviously be for him to
go back to it afterwards, writing down their problems and successes. Its enough for now to
remember that, both in Physics and in De caelo, Aristotle dedicates some comments to the
scientific doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and in Metaphysics (986a 12) refers to a more accurate
discussion about these. This reference was to the two famous (lost) books he had specifically
devoted to Pythagoreanism. For the sources of this tradition and a comprehensive historiogra-
phical discussion of these books, see Burkert 1972: 29.
103 Likewise, Camerons doctoral thesis (1938) suggests a Pythagorean basis for the theory of
the anmnesis.
38 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
Franks general assumption is that one cannot imagine scientific thought in the
Greek world before Anaxagoras:
Anaxagoras was the first to formulate the principle of modern science in distinguishing, in
his optical investigations, the immediate subjective-psychological image-of-the-world from
the objective point of view of an ideal absolute observer.
However, in the foreword to the English edition, ten years later, Burkert had to
acknowledge that in his own words I have learned in these years []
about the question of the Discovery of the irrational, I have taken a stand
which is less critical of the tradition.
1996, Salas 1996 and Casertano 2009. See below, on chapter four, for a development of this
issue.
109 There was no shortage of critical reviews of Burkerts skeptical stance on the sources of the
contributions of Pythagoreans to mathematics. Many of them will be cited in the following
chapters, as they constitute a key obstacle to any interpretation of Pythagoreanism after 1972.
Just for now, let us remember the clever criticism that Von Fritz makes of it in his review of
Weisheit: It is not very good method to deny categorically the occurrence of an event the details
of which are reported in a somewhat contradictory manner. If this methodical principle is strictly
and consistently applied, it becomes possible to prove that no automobile accident ever hap-
pened (Von Fritz 1964: 461).
110 Burkert 1972: 466.
111 The adage is conveyed by Eusebius of Caesarea: (Euseb. Prep.
Evang. 1903: 15, 37, 6).
1.8 From Burkert to Kingsley 41
thus the difficulty in admitting a significant contribution of Pythagoreanism to
the progress of the mathematics of the fifth century BC. Against this pars des-
truens of source criticism, Burkert develops a hermeneutics which admirably
links religious anthropological studies with a solid philological and historio-
graphical approach and leads to the unprecedented rescue of the historical Py-
thagoras and proto-Pythagoreanism in its whole primitive, pre-rationalistic real-
ity: Pythagoras must have been both a magician and a shaman (though a scien-
tist, at least in his own way), basing his scientism on an effort to take what Bur-
kert calls a step beyond. This step beyond, which distinguishes Pythagoras in-
side the primitive magic-thaumaturgical world, can be detected by the presence
of notions like kthrsis and anmnsis within the oldest testimonies (Burkert
1972: 211).
In the seesaw between trust and distrust in the sources which engages every
philologist (The very life of philology is the struggle between the tendencies to-
ward faith in the tradition and skepticism of it
On another front, Minar complains that Burkert fails to give any treatment of
the social and political aspects of Pythagoreanism (Minar 1964: 121). As our dis-
cussion above suggests, these issues were previously important issues in the in-
terpretation of Pythagoras, and so should play an important role in any recon-
struction of his philosophy.
However, its the very gap that Burkert is able to establish with some preci-
sion between the traditions of proto-Pythagoreanism and of those Pythagoreans
in touch with the Academy (especially Archytas) that, allows the study of proto-
Pythagoreanism to develop as a relatively independent field from its successive
re-appropriations by literature.
Detienne initiates the exploration of Pythagoreanism as originating in mys-
tical-religious concerns. His entire historical agenda, which seriously engages
with Pythagoreanism several times, is characterized by an anthropological and
comparative approach to the ancient world.
that Pythagoras was initially trained through homeric poems. Pythagoras had been a disciple of
Hermodamante, who belonged to a traditional family of Homeric rhapsodes, the Creophiles. This
allows Detienne to state that Samos would be the place of the first meeting between poetry and
philosophy. For a criticism of this assumption and Detiennes subsequent argument, see Feld-
man 1963: 16 and Pollard 1964: 188.
118 The work was preceded by at least two articles in which the author inaugurated the research
and defined its fundamental lines (Detienne 1959a and 1959b). For a criticism of Detiennes
reading, see Kerferd 1965, which looks at how the concept of damon is, in all probability, a
Platonic assignment to ancient Pythagoreanism (Kerferd 1965: 78), and, thus, does not allow for
the support of the thesis of an original theological conceptualization in a proto-Pythagorean
scope. Vidal-Naquet 1964 gives him a warmer reception, although complaining of a certain
audacity as regards the use of sources.
119 Detienne 1970: 162, orig.: Le systme des nourritures form par les principales alimentaires
des Pythagoriciens apparat donc comme un langage a travers lequel ce groupe social traduit ses
orientations et rvle ses contradictions.
120 Detienne 1970: 152, orig.: Dun sacrifice lautre, non seulement les offrandes changent de
nature, mais le mode de relation avec les dieux sinverse. Le renversement se marque en par-
44 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
Major historians and archaeologists of ancient religion leave behind Detiennes
theologizing interpretations in their investigations into Pythagoreanism. Among
them Cumont 1942a and 1942b and Carcopino 1927 and 1956 engage in the recep-
tion of the Pythagorean tradition by Roman funerary symbolism; several articles
by Festugire, many of them ultimately collected in tudes de religion grecque
and hellenistique (1972), as well as two important works by Lvy 1926 and
1927, consider the legend of Pythagoras. They all acknowledge, in the reception
of Pythagorean motifs within the expressions of orientalizing Hellenistic religios-
ity, a continuity between the religious orientation of early and late Pythagorean-
ism. This suggests the metaphor of a sort of underground river of religious tradi-
tions attributed to Pythagoreanism flowing over the course of a thousand years
(Burkert 1972: 6).
Of particular rele-
ticulier dans le statut religieux des crales. Dans le sacrifice olympien, les grains dorge et de
bl (entiers) (oulochutai), que les sacrifiants rpandent sur les victimes animales, reprsentent la
nourriture spcifiquement humaine, rserve aux mortels qui cultivent la terre et mangent le
pain. Likewise, that is, underlining the theological rationalization process, Detienne provides
an interpretation ofthe Pythagorean dietary restriction on the use of a special type of lettuce,
which they called eunuch. This was especially suitable for the summer period, because their
properties decreased sexual desire, considered harmful to health in that season, due to the
impairment caused by strong heat. A use for ethical and theological ends of myths relating to the
gardens of Adonis is evident here.
121 Of great historical interest, and an unmistakable sign of erudition and wide range of res-
earch to which Levy was dedicated, is a posthumous collection of his Recherches et essniennes
pythagoriciennes (1965): a series of essays in which the author dedicates himself to uncover
possible non-Jewish influences, and especially Pythagorean ones in the Jewish religious mo-
vement of the Essenes, which is thought to be the depository of the famous library of Qumran
near the Dead Sea.
122 See the first official edition of the papyrus, Kouremenos, Parassoglou and Tsantsanoglou
(The Derveni Papyrus, 2006). For a more detailed study of the papyrus, see the minutes of a
symposium held at Princeton (Laks and Most 1997). A group of scholars led by Pierris and
Obbink, with the help of the modern technology of infrared multispectral imaging, in collabo-
1.8 From Burkert to Kingsley 45
vance for its sobriety and philological attention is the study devoted to the rela-
tions between Orphism and Pythagoreanism by Bernab 2004, as well as the lat-
est observations on the subject found in Bernab and Casadesus 2009.
The modern revival in Orphic studies reveals the deep relationship between
Orphism, Dionysiac religion and Pythagoreanism. The interpretations of these re-
lationships are anything but consistent. Pugliese Carratelli proposes a resolution
to this problem, identifying a particular character given to genuine Orphism by
an intimate connection of this with the Pythagorean school.
Based substan-
tially on an original analysis of the Orphic gold leaves, Pugliese Carratellis thesis
is that the theoretical mixture between the two movements can be attributed to a
reform of Orphism by the Pythagoreans, which probably lasted well into sixth
and fifth century. This explains the appearance of a new philosophy of immor-
tality, radically different from the world view found in the gold leaves with their
formulas for ritual practices and invocations to the chthonic deities (including
Persephone, Dionysus Zagreus and Hades) and viatica to face the terrible trials
through which the initiate must pass (part of this group are the plates of Thurii,
Pelinna, Eleutherna, Pherai). A second group of leaves, a result of this Pythagor-
ean reform, emphasizes instead ethical and spiritual commitment to understand,
with the help of Mnemosyne, the cosmic and human living principles. This new
concept of immortality is rooted in the exercise of memory and the wisdom that
derives from it. The proof of this lies not just in the scientific dimension of mem-
ory, but also in the fact that mnm is one of the key components of the Pytha-
gorean way of life: tradition is unanimous in remembering that members of the
Pythagorean koinna were instructed to devote a specific time of day (morning
or evening) to anmnsis, to recollectio, of all events of the previous day (Iambl.
VP: 165). One likely consequence of the overlapping of the two movements is the
fact that both Herodotus and Plato show a strong tendency to confuse them. This
is a sign of the difficulty those authors had in distinguishing them.
That is, the final stage of this continuity can be reached without going through
Plato and Aristotle.
In a frank unritualized
way, Kingsley himself thus presents the goal of his monograph on Parmenides
and dark places of wisdom as follows: And what is it that we long for?
Thats what this story is about.
Kingsley does not make a point of hiding his satisfaction in his writing
127 Kingsley 1995: 339.
128 For a fuller review of this issue, see Cornelli 2002 and 2003a.
129 Gemelli 2006: 670671, orig.: una messa in discussione non solo dei criteri interpretativi
comunemente adottati per affrontare questi testi, dellenorme peso attribuito alla forza tran-
quillizzante della razionalit, della concezione stessa di filosofia come esercizio intellettuale,
ma anche e soprattuto dellthos polpeiron che guida la nostra vita.
130 See in the same line the synthesis that Hadot 1999 makes, although in a familiar Academic
way, of philosophy thought back to its origins primarily as a lifestyle.
131 Kingsley 1999: 4. The reference to the dark places of wisdom is to the title of Kingsleys
1999 work: In the dark places of wisdom.
132 Kingsley 1999: 5.
48 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
style, which corresponds to a historiographical style that flouts the rules of Aca-
demic acceptability.
Obviously, Kingsleys proposal faces difficulties. Some are internal to the au-
thors own argumentative plan in particular the difficulty inherent in pulling
together so many late and differing testimonies into a coherent vision of pre-Soc-
ratic philosophy and Pythagoreanism. One has to agree with Morgan that some-
times he does not tie the pieces together.
1.9 Conclusion
Between hermeneutic circularities and historiographic panics, this brief history
of modern criticism on Pythagoreanism reveals a narrative in which each fact
and each testimony is subjected to scrutiny, creating controversy and mutual ref-
utations. The Zellerian doubt, that Pythagoreanism is merely an intricate fabric
of traditions scarcely deserving a place in a serious history of philosophy, surrep-
titiously follows most of the interpretations of Pythagoreanism. Since Zellers
evolutionary historicism, which directly influenced Dielss collection, through
133 This is certainly the case with his most recent monograph (Kingsley 2010) on Pythagoras,
which aims at bringing dramatic and revolutionary new documentary evidence, in the au-
thors own words. Notably on the connection of Pythagoras with the figure of Abaris, the priest
of Hyperborean Apollo, who arrives in Greece in all probability from the Mongolian plateau as a
god himself, as a purifier, and delivers his magic arrow to Pythagoras. Although, as usual, full of
notes and bibliographical references, Kinsgleys work has a pace and style far removed from a
calm and sober historical-philological argument. It is enough to think about the title: A Story
Waiting to Pierce you: Mongolia, Tibet and the Destiny of the Western World.
134 Morgan 1997: 1130.
135 For all of them, see the dry review of Brien 1998.
136 Both in the most recent monograph devoted to Pythagoras (Riedweg 2002) as in the chapter
on Pythagoras in the Vorsokratiker edition by Tusculum (Gemelli 2007b), Kinsgley begins to
build his hermeneuticsal heritage. It is certainly not a coincidence the fact that both authors are
disciples of Burkert. The pages that follow will also record the contribution of other contem-
porary authors of great hermeneutical distinction. Among them, certainly, Staab, Kahn, Macris,
Centrone, Musti, Giangiulio, Sassi, McKirahan, Laks, Thom, Zhmud, Casadess, Bernab,
OMeara, as well as many others. Their research will certainly soon deserve a new page in
historiography of Pythagoreanism.
1.9 Conclusion 49
Burnets a priori approach, which held that Pythagoreanism was originally only a
religious movement, with the identification of the archaic with the religious el-
ement of the movement, and the recent with the scientific one, the presumed
bridge between the two Pythagoreanisms has become the central problem in
the history of criticism of of Pythagoreanism.
Reactions to the scholars skepticism were quick to appear. Rohde and De-
latte were the first to question the alleged absolute faith in the reliability of
the later sources. Cornford and Guthrie led the way towards a comprehensive ac-
count of Pythagoreanism, despite its diversity. Criticizing the modernist fallacy,
Cornford inverted the anachronistic logic, pointing to Pythagoreanisms mystical
side as its most important legacy, although this mystical side is not openly incon-
sistent with its philosophical side. Guthrie, for his part, proposed an a priori
method, defending the internal coherence of pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism. The
influence of the writing of the great Histories of Philosophy from the twentieth
century has certainly contributed to the development of this search for a unitary
Pythagoreanism. At the same time, however, there emerged works dedicated to
the study of particular areas and problems having to do with the sources; in pri-
mis, the question of the political involvement of the Pythagorean communities.
Many scholars had devoted themselves to this topic, especially in the Italy,
from Roman times, through the Renaissance Quattrocento up to the renewed in-
terest in the issue in contemporary historians.
In contrast, a number of scholars have dedicated themselves to the study of
the indirect sources, both pre-Socratic and Platonic, for ancient Pythagoreanism.
The image of a pre-Socratic dialogue between Pythagoreanism and other
schools, though tempting, seems to lack solid textual basis; nevertheless, the im-
portance of Tannerys thesis about the relations between Eleaticism and Pytha-
goreanism opened an area of research that began to bring criticism from other
sources to question the presumption that Aristotles testimony is uniquely valua-
ble. There remains no consensus on the value of Platos and Aristotles evidence.
More historiographically nave stances, such as Burnets and Taylors, were chal-
lenged by skeptical stances such as Cherniss and Franks. While Burkerts work
seemed to suggest a true third way of criticism, lying between the Zellerian skep-
ticism and an over-reliance on sources, it ends up supporting the view that the
original of Pythagoreanism was a religious movement.
Studies of this religious side of Pythagoreanism by Detienne and Cumont
make a strong mark on the history of criticism. A privileged locus for these stud-
ies is certainly the examination of Pythagoreanisms relationship with Orphism.
Recent archaeological discoveries have prompted a revival of studies on this sub-
ject.
50 1 History of criticism: from Zeller to Kingsley
Finally, a radical hermeneutic reversal, represented by Kingsleys work,
closes this history of modern criticism portrayal. The most important reason
for this is that Kingsley synthesizes three of the most significant hermeneutic
contributions of the twentieth century, that is, skepticism about Aristotles testi-
mony, the inclusion of philosophy in its birth within the religious traditions of its
time, and the influence of Oriental studies on the history of ancient philosophy.
Kingsley offers unique and bold solutions to the sensitive issues of source criti-
cism. Of particular note is a focus on the issue of bos and its implications for a
greater continuity than generally allowed between proto-Pythagoreanism and
Neopythagoreanism.
This brief overview, here summarized through its chief motives and their rep-
resentative authors, results in a contradictory and multifaceted picture of Pytha-
goreanism. From it emerges the central issue for understanding the movement:
that it must be considered as a unique historiographical category, one that sim-
ply does not admit of a single understanding. Instead, one must consciously fol-
low the paths of different interpretations and different strata of the tradition, in
search of a sufficiently pluralistic image of Pythagoreanism, which will give ad-
equate recognition to all the diversity it encompasses.
This is what will be essayed in the following chapters.
1.9 Conclusion 51
2 Pythagoreanism as a historiographical category
2.1 Interpreting interpretations: diachronic and synchronic
dimensions
In the previous chapters portrayal of the history of criticism of Pythagoreanism,
Zeller was shown to have already boldly faced the problem of the historiograph-
ical categorization of Pythagoreanism: could Pythagoreanism constitute a prop-
erly philosophical and scientific system (Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 597)?
The Zellerian doubt, which was shared by many subsequent scholars, intro-
duces the chief problem of how to deal with the variety of experiences and doc-
trines that tradition has gathered under the umbrella of Pythagoreanism.
More precisely, this means inquiring into the content of the historiographical cat-
egory that corresponds to what tradition calls Pythagoreanism.
The discovery of the historical and theoretical scope of this category involves
two key dimensions: the first will be called diachronic, while the second will
be identified as synchronic. Although complementary, each dimension encom-
passes a distinct field of investigation.
An account of the historiographical category of Pythagoreanism in its dia-
chronic dimension requires a study of its construction from Plato and Aristotle up
to the Neoplatonic literature, in search of continuity and even homogeneity in
the tradition.
The starting point of is approach is the recognition that it is impossible to
reconstruct a historical Pythagoras, because information on the origins of Pytha-
goreanism is virtually nonexistent. Rather, one must, in Burkerts words, inter-
pret interpretations:
The first task must be, since the original phenomenon cannot be grasped directly, to inter-
pret interpretations, to single out and identify the different strata of the tradition and to
look for the causes that brought transformation to the picture of Pythagoras.
The scholar if faced by a fork that forces him to make a methodological choice.
Either to understand Pythagoreanism as a multifaceted and complex historio-
graphical category, in which case it is possible to accomodate both the long
course of the history of its tradition and its complex and evolving relations
with the intellectual world of philosophy beginning with the sixth and fifth cen-
turies BC, or alternatively to follow one or more strands of the tradition and re-
ject or downplay the others.
Also to be recognized are the fundamental contributions to the understanding of the rela-
tionship between Platonism and Pythagoreanism which arise from the works of the so-called
Tbingen-Milan school on the doctrine of the principles of Plato and the Old Academy (see
especially, Krmer 1959, Gaiser 1963, Szlezk 1985 and Reale 1991.
139 Burkert 1972: 10.
140 Burkert 1972: 12.
2.1 Interpreting interpretations: diachronic and synchronic dimensions 53
One consequence of the former choice is that the approach must necessarily
be interdisciplinary: the conventional (though debatable) division of labor in
classical studies among historians, archaeologists, philologists and philosophers
does not seem to work very well in the case of Pythagoreanism:
It can happen that the historian of science builds his reconstruction on a philologically in-
adequate foundation; the philologist takes over the seemingly exact result of the historian
of science; the philosopher, on the basis of this criterion, rejects contradictory evidence and
so on.
Zhmuds 1997 monograph advocates an even stronger rejection of the thesis that
Pythagoreanism can be non-circularly identified with a particular doctrine, to
the point that Centrone 1999 admits that Zhmuds thesis has put an end to
this question, making the identification of Pythagoreanism with the adhesion
to a doctrine no longer possible:
One of the central theses of this monograph (Zhmud 1997), that is, the idea by which the
criterion for identifying a Pythagorean would not be the profession of a philosophical doc-
trine, finds here a solid and well argued foundation, and I dont think it can be put under
discussion again.
On the other hand, the history of philosophy, at least since Diogenes Laertius (D.
L. Vitae I. 1315), has become accustomed to using a geographical criterion, to
identify, among other philosophical schools, the Italic or Pythagorean one. How-
ever, even here, the issue is more complex than mere geographical proximity.
After the founder, the rest of the Pythagoreans are frequently identified in
terms of their adherence to a doctrine (as is the case of Empedocles or Eudoxus,
or even Democritus, see D. L. Vitae IX), but more importantly by having a direct
pedagogical relationship, that is, by some kind of intellectual dependence on Py-
thagoras or another famous Pythagorean. In the unique case of Pythagoreanism,
a group of philosophers is for the first time not identified by its doctrinal consis-
tency (physiko), or geographical proximity (Eleatics), but rather by the name of
its founder: Pythagreioi.
Thus, once again, the most reliable criterion, that of bos as transmitted by tra-
dition, goes beyond any distinction based on doctrines. It is therefore appropri-
ate to agree with Centrones conclusion:
Pythagoreanism did not emerge as a philosophical school, and a philosophical doctrine
cannot be that which allows one to identify a Pythagorean. A more reliable criterion
would be to consider Pythagoreans the ones that ancient tradition qualifies as disciples
or successors to Pythagoras. [] this excludes the delimitation of the Pythagorean phenom-
enon to a specific field or to having a monothematic philosophy.
Thus, for all purposes, authors with interests ranging from physiology to botany,
as in Alcmaeons or Menestors case, can be considered Pythagoreans.
However, the possibility of adherence to a particular way of life implies, at
least in its inaugural pre-Socratic times, the actual existence of a community
that is structured around that same way of life. Even later, in the Hellenistic
age, when the definition of bos may become an individual choice, the commun-
ity of the beginning of the doctrine would be held up as a model far off in time,
and worthy of being followed.
The same idea seems to be expressed on the next page of the Republic, when Py-
thagoreans are utilized as part of a contrast between, on the one hand, those
who torture strings and obstruct their ears to thinking by doing empirical musi-
cological research but never make the ascent to problems and, on the other
hand, the methodical research of the Pythagoreans (Plato, Rep. VII: 531a-d).
The similarity between this Archytas fragment and Platos second testimony
above suggests a way to resolve the apparent inconsistency of the Platonic tradi-
tion: in the first passage, Plato is referring to proto-Pythagoreanism, while in the
second he is referring to the Pythagoreanism of his time, in particular to Archy-
tas. Since the Pythagorean communities disappeared after the anti-Pythagorean
riots of the mid-fifth century BC, and since in fact Archytas always appears in the
tradition as an independent thinker and scientist, he was therefore not usable as
a model for the Pythagorean community and its bos.
Returning to the Aristotelian testimony and moving beyond the above dis-
cussed expression hoi kalomenoi pythagreoi, the references to the Pythagor-
ean contributions to mathematics and physics (see Met. 985b 23) would suggest
a prior identification of Pythagoreanism with a scientific and philosophical com-
munity. And yet, the remaining fragments of works from the Aristotelian corpus
specifically devoted to the study of the Pythagoreans (fragments 191205 Rose)
seem, on the contrary, to reveal other approaches: Aristotle occupies himself
here with the life of Pythagoras and with akosmata and smbola which guide
the Pythagorean community life. Famous is the testimony of the fragment 192
Rose:
Aristotle in his work On Pythagorean Philosophy brings news of the fact that his followers
are guarding within the most rigid secrets of the following distinction: of the living beings
endowed with reason, one is god, the other is man, the third has the nature of Pythago-
ras.
So even Aristotles testimony, as is the case with Plato, is not crucial to under-
stand what would be the main feature of the community, whether the scientific
research or that of a common life guided by akosmata and smbola.
It is likely that the question ideally addressed to Plato and Aristotle What
is the (single) salient feature of the Pythagorean koinna? is indeed mis-
placed. The apora suggests that its necessary both to methodologically review
the very attempt to separate the two alternatives and to resume the search for the
nature of this community from an alternative point of view.
2.3 The Pythagorean koinna
There were two basic kinds of Greek associations: the thasos and the hetaira.
The former was directly connected to a cult, and involved the sharing of rites
and mysterious knowledge, while the hetaira was more closely linked to the
idea of an association of phloi, in the political sense of allies and brothers
who meet each other in a private club. The Pythagorean community is almost
160 On the authenticity of fr. 1 of Archytas, doubts were raised by Burkert 1972: 379 and
Centrone 1996: 70 n21. For the idea of the outmodedness of Archytas for a discussion on the
proto-Pythagorean community, see Centrone 1996: 70.
161 14 A 7 DK = Iambl. VP: 31.
2.3 The Pythagorean koinna 61
unanimously considered by tradition to be a hetaira, albeit rather a sui generis
one: indeed, while trying to justify the violent revolt against the Pythagoreans,
Iamblichus reveals the feeling of estrangement felt by the population with re-
spect to the community of Pythagoreans:
The leaders of this dissension were those that were nearest to the Pythagoreans, both by
kindred and intercourse. These leaders, as well as the common folk, were offended by
the Pythagoreans actions, which were unusual, and the people interpreted that peculiarity
as a reflection on theirs.
This difference that constituted the community, linked to some strange cultural
and economic practices, was, in all probability, an essential part of the reason
for the aforementioned enmity towards that very community. The Pythagorean
communitys political presence, underlined above, also would suggest that the
best identification would indeed be with the model of hetaira. And yet, the sour-
ces are quite insistent on presenting a community openly dedicated to worship
and based on akosmata and smbola, that is, on secret words and signs of iden-
tification. This evidence supports the opposite hypothesis, that is, that the Pytha-
gorean community finding their most appropriate typological place under the
thasos.
Limited number. The Pythagoreans, though influential in the cities they ran
in Magna Graecia, were always a minority, both within the aristocratic groups
these same cities as well as in the larger sphere of the intellectual culture of
their time. Although Pythagoras four political speeches upon arriving in Croton
did win according to Porphyry (VP: 20) and Iamblichus (VP: 30) an audience
of two thousand people, only six hundred of them became real disciples, not
only led by him to philosophy, but also ready to live together, as it was, accord-
ing to his precepts (Iambl. VP: 29).
Both Porphyry and Iamblichus draw this information about the Pythagorean bos
from Nicomachus. There is a suspicion, raised by both Von Fritz 1940: 220 and
Philip 1966: 140, that the extreme rigidity of access to the Pythagorean commun-
ity (three years of neglect, followed by another five years of silence) is actually a
backwards projection by Nicomachus. And yet, there is a parallel testimony in
Diogenes Laertius, whose source would have been Timaeus, which confirms
the testimonys probable antiquity:
[His disciples] kept in silence for five years, only listening to his speeches, without ever see-
ing Pythagoras until they didnt overcome the test, from then on they became part of his
house and were welcomed in his presence.
Life in common (cenobium) and communal property. The testimony above is full
of other sectarian signs, such as secrecy and especially communal property. The
passage from Iamblichus mentioned above refers to the dokimasa of young as-
pirants, detailing the nature of this sharing:
During this period, each ones assets, that is, their properties, were joined together and en-
trusted to the notable members of the community in charge, called politicians: Some of
them were administrators, others legislators.
That is about the famous saying koin t phln (or koin t tn phln) which
Plato refers to the Pythagoreans.
That
same relation between phloi and dkaion is found in Plato who conversely has
no doubts attributing the saying directly to the Pythagoreans. A key passage
from the Republic explicitly mentions the connection between Pythagoreanism
and phila: at the beginning of Book V (449c), Adeimantus, at Polemarchus in-
vitation, rebukes Socrates for putting aside in his discussion of the fair and per-
fect city the problem posed by applying the saying koin t phln to women and
children; he is suspicious that Socrates wants to evade the question:
It seems to us that youre trying to run away quickly, stealing an entire part of the discourse
(and certainly not the smallest one) lest you have to discuss it, that you have thought of
170 Schol. In Phaedr. 279c = FGrHist: 566 F 13.
171 See the references to the Platonic steps in the paragraphs immediately following.
172 NE 1159b 2532.
173 Among them, Minar 1942: 29, 32, 35, Conybeare, in his translation of Philostratus Life of
Apollonius of Tyana (194850), and Burkert 1982: 15.
2.3 The Pythagorean koinna 65
running away by slightly dropping that saying by which, regarding women and children,
for everyone it should be obvious that everything must be common among friends.
The saying, phauls slightly introduced, in Book IV (424a), requires on the con-
trary in the saying of Adeimantus an explanation regarding the trpos ts
koinnas (V: 449d), the type of this communion. Thus, Socrates will begin to in-
troduce the gynaikeon drma of the city in detail. The vocabulary of this passage
is impregnated with Pythagoreanism: both the communion of property (and of
women and children), and the importance of listening as a characteristic of
the bos and the fair city, refer immediately to the characteristics of the Pythagor-
ean life.
The anecdote reveals once again the radical nature of this community.
Similarly revealing is the uplifting story of a Pythagorean who fell seriously
ill during a long trip. After being treated with great generosity by the owner of a
hostel that received him in the last days of his life, the Pythagorean engraved a
symbol on a tablet and gave the following instructions:
He asked him to hang it outside the hostel door and keep an eye in case some passerby
recognized the sign, as, in that case, this person would pay him back all expenses and
thank him on his behalf. When the guest had died, the owner of the pension buried him
and took great care of the casket without worrying about the costs or receiving some rec-
ognition of whoever would eventually identify the tablet. And yet, out of curiosity regarding
the order received, he wanted to put it to test, exposing the tablet so that it could always be
visible. Much later, a Pythagorean who passed by recognized the symbol. He then asked
what had happened and gave the owner of the hostel a much larger amount than that
which was disbursed.
The Pythagorean discussion of phila goes beyond the scope of mere common
life, and in fact reflects a key concept that pervades all of reality. For example,
Iamblichus testimony (Iambl. VP: 229230; VP: 6970) lists the six aspects of
phila taught by Pythagoras: of gods towards men, of the doctrines among them-
selves, of the soul with the body, of men among themselves and with animals,
and of the mortal body towards itself.
The tradition clearly testifies to the proverbial loyalty of the Pythagorean phila.
The phila between Lysis and Euryphamus is the subject of another narrative that
also represents loyalty between friends, although Rohde 1872: 50 describes it
simply as silly (eine alberne Geschichte):
As for the set pacts, Pythagoras prepared with such effectiveness his disciples to honestly
respect them, that it is narrated that once Lysis, while leaving the temple of Hera, after say-
ing his prayers, found Euryphamus of Syracuse, his companion, who in turn was entering
the temple. When the latter asked him to wait while he said his prayers, Lysis sat on a stone
bench near the exit of the temple. After the prayers, Euryphamus, deep in thought and
taken by a profound reflection left the temple by another door. Lysis, for his part, stood
still, waiting all day and night, and much of the next day. And probably would have re-
mained much longer if in the next day, Euryphamus, who had gone towards the auditorium,
had not remembered the fact, after hearing that Lysis was surrounded by friends from the
community. Only then did he go to meet him: the latter was waiting for him as he had
promised. He led him away, explaining the reason for his oversight: It was a god that
made me forget, so I test your strength in keeping your promise.
The mention of the introduction of this belief into Greece presupposes a public
response of general surprise to it and supports the image of a sect marked by an
alternative subculture.
Silence and secrecy. Several quotes above recall the obligation to keep silent
and maintain the secrecy of Pythagorean doctrine. This secrecy is frequently
mentioned in the tradition. The earliest testimony comes from Isocrates, a con-
temporary of Plato: in our time, are still more admired those who profess to
be his disciples [Pythagorass] and keep silent, than those who get very great
fame through the word (Isocrates, Busiris 29 = 14 A 4 DK). Even some fragments
of Middle Comedy (DK 58 E) describe this obligation of silence, it was necessary
to withstand the scarcity of food, the dirt, the cold, the silence, the severity and
lack of hygiene (Alexis, The Pythagorizousa, fr. 201 Kassel-Austin = 58 E 1 DK).
The most famous (and melodramatic) instance of ther violation of the oath
of silence concern the revelation, probably by Hippasus, of the doctrine of in-
commensurability of the side and diagonal of a square (or, in another version,
the method of inscribing a dodecahedron in a sphere.
192 See, for the collection of these apocrypha, Thesleff 1965, and his Introduction to this
literature (Thesleff 1961). See also Szlezk 1972 for editing and commentary on the famous
treatise On the ten categories by pseudo-Archytas, and Centrone 1990 for an edition and com-
mentary on some pseudo-Pythagorean moral treatises. Even Philolaus is remembered for a
breach of confidentiality on the occasion of the release of three celebrated books bought by
Plato (D. L. Vitae VIII. 85). And even that news is used to legitimize a false Pythagorean of the
Hellenistic age (mentioned earlier in D. L. Vitae VIII. 6). See, for this, Burkert 1972: 223227,
Huffman 1993: 1214, and what will be written next (4.1.3.1).
193 See D. L. Vitae VIII. 68. For a comment on this controversy see Centrone 1992.
194 Gemelli, 2007b: 438, orig.: ist ein Charakteristikum esoterischer Texte, die eben fr den-
jenigen nichtssagend sind, dem die Fhigkeit fehlt, dem Wort einen konkreten Sinn zu ver-
leihen. Das Schweigen, das die Pythagoreer verlangten, bezog sich nicht auf das Gesagte,
sondern auf das Erlebte. Denn das eine blieb ohne das andere ein versiegelter Schrein.
72 2 Pythagoreanism as a historiographical category
Therefore, secrets would be a communitys strategy to keep their experiences as
the exclusive prerogative of the initiates; Gemellis thesis is very convincing and
filled with consequences for understanding the esoteric dynamics of proto-Py-
thagoreanism.
Charismatic guide. The charismatic presence of the founder Pythagoras hov-
ers above the various features so far detected in his sect. Both the above Aristo-
telian reference to Pythagoras intermediate nature between gods and men
(Iambl. VP: 31), as well as the expression to andrs (Iambl. VP: 88), referring
to Pythagoras without naming him, indeed suggest the presence of yet another
criterion for identifying Pythagoreanism as a sect. In addition, there is a recur-
ring tradition of attributing the authority of virtually any doctrine to the master
Pythagoras, a tradition remembered by the expression Auts pha, ipse dixit
(Iambl. VP: 46). The figure of Pythagoras falls clearly in the pattern of theos
anr, the divine man of ancient Greek tradition, whose characteristics were clev-
erly summarized by Achtemeier:
The characteristics of theos anr can be summarized briefly: a miraculous birth, the over-
powering ability to persuade by speech, the ability to perform miracles, including healing
and foreseeing the future, and a death marked in some way as extraordinary.
One of the accounts of Pythagoras katbasis to Hades points in the same direc-
tion: among those who were being punished, he saw men who had been unwill-
ing to have sexual intercourse with their wives (D. L. Vitae VIII. 21). Iamblichus
(VP: 132 and 195) reports that Pythagoras convinced the people of Croton to
abandon their concubines. Here the concern would not be, it seems, the equality
of marital moral obligations between men and women, but rather a typical atti-
tude of small sectarian communities to ensure their own survival by limiting re-
production to within the group itself. Possibly, these two goals coincide: equality
of husband and wife implies sexualy fidelity of both partners, which in turn pro-
motes the survival of the koinna. The various sayings dedicated to the need to
procreate in order to honor the gods, themselves seemingly generic, assume, in
the context of the relatively small Pythagorean community, tones of genuine
drama.
In one single lesson, the first he had ever given publicly after arriving alone in Italy, he
knew how to win over with his words more than two thousand people. These were taken
to the point where they didnt return to their homes and, instead, constituted, along
with women and children, an immense house of listeners and founded what was called
by all Magna Graecia. They took from him [Pythagoras] laws and prescriptions [] and put
their goods in common.
The narrative scheme closely follows the model of the foundation of a city-col-
ony: to the injunction not return to their own homes (oukti oikde apstsan),
the establishment of a new common center (homakoeon), and ultimately the
foundation of a new city which includes women and children and is built on
communal property.
The reference to Magna Graecia alludes to something new: in its normal use,
the term Megl Hllas does not refer to a specific city, but rather to a whole area
(southern Italy). Consequently, Pythagoreanism here means more than just
founding a city: instead, it gives the territories of Magna Graecia a political
unity (polzein is the verb used in both traditions) which was previously nonexis-
tent (Mele 2000: 329).
199 Porph. VP: 20
200 Iambl. VP: 30.
201 The terms used to indicate the political colonization are significantly in Porph. VP:
20 and in Iambl. VP: 30.
2.3 The Pythagorean koinna 75
Seen from the outside, the Pythagorean koinna-plis-chra system could
not help but appear threatening to the rest of the established powers. The news
of the riots and the successive crises of the Pythagorean presence in Magna Grae-
cia are clear evidence of hostility to the school. Above all, the tradition of the re-
fusal by the inhabitants of Locri to welcome Pythagoras when he was a fugitive
is significant:
We heard, Pythagoras, that thou are wise and exceptionally talented, but with regard to our
laws, we have no reason to reconsider them and, therefore, we will try to stick to them. You,
on your part, go to another place, but take that which is necessary.
In what way this political and diplomatic project to reestablish Magna Graecia in
fact corresponded to the intention of the first Pythagorean communities is un-
clear. Surely, however, Pythagoras and his peers were perceived as a threat to na-
tive laws and custom, as they carried with their arrival a reputation for large eth-
ical, political and legal reform: the Pythagorean community is perceived as a
mtrpolis that permeates all Magna Graecia, ready to re-found and to colonize
the whole territory. The mobility of the Pythagorean leadership (and of Pythago-
ras himself), as well as the archaeological evidence, especially of the coins of the
time, seem to point to the fact that at least until the crisis of the end of the
sixth to the mid-fifth centuries BC this project was very successful.
On the
other hand, the Pythagorean literature defends koinna as necessary to avoid
tyranny which is inimical to the achievement of a philosophical bos.
207 The interpretation of the distinction of the two kinds of men as lying between the man of
science and the man of faith is by Centrone 1996: 81.
208 Iamblichus himself uses smbola up to the Protrepticus. See Zhmud 1992: 248 n15 for the
references to the passages from Aristotle to Porphyry.
209 Iambl. VP: 82.
78 2 Pythagoreanism as a historiographical category
The result is a series of precepts that Zhmud 1992: 241 defines in no uncertain
terms as a tremendous amount of absurdities. Among them, one must first
wear the right pair of the shoes, one should not frequent the main streets nor
talk in the absence of light, and one should not bear the image of a god in a
ring nor sacrifice a white rooster.
The contradiction is obvious: while in the first version mathematicians are the
real Pythagoreans and, therefore, would deny the title of Pythagorean to the
acousmatics, in the second version (both in the Life of Pythagoras as well as
in the parallel passage of De communi mathematica scientia), Iamblichus says
the opposite: acousmatics deny that mathematicians profess the true Pythagor-
ean doctrine. There is one particularly interesting detail: Hippasus ends up being
identified as an acousmatic in the first version and a mathematician in the sec-
ond one.
This contradiction requires a reconstruction of the possible original version
of the testimony. Deubner (Iamblichus, 1937), and later Burkert 1992: 193208,
demonstrated indisputably that the second testimony is the original, that is,
the acousmatics were the ones questioning the congruence between the mathe-
maticians and the real pragmatea of Pythagoras. It is, in fact, impossible to
imagine this to be just a slip of Iamblichus in VP: 81: something in this contra-
diction should reveal its reasons. However, Iamblichus clumsy cut and paste
procedure would be unlikely to cause the transformation of Hippasus from math-
ematician to acousmatic.
The reconstruction of the confusion of Iamblichus and his name swap eventu-
ally leads to the central hypothesis of these last pages: that contrary to the stan-
214 Iambl. De Comm. Mathem. 25: 26.1678.8.
215 For an analysis of the passages in which Iamblichus shows similar superficiality in the
reading of the sources, see Von Fritz 1940: 105107.
216 Burkert 1972: 1945.
80 2 Pythagoreanism as a historiographical category
dard view, acousmatics and mathematicians were not, unlike the vulgata of the
Pythagorean studies, two different degrees of membership in the koinna, but
rather two currents, two groups within the same Pythagorean movement. The
mathematicians represent the second phase of the development of an original
Pythagoreanism, which was otherwise markedly acousmatic. For this reason,
mathematicians would have been engaged in a struggle for legitimacy, in the
face of refusal by the acousmatics to recognize them as having the same truth,
which means engaging in pursuits that go back to the founder.
This hypothesis raises an additional problem: when did such a schism hap-
pen? It is, in all probability, a division that happen during the successive devel-
opment of Pythagoreanism, even if its impossible to be more precise about when
exactly it occured. Attempts to connect this internal schism with the crisis gen-
erated by the anti-Pythagorean riots of the mid-fifth century BC did not produce
any concrete results, although Riedweg 2002: 176 suggests that it is possible to
link the separation between the two groups to the period after the diaspora
that followed the riots and contemporaneous with the advancement of natural
philosophy at the end of the fifth century and early fourth century BC.
Despite the very existence of this schism being placed in serious doubt by
Zhmud 1992, Delattes arguments 1915: 273ff. and, in particular, Burkerts 1972:
196ff., that Aristotle might be the authority behind Iamblichus (original) testi-
mony on the distinction between acousmatics and mathematicians, would con-
firm the tradition of the division between the two groups.
An argument in
217 For this reason, another question is obviously the genealogy of the schism in his ma-
thematical version, Pythagoras, for receiving various political leaders of the cities, would have
needed to simplify his doctrine, that is, to dispose of the scientific demonstrations from his
public teachings, which, in contrast, he would reserve for the younger, eager to learn: the
mathematicians would derive from this (see Iambl. VP: 8789).
218 Seemingly agreeing with him is Huffman 2008: 220. Tannery 1887: 85ff. and Von Friz 1940:
59, 92, in the opposite direction of the reconstruction of Iamblichuss testimony, even suggest
that there may be some relationship between the community schism and the anti-Pythagorean
riots of the mid-fifth century BC: based in Iambl. VP: 257ff., they imagine that the internal
division of the school, which was due to Hippasus, would then have led to a civil war and the
final crisis. After the diaspora that followed it, the Pythagoreans would have retired to private
religious life. Against this hypothesis, however, is the fact that mathematicians are still active
after the crisis, as evidenced by, among others, Philolaus and Archytas.
219 See, in this sense, also what was said above (1.4) in relation to the previous position of
Burnet 1908, 94 in this regard. Delatte and Burkert, Rohde 1871, Minar 1942: 43ff., Frank 1943:
69ff., Huffman 1993: 11 and Guthrie 1962: 192ff. agree with Burnet on this, especially: the thesis
that there were two kinds of Pythagoreans, the one chiefly interested in the pursuit of ma-
thematical philosophy and the other in preserving the religious foundations of the school, is
2.4 Acousmatics and mathematicians 81
favor of the antiquity of the schism is that if it had taken place too late, it would
not make sense for the mathematicians to feel pressure to make a claim to legiti-
macy if the environment of Pythagoreanism was already almost exclusively
mathematical since the time of Timaeus.
It is not by chance, indeed, that many classical scholars have recognized the im-
portance of this passage for connecting the origins of Pythagorean philosophy
with ethical-religious issues.
225 Burkert 1972: 122123, despite resistance from both Rathmann 1933: 3ff. and Wehrli, who
does not accept chapter 19 of Porphyry in his volume devoted to Dicearchus (Wehrli 1944),
supports this traditional attribution, along with Rohde 1871: 566, Burnet 1908: 92, Lvy 1926: 50,
and Mondolfo and Zeller 1938: 314. He adds clearly convincing arguments, grounded in the
passages skeptical tone, which certainly cannot be attributed to Porphyry, a believer: it would
more plausibly be a creation of Dicearchus, Aristotles skeptical student, who in other fragments
reveals the same skepticism and irony: he stated, for example, that the soul is simply a word (fr. 7
Wehrli) and that Pythagoras was, in the past, a beautiful courtesan (fr. 36 Wehrli). For a new
edition of Dicearchus texts see Mirhady 2001.
226 See both De Vogel 1964: 16, and Guthrie 1962: 186, as well as the more general points above
(1.5).
227 Our investigation does not allow us to develop an account of the archaic journey model. It is
helpful to refer to Beteghs discussion (2006) for the formulation of the model, as well as to two
recent studies that develop a variation of this model, , that is, the journey to the Hades
(Cornelli 2007a; Ustinova 2009). Memories of are widely attested within the literature
on Pythagoreanism. Among them, of course, is the story of the Thracian Zalmoxis, narrated by
Herodotus (IV. 9495), whose discipleship to Pythagoras will be discussed below.
228 The mention of the of the soul is significantly present in a text of the ancient Orphic
literature. The third Orphic gold leaf from Thurii (fr. 32c Kern, 4 A 65 Colli, II B1 Pugliese
Carratelli) reads: I flew away from the painful circle that causes serious concern. This source is
now also included in Tortorelli Ghidini 2006: 7475.
3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis 87
However, it is crucial to note that there was a lack of terminological preci-
sion in describing this cycle of immortality of the soul at least until the classical
age. As we shall see, different expressions and images are used to characterize
this transmigration: from clothing and covering (Empedocles), to penetration
of the soul in the body (Herodotus), to being born again, expressed by Platos
term palingnesis (plin ggnesthai).
Even though the term metempschsis first appeared only in the first century
AD, with Diodorus Siculus (X. 6, 1), and was quickly applied to Pythagoras, its
etymology points to a much older origin of the term: in fact contrary to
what was thought both in antiquity and among many contemporary scholars
the etymology of the word does not indicate the entry of something into
the soul, and it does not even derive directly from the word psych. Rather, as
rightly notes Casadio:
It was formed from the verb empsych, to animate (which in turn is connected through
mpsychos and psych to the verb psch, to blow), to which the preverb meta (Lat. trans),
which denotes not only change, but also succession or repetition, and the suffix sis, denot-
ing abstract action, were added.
Therefore, the origin and even use of metempsychosis denotes the idea of blow-
ing the soul back into a body. The cycle is thus conceived as a series of acts of
inhaling the life-soul, an image which refers to the pnema in the interior of a
body and is clearly dependent on the Ionian physical conception of ar. Anaxi-
menes fragment 2 links the three terms, psych, pnema and aer in the same sen-
tence: as they say, our soul, which is air, holds us together, thus, air and breath
keep the entire cosmos together (13 B 2 DK). This indicates a strong continuity,
at least in relation to the semantics of metempschsis, with the oldest con-
ceptions of soul-breath-life.
What matters most for this research is that the tradition, from its very begin-
nings, associates the theory of transmigration with the figure of Pythagoras. On
this topic, as will become clear below, until today the discussion heats up wild-
ly (Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 560).
229 See below for references.
230 Casadio 1991: 122123, orig.: si formato a partire dalo verbo empsych, animare (che a
sua volta collegato, attraverso mpsychos and psych al verbo pscho, soffiare), cui stato
aggiunto il preverbio meta (lat. trans) denotante non solo il cambiamento ma anche la suc-
cessione o ripetizione e il suffissale -sis denotante lazione astratta. See for the ancient,
especially Olympiodorus (In Phaed: 135 Westerink). For the contemporary Kernyi 1950: 24 and
Von Fritz 1957: 89 n1.
231 See for this continuity, the observations of Casadio 1991: 142 and Bernab 2004: 7678.
88 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
3.1 Is it the soul? (Xenophanes)
Xenophanes famous fragment, almost contemporary with Pythagoras, bears wit-
ness to Pythagoras belief in the movement of the soul:
As a dog was being punished, he [Pythagoras] was passing by and took pity and uttered the
following words: Stop beating it. For it is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognized
as I heard its cries.
The fragment is probably the oldest remaining testimony about Pythagoras. Al-
though a few attempts have been made to deny that Pythagoras was the man re-
ferred to, mostly by skeptics who doubt that metempschsis qualifies as an orig-
inal Pythagorean doctrine (Kern 1888: 499; Rathmann 1933: 3738; Maddalena
1954: 335; Casertano, 1987: 19ff.), there is a widespread agreement that the char-
acter mentioned by Xenophanes is Pythagoras, starting with Zeller 1938: 314, fol-
lowed by Burnet 1908: 120ff., Rostagni 1982: 55, Long 1948: 17, Dodds 1951: 143
n55, Timpanaro Cardini (Pitagorici, 195862), up through Burkert 1972: 120ff.,
Huffman 1993: 331, Centrone 1996: 54, Kahn 2011: 11 and the most recent work
of Riedweg 2007: 104.
However, Xenophanes passage contains one critical detail which makes it even
more interesting to our research. While representing probably the earliest refer-
ence to Pythagorass theory of metempschsis, the text also immediately reveals
a serious historiographic difficulty which suggests caution attributing this doc-
trine to historical Pythagoras and proto-Pythagoreans. This difficulty is the de-
gree to which it attributes psych to the dog. Both Burkert 1972: 134 n77 and Huff-
man 1988 and 1993: 331 rightly note that the testimony of Xenophanes does not
properly attribute a soul to the dog, but argue that the dog is (est) the soul of a
friend. This seemingly minor detail is in fact the symptom of a deeper and diffi-
cult problem: what was the proto-Pythagorean concept of the immortality of the
soul?
The way to resolve the matter is certainly to analyze this term, psych, as it
appears in Xenophaness testimony. Although the fragment can prove Pythagor-
ass relationship with the theories of metempschsis, it is certainly not reason-
able to think that the termpsych itself may have been part of Pythagorass al-
leged ipsissima verba.
uses the term damones (31 B 115 DK) rather than psych in his ac-
count of immortality.
It was noted earlier that it is quite plausible that when Aristotle speaks indis-
tinctly of Pythagoreans, he is really thinking of fifth century BC Pythagoreanism,
and more specifically of Philolaus (see 1.1). The semantic scope of the Pythagor-
ean psych would, therefore, be that of the movement of the animate beings, and
one with a distinctly materialistic connotation: the soul is a jumble of tiny ele-
ments (xsmata, dust), always in motion, and located in the heart. The theory
of harmona, which is attributed to every material element, thought by Philolaus
to be an agreement of limited and unlimited elements (44 B 1 DK), reveals this
movement to follow strictly harmonic patterns.
244 De an. 404a 16. It should be noted that the comparison between the two doctrines (Py-
thagoreanism and Atomism) is underlined by Ross translation with the inclusion of the qua-
lification spherical ( ), attributed to the atoms/dust on the lines 24 of 404a. Diels
proposes an amendment to this, by considering it a gloss of what is later said of the Py-
thagoreans in lines 16 and next, in the passage (67 A 28 DK) in question here.
245 It is important to recognize a significant connection between the Pythagorean and the
atomistic conception of : both are deeply linked to the environment of ancient medicine.
Burkert and Huffman speak respectively of medical milieu (Burkert 1972: 272) and medical
background (Huffman 1993: 329) as lying behind both; Gemelli comes to postulate that there is
no distinction between philosophy and medicine until the third part of the fifth century BC:
keine Grenzen (Gemelli 2007). Certainly the conceptions of of both schools are deeply
influenced by the theories of health as balance () or . See the use of these terms
by Alcmaeon (24 B 4 DK), as well Peixoto 2009 and Cornelli 2009a.
92 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
However, this theory of the psych as a harmonically-structured composition
of material elements is clearly contradictory to its immortality.
How can we
reconcile it with Porphyrys claim that metempschsis was one of Pythagorass
most celebrated doctrines (VP: 19), and with the fragment of Xenophanes, in
which Pythagoras himself seemed to speak of the immortality of the soul and
its transmigration?
Suggesting that Philolaus did not believe in the immortality of the soul, as
Wilamowitz 1920: II 90 does, is apparently only lectio facilior.
246 The idea of Drosdek 2007: 66, in which the final stage of reincarnations would just be
harmony is no more than a conjecture without philological support, as the author himself
admits (We can only guess an answer. And the answer is harmony.).
247 Guthrie 1964: 119. This same doctrine is upheld by Plato in Phaedo (85), through Simmias.
However, Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 563 and Cornford 1922 argued that Pythagoreans of the fifth
century BC would not have been aware of this contradiction, whether because the harmony
would refer only to parts of the soul, and not to its corporeal elements (Rohde 1920), or solely to
the part of the soul destined for death with the body (Rostagni 1982). The full discussion of the
issue by Guthrie 1964: 308319 connects the matter to cosmic harmony, while Philip 1966: 163ff.
suggests that the conception of the soul as would not be Philolaic, but a Platonic rear
projection.
248 Methodologically, Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 563 seem to understand the issue of the
coexistence of different theories of the soul during the development of Pythagoreanism in the
3.1 Is it the soul? (Xenophanes) 93
This introduction to the historiographical issues related to the theory of the Py-
thagorean soul relates to two hermeneutical suggestions, both to be developed
over the next few pages.
First, it is likely that Pythagoras and his movement produced a theory of the
immortality of the soul that included metempschsis as a key element. As we
will see, this seems to be recognized by the ancient sources as one of the
most characteristic features of the thought on the soul in antiquity. The recogni-
tion of this attribution does not imply, however, that the Pythagorean theory of
the soul constitutes a coherent doctrine. In this sense, it is possible to agree with
Burkerts anthropological observation:
Conceptions of the afterlife are and have always been syncretistic. It is only theology, com-
ing along rather late in the tradition, that is interested in smoothing out the differences. []
Only dead dogma is preserved without change; doctrine taken seriously is always being re-
vised in the continuous process of reinterpretation.
Thus, all the consistency this object needs is to be found not in an explicit doc-
trine but in a lifestyle that derives from this ethical-religious belief, that is, from
the acousmatic side of the bos, along the lines of the story we sketched above
about Philolaus and his theory of the soul.
Second, the testimony of Xenophanes, with his anachronistic use of the term
psych, points to the need to check how the history of tradition has appropriated
Pythagorean theories of the immortality of the soul. This examination must de-
velop its own lexicon and associated mythic images to build a historiographical
category able to address each of the historical moments of this transmission.
The following pages will be woven from these two suggestions: on the one
hand through the pursuit of a set of doctrines which corresponds to a proto-Py-
thagorean theory of the soul; on the other, following the construction of the cat-
egory of Pythagoreanism from his theory of the immortality of the soul.
3.2 Wiser than all (Heraclitus and Ion of Chios)
We will start with another fragment dedicated to Pherecydes, attributed to Ion of
Chios whose verses in an elegiac meter name Pythagoras as wiser than all:
same vein: [nel pitagorismo] le concezioni vecchie paion continuare a sussistere accanto alle
nuove, non che ad altri svolgimenti collaterali, pur derivati dallunione di elementi preesistenti.
249 Burkert 1972: 135.
94 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
Thus he [Pherecydes], distinguished by manly soul and dignity even in death, enjoys him-
self with the soul of a blessed life if Pythagoras, the wisest of them all, had truly under-
stood the mental dispositions of men.
Unfortunately, the full context of the quote is lost, making it difficult to grasp the
exact relationship between Pythagoras and Pherecydes. However, it is possible
to conjecture, as Kranz 1934: 104 and Riedweg 2007: 110 do, that the connection
between Pherecydes and Pythagoras, in the context of a blessed life beyond the
grave, is bound, on the one hand, to the fact that Pherecydes led a highly moral
life which deserved a well-blessed reward, and on the other hand, to Pythagor-
ass renowned wisdom on such matters as the reincarnation and immortality of
the soul.
Another argument seems to support this reading: the same Ion refers in an-
other fragment to Pythagoras as the author of some Orphic poems: Ion of Chios,
in the Triagmas, says that Pythagoras attributed to Orpheus some poems written
by him (36 B 2 DK). This is certainly the oldest testimony of Pythagorass rela-
tionship with Orphism. The deeper consequences of this relationship for the un-
derstanding of the Pythagorean theory of the immortality of the soul will be dis-
cussed later.
In fact, there is another detail in Ions fragment 4 which cannot be over-
looked: the term sophs per pntn anthrpn, wiser than all men immediately
echoes the famous fragment 129 of Heraclitus.
Histore is the scientific research of the Ionian school that Heraclitus knew well.
Pythagoras is here presented as excellent at this research. Yet in this same frag-
ment, in which Pythagoras stands above all others and seems worthy of unpre-
cedented praise from Heraclitus himself (pursued further than all other men),
Pythagoras is instead charged by Heraclitus with practicing a multiscience
(polymatha) and charlatanism (kakotechna), with an ambiguous reference
to certain Pythagorean writings to which Heraclitus had also previously refer-
red, as the term tatas would suggest. While the history of criticism has tried to
guess what these writings were, their immediate context might be suggested by
another critical passage that mentions Pythagoras:
Much learning does not teach understanding. Otherwise it would have taught both Hesiod
and Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecataeus.
The proximity of Hesiod and Pythagoras in this fragment seems to indicate that
the writings of the latter were linked to the literature whose primary exponents
were both Hesiod and Homer. However, this is literature that Heraclitus dis-
dains.
The Ion fragment quoted above can also corroborate a third hypothesis for
attribution of these Pythagoras sngraphai: that they were Orphic texts. With pre-
cise textual references, Ion would have wanted to defend Pythagoras, now in an
252 22 B 40 DK.
253 22 B 40 DK.
254 See 22 B 57 and 106 DK for Hesiod; 22 A 22 DK for Homer. For further discussion of the
relationship between and , see Gemelli 2007a: 13ff.
255 Recently, Burkert 1998: 306 suggested the possibility of these writings being like the writings
of Pherecydes or even Orphic poems. Kahn 2001: 17 n32 imagined them more likely as something
between the writings of Anaximander and Philolaus.
256 The link of Pythagoreanism with Egypt is attested not only by these mathematical studies,
and the presence of a temple of Hera with Egyptian architectural forms on Samos, in the sixth
BC (Kingsley 1999: 16), but also through some references to it from Herodotus who, in his
remarks about the sepulchral uses of the Egyptians (who buried the dead in linen robes and not
wool, as in Greece), states: This [practice] corresponds to so-called Orfik and Bakchik, which
are actually Egyptians and Pythagoreans (Herodt. II. 81).
96 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
Athenian environment, from attacks which Heraclitus had launched against him.
He did this in two ways: first, by identifying these writings, as he did in fragment
2, as pseudo-epigraphic Orphic texts; second, by identifying histore with the
practice of the knowledge of the palingnesis of previous lives, that is, the psy-
chological history of the individual as the amendment of Sandbach 1958/59 to
the fragment 4 quoted above seems to suggest: he had understood the men-
tal dispositions of men (36 B 4 DK). Heraclitus criticism, as well as Ions de-
fense, would be focused on the strong presence in Pythagorass sopha of Orphic
theories of the immortality of the soul. Both are, in this way, precious testimonies
to the antiquity of the allocation of such doctrines to proto-Pythagoreanism, if
not Pythagoras himself.
See, indeed, along the same lines, what Empedocles says in the
prologue to his poem Purifications: thousands follow me [], some in want
of oracles, others, for a long time pierced with grievous pains, seek to hear
from me keen-edged words that will cure all sorts of diseases (31 B 112 DK).
Healing here is also linked to a special oracular ability, which can be ap-
proximated, though not perfectly, by Pythagoras genealogical psychology of
the soul.
3.3 Ten or twenty human generations (Empedocles)
Empedocless testimonies belong to the same intellectual and cultural context as
Ions. Since ancient times, the protagonist of his Purifications was identified with
257 See Burkert 1972: 130131. It is interesting to note that Kranz 1934: 227ff. had already argued
that Heraclitus should know these Pythagorean writings, and was followed on this by Zeller and
Mondolfo 1938, although Mondolfo considers this hypothesis alquanto ardita (1938: 318).
258 See also Nucci 1999 and Macris 2003: 257.
3.3 Ten or twenty human generations (Empedocles) 97
Pythagoras,
259 See D. L. Vitae VIII. 5456 and the testimonies of Alcidamas, Neanthes and Timaeus in this
sense. For the modern criticism: Who could this be but Pythagoras? wonders Trpanier 2004:
105. See also Doods 1951: 182, Zuntz 1971: 183, Burkert 1972: 109 n65, Zeller and Mondolfo 1958:
329, although a bit skeptical and, as always, Rathmann 1933: 94131.
260 See West 1983: 26, Riedweg 1995, Scarpi 2007: 150, despite Trpaniers doubts 2004: 106.
261 There they were the chthonia and the solar of wide look, bloody hatred and harmony with
awful look, and the beautiful and the ugly, the fast and the sluggish, the truly lovely and the
dark-haired (31 B 122 DK). Birth and dissolution, sleep and wakefulness, the mobile and the
immobile, grandeur surrounded by many crowns and misery, the silent and the vociferous (31 B
123 DK). See for these fragments Casertanos elegant comment (2007a).
262 These references to harmony in Empedocles make one suspect that the proposition of the
concept of harmony within the history of Pythagoreanism precedes its canonical formulation,
developed by Philolaus only in the fifth century BC. See Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 331.
263 With the earth, we see the earth, with water, the water, with ether, the ether divine, with
fire, overwhelming fire, with love, love, and with disastrous fight, we see fight (31 B 109 DK).
264 The same criterion of knowledge is recalled in Platos Timaeus (45c) in relation to the
creation of human beings and, in primis, of vision. A heated debate in recent years aimed to
analyze the appropriation of these theories of knowledge by what will be named Optics,
98 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
However, it is Empedocless fragment 129 which is more immediately rele-
vant to a discussion of the oldest testimonies to the Pythagorean theory of the
immortality of the soul. There is no need to accept the suggestion of Pascal
1904: 141 ff. that the verses of fragment 129 are only an introduction to a speech
by Pythagoras himself, as mentioned in Ovid (Metam. XV. 60). Rather, the above-
outlined doctrinal coincidences reinforce a majoritarian understanding that Py-
thagoras is the real protagonist of fragment 129:
Among them, there was a man of extraordinary vision, that acquired a wealth of intelli-
gence and was excellent in a lot of wise activities. When in fact he tensed all the powers
of his mind, he easily saw all the things that is, in ten or twenty human generations.
Again, the terms of the citation, as in the case of the Ion quote above, seem to
echo the well-known criticisms of Pythagoras by Heraclitus. Expressions such
as extraordinary vision, wealth of intelligence, lots of activities of wisdom
certainly are not casual. There is here indeed an affirmation of Pythagorass pol-
ymatha. This claim, unlike the one by Heraclitus, is not marked by sarcasm. On
the contrary, the second part of the quote very accurately qualifies this particular
wisdom: Pythagorass whole vision is directed to palingnesis, that is, to the scru-
tinizing of the history of the soul in its movements of metempschsis. Both Py-
thagorass own soul and the souls of others as well. Although the reference is
more generally directed to the ability to see all that is, including, for example,
the ability to hear the harmony of the universe, in the sense of perceiving the
sound of the spheres (Porph. VP: 30), it is clear that the context of the quote im-
plies more specifically Pythagoras famous special ability.
Fragment 129, therefore, in the context of both Purifications and the tradition
on the figure of Empedocles as a divine man, is a testimony to the attribution to
proto-Pythagoreanism of a theory of the soul that involves granting Pythagoras a
special ability to peruse the history of the transmigrations of a soul.
revealing a dialogue, in fieri, between Plato and Archytas. See for this Burnyeat 2005 and
Huffman 2005: 551569.
265 While Rostagni 1982: 232 follows Pascals suggestion, see Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 329 and
Timpanaro Cardini (Pitagorici, 195862 I: 18) for an exhaustive list of the history of this critical
attribution. More recent scholars, including Riedweg 2002, Trpanier 2004 and Gemelli 2007,
follow the tradition, agreeing with the same attribution.
266 31 B 129 DK.
267 To these arguments, Philip 1966: 156 adds another one: the food vetoes, which bring
Empedocles close to Pythagoreanism, depend directly, in his view, on the belief of trans-
migration that both share.
3.3 Ten or twenty human generations (Empedocles) 99
3.4 Plato and Orphism
The work of Plato is full of references to Pythagoreanism and metempschsis,
yet most sensitive to the difficulties that attach to such a discussion. However,
even Platos testimony is not exempt from problems and uncertainties. For exam-
ple, the lack of explicit quotations from Pythagoras in the Platonic texts allowed
room, early on, for the hypothesis that they refer to Orphism rather than Pytha-
goreanism.
A bos orphiks is
discussed in a discussion on vegetarianism in the Laws (VI: 782c). Often within
Platos work, the antiquity of Orphic doctrines is recalled
It is impossi-
ble to deny, therefore, that Orphics and Orphism have a very significant and im-
portant place within the Platonic corpus.
However, the presence of Orphism in Platos work is especially visible when
he refers to theories about the soul. The dialogues are indeed full of myths,
273 Brissons skeptical position is, in this sense, paradigmatic (Brisson 2000a: 253). A me-
thodological solution to the problem is proposed by Bernab 2002: 239: chaque foi que lon
parle dinfluence orphique chez um auteur, on doit citer des textes soumis une critique
profonde et une hermneutique minutieuse, pour viter les lieux communs et les affirmations
vides. Le travail reste en grande partie faire et il est urgent de lentreprendre. So, showing the
texts: thats the imperative.
274 On the Derveni papyrus, see what was said above at 1.8.
275 Although the term is not registered as such within the Platonic corpus, it already
appears in Herodotus (II. 81, vide infra)
276 See for Vegett 1998: 229 and Burkert 1972: 125 n30; 1982: 4 n13 for citations.
277 See Phlb. 66c; Leg. 715e.
278 See Phaed. 69c-d, Crat. 402b-c. See also Kingsley 1995:118 and Tortorelli Ghidini 2000: 12.
3.4 Plato and Orphism 101
moral reflections, and literary images that imply or directly face the issues of the
immortality and metempschsis of the soul.
This is certainly the case for a famous page in the Meno, where Plato attrib-
utes the authorship of the theory of metempschsis to great priests and priest-
esses, who were concerned with understanding the lgos of their ministry
(Men. 81a). He goes on to explicitly state the content of this lgos: at one
time [the soul] has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born
again, but is never destroyed (Men. 81b). Let us more closely examine the pas-
sage and its context. The theme of the dialogue between Socrates and Meno is
the definition of virtue, approached from an epistemic perspective. The problem
at hand is how to recognize the truth when it is not known beforehand: it is the
question, central to Platonic philosophy, of anmnsis. In this context, the dia-
logue proceeds as follows:
SOCR. I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine. MEN.
What did they say? SOCR. They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive. MEN. What was
it? And who were they? SOCR. Some of them were great priests and priestesses, who
were concerned with understanding the lgos of their ministry. Pindar and many others,
the divine poets, also spoke of these things [b]. And that is what they say, mark, now,
and see whether their words are true: they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at
one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is
never destroyed. And that is why, they say, a man ought to live always in perfect holiness.
For Persephone, in the ninth year, sends the souls of those from whom she has received the
penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light of the sun above. And from
these noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom sprout. And for the rest of their days,
as immaculate heroes, they are invoked.
The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having
seen the world from one side and the other, in a word, all things that exist, has knowledge
of them all. And it is no wonder, therefore, that the soul should be able to call to remem-
brance all that it ever knew about virtue, and about everything else. For as all nature is
akin.
Indeed, Kingsley
1995: 161162 rightly notes that there is no tradition that allows one to consider
the Orphic rituals or mythology as inclusive of women: Platos reference must
therefore be an exclusive indication of Pythagoreanism.
Just as Plato does, the author of the Derveni papyrus, although in the role of an
Orphic exegete, seems to weave in criticisms of a part of the same Orphics who
fail to know how to explain the rites performed. To this charge of incompetence,
others are added, including the both the promotion of the commercialization of
the holy, if we take into account the mention of the money charged to the faith-
ful, and the consequent disbelief among the faithful.
It is no surprise, then, that Plato uses this same image in a famous page of
the Republic (364b-c) in the context of the harsh criticism of Musaeus and his
son, Eumolpus, eponym of the hierophants of Eleusis. Plato does not hide his
criticism, that the diffusion of the Eleusinian mysteries was causing problems
for the city (Rep. II: 378a); he even parodies of these for the initiation of the
democratic man (560d-e).
[They] guide the initiated to the Hades with his speech, preparing a pious symposium for
them, in which they lie with garlands, and from then on make them spend their whole time
drinking, as they believe that the best reward of virtue is eternal drunkenness.
Again, our analysis of this issue will seek to both see how Plato
289 For this hypothesis, see Bernab 2011, ch. 6.
290 See for this Bernab 2011, ch. 6.
291 See for the citations Casadio 1991: 132.
292 The term transposition is used here in the sense coined by Dis 1927: 432ff.
3.4 Plato and Orphism 107
appropriates the Orphic theory within his own view of the immortality of the
soul, and attempt to move backwards to determine what genuine dependencies
between Orphism and Pythagoreanism can be found in his sources.
In a page of the Gorgias, Socrates, in response to Callicless proposition that
there is a need for a total liberation of the passions in pursuit of pleasure, intro-
duces with Euripidess verse Who knows if life is not death, and death life?
a discussion on the body (sma) as the tomb (sma) of the soul, a motto whose
authorship Socrates refers to some ingenious person, maybe a Sicilian or an
Italian. Thus the text reads:
But even the life you talk about is an awful thing; and indeed I would not wonder that Euri-
pides may have been right in asking: Who knows if life is not death, and death life? At this
very moment maybe we are actually dead! I have heard a wise man say: we are actually
dead and our tomb is our body, and that part of the soul which is the seat of the desires
is liable for its very nature to be tossed around and blown up and down. That was said,
in myth form, by some ingenious person, maybe a Sicilian or an Italian, who playing
with the word, invented a tale in which he called that part of the soul a vessel as it was
so easily wheedled, and he called foolish the uninitiated men. In these, the part in the
souls in which the desires are seated, its intemperate and incontinent part, he designed
as a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking,
Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in the Hades meaning the invisible world
these are precisely the happiest, while the uninitiated are condemned to pour water into a
vessel which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander
as the one who told me the story said , is the soul of the foolish ones, because it is full of
holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith.
We should note, first, that Plato, as with his other strategies of transposition so
far, uses the sma-sma motif in a dialogical context that is markedly ethical-
apocalyptic.
Philolaus, for his part, seems to carefully discuss the doctrine of the sma-sma,
in the context of the archaic magico-religious traditions: theologo and mn-
teis.
The difficulty is that, since Wilamowitz 1920: II 90 and Frank 1923: 301, up to
Burkert 1972: 248 n47, Casadio 1991: 124 n9 and even through Huffman 1993:
404406, many scholars seriously doubt the originality of this fragment, and
therefore the possibility of considering the idea of the sma-sma as originally
Philolaic.
Trying to find a solution to the first dilemma, one could speculate that it is
only the presence of the word psych which raised doubts about the authenticity
of the fragment, while the rest of the fragment seems original. Therefore, we
could imagine that the term psych, and it alone, is the result of a correction
by Clement of the original Philolaic term (which could have been damon, for ex-
ample), for the immortal part of the individual.
299 The proof of this can be seen in Burkert 1993: 405, who rightly notes that the phrase
appears, for example, already in fragment 131 by Empedocles (31 B 131 DK).
300 Incisive is Casadio 1991: 124 n9: per quanto ci si arrampichi sugli specchi non si riuscir
mai a far dire a Filolao che un sepolcro linvolucro corporeo di cui lanima si compiace.
110 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
A very elegant and effective solution has been proposed by Timpanaro Car-
dini for the second dilemma, regarding the contradiction between the idea of a
body-tomb and the love of the soul for it, from fragment 22:
One must consider that in the Orphic-Pythagorean mysteriology, the body is the place and
means of atonement, to achieve the liberation of the soul, hence there is a certain emotion-
al attachment of the soul to its own custody.
Thus, the souls love for the body is, consistently, its love for the possibility of the
atonement of sins committed in previous lives. Such atonement is only possible
through the body, bringing the fragment closer to the conceptual scope of the
theories of metempschsis. In the same sense, the immediately following sen-
tence of fragment 22 adds: Because without this you cannot use the senses
(quia sine eo non potest uti sensibus). The subject of the sentence is the soul,
which without the body cannot use the senses, receive and send signals. As
we will see, this is the same theory of sma-sma as given by Plato in the Cratylus
(400c), that is, of the body as a sign. The body presents itself in fragment 22 of
Philolaus as an open custodian for the soul, which allows for interaction with the
world, in the form of knowledge, and expression.
To sum up, in fragment 14, Philolaus seems to discuss the immortality of the
soul as something originated previously to his work, possibly like something that
comes to Pythagoreanism from outside, by no means previous to the Pythagor-
eanism of the fifth century BC, of which Philolaus is the greatest representative.
On that point, it seems to agree with the above page of the Gorgias by Plato, that
these theories originated in a religious and ancient sphere. Though not the same
kompss anr mentioned by Plato, Philolaus could be said to be a central witness
to the antiquity of this doctrine and of its early reception within the Pythagorean
literature.
Recent findings of three bone plates in Olbia (discovered in 1951) seem to
confirm the existence of the sma-sma theory in an Orphic context.
In the
first (94a Dubois) and third (94c Dubois), one can read a few sequences of
names that begin or end with the theonym DION, an abbreviation of Dionysus:
Life Death Life
Truth
Dion (ysus) Orphics
301 Timpanaro Cardini (Pitagorici, 1962 II: 2467).
302 West 1982, Zhmud 1992, Dubois 1996 and Tortorelli Ghidini 2006, especially, devoted
themselves to the Olbias bone plates.
3.4 Plato and Orphism 111
Dion (ysus)
[Lie] Truth
Body Soul
In the first plate, the life-death-life sequence is said to be truth and is attributed
to the Orphics: the plate contains, for the first time, the name Orphiko. Before
the discovery, the first appearance of the term was only in Herodotus (II. 81),
as we will discuss next.
On the page of the Gorgias (492e-493c) with which we began this section, the
great intelligence of a Sicilian or an Italian is exemplified by a series of etymo-
logical games that are echoed in the second part of the quotation. With a play on
words (lit. a change of terms, pargon t onmati), the sage calls pthos (vessel)
that part of the soul that is pithans (easily persuadable), and ametoi (uniniti-
ated) the antoi men (who have no sense). The game extends even to the very
etymology of the des (Hades), the realm beyond the grave, which is understood
as ads (invisible).
No wonder, therefore, that the same sma-sma motif is featured in an ex-
quisite etymological game in a famous page of the Cratylus (400c), already ex-
tensively studied by criticism.
One must unravel the very articulate word game that the text builds, with not
only two different meanings for the term sma (tomb and sign), but also the re-
invention all Platonic of a new meaning for the term sma: salvation.
Socrates reveals here, therefore, that he knows two different meanings of the
term sma: on the one hand, tomb; on the other hand, sign. The assonance ob-
viously plays a central role in the comprehension of the passage: Socrates must
have known well the Orphic motto sma-sma in the sense of body-tomb, but he
also seems to know a different exegesis of that motto, which somehow di-
minishes the cruel and archaic impact of the image, probably originally attached
to the rites of the telesta like the aforementioned Olbia plates seem to indicate,
refining it to insert it into a more intellectualist semantic scope. The game is pos-
sible thanks to the archaic sense of the term sma, already present in Homer,
which meant not exactly grave, but more precisely the headstone that is erected
to indicate or signal the place of the grave and therefore to remember the person
buried there.
However, this
attribution is not universally accepted. Indeed, although Burkert initially asserts:
We may suppose that if it is not Orphic, it is likely to be Pythagorean, he ends
up skeptically concluding that we do not know whether this [the great Sicilian
306f., Ferwerda 1985, Casadio 1987: 389f. and 1991: 123f., Riedweg 1995: 46 and Zhmud 1997: 123.
Wondering in contrast to all of the above, Bernab 2011, ch. 7.
307 Crat. 400c.
308 For the Homer quotations, see Il. II 814 and VII 319, Od. II 222 and XII 175. For the meaning
of , see Liddell-Scott 1996. For a discussion of the term, see Prier 1978: 91101.
309 See among them, Thomas 1938: 5152 and Dodds 1951: 171 n95.
3.4 Plato and Orphism 113
or Italian] was a historical character.
This re-
sults from the continuity of reality, its syngneia, in which everything refers to ev-
erything.
However, the third passage of the text is the most surprising part of the ety-
mological game. At the end of the argument, Socrates proudly declares, and no
need to change one letter. What goes on here is an association of sma with the
verb siz, which moves the term sma into the semantic sphere of salvation.
Linguistically, the game is clear: Socrates considers so-ma as a name formed
by so- (from siz, to save) and -ma, a suffix that indicates action. S-ma
thus becomes an action name, a clever morphological construction of Socra-
tes-Plato which means that the body is the salvation of the soul. For this reason,
Socrates can say that theres no need to change one letter, as was assumed in the
310 Burkert 1972: 248 n47.
311 This is certainly a good way to solve, on the Platonic page, the opposition between those
who say the theory and , who were the first to say it: in the former () the
latter would fit, the Orphics, but the range of this identification is not limited to them: in
could fit then, the Pythagoreans, though not in a position of formers to withhold this theory.
312 Significantly, in this sense, the page of Stobaeus (Stob. 3.1.199): indeed, there is nothing so
characteristic of the Pythagorean philosophy as the symbolic, as the way of teaching in which
word and silence mix, as if not to say. On the other hand, the idea of the symbolic sign was not
something restricted to the Pythagorean tradition, and was widely present in the rest of the
Presocratic literature. See, for example, fr. 93 of Heraclitus, the lord whose is the oracle at
Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, he signals (22 B 93 DK).
313 We do not follow Ferwerdas argument (1985: 270272) which tends to show that on the
contrary the first etymological sense of the body as the tomb of the soul cannot be Py-
thagorean. The author argues that, on the one hand, an idea so pessimistic would not match the
more positive worldview of the Pythagoreans (notably as related to the idea of ), on the
other hand, he argues that it wouldnt make sense to imagine that a Pythagorean thought on the
death of the soul during its earthly life in the body. The authors mistake lies in considering, in
both cases, the death of the soul in the body as something definitive, rather than thinking on it
as continually reborn, thus thinking of death as the beginning of a new life, during the course of
metempschsis.
114 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
case of the sma-sma game, in which there is an exchange between mga and
ta. This new etymology enables Socrates to make sense of the image of the body
as perbolos, a coating of the soul, after the image of a desmotrion, a prison.
Among the few scholars on this passage, De Vogel 1981 and Ferwerda 1985
agree that with this etymological proposal Plato rejected the totally pessimistic
view of the body as a tomb in favor of a less definitive image, as that of perbolos
or even jail.
The central theoretical point here is: to say that the body is a coat-
ing and imprisonment of the soul is something much lighter than saying it is its
tomb.
This interpretation of the passage brings it into line with other parts of Pla-
tos conceptual universe, well exemplified by a page from the Phaedo where the
theme of the prison of the soul takes on strong ethical connotations:
314 Significant here is the position expressed by De Vogel 1981: 98: all this, I think, brings out
fairly clearly that those modern authors who write and speak as if the - formula were
the most adequate expression if Platos view of man and human life, can do so only by a certain
misinterpretation of the function of that formula in Platos thought. For in fact, Plato took
human life much more as a challenge than as some kind of penance. On the other hand, it does
not seem to make much sense to show as Ferwerda wants to do 1985: 274 that Platos term
did not necessarily mean cage, but a protective enclosure. Although the proposed
review of the term throughout the rest of the Platonic work is convincing, this does not change
the fact that in the context of this passage, the specific is indicated as
, its more precise meaning.
315 Although Casadio 1991: 124 considers themmetafore che esprimono con gradazione diversa
lo stesso concetto, it is yet possible to think of a more accurate change in direction in the
Platonic exegesis, as we shall see next. Guthrie 1952: 311 agrees with him.
316 Timpanaro Cardini (Pitagorici 1962 II: 229), orig.: risente di tendenze culturali pi vicine
allet di Socrate. See also Nilsson 1935: 205: It may, however, seem doubtful whether the
etymologies (-, -) are quoted from the Orphics or are Platos own
speculations. It may be doubted if such etymological speculations are appropriate for the Or-
phics, and it seems not unlikely that Plato added them as explanatory comments intended to
illuminate the saying. And Casadio 1987: 390: ci che Platone attribuisce agli Orfici lidea
dellespiazione delle colpe, non necessariamente il legame etimologico tra sma e szo. Ne-
vertheless, it is certainly the case to note, with Bernab 2011, ch. 7, that in the two Orphic blades
of Pelinna, dating from the fourth century BC, we find the same idea of liberation of soul from
the body, has just died, has just been born, or three times blessed, these days. Tell Persephone
that Bacchus himself has freed you (see Tortorelli Ghidini 2006: 8485). For arguments in favor
of a now Orphic assignment of the idea of the body as salvation, see Ferwerda 1985: 267.
3.4 Plato and Orphism 115
Those who love knowledge are conscious that philosophy takes their souls, which are in
fact chained, in a word, glued to their bodies, condemned to view all that is as through
the bars of a prison, and not in their own nature, and these souls are wrapped up in igno-
rance. And although they feel the terrible nature of that confinement due to their passion,
those who are chained in their bodies turn out to be the author of their enslavement ().
Therefore, the imprisonment of the soul in the body consists of ignorance and
passion. However, it is still subject to pedagogic intervention from philosophy,
which tries to disengage the soul from the body, expanding the formers vision.
What is important to underline here, in a Platonic perspective, is that the body-
imprisonment image allows this intervention from philosophy, while the simple
body-tomb image does not. And with that, the Platonic moralization of the the-
ories of the immortality of the soul reaches its highest point and at the same time
probably quite distances itself from its Orphic origins.
An unmistakable sign of the new Platonic synthesis of the various etymolo-
gies is a page of the Phaedrus (250c), in which they again appear articulated
and without the slightest sign of tension between them as the two images of
the body as a prison and as a tomb: the souls are at the highest level of their
initiation, along with Zeus, and are described as being ourselves pure and un-
marked in this which we carry around with us and call the body, in which we are
imprisoned like an oyster in its shell (Phaedr. 250c). The reference to the afore-
mentioned etymological game of the Cratylus is evident in the use of the term
asmantos, which we translate as unmarked, but which, while consisting of al-
pha+sma, can and certainly does carry the meaning of not buried, not entom-
bed. So the page may be read as: being ourselves pure and not entombed in
this which we carry around with us, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster
in its shell. Again, the topic sma-sma plays with the meanings of tomb and
sign.
We cannot advance a more precise distinction between the Orphic and Py-
thagorean traditions in regards to their theories of the soul. Some authors sug-
gest that the distinction should be drawn along the lines of an original guilt. In-
itially, Pythagoreans would have considered metempschsis to be a logical con-
sequence of the immortality of the soul, rather than a kind of punishment. How-
ever, the influence exerted by the anthropogonic myth of the Titans and Diony-
sus, with the consequent anthropology of mans dual nature and the necessary
atonement of an original crime, would lead Pythagoreanism to adopt the moral-
ized Orphic conception of metempschsis as punishment.
However, there is
not a single solid textual basis for these claims, which suggests that it is appro-
priate for us to stop at this point.
The Platonic text continually refers to the theories of the immortality of the
soul and of metempschsis, accustoming our ears to the Orphic-Pythagorean
theory of metempschsis. However, this can lead to the misleading impression
that such a theory was common amongst Platos contemporaries. On the contra-
ry, Plato takes up here a rather strange and exotic idea, which he received from
Orphism, probably through Pythagoreanism. The Platonic texts themselves, in
319 Something related to the Orphism states Burkert 1972: 132 had emerged from the
anonymity of back-alley ritual to become respectable.
320 See Casadesus, apud Bernab 2011, ch. 8.
3.4 Plato and Orphism 117
their dialogical fabric, give hints that theories of the immortality of the soul were
strange for the culture of his time. This is the case with Cebes reluctance, in the
Phaedo (69e-70a), to accept that the soul has an existance apart from the body.
Also, Glaucon in the Republic (X: 608d), declares he has never heard of the im-
mortality the soul.
The strangeness of the Pythagorean doctrine of the immortality of the soul
coincides with another oddity, already detected (see. 1.6) in the sources on Pytha-
goreanism: the idea of a koinna that presents itself as a city within a city, an
alternative to the life style of the plis. A conception of the soul that can accom-
modate such a unique political, religious and philosophical experience involves
a breakdown of order, and even a decidedly countercultural alternative to main-
stream life. Indeed, the description of the individual through the history of his
immortal soul is in direct conflict with the biological and social criteria that nor-
mally define it within the plis. No mere sociobiological progeny, but the history
of their previous lives determines their place in society. And this history depends
entirely on an idea of ethical responsibility.
Further proof of a link between Pythagoreanism, memory, and the goddess Mne-
mosyne, is found in the testimony of Theologumena Arithmeticae, a text from the
first Academy that probably refers to the traditions of Speusippus, which attest
that the Pythagoreans called the monad Mnemosyne and the decad
Mneme or Pistis (44 A 13 DK).
Second, knowing Herodotuss irony and his taste for play, it is not hard to
think that not writing the authors names may be a playful reference to the ini-
tiatory silence demanded by Orphic-Pythagorean practices and, especially, to
their commandment to not write them down.
329 The passage does not deserve further consideration, because the discrepancy between two
families of manuscripts, the Roman (AB) and the Florentine (SVR)s has made virtually all
scholars suspect that the information for which the sepulchral uses ,
<> constitutes a late amendment. See Rohde 1898: 439f., Wilamowitz-
Moellendorf 1932: 189, Rathmann 1933: 52ff. and Timpanaro Cardini 195862: 22. Burkert 1972:
127ff. argues but is not totally convincing in favor of the Florentine version and rightly
concludes that the latter would suggest a ritual connection between Pythagoreanism and Or-
phism. Although relevant, therefore, for the discussion of the relationship between Orphism and
Pythagoreanism, the value of the Herodotus testimony of the passage is nullified by the possible
amendment of the reference exactly to Pythagoreanism.
330 See for this discussion also Cornelli 2006.
331 For an extensive discussion of the history of Sybaris along with the Pythagorean domination
on the cities of southern Italy, see Mele 2007: 240247.
332 See for full bibliographic references Burkert 1972: 126 n38. In short: a) Long 1948: 22, Kirk-
Raven-Schofield 1983: 210ff.; b) Morrison 1956: 137, Casadio 1991: 128f., Zhmud 1997: 118ff.; c)
Rathmann 1933: 48ff.
122 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
However, certainly the most significant fact is that the Egyptians in fact did not
have any theory of the immortality of the soul.
333 See for this, already Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 133, Kees 1956: 6, Burkert 1972: 126 n36 and
now Centrone 1996: 55.
334 Burkert 1972: 126 n37, albeit with some exaggeration in his paleo-psychological analysis,
even suggests that the immediate context of the passage of the Histories II. 12, quoted above,
could have led Herodotus to a kind of reminiscence of the theories of metempschsis, origi-
nating in the South of Italy. The passage in question is indeed preceded by information that
Demeter and Dionysus were called by the Egyptians as owners of the hereafter. Both, in turn,
would be revered in Southern Italy.
335 Isocrates, Busiris 2829.
336 The value of Isocrates testimony, however, is doubted by Ries 1961, who detects a strong
Academic influence on the tradition.
3.5 Herodotus, Isocrates and Egypt 123
3.6 Legends on immortality
The same irony is evident in the story of Zalmoxis as reported by Herodotus
(IV. 9496): it is about the saga of the Thracian god Zalmoxis, whom the
Getae (which are defined by the historian as athanatzontas, convinced of
being immortal) believe those who were about to die will meet. They perform
rituals of human sacrifice to this god in the hope that the sacrificed will come
into contact with God after death. This cult is deeply intertwined with the tradi-
tions of the immortality of the soul and the journey model mentioned above, that
is, travels to an afterlife. For this reason, Herodotus, after the description of the
sacrificial rituals, recalls a tale according to which Zalmoxis was in truth, a serv-
ant of Pythagoras:
Then having become free, he gained great wealth, and afterward returned to his own land;
and as the Thracians both live hardly and are rather simple-minded, this Zalmoxis, being
acquainted with the Ionian way of living and with manners more cultivated than the Thra-
cians were used to see, since he had associated with Hellenes, and not only that but with
Pythagoras, Mnesarchus son and not the least able philosopher of the Hellenes, prepared a
banqueting-hall, where he received and feasted the chief men of the tribe and instructed
them meanwhile that neither he himself nor his guests nor their descendants in succession
after them would die; but that they would come to a place where they would live forever
and have all things good. While he was doing these things which have been mentioned,
he was making for himself a chamber under the ground; and when his chamber was fin-
ished, he disappeared from among the Thracians and they grieved for his loss and
mourned for him as dead. Then in the fourth year he appeared to them, and in this way
the things which Zalmoxis said became credible to them.
The low probability that Diogenes Laertius took the legend directly from a dia-
logue of Heraclides Ponticus (as he does not cite any specific text for this)
makes one think of a doxographic reading that is at best second-hand of this tra-
dition. On the other hand, several variants of the same genealogy of Pythagoras
soul are recorded in ancient literature: in all of them, the common element is the
reincarnation in Euphorbus.
Further proof
is that Menelaus shield is, in the tradition of Heraclides, once again, dedicated
to Apollo.
The scant attention the legends about Pythagoras have received must not
make one forget that our most important source for them is the fourth century
BC: Aristotles own book on Pythagoreanism (fragment 191 Rose). In this materi-
al, there are several legends about miracles and wonders wrought by Pythago-
ras: the mirabilia include instances of bi-location, dialogues with a river, divina-
tion, and the significant reference to Pythagoras as Apollo himself. Of course,
our research does not allow an exhaustive analysis of these Aristotelian passag-
es. We once again agree with Burkerts careful analysis 1972: 145 that these leg-
ends should be considered congruent with the mood of the fourth century BC,
and only in later centuries would they be used as a source of ridicule and criti-
cism of Pythagoreanism. The value of these traditions is even more important
when considering the commonly demonstrated intentions of Aristotle to separate
proto-Pythagoreanism from its Platonization by the Academy, which among
other things would have reduced Pythagoras to an alter ego of Plato himself.
The Aristotelian records of the legends have authority and are old enough to be
taken seriously.
342 Centrone 1996: 64 rightly notes that the cult to Apollo was widespread in the Pythagorean
cities of Croton and Metapontum. See also Iambl. VP: 52.
343 Also intriguing, though an allegorical troppo, is the reading that Biondi 2009: 77 proposes
from the passage quoted above from the Iliad: lintervento di Euforbo che svela lidentit
autentica di colui che sembrava Achille: se larmatura simboleggia il corpo, allora lindifesa
nudit rappresenta lanima; dunque lazione di Euforbo potrebbe effettivamente significare, al
di l della lettera del testo omerico, lo svelamento dellanima e la punizione della sua traco-
tanza.
344 See Burkert 1972: 146, in addition to what was said above (1.7), for the use of Py-
thagoreanism within Aristotles anti-Academic controversy.
345 Among the references to mirabilia, it is again the theme of apparent death that is very
present in the literature of the period, we accept that this is the reference of Sophocles Electra:
For a long time ago I saw the wise men who claimed falsely to have died. And then once they
returned home, were received with great honors (Soph. El. 6264). The scholiast wrote down a
reference to Pythagoras beside this passage (Schol. In Soph. 62).
126 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
3.7 A Pythagorean Democritus?
Even more significant is the testimony of Democritus who is described by his
contemporary Glaucus of Reggio as a disciple of a Pythagorean (68 A 1, 38
DK). The tetralogical catalog of his works prepared by Thrasyllus begins its sec-
tion on ethics with the three following works: Pythagoras; On the Disposition of
the Wise Man; On the Things in Hades (68 B 0a-c DK). Proclus knows the content
of the latter work, in which the theme of apparent death appears again:
As is the case with many other ancient philosophers, including Democritus the physicist, in
the writings On Hades stories about people who seemed dead, but instead came back to life
are told.
The very order of the first three ethical works of Democritus points to his depend-
ence on Pythagoreanism. This is suggested by Frank 1923: 67, who commenting
on Pythagoras dedication to his most important ethical work (not accidentally
mentioned first) believes that this is due to the fact that Democritus saw Pytha-
goras as basically the founder of an ethico-religious sect.
With the definition of the soul as that which moves itself, we are already into Aca-
demic territory, and more precisely Xenocrates. Not by chance, a few pages later,
when the discussion of Aristotles predecessors theories of the soul focus a more
precise Academic field, it is stated that some declared the soul to be a self-mov-
ing number (De an. 404b 2930). This is without a doubt the interpretation that
Xenocrates (fragment 165 Isnard Parente) elaborates, in a mathematical and Py-
thagorizing key, of Platos doctrine of the soul as self-moving (Phaedr. 245c-246a;
Leg. X: 895).
Philip 1966: 151, appealing to the distinction Aristotle makes between some Py-
thagoreans (tnes), who think the soul is dust and others (Pythagorizing Aca-
349 De an. 404a 2125.
350 See especially Isnardi Parente 1971: 166f., with which agrees Gemelli 2007: 57.
351 Cherniss 1935: 291 n6. Though without the positivist rancidity of Cherniss (evident in ex-
pressions like earlier superstition), agree with him Rathmann 1933: 1819, Zeller and Mondolfo
1938: 554, Burkert 1972: 120, Guthrie 1962: 306 and Alesse 2000: 397. Casertano 2009: 70 considers
the naturalistic conception of the soul as incontestabilmente pitagorica.
128 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
demics?) who maintain that the soul is what makes dust move, thinks it pos-
sible that Aristotles notion of the former refers to later Pythagoreans of the fifth
century BC who would have accommodated their theory of the soul to contempo-
rary atomism. The hypothesis, however, is incomplete without an explanation of
what pressures these Pythagoreans would feel that would require such an ac-
commodation.
3.8 Aristotle and the Pythagorean myths
Aristotles connection between Pythagorean and atomistic accounts of the soul
comprises at best a reference to the Pythagoreanism of the fifth century
BC, and at worst just a misunderstanding. For that reason, it cannot constitute
an Aristotelian testimony of the theory of the Pythagorean soul.
However, Aristotle himself provides the most explicit philosophical testimo-
ny of the existence of a Pythagorean doctrine of metempschsis. A passage from
the following pages of the De Anima reveals the difficulty of attributing a coher-
ent theory of metempschsis to the early Pythagoreans. Aristotle seems to ini-
tially complain about this difficulty:
All that these [philosophers] do is describe the nature of the soul; they do not try to deter-
mine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were possible, as in the Pytha-
gorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon with any body.
The soul, in the elegant image of Aristotle, resembles an art. As such, it requires
its own instrument, that is, a body. This is contrary to the assumption of the Py-
thagorean myths that any soul can enter any body.
This immediately brings to mind metempschsis.
Most
scholars (Burkert 1972: 121 n3) seem to consider that Aristotle is referring, in the
specific case, not to a single soul and a body, but rather to the general nature of
the relationship between bodies and souls.
A few pages later in the De Anima, Aristotle seems to refine the critique in
407b by indicating that the problem is more specifically that souls enter different
bodies:
The body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the actuality of a certain
kind of body. Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while
it cannot be a body. In fact, it is not a body but something relative to a body, and that is why
it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind, but not as former thinkers did think, who mere-
ly fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or the qualities of that
body, even if is evident that any one thing cannot receive any other thing.
Aristotles criticism must be understood within the context of his theory of the
soul as the entelcheia of a body by which it performs the functions that are al-
ready potentially in the matter which constitutes the body. Therefore, even if it is
evident that any one thing cannot receive any other thing, to claim that any
body can receive any soul is still to operate at too high a level of generality
358 Rathmann 1933: 17ff. agrees with Zeller as much as Maddalena 1954: 340 and Casertano
1987: 19f. Timpanaro Cardini also demonstrates his skepticism that the passage refers to me-
tempschsis, advancing, however, once again, an original explanation for this. According to
her, the example of the carpenter and the flutes unmistakably indicates that the passage cannot
refer to metempschsis, and should instead be simply understood as referring to the association
between body and soul. The reason for this is that it would not make sense that the art of the
luthier was considered by Aristotle as separate from the flute because, in order to improve his
ability, that is, his art, the luthier needs the flute as the soul needs the body (Timpanaro Cardini,
Pitagorici, 195862 III: 214). However, Alesse 2000: 403 n23 rightly notes that Timpanaro Car-
dinis reading depends on a mistaken translation of : Timpanaro Cardini believes that
this is the art of the luthier, while it would be more plausible that Aristotle was referring in this
case, to the art of the flute player, that is, the flute can be used only by one who possesses the art
of playing to perfection that instrument. Aristotle would be saying here: this would be the flute
player, not the luthier. The terms of similarity, however, are quite clear: on the one hand, art and
soul, on the other, the flute and the body, as the body in relation to the soul, the flute is the
matter that is predisposed to accept the art form (of the flutist), and only from him or her, not
that of the carpenter-luthier. Cherniss 1935: 325 n130 suspects that the passage could refer more
precisely to the Platonic theory of the Timaeus of a choice of the body after the first life, thus
representing more an anti-Platonic polemic than an anti-Pythagorean position. Anyhow, there
remains in the passage the reference to metempschsis, which is what is most directly relevant
to our investigation.
359 De an. 414a 1825.
3.8 Aristotle and the Pythagorean myths 131
only a specific kind of body can receive a kind of soul, echoing the same idea
expressed in 407b, in which it is written that any soul could be clothed upon
with any body (v. 23).
Aristotles criticism in the two passages is directed at Pythagorean metem-
pschsis. Aristotle could not admit the possibility of a soul entering into a
body of which it is not the entelcheia, as would happen in the case of the trans-
migration of a human soul into an inferior animal body.
Another lexical mark of this antiquity is the verb used by Aristotle in the
passage from the De Anima (407b 2023) to indicate metempschsis: endomai,
to enter (the soul enters into the body). The same verb is used by Herodotus to
describe the transmigration of the soul when indicating the Egyptian origin of
the theory of metempschsis (Herodt. II. 123, see 3.5). In Plato, the verb is
used in two passages to indicate the metempschsis of a soul that was in a
man and enters into an animal: asses and other beasts of that sort (Phaed. 82a)
or an ape, in the case of the ridiculous Thersites soul within the myth of Er
(Rep. X: 620c). The two Platonic passages illustrate precisely what Aristotle
sees as an absurd consequence of the theory of metempschsis: the possibility
of a human soul entering into the body of an inferior animal.
362 Met. 1074b110. Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of the passages quoted from
Aristotles Metaphysics in the Brazilian Portuguese edition of this book are from G. Reale/M.
Perine (Aristoteles, 2002), with some modifications.
363 See in this sense Alesse 2000: 408.
364 For this identification of the Pythagorean doctrines of the book A of the Metaphysics with
Philolaus Pythagoreanism see Burkert 1972: 236238, Centrone 1996: 105 and Huffman 1993. See
also the historiographical review of the value of Aristotles testimony on Philolaus outlined
above, alongside the first chapter.
365 Alesse 2000: 409411 suggests that, if we enlarge the meaning of the verb to the
semantic sphere of to dress, which also belongs to it, the verb would point immediately to a
wide range of images of the body as a garment of the soul, present in both the Platonic writings
3.8 Aristotle and the Pythagorean myths 133
The Aristotelian vocabulary of the passage suggests, therefore, that it refers
to the ancient traditions of the theory of metempschsis, which Aristotle calls
Pythagorean myths, probably recognizing the source of these doctrines on the
immortality of the soul and its transmigration in proto-Pythagoreanism. Aristotle
thus becomes one of the most reliable sources for the attribution of the theory of
metempschsis to the older Pythagoreans.
3.9 Conclusion
Based on a testimony by Porphyry on the central doctrines of Pythagoras, we
have analyzed the tradition of the theory of the immortality of the soul and its
metempschsis, with the intention, on the one hand, of determining whether
it can be traced back to the practice and doctrine of proto-Pythagoreanism,
and on the other hand, of understanding to what extent it has contributed to
the definition of the category of Pythagoreanism throughout history. The oldest
testimonies attributing that doctrine to Pythagoras suggest two different herme-
neutic routes. First, although old, the theory of the immortality of the soul, apoc-
alyptic by its very nature, does not imply the existence of a dogmatic system of
beliefs. That is to say that throughout the various strata of the Pythagorean tra-
dition, the concept of this immortality significantly differed. Second, as a result
of the first route, it turned out to be necessary to verify how the reception of the
theory by later sources contributed to the construction, through it, of the catego-
ry of Pythagoreanism. The testimonies of Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Ion and Em-
pedocles reveal, albeit in different shades, an unusual feature of the historical
figure of Pythagoras its interest in reconstructing the psychological history
of a person, that is, to define the movements of the metempschsis of his
soul in its palingnesis. These testimonies suggest that metempschsis is quite
an old theory, corresponding to the proto-Pythagorean stratum.
Plato and his work have been identified as crucial places for the exercise of
the two hermeneutical routes mentioned above, and especially for bringing up
the vexata quaestio of the relations between Pythagoreanism and Orphism.
The study of the references to this second movement in the Platonic work, espe-
cially in the passages that relate to the theories of the immortality of the soul,
has outlined a precise historiographical scheme by which Plato indeed reached
(Phaed. 86e-88b) and in Empedocles fragment 126. A garment that turns out to have also the
meaning of a tomb in the tradition of the body as the tomb of the soul; close to an Orphic
sensitivity.
134 3 Immortality of the soul and metempschsis
the Orphic theories through a mediation by Pythagoreanism. It is assumed by
this thesis that Pythagoreanism was an intellectual and aristocratic reform of Or-
phism as such. A clear sign of this Pythagorean mediation is the moralization of
metempschsis. Platos proposal for a hierarchy of incarnations, as well as the
etymology of the Orphic motto sma-sma, point to a dependency in his work on
the Pythagorean transposition of the Orphic theories of immortality. Thus, Plato
also becomes a reliable source for the existence of a proto-Pythagorean theory of
the soul and for a close relationship between that same theory and its Orphic
origin. This relationship was described as a mytho-logic exegesis by Pythagorean-
ism of the Orphic traditions, in the manner of the Derveni papyrus. The immor-
tality of the soul and metempschsis are important both for Platos own concep-
tion of ethics and for his theory of knowledge: anmnsis, fundamentally linked
to the exercise of memory, refers directly to the practices of histora of the soul
and knowledge of its palingnesis, that, as was said above, are attributed to Py-
thagoras by testimonies contemporary with him. In short, Plato, revealing his
debts to Orphism, ends up pointing directly to the philosophical blending that
Pythagoreanism must have developed from the former.
While the testimonies of Herodotus, Isocrates, Democritus and the legends
of immortality and the apparent deaths do not allow firm philological or histor-
iographical conclusions, one finds in Aristotle the most explicit testimony of the
existence of a proto-Pythagorean theory of metempschsis. In summary, the use
of the term mthoi to refer to these Pythagorean doctrines of the soul suggests
that Aristotle considered them sufficiently old, and therefore in all probability
proto-Pythagorean. The Aristotelian lexicon ultimately reveals proto-Pythagor-
eanism as the source of the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and its trans-
migration. In fact, in relation to mathematical doctrines, concerning another mo-
ment of Pythagoreanism, the one usually identified by Philolaus and Archytas in
the fifth century BC, Aristotle never refers to myths.
It is with these mathematical doctrines, notably absent from Porphyrys
summary of Pythagoras most celebrated doctrines, that we began this chapter,
and to which we will direct our attention in the fourth and final chapter.
Before that, it is important to point out that attributing a theory of metem-
pschsis to proto-Pythagoreanism means much more than simply recognizing
a dialogue between the latter and the Orphic culture of its time. For, in itself,
the theory of transmigration of the immortal soul assumes the theory of the uni-
versal kinship referred to in Porphyrys summary.
The influence of Franks skepticism is such that even Cherniss 1935, who
disagrees with Frank about the value of Aristotles testimony, agrees with Franks
interpretation of the connection between the Aristotelian dgma that all is num-
ber and ancient Pythagoreanism. The consensus of scholars is especially im-
pressive when it comes to the value to be given to Philolaus fragments, which
we regard as one of the fundamental loci of this debate:
367 See for this 1.1.
The fragments attributed to Philolaus are surely spurious, since they contain elements that
cannot be older than Plato. Erich Frank has gathered the evidence against the fragments;
and, apart from his own theory as to their origin and his conclusion of certain very weak
arguments [] his analysis makes it superfluous to restate the overwhelming case against
them.
More recently, authors like Burkert 1972: 238277 and Kirk, Raven and Schofield
1983: 324 have subjected Franks arguments to critical review. Especially signifi-
cant are Huffmans efforts, both in his 1988 article and especially in his mono-
graph devoted entirely to Philolaus and the problems of the authenticity of his
fragments (Huffman 1993): the first book devoted entirely to the philosopher
of Croton after Boeckhs 1819 monograph.
Reasons for such confidence are not absent. Indeed, in Aristotle, the assign-
ment of the doctrine of all is number to the Pythagoreans is recurring and ul-
timately summarizes his interpretation of Pythagoreanism.
Aristotle states repeatedly that:
1) They thought the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things
2) and the whole heaven to be a harmony and a number (Met. 986a 3).
4) They say numbers are the things themselves (Met. 987b 28).
5) Those [philosophers] say that things are numbers (Met. 1083b 17).
Six times, Aristotle makes the Pythagoreans affirm that reality as a whole (t
nta, tn hlon ourann, t prgmata) is a number.
In contrast, seven other times, Aristotle seems to suggest that the Pythagoreans
say something slightly different:
1) There is no other number than the number by which the world is consti-
tuted (Met. 990a 21).
2) For the Pythagoreans there is only the mathematical number, but they
say that it is not separate and that, but that sensible substances are composed
of it
3) because they build the entire heaven with numbers (Met. 1080b 16
19).
372 See for the citations, Heath 1921: 67, Guthrie 1962: 229ff. and Huffman 1988: 5 and 1993: 57.
373 Orig.: ,
(Met. 986a 3).
374 Orig.: , , (Met. 986a 21).
375 Orig.: (Met. 987b 28).
376 Orig.: (Met. 1083b 17).
377 Orig.: (Met. 1090b 23).
378 Orig.:
(Met. 990a 21).
379 Orig.: , ,
.
(Met. 1080b 1619).
380 Orig.: , [] (Met. 1083b 11).
4.1 All is number? 139
5) They assumed that real things are numbers, but not in a separate way,
rather, that real things are composed of numbers (Met. 1090a 2324).
6) They derived the physical bodies from the numbers (Met. 1090a 32).
7) Those who believe that heaven is made of numbers reached the same re-
sult as them [the Pythagoreans] (De caelo 300a 16).
In the above quotes, Aristotle makes the Pythagoreans claim more precisely that
the foundation of the world is ex arithmn, that is, numbers are constitutive of
and therefore immanent in the world.
This variability of the Aristotelian lectio marks his whole approach to Pytha-
goreanism (Burkert 1972: 45). We have already noted the difficulties that Aristotle
has in expressing Pythagorean doctrines in the terms of his philosophy (3.8).
Here the presentation of the doctrine of all is number by Aristotle is, at
worst, contradictory, and at best presents three different versions.
In addition
to the first version, which identifies numbers with sensitive objects, two other
versions are provided by Aristotle.
The second identifies the principles of numbers with the principles of the
real things:
The so-called Pythagoreans are contemporary and even prior to these philosophers [Leu-
cippus and Democritus]. They have applied first in mathematics, making them grow, and
nurtured by them, believed that their principles were the principles of all beings.
This claim is closely related to the above quote from Met. 986a 3, which is stated
in terms of stoichea instead of archa.
The third version is that real objects imitate numbers, as suggested by a fa-
mous passage in which a parallel is drawn with the Platonic conception of par-
ticipation:
381 Orig.: , ,
(Met. 1090a 2324).
382 Orig.: (Met. 1090a 32).
383 Orig.: (De caelo 300a 16).
Huffman 1988: 5 n15 and 1993: 57 n2 rightly observes that Aristotle includes, in these, also the
atomists.
384 Cherniss 1935: 386, Zhmud 1989: 284286 and Huffman 1993: 60 reproduce that same
tripartion.
385 Met. 985b 2326.
140 4 Numbers
The Pythagoreans say that beings exist by imitating the numbers. Plato, on the contrary,
says it is by participation, changing only the name. In any case, either one or the other ne-
glected equally to indicate what participation and imitation of ideas mean.
The first claim, that things are numbers, is clearly inconsistent with the other
two. Cherniss 1935: 387 rightly notes that Aristotle seeks to reconcile the first
claim with the second, that numbers are principles of all things. His attempt de-
pends on his claim that the Pythagoreans derived all of reality from the number
one, a theory that is not present in the sources, and apparently confuses Pytha-
gorean cosmology with their theory of numbers (Cherniss 1935: 39). Aristotle
himself seems to recognize this approach to be bankrupt:
These philosophers also did not explain how the numbers are causes of substances and
being. Are they causes as limits of greatness, and just as Eurytus established the number
of each thing? (For example, a number for man, one for the horse, reproducing with peb-
bles the shape of the living beings, similar to the numbers that refer to the figures of the
triangle and the square [] .
Tannery 1887b: 258ff., Cornford 1923: 7ff. and even Cherniss 1935: 387, fascinated
by Eurytuss primitive atomistic-numerical method, found it to be quite old.
They all essentially follow Franks hypothesis (1923: 50) that the theory was bor-
rowed by Archytas from Democritus. Not coincidentally, the citation from
386 Met. 987b 1114.
387 Met. 1092b813.
388 Cherniss 1951: 336.
389 See what was said above in relation to numerical atomism as the fundamental model of the
Pythagorean scientific system to Cornford (1.5).
4.1 All is number? 141
Met. 985b 2326 refers to the atomists Leucippus and Democritus. Moreover, it
has been suggested that some of Zenos arguments against plurality presuppose
a Pythagorean theory of numerical atomism.
On this interpretation, the number is still itself a thing (Burkert 1972: 265).
Thus, the second sense of all is number, by which the principles of the
numbers were the principles of all things, will correspond more readily to
what Cherniss 1935: 390 defines as an Aristotelian construction of the Pythagor-
ean theory. Aristotle would have been led to this synthesis, on the one hand, by
his difficulty in accepting the overly simplistic material notion of number as
analogous with Eurytus pebbles, and on the other hand, by considering it
more logical to understand the existence of the Pythagorean numbers in the
same way as the Platonists treated them, that is, by considering the arithmo
as archa. But with this move, Aristotle moves the problem of a Pythagorean
theory of numbers into an Academic sphere. In fact, Frank 1923: 255 suggests
that the source of this misunderstanding in Aristotle is in fact Speusippus;
therefore, part of the Academy was deeply connected to the Pythagorean tradi-
tions. Speusippus is directly quoted by Aristotle in the Metaphysics (1085a 33),
390 See also what was said on that point at (1.5).
391 However, it is not appropriate to mention all of them here. For arguments against Franks
thesis, see Cherniss 1935: 388389. For arguments against the controversial Zenonian thesis, see
Burkert 1972: 285289.
392 Nussbaum 1979: 90.
393 Is itself a thing (Burkert 1972: 265). In the same context, Burkert rightly notes that it
should not be forgotten that the has a certain aristocratic sound, which refers to what
counts in the sense of being important, worthwhile to be counted. The term can be so
approximated to the pre-Socratic .
142 4 Numbers
when he mentions those according to whom the point is not one, but similar to
one that is, hoon t hn. The point, in fact, plays a central role in Speusippus
work; Speusippus was both a scholar of Philolaus and openly declared that he
based his writings on the latter. This statement is located in fragment 4
(Lang), preserved by Nicomachus as part of his book On the Pythagorean num-
bers. This fragment is clear evidence of the Academic origin of the principles
of the Pythagorean theory of numbers. In this vein, Speusippus would assert
when considering the generation: the first principle from which greatness gen-
erates is the one, the second the line, the third the surface, the fourth the solid
(44 A 13 DK = Fr. 4 Lang).
394 Cherniss 1935: 391 considers the probability of Aristotle having also derived entirely from
Speusippus the list of opposites from Met. 986a 22, though simply as the most well-rounded list
that was available to him. Without denying, therefore, the possibility that there could be other
lists that could be originally Pythagoreans.
395 Met. 985b 2732.
4.1 All is number? 143
Therefore, it is in this sense of homoimata that the reference to mmsis must be
understood.
The analogy between numbers and Eurytus pebbles (Met. 1092b 813) also
relates to conceptions of similitude and imitation. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in
his commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics, explains the reasoning which would
have led to the imitative connection between justice and the number four:
Assuming that the specific nature of justice be proportionality and equality, and realizing
that this property is present in numbers, for this reason the Pythagoreans used to say that
justice is the first square number; [] This figure some used to say it was four, as it is the
first square, and also because it is divided into equal parts and is equal to the product of
these (indeed, it is two times two).
Burkert 1972: 4445 notes that this conception of mmsis, even if the terminol-
ogy is Aristotles, must correspond to a pre-Platonic theory. The fundamental
idea of magic or of Hippocratic medicine is that of a two-way match between
two entities (body and cosmos, art and nature). In this specific case, there is a
two-way match between the cosmos and number the cosmos imitates number,
and vice versa. Cornford 1922 considered this idea of imitation rather ancient,
precisely because of its mystical nature; he uses etymology (mmos = actor) to
connect the term to Dionysian cults and the fact that the protagonists of the
cults play the role of god himself:
At that stage likeness to God amounts to temporary identification. Induced by orgiastic
means, by Bacchic ecstasy or Orphic sacramental feast, it is a foretaste of the final reunion.
In Pythagoreanism the conception is toned down, Apollinized. The means is no longer ec-
stasy or sacrament, but thera, intellectual contemplation of the universal order.
Against these hypotheses, however, the fact that Aristotle actually does not indi-
cate the imitation of prgmata, but of abstract realities such as justice, time, etc.,
plays an important role.
We can conclude that the three versions of the doctrine all is number (that
of identification, of the numbers as principles and of imitation) appear imper-
fectly articulated and ultimately contradictorily within Aristotles work.
However, it is significant that Aristotle never mentions that the three differ-
ent lectiones of all is number belong to different groups of Pythagoreans. He
seems to consider them, if not coherent among themselves, at least reconcilable,
and refers to them all without distinction as defining the so-called Pythagor-
eans.
Recognition of this fact has led several authors to adopt conciliatory solu-
tions to the problem. First of all, Zeller himself. Although he felt that Aristotles
testimony should be taken with all due care, its historical proximity to the Pytha-
gorean doctrines should support its authenticity. Thus, for Zeller:
No doubt that in Aristotles exposure we must seek first of all and only his own way of see-
ing, and not an actual and immediate testimony of reality, however even in this case [that
of the numerical theory], everything speaks in favor of a recognition of the fact that his way
of seeing was based on a direct knowledge of the actual connection of the very ideas of
Pythagoreanism.
Frank 1923: 77 n196 and Rey 1933: 116, seeking to show the possibility of the
compability of the three versions of all is number, imagine that Aristotle un-
derstood the different versions to be logically derived from one another. Rey
draws up a proposed compromise between the version of numbers being the
things and that of numbers imitating things: numbers would be things when con-
sidering their nature and would imitate things when one would consider their
400 This is also one of the reasons which forces one to reject Burnets hypothesis (1908: 355)
and Taylor 1911:178ff., taken up also by Delatte 1922a: 108ff. Whereby Pythagoreanism would be
the inventor of the theory of the Platonic forms. Thus, Burnet 1908: 355: the doctrine of forms
(ed, idai) originally took shape in Pythagorean circles, perhaps under Sokratic influence.
401 For these reasons, it is unfounded from a methodological point of view to use only Aristotle
to say anything about an alleged mathematical design in proto-Pythagoreanism.
402 Zeller and Mondolfo 1932: 486, orig.: non vh dubbio che nella esposizione di Aristotele
noi dobbiam cercare anzi tutto e soltanto il suo proprio modo di vedere, e non unimmediata
testimonianza sulla realt di fatto. Tuttavia anche in questo caso tutto parla in favore di un
riconoscimento del fatto che questo suo modo di vedere si fondasse su una diretta conoscenza
della effettiva connessione didee propria del pitagorismo.
4.1 All is number? 145
properties (Rey 1933: 356ff.
In an open controversy with Cornford 1923: 10 and his idea that Aristotle failed to
distinguish two moments of Pythagoreanism (a first one on the idea of the ma-
teriality of numbers, and a second one where the Pythagoreans would be more
concerned with the numerical make-up of reality), Raven proposes instead a rad-
ical inseparability of the dual use of these senses within ancient Pythagorean-
ism.
We can say at the very least that the idea of mmsis that Aristotle attributed
to the Pythagoreans has little to share with the Platonic conception of mmsis
according to which phenomenal realities mimic the forms, in the sense of
being made similar to supra-sensible realities of a higher ontological level.
If this observation is correct, what Aristotle must attribute to the Pythagoreans
when speaking of mmsis cannot be anything other than a generic correspond-
ence between things and the numerical relationships that explain them and
make them intelligible. Casertano summarizes the matter very well:
Immanent intelligibility, therefore, and not transcendent to the same things. This is why the
Pythagorean formula, things are numbers and things are similar to numbers, are not
contrasted, but rather are expressions of the same basic intuition, which is one of homo-
geneity between reality and thought, between the laws of reality and the laws of thought:
403 For the criticism of Franks and Reys proposal, see both Cherniss 1935: 386 and Burkert
1972: 44 n86.
404 Raven 1948: 63.
405 Cornford 1923: 10 says in effect that: Aristotle himself draws attention to the two diverse
ways of making numbers the causes of substances and being, which, in my view, are cha-
racteristic of the two different schools of Pythagoreans.
406 See Guthrie 1962: 230f. for a similar idea.
146 4 Numbers
to comprehend things is essentially to mirror them, to reproduce at the mental level that
fully intelligible structure, which is characteristic of material reality.
This second
possibility corresponds to the classic position of Burnet, in which Pythagoras
himself left no developed doctrine on the subject, while the Pythagoreans of
the fifth century did not care to add anything of the sort to the school tradition
(Burnet 1908: 119).
For example, only in this way could the Pythagorean arch be an antag-
onist of the Ionic material cause. At the same time, terminological imprecision in
the Pythagorean sources (which Aristotle himself complains about in Met. 1092b
113) allows the postulation of Pythagorean numbers as the precursor of the Pla-
tonic formal cause. Even if number did not already have this dual valence, Aris-
totle would probably have invented it, for it fits to perfection within his doxo-
graphic model.
Thus, the postulation that all is number would have been Aristotles sol-
ution to a historiographical problem, and in some ways the beginning of a
long tradition which, starting with Zeller (Zeller and Mondolfo 1938: 435), re-
duced the category of Pythagoreanism to the narrow limits of this metaphysical
doctrine.
The first solution leaves us at a hermeneutic impasse: Aristotle himself in-
vented a historiographic category (the so-called Pythagoreans) and a doctrinal
common denominator defining it (all is number). The second solution seeks to
avoid tracing the category back to a mere invention by undertaking a reassess-
ment of the Pythagorean sources of the fifth century BC for possible historical
references to Aristotles term so-called Pythagoreans.
Let us start with an important observation: the great number of references to
Pythagoreanism and their theory of numbers in Aristotle reveals an indisputable
fact: Aristotle must have really had several Pythagorean texts on his desk.
The
certainty with which Aristotle presents some statements about the Pythagoreans
seems to presuppose his access to a sufficiently broad literature of their author-
ship. Consider the debate whether the Pythagoreans considered the world to be
generated or not. Aristotle says it is impossible to doubt it: There is no reason to
doubt whether the Pythagoreans do or do not introduce generation of things
which are eternal (Met. 1091a 13). Likewise, he appears to be absolutely certain
that the Pythagoreans had not philosophized about sensible bodies: They did
not say anything about fire nor earth, or on other bodies (Met. 990a 1617).
Moreover, tradition informs us that Aristotle devoted at least two books to
the Pythagoreans, not to mention the works devoted specifically to Pythagoras
or particular Pythagoreans such as Archytas.
The reference to the letter alludes even more strongly to the pseudo-epigraphy of
the tradition in question: it was quite common in ancient times for a pseudo-epi-
graphic text to be accompanied by a letter from an esteemed authority, which
would attest beyond any suspicion to the authenticity of the work (Burkert
1972: 224).
The claim that Philolaus wrote three books must have been erroneously de-
rived from the parallel attribution of three books to Pythagoras himself. This in-
ference was not without reason: unlike Diogenes Laertius (Vitae VIII. 6), the
the first person, hiding behind his characters as well as the use of quoting his predecessors with
extreme parsimony, plays a decisive role in the appearance of such an issue.
415 D. L. Vitae VIII. 15.
4.1 All is number? 151
greater tradition had always identified Philolaus as the first writer on Pythagor-
eanism.
Starting with Wiersma 1942, a new consensus that Philolaus wrote a single
book has arisen among historians.
The Hermippus tradition seems, for all purposes, older. Two things confirm this:
first, the fact that there was no need for a Platonic letter of attestation and, sec-
ondly, because the intent of this tradition is alien to the very question to the
texts authenticity. Hermippus was indeed more interested in accusing Plato of
plagiarizing Philolaus in his Timaeus than of selling Philolaus book as a Pytha-
gorean original. Moreover, ancient sources independently attest to the plagia-
rism of the Timaeus.
Both Hermippus charge against Plato and the testimony of Timon presuppose
the existence of Philolauss book. And, even though it might not have been pur-
chased by Plato himself, the book must have been in some way available to both
Plato and Aristotle in Athens.
416 Wiersma was followed on this, among others, by Maddalena 1954: 169, Philip 1966: 41,
Burkert 1972: 225, Huffman 1993: 26 and Centrone 1996: 119.
417 D. L. Vitae VIII. 85.
418 In truth, the tradition of Platos plagiarism is actually quite extensive. See, for a long section
dedicated to the accusations of plagiarism, D.L Vitae III. 918. For a recent discussion of the
question, see Brisson 2000b: 3545.
419 44 A 8 DK = Gell. III 17, 6. The same tradition is remembered by Iamblichus in his In-
troduction to Arithmetic by Nicomachus (105), which mentions the book as being written by
Timaeus of Locri. For a recent critical edition of the book, see Timaeus Locrus (ed. Marg 1972).
420 Huffman 1993: 30 defends the authenticity of the booklet against suspicions that Timon
himself was a fake Academic, by arguing that his reference to the smallness of Philolaus book
would point to it its pre-Socratic origin, since pre-Socratic books would all have been of reduced
152 4 Numbers
There is even a document confirming this, which comes from the 1893 dis-
covery of the papyrus catalogued as Anonymus Londinensis (44 A 2728 DK).
The text is attributed to Aristotles disciple, Meno, and presents excerpts from
medical doctrines attributed to Philolaus.
Philolaus of Croton said that our body is made of heat. That it does not participate in the
cold is deduced by certain facts such as: the sperm, which has the property of producing
the living being, is hot. [] The desire for outside air is born precisely from this need,
that our body, being too hot, by breathing that air, it will cool down when in contact
with it. [] Diseases are generated either by bile or blood or mucus; these are the causes
for the emergence of diseases.
Moreover, med-
ical terminology is also present in Platos Timaeus (Burkert 1972: 227). Thus, the
papyrus represents some evidence that Plato may have plagiarized from Philo-
laus can also be approximated to the tradition of the charging of Plato with pla-
giarism, thereby making it even more reliable.
4.1.3.2 Authenticity of Philolaus fragments
Although we have demonstrated that Philolaus likely wrote a single book, the
Philolaic problem is far from solved. It suffers the same historiographical prob-
lems that accompany all ancient Pythagorean literature. Unlike most other criti-
cism, the burden of proof for a Pythagorean texts authenticity generally falls on
those who propose it as authentic, because the general assumption is that every-
thing must be spurious.
These scholars argument does not add up mainly because they seem to con-
veniently forget that Philolaus book was followed by a huge effort in the pseu-
do-epigraphic period to forge all the Pythagorean texts: Thesleffs collection
(1965) has about two hundred pages worth of texts. Given, therefore, this luxu-
rious (Huffmans term, 1993: 27) pseudo-epigraphic tradition, it would be
strange that the works of Philolaus would have been immune to forgery.
Aris-
totle also says that Platos philosophy follows in many respects that of the Pytha-
goreans and presents itself primarily as a synthesis between Socrates and Pytha-
goras (Met. 987a 29).
Not coincidentally, the Life of Pythagoras that Photius reproduces in his Bib-
liotheca, revealing a genealogical intent also typical of late Platonism, puts Plato
as the ninth successor to Pythagoras, and Aristotle as the tenth: Plato, who had
been disciple of the older Archytas became, as they say, the ninth Diadochos of
Pythagoras, and Aristotle was the tenth (Phot. Bibl. 249.438b 1617).
However, with the skeptical turn of the Middle Academy headed by Arcesi-
laus, the Platonic tradition ultimately identifies itself more firmly with the Soc-
ratic side, and Pythagoras becomes both a new problem and the solution to an-
other one.
Numenius history
of Platonic philosophy was controversially titled: On the divergence between the
Academics and Plato. His conclusion is simply that true Platonism is Pythagor-
eanism (fr. 24, 7379), despite what the Academics, identified in his book sim-
ply with the skeptics, were saying.
What matters here, however, is simply that Aristotle is comparing the Pytha-
goreans and Plato, in the terms of his own philosophy (aitai, stoichea), and
finding deep analogies in their ontological systems. In the lines immediately fol-
lowing, the analogy is summed up as follows:
As for the statement that the One is substance and not something different from what it
predicates, Plato is very close to the Pythagoreans and, like the Pythagoreans, considers
the numbers as the cause of the substance of other things.
The Platonic theory of principles stands apart from the Pythagorean tradition in
two ways: first, by positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and
small, instead of treating the infinite as one, and second, because of Plato
placing the numbers (arithmo) outside the sensible things (par t aistht),
while those [the Pythagoreans] hold that the numbers are aut t prgmata
and do not have the matematik as intermediaries (metax) between the latter
and the former (987b 2529). This latter difference corresponds to what Aristo-
tle considers a typical Platonic error (Kahn 2001: 63). The second difference re-
flects the Platonic doctrine of chrisms, that is, the separation of shapes/num-
bers from the sensible world, which Aristotle considers to have been a Platonic
error (Kahn 2001: 63) which arose within the Socratic dialectic, and was thus ab-
sent from Pythagorean philosophy.
Plato and the Pythagoreans are similar not only in separating the real ontologi-
cal element from the nature of things, but also for understanding that, without
the aristos dys, the world could not be generated. From this perspective, the
postulation of the indefinite dyad as one of the principles is absolutely necessa-
ry. We are, therefore, already in Academic ground.
However, the cited passage of Aristotles Metaphysics leaves no doubt that
this difference does really exist. Aristotles decision to attribute this doctrine
to Pythagoreanism as a whole, rather than to particular characters, suggests
that it is not a hpax legmena, but as stated above (4.1.1) a piece of a bigger
puzzle, which contributed to the very definition of the Pythagorean conception of
the principles of the world. Shortly before, in fact, Aristotle assigns to the Pytha-
goreans in continuity with other Italics (Empedocles and Parmenides) and
Anaxagoras a theory of the two principles:
The Pythagoreans likewise affirmed two principles, but added the following peculiarities:
they considered that the limited, the unlimited and the one were not attributes of other re-
alities (for instance, fire or earth or something else), but the very unlimited and the one
were the substance of the things that are not predicated, and therefore number was the
substance of all things.
Here, the two Pythagorean principles are called peperasmnon and peiron, that
is, limited and unlimited. However, Aristotle, with the phrase ka t hn, adds a
third principle, the one. How can we understand the fact that Aristotle announ-
ces two principles but ends up identifying three: limited, unlimited and the
one? The acknowledgment of this contradiction in Aristotles testimony
makes some authors exclude the expression ka t hn from the passage.
Despite the possible Platonizing slide, which shows how tempting the Pla-
tonic derivation system is, the first statement, that numbers themselves are
created from the principles, is still in compliance with all of the Aristotelian lec-
tio. As will be seen in the comparison with Philolaus, this interpretation must
correspond precisely to the thought of the Pythagoreans.
Confirmation of the idea that number is composed of both principles, limit-
ed and unlimited, appears clearly in the passage immediately preceding this dis-
cussion, in which the Pythagoreans
claim as constituents of the number, the odd and the even, from which the first is unlimited
and the second limited. The One stems from both elements, because it is even and odd at
the same time. From One there proceeds then number, and numbers, as we said, would
constitute the entire universe.
obvious, because it is a Platonic author, and therefore an argument in favor of the authenticity of
. See for that Burkert 1972: 3537, Centrone 1996: 111 and Huffman 1993: 206.
457 The possibility of an unconscious slip by Aristotle is an argument that actually would
methodologically require impossible verifications. And yet, it is suggested both by Burkert 1972:
36 and by Huffman 1993: 206.
458 Met. 986a 1721.
164 4 Numbers
This derivation does indeed make the one to be both even and odd, and as such,
the principle of numbers. Here, the two principles are odd and even, while lim-
ited and unlimited appear to be only their attributes. Aristotle explains this cor-
relation between even and limited on one side, and odd and unlimited on the
other, in a difficult passage of the Physics (203a). The same idea reappears
also in his fragment 199 (Rose), probably taken from one of his books on the Py-
thagoreans, and finds a significant echo in the idea of artiopritton, the even-
odd from fragment 5 by Philolaus, which we will soon consider.
The most significant difference that Aristotle perceives between the Pytha-
goreans and Plato is, however, still connected to the idea of chrisms, as it ap-
pears in the central passage of Met. 987b 2533, and makes him conclude that
for the Pythagoreans numbers are the things themselves. Of course, this state-
ment has cosmological importance. Indeed, in relation to the two issues we
are discussing, that is, both that of the identity between numbers and reality
as well as the generation of numbers from the principles of limited and unlim-
ited, Aristotle undertakes a description in cosmological terms (Burkert 1972:
31 ff.). This appears most clearly in the passage of the Physics where he deals
with the void:
Also the Pythagoreans affirmed the existence of the void, which enters the heavens by the
unlimited breath, as if heavens breathed, and that void borders the nature of things, as if
the void was something separate and bordered things in succession. And this happens pri-
marily in numbers, because the void demarcates its nature.
Here, the unlimited is not only an ontological principle separate from reality, as
was the Platonic infinite dyad, but also something that is inspired by the heav-
ens to give rise to the multiplicity of beings. A page of the Metaphysics mirrors
the same ontological vision:
To be sure, they clearly state that once the One is formed be it with plans, with colors,
with seeds, with hardly definable elements immediately the part of the unlimited that
was closer to it began to be attracted and demarcated by limit.
Timpanaro Cardini (Pitagorici, 195862 III: 154) notes that this could be Aristo-
tles description of a number of doctrines that were developed by ancient Pytha-
goreanism to explain how the one was formed. The plan would be a first, geo-
metric, hypothesis; chroi, color, would correspond to a bodys surface, that
459 Phys. 313b 2327.
460 Met. 1091a 1518.
4.1 All is number? 165
is, its pras, which is not identifiable with the actual body.
A third hypothesis,
which postulated sprma, is reminiscent of fragment 13 of Philolaus (44 B 13 DK)
and its claim all things sprout and grow because of the seed.
The generation of the cosmos is thus described in embryological terms as the
birth of a living organism, in a way similar to early embryological theoriesin
which the generation of the embryo takes place through breathing.
The em-
bryological terminology and the premise of a macrocosm-microcosm correspond-
ence refer to a more ancient, in all likelihood pre-Socratic, origin of this doc-
trine.
Platos methodology, and its deliberate use of dual principles, aims to draw
a contrast with a problematic, heuristic method. Certain wise men of today (hoi
d nn tn anthrpn sopho, the syntactical construction of the expression
leaves no doubt about the irony of this) merely place One at random, immedi-
ately passing to the infinite (17a), and escaping contemporarily from the inter-
mediate realities (17a). Plato, on the other hand, carefully follows a road
(hods, 16b) the method of dialectic which will correctly solve the problem
of the relation of the unity with the infinite, as well as permit a solution to
the greater problem of determining the place of pleasure in the good life.
Protarchus, who seems unable to even keep up with the improvised meta-
physical turn of the argument, throws in the towel (17a). However, Socrates re-
plies with two clarifying examples. The first, annoyingly didactic, is the sound
emitted by our mouth when pronouncing the letters of the alphabet.
This
sound is at the same time one (ma) and infinite possibility (peiros a plthei),
for whom utters it (17b). But understanding grammar does not consist in know-
ing the dual nature of a sound as an infinity and a unity, but rather consists in
knowing the quantities and qualities (psa ka opoa) of sound in each syllable
and their relation in a sentence.
466 There does not seem to be reason to doubt it, not even wanting to be too conservative in
relation to the expression the things that we always say are things that be, as Mazzarelli
(Platone, 1991) and Striker 1970, among others, want to be: in the context of the stability of
predication, the axis of the issue does not seem to be this one, but rather, on the contrary, the
correspondence of this stability of the being with things that be. See Migliori 1993: n96.
467 See, indeed, the resulting irritation of Protarchus with by which Socrates seems to
want to tangle Sophistically his interlocutors (Phlb. 19a).
468 The idea is, as yet, only hinted at inside the development of the argument in this page from
Philebus; it will be resumed and more fully developed below, along the same dialogue.
168 4 Numbers
The second example chosen by Socrates is musical. He argues that knowing
three tones, one low, one high, and one intermediate, still does not make us mu-
sical experts:
But, my friend, when you have grasped the number of the intervals in respect to high and
low pitch, and the limits of the intervals, and all the combinations derived from them,
(which the men of former times discovered and handed down to us, their successors,
with the name of harmonies, and also when the said that even as regards to the movements
of the body, corresponding effects are verified, which as they are measured by numbers,
those men said they must be called rhythms and measures, and at the same time, they
said that we must also understand that every unity and multiplicity should be considered
in this way); thus, when you have also grasped those facts, you will then become a connois-
seur of music, and when you have obtained and understood, by analyzing it, any of the
unities, then you will become a deep and intelligent knower of the object of your analysis.
But the infinity of things, the infinite multiplicity that is present in each one of them, in any
and every case makes you unfit of thinking deeply and hinder that you be a distinguished
man, one whose value has been recognized, so long as you have never recognized in any-
thing any number
Therefore, the analysis of music requires careful knowledge of limits, intervals
and correlations between different sounds; this will be knowledge of the num-
bers that constitute the sounds.
The two examples draw on the way in which we can explain reality through
an appeal to the web of relationships that constitute the infinite number of
things and the infinite number that is present in each one them (Migliori
1993: 108). The discovery of this systematic explanation is attributed to Platos
predecessors (hoi prsthen).
Platos text draws an analogy between the goodness of a life of many, mixed
goods and the ontological structure of reality as a mix of pras and peiron. What
matters most to us is Socrates reference in the summary (23c-d) to a divine rev-
elation of the dual nature of limited and unlimited:
SOCR. Let us take some of the subjects of our present discussion. PROT. What subjects?
SOCR. We said that God revealed, somehow, the presence of the unlimited and the limited
in things that be, did we not? PROT. Certainly. SOCR. We, therefore, assumed these two as
469 Pace Gaiser 1988: 84, both dialectics and the theory of principles are indicated, by the
Socratic statements in the Philebus, as having its origin among the ancients, and not as Platonic
creations.
470 See for this quote Huffman 1993: 162.
4.1 All is number? 169
two of our genres, and as a third one, that made by a certain combination of these first
two.
Leaving aside for a moment the introduction of a combined genre, consider the
assertion of a divine revelation. This insistent reference to a divine origin empha-
sizes the value that Plato gives to the theory of the limiting and the unlimited.
Socrates begins the dialogue by declaring his fear of the gods several times
(12c). On the other hand, the revelation should not be thought of as something
complete or definitive to assume that revelations are absolutely true would
suggest a Platonic influence on the dogmatic readings of the Jewish-Christian-Is-
lamic matrix, that is, the so-called religions of the Book.
A revelation, on the
contrary, could be understood like something of noble origin which must be con-
tinued: as a commitment to follow through in the future with something given,
rather than being something static or dogmatic.
These passages from the Philebus, central to the definition of the dialectics
of the limited and unlimited, reveal the Pythagorean roots of the Platonic theory
of the principles. This makes them a pre-Aristotelian testimony on Pythagorean
philosophy. These ancient, Pythagorean roots are recognized by Platos own
text, and then reinterpreted by the Academy, which, in a certain sense, continues
to mediate the Pythagorean dialectical-metaphysical effort.
Although the Pythagoreans are the source of the dialectical argument in the
Philebus, the final argument is the fruit of the Platonic philosophical outlook. In
the conclusive summary of the whole argument (see above, 23c), Plato introdu-
ces a third element besides the opposition of limited/unlimited: there is a some-
what mixed, combined thing (hn ti summisgmenon) that originates from both.
There is also a fourth element: the cause (aita) of that mixture.
The argument is developed within the full scope of Platos theoretical philos-
ophy. Despite recognizing the theory of limited/unlimited as Pythagorean (we
might say, more precisely, Philolaic), Plato develops the argument in a novel
way. This modification of the Pythagorean view would not have been sanctioned
by Philolaus himself.
The application of Platos theoretical philosophy to ancient Pythagorean
doctrines corresponds to the first movement of what we have called the Platonic
mediation of Pythagoreanism. In the Philebus, Plato begins with the unlimited,
thought by the Pythagoreans to be a spatial and numerical plurality, and trans-
forms it into an indefinite quantity, opening the door to the theory of the forms
and its indefinite dyad.
The prologue of what should have been the Philolaus book (44 B 1 DK) also
refers to this doctrine of the limited and unlimited. Therefore, we will now move
to a discussion of Philolaus.
475 Interestingly, Glaucons response refers again to the world of the divine: !
says Glaucon would be the way up to the numbers as such (Rep. VII: 531c). Burnet 1908: 228
and Burkert 1972: 87 agree to recognize in the Pythagoreans mentioned in the
Republic. Barbera 1981: 395410 and Centrone 1993: 112 are more skeptical. However, even Frank
1923: 155 agrees with Burkert this time.
4.1 All is number? 171
4.2 The fragments of Philolaus
4.2.1 Unlimited/limiting
The proximity of Philolaus fragment 1 to the Philebus was already noticed in an-
tiquity: Damascius of Damascus, the last didochos of the School of Athens,
spoke of what is derived from the limited and the unlimited, as Plato says in
the Philebus and Philolaus in the books on nature (De principiis I: 101, 3).
The previous sections have pointed to the complicated relationship between
the lectio of Aristotle and Philolaus testimonies. The subject of this chapter will
be an analysis of Philolaus fragments through the lens of Aristotles non-Platon-
ic testimony. Aristotle is used as a cornerstone for two reasons. First, his work
offers textual proof of the revisionist nature of the Academic reception of Pytha-
gorean mathematics. Second, his work contains unmistakable signs of a Pytha-
gorean theory of numbers dated back to the fifth century BC.
Let us return briefly to the question of the authenticity of Philolaus book.
Besides the already mentioned (4.1.3.2) skepticism of Bywater 1868: 2153, Bur-
net 1908: 279284, Frank 1923: 263335 and Lvy 1926: 70ff., the proximity of
Philolaus fragments to Aristotles testimony has made more recent authors
such as Raven 1966: 98, Kahn 1974, and Barnes 1982, raise the hypothesis that
Philolaus fragments are a forgery based on the Aristotelian testimony. Although
it is technically possible to imagine that someone forged Philolaus book on the
basis of the Aristotelian testimony, such a procedure would be unprecedented
within the pseudo-epigraphy of Pythagoreanism, which usually aimed to Platon-
ize, rather than to Aristotelianize, Pythagorean concepts. To be sure, Burkert
1972: 238ff., Huffman 1993: 23 and also more recently Kahn 2001: 23 agree that
at least the first seven fragments in the collection of Diels-Kranz (44 B 17
DK) are authentic. Again, the sense in which Aristotles lectio represents an ex-
ception to the Academic line on Pythagoreanism suggests that the falsification
of the fragments would be unlikely. The opposite is much more likely to be
true that is, that these fragments of Philolaus are authentic and were the sour-
ces of Aristotle.
Out of those seven fragments, fragments 1, 2, 3 and 6 are explicitly about the
issue of the limited and unlimited which we recently examined in the Philebus.
Thus begins Philolaus book:
172 4 Numbers
The work On Nature began with the following statement: nature in the ordering of the world
resulted from the agreement of unlimited and limiting things, and so the entire cosmos and
all things that are in it,
Several textual signs confirm that this is an original fragment, from the title of
the work, Per Phses, to the presence of the particle d.
Besides the works title, which could simply be conventional, the recurrence
of such terms as phsis and ksmos puts the fragment within the century-old pre-
Socratic tradition. The book might operate as a synthesis of the pre-Socratic Mile-
sian cosmology of the unlimited and the Eleatic design of the perfection of being,
basically as a response in a dialogue between philosophers like Anaxagoras and
Parmenides.
However, the introduction of the concepts peira and peranonta particularly
draws our attention here. In a search for the definition of a phsis en t ksm, of
a rationality internal to nature, which we could take to be synonymous with the
pre-Socratic arch, Philolaus does not claim as Aristotles testimony might lead
one to expect that all is number, but rather that there is an agreement of
unlimited and limiting things.
There is a further terminological detail that deserves to be highlighted.
Philolaus does not use the terms unlimited/limited, but, always only the plural:
peira and peranonta. A more philologically faithful and philosophically fruitful
translation would be unlimited and limiting things, the latter being the present
participle of the verb peran. On the other hand, in both Platos Philebus and
Aristotles Metaphysics, the terms are thought and used in the singular: the
name pras for limit or the passive participle of the verb peran, peperasm-
non for limited, and the neuter singular adjective peiron, preceded by the ar-
ticle (t peiron), the unlimited, all of them singular. This distinction in quan-
tity indicates that Philolaus will not understand these principles as metaphysical
476 44 B 1 DK.
477 Boeckh 1819: 45 had suggested that the presence of at the beginning of the sentence
demonstrates this could not be the beginning of Philolauss book. suggests that there is
something that was said before, and for this reason could not be in the prologue to the book.
However, Burkert 1972: 252, followed by Huffman 1993: 95, argues that the presence of early in
a work was a common practice among authors of the fifth century BC (see Heraclitus, fr. 1 and
Ion, fr. 1), and it might refer to the title of the book. Contrary to Boeckhs thesis, its presence
would be a good reason to consider this fragment as authentically pre-Socratic.
478 See for these observations, Burkert 1972: 253ff. and Huffman 1993: 39.
4.2 The fragments of Philolaus 173
in the way they will be understood by Plato and then Aristotle (and it is for ex-
actly this reason they prefer to use the singular).
Fragment 2 leaves no doubt that Philolaus limiting and unlimited things are at-
tributes of reality itself, not abstract principles which are separate from the
world. This is why the fragment describes the limiting/unlimited as evident,
that is, as manifest in the world. Philolaus insists on this four times, using
terms semantically related to a manifest appearance: a) phanetai enta:
show clearly the things they are; b) dlon: It is clear that from the agree-
ment; c) dloi en tos rgois: it is shown by the facts; d) phanontai:
seem [unlimited]. Such a philosophy is far away from a Platonizing forgery.
The rhythm of fragment 2 is also signicant. The litany of limiting/unlimited
things closely resembles an incantation. This is certainly another sign of the
deep roots of the Philolaic text in the sphere of pre-Socratic philosophical pro-
duction.
The plurality and naturalness (in the sense of them being attributes of phsis un-
derstood as real nature) of the unlimited/limiting things are also confirmed by
the fact that Philolaus refuses to define or enumerate exactly what realities
are limiting and unlimited, that is, to give a list of limiting principles and unlim-
ited principles, such as water, fire, etc.
In fact, in the first part of fragment 6, he says the following:
On nature and harmony, things are like this: the being of things, which is eternal, and the
very nature require a divine knowledge, not human. Moreover, it would be impossible for
any of the things that be, were not known to us if there had not been as a groundwork the
being of realities that form the ordered world, that is, the limiting and unlimited ones.
This is far from merely an example of the epistemic modesty that is customary
in archaic thought.
However, the most interesting relation between Aristotle, the Philebus, and
Philolaus lies in their discussions of the musical scale. In the second part of frag-
ment 6, the musical scale is defined as a magnitude of agreement (harmona m-
gethos) in a Pythagorean diatonic scale (Timaeus 35b also assumes a Pythagor-
ean diatonic scale):
The magnitude of the agreement is formed by the intervals of the fourth and the fifth. The
fifth is greater than the fourth by a tone. In fact, from the highest chord/pitch to the string
in the middle there is a fourth, from the one at the middle to the last, there is a fifth. From
the last to the third, there is a fourth, and from the third to the higher, there is a fifth. The
interval between the one at the middle and the third is a tone (9:8), the fourth is expressed
by the epitrite ratio (4:3), and the fifth by the emiolium (3:2), and octave by the double (2:1).
Thus, the agreement (harmonic scale) consists of five tones and two minor semitones, the
fifth, three tones and a minor semitone, the fourth, two tones and a minor semitone.
Here, the image of limiting and unlimited as in music theory and the example
that Plato uses in the Philebus is that of a musical string, continuous and un-
limited, in which specified intervals are defined and delimited.
Once again,
harmony, the agreement, should never be confused with the limiting factor itself:
the agreement works through the number, but the number and the agreement
are not replaced by the limiting.
It is not surprising to find cosmology and music joined in fragment 6. We
have already discussed an Aristotelian testimony which connects exactly these
two dimensions in a summary of the Pythagorean numerical theory: They be-
will be said next about the methods of the archa that Philolaus shares with authors from the
fifth century BC like Hippocrates of Chios and Herodotus, should suggest just the opposite.
487 44 B 7 DK, orig.: , , .
488 See other doxographic parallels in A 16 and A 17.
489 Other examples arise from the medical-anthropological range, as is the case of a significant
parallelism between fire and the heat of life (Huffman 1993: 45). The economy of these pages
makes it impossible for a detailed analysis of these references.
490 44 B 6, 1624 DK.
491 For a detailed study of the relationship between Greek music theory and string instruments,
see Rocconi 2003, as well as a very recent study on Creeses monochord (2010).
4.2 The fragments of Philolaus 177
lieved the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things and that all of
heaven is harmony and number (Met. 986a 3).
Philolaus fragments notion of numbering the consonant intervals hints at
the central theme of this chapter, Pythagorean numbers. Although we have
not found any explicit reference so far to number in Philolaus fragments, frag-
ment 6 shows that the theme of numbers is also not entirely absent.
This brings us to our next question: what is the function of numbers within
the Philolaic system, and what is their relationship with the duo of limiting/un-
limited?
4.2.2 The role of numbers in Philolaus
Philolaus fragment 4 more precisely indicates the role of numbers in his philos-
ophy:
And, really, all things that are known have numbers. Thus it is not possible that something
is thought or known without them.
Given that the Greeks understood arithmo as an ordered plurality, the expression
arithmn chonti, have number, should be understood in the sense that reality
consists of an ordered plurality. All things have number means, in practice,
all things are, basically, number (Burkert 1972: 266f.).
The three species of numbers, properly, do not correspond to reality, but to signs
emitted by reality in order that it may be known. Therefore, Philolaus does not
say that reality as such is a number (something Aristotle will say), but that it
is knowable through numbers. Reality itself is truly made up of limiting and un-
limited things, of which the numbers are signs. Herein is perhaps the greatest
originality of Philolaus thought: of the dual explanatory principles of limiting
and unlimited introduced like explanatory principles of reality, not like some-
thing real themselves. This is an epistemological rather than an ontological per-
spective, and far more than a simple mixture of myth and physiology.
Burkerts argument is
499 A previous study of mine details this method of the archa and their references, see Cornelli
2003c. See also Burkert 1972: 420: From about the middle of the fifth century, it is clear that
mathematics is a center of intellectual interest. Almost all the important thinkers are concerned
with mathematical questions, and Huffman 1993: 7892.
500 See what was said above (1.8) in relation to the use of the term arhythmology for indicating
more precisely the Pythagorean numerological tradition. For a comprehensive study of the
history of the tradition of arhythmology, see Robbins 1921. For a recent critical evaluation of the
relationship between Pythagorean arhythmology and the development of ancient Greek ma-
thematics, see Cambiano 1992.
4.2 The fragments of Philolaus 181
based in other fragments of Philolaus that engage in numerology. This is certain-
ly the case with fragment A14, which attributes geometric figures to certain dei-
ties, and which since Tannery 1899 has been associated with the first appearance
of astrology in Greece. A vestige of that numerology might be present in Aristo-
tles account of the association of certain numbers with properties and entities
such as justice, the soul or the intellect (Met. 985b 2732, see above). In the
same vein, Philolaus refers in fragment 20 to number seven as a virgin and
motherless number (44 B 20 DK).
501 Although frankly intemperate, Kingsleys critical review (1994) of Huffmans book on Phi-
lolaus is dedicated to the question of Huffmans excessively rapid dismiss of A14, and the
astrological reference therein, as a post-Platonic forgery. Huffman argues that this reference
would be an elaboration from Platos Timaeus. Kingsley responds that the influence of Baby-
lonian astrology on Greece in the fifth century BC has been widely proven and that, therefore,
this would be the origin of the thematic in Philolaus (and later in Plato). The absurdity of
Kingsleys criticism is well summarized in the final sentence of the review: Huffman presents a
picture of him [Philolaus] ultimately as false as any Philolaic forgery in antiquity (Kingsley
1994: 296).
502 Lloyd 1989: 257 confirms: Great importance is attached by many Hippocratic authors to the
study of numerical relationships in connection with the determination of periodicities, notably
in two types of context: (1) pregnancy and childbirth; and (2) the phases of diseases, especially
their crises, the points at which exacerbations or remissions are to be expected. Burkert 1972:
264 imagines, however, on the contrary, an influence of Philolaus and more generally of the
Pythagorean concepts of harmony and number on the Hippocratic corpus: we perceive in the
Hippocratic corpus reflections of Pythagorean doctrines, which were probably in written form;
and the most likely source is the book of Philolaus.
503 Huffmans arguments (1993: 75) that Philolaus, like a modern scientist, would be waiting for
a confirmation of the theory which would come from further evidence, but also that his search
would not force him to indicate a numerical structure at all costs, actually weakens Huffmans
thesis and therefore the idea that there may be a Philolaic program. See in this regard Huffman
182 4 Numbers
We must conclude that no definitive account can be given, due to our frag-
mentary information, on the role of the numbers in the work of Philolaus. And
for this reason, both the epistemological and the numerological theses could be
considered valid. However, we certainly disagree with Philips careless assess-
ment that even if the fragments of Philolaus were authentic they would not en-
able us to solve our problems. For they reveal a thinker of no great stature, whose
interests are peripheral.
For example, Knorr 1975: 45 suggests that Philolaus hanged the theory
everything is number to the theory of the limiting/unlimited things to respond
to the recent discovery of the irrationals in geometry.
that
is, it is an exception to the Platonizing system (Burkert 1972: 230), Philolaus doc-
trine of numbers coincides in several places with the Aristotelian testimony. For
these reasons, Philolaus doctrine is the solution we have been looking for to the
problem of attributing a doctrine of all is number to ancient Pythagoreanism,
in epistemological, ontological and numerological dimensions.
The rest of the Pythagorean doctrine of number, which is no small amount of
philosophy, is mainly a result of the Platonic reception and revision of such the-
ories.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter has submitted Aristotles claim that the Pythagoreans believed that
all is number to critical review. Contemporary criticism is generally skeptical
507 See Huffman 1988: 16: Viewed in this way, the case of the diagonal of the square (i. e. the
isosceles right triangle) becomes an excellent illustration of Philolaus central thesis about the
cosmos. That thesis said that all things are composed of two unlike elements, limiters and
unlimiteds, and that, since these elements are unlike each other, they must be held together by a
harmonia which supervenes on them. In the case of the isosceles right triangle what must
initially have caused wonderment was not only that the hypotenuse cannot be measured by any
measure no matter how small but that such a magnitude without measure (an unlimited) is
combined in the same figure with magnitudes that do have a measure, the sides (limiters).
508 Burkert 1972: 413.
509 Huffman 1993: 5253.
184 4 Numbers
about this attribution; Frank and Cherniss argue that all of Pythagorean mathe-
matics was a result of an Academic revisionism.
However, the more recent trends in criticism focus on the reevaluation of the
authenticity of Philolaus fragments, which can be used to recover a genuinely
pre-Socratic Pythagorean theory of numbers.
Our analysis of the many ways that Aristotle states the thesis all is number
revealed, beyond merely semantic variations, a fundamental theoretical contra-
diction that Aristotle himself seems incapable of solving. Three different versions
of the doctrine are in fact present in the Aristotelian doxography: a) an identifi-
cation of numbers with the sensible objects; b) an identification of the principles
of numbers with the principles of things that are; c) an imitation of objects by
numbers. While versions a) and c) seem to identify numbers with the material
cause of reality, in terms (imitation) reminiscent of Plato, version b), numbers
as formal causes of reality, is an Aristotelian reconstruction of the Pythagorean
theory. Aristotle would have been pushed to such a reconstruction by the diffi-
culty he found in accepting the Pythagorean material notion of number, and by
considering it closer to its sensitivity, strongly marked by the reception of that
same theory in the Academic realm. In contrast, the Platonizing tradition treats
numbers as ontological principles. After having played a central role in defining
the Pythagorean theories of immortality (3.4.4), the Academic reception of the Py-
thagorean doctrines also affects how tradition has remembered their theory of
numbers. The Aristotelian summary of the Pythagorean theory of numbers re-
veals itself to be simultaneously a response to Plato, and also, therefore, depend-
ent on Platos commentary. Although it is clear that Aristotle deeply values the
fundamental insight of the Pythagoreans, that is, their attempt to understand
the nature of the numbers in relation to the nature of the world, the fact is
that his attempt at reconciliation, straddling both pre-Socratic sources and Pla-
tonizing mediation, seems less than successful.
Considering these difficulties, two approaches have been recently presented
to examine the validity of the doctrine all is number. On the one hand, Zhmud,
deepening Burnets already classic position, radically challenges the validity of
the Aristotelian testimony. He even denies that proto-Pythagoreanism included a
doctrine of number, pointing to a lack of references in pre-Socratic sources. The
conclusion of this skeptical thesis is that Aristotle himself invented all is num-
ber as a common denominator under which to unite a disparate group He
needed a clear account of the so-called Pythagoreans so he could use them
as a foil for Plato. In reaction to this solution, Huffman, following a point in Bur-
kert, undertook a careful review of the pre-Socratic sources of Pythagoreanism
likely available to Aristotle, searched for possible independent references to
the Pythagorean doctrine of number. Aristotles testimony seems to be based
4.3 Conclusion 185
on a written Pythagorean literature, and textual hints seem to identify Philolaus
book as Aristotles primary source, and though this to the the Pythagorean move-
ment from the fifth century BC. However, even this solution presents a difficulty:
the works of Philolaus lack an explicit reference to that doctrine all is number.
The Philolaic problem is not yet a solution, but rather sets us back on the
hermeneutic saw between an Academic Platonization, on one side, and an Aris-
totelian reconstruction on the other. However, the inconsistency of the tradition
on the size of Philolaus literary output and the existence of the ample pseudo-
epigraphical Hellenistic literature suggest the need for a careful job of sifting
through Philolaus. Ultimately, the two questions depend on a fundamental char-
acteristic of the Pythagorean pseudo-epigraphical Hellenistic literature: it is in-
delibly tied to Pythagoras relation to Plato and the way this relationship was
manipulated in the various moments of the history of the intra-Academic polem-
ic debates between dogmatists and skeptics. On the other hand, within the Py-
thagorizing-Platonic reconstruction of the philosophy of the ancients, we
find no echoes of the fourth-century BC Aristotles description of Pythagorean-
ism. On the contrary, the value of his testimony is widely criticized by Platonic
tradition. However, it is exactly Aristotles status as an outsider to the Platonic
tradition that constitutes a real hermeneutic lever for the Philolaic question.
The proximity of the fragments attributed to Philolaus with the Aristotelian lectio
of the so-called Pythagoreans, the latter hopefully untainted by Academic in-
fluence, can become a sign of the authenticity of Philolaus fragments.
Aristotle, in fact, distinguishes Pythagoreanism and Platonism in two central
ways, both articulated in a famous page of the Metaphysics (987b). The first dif-
ference is in the ontological place attributed to numbers: for Plato, numbers are
separate from the sensibles, while the Pythagoreans hold that the numbers are
the things themselves. This is the doctrine of chorisms, separation, which Ar-
istotle takes to be a typical Platonic error: Aristotles intention to critique Platon-
ism could not be clearer. The difference between Aristoteles testimony and the
revisionist Academic testimony suggests that we can discover the genuine pre-
Socratic vision of numbers in Aristotles views. A second difference between
Plato and the Pythagoreans is in the way the One is conceived: Plato has a poor-
ly reasoned doctrine, because he uses a dyad as the fundamental thing and
conceives the unlimited as derived from large and small, whereas the Pythagor-
eans take the unlimited and limiting to be the fundamental elements of the
world. Once more, Aristotle is alone in defining this difference, because the
later, Platonic doxographic tradition points out instead that the Pythagoreans
postulated both the One and the indefinite dyad as principles of reality.
The analysis of a passage from the Philebus confirmed the credibility of Ar-
istotles testimony: Plato himself, not just the Academy that followed him, had
186 4 Numbers
already begun the Platonizing of Pythagoreanism. Plato probably viewed his
second navigation as a continuation of Pythagoreanism, and this necessitated
occasionally altering the original Pythagorean doctrines. Even if the page from
the Philebus proves to be a pre-Aristotelian testimony of the Pythagorean philos-
ophy, it is a starting point for Plato to pursue his own theoretical projects, espe-
cially in search of a solution to the problem of the unity and multiplicity of the
existing ones.
The same issue of the relationship between the unlimited and limited which
guides Philebus argument appears indeed in what should be the prologue of Phi-
lolaus book. Aristotles place as an exception to the Platonizing categorization
of ancient Pythagoreanism becomes central to the analysis of Philolaus frag-
ments. Aristotles testimony lets us discover the process of the formation of
the Academic reception of Pythagorean mathematics, as well as to have a
clear sign of a fifth-century BC Pythagorean theory of numbers. Philolaus
own fragments show themselves to positioned within secular, pre-Socratic de-
bates. They seem to attempt a synthesis of the Milesian cosmology of the unlim-
ited and the Eleatic concept of the perfection of being. The authenticity of frag-
ment 2 is demonstrated by its lack of Platonic influence: limiting and unlimited
are still thought of, not as abstract principles and separate from the world, but as
attributes of reality itself. Philolaus, attempting to show the harmona between
limiting and unlimited, significantly uses the Pythagorean diatonic musical
scale as an example. However, here we find our first hint of the theme of our
chapter: Philolaus fragment 6 suggests that these consonant intervals in a
scale are essentially numerable. Number certainly plays a role within the Philo-
laic system, although not as the ontological principle that Plato and Aristotle
wanted. Rather, the analysis of fragments 4 and 5 indicates that Philolaus valued
numbers for their epistemic roles, because reality can be known in virtue of its
propensity to be described in numerical terms. Numbers are thus signals emitted
by reality, and as such allow it to be known (fr. 5). However, this fragment also
suggests that there may be a correspondence between the ontological (limiting/
unlimited) and epistemological (even-odd) levels. The introduction of a third
type of number, even-odd, seems to correspond, in the argumentative order,
to the introduction of harmona for the pair limiting/unlimited. Huffman rejects
the idea that numbers play a mystical role in Philolaus system, rather than an
epistemological one. Even if this is the case, we have enough evidence to con-
clude that Aristotles testimony about the so-called Pythagoreans coincides
in several places with Philolaus book. In short, Philolaus can be considered
the solution to our problem: ancient Pythagoreanism, or at least fifth-century Py-
thagoreanism, did hold the doctrine of all is number, whether in a mystical or
epistemological sense.
4.3 Conclusion 187
As with the theories of immortality (see 3.8), Aristotle again provides the
most reliable testimony on ancient Pythagoreanism. This same testimony, con-
sidered in light of its probable source, Philolaus, allows one to detect the long
process of Platonic and Academic appropriations of Pythagorean mathematics.
The analysis of the tradition of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, from its
mystical to its epistemological moments, reveals once again the process of the
formation of the category of Pythagoreanism in its synchronic and diachronic di-
mensions. This process reveals significant discontinuities in the tradition: initial-
ly valid approaches, like a proto-Pythagorean numerical mysticism, are aban-
doned because they do not fit in with the general philosophical new context.
However, such interpretations are finally resumed with renewed enthusiasm in
later times when the conditions of philosophy change, remarkably in the Neopla-
tonic period. Thus, it is possible that Iamblichus mathematics are closer to the
mystique of proto-Pythagorean numbers than Philolaus mathematics.
However, the assumption that there is a clear division between a mysticism
of numbers and an epistemology of numbers during all stages of Pythagorean-
ism, even during the Philolaic stage, is itself the result of historiographical prej-
udices. It depends, ultimately, on a positivist view of the history of thought as a
steady progress from its very origins towards a barely related ideal of modern ra-
tionality, masterfully represented by Galileo and Descartes, and epitomized by
mathematical reasoning. A description of ancient Pythagoreanism from these
historiographical pre-comprehensions reveals itself to fail as a historical analy-
sis. It also ends up losing what is probably Pythagoreanisms most striking fea-
ture: that of a movement of life and thought that lasted for centuries, throughout
antiquity, and which succeeded in being identified as a single movement, de-
spite or rather by virtue of the polyphony of its differences and contradic-
tions.
188 4 Numbers
Conclusion
There is no better way to conclude a historiographical work on Pythagoreanism
than to focus on a seemingly innocuous editorial detail, but one revealing itself
significant to the history of criticism of Pythagoreanism in the twentieth century.
Giangiulio introduces his edition of Pythagorean literature (Pitagora, 2000: XVI)
by reproducing an entire section of Burkerts essential work on Pythagoreanism,
Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (1972: 208217). However, he quite
significantly omits a passage from Rohde quoted in p. 217 of Burkerts book.
The omission is obviously deliberate and follows a widespread difficulty for con-
temporary criticism. We are used to simply repeating the script of the diadocha
of characters and concepts formatted by Aristotelian doxography, but Rohde im-
plores us to seek to understand the emergence of this phenomenon within the
pragmatic context of ancient times.
The Dielsian collection of texts on pre-Socratic philosophy gives the illusion
that the succession of philosophical systems in history embodies a Hegelian
progress of thought. However, we have discovered that the existence of a Pytha-
gorean philosophical school is a retrospective illusion. For the most part, critics
have not yet come to realize this, and to try to understand pre-Socratic philoso-
phy as a whole, and particularly Pythagoreanism, through the very characteris-
tics of the permeable and fluid first steps of the construction of philosophy itself.
Laks conciliatory suggestion (2007: 233235) is to understand the heterogeneity
of pre-Socratic philosophy as a not wild, but rather reflexive diversity, which is
510 See Giangiulio (Pitagora, 2000: XVI). The omission is not unreasonable from a formal
standpoint: the author warns (Pitagora, 2000: V) of the occurrence of poche omissioni in the
translation of that Burkert section.
511 The ellipses inside the quotation are the authors own.
structured, in a Weberian way, by two types of consistencies: a logical one, ac-
cording to whom a new thesis implies the answer or explanation of an earlier
theory, and a practical one, which connects each subject with the specific con-
cerns of its author. The pages of this book have attempted to frankly discuss
the connections between the ideas and protagonists of proto-Pythagoreanism
and fifth-century Pythagoreanism in the context of the raising of early philoso-
phy. However, the image, admittedly somewhat anachronistic, of scholars debat-
ing amongst themselves, is still related to the first kind of logical consistency.
Hermeneutic progress would be possible only if we could also bring them
under the rubric of a practical consistency.
The controversy over the end of Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic age also
belongs to this problem. The question alone deserves a new monograph. It is
mentioned here simply as an illustration of the attempts to insert some evolu-
tionary logic into the history of Pythagoreanism which tradition nonetheless re-
sists. It is common among todays scholars in the wake of Burkert 1961: 232 to
postulate a reflourishing of Pythagoreanism in the last years of the first century
BC, after its extinction in 360 BC, the year Aristoxenus claims he had known the
last Pythagorean (fragment 14 Wehrli). The revival of Pythagoreanism is wit-
nessed by Cicero, in his introduction to the translation of the Timaeus: his friend
Nigidius Figulus is claimed to have revived (renovaret) Pythagoreanism (Cicero,
Timaeus 1.1). The two phases of Pythagoreanism were separated not only in
time but also, according to Burkert 1982 himself, the two movements were
quite heterogeneous anyway.
On the other hand, the advantages of this separation for the historiography
of Pythagoreanism are incomparable. Notably, by allowing one to push the
acousmatic features of Pythagorean philosophy to a later time, one can maintain
the canonized image of an Ionian enlightenment and of an ancient Italic philos-
ophy. This certainly motivates Dodds 1951, when he states that:
Many students of the subject have seen in the first century B. C. the decisive period of Welt-
wende, the period when the tide of rationalism, which for the past hundred years had flow-
ed ever more sluggishly, has finally expanded its force and begins to retreat. There is no
doubt that all the philosophical schools save the Epicurean took a new direction at this
time. [] Equally significant is the revival, after two centuries of apparent abeyance, of Py-
515 This has to do most likely with symbolic doctrines ( )
in the terminology used by Iamblichus (VP: 20) represented by the memory of the akos-
mata.
516 Against Burkert, see both Drrie 1963: 269 and Kingsley 1995: 320ff.
517 See for that Kingsleys arguments (1955: 323324).
Conclusion 193
thagoreanism, not as a formal teaching school, but as a cult and as a way of life. It relied
frankly on authority, not on logic: Pythagoras was presented as an inspired Sage [].
This work is thus the result of a conscious choice, announced from the begin-
ning, to avoid proposing yet another interpretation of Pythagoreanism; these
pages, on the contrary, seek to address the very historiographical issue that un-
derlies the various hermeneutical solutions of the Pythagorean question and
which, somehow, continually reinvent it.
A study of Pythagoreanism takes the risk of being either useless or insuffi-
cient, such is the amount of literature, so complex the problem is, as Maria Tim-
panaro Cardini lucidly noted.