Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

80718 January 29, 1988 FELIZ P. !E RO" an# $IRGILIO R MOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF PPE LS an# LUIS %ERN L, SR., GLENI %ERN L, LUIS %ERN L, JR., &EIRS OF M RISS %ERN L, na'()y, GLICERI !EL CRUZ %ERN L an# LUIS %ERN L, SR., respondents. RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.: This special civil action for certiorari see s to declare null and void t!o "#$ resolutions of the Special %irst Division of the &ourt of 'ppeals in the case of (uis )ernal, Sr., et al. v. %elisa Perdosa De Ro*, et al., &'+,.R. &V No. -.#/0. The first resolution pro1ul2ated on 3- Septe1ber 45/. denied petitioners6 1otion for e7tension of ti1e to file a 1otion for reconsideration and directed entr* of 8ud21ent since the decision in said case had beco1e final9 and the second Resolution dated #. October 45/. denied petitioners6 1otion for reconsideration for havin2 been filed out of ti1e. 't the outset, this &ourt could have denied the petition outri2ht for not bein2 verified as re:uired b* Rule 0; section 4 of the Rules of &ourt. Ho!ever, even if the instant petition did not suffer fro1 this defect, this &ourt, on procedural and substantive 2rounds, !ould still resolve to den* it. The facts of the case are undisputed. The fire!all of a burned+out buildin2 o!ned b* petitioners collapsed and destro*ed the tailorin2 shop occupied b* the fa1il* of private respondents, resultin2 in in8uries to private respondents and the death of Marissa )ernal, a dau2hter. Private respondents had been !arned b* petitioners to vacate their shop in vie! of its pro7i1it* to the !ea ened !all but the for1er failed to do so. On the basis of the fore2oin2 facts, the Re2ional Trial &ourt. %irst <udicial Re2ion, )ranch ===VIII, presided b* the Hon. 'ntonio M. )elen, rendered 8ud21ent findin2 petitioners 2uilt* of 2ross ne2li2ence and a!ardin2 da1a2es to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court !as affir1ed in toto b* the &ourt of 'ppeals in a decision pro1ul2ated on 'u2ust 4., 45/., a cop* of !hich !as received b* petitioners on 'u2ust #;, 45/.. On Septe1ber 5, 45/., the last da* of the fifteen+da* period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a 1otion for e7tension of ti1e to file a 1otion for reconsideration, !hich !as eventuall* denied b* the appellate court in the Resolution of Septe1ber 3-, 45/.. Petitioners filed their 1otion for reconsideration on Septe1ber #>, 45/. but this !as denied in the Resolution of October #., 45/.. This &ourt finds that the &ourt of 'ppeals did not co11it a 2rave abuse of discretion !hen it denied petitioners6 1otion for e7tension of ti1e to file a 1otion for reconsideration, directed entr* of 8ud21ent and denied their 1otion for reconsideration. It correctl* applied the rule laid do!n in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, ?,.R. No. .-/5;, 'u2ust ;, 45/;,43/ S&R' >04, that the fifteen+da* period for appealin2 or for filin2 a 1otion for reconsideration cannot be e7tended. In its Resolution den*in2 the 1otion for reconsideration, pro1ul2ated on <ul* 3-, 45/0 "4># S&R' #-/$, this &ourt en bancrestated and clarified the rule, to !it@ )e2innin2 one 1onth after the pro1ul2ation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictl* enforced that no 1otion for e7tension of ti1e to file a 1otion for reconsideration 1a* be filed !ith the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial &ourts, the Re2ional Trial &ourts, and the Inter1ediate 'ppellate &ourt. Such a 1otion 1a* be filed onl* in cases pendin2 !ith the Supre1e &ourt as the court of last resort, !hich 1a* in its sound discretion either 2rant or den* the e7tension re:uested. "at p. #4#$ Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate ppellate Court, ?,.R. No. .34>0+;3, 'u2ust #0, 45/0, 4>3 S&R' 0>3A, reiterated the rule and !ent further to restate and clarif* the 1odes and periods of appeal. !acaya v. Intermediate ppellate Court, ?,.R. No. .>/#>, Sept. 4;, 45/0,4>> S&R' 404A,stressed the prospective application of said rule, and e7plained the operation of the 2race period, to !it@ In other !ords, there is a one+1onth 2race period fro1 the pro1ul2ation on Ma* 3-, 45/0 of the &ourt6s Resolution in the clarificator* Habalu*as case, or up to <une 3-, 45/0, !ithin !hich the rule barrin2 e7tensions of ti1e to file 1otions for ne! trial or reconsideration is, as *et, not strictl* enforceable. Since petitioners herein filed their 1otion for e7tension on %ebruar* #., 45/0, it is still !ithin the 2race period, !hich e7pired on <une 3-, 45/0, and 1a* still be allo!ed. This 2race period !as also applied in "ission v. Intermediate ppellate Court ?,.R. No. .3005, October #/, 45/0, 4>; S&R' 3-0A.A In the instant case, ho!ever, petitioners6 1otion for e7tension of ti1e !as filed on Septe1ber 5, 45/., 1ore than a *ear after the e7piration of the 2race period on <une 3-, 45/0. Hence, it is no lon2er !ithin the covera2e of the 2race period. &onsiderin2 the len2th of ti1e fro1 the e7piration of the 2race period to the pro1ul2ation of the decision of the &ourt of 'ppeals on 'u2ust #;, 45/., petitioners cannot see refu2e in the i2norance of their counsel re2ardin2 said rule for their failure to file a 1otion for reconsideration !ithin the re2le1entar* period. Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be 1ade to appl* to the case at bar o!in2 to the non+ publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official ,aBette as of the ti1e the sub8ect decision of the &ourt of 'ppeals !as pro1ul2ated. &ontrar* to petitioners6 vie!, there is no la! re:uirin2 the publication of Supre1e &ourt decisions in the Official ,aBette before the* can be bindin2 and as a condition to their beco1in2 effective. It is the bounden dut* of counsel as la!*er in active la! practice to eep abreast of decisions of the Supre1e &ourt particularl* !here issues have been clarified, consistentl* reiterated, and

published in the advance reports of Supre1e &ourt decisions ",. R. s$ and in such publications as the Supre1e &ourt Reports 'nnotated "S&R'$ and la! 8ournals. This &ourt li e!ise finds that the &ourt of 'ppeals co11itted no 2rave abuse of discretion in affir1in2 the trial court6s decision holdin2 petitioner liable under 'rticle #45- of the &ivil &ode, !hich provides that Cthe proprietor of a buildin2 or structure is responsible for the da1a2e resultin2 fro1 its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lac of necessar* repairs. Nor !as there error in re8ectin2 petitioners ar2u1ent that private respondents had the Clast clear chanceC to avoid the accident if onl* the* heeded the. !arnin2 to vacate the tailorin2 shop and , therefore, petitioners prior ne2li2ence should be disre2arded, since the doctrine of Clast clear chance,C !hich has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case. DHERE%ORE, in vie! of the fore2oin2, the &ourt Resolved to DENF the instant petition for lac of 1erit. #ernan $Chairman%, &utierrez, Jr., #eliciano and !idin, JJ., concur.