BACKGROUNDER | NO.

2821 JULY 11, 2013

very perceptions that inform decision making, from the context to the biases. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations, influencing the course of the conflict. To be effective, however, psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Instead, peacetime psychological operations are necessary, both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations.

PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime, between military and civilian, and among strategy, operations, and tactics.
Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious, implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. By employing various forms of strategic communications, including diplomatic efforts, one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. At the same time, such techniques attempt to isolate opponents, undermining their positions, portraying them as fostering ill intentions, and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. In addition, employing all the tools of communications, including various forms of media, emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. All the while, one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. In wartime, psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion, doubt, anxiety, fear, terror,

regret, and exhaustion in an opponent, especially among senior military and civilian leaders. Ideally, such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels, thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems, coupled with efforts to influence decision makers, can create a strong psychological impact. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance, but once the conflict is concluded, such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. “When one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale, one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties, friendly elements in the opponent’s society, and similar outlets. Finally, offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures, since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces, population, and leaders. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict, highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures, and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population, including the “Great Firewall of China.”

Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks

For the PLA, psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD), working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy

6.

Guo, Psychological Warfare Knowledge, p. 14. 3

manage. information warfare is the struggle to dominate the generation and flow of information in order to enhance and support one’s own strategic goals while degrading and constraining those of an opponent. and exploit accurate information more quickly than an opponent. Military News Department Study Group. etc. November 2005).2 The goal of psychological warfare is to influence. especially those who are making decisions. emotions. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. affecting the 1. and even exploitation. psychological operations are seen as an essential part of future conflicts. it must deal with allied countries. Yuan Wenxian. constrain. Academy of Military Science. Li Naiguo. with effective coverage of many areas. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office. information warfare is constant and ongoing.5 Rather than trying to draw artificial boundaries among these categories. Information dominance rests on two primary factors: modern information technology. 2. p. Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing. but also against friends. A product of the Information Age. and tactics. p. it targets externally. “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War. 3. whether by slowing down transmission or by introducing false or inaccurate data. 2005). No. 77–79. Nanjing Political Academy. 2013 Specifically: There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare. and among strategy. is not necessarily restricted by “wartime” versus “peacetime” categorizations. appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict. and one must rely on the media acting in multiple directions jointly. 4. and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts. operations. will target not only the physical information infrastructure and the data that pass through it. the implication is that information should be treated as an integrated whole. 2004). PRC: National Defense University Press. 404. Given the nature of modern technology and informationized societies. information collection. As one Chinese volume observes. therefore. New Theories of Information War (Beijing. but also internally. which emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. 4 (2003).4 This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings. 2821 JULY 11. clerks. appropriately control the level of attack. as only then can one scientifically establish operational plans. 5. intertwined nature of modern international politics and economics: [I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in the political. and habits while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology. precisely strike predetermined targets. economic. operations designed to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime. The ability to triumph in future “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions”—the most likely form of wars in the Information Age—rests upon the ability to secure “information dominance (zhi xinxi quan). p. But in the Chinese conception of psychological warfare. and military realms. Similarly. but also the human agents that interact with those data. which is integral to information collection and transmission.)—are as important as the computers and networks and the software that runs them. technical.BACKGROUNDER | NO. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. PRC: National Defense University Press.” China Military Science. in order to comprehensively realize the various goals. the users of information—both high-level decision-makers and lower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers. pp. and seek the best strategic interest and long-term benefit.3 Psychological Warfare and Information Warfare Psychological warfare operations are integral to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng). but also the entire globe. The Science of Military Information (Beijing. 2008). In this context. The interconnected nature of information. p.” This in turn requires the ability to collect. makes clear-cut classifications of “military” and “civilian” almost impossible. between military and civilian. and the ability to degrade the quality of information. Guo Yanhua. as well as information systems. Because of the complex. it is applied against the enemy. Efforts to secure information dominance. 30. 154. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing. 1. whether in wartime or peacetime. 2 .

http:/ / online. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. mr. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). and political problems. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940.html (accessed July 8. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court.” Badie warned. and Reem Abdellatif. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. Tamer El-Ghobashy. On Monday. 2013. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. and youth activists. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control.” The Wall Street Journal. Mohammed Badie.000 injured. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. On July 3. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. 2013). As a judge. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. Yemen. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. 2824 JULY 11. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. social. 2013 opposition political parties. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. The next day. a coalition of 1. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location.wsj. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people.BACKGROUNDER | NO. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. the provincial capital. Similar organizations in Libya. Under these conditions. a new Islamist group. Baradei. Matt Bradley. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. had been sworn in as interim president. political leaders. leftist and liberal parties. During his year in office. July 6. 2 .

Psychological Warfare Knowledge. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. At the same time. or winning a piece of ground. population. including various forms of media. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. All the while. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. including diplomatic efforts. “When one defeats the enemy. employing all the tools of communications. p.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. In addition. In wartime. 14. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. influencing the course of the conflict. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. To be effective. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). can create a strong psychological impact. Instead. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. and tactics. between military and civilian. and leaders. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. from the context to the biases. it is not solely by killing the enemy. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. fear. including the “Great Firewall of China. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. 2821 JULY 11. undermining their positions. regret. Finally. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. however. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. and exhaustion in an opponent. terror. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. By employing various forms of strategic communications. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. anxiety. 3 . Guo. but once the conflict is concluded. and similar outlets.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. and among strategy. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. doubt. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. Ideally. operations.

Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. On Monday. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). had been sworn in as interim president. Matt Bradley. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. and youth activists. political leaders. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Badie warned. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. Mohammed Badie.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. 2013. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday. mr. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. a new Islamist group. the provincial capital. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front.html (accessed July 8.000 injured. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. social. 2013 opposition political parties. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government. Tamer El-Ghobashy. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. As a judge. 2 . many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. The next day. a coalition of 1. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. Under these conditions. and Reem Abdellatif. Similar organizations in Libya.wsj. leftist and liberal parties. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. http:/ / online. During his year in office. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently.” The Wall Street Journal. Yemen. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. 2824 JULY 11. On July 3. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. and political problems. Baradei.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster.BACKGROUNDER | NO. July 6. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. 2013). chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. All the while. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. doubt. operations. In wartime. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. “When one defeats the enemy. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. anxiety. regret. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. including the “Great Firewall of China. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. but once the conflict is concluded. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. By employing various forms of strategic communications. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). and tactics. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. and similar outlets. between military and civilian. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. terror. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. from the context to the biases. or winning a piece of ground. especially among senior military and civilian leaders.BACKGROUNDER | NO. At the same time. can create a strong psychological impact. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. To be effective. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. Guo.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. including various forms of media. 2821 JULY 11. and leaders. including diplomatic efforts. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. however. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. Instead. employing all the tools of communications. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. population. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. fear. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. it is not solely by killing the enemy. 3 . p. influencing the course of the conflict. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. undermining their positions. 14. In addition. Ideally. and exhaustion in an opponent. and among strategy. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. Finally. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed.

Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing. 2 . economic. but also against friends. information warfare is the struggle to dominate the generation and flow of information in order to enhance and support one’s own strategic goals while degrading and constraining those of an opponent. in order to comprehensively realize the various goals. 2821 JULY 11. 30. and one must rely on the media acting in multiple directions jointly. PRC: National Defense University Press. 2005).)—are as important as the computers and networks and the software that runs them. and exploit accurate information more quickly than an opponent. But in the Chinese conception of psychological warfare. pp. and habits while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology. Efforts to secure information dominance. between military and civilian. November 2005). but also the entire globe. and seek the best strategic interest and long-term benefit.BACKGROUNDER | NO. and even exploitation. emotions. 4 (2003). p. information collection. psychological operations are seen as an essential part of future conflicts. with effective coverage of many areas. 2. Military News Department Study Group. 2004). 2013 Specifically: There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare. which is integral to information collection and transmission. intertwined nature of modern international politics and economics: [I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in the political. affecting the 1. “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War. and the ability to degrade the quality of information. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office. and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts. 1. operations. p. constrain. No. appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict. it must deal with allied countries. Guo Yanhua. Given the nature of modern technology and informationized societies. 404. PRC: National Defense University Press. as only then can one scientifically establish operational plans. information warfare is constant and ongoing. 3. etc. As one Chinese volume observes. but also internally. whether in wartime or peacetime. operations designed to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime. clerks.4 This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings. Nanjing Political Academy. especially those who are making decisions. therefore. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. Li Naiguo. manage. Information dominance rests on two primary factors: modern information technology. 154. The ability to triumph in future “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions”—the most likely form of wars in the Information Age—rests upon the ability to secure “information dominance (zhi xinxi quan).” This in turn requires the ability to collect. precisely strike predetermined targets.3 Psychological Warfare and Information Warfare Psychological warfare operations are integral to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng). the implication is that information should be treated as an integrated whole. technical. whether by slowing down transmission or by introducing false or inaccurate data. Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing. which emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. appropriately control the level of attack. and military realms. Because of the complex. p.” China Military Science. 5. Academy of Military Science. A product of the Information Age. and among strategy. it is applied against the enemy. will target not only the physical information infrastructure and the data that pass through it. it targets externally. but also the human agents that interact with those data. The interconnected nature of information. 2008). is not necessarily restricted by “wartime” versus “peacetime” categorizations. New Theories of Information War (Beijing. and tactics. 77–79. p. makes clear-cut classifications of “military” and “civilian” almost impossible. The Science of Military Information (Beijing.5 Rather than trying to draw artificial boundaries among these categories. Similarly. as well as information systems. In this context. the users of information—both high-level decision-makers and lower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers. Yuan Wenxian.2 The goal of psychological warfare is to influence. 4.

Finally. can create a strong psychological impact. however. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. regret. including the “Great Firewall of China. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. By employing various forms of strategic communications. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. “When one defeats the enemy. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. including diplomatic efforts. employing all the tools of communications. All the while. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). influencing the course of the conflict. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. Guo. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. population. and leaders.BACKGROUNDER | NO. doubt. anxiety. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. terror. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. p.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. from the context to the biases. 14. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. and tactics. but once the conflict is concluded. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. To be effective. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. In addition. and exhaustion in an opponent. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. Instead. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. undermining their positions. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. 2821 JULY 11. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. between military and civilian. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. or winning a piece of ground. including various forms of media. fear. 3 . and among strategy. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. operations. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. and similar outlets. At the same time. Ideally. In wartime. it is not solely by killing the enemy.

and Reem Abdellatif. Morsi has been detained at an undisclosed location. the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. On Monday. has called for continued protests until Morsi is reinstated as president. During his year in office. Mansour pledged to continue the democratic reforms of the 2011 revolution so that “we stop producing tyrants” and said that new elections were “the only way” forward. a coalition of 1. Matt Bradley. but Islamist leaders have vowed not to give up without a fight. Mohammed Badie. who had “failed to meet the demands of the people. The authorities have sought to arrest more than 200 top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations on charges of inciting their followers to kill anti-Morsi demonstrators. 2013 opposition political parties. “Post-Coup Violence Spreads in Egypt. Egypt’s mushrooming political violence will be hard to control. mr.com/article/SB10001424127887323899704578587131736732940. 2824 JULY 11. President Mansour initially chose former opposition leader Mohamed el-Baradei as prime minister of the interim government on July 6. a hotbed of Islamist extremism. Egypt’s army justifiably intervened to restore order in support of the majority of Egyptians who were rebelling against an Islamist authoritarian regime. ProMorsi demonstrations were quickly countered by anti-Morsi protests in a highly charged atmosphere that degenerated into widespread clashes. It is expected that President Mansour will soon announce the formation of a new government with a cabinet composed of technocrats and caretakers. more radical Islamists are sure to push back violently. this time the military sought the endorsement of religious leaders. 2013). http:/ / online. and Tunisia have served as front groups for attracting recruits to al-Qaeda–like terrorist organizations. On July 3. and youth activists.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 1952 or the 2011 coup that brought down Hosni Mubarak. a secular liberal who led the National Salvation Front. Mohamed Morsi focused more on maximizing his own power and that of the Muslim Brotherhood than on addressing Egypt’s worsening economic. As a judge. Tamer El-Ghobashy. many of whom shared the stage when General el-Sissi announced Morsi’s ouster in a televised statement. Similar organizations in Libya. at least 51 of Morsi’s supporters were killed when troops responded to an attack on the Republican Guard headquarters where Morsi was last seen before his ouster. launched coordinated attacks against police facilities and an airport at El Arish. chief justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court. political leaders. the provincial capital. but this appointment was later rescinded under pressure from the Nour Party. leaving at least 36 dead and more than 1. Speaking at Cairo’s Rabaa Mosque during a demonstration on “Rejection Friday.000 injured. and political problems. one of the few Islamist groups that supported the coup. Baradei. The next day.” The Wall Street Journal. had been sworn in as interim president.wsj. social.”1 Tens of thousands of Morsi supporters poured out of mosques on Friday to protest Morsi’s ouster. he could be well suited to steering the writing of a new constitution to replace the Islamist document that Morsi had rammed through in December. 2 . a new Islamist group. Mansour is a little-known but respected low-key technocrat. Egyptian Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi announced that Morsi. announced its formation on an online forum for militants in the Sinai region and proclaimed that it will gather arms and train recruits for a jihad against Egypt’s new government.” was relieved of his duties and that the Islamist-written constitution was suspended.html (accessed July 8. Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (Supporters of Islamic Law). Yemen. Under these conditions. leftist and liberal parties. frequently clashed with the United States over the Iran nuclear issue when he led the International Atomic Energy Agency. which he linked to foreign conspiracies. 2013. Islamist militants in the northern Sinai. July 6.” Badie warned. the military authorities announced that Adly Mansour. Even in the unlikely event that the Muslim Brotherhood reins in its members as part of some deal to allow it to compete in future elections. although he gave no indication of when they would be held. “We are all willing to sacrifice our necks and our souls for him.

Psychological warfare is in some ways the most far-reaching of the “three warfares. How? By using psychological warfare to manipulate both a nation’s leaders and its populace—affecting the thought processes and cognitive frameworks of allies and opponents alike. O ■■ ■■ ■■ This paper. The “three warfares” represent the PRC’s commitment to expanding potential areas of conflict from the purely military (i.heritage.org/bg2821 Produced by the Asian Studies Center The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue. alienation.” including what is termed the “three warfares”: public opinion warfare. in its entirety.” It involves the application of specialized information and media in accordance with a strategic goal and in support of political and military objectives. first and foremost. and deception. it is also preparing to conduct “political warfare.1 Such efforts are aimed at a variety of potential audiences and usually involve operational missions against an opponent’s psychology and cognitive capacities. DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage. To this end. public diplomacy. involving the direct or indirect use of military forces) to the more political. Key Points ■■ Over the past decade. Such expansion will be supported by manipulation of an enemy’s leadership. Indeed. can be found at http://report. 2013 Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge Dean Cheng Abstract Beijing hopes to win future conflicts without firing a shot. and media outreach capabilities. the U. and psychological warfare.e. legal warfare. the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). the PRC’s psychological warfare operations are already underway despite the fact that there is no active conflict. It is therefore essential that the United States counter such psychological operations now while preparing to use its own arsenal of political warfare weapons should a conflict ever arise. To avoid being psychologically outmaneuvered by a PRC intent on winning without firing a shot.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. This distinction both obligates the PLA to help maintain the CCP’s grip on power and gives it an additional set of tools with which to defend the CCP and the Chinese state. the People’s Republic of China has exhibited growing interest in waging asymmetrical warfare.S. must strengthen its own psychological warfare capabilities. NE Washington. The PLA is.BACKGROUNDER No. . At the moment. including strategic communications. 2821 | JULY 11. the PLA is not only planning for operations on the physical battlefield. as well as dedicated psychological operations units.. psychological warfare. including through intimidation and coercion. and legal warfare. ■■ ne of the elements distinguishing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from many of its counterparts is its continued role as a Party army. the PRC released “political work regulations” for the People’s Liberation Army addressing the importance of waging “the three warfares”: public opinion warfare.

and leaders. Guo. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. 14. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. 3 . influencing the course of the conflict. and exhaustion in an opponent. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. p. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). undermining their positions. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. Finally. population. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. In wartime. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. between military and civilian. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. and similar outlets. from the context to the biases. or winning a piece of ground. To be effective. In addition. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. fear. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. including various forms of media. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. By employing various forms of strategic communications. Instead. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. “When one defeats the enemy. Ideally.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. but once the conflict is concluded. 2821 JULY 11. doubt. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. and tactics. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. employing all the tools of communications. including diplomatic efforts. regret. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. terror.BACKGROUNDER | NO. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. At the same time. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. and among strategy.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. operations. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. anxiety. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. it is not solely by killing the enemy. can create a strong psychological impact. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. including the “Great Firewall of China. All the while. however.

information collection. emotions. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press. and/or alter an opponent’s thoughts. and among strategy. it is applied against the enemy. manage. 4. Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing. but also internally. but also the entire globe. which is integral to information collection and transmission. The interconnected nature of information. between military and civilian. intertwined nature of modern international politics and economics: [I]t is necessary in peacetime to undertake information warfare in the political. with effective coverage of many areas. 2. appropriately calculate gains and losses in a conflict. PRC: National Defense University Press.” China Military Science. technical. it must deal with allied countries. As one Chinese volume observes. affecting the 1. November 2005). A product of the Information Age. Academy of Military Science. clerks. pp. but also against friends. whether by slowing down transmission or by introducing false or inaccurate data. p. but also the human agents that interact with those data.)—are as important as the computers and networks and the software that runs them. Military News Department Study Group. Because of the complex. Nanjing Political Academy. PRC: National Defense University Press. information warfare is constant and ongoing. Information dominance rests on two primary factors: modern information technology. 2 .BACKGROUNDER | NO. precisely strike predetermined targets. 154. 2004). 1. will target not only the physical information infrastructure and the data that pass through it. 3. operations. economic. p. and one must rely on the media acting in multiple directions jointly. “Study of the Journalistic Media Warfare in the Iraq War. and exploit accurate information more quickly than an opponent. information warfare is the struggle to dominate the generation and flow of information in order to enhance and support one’s own strategic goals while degrading and constraining those of an opponent. Li Naiguo. therefore. as only then can one scientifically establish operational plans.5 Rather than trying to draw artificial boundaries among these categories. and military realms. especially those who are making decisions. whether in wartime or peacetime. 2821 JULY 11. The Science of Military Information (Beijing. 30. But in the Chinese conception of psychological warfare. Efforts to secure information dominance. and even exploitation. Informationalized Operations Theory Study Guide (Beijing. p. 2008). the implication is that information should be treated as an integrated whole. makes clear-cut classifications of “military” and “civilian” almost impossible. etc. operations designed to influence a rival nation can no longer be aimed solely at military leaders or reserved for wartime. and seek the best strategic interest and long-term benefit. and habits while at the same time strengthening friendly psychology. appropriately control the level of attack. and tactics. In this context. The ability to triumph in future “Local Wars Under Informationized Conditions”—the most likely form of wars in the Information Age—rests upon the ability to secure “information dominance (zhi xinxi quan). Given the nature of modern technology and informationized societies. which emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. p. Operations Theory and Regulations Research Department and Informationalized Operations Theory Research Office.4 This philosophy is echoed in other PLA writings. New Theories of Information War (Beijing. 404. PRC: Academy of Military Science Press.3 Psychological Warfare and Information Warfare Psychological warfare operations are integral to the broad concept of information warfare (xinxi zhanzheng). constrain.” This in turn requires the ability to collect. 77–79. 2005). the users of information—both high-level decision-makers and lower-level policy implementers (individual soldiers. 5. psychological operations are seen as an essential part of future conflicts. it targets externally.2 The goal of psychological warfare is to influence. Yuan Wenxian. No. in order to comprehensively realize the various goals. as well as information systems. 2013 Specifically: There are myriad targets and objects of psychological warfare. is not necessarily restricted by “wartime” versus “peacetime” categorizations. and the ability to degrade the quality of information. Similarly. 4 (2003). Guo Yanhua.

employing all the tools of communications. however. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. Finally. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. 3 . working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. from the context to the biases. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. and among strategy. To be effective. p. Instead. operations. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). terror. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. fear. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. Ideally. including diplomatic efforts. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. By employing various forms of strategic communications. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. population. but once the conflict is concluded. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. can create a strong psychological impact.BACKGROUNDER | NO. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. “When one defeats the enemy. In wartime. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. it is not solely by killing the enemy. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. 2821 JULY 11. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. In addition.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. including various forms of media. and leaders. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. and tactics. or winning a piece of ground. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. anxiety. Guo. between military and civilian. including the “Great Firewall of China. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. and exhaustion in an opponent. influencing the course of the conflict. undermining their positions. 14. All the while. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. doubt. At the same time. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. and similar outlets. peacetime psychological operations are necessary. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. regret.

BACKGROUNDER | NO. and leaders. including various forms of media. psychological warfare operations cannot be limited to wartime. Another facet of wartime psychological operations is the sowing of discord and a sense of hopelessness in the enemy. Guo. “When one defeats the enemy. The primary objective of such efforts is to generate confusion. and forcing them to react to a variety of charges so that their energy is dispersed. since an opponent will also be trying to undermine one’s own forces. 2821 JULY 11. Instead. offensive psychological warfare operations must be complemented by defensive measures. By employing various forms of strategic communications. and exhaustion in an opponent. influencing the course of the conflict. All the while. terror. doubt. including diplomatic efforts. psychological warfare is the resposibility of the General Political Department (GPD). employing all the tools of communications.”6 In order to undermine the opponent’s morale. Such defensive measures require tight control of information flows in one’s own society and the insulation of one’s decision-makers and decision-making processes from enemy information warfare efforts. one must emphasize information favorable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties. In wartime. thereby degrading opposition decision-making processes. 2013 very perceptions that inform decision making. population. This need for control explains Beijing’s efforts to limit cyber access to the larger population. such a campaign will induce neglect and maximize the chances of an opponent making mistakes. and similar outlets. between military and civilian. both to understand an opponent better and to lay the groundwork for effective wartime operations. undermining their positions. it is not solely by killing the enemy. such techniques attempt to isolate opponents. working in coordination with the rest of the PLA. highlight one’s successes and the enemy’s failures. anxiety. Peacetime applications of psychological warfare techniques involve influencing and altering an opponent’s unconscious. Finally. such operations may facilitate peace negotiations and induce more concessions. including the “Great Firewall of China. To be effective. Psychological Warfare Knowledge. operations. The ability to interfere with an opponent’s information systems. 3 . or winning a piece of ground. one can foster a positive national image and increase foreign sympathy and support for one’s own policies and goals. implicit views in order to make that opponent more susceptible to coercion. from the context to the biases. In addition. but is mainly in terms of cowing the enemy’s heart. and tactics. and instill confidence and support for the Party and the state. Ideally. especially among senior military and civilian leaders. At the same time. The GPD not only ensures political orthodoxy 6. Not only will this help generate war-weariness among enemy forces and populations and discourage resistance. emphasizes one’s own strengths as well as a willingness to employ that strength to deter and coerce opponents more effectively. regret. can create a strong psychological impact. peacetime psychological operations are necessary.” Chinese Concept of Psychological Warfare Tasks For the PLA. p. PLA writings emphasize that modern information technology blurs the lines between peacetime and wartime. One must therefore attempt to solidify popular support for the conflict. psychological operations shift emphasis towards more specifically military targets and goals. portraying them as fostering ill intentions. coupled with efforts to influence decision makers. 14. but once the conflict is concluded. It is also likely that an opponent will attempt to demoralize one’s populace and that appropriate defensive measures will have to be taken. fear. Successful psychological operations will therefore have repercussions at every level of operations. and among strategy. friendly elements in the opponent’s society. Wartime psychological warfare operations also aim to generate a sense of uncertainty and indecisiveness at all levels. however. one must be working to counter opponents’ efforts to foster their own image of strength and unity.