Aurangzeb's Policies and the Decline of the Mughal Empire Author(s): Hamida Khatoon Naqvi Reviewed work(s): Source:

The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Nov., 1977), pp. 191-192 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053411 . Accessed: 05/10/2012 20:00
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Aurangzeb's Policies and the Decline of the Mughal Empire

an analysisof M. N. Pearson attempted In the FebruaryI976 issue, Professor the empire's the determinants in the decline of the MughalEmpire.' He attributes factors: performance of almost crisisto twoprincipal (i) thepoor and unsatisfactory all the powerfulMughal nobles; (2) Aurangzeb'smove south in I68I-82. Though I shall limitmyself one may join issue withProfessorPearson in several matters, here to the two most crucialpointsnoted above. accepted, of Aurangzeb'sumerahis generally Whereas the decadent character of his approximately Pearsondoes not seem to have takenintoaccountthefactthat, withthe in I647 were,together in I695, at least 8,ooo existing I4,500 mansabdars crown,received by Aurangzebas a legacy of the House in i658. By about the had sucmiddle of Emperor Akbar'sreign(I556-I605), the Mughal mansabdars of decision-making on vitalissuesof the to themselves theright ceeded in arrogating withcash regnalyear,Akbar replaced land assignment empire. In the nineteenth within a his nobles that, butsuchwas thepressurefrom salariesto imperialofficers,2 alreadyenjoying fewyears,he restoredstatusquo ante.3The imperial mansabdars, in addiand executivepowers in the realm,were henceforth almostall the military over the land revenueof the tion enabled to acquire more or less completerights thatover the decades renderedthe mansabdar non-khalisa areas-a circumstance Jahangir supremein theempire.It is well knownthatEmperors community virtually had ele(i 605-2 7) and Shah Jahan(i 62 7-58), leaningheavilyon the mansabdars, ranks.Aurangzeb's and further expanding the maintaining vatedand expanded their to them.Pearsonwould was merelyto honorthe dynasty's commitment community and unAurangzebforso stubbornly perhapshave done betterifhe had criticized 7,000 new manon to the tradition, since the approximately imaginatively hanging upon the older sabdarshe enlistedover the lastfivedecades were no improvement set of umerah. Pearson puts Aurangzebin the dock once again when he contendsthatwhat soundedthe deathknellof theGreat Mughalswas the emergenceof Shivajiand his while Aurangzebgenerally blunas a parallelpowerful Marhattas body. Worse still, on fourspecificoccasions-according to dered in his dealingswiththe Marhattas, of the rebelswas decisive:in handling Pearson'sassessment-his unwiseand tactless of of theopportunity oftheDeccan, he failedto availhimself I 65 7, when,as subedair in I659, whenShaistaKhan's crushing Shivaji,who had notyetgrowntoo powerful; in and finally debacle occurred;in I664, when Shivaji sacked Suratwithimpunity; was presentedto the Emperorat Agra. Shivaji and his i666, when the arch-rebel a formidable forcein thelaterhalfof thesevenwere undoubtedly bandoffollowers and the factremainsthatAurangzeband his nobles failedto supteenthcentury, audacipressthem.It mayalso be conceded thatMarhattas-bytheirperseverance, to the generalweakeningof the empireand contributed ty,and vigor-had largely as a body did to the erosion of imperialprestige, time,and energy.But Marhattas
pire,"JAS, XXXV, pp. 22I-35.
I"Shivaji

and the Decline of the Mughal Em-

2 Abul Fazl, Akbarnama (Persian ed.), III (Calcutta,i 886), p. I I7.

Muntakhebat-ut3Fazl, pp. 292, 327; Badayuni, Tawarikh,II, trans.by Rankingand Lowe (Patna,
I973), pp. i88, I93, 2I8.

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notexistwhenAkbardied; theyarose and grewover the subsequentdecades. Their principal asset was theirlarge and ever-growing strength of followers. Aurangzeb, however, did not ascertain the causes of the swelling of the Marhatta ranks,nor did he checktheoutflow ofmenfrom theimperial domainsintoMarhatta arms.Instead, to reduce the inAurangzeb embarked upon a twenty-five-year-long campaign In otherwords,Aurangzebomittedto tracethe cause of the trouble,and surgents. confined himself to dealingwiththe resultant phenomenonof Shivajiand Marhatta almostexclupower. Substantially following Aurangzeb,Pearson too concentrates the Marhattas, sivelyon Aurangzeb vis-a-vis disregarding the factsof the origin, character, composition,and circumstances attending the rise of Marhattapower. Large migrations of able-bodiedmen fromtheirsettledtrade and base are usually promptedby politicalinsecurity, social barriers, or economic crises;and it would or Bundelas) were in facttheresultof seem thatMarhattas (as well as theSikhs, Jats, in the precedingdecades withinthe imperialdosome unfortunate developments minionoccasioninglarge movementsinto rebel camps. Even the factthat,as the it onlyadded to the size and imperial armsmade theirhalting progressin victories, did not make eitherAurangzebor Pearson thinktwice of the Marhattas, strength Each yardof land gained by Aurangzeb beforecommitting themselves anyfurther. drove at least one individualto findrefugeand perhaps livelihoodwiththe Marhattas. As a matterof fact,in medievaltimes,social and economic changeswere very slow indeed: the rebel forcesthatcrystallized duringAurangzeb'sreigncould not of (and actuallydid not) emergeat one strokein i658. The originand beginnings the Marhattas, Sikhs,Jats,and Bundelas can, withthe help of availablesources,be or early years of Shah Jahan'sreign; Aurangzebmerely traced back to Jahangir and grandfather had sown. He certainly reaped whathis father stumbledand blunbut it is less thanfairto hold himrespondered when facedwiththe predicament, sible forthe sins of his royalprogenitors. thatof the GreatMughals,are complexin character. Finally, societies,including and all thatfollowedin itstrain, to a singlecauseTo ascribethe I 707 catastrophe, invasion of a Taimuror a Nadir Shah-is an especiallyin the absence of a whirlwind A Marhatta, oversimplification. Sikh,orJatrebellionmayweakenan empireor even but in orderto see the qualitative reduce its territory, changesthatcame over the of theempire,the threads of a denouementas complexas thatof shape and interests I707 have to be soughtverymuch earlier. Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi
HAMIDA KHATOON NAQVI