The Origins and Growth of The Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations

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The origins and growth of the Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

Yoginder S. Sikand
a a
Department of History, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 OEX, UK Version of record first published: 18 Apr 2007.
To cite this article: Yoginder S. Sikand (1998): The origins and growth of the Tablighi Jamaat in Britain, Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations, 9:2, 171-192 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596419808721147
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Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1998
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The Origins and Growth of the Tablighi Jamaat in Britain
YOGINDER S. SIKAND
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ABSTRACT One of the largest Islamic movements of contemporary times, in terms of both geographical spread and number of activists, the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) has received but scant attention from scholars. By and large, what little has been written about it has focused on the movement in its South Asian setting. To date no detailed study has been conducted on the TJ in the West, where it has become increasingly active in recent decades. This paper seeks to study the origins and growth of the TJ in one such Western country--Britain, starting from the 1940s continuing till the present day. The paper begins with a brief account of the growth of Muslim communities, largely of South Asian origin, in Britain and this provides the context for the study of the TJ in the country. It goes on to discuss the growing appeal of the TJ to these early migrants, seeing this as reflecting the concerns and needs of groups who found themselves culturally uprooted in an alien land. The attraction that the TJ held was not, however, uniform across these Muslim groups, and here we deal with the movement's special appeal among certain classes and ethnic clusters among Britain's Muslim communities of South Asian origin. Tracing the historical development of the TJ in Britain through the decades, we finally turn to the state of the movement in the country today. Here we focus on how the movement is faring among young British Muslims and search for answers to the question of why it appears to be facing a crisis of credibility, with young Muslims increasingly turning either the secular way or going in for more activist, and sometimes more aggressive, Islamic groups.
What is the TJ? The TJ is a world-wide Islamic movement that seeks to revive Islam by encouraging Muslims to lead their lives in accordance with the injunctions of Islamic law, the Shari'a. The movement has its roots in what is commonly known as the 'Deobandi' tradition. In the wake of the failed uprising against the British in India in 1857, a group of ulama got together to establish an Islamic seminary or madrasa, the Dar-ul Ulum, at the town of Deoband, not far from Delhi. The principal aim behind the setting up of the madrasa was to train Muslim scholars and activists who would work to 'purify' Indian Muslim society of supposedly 'un-Islamic' customs. The founder of the TJ, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (d. 1944), was a student of the Deoband madrasa. Some time in the early 1920s, after graduating from the madrasa, Ilyas set about spreading the message of Deobandi reformism in the villages of northern India. By 1947, when India won her independence, Ilyas' efforts had blossomed into a fully-fledged movement that had spread over much of South Asia. Features of the TJ The TJ shares with other Islamic movements the goal of the 'revival' of Islam, taking as its model the 'Golden Age' of the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs. However, it 0959-6410/98/020171-22 1998 CSIC and CMCU
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possesses several distinguishing features of its own. One of these is its immediate focus, restricted as it is simply to matters related to personal worship or ibadah. It thus claims no overt political ambitions, and its activists confine themselves to purely spiritual or dini affairs, developing, in the process, a distinct distaste for worldly or dunyavi involvement. Life in this ephemeral world is seen as a Satanic snare and believers are exhorted to turn their attention to build up treasures in heaven instead by leading pious lives. In order to encourage Muslims to devote themselves whole-heartedly to prayer (namaz) and remembrance of God (zikr), Maulana Ilyas commissioned the preparation of a voluminous tome, the Fazail-i-Amal ('The Virtues of Pious Deeds'). This book contains a number of stories about the great heavenly rewards (sazvab) that await Muslims if they follow the commandments of the Sharf a strictly in their own personal lives and steer clear of worldly temptations. Tablighi activists are expected to read or recite aloud this text in small groups in the mosque after the congregational prayers. Another unique feature of the TJ is its method (tariqa) of preaching (tabligh). Small groups (jamaats) of ordinary Muslims go out from their homes and travel from place to place exhorting local Muslims to attend prayers in the mosques. This is known, in tablighi parlance, as gasht. After the congregational prayers are over, a muballigh (missionary, pi. muballighin) from among the jamaat delivers a lecture (bayan or taqrir) on the importance of cultivating one's faith (iman) and appeals to the men present to take time off from their dunyavi affairs and join a travelling jamaat to spread the message of tabligh. In addition to the roving bands of muballighin, the TJ also organizes large congregations (ijtemas, jalsas) from time to time in which thousands of Muslims participate. At the conclusion of these rallies, participants are exhorted to join one or other jamaat to engage in tabligh work for a fixed period according to a pre-set schedule. TJ leaders and activists believe that the particular method of doing tabligh work (tariqa-i-tabligh) that Maulana Ilyas developed is actually the method that the Prophet Muhammad himself employed. Since it is seen as the nabavi tariqa, it is believed that it cannot be changed or altered and that it must be followed to the letter at all times and in all places. Consequently, the tariqa of the TJ is entirely the same wherever the movement is active.
The TJ in Britain
Before we go on to a discussion of the growth of the TJ in Britain, we need to turn our attention to the question of the historical origins of the Muslim community in the country. The earliest Muslim settlements in Britain date back to the mid-nineteenth century, when groups of Muslim seamen from Asia are reported to have taken up residence in port cities such as Cardiff, Liverpool, Tyneside and London. Ally1 divides the history of the Muslims in Britain into two broad periods. In the first period, stretching for a century from 1850 to 1949, the Muslims remained fairly small in number. Most of them were seamen, students and professionals from abroad. The second period, from 1949 to 1980, is really when large numbers of Muslims, mainly of rural South Asian background, arrived in Britain as workers in search of economic prosperity in the wake of the post-Second World War boom that had resulted in a great demand for un-skilled and semi-skilled labour in the country. As a result of this influx, South Asians came to form the vast majorityover 80%of the British Muslim population. Of these new migrants, the largest group came from what is now Pakistan, mainly from the Mirpur district in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, the Nowshera district of the North-Western Frontier Province, and the
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Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Lyallpur (Faisalabad) districts of the Pakistani Punjab. Most of these people belonged to rural areas and were largely illiterate. The same was true in the case of another large group of South Asian Muslim migrants, the Bengalis of Sylhet, a district in what is now Bangladesh. Smaller numbers of Muslim migrants also arrived from India, particularly from the western state of Gujarat, as well as a number of Muslims of Gujarati origin from East Africa. Prior to 1961 Muslim immigration into Britain appears to have been entirely unorganized, consisting predominantly of economically-active men. However, the passing of several acts of immigrant-related laws in Britain in the 1960s severely restricted the further inflow of foreign workers, though it did allow for the entry of a substantial number of dependants of immigrants already in Britain. This led to the creation of permanent Muslim communities resident in Britain, with Muslim men now having their wives, children and other dependants with them. The pattern of South Asian immigration into Britain over the years seems, in a way, to have actually worked to preserve, rather than loosen, community structures and primordial ties. As part of the process of 'chain migration', with immigrants sending for their relatives back in their villages in South Asia to join them, Muslims of a particular regional, linguistic or ethnic background tended to cluster together in residential areas inhabited largely by them. This process of 'ethnification' was given a major impetus by the sudden influx of the dependants of the early migrants with the passing of the new laws. From being a motley group of workers who saw themselves as temporary, transient migrants, Muslim groups now turned into fully-fledged communities. This change in the structure of the Muslim society in Britain had far-reaching consequences for how British Muslims were to now relate to Islam. 'Interest in religious matters', writes Nielsen, 'had been minimal among the (Muslim) male migrant workers living in boarding houses.'2 Lewis says of the period before the arrival of the Muslim workers' families in Britain, 'Earlier, religious sentiments had been expressed in avoiding non-halal meat, but for the rest the men were preoccupied with "survival", which left little time for religious devotions.'3 These early immigrants, it seems, typically saw their own stay in Britain as temporary, and they hoped to go back to their countries of origin after accumulating enough savings. However, the arrival of their families and their receiving British citizenship put paid to what Lewis calls 'the myth of return'. The Muslims were now here to staythey were no longer temporary guestworkers but settlers, and Britain was henceforth to be their new home. While the early Muslim migrants seem to have given Islam but little importance, increasing attention now began to be given to religion. This was reflected, for instance, in the setting up of several Islamic makatib (religious schools) for their children as well as prayer houses. In 1963 there were just thirteen mosques registered with the Registrar-General as places of worship. From 1966 onwards, new mosques began to be registered at the rate of seven per year, a consequence, says Nielsen, of the reunion of families facilitated by the new immigration policies of the 1960s.4 One recent estimate put the number of mosques in Britain at around 1000, calling this 'the greatest achievement' of the British Muslims, adding that perhaps as much as 200 million have been invested in building these structures over the years.5 In the period before the migrant Muslim workers were joined by their families, mosques were generally housed in converted homes. Interestingly, Muslims of various different Sunn! groups who today in Britain, as also in South Asia, have their own, separate mosquesgroups such as the 'Barelwis',6 the 'Deobandis' and the Ahl-iHadith7shared the same prayer rooms and even prayed together, with little or no
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awareness of sectarian differences. However, the period which saw this rapid growth in the number of mosques and Islamic schools also witnessed a growing sectarianism, with mosques and Islamic makatib now being set up on sectarian lines, thereby reproducing the sharp divisions that characterize Islam in South Asia itself. This corresponds to what Lewis calls the period of fission, as Muslim groups began to close in among themselves not just on the basis of ethnic, regional or linguistic background but, increasingly, on sectarian lines as well.8 Qualified religious personnel to staff the mosques and to run the makatib and madrasas (institutes of higher Islamic education) had to be procured from South Asia, and they, in turn, brought along with them their own sectarian antagonisms and quarrels. It was in this climate of growing 'fission' and sectarianism starting in the early 1960s that the TJ was to find fertile ground to grow and flourish in pockets across Britain. Downloaded by [Sheffield Hallam University] at 13:25 25 December 2012
The TJ in Britain: the early years

Marc Gaborieau, in his paper, 'The transformation of the Tablighi Jama'at into an international movement' writes that, while by the time of Ilyas' death the TJ had spread to various parts of India, it had not yet crossed the boundaries of the subcontinent, except perhaps for the brief and all too unsuccessful attempt by Ilyas himself to begin tablighi work in the Hijaz when he had gone there for his third and last haj. Yet, he says, it is beyond doubt that Ilyas had envisaged the spread of the movement outside South Asia as well. This task was to be taken up in full earnest by his son and immediate successor, Maulana Muhammad Yusuf (d. 1965), under whose leadership the TJ managed to expand to over 30 countries in various continents. This trans-national expansion of the movement under Yusuf, Gaborieau stresses, is to be seen as 'the accomplishment of a plan made by Maulana Ilyas', and 'not as a new policy'.9 If the chronology of the initial spread of the TJ outside South Asia is observed, says Gaborieau, one can note that impetus for this expansion came basically from three centresfrom South Asia itself (from the TJ's headquarters in New Delhi), from Arabia ('in order to establish contacts with the Arab countries and more generally in the Muslim world through pilgrims'), and from London, where, 'from the very beginning an effort was made to build a ... centre ... in the heart of (the) industrialised countries', for these countries were 'an important target' for the TJ.10
The First Jamaats in Britain

One of the first steps that Yusuf is said to have taken on assuming the post of amir (head) of the TJ, writes one of his principal biographers, was to instruct his followers to spread the work of the movement outside the confines of South Asia, to which it had, till then, been restricted. Yusuf s first appeal in this regard is said to have been made at a large tablighi ijtema held at the town of Moradabad in northern India in January 1945. Accordingly, a year later, on 20 January 1945, the first tablighi gasht and meeting in the West was organized in an Indian quarter of London.11 The amir of the gasht party was one Rahat Rizvi, scion of a wealthy family hailing from Lucknow, but having long since settled in Calcutta. Rizvi is said to have come in contact with the TJ through one Haji Irshad of Peshawar. The other main participant in this first tablighi group in Britain was the noted educationist, Dr Zakir Hussain, who was later to go on to become the President of India. Hussain is said to have been in London at this time attending an educational conference.
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Sani Hasni, Yusuf s principal biographer, writes that the Muslims of London responded enthusiastically to this first jamaat's appeals, adding that this had much to do with Dr Zakir Hussain's own personal reputation and fame in intellectual circles. Yet, 'those who know London', he says, 'can well appreciate how difficult it must have been for them to do this work of tabligh there, especially since it involved such a practical (amali) exercise as gash?. However, we are told, against all die odds this jamaat was a success and that it laid 'the august beginning' of the TJ's activities in Britain.12 The enthusiasm which fired the early TJ muballighin to the West, and the sort of experiences that they must have encountered is well illustrated in the following account which Sani Hasni gives of one of the first jamaats, to the Westin this case, to the USA. He writes that the members of this jamaat 'had no wealth and palaces, no honour or riches, no store-house of worldly knowledge and culture', but possessed just one treasure that alone sufficed for themunflinching faith in Islam.13 Before departing on their mission, they came to visit Yusuf, who addressed them, saying: We need such firm believers (ahl-i-yaqiri) and men of God (rnardan-i-khudd) to go to the wealth-worshipping countries of Europe and America who, on seeing the glitter and glamour of life there, will not get beguiled by it all, but will, instead, shed tears on seeing the anti-Islamic ways of the people who live there.14 The zeal to begin tabligh work right away seems to have been so very irrepressible that as soon as this jamaat boarded the aeroplane, 'they began discussing among themselves as to how they should start their work (among the passengers of the plane itself)'. They approached the captain to seek his permission to call out the azan (call to prayer) aloud. He told them that the other passengers might object to that. The muballighin, however, or so we are told, ignored the captain's warnings and, after calling out the azan, proceeded to offer namaz. The other passengers seem to have found this sight rather curious. Many of them actually got up from their seats to see what they were doing. When the muballighin found that the other passengers were taking an interest in what they were engaged in, they began their talim (teaching), which probably consisted, as it does till today, of reading aloud from the Fazail-i-Amal. They went around the plane identifying all the Muslim passengers, beseeching them to join them for the talim. The captain of the plane would, every now and then, pass by, and, according to Sani Hasni, seeing that 'these people were talking only about the importance of cultivating good morals, worshipping God, remembering the Hereafter, leading a good life and loving others' was reportedly 'greatly impressed'. Sani Hasni would have his readers believe that the presence of the pious muballighin on board the plane had a miraculous effect of some sort, for he writes that, 'By the grace of God, this time the plane did not run into rough weadier as it usually had in the past'. On landing safely the captain is reported to have admitted, 'God has been merciful to all of us only because of these pious men, otherwise we certainly would have been troubled by a storm because, with the exception of this particular flight, every flight of mine has got caught in bad weather.' It was as if God were blessing the first foray of the TJ in the West, or so Sani Hasni suggests.15 On their arrival at their destination, the muballighin began scanning the telephone directory for the names of local Muslims whom they could work among, a practice, incidentally, often still used by tablighi groups going to new areas. They managed
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to locate a few names, and contacted them. At first, they had to struggle to convince the local Muslims that they had come all the way from India, 'only for the sake of Allah and not out of greed for any worldly riches'. When at last they managed to set aside these apprehensions, the local Muslims asked them to tell them how 'the wealth of love could be acquired'. They were told that the only way to do so was to take three days off and join them in a jamaat to do tabligh work.16 They readily agreed. After the tour was over, the participants are said to have been so impressed that they said, 'We shall never in our lives forget this jamaat. We would never have been able to acquire such joy even if we had spent thousands of rupees.' The mubalUghin then told them that if they really wanted to remain immersed in the bliss they had just experienced they should form a jamaat and go to South Asia to do tabligh work there for a period of four months. All those who participated in the jamaat are said to have willingly agreed to this suggestion and, accordingly, gave their names to the mubalUghin.I7
The TJ in Britain in the 1960s Sani Hasni's account of the TJ in Britain is very sketchy, based as it is on a few letters sent by early mubalUghin to the tablighi authorities in Delhi. The dates of these letters have not been provided, though there is reason to suggest that they were all written in the 1960s. This was at a time when the TJ markaz (headquarters) in Delhi had begun despatching jamaats from India to Britain to carry out tabligh work there, the first of which, probably sent some time in 1962 or 1963, is said to have been comprised of, among others, some teachers of the Muslim University, in Aligarh, India. These letters highlight both the immense hurdles that the early mubalUghin in Britain had to face and the limited, yet significant, achievements that they were able to make. Summing up the work of a particular jamaat, an early muballigh to Britain, in his letter to Yusuf, wrote: All our companions are in good health, and with love and co-operation are engrossed in the work of the din. Every effort is being made to abide by the rules of talim, tasbihat (counting the rosary), shab bedari (nightly vigil), nawafil (optional prayers) and tilawat (recitation of the scriptures) ... All praise be to Allah! Due to the blessings of this holy effort (of tabligh) many mosques have now been set up in several cities of this country, in which the azan is being called out and Muslims pray together in congregation. Where there is no mosque, many friends are thinking of setting them up. At the local level, at a few places, the weekly gasht, ijtema, talim and shab bedari have been started and jamaats are now being despatched to nearby places.18 It was not that the early mubalUghin faced no major difficulties in their efforts, for as this muballigh continued in his letter, 'It was only with the special favour of God' that they were able to carry on with their work. One of the greatest challenges they seem to have faced appears to have been cultural, with many local Muslims having 'succumbed' to what they saw as immoral and un-Islamic Western ways. As this muballigh went on to add, The conditions in this country are indeed very difficult. The bazaar of immorality thrives and Satan has set here a wide and tough snare. Goodness knows how many Muslims have got ensnared in this trap after coming here. There is a pressing need for doing (tabligh) work among them. Pray for us that Allah should keep us firm on the principles (needed to do) this work here, that
Origins and Growth 0/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain He should accept us poor, miserable creatures in His make this tour of ours a means for our own complete should shower His blessings upon us ... May Allah the means (zariya) and pretext (banana) to convert this polytheism into the centre of peace and the Faith.19 court, that He should guidance and that He Pure One make us the land of infidelity and
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The sudden influx of wives, children and other dependents of male Muslim workers into Britain in the early 1960s meant, as we have seen, that British Muslims now had to turn their attention from simply earning their livelihood to providing, among other things, for the religious needs of their families and communities. Thus began a phase of feverish institution building, in which particular importance began to be given to the setting up of mosques and religious schools. Like the other Muslim groups, the TJ, too, seems to have played a significant role in this regard. The particular importance that the TJ gave to mosque building activity at this time, as evidenced in the letter quoted above, probably had much to do with the fact that tablighi work itself is largely mosque-centred. Makatib and madrasas, too, began being set up under TJ influence, and these assumed particular importance as a means to transmit religious learning to the younger generation. Pointing to the attention that the TJ was now paying to the establishment of schools for the religious education of the young, a London-based muballigh wrote, Till now the religious education of our children has been completely ignored. Words cannot express our gratitude to Allah that in a short span of a mere two years since this madrasa was set up, we have managed to enrol over forty children ... For these children everything (that we teach) is new because they have an Islamic environment neither in their schools nor even in their homes. For them, the namaz itself is new and for the vast majorityby which is meant 99% of the studentsthe kalima20 itself is something novel.21 The focus of this founder of one of the earliest tablighi madrasas in Britain seems to have been three-foldto impart knowledge of the basics of Islam, including its rituals and fundamental beliefs, to the children; to combat Christian and Western cultural influences; and to instil in the children a spirit of dedication to the work of the din, which could later be channelled into tablighi activity. He wrote in his letter that he had divided the students into three classes based on age. The children in the first class were taught the kalima, iman, the divinity of Allah (Allah ki khudaniyyai), and the refutation of the Christian concept of the Trinity (Taslis ki nafi) and were also told about the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. Children in the second class were taught the same things, though in greater detail. The students in the third class were taught how to say namaz, how to 'purify their intention' (khulus-i-niyyat), 'reflecting and relying upon Allah', 'knowledge of Allah as the Omnipresent and the Omniscient', along with the complete text of Maulana Kifayatullah's Talim-ul-Islam, a book used in a large number of Deobandi makatib all over South Asia. In addition, all the students were taught 'the great importance of struggling in the path of the din in this environment', along with 'the rewards (fazail) of doing this work'.22 By the mid-1960s or so, the TJ seems to have made its presence felt in several towns and cities across England with a substantial South Asian Muslim presence. It was probably around this time that a muballigh wrote from London, hardly able to control his excitement: People are now ... taking time off on weekends to go on jamaat. Last year 75 friends from here went on the haj. Several mosques have now been set up, and
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Yoginder S. Sikand parents have now been made concerned about how they can save the faith of their children. Mosques now get full on Fridays. In Newcastle, Glasgow and London, a couple of non-Muslims have accepted Islam ... A thirst for religion is now apparent among the (Muslim) women of Glasgow and Manchester ... they listened very attentively to (our) talk about Allah.23
The First Ijtemas in Britain

After the TJ had managed to spread to a few towns and cities in England, an ijtema, the first of its kind in Britain, was organized over the Christmas vacation in London. The four-day ijtema was attended by around one hundred people, and participating in it were jamaats from Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield, besides activists from London itself. Some time after the London ijtema, a similar gathering, but on a grander scale, was held at Manchester, providing another opportunity for tablighi activists from all over Britain to meet and discuss plans for the future expansion of the movement. The participants in this ijtema seem to have been drawn from all walks of life. One of them excitedly wrote, Ajamaat arrived (at the ijtema) this morning from Leeds ... Another came up from Birmingham. Ajamaat of seventeen brothers has come from London ... Ajamaat from Glasgow is due to arrive shortly and so is one from Liverpool. What, is this the Bhopal ijtema?2* No! It is the ijtema at Manchester in England. Here there are men with beards, men wearing (Western) suits, officers, traders, factory workers, doctors, scientists, students, old men, men from British Guyana, men who have come here by train, others who have come by 'motor' and yet others who have come by car ... Today let those people see with their very own eyes who say that there is no tabligh work being done in London, in England! Let them see the number of jamaats that has now gone off on gasht and the other jamaats that, standing outside the mosque, are profusely shedding tears while earnestly making supplications to God!25 The Manchester ijtema seems to have been a major success and to have enthused the participants with great zeal for carrying on their tabligh efforts. As one participant put it, 'It seems that Allah is (now) going to do some very big and important work through us.' Another equally zealous activist declared, 'The so-called Big Powers will probably not survive the terrible destruction that is sure to follow from Allah's wrath. If only (the Muslims) who have been influenced by the environment (of the West) would turn their attention to this! May Allah give us the courage to fight this environment.'26
Further Expansion of the Movement in Britain

Sani Hasni stops abruptly at the Manchester ijtema and does not go on to describe the further expansion of the TJ in Britain. From here one enters difficult terrain, because little or no literature is available that documents the subsequent course of the movement in the country. Material gathered through interviews with first-generation migrants27 suggests a slow but sustained expansion of the movement from the 1960s right through the 1970s and after, particularly in industrial towns with a sizeable Muslim presence, especially in the Midlands and Yorkshire. Not only was the TJ able to reach
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out to those South Asian Muslims who were already associated with the TJ or the 'Deobandi' maktab-i-fikr (school of thought) before their arrival in Britain itself, it was also able to win over several who came from parts of South Asia where the cults of the Sufis were popular. One reason for this could be that, compared with the TJ, the traditionalist ulama seem to have been far less well organized and active. Interestingly, not all 'Barelwis', as these traditionalists are commonly referred to in South Asia, who went on to associate with the TJ after their arrival in Britain, actually seem to have been very aware of the intricacies of the theological wranglings between the 'Deobandi' and 'Barelwi' ulama. As a result, many of them continued to have faith in the efficacy of the intercessionary powers of the dead saints, a key concept in 'Barelwi' cosmology, but one condemned as shirk (polytheism or associationism) by the 'Deobandis'. This accommodation to 'Barelwi' beliefs, which, in fact, enabled the TJ to make considerable inroads among the 'Barelwis', was facilitated by the fact that the TJ concerned itself only with matters such as the fazail, namaz and iman, studiously avoiding ikhtilafi or contentious religious issues that divided the various Muslim sects. It appears that many among the early Muslim migrants, hailing as they did from the rural areas of some of the least urbanized parts of South Asia, were themselves hardly familiar with some of even the most basic of Islamic beliefs and rituals, such as the rules of namaz, wuzu (ritual ablutions), roza (fasting), and even, in some cases, of the very kalima itself. The TJ's sole focus on these simple Islamic basics, and its steering clear of theological intricacies, had, then, a natural attraction for many such people, a fairly considerable number of whom were, at least formally, traditionalist Muslims. As one former 'Barelwi', an elderly Muslim of East Ham, London, originally from Belgaum in South India, who arrived in Bradford in 1961, put it, In those days, jamaat would come here from India and Pakistan. With great courtesy they would approach us and would even share whatever little food they had with us. They would teach us things about Allah and Allah's Prophet. Who, tell me, could have had any objection to that? In those days, very few of us had knowledge of the masail (details) of ibadatabout how many rakaats (genuflections) there are in namaz, what hfarz (a duty) in wuzu and about how ghusl (bath)should be takenthings which are most fundamental in Islam, without which your namaz is not accepted by God ... The jamaat people would teach us all this with great love and affection. They would, out of humility, say that they had come, not to teach us, but, in fact, to learn from us, so that we would not feel small. That is how many of us began participating in jamaat work. Besides the quietistic and non-controversial nature of the TJ, which enabled the early Muslims to carry on with their business of struggling to make money unhindered by wranglings with their host society, the attraction the movement held for many firstgeneration Muslim migrants lay, as Lewis says, in its role of a surrogate family for these suddenly dislocated people who had been uprooted from their homes and communities in rural South Asia and had been thrust into an unknown and generally hostile environment.28 The TJ community provided them with a familiar South Asian atmosphere, where they could spend at least a few days in the company of their co-religionists from their own countries of origin, away from the hostile host population among whom they otherwise had to live and work. The TJ, as Lewis perceptively notes, has a distinct South Asian 'flavour' about it, which made it particularly attractive to many Muslims newly arrived from that part of the world. Urdu, a language with which many of them
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were familiar, was, and still is, the medium generally employed in tablighi circles and meetings, not the unfamiliar English, in which few Muslims were then fluent. Tablighi tended to see, and this is true even today, Western dress as somehow outside the bonds of Islamic modesty. Consequently, TJ activists generally wore (and still wear) traditional South Asian attirebaggy trousers or shalwars or lungis, a long, wide cloth wrapped around the waist, knee-length shirts or kurtas or katneez, or Arab-style gowns, along with either skull-caps or turbans. The books that they read out from in their circles were all written by South Asian Deobandi and Tablighi buzurgs (elders), many of whom, including Maulana Enamul Hasan, the amir of the TJ who succeeded Yusuf on his death in 1965, and Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya, the chief ideologue of the movement, visited Britain periodically to strengthen ties between the tablighi markaz (headquarters) in Delhi and its branches in Britain. Even the food that was served at tablighi meetings was, by and large, South Asianconsisting, almost invariably, of spicy rice, meat curry and thick roth or unleavened bread. The TJ, then, was, in some sense, a home away from home for newly arrived South Asian Muslim migrants, aliens in a hostile land. Several respondents who arrived in Britain in the late 1950s and in the 1960s cite this as a major attraction and appeal that the movement held out for them.
The Establishment of the Tablighi Markaz in Britain

As we have seen, by the early sixties the TJ seems to have established a fairly significant presence in several towns in England. Steps now began to be taken to establish a markaz in the country from where the activities of the movement, not just in Britain alone but in Europe as a whole, could be directed and co-ordinated under the guidance of an amir appointed by and directly responsible to the TJ authorities in Delhi. The person who was to become the first amir of the TJ in Britain and all Europe was a Gujarati first-generation migrant, one Hafiz Patel, who, though fairly advanced in years now, still continues to occupy that position. According to a student at the tablighi madrasa at Dewsbury (West Yorkshire), the hafiz had come to England as an ordinary worker. One year he went on haj, where he is said to have met Yusuf, then the global amir of the TJ. Yusuf was apparently so impressed with his sincerity to the cause of Islam that he took him in front of the Ka'aba and there 'offered supplications to Allah to make him the instrument for winning the whole of Britain to Islam.' According to another source, an elderly Gujarati man who runs a small Islamic bookshop at Dewsbury, even before the tablighi markaz was set up at Dewsbury under the supervision of Hafiz Patel, there was already a sizeable Gujarati presence in the town. However, they did not have a mosque and not many of them were regular in their prayers. In fact, says this informant, most of them had little knowledge of even the fundamentals of Islam. Then, in 1963, these Gujaratis invited Hafiz Patel, a fellow Gujarati, who was then working in a factory in Coventry, to come and live amongst them in Dewsbury and to guide them in religious matters, since, being a hafiz, he knew more about Islam than the rest of them. One of the Dewsbury Muslims offered his house to be converted into a mosque. Over time, this became the markaz of the TJ in Britain. Later, when this building proved too small to accommodate the growing number of tablighi activists from Dewsbury and elsewhere, a large plot of land was purchased in Dewsbury itself, and an impressive new markaz building was constructed there. On a visit to Britain, Maulana Zakariyya is said to have come to the construction site to make special supplications for its future success as the centre of tabligh work in the West.
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The construction of the new campus of the Dewsbury markaz, crowned with the building of the grand Markazi mosque in 1982 along with the adjacent seminary, signified the fact that the TJ had now struck firm roots in British soil. Yet, the TJ was not to get a uniformly warm response from all sections of British Muslim society. For one thing, outside the industrial belt in the Midlands and Yorkshire, its influence was not very significant. For another, its followers were to be drawn largely from only certain particular social groups, reflecting the fact that it was unable to transcend its own inherent limitations and constraints. It is to this that we now turn in the next section.
Social Support Base of the TJ in Britain

Downloaded by [Sheffield Hallam University] at 13:25 25 December 2012 Most social, including religious, movements, while attracting individuals from several social groups, develop a core support base among certain generally identifiable sections of society that find a particular social movement more in tune with their ethos, their style and, of course, their interests, than other movements. This core support base may be distinguished on the basis of one or more of a number of social variables such as economic class, occupation, age-group or generation, ethnicity or race, gender, level of educational attainment, religion and sectarian affiliation and so on. In the case of the TJ in Britain we find that, as a consequence of a variety of factors, it tends to find its core support base among certain specific social groups, even though its appeals are directed at all Muslims.
Ethnicity: Explaining the Gujarati Presence

To begin with, and not simply because of their numerical preponderance among British Muslims, the TJ in Britain is largely, though not entirely, associated with Muslims of South Asian origin. Yet, it does not seem to be equally popular among all the various South Asian ethnic groups. Of them, it is less strong among the Pakistanis, who hail from a region where the cults centred around the shrines of the Sufis are still very powerful and popular. The TJ does have some following among the Bengalis from Sylhet, but it is its association with the Gujarati Muslims, in both its general following as well as higher-level leadership, that is most marked, a fact that has been commented upon by several writers. In this section we take up for discussion the case of the Gujarati Muslims of Britain and shall seek to understand the particular attraction that the TJ holds for this ethnic group. In his paper on the 'Deobandi' mosques in Britain, King argues that the Gujarati affiliation with the TJ stems from their long association with the Deobandi school of thought, from which the TJ itself actually emerged. Deobandi reformism, he says, tends to have greater influence among the urban middle-classes, especially traders, among whom he includes many Gujaratis in Britain as well as in India. As a result of the historical links between the TJ and the Deobandi school of thought within the South Asian community inside which tabligh originated, the movement is limited to the Deobandi section, and it is to this section that a large proportion of Britain's Gujarati Muslim population belongs.29 Ally suggests that the strong Gujarati presence in the TJ in Britain has to do with the fact of the Gujaratis having traditionally learnt how to come to terms comfortably with minority status, both in India itself and in East Africa as well.30 Presumably, because of its strict aloofness from active political involvement and controversy, it is particularly
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suited to Muslim groups that are a minority in non-Muslim societies, as is the case in Britain. In this regard, Lewis remarks that the Gujaratis in Britain have learnt to adjust to a minority situation, unlike, say, British Muslims of Pakistani origin. That is why, he says, 'the Pakistanis here tend to get involved in all sorts of political wranglings', while the Gujaratis do not, preferring, instead, to 'quietly get along making their money, studiously avoiding a high profile'. A politically quiescent sort of Islam, such as the TJ presents, therefore suits them ideally. 'Being a minority does not worry them', he says, 'and so they have learnt to recreate their own separate world wherever they might be.' On the other hand, he says, the Punjabi Muslims, coming from an overwhelmingly Muslim country, would take an Islamic ambience in society for granted and would, hence, find it difficult and distressing to live comfortably as a minority. 'That probably explains', he says, 'the relatively greater popularity of political Islamic groupsgroups that talk about the setting up of an Islamic Stateamong them.' 31 Drawing attention to another dimension of the traditional minority status of the Gujarati Muslims which could have some relation with their active involvement in tablighi activities, a leading activist of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a radical Islamic group says that there is 'a tremendous difference' between the Gujarati and Punjabi Muslim youth in Britain. The Punjabis came here from a country where there are almost no non-Muslims at all, where one's 'Muslimness' is taken for granted. 'Punjabi parents back in Pakistan', he says, 'are then not overly careful to teach Islam to their children, because there is no threat of their children going astray by turning kafir.' Punjabi Muslim parents in Britain apparently, carry over this attitude as well, which is why 'if you visit a mosque in a Punjabi locality in Britain you will hardly find more than a handful of youngsters praying'. On the other hand, he says, mosques in Gujarati areas in Britain are 'packed with youngsters', because the Gujarati Muslims, who have traditionally always lived as a minority, have learnt that if they do not pay proper attention to the Islamic education of their children, 'they would be lost in the vast sea of kufr (unbelief) that surrounds them'. 'This is why', he adds, 'Gujarati parents generally make it a point to encourage their children to go on tablighi tours right from an early age itself.' Gujaratis, both Hindus and Muslims, are well-known for their entrepreneurial skills, and have a long tradition of migration to far-off lands in search of opportunities for trade. Significant Gujarati settlements are to be found in countries as far apart as South Africa, Fiji, Mauritius and the West Indies, besides Britain. In Britain itself the Gujaratis mainly come from two different backgrounds. Firstly, migrants from East Africa, who are, for the most part, traders and merchants and are comparatively well-off, and then migrants from the villages of Gujarat who have now, as Humayun Ansari puts it, 'been plugged into the merchant-trader grid at some level or the other'.32 The Gujaratis, on the whole, are thought to be a well-knit and closely integrated community, characterized, as one informant says, by 'an insular, almost caste-like mentality'. They maintain strong family and cultural, including religious, ties with Gujarat and are acutely conscious of their own Gujarati identity, while at the same time also stressing their links with the wider Muslim ummah (fraternity). Various Gujarati communities all over the world are thus linked with each other by a multiplicity of ties, religious as well as mundane, including economic. This international dimension of the Gujarati community, suggests Ansari, 'equips them with a broad international vision, which then links up comfortably with tabligh's international reach and networks and its thrust to expand all over the world'. Going out of one's home to other cities and countries, therefore, is not new for many Gujaratis, only this time it is for tabligh and
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not trade, 'so it is easy to see how tabligh fits in with the general Gujarati ethos'. Likewise, Murshid remarks that, "The tablighi activists and the Gujaratis share a common bond that draws them togetherthey are both great travellers.'33 'Their habits as travellers and their international links,' writes King of the Gujaratis in Britain, 'have naturally led them to be attracted to the similar spreading network represented by Tabligh, and to be ideally able to serve Tabligh's purposes at the same time as their own business interests.'34 In this regard, both Ansari as well as Murshid, stress that white on tabligh tours, Gujarati traders do not engage directly in economic activities to promote their own business interests, for dunyavi dealings, barring the most basic, are strictly prohibited while on jamaat. However, suggests Murshid, 'While on jamaat, the contacts made with other Muslims or the knowledge of opportunities gained could later be used by them to further their own economic interests.' Similarly, Ansari adds that if one were to see how interactions and interrelationships develop between people, at a subliminal level and in a subtle, probably unconscious, way the contacts that muballighin develop while on tabligh might later go on to prove useful for their business prospects. For a largely trading community with international links, such as are the Gujaratis, this feature of the TJ could possibly serve as a major attraction, at least for some.
Social Class
Due largely to certain peculiar features that it possesses that set it apart from other Islamic groups, the TJ is especially strong among particular socio-economic class clusters. Personal observation, as well as responses from interviewees, suggests a very strong presence of lower and lower-middle class Muslims in the TJ, and this seems to be the case not just in Britain but in many other countries as well. In the case of Britain this may not seem very surprising, for as Lewis, quoting Modood, notes, the South Asian Muslim community in Britain could, by and large, itself be characterized as 'a semi-industrialised, newly urbanised working class community that is only one generation away from rural peasantry'.35 Yet, over the years British Muslim society has been witnessing a perceptible process of class differentiation, if not polarization, with the gradual emergence of a small elite and a not too insignificant educated middle class. Few individuals from among these classes, however, seem to be very active in the TJ. Lewis says that its 'unsophisticated, anti-intellectual, yet activist ethos', makes the TJ particularly attractive to semi-educated people from small towns and cities. The avenue of upward social mobility through Islamization that the TJ opens up to lower-middle class families aspiring for higher status within the traditional hierarchy, a phenomenon that has also been observed in South Asia, seems to be at work in Britain, too. The TJ's stress on taqwa (piety)and the strict observance of ibadah, as against wealth or educational attainment, as criteria for distinction in the eyes of God, would seem to hold a particularly strong appeal for educationally and economically less privileged individuals. Thus, Arshullah, an unemployed Pathan TJ activist from a working-class family in Manchester, says, reflecting this appeal of the movement for people like him, that, 'Tabligh teaches that we are all equal. None of 'em high class-low class stuff around here! We all eat together sitting on the floor. In Dewsbury there ain't no knocking on doors before they let you inthat's upper-class snobberyyou just walk straight in.' Interestingly, though the rank and file of the TJ in Britain is largely lower-middle class, a number of local tablighi leaders (zimmedaran) come from educated, middle-class backgrounds, their wider access to knowledge, contacts and other resources probably
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facilitating their acquisition of these positions of authority. Thus, at the London tablighi markaz, the amir, a Pakistani Punjabi, is a businessman, and members of the managing committee {shura) include accountants and lawyers. The amir of the TJ in Glasgow is a surgeon, while at the Dewsbury markaz members of the shura include doctors and a teacher as well as a retired nuclear physicist.
Age Groups A visit to any tablighi mosque in Britain would reveal two interesting facts about the sort of people who, at any time, can be found therein, engrossed in prayer or zikr or listening to the impassioned appeal of a mullah or tablighi activist. Firstly, a greatly disproportionate number of those present would be older generation Muslims, mostly with white beards. Secondly, the relatively younger Muslims present would generally seem to belong to lower and lower-middle class families, still deeply steeped in South Asian tradition, many involved in petty trade (besides some relatively affluent Gujaratis), and, by and large, with low to medium levels of educational attainment. It is the first factof the far more visible presence of older generation Muslimsthat concerns us here. The strong South Asian 'flavour' of the TJ in Britaina fact already dealt with makes the TJ culturally familiar and acceptable to many first-generation British South Asian Muslims. Farid Kassim, the official spokesman of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Britain and a keen observer of the British Muslim scene, has an interesting explanation for the relatively stronger presence of the older generation in the TJ. He says that the TJ is very much centred around mosques and that today, 'mosques are the second home for the retiredold men with nothing to keep them occupied spend the whole day there.' 'The closer they get to their graves', he says, 'the more do they think about the akhirah (hereafter) and of earning sawab to get a place for themselves in heaven.'36 The TJ, with its constant references to the akhirah, contrasting it with the ephemeral dunya, and with its offer of earning for one great sawab through following even the most simple of the laws and rituals of Islam, thus eminently fits in with the concerns of the elderly Muslims that Kassim talks about. Amir, a young Punjabi Muslim of Bradford, who was at one time involved in the TJ but is now no longer so, makes the same point when he says that, 'The mentality of the Tablighi Jamaat resembles remarkably that of a retirement club. Joining it is like buying your ticket to heaven just before you leave for your destinationthe akhirah, or so many of its activists believe.'
The Younger Generation and the Future of the Tablighi Jamaat in Britain The future of Islam itself in Britain depends on how successful the older generation are in transmitting it to the generations that will succeed them. This, says Joly, is the main concern of British Muslim leaders.37 Haji Ebrahim Yoosuf Bawa Rangooni, a Gloucester-based tablighi activist, stresses this same point more forcefully when he writes that 'The greatest jihad of the time is that the iman of the younger generation should be protected.'38 To assert that the TJ has a considerably stronger presence among the older generation, first-generation British Muslims, than among the youth, and that even among the latter, barring perhaps a considerable number of Gujaratis, a great many are poorly educated and come from humble backgrounds, would suggest that as the younger,
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British-born generation Muslims take over and as they increasingly go in for higher formal and modern education, as the statistics actually reveal is indeed the case, the support base of the TJ among Britain's Muslims will slowly begin to narrow down. This is what actually seems to be taking place today, in fact. Fewer and fewer youngergeneration British Muslims seem to be going in for the TJ, preferring, instead, to go either the secular way or else to join other, more activist, Islamic groups, such as the Salafiyya, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Young Muslims instead. One reason for this development seems to be the general tablighi attitude towards Western education, especially in institutions run by non-Muslims, such as are most schools and colleges in Britain. As increasing numbers of young British Muslims graduate from British schools and go in for higher education in colleges and universities, they would probably find the culturally separatist milieu that the TJ seeks to cultivate a major stumbling block to their enthusiasm for acquiring higher education in Western institutions. For, as it is, as Lewis rightly observes, 'British Muslims are heirs to a fragmented Islamic tradition, with most of the ulama and university graduates inhabiting separate intellectual worlds, with little meeting, still less creative interaction between them.'39 It is not possible to state precisely what the definitive official stand of the TJ is on the issue of secular education in general, and on its pursuit in non-Islamic and non-Muslim institutions in particular. This is because the TJ itself has no official publications of its own in which such a stand could be explicitly spelled out, and because matters such as education, being among the dunyavi masa 'il, are strictly beyond the immediate purview of tablighi focus. There are, no doubt, some medical doctors, engineers and other professionals active in the TJ in Britain and a special ijtema is said to be held for them, as also for foreign students, every year at the Dewsbury markaz. Moreover, tablighi activists never tire of asserting that they are not explicitly prevented by tablighi authorities from going in for higher education. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note, neither are they actively encouraged to do so. The considerable amount of literature published by the Idara Isha'at-i-Islam, a Gloucester-based publishing house, provides a good illustration of how in one strong strand in British tablighi opinion the issue of Muslim children studying in Western, non-Muslim institutions is perceived. The founder of the Idara and the author of almost all its publications, Haji Ibrahim Yoosuf Bawa Rangooni, has been deeply involved in tablighi work for over three decades, first in Burma and then in Britain after his arrival there in 1972. He claims to have close contacts with TJ leaders in Britain, including with the TJ amir for Britain, Hafiz Patel, as well as some ulama at the Deoband madrasa, some of whom have visited and toured Britain, addressing Muslim gatherings, at his invitation. He relentlessly espouses the tablighi cause in his writings, and says that in his eyes, 'There is no other work more necessary and essential than participation (in the work of the TJ).' 40 In a pamphlet entitled, The Importance of Islamic Education and Training, aimed specially at a British Muslim readership, Rangooni spells out his approach to the issue of Muslim children studying in Western, non-Muslim educational institutions, and then lays out his own strategy as an alternative. Rangooni's case against educating Muslim students in non-Muslim schools and colleges is built upon the 'dangers' of learning from the 'enemies of Allah' and the fearful consequences of Muslim children befriending non-Muslim classmates at such schools. 'Save your progeny from the education of school and college', Rangooni gravely warns British Muslim parents, 'in the same way as you (would) save them from a lion or a wolf.' 'To send them in the
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atmosphere of college', he adds, 'is as dangerous as throw(ing) them into hell with your own hands.' This is because, 'it is almost impossible for the children to save their religion in the atmosphere of college'.41 In many places in Britain where sizeable numbers of Muslims live, Muslim parents have worked out a pragmatic arrangement whereby they send their children to regular school to study and send them after school hours to Islamic makatib for basic religious instruction. Rangooni is of the view that such part-time religious institutions 'are neither proving beneficial... and nor is there any hope of good from them', presumably because under the present arrangement Muslim children still spend a greater part of the day in the company of non-Muslim teachers and class-mates in an 'un-Islamic' environment.42 The only way out, says Rangooni, is for British Muslims to establish separate full-time schools of their own wherein both religious and secular disciplines would be taught. Thus, he says, If we sincerely wish our children to remain faithful to our dear religion, Islam, there is no other choice (but to) ... send our children (to) a full-time Islamic school wherever it is established or (else to) sacrifice everything in ... (our) possession to establish one such school in every area where Muslims are living. The sort of full-time educational institutions for Muslims that Rangooni has in mind would be similar, he suggests, to the madrasas that have been established under TJ inspiration at Dewsbury and Bury, about which we shall speak later in the course of this paper, where arrangements have been made for limited teaching of secular disciplines as well. Rangooni envisages a vast chain of such schools for Muslims to be set up wherever sizeable numbers of Muslims live, to serve the community as an ideal alternative to the existing system. Thus, he says, After having met with me on a couple of occasions, Hafiz Saheb (Hafiz Patel) gave me the good news that a full-time Dar-ul-Ulum was going to be established at Dewsbury. I congratulated him but said that it is of no use setting up just one such Dar-ul-Ulum. A call should be made to all Muslims, on an individual as well as communal level, that wherever Muslims live they should set up (such) institutions in accordance with their population.43 Given the fact that not many younger-generation British Muslims, most of whom study in precisely the sort of non-Islamic schools that the Haji comes down upon so heavily, would probably find the environment, as well as the standards, of institutions like the Dewsbury and Bury madrasas referred to above very satisfying, Rangooni's scheme would, it appears, find few takers. Considering Rangooni's approach towards Western education, which is a reflection of a strong strand in tablighi thinking on the subject, it is not surprising that, as Farid Kassim notes, 'The Tablighi Jamaat has very little presence among Muslim students in British schools and colleges.' Generally speaking, if a movement is to sustain its appeal to individuals and groups it must directly or otherwise reflect their everyday concerns and offer a means to handle them. This is true for even the most idealistic or spiritual movements. Men cannot live on dreams of a grand Utopia somewhere in the indefinite future or the afterlife for too long, and after a while such movements have either to come to terms with the harsh realities of actual day-to-day existence and pragmatically deal with them, or else risk the prospect of extinction, owing to disillusionment on the part of their activists and supporters. True, as the Bible says, Man does not live by bread alone, but, then, neither can he live without it.
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The younger generation of Muslims in Britain has increasingly to deal with a multitude of challenges on various fronts, such as racial harassment, inter-generational conflict and the struggle to fashion a harmonious balance between South Asian and Western value systems and ways of life. It would seem that if Islamic groups are to find a receptive constituency among the emerging generation of British Muslim youth, they cannot afford to turn a blind eye to these matters of crucial concern to the youth, and must incorporate them, at some level or other, in their agendas. As Ansari says, 'If the Muslim youth in Britain would at all be attracted to any Islamic group it would really depend on how far that group would serve, or at least reflect, their interests, which, in turn, are moulded largely by their own experiences of racism and discrimination.' Likewise, Qari Muhammad Hanif, head-teacher at die Madrasa Talim-ul-Islam in East London, a taWj^/zi-oriented Islamic school, referring to the increasing popularity of radical and 'modernist' Islamic groups among increasing numbers of Muslim youth in Britain today, laments, 'The Muslim youth in this country are looking for the sort of Islam that would suit their own needs.'44 Given this, the prospects for the TJ among British Muslim youth may, it appears, not seem to be very bright. For one thing, most tablighi ulama in Britain are not bilingual, at least in the crucial sense of having a mastery of English and, widi it, an informed understanding of British culture. Thus, for instance, Hafiz Patel, the amir of the TJ in Britain, who has been resident in the country for a quarter of a century or so, is said not to be able to speak English. As a result of this linguistic barrier, the traditional ulama apparently 'find it difficult to understand, still less engage widi, the world and concerns of young British Muslims', increasing numbers of whom are fluent only in English.45 Their cognitive worlds may also be seen as separate and distinct. Thus, many young Muslims tend to dismiss stories in die Fazail-i-Amal as fanciful tales which die 'half-educated' generations of their fadiers may have believed but which do not address their own concerns. Lewis also opines that instead of encouraging a serious engagement and dialogue widi the world outside, die TJ merely seeks to create a separate, imaginary world of its own and diat diis itself would make it unattractive for growing numbers of British Muslim youth. Furthermore, as we have seen, die TJ studiously avoids all reference to die masa'il and the dunyavi m'amilat (worldly affairs). Thus, any talk of mundane matters diat concern ordinary Muslims in dieir day-to-day lives is dismissed as dunyavi, which should in no way be allowed to distract one from die single-minded pursuit of die din (religion). 'We talk only about die skies above and the grave below', is a popular expression which many tablighi activists employ widi great pride, as if to talk about worldly affairs were some sort of sin. This attitude, however, invariably brings disillusionment in its trail for many young Muslims who see die tablighi focus, style and edios as too narrow and restricted for their liking, and as largely irrelevant to dieir own needs, being excessively concerned widi ritualistic minutiae to die neglect of issues of practical concern for today's Muslim youdi in die West, issues such as unemployment, drugs, racism, growing anti-Muslim feelings in the West, etc. One respondent, for instance, a Mirpuri from Bradford, said diat he decided to leave die TJ, in which he had earlier been quite active, after he was reprimanded by a Maulana for reading a newspaper in a tablighi mosque. The Maulana told him diat it was a sin to bring dunyavi affairs into the House of God. The respondent argued with the Maulana, saying diat even in die days of die Prophet die Muslims would sit in die mosque and discuss politics and warfare, but die Maulana refused to listen. 'I dien diought to myself, he says, 'diat diese people are just too narrow-minded and diat is why I left diem.' This respondent speaks for a number of odier British Muslims of his generation
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when he says that, 'By turning a complete blind eye to the real-world concerns of British Muslims, movements like the Tablighi Jatnaat are bound to lose their appeal in the years to come.' Efforts to link tabligh work with issues of practical concern on the part of young Muslims seem to have met with little success. One respondent spoke about how his efforts to start a co-operative interest-free lending society in his mosque were opposed by tablighi activists who controlled the mosque, on the grounds that this could possibly prove to become a source of dissension and, therefore, of fitna (schism). Likewise, Farid Kassim of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir tried to introduce radical political ideas in a tablighi mosque in London but was stiffly opposed. In his words: If you go to any tablighi mosque you'll find that after the evening prayer what they do is to read out from the Fazail-i-Amal all those stories about the sahaba (Companions of the Prophet), but they make them out to be like some fanciful fairy tale, all about things which Muslims today would think it impossible to do. But the sahaba are not just to be admired. They have to be emulated. Islam, surely, did not come simply to regale us with all those good stories about the sahaba. Islam must be related to our real world, life's pressing problems and that's what the sahaba did, challenging the oppression of the kuffar (unbelievers), for instance. He then continues: I thought that this point must be put across, so one day, when I had gone to a tablighi mosque, after the prayer was over I began reading out from the Fazail-i-Amal to a group of people who had assembled there. The chapter was about the sahaba and their wars against the kuffar. But I did not read out the story just like that. I wanted to relate it to the problems that the Muslim ummah faces today. So, after reading out the story, I said, 'SubhanallaM SubhanallaM See, the sahaba had a real army! Islam says we should follow the sahaba, so we, too, should have a real army of our own! And just as the sahaba fought against the kafir oppressors of their time, we, too, should fight the oppressors todayIsrael, for instance, or the Indians in Kashmir or the Serbs in Bosnia.' However, when the mosque authorities heard of this they forced me out of the mosque, saying that politics had no place in the house of Allah.46 Kassim claims that a major challenge to the TJ in Britain today comes from activist groups like his own Hizb-ut-Tahrir, with many young British Muslims, whose fathers would have readily identified with quietistic groups like the TJ, now flocking to such groups instead. The growth of anti-Muslim sentiment in the West in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the Satanic Verses controversy, the Gulf War and Western connivance at the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at the hands of the Christian Serbs, have, he says, all had the consequence of radicalizing the Muslim youth in the West, and no longer are they prepared to remain passive spectators as they see the TJ exhorting them to be. Kassim believes that, increasingly, youngsters just do not seem to find the TJ relevant to their existential concerns. You need more than just the Fazail-i-Amal and the stories about the sahaba to face British society. In the play-grounds of the schools here children aren't discussing about the Great Caliphs or arguing about how many fingers of which hand to eat fromstuff that the Tablighi Jamaat talks aboutthey are talking about girlfriends and which drug to inject into your veins. So, unless
Origins and Growth 0/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain the Fazail-i-Amal is contextualized and related to the actual problems of Muslim youth in Britainwhich is something the Tablighi Jamaat is certainly not doingI am convinced that in this country the Tablighi Jamaat shall sooner or later fade away.
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The TJ, British Muslim Youth and South Asian Culture

Interestingly, and rather ironically, while the decidedly South Asian 'flavour' of the TJ played no insignificant role in attracting older-generation Muslims to its fold, this cultural rootedness of the movement would actually seem to be one cause of its growing failure to attract the younger, British-born generation. Several scholars have noted that as their links with South Asia become increasingly tenuous, more and more young British Muslims are identifying themselves as Muslims first and foremost and then as British, rather than as South Asian Punjabi or Mirpuri, Gujarati or Bengali. According to Faisal Badi, news editor of Q-News International, a popular British Muslim weekly, many young British Muslims now do not think of themselves as Asians at all, but simply as Muslims, believing that they have more in common with a black or white convert to Islam than with a Hindu whose family came to Britain from the same part of South Asia as theirs.47 With successive generations of British-born Muslims increasingly coming to see themselves as, at least in part, British by culture, the assertion that, 'a major aim of tabligh is to rescue the ummah from the culture and civilization of the Jews, Christians and (other) enemies of Islam and to create such hatred for their ways as human beings have for urine (peshab) and excreta (paykhanq)'4* naturally finds little favour with many. Fozia Bora of Q-News International remarks that by conflating South Asian cultural traditions with Islam, 'the older generation ... have created an image of Islam ... which is easy for young people to reject.'49 Consider, for instance, the question of dress and external appearance. While on tabligh, and as far as possible at all other times as well, tablighi activists are expected to wear 'Muslim' dress and to 'look Muslim'. As a middle-aged Gujarati from London says, 'It is not enough to be a Muslim at heart. From your physical appearance itself it should be clear to others that you are a Muslim.' Thus, there is in Britain, as in South Asia and elsewhere, something like a tablighi uniform. Besides, the moustache is generally shaved off and great stress is given to growing a beard, the ideal recommended length of which is at least 'one fist full' (ek muthi bhaf). South Asian and Arab dress and the beard with the moustache shaved off, then, is seen as somehow 'Islamic'. On the other hand, Western-style shirts and trousers are generally seen as somehow 'un-Islamic'. With the younger generation of Muslims, not only in Britain but in India as well, increasingly taking to Western dress, the general tablighi attitude to dress begins to be seen, quite naturally, as yet another reflection of the peculiarly South Asian character of the movement, and as yet another reason for its rejection. 'I would feel like a clown if I were to wear those flowing robes', says a young Mirpuri man from Bradford about the dress that tablighi activists almost invariably wear. He adds that most of his associates of his generation would also feel the same way. Not surprisingly, then, one finds that in Islamic groups other than the TJ, such as the Young Muslims or the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, whose membership consists almost entirely of young people, Western dress, provided it is within what is seen as the limits of Islamic modesty, is not an issue at all. Indeed, it is rare to see male activists of these groups in anything but shirts and trousers or suits and ties.
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This growing rejection by British Muslim youth of varieties of traditional Islam that are distinctly South Asian in characterand this would include the TJ as wellowes as much to the gradual shedding by the youth of a South Asian identity in favour of a new, British Muslim one as to inter-generational conflict of values and expectations, in which new, assertive and aggressive forms of Islam, increasingly popular among the youth, that seek to by-pass centuries of fossilized tradition and go straight to the Qur'an and Sunna, can be seen as actually challenging the traditional quietism of their parents' generation. The tablighi ethos that is hostile to the exercise of reason (aql) and enjoins strict, unthinking and unquestioning obedience of the buzurgs, is, says Farid Kassim, today seen by many young British Muslims as reflecting the general authoritarian ethos of South Asian culture and not in keeping with what they feel is the true spirit of Islam. Rejection of South Asian traditions in the guise of Islam is not the only reason why growing numbers of young Muslims are going in for more activist and explicitly political Islamic groups, in place of older and more traditional groups such as the TJ. According to several young Muslim respondents, their parents' generation did not really concern themselves with broader social and political issues relating to the community, .since they viewed their stay in Britain as purely temporary, as a result of which all that they wanted was to be able to go ahead and make as much money as they could. That is why they tended to favour quietistic Islamic groups such as the TJ, if they gave much importance at all to religious matters at that time. However, the situation for young Muslims today is viewed as vastly different. Britain is seen as their own country, with none other to call their own. This is what makes many of them realize the need to take an active role in furthering community interests and struggling for their rights. This naturally, they say, makes Islamic groups that actually engage with society, whether it be in the form of political involvement or community development work, far more relevant for them than quietistic and socially disengaged groups like the TJ. In this context, some even go so far as to see the TJ as part of a grand Western conspiracy to enfeeble the Muslims, by directing their attention away from questions of power to 'politically safe' and 'non-threatening' spiritual delusion. Yet, it would be erroneous to contend that it is simply the radical anti-Western rhetoric of groups like the Hizb-ut-Tahrir or, to some extent, the Young Muslims, that is attracting increasing numbers of British Muslim youth to their camp. What is equally, if not more, attractive is the fact that in many ways the leaders in these groups appear as suitable role-models for the Muslim youth of today to emulate. Thus, according to Lewis, Few British Muslim youth would probably find in the average tablighi Maulana, who hardly knows any English, dressed in his shalwar-kamiz or lungi, shunning all contact with the outside world, a role model to follow. On the other hand, you have the smart English-speaking professionalsdoctors, lawyers and so onin Islamic groups such as the Young Muslims or the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, debating with Europeans and championing the cause of Islam. These are the sort of people young Muslims in Britain would now look up to for inspiration.50
Conclusion
We have seen how the TJ managed to secure for itself a firm foothold in Britain in the years following the influx of large numbers of Muslim workers and their families from
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South Asia into Britain. While it seems to have found substantial support among first-generation immigrants, especially among certain social groups, its appeal seems to have been somewhat limited in terms of geographical spread and ethnic affiliation. Its attraction for recently-arrived migrants from South Asia, particularly Gujaratis from India and east Africa, seems to have lain in its rootedness in the South Asian 'Deobandi' cultural tradition and its political quiescence that enabled its followers to adjust themselves to the new and often hostile situation in which they found themselves in their host country. However, it appears today that, although the TJ still continues to include a number of young Muslim activists in its ranks, particularly from lower and lower-middle class backgrounds, increasing numbers of young British Muslims seem to find that it fails to address their own concerns, as a result of which recent years have witnessed a growing popularity of more activist, including militant, Islamic groups among sections of British Muslim youth. The TJ, with its rootedness in South Asian cultural tradition and its aversion to any modification or adaptation to what it claims is the nabavi tariqa, seems unable, indeed unwilling, to take into account these major challenges. That this has important implications for the very survival of the movement in Britain, and in the West more generally, is obvious. NOTES
1. M. M. Ally, History of Muslims in Britain: 1850-1980 (unpublished MA research thesis, University of Birmingham, Faculty of Arts, 1987). 2. J. Nielsen, Muslims in Britain: searching for an identity? New Community, Vol. xiii, No. 3, Spring 1987, 387. 3. P. Lewis, Islamic Britain: religion, politics and identity among British MuslimsBradford in the 1990s (London and New York, I. B. Tauris, 1994), 50. 4. Nielson, op. cit., 387. 5. K. Siddiqui, The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain: political innovation and adaptation (London, The Muslim Parliament, 1992), 12. 6. This term refers to traditional Muslims who believe in the intercessionary powers of the Prophet and the Sufi saints and the cults centred around their graves or dargahs. 7. The term refers to the so-called gayr muqallidin or those Muslims who deny the need for the taqlid (imitation) of any of the four schools of SunnI jurisprudence. 8. Lewis, op. cit., 56. 9. M. Gaborieau, 'The transformation of the Tablighi Jamaat into an international movement (according to some Urdu sources): 1944-1965' unpublished paper, 3. 10. Ibid., 7. 11. M. Sani Hasni, Sawaneh-i-Hazrat Maulana Muhammad Yusuf Kandhlawi Rahmatullah Aleih (Lucknow, Department of Publications and Dissemination, Nadwat-ul-Ulama, 1989), 257. 12. Ibid., 258. 13. Ibid., 517. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 518. 16. Ibid., 517. 17. Ibid., 519. 18. Ibid., 521. 19. Ibid., 522. 20. The Islamic creed La ilaha il allah Muhammadu rasul allah (There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet). 21. Sani Hasni, op cit. 523. 22. Ibid., 522-523. 23. Ibid., 523-524. 24. Referring to the annual ijtema at the central Indian town of Bhopal attended by hundreds of thousands of Muslims from all over India and beyond. 25. Sani Hasni, op cit. 525-526.
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26. Ibid., 525. 27. The term is used here to refer to those South Asian Muslim men, born in South Asia itself, who arrived in Britain in the years soon after the Second World War and were only later joined by their families. 28. Interview, Bradford, 15 December 1995. 29. See, for further details, J. King, Tablighi Jamaat and the Deobandi Mosques in Britain, unpublished paper, presented at the Conference on New Islamic and Related Movements in the West, 11 December 1993, at the Centre for New Religious Movements, Kings College, London. 30. Ally, op. cit., 141. 31. Interview, 15 December 1995. 32. Interview with Humayun Ansari, Centre for Minority Studies, Royal Holloway, Egham, 12 November 1995. 33. Interview with Tazeen Murshid, lecturer in South Asian Studies, University of North London, 16 November 1995. 34. King, op. cit., 12. 35. Lewis, op. cit, 77. 36. Interview with Farid Kassim, London, 2 November 1995. 37. D. Joly, Britannia's Crescent: making a place for Muslims in British society (Ashgate, Avebury, 1995), 35. 38. H.E.Y.B. Rangooni, The Importance of Islamic Education and Training (Gloucester, Idara Isha'at al-Islam, 1995), 20. 39. Lewis, op. cit., 189. 40. H.E.Y.B. Rangooni, Al Islam Bartanniya: Alulad via Nasl Nambar (Gloucester, Idara Isha'at al-Islam), 15. 41. Rangooni, Importance of..., 17. 42. Ibid., 23. 43. H.E.Y.B. Rangooni, Al Islam Bartanniya Vol. 1, Nos. 3, 4, 5 (Gloucester, Idara Isha'at al-Islam), 19. 44. Interview with Qari Muhammad Hanif, London, 3 November 1995. 45. Lewis, op. cit., 205. 46. Interview with Farid Kassim, London, 2 November 1995. 47. P. Vallely & A. Brown, British Islam: a new generation awakes, The Independent (Supplement), 6 December 1995, 2. 48. Rangooni, Al Islam Bartanniya Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1996 (Gloucester, Idara Isha'at al-Islam), 24-25. 49. Quoted in Vallely & Brown, p. 2. 50. Interview, 15 November 1995.

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This article was downloaded by: [Sheffield Hallam University] On: 25 December 2012, At: 13:25 Publisher: Routledge

Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations

The origins and growth of the Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1998

The Origins and Growth of the Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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Origins and Growth o/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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The TJ in Britain: the early years

The First Jamaats in Britain

Origins and Growth o/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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The First Ijtemas in Britain

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Further Expansion of the Movement in Britain

Origins and Growth of Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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The Establishment of the Tablighi Markaz in Britain

Origins and Growth o/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

Social Support Base of the TJ in Britain

Ethnicity: Explaining the Gujarati Presence

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Origins and Growth o/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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Origins and Growth 0/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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Origins and Growth 0/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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The TJ, British Muslim Youth and South Asian Culture

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Origins and Growth o/Tablighi Jamaat in Britain

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