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Class, caste and housing in rural Pakistani Punjab: The untold story of the Five Marla Scheme
Haris Gazdar and Hussain Bux Mallah Contributions to Indian Sociology 2012 46: 311 DOI: 10.1177/006996671204600303 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cis.sagepub.com/content/46/3/311
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Class, caste and housing in rural Pakistani Punjab: The untold story of the Five Marla Scheme
Haris Gazdar and Hussain Bux Mallah
This article examines the contemporary significance of caste as a dimension of social stratification in Pakistani Punjab, using rural housing as a vantage point. Work on the interplay of class and kinship group, mediated by status hierarchy between agricultural and non-agricultural castes, serves as a point of departure. The organisation of the system of private property in rural land, based on the colonial village record and land alienation laws, is actively used to maintain class power and status hierarchy between kinship groups. Post-independence reforms sustained caste disadvantage, which is particularly conspicuous with regard to housing. The Five Marla Scheme was an exceptional intervention, rooted in populist electoral politics of the 1970s, which provided residential land to rural workers belonging to non-agricultural castes. This significant but dormant and largely undocumented intervention is examined through the case study of a large village in Okara district. We argue for a re-engagement with caste as a valid category for the understanding of class and citizenship in Pakistani Punjab. Keywords: Class, caste, housing, land
Contributions to Indian Sociology 46, 3 (2012): 311336 SAGE Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC DOI: 10.1177/006996671204600303
Pakistan. While early post-partition rural ethnographies in Pakistani Punjab persevered with the colonial interest in occupational caste (Eglar 2010; Honigmann 1954; Marriot 1960; Smith 1952), kinship group dynamics began attracting attention away from religiously ordained hierarchy. Alavi (1972) proposed that the prevalent Indian sense of caste was inappropriate in Pakistani Punjab, where patrilineal endogamous kinship groups (biraderis) were stratified, not by status but by economic resources and political power. We take Rouses (1983, 1988) analysis of the interplay between class, kinship group and occupational caste in a Sargodha village in the 1970s as a point of departure.1 She found the kinship group (referred to as quom rather than biraderi) to be a primary unit of political solidarity as well as factional difference. The view from a village, stratified not only between agrarian classes but also hierarchically ordered occupational castes (agricultural versus non-agricultural), offered cogent insight into technological change, market penetration and political currents in rural Pakistani Punjab. By contrast, Hussain (1980), who was also interested in agricultural growth and agrarian structure, based his analysis on class defined exclusively in terms of asset ownership and employment. Much of social science research on rural Pakistani Punjab since then has done the same.2 Our return to Rouse (1988) is based on a conviction that three decades later, the interplay between class, kinship, group identity and occupational caste remains a factor in shaping social disadvantage in particular, and economic and political outcomes in general.3 In the meanwhile, the Indian debate on caste has moved beyond its original concern with status hierarchy.4 The perspective on caste as solidarity group diminishes the importance of status to that of an instrument
Ahmed (1972) first studied social stratification in this village in the mid-1960s. The few village-based studies that were carried out after the 1970s either focused exclusively on economic dimensions of class (Mahmood 1988; Nabi 1985), or analysed class and kinship group as autonomous categories (for example, Khan 1991; Lefebvre 1990; Rauf 1987). Interest in the relationship between class and kinship group has revived recently (for example, Cheema, Mohmand and Naqvi 2007). 3 Bonded labour is one area where the interplay of class, kinship group and occupational caste is known to be important (Martin 2009). Statistical analysis of village survey data revealed the kinship group as a significant correlate of household economic well-being, even after controlling for land ownership and education. The effect was strongest in central Punjab for kinship groups associated with non-agricultural occupational castes (Gazdar 2007). 4 Desai and Dubey (2011) provide a useful summary.
1 2
for the projection of political power, rather than as a primary source of hierarchy.5 This is close to where Alavi (1972) and Rouse (1988) were in their understanding of kinship groups (biraderis or quoms) in Pakistani Punjab. The extent to which caste-based differences in well-being in India today reflect historical rather than current practices of active discrimination is another area of empirical study that keeps open the question of status.6 Moreover, the role of policy in shaping social categories has emerged as an important concern in Indian discussions of castewith regard to colonial governance and post-independence affirmative action (Dirks 2001; Mayer 1993). While it is difficult to attribute causality within an overarching narrative, the focus on policy has greatly enriched the debate on institutional change. This article examines the contemporary significance of caste as a dimension of social stratification in Pakistani Punjab using rural housing as a vantage point. We depart from earlier work on stratification by shifting our focus from the distribution of land ownership to social and institutional inequalities in the system of property rights in rural Pakistani Punjab. We are particularly interested in the Punjab Five Marla Scheme, a housing programme for the rural landless, first introduced in the 1970s. This scheme represented, in part, the fulfilment of pledges made by the populist Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), as it channelled class conflict into an electoral victory. The intervention was short-lived and became dormant when the PPP lost power in a military coup. The Five Marla Scheme was noticed by Rouse (1988) in her fieldwork in the 1970s, as well as in political commentaries at the time (Sayeed 1980), but fell into relative obscurity despite its significance as a rare government intervention whose intended beneficiary was a class largely populated by the lowest castes in rural Pakistani Punjab.
5 This is an implication of Srinivass (1987) thesis of the local dominant caste. Studies of landless labour in different regions of India have highlighted the importance of caste in the construction of class solidarity among upwardly mobile groups. While ritual purity was a key dimension in Bremans (1993) early writing on class relations between Anavil landlords and Dubla labourers, his later work was more attentive to classcaste solidarity (Breman 2007). Lerches (1999) understanding of the situation of western UP Jats is comparable. 6 See, for example, Desai and Dubeys (2011) analysis of survey data on caste and Gazdar (2007) for a similar exercise in Pakistan. Shah et al. (2006) provide useful empirical evidence on current practices of active discrimination across India, while Ram (2004) examines untouchability in contemporary Indian Punjab within a historical-political context.
by the lambardar who is recognised as an agent of the land revenue administration.9 The entitlements of the haqdaran-e-zamin are essentially shares in the land resources of the revenue estate that come closest to unfettered private property rights but also include rights in common property and rights of pre-emption. The development of irrigation canals from the 1880s onwards and the colonisation of newly opened land in western Punjab by migrants from northern and eastern districts represented a major change in the geography and demography of the region (Ali 1988). Here, it was the government rather than the proprietary body that owned non-cultivated land, but grantees eventually came to acquire ownership rights and rights of pre-emption that were analogous to those enjoyed by the proprietary body in the older villages. Grantees in a canal village were usually entire kinship groups of cultivators from the same village, whose leaders were appointed as lambardars (The Punjab Government 1996).10 Ibbetsons (1986) influential classification of Punjabs population was based on the first census of the province in the 1880s. Occupational castes were divided into three broad categories: landowners; priests and merchants; and artisans and menials. Economic importance, social status and political power were ascribed to these groups in this very order. It was in the social organisation of the village that the caste groups enumerated in the population census were actually visible. The hierarchy of functions between landowners, muzara tenants, village servants (kammis) and menial workers in the village was reflected not only in wealth but also in status, and ultimately in political power.11 The institution of seyp or harvest obligations of cultivators (landowners and tenants) to village or patti servants in return for service throughout the year regulated economic relations between the two groups and was still in evidence though declining into the 1970s (Nazir 1991; Rouse 1988). Economic and social hierarchy between cultivators and others was given legal expression in 1900 with the Punjab Land Alienation Act which
See also Marriott (1953) for a discussion of the linkage between village social organisation, and particularly patti and land revenue administration. 10 Ali (1988) documented the efforts that were undertaken during canal colonisation for preserving elements of existing village social organisation of the colonists home regions. 11 Colonial administration saw this hierarchy in village social organisation as self-evident and unremarkable (Marriott 1953) in proprietary and colony villages alike (The Punjab Government 1994, 1996).
9
divided Punjab society formally into agricultural and non-agricultural tribes. The stated purpose of the law was to protect landowners, who the colonial government regarded as the bedrock of agricultural growth and political stability, from the loss of mortgaged property to professional moneylenders (Ali 1988; Islam 1995). The law regulated the transfer of agricultural land from an agricultural tribe owner to a person from a non-agricultural tribe. The land revenue bureaucracy became the arbiter of the tribe or kinship group to which a person belonged and whether that tribe was agricultural. While the primary target of this law was the class of professional moneylenders, it also provided a legal basis for turning occupational groups such as kammis and menial workers into non-agricultural tribes. The village record combined with the Punjab Land Alienation Act ensured a close association between tribal or kinship group identity and occupational caste. Despite a number of amendments over the decades, essential features of the legal framework governing land administration remain unchanged. The West Pakistan Land Revenue Act of 1967 (subsequently called the Punjab Land Revenue Act of 1967) is the foundation of the formal system of property rights in land in rural Punjab, and is based on the village record which consists of a cadastre, family lineage and jamabandi. The hierarchy between agricultural and non-agricultural tribes is also retained through the currency of the Punjab Land Alienation Act.12 India, which inherited the same law in its part of partitioned Punjab, repealed it in 1951 through a constitutional order (Ram 2004). The land revenue administration system did not only stratify the population between cultivator and non-cultivator castes, but also privileged the claims and rights to land of haqdaran-e-zamin over others in rural Punjab. The Punjab Land Revenue Act of 1967, like its colonial predecessor, had no jurisdiction over the village site as this was not assessed for revenue (Mahmood 2006: 9). Nor was there any other authority that was responsible for maintaining a register of property rights within village sites. The Land Settlement Manual implied that the village site (abadi deh) was divided among pattis of haqdaran-e-zamin, whose individual and collective property rights in the cultivable land of the mauza were part of the
12 In 2002, the Supreme Court upheld the provisions of the Punjab Land Alienation Act that empower the district land revenue officer to regulate the transaction of land between agricultural and non-agricultural tribes (Muhammad Anwar versus Deputy Commissioner Faisalabad, Supreme Court Monthly Review 422, 2002).
village record. The village record included a record of abadi deh but this was based on surveys conducted at the time of the land settlement, the last of which was completed in 1915 (ibid.: 139), and invariably favoured the original proprietary body over others. In older proprietary villages, it was assumed that the individual owner of cultivated land and a patti or group of pattis made provision for the accommodation of their dependent seyp service providers and menials. Kammis and menials who served a patti or the entire village were entitled to live in the village at the pleasure of the proprietary body. Individual owners were responsible for housing their private farm and domestic servants. In canal colonies, village sites were demarcated and plots within these were allotted to land grantees. Many such villages also had separate quarters with smaller plot sizes for village servants.13 Farm land, known as the kammi ahata (kammi square), was also set aside for subsistence farming by village kammis (The Punjab Government 1996). Unlike older proprietary villages, village sites in the canal colonies were liable to land revenue. The jamabandi, therefore, included a record of ownership or tenure of the village site (jamabandi abadi) even though most residents were actually exempt from land revenue. The jamabandi abadi is significant because it is one of the few revenue documents where village servants or kammis are actually supposed to be recorded (Mahmood 2006: 873). Even in these canal colony villages, however, the kammis entitlement to a subsistence farm and housing was in lieu of service to a patti and regulated by the lambardar (The Punjab Government 1996). Post-independence population census and large-scale surveys in Pakistan do not report data on caste. To get a measure of the distribution of occupational castes at the time of independence and Punjabs partition between India and Pakistan, we need to go back to the 1931 population census. Communal displacement left few Hindus and Sikhs in the Pakistani portion of Punjab which, in turn, received the main body of Muslim migrants from the Indian side of the province. Data for undivided Punjabs Muslim population in 1931, therefore, provide us with a proxy for the caste distribution that Pakistani Punjab might have started with at the time of independence.
13 The village site was usually allotted 25 acres, and typical grantee homesteads measured over 1,000 square metres (The Punjab Government 1996: Appendix 14). These were considered sufficiently large compounds for housing the grantees, their private servants and farm animals.
The share of the population of Punjab Muslims by occupational castes is reported in Table 1.14 Between officially recognised agricultural and nonagricultural castes, the former constituted three-fifths of the population.15 We have further clustered castes into categories that correspond with the classifications used in post-independence Indian Punjab as Backward and Scheduled Castes, to indicate the proportions of population which might have faced different degrees of caste-based disadvantage.16 Kammis who may have been classified as Backward Castes in Indian Punjab made up 21 per cent of the population and included occupational groups which would have been engaged as village or patti servants. The occupational categories which would have constituted Scheduled Castes, including weavers, shoemakers and sweepers (Chuhra and Mussali) were 12 per cent of the reference population, with Chuhras and Mussalis accounting
Table 1 Caste distribution of Muslim population of Punjab in 1931 Occupational caste status Agriculture Kammi: backward Main castes, tribes and kinship groups Jat, Rajput, Awan, Biloch, Gujjar, Pathan Kumhar (potter), Tarkhan (carpenter), Teli (oil-presser), Machhi (water-carrier), Faqir (beggar), Mirasi (minstrel), Lohar (ironsmith), Nai (barber) Julaha (weavers), Mochi (shoemakers), Mussali and Chuhra (sweepers) Sheikh, Kashmiri Proportion of Muslim population 50.7 11.7 20.8
12.1 4.6
14 Christians constituted a small proportion of the Chuhra population in 1931, and it is believed a large part of this caste had converted to Christianity by or at the time of the partition and remained in Pakistani Punjab. We therefore, include all Chuhras resident in the western districts of undivided Punjab, regardless of religion, in our calculations. 15 Cassan (2011) has shown that the land alienation law had induced a reporting bias in favour of agricultural castes in the census. Changing ones caste in the village record, however, was and is a more complex matter. The census, therefore, may have underestimated the proportion of non-cultivators. 16 See Department of Revenue, Rehabilitation and Disaster Management. Available at http://punjabrevenue.nic.in/gaz_asr38.htm (Accessed on 1 November 2011).
for 4 per cent. Less than half the Chuhras and under a third of the Mussalis were actually reported working as sweepers, and around a third in each group worked as agricultural labourers.
provincial legislature of Punjab accepted the committees recommendations with respect to tenant cultivators when it passed the Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Act in 1950. All of the recommendations relating to agricultural labourers and non-cultivator service castes were ignored. A small concession was made in land revenue manuals to replace the word kammi, which was acknowledged now to have pejorative connotations, with the formal Urdu term mueen (helper) to refer to the service castes.18 Some elements within the Muslim League continued to press unsuccessfully for reforms aimed at these castes and classes in the first five-year plan of the country. The setting up of a Land Reform Commission for West Pakistan to draft the first redistributive land reform law followed a military coup in 1958 which was implemented in 1959. The 1959 reforms empowered the government to set land ceilings for private ownership, and the appropriation of above-ceiling land for redistribution. The primary beneficiaries were to be tenants already cultivating land (Naqvi, Khan and Chaudhry 1987). About agricultural labourers, the commission said (ibid.: 215): We have not dealt with agricultural labour and the steps that should be taken for the amelioration of its condition. We do realise that this class of workers is almost entirely at the mercy of its employer [.] this, however, is a problem which, to our mind, is more akin to the conditions of labour generally. Sooner or later, it will be necessary to provide the agricultural labour some measure of security and protection, but the problems involved in devising such measures are so intricate that it would need far more time than we had at our disposal. It took another 15 years and the election of a populist government before the recommendations of the Muslim League committee with respect to residential security were finally addressed. Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos PPP rode a wave of political mobilisation in the late 1960s and swept into office on slogans of bread, clothing and shelter. One of its early acts was to renew redistributive land reforms that had started in the 1950s. The Land Reforms Regulations of 1972, however, retained the focus on
18 It was, in fact, in the record of rights in the village site (jamabandi abadi) that the kammi or mueen were recognised at all by land revenue administration (Mahmood 2006: 875).
tenants, virtually excluding non-agricultural castes from beneficiaries (Haq 1989: 6768): Land which vests in Government shall [.] be granted free of charge to the tenants who are shown in Revenue Records to be in cultivating possession of itWhere any land is not shown in the Revenue Records to be in cultivating possession of any tenant [] it shall be granted to such tenant or other persons, owning less than a subsistence holding. But in a departure from past practice, the government also announced measures that went beyond an agrarian agenda. The Punjab Housing Facilities for Non-Proprietors in Rural Areas Act, popularly known as the Five Marla Scheme, was passed by the Punjab Provincial Assembly in 1975 to grant government-owned or acquired land to the rural landless for housing purposes (Government of Punjab 1975). A non-proprietor was defined as a person who or any other member of his family does not own any agricultural land or other immovable property anywhere in the country. Immovable property, moreover, did not include the structure raised by a non-proprietor on land not owned by him, thus covering kammis and other non-proprietors living in village sites effectively owned by pattis. Beneficiaries were to receive land measuring five marla (126 square metres) free of cost for home building in rural housing schemes on stateowned or acquired land. If a non-proprietor already had a home in the abadi deh or recognised village site, he was to be recognised as its owner. Since most kammis (or mueens) as well as landless tenants did, in fact, possess houses in established village sites, the main beneficiaries of the Five Marla grants were likely to be menial castes who worked as farm labour or domestic servants for individual cultivators. Unlike the land reform laws, which were administered exclusively by the land revenue administration, the Punjab Five Marla Scheme was to be implemented in partnership with newly formed Peoples Village Committees (PVCs) set up specifically for this purpose at the mauza level. The PVCs were composed of local PPP activists and, as we show in the following sections, there was general agreement that the scheme was for the benefit of kammis and menial caste labourers. Beneficiaries were awarded lease titles to their plots of land and in many villages in Punjab, the settlements thus created became known as Bhutto colonies. It is in and around these Bhutto colonies in a number of districts of central
Contributions to Indian Sociology 46, 3 (2012): 311336
Punjab that we carried out our fieldwork. The PPP claimed that by 1977, some 700,000 families in rural Punjab had received plots under the Five Marla Scheme (Pakistan Peoples Party 1977).19 Soon after, Bhuttos government was overthrown in a military coup and the country was placed under Martial Law. The Five Marla Scheme became inactive. In 1985, the military regime initiated a transfer of power to its civilian allies who were also opponents of the PPP and Bhutto. At this moment, when Martial Law regulations were rescinded, a transitional government repealed the original Five Marla Scheme law of 1975 and the 1973 law expediting land acquisition. A new law called the Jinnah Abadis for Non-Proprietors in Rural Areas Act of 1986 was enacted (Government of Punjab 1986). An Allotment Committee which included a nominee of the provincial government and the lambardar replaced the PVC. The presence of the lambardar restored the influence of the proprietary body in decisions over village housing. The 1986 law also weakened the provision for recognising property rights of non-proprietors over existing homes within the village site or on other uncultivated area of the village. A subsequent circular (Government of Punjab 1988), ostensibly for the recognition of rural katchi abadis (unplanned settlements), also ruled that the home of a mueen (formerly kammi) allotted in the village site in lieu of service was no longer eligible for the regularisation of ownership rights in favour of the holder.20 The Jinnah Abadis law remains on statute and the Office for Land Colonisation within the provincial Land Revenue Department is its responsible authority. We find sketchy records of the functioning of the 1986 scheme, while none exist at the provincial level for the original 1975 scheme. Jinnah Abadis implementation currently receives nominal fundingthe provincial budget for 200809 (Government of Punjab 2009) allocated only 2.6 million rupees (equivalent of $ 50,000)confirming the impression that the scheme is moribund. In the 1990s, policy focus shifted to regularising existing unauthorised settlements (Government of Punjab 1992), but with a restricted mandate in rural areas. In interviews, some officials suggested that the post-1986 version of the Five Marla Scheme had to be stopped because it had become an instrument
19 See Pakistan Peoples Party 1977. Election Manifesto. Available at http://www.ppp. org.pk/manifestos/1977.html (Accessed on 1 November 2011). 20 This made explicit the reversal of the provision in the 1975 law which had declared non-proprietors homes within the village site as eligible for grant of ownership rights.
of local elites to legalise their possession of public land. This impression, even if true, was based on anecdotes rather than documentation, let alone analysis of evidence. The fact is that a window that had been opened for classes and castes marginalised by the village record was effectively closed without anything else being put in its place.
for in-depth study. Non-cultivator castes include kammis of whom only a handful of households are still engaged in their traditional occupation under seyp arrangements. The most numerous among the non-cultivator castes in Chak 003 are the two menial groups identified as sweepers in the 1931 CensusChuhra and Mussali. These caste names are used by landowners in a pejorative manner, and resisted for the same reason by their bearers. Chuhras are all Christian and like to assert their religious identity in place of a caste title that is regarded as a term of insult.23 Many Mussalis insist on being recognised as Muslim Shaikh.24 Most workers from these groups are either casual wage labourers or farm servants of landowners. Words used for referring to the groups that are of particular interest to us, namely those identified as belonging to service and menial castes in colonial classification, are obviously loaded with political meaning. As we have noted above, kammi was acknowledged as having a pejorative association and was replaced in land revenue manuals with mueen. The names Chuhra and Mussali likewise were used casually in earlier records but are considered offensive in our fieldwork villages today. Even employers, who frequently use these words as terms of abuse, switch to Christian and Muslim Shaikh when they choose to be respectful. This is not to say that speakers or those who are being spoken about universally accept the new terms. We have used classificatory categories in English (service and menial castes) as well as other terms (kammi and mueen, Chuhra and Christian, Mussali and Muslim Shaikh) with reference to context.
of this settlement. The bulk of the population belongs to service castes, many of whom live in the congested kammi quarters. Some service caste families have acquired agricultural land as well as better homes in the village, though their rights in the village like those of other latter-day landowners are limited. Most of the service castes families no longer work as village servants. While they remain in the village, they do face threats of eviction from the village owners. One barbers family was evicted from the kammi quarter in 2005 due to complaints from a faction of landowners that he was no longer providing satisfactory service. Other village servants have also come under pressure to give up their entitlement to cultivated land. Sajan, a Christian from the sweeper caste, had a residential plot and two acres of cultivated land as a village servant. He fell ill and in 2002, leased out his two acre plot to the lambardar. The lambardar stopped paying rent and used his influence with land revenue officials to get the land title transferred to his name. Sajan died in 2009 and the lambardar pressured the family to surrender possession of their home. Sajans son Yasin, who no longer worked as a sweeper, had once refused to remove a dead dog from a village street. The lambardar used this refusal as a pretext to press for eviction. In the meantime, another landowner who was a factional political rival of the lambardar had begun to support Yasin and helped him to get a stay order from the court against eviction.
who lived in their employers compounds. Besides Christians and Muslim Shaikhs, a number of Julaha (weaver caste) families were also allotted plots in TBS. A second Five Marla Scheme settlement, known as the Pullwali Bhutto Scheme (PBS), was also initiated in the 1970s. This was located along a canal bank on land that belonged to the irrigation department. Approximately 100 plots of five marla each were allotted to farm and domestic labourers, mostly Muslim Shaikh families. Because this land was in an isolated spot, far away from the main settlement, the allottees did not take possession of it. After a few years when the area had become more accessible, original allottees as well as some landowning families attempted to take possession of these plots. Since the original sanction had lapsed with the repeal of the 1975 law, new allotments had to be made which finally happened in the 1990san action attributed by Muslim Shaikh allottees to the brief return to office of the PPP.25 There are two other predominantly low caste settlements in the mauza that were developed by private individuals from landowning families.26 In the 1990s, a Jat lambardar partitioned two and a half acres of his farmland adjacent to the original settlement and sold possession of these plots to landless families. Muslim Shaikhs or Mussalis constitute a majority of the inhabitants, while another significant group consists of Faqir (a traditional beggar caste) families who have adopted the surname Jat Gill and now work as casual labourers. Plots in Jat Basti are not officially leased and the lambardar had consistently refused demands from the residents to register sale deeds in the land record. There is a similar story with School Basti which was developed by influential Rajput landowners who took possession of unoccupied government land reserved for public amenity, and sold possession of plots to landless families, mostly from service and menial castes. Like their counterparts in Jat Basti, the residents of School Basti were not given title documents and their ownership of residential plots was not officially recorded. Many original allottees in TBS and PBS had sold their plots and migrated out of the village. Buyers were nearly all from service and menial
25 Although the PPP has led three national governments since its overthrow in the 1970s, it has only held office at the provincial level for three years in the 1990s. 26 Rouse (1988) had found a similar development (Lokri) besides the Marla Scheme in her fieldwork village in the 1970s, and found such settlements to be common across the fieldwork districts.
castes, as well as a small number of landless agricultural caste Arain families. We found this pattern repeated in many Five Marla Schemes across the province. The schemes had contributed to the creation of a market in low-cost rural housing for low caste people where none existed. There were transactions also in the privately developed settlements such as Jat Basti and School Basti. Property rights in these settlements had become more secure with the passage of time, but developers who were haqdaran-e-zamin owned the title to land and enjoyed a privileged position in the village record which remained the ultimate proof of property rights. The latter day katchi abadi regularisation law does not apply to Jat Basti or School Basti. The Five Marla Scheme, by contrast, had invoked government acquisition of land prior to its allotment and thus breached an institutional barrier to secure property rights for the low castes.
approximately half the amount that an employer would have to pay if he were to hire from the casual labour market, and also around half the minimum wage. In addition to specific duties, it is expected that family members will, without additional pay, perform many unspecified tasks. Family members are not allowed to take up work with other employers. They can work for extra pay with the employer well below the going rate of pay in the casual labour market. A loan or an advance is an essential part of this arrangement. The amount of outstanding debt ranges from 30,000 to 70,000 rupees (350 to 800 US dollars). In many cases, the debt was inherited. A servant can negotiate with a new employer at the end of a crop cycle. When landowners hire new servants, they must compensate the previous employer for any outstanding debt, which then gets transferred to the new employer. Landowners have strong networks across the district and province and are able to track down absconding servants. They prefer to hire servants who have families, so that it is difficult for the entire family to abscond together. If a servant absconds, the landowner can and does use other family members as hostages.28 There are stories of individuals in the fieldwork villages who had gained their independence by paying off debts. A conspicuous problem after securing freedom from their employers was to find a place to live. In most cases, present day dera servants are descendants of servants who lived on deras or in their employers residential compounds. They never had homes of their own. Many had been acquired by Chak 003 landowners upon payments to other employers, and a neighbouring village whose landowners had obstructed the establishment of a Five Marla Scheme settlement, was frequently mentioned as the place of origin.
had been mobilised by political parties, notably the PPP, using socialist slogans. This movement was particularly strong in Chak 003 where PPPs election victory in 1970 triggered tenant takeovers of land.29 Family members of some of the Chak 003 landowners had joined the PPP and sided with the tenants. It was in this politically charged atmosphere that the Five Marla Scheme was announced. A PVC consisting of local party workers, some of them sons of local landlords but also including individuals from service and menial castes, began implementing the scheme soon after it was launched. Although the formal wording of the law mentioned non-proprietors as beneficiaries in Chak 003, this was interpreted to mean farm servants of landowners who lived in their private compounds. At least other nonproprietors such as tenant-cultivators and kammis had their own homes, even if they did not enjoy secure possession. Servants in Chak 003 like the ones currently living on deras did not have an independent home, and local activists understood that the scheme was meant for them. Nearly all of the allotees of TBS were families of farm servantseither Christian Chuhras or Muslim Shaikh Mussalis. The allottees of TBS as well as their former employers recall the disruption caused to the landowners economy by the sudden departure of the servants. It was as though the village had been abandoned en-masse. There was no real distinction in the minds of both sets of protagonists at the time between farm servants work relationship and their residential dependence on employers. The TBS grantees stopped being farm servants the moment they left their employers houses. Some individuals from the landowning families claim they were active in implementing the scheme out of commitment to their partys programme. It was also widely believed that attempts at stopping the farm servants from leaving would have led to violence. The relationship between tied labour arrangements and housing dependence on employers is not straightforward. While there was an apparent correlation between the Five Marla Scheme and a wave of farm servant emancipation in Chak 003, we have also observed in our fieldwork, situations where farm servant families do not reside on deras
The tenants movement was revived recently in Okara when tenants of militaryowned farms resisted pressure from military authorities for changes in the terms of tenure (Akhtar 2006).
29
or in employers houses. It is harder, however, to come across instances of labourers who live on deras or in employers houses and are not in tied labour arrangements. The fact that the farm servant system was revived quickly at deras, and that there were villages nearby where the scheme had been blocked, suggests that local politics were instrumental in the success of the Five Marla Scheme in Chak 003. Although many of the local leaders who ensured scheme implementation in this mauza were men from cultivator castes, the scheme triggered political articulation among the formerly voiceless Christian Chuhras and Muslim Shaikh Mussalis. Public life in the Five Marla Schemes is marked by segmentation between Christians and Muslim Shaikhs but also cooperation within and between the two groups. By contrast, individual service and menial caste residents of localities such as Jat Basti and School Basti are fragmented within and isolated from their counterparts in the Five Marla Schemes. Christians and Muslim Shaikhs inhabit different parts of TBS. The former organise their religious activities around a small house which serves as a chapel as well as a community centre. They also receive support from a Christian non-governmental organisation. Support for the PPP, however, cuts across religious lines in TBS and is a factor in defining the collective identity of the settlements residents. They have remained strong supporters of the party for nearly four decades since the establishment of the Five Marla Scheme despite turnover in the population as original grantees sold their plots and moved on. TBS voters regard themselves as authentic party supporters unlike leaders from local landowner families who are known to switch party affiliation. Local party leaders respond to this widely accepted claim of authenticity and ensure they remain on good terms with the partys vote bank in TBS. Although most residents of the two commercially developed settlements (Jat Basti and School Basti) are also counted as PPP supporters, they are not seen as a dependable vote block. National political currents and policy changes were manifested in Chak 003. The repeal of the 1975 law and its replacement with the Jinnah Abadis in the mid-1980s was felt locally when an already sanctioned Pullwali Bhutto Scheme was stalled, only to be revived with the brief return of the PPP to office. Rightly or wrongly, PPP supporters tend to credit all development initiatives in their settlement to the fortunes of their party and its leaders in national politics. The development of Jat Basti and
Contributions to Indian Sociology 46, 3 (2012): 311336
School Basti and the inability of their residents to gain secure property rights attests to the dormancy of the Jinnah Abadi legislation that might have been used to provide legal cover to the possession claims of nonproprietors. The regression in the latter law with respect to the rights of village kammis or mueens is also visible from the ability of lambardars and other haqdaran-e-zamin of the original village of Chak 003 to initiate eviction proceedings against non-proprietors.
is not only the legal register of private property in land but a signifier of the institutionalised disadvantage of service and menial castes. Other citizenship-based interactions and entitlements reinforce the structure buttressed by the village record.30 It is telling that the only reforms that directly addressed the situation of castes and classes comprising up to a third of the population were initiated by a section of the elite which sought electoral support in the first ever national general elections based on adult franchise. This intervention formally chose the language of class rather than caste, even though the message was widely interpreted locally as being directed to those landless who belonged to service and menial castes, particularly the latter. Even a reformist regime, like that of the PPP in the 1970s, was unwilling or unable to directly address the institutionalised inequality embedded in the village record and the land alienation law. If the narrative of an overarching ideology of caste in India was instrumental in the construction of caste identity, it also suggested identities for resistance.31 The absence of this narrative in Pakistani Punjab has not meant that resistance is absent, but rather that identities that are used for resistance vary across time and place. The adoption of agricultural caste surnames is not uncommon even when confronted by the immutable village record. The transition from Chuhra to Christian was clearly more than a name change and involved a higher level of articulation and commitment. It is another matter that discriminatory laws and politics later confronted the new religious identity. The Five Marla Schemes themselves became sources of identity. The generic name Bhutto colony survived ebbs and flows in the fortunes of the PPP, and residents reputation as authentic party loyalists influenced access to public resources positively or negatively, depending on whether their party was in office or in opposition. In either case, this reputation guaranteed status within a large national organisation. The relationship between caste and class varies across rural Pakistani Punjab. As our case study shows, there can be variation in the housing conditions of the landless low castes even within an administrative village.
30 Government school enrolment forms in Pakistani Punjab demand to know a childs caste using three alternative wordsbiraderi, quom and zaat. As though to drive home the message, the form further enquires if the child is from a cultivator or non-cultivator family. 31 Ram (2004) demonstrates this with respect to the Scheduled Castes, Ad Dharmis and Dalits of Indian Punjab.
Local balances of political power between classes, castes and factions can be instrumental in shaping outcomes. A Five Marla Scheme was initiated in our case study village but resisted in a neighbouring one, and one kammi was evicted for displeasing a lambardar while another managed to remain by aligning himself with a rival faction. We adapt Martins (2009) conclusion with respect to the perpetuation of bonded labour that frequent interruptions in electoral democracy have a case to answer. Variation in the strength of the casteclass hierarchy may be a reflection of the fact that national and provincial level politics are yet to provide conclusive direction to the issue.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on work done as part of the research programme Social Protection in Asia, supported by Ford Foundation and IDRC. The authors are solely responsible for the content including any errors.
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