Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends Author(s): A. Nizar Hamzeh Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No.

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Clientalism,Lebanon: Roots and Trends

A. NIZAR HAMZEH

Although patronage is prevalent in developed and lesser developed countries alike, clientalism may be more entrenched in Lebanon than in most other countries. In fact, there have been a numberof theoreticalworks and a myriad of empirical analyses of patronageand clientalism in modern societies.' These studies explicitly voiced a number of important observations. First, clientalistic arrangementsare not destined to disappear or even to remain on the margins of the society with the establishment of modern regimes. Rather than dying out, the patron-client relationship has been found to crystallize in a great variety of forms. Second, patronageand clientalism assume a certain logic of social exchange; that is, clientalistic arrangementsare built aroundasymmetricbut mutually beneficial and open ended transactions.2 Third, patron-client relations either have long permeatedthe central core of the society or have become an 'addendum'to the central institutionalmodes of organization,interactionand exchange.3 In this article, I will argue that despite the establishment of modem Lebanon, clientalism has evolved and persisted along with other 'modem' forms of participation.Its various forms have had a constraining effect on the enactmentofuniversalistic policies and discouragedthe development of citizen participationand supportas contingent to general policy implementation. Accordingly, I first examine how clientalism is rooted in and intertwined with the Lebanese political system. I also discuss the coexistence of various forms of clientalism, by focusing on the transformationof patronclient relations from traditionalforms of patronageto clientelistic brokerage typical of contemporary Lebanon. Finally, I will shed some light on the future trends of clientalism in Lebanon.

It has been argued that clientalism is a holdover from traditional or premodern societies. The dyadic, hierarchical, personalistic nature of clientalistic relations has been associated with ritual kinship, Sufism and feudalism, all of which enact forms of social interaction and commitments
Middle EasternStudies, Vol.37, No.3, July 2001, pp.167-178
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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with roots in premodern times.4 The pervasiveness of clientalism in Lebanon, however, is easily traced to the feudal eighteenth century when the overlord allowed peasants and their families the use of land in exchange for unquestioned loyalty. To a large measure, clientalism is also rooted in sectarian or confessional identity where, as of the mid-nineteenthcentury, the overlord extended his clientalistic network to include beside personal, sectarianallegiances as well. The socio-economic and political organizationof Mount Lebanonduring the eighteenth and early nineteenthcenturiesmay be characterizedas feudal. In both its origin and evolution, the iqta' system of Mount Lebanon had much in common with other feudal societies.5 The term iqta, however, denotes a socio-economic and political system composed of districts (muqata'as) in which political authoritywas distributedamong autonomous feudal families (muqata'jis). The muqata'jiwas subservientto the amirwho, as a supremeleader,occupied an office vested in the family. In such case the Shihabs ranked first among great feudal families of Mount Lebanon, followed by the Abi al-Lama and the Arslans, all of whom were given the princely title of amir.Next in line came the families with the title of shaykh, including the Druze Junblatsand Talhuqsand the MaroniteKhazins. Almost equally important were the Shiite Hamadeh shaykhs, not to mention the Khuriand Karamshaykhs,both of whom were Maronites.Withinthe context of the Ottoman system of government, the Sultan was formally the highest authority over the rulers of Mount Lebanon and their subjects. The amir received his yearly investiture through one of the Sultan's representatives, the pasha of Saida, Tripoli or Damascus, under whose administration Lebanon and its dependencies were divided. Through the pashas, the amir also forwardedhis annual tribute (al-miri) which he owed to the Ottoman The amir,on the otherhand, had the double task of dealing with the treasury.6 demands of the Ottoman pashas and acting as arbitrator among the muqata'is in the case of internal conflict. The specific duties of collecting taxes, maintainingpeace and order and exercising judicial authorityof first instance over all local, civil and criminal cases involving penalties short of death were all partof the traditionalauthorityof the muqata'ji.7 The basic characteristicof the iqta' systems was thatpolitical legitimacy and allegiance depended more on personal loyalty than on coercive obedience to an impersonal authority.To put it differently,the amir did not need to resort to coercion to generate and sustain conformity to his authority. Instead he relied on the good will of his muqata'jis and the personal allegiance of their followers (atba' or 'uhdah). It is to be noted, however, that this form of political allegiance was not in the beginning sectarian or confessional but predominantly personal. The mutual moral obligations and feelings of inter-dependenceinherent in such personal ties

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are aptly absorbedand documented by Iliya Harik:8 To be of the uhdah of a muqatijiplaced moral obligations not only on the followers but also on the muqatiji, who would come to the aid of his men and protect them. This duty was usually expressed as haq al ri'ayah wal-himayah (to tend and protect). To maintain his integrity and position in the political life of the Immarah,a muqatiji was well aware that he had to have a strong following and a loyal one. The above is clearly a form of patrimonial clientalism, involving the exchange of supportfor protection. Peasants or villagers needed protection from the excessive demands of the central administrationparticularlywith regard to taxation, army recruitmentand arbitraryconscription. This form of patronage,with all its moral undertonesand mutualbenefit, is what John Waterbury calls 'perceived vulnerability' in a traditional form 'where patronage is after all a means of protection both for the weak and for the politically powerful and hence the politically exposed'.9 In such a differentiated hierarchy of authority the muqata'ji emerged with almost undisputed sovereignty over his own district. This sovereignty was further reinforced and perpetuatedby the hereditarycharacterof the iqta'system. As Harik noted, 'Power and transferencewas subject to blood relationship ... Both title of nobility and government rights were passed from father to son and thus authority was kept within the patrilineal groups.' '? The muqata'ji lived on his fief, attendedpersonally to the affairs of his subjects. The feudal districts he presided over were mainly composed of heterogeneous kinship and religious groups. In fact, Khalaf noted that of all feudal districts only these in the North (Bchari, Zawiya and Futuh) were Maronite and one in the South (Jabal-Amal)was Shiite." Throughoutthe nineteenth century patron-client networks continued to display themselves under varied forms, as argued by some observers.'2 There were, however, two significant shifts, both in the form of patron-client relationships and in their mechanisms. To start with, the peasant uprisings of 1820, 1840 and 1856 ushered in the church as an alternative source of patronage and political leadership, and necessitated a shift from ascriptive ties of status and kinship to those based on communal and public interest. The 'ammiyah (commoners) no longer perceived themselves as being bound by personal allegiance to their feudal lords. Instead they were made conscious of their communal interest and public welfare (al-salih al-'umumi).'3 However, the 'ammiyah revolt remained essentially a Maronite phenomenon and was predominantlyconfined to the Christians'muqata'as of the North.'4 It failed to sparka similar shift among the commoners of the Druze, as well as in the South, where the commoners remained overwhelmingly loyal to their feudal shaykhs.

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However, the outbreakof sectarianhostilities in 1841 and 1860 brought about a more significant shift thatnot only changed clientalistic relationships from personal to sectarianor confessional allegiance but highly influenced the birthof Lebanon's modem political system. Although the administrative division of Mount Lebanon in 1841 did not undermine the power of the feudal families, it divided Lebanon into separate Christian and Druze districts (double qayyim maqamiyyah) each with its own sub-governor. Being now homogeneous in their sectarian structure, patron-client relationship, became predominantly sectarian. The individual perceived himself as being bound by his sect, not necessarily by personal allegiance to his feudal lord. In much the same way, the Reglement Organique of the Mutasarrifiyah (govemorate) in 1861 divided Lebanon into seven districts (qada).'5 The Reglement also called for a central administrativecouncil, composed of twelve members,presidedover by a Christiangovernor who is designated by signatorypowers. The distributionof seats within the council was purely on a confessional basis: two seats for each of the major six sects (Maronites,Greek Orthodox,Catholic, Druze, Shiite and Sunni Muslim). It was in this period that sectarianidentityreinforcedpersonalor ascriptiveties to feudal families. In fact the Reglementand the growing commercial urban class threatenedand underminedthe security and social standing of feudal families. However, the mutesarrif (Dawud Pasha) undertookto keep them contented, by arranging for their gradual absorption into the new The Reglementconfessional distributionand the absorption administration.'6 of prominentfamilies generated conditions conducive to the emergence of the Lebanese political system, where both clientalism and confessionalism into the system. have become institutionalized In general terms, the forms that clientalism has assumed reflect the wide range of social, political and economic contexts in which it has appeared. With the establishment of modern independent Lebanon in 1943, clientalistic arrangementsare not destined to disappear. Rather, although feudal or patrimonial clientalism was undermined, new types have been found to crystallize in a variety of forms. Over the entire span of 56 years of parliamentarydemocracy or Lebanon's consociational democracy, four new forms of clientalism have appeared. These are: zu'ama' clientalism, party-directed clientalism, militia clientalism, and Islamist clientalism. Although the basis of their patronage remains mainly confessional, these forms differ in clientalistic relationshipand networks.'7 The zu'ama clientalism, dominated Lebanon at least until 1975, though not exclusively. A political leader, ratherthan exclusively an office holder, za'im may be a power broker with the ability to manipulateelections and the officials he helps to elect. Accordingly, wasta - the ability to attracta client group and attain access to a power broker - is widely sought. The

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position of the za'im is frequentlyhereditaryand politics is often treatedlike a family business. In such a case one is tempted to think of this form as an extension of feudal or patrimonialclientalism. However, the process of zu'ama formation in contemporary Lebanon has been most powerfully affected not only by 'kinship' or the 'clan system' as some observers argue, but by confessional affiliation as well.'8 It is often difficult to determine which came first, kinship or confessional loyalty; suffice it to say that the two variables were mutually reinforcing and resulted in expansion of the zu'ama influence. Nonetheless, the early years of the present century witnessed the emergence of a second and larger category of leaders who could not boast of belonging to prominent families. As noted by Dekmejian, the new elite came from families of local notables large landowners, rich urban merchants,and bankers who acquiredpolitical power either during the last days of Ottoman rule or under the French mandate. The new zu'ama included, for example, families such as As'ad, Bustani, Butrus, Baydoun, Cham'un, Da'uq, Far'aoun, Franjiyyah, Ghusn, Haydar, Hilu, Eddeh, Jumayyil, Karami, al-Khalil, Lahhud, Salem, Saraf, Skaff, Sulh, Taqla and Usayran.'9Like their more famous predecessors, the new zu'ama tended to operate through kinship ties and confessional sentiment. They also tended to provide patronage,which was 'more bureaucratic than feudal in nature.2O To be sure, consociational democracy confessional representationprovided access since 1943 to governmental patronage; and, in order to maintaina large clientele, it became essential for the zu'ama to be regularly elected as deputies and appointed as ministers. As part of the confessional formula, the office of the president was reserved to a Maronite Christian. The Sunnis were given the premiership,and the Shiites the part of speaker of parliament. Likewise, parliamentaryrepresentation of each sect was proportionalto its size. It has been pointed out that at the local level zu'ama clientalism may have reduced sectarian strife. Often political competition was intrasectarian ratherthan with members of differentgroups.2'However, in the events of 1958 and 1975 the zu'ama turned their militias against members of opposing sects. Nonetheless, the zu'ama inherited both the wealth and the political legacy of their fathers, and this formed the basis of their electoral supportin independent Lebanon. For example, almost one fourth of the members of the 1960 parliamentwere the descendants of men who had been appointed to the legislative assemblies underthe French mandate.22 Some other studies reportedthat out of 359 deputies slightly more than 300 may be considered to have inherited their parliamentaryseat from a family member.23 Furthermore, it was not uncommon for more than one member of the same family to hold the office of prime minister or speakerof the Chamber;for example,

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two of the Sulh family held the position of prime minister.The As'ads, both father and son, served as Speakers of the Chamberfor many years.24 Contrary to patrimonial clientalism where the patron-client network exhibits a narrowlocalized structure,the clientalistic network of the zu'ama is more linked to wider institutionalframeworkof Lebanon'scentraladministration. As Roniger noted, traditionalor feudal patrons,tried to build their domains locally and were interestedin keeping governmentalagencies away, so that the resultantnetwork, were of a dispersed kind. In contrast, as the zu'ama became interestedin gaining access to materialresourcescommanded by the stateor channelledthroughits organs,this strategybecame more supralocal.25 In such a case, the client is bound to the za'im by a networkof transactional ties, where economic and other services are distributedto the clients in exchange for political loyalty. This political supportusually takes the form of voting for the za'im and his allies in parliamentaryelections. Most importantly,the za'im maintains his support in two important ways, as stressed by Johnson:26 first by being regularlyreturnedto office, so he can influence the administration andcontinuouslyprovidehis clients with government services; and second by being wealthy, so he may use his financial contactto give his clients employment,contractsandcapital.Most importantly, most of Lebanon'szu'ama createdwhat Roniger calls 'complicatednetwork of brokers and clients'27which have permeated Lebanon's administrative apparatus.Such networks allowed many of the zu'ama to survive electoral defeat and periods in opposition. For example, a judge who owes his appointment to a particular za'im would probablycontinueto be lenient to the za'im's criminalclients even if the za'im were no longer in office. Perhaps the most distinguishing characterof zu'ama clientalism is the ability to provide the clientele with services. In this sense, the clients' support is a transactional obligation rather than a form of confessional loyalty. Although national and programmaticappeals are not made by the zu'ama, they do make sectarian appeals and seek to woo their electors by posing as confessional representatives.It has been pointed out that often the zu'ama could not be elected unless they were supported by other confessional groups within their electoral district.28It is true that the electoral system - single electoral college and proportionalrepresentation compels them to do this. But most districts have a sectarianpreponderance and most support comes from within a sect. Nonetheless, the relationship between the za'im and his clients remains asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open-ended. However, zu'ama clientalism has crippled the role of the legislature and eroded the power of the state. The erosion of the legislative and executive powers and the reduction of the entire political process to one of squabbles over patronage rights relegated to the zu'ama exceptional powers over the Lebanese state.

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The socio-economic and political transformationsof Lebanon after the Second WorldWar,in the form of expanding economic opportunities,rapid geographical and social mobility and the inevitable process of politicization - the growth of political parties and ideological groups - led to what Waterburycalls 'trading in the traditional forms of vulnerabilities for the vulnerabilities of modernization.'29 This modernizationresults in uprootedness, anxiety and insecurity in those that experience it, creating new needs and demands. It is in these transitional settings that we find the clearest evidence of the formation of a new form of political clientalism - partydirected clientalism. Although nationalist ideology had played some role in the formation of rightist parties - the Kata'ib (Phalange) of Pierre Jumayyil, the Liberal National Bloc of Raymond Edde, and the Liberal National Partyof Camille Chamoun- for the most partthese parties seem little differentfrom those of a client group vis-a'-vis its za'im, and they have overall remained confessionally based. On the other hand, ideology, more than the power and sect of a za'im, has been the basis for the formation of leftist parties. These multisectariangroups have espoused causes ranging from Marxism to PanArabism or Pan-Syrianism. Parties such as the Progressive Socialist party (also perceived as a sectarianDruze party), the Communistparty,the Ba'ath party, the Independent Nasserist Movement, the Syrian Social National Party and the Palestinian resistance, clients and non-Lebanese outsiders, have all invoked ideological programmesindependentof any specific act of clientalistic exchange.30 As has often been emphasized, the powers of political parties serve two functions.3' They become the means through which bargaining over resource allocation can occur. Moreover, they serve as a basis for the formation of a new kind of identity, a sense of belonging to an imagined community. In this sense a shift from vertical forms of participation to horizontal networks was not achieved by Lebanese political parties. On the contrary,the experience of the rightistpartiesclientalistic networkremained vertical and has continued to be sustained by personal and confessional reciprocalobligations.As such, rightistparty-directed clientalism became an extension of the clientalism of some of the zu'ama who perhaps have been able, by skilful manoeuvering, to circumvent their gradual demise. On the other hand, the leftist political parties who have derived much of their support from heterogeneous urban masses failed to move to the public arena. While there is more to their party directed clientalism than favouritism and particularisticresource allocation, in comparisonto rightist parties the shift by the leftists from vertical forms of participation to horizontal networks was too slow. Therefore their communitarian clientelistic networks have remained distorted and failed to move from the

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privateto the public arena.All in all, the failure of Lebanese political parties to develop national constituencies also gave the zu'ama a new lease on life.

With the occurrence of civil wars, a new type of repressive clientalism sets in, primarilyfocused on militias or what Lemarchandcalls 'armies'." With the erosion of the Lebanese state, both the zu'ama and party-directed clientalism were being challenged throughfear and coercion by a post- 1975 civil war development: the rise of the militias. Although some militias were still controlled by sons of traditionalzu'ama - Amin Jummayyil'sPhalange, Dani Chamoun's Tigers militia and Walid Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party militia - others like the Sunni Murabitun(Sentinels), the Maronite Lebanese Forces, the Shia Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah), and the Party of God (Hizbullah) were led by figures who had arrived recently on the political scene. Thus in 1975 the Lebanese political system had to be viewed through the overlay of militia or repressive clientalism. This form persisted in full force at least until the 1989 Taif agreementwhich called upon Syria to help the Lebanese state regain its authority.33 The new militias derived much of their supportfrom their own sects. By virtue of armed strength,the various militias that controlled the nation had divided Lebanon into several semi-autonomous cantons, each having its own political, social and economic structure. The militias were not just military organizations, through military force they gained control of revenues that formerly went to government coffers. In this way, by the controlling armed might and the purse, the militias were appropriating basic stock-in-tradeof both zu'ama and party-directedclientalism. However, the shrinking political arena led to an atrophy of clientalistic networks (Hizbullah is somehow exceptional); social exchange took the form of unrestrainedcorruptionand extortion; in so far as one speaks of a 'nexus function' it operatesamong highly personalisedmilitia members,and is primarily used in the form of an exploitative monopoly of resources.34 More importantly,cruder forms or physical coercion played an important part,more than the zu'ama's qabadayat (enforcers),in clientalistic relations. The militias developed a ratherunique kind of patron-client relationswhere no balance of consideration took place in the exchange. Only the patron's interest was reinforced by his militia power. What the system had failed to accomplish through its anarchic reward system, the militias did by way of periodic purges of surrogate armies, by the indiscriminate slaughter of anyone suspected of opposition and by assassination.For example, in 1978, the Lebanese Forces subjugatedthe MaradaBrigade, the militia of former president Sulayman Franjiyeh, killing his son Tony in the process. In the 1980s, the same fate befell Camille Chamoun's Tigers militia, and his son

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Dany was killed. From 1980 to 1989, similarclashes and assassinationstook place between Murabitunand the ProgressiveSocialist Party(PSP), PSP and Amal, Amal and Hizbullah, and Amal and the Palestinian resistance. Overall, there was little or no incentive for all militias to operate a redistributionof resources below the circles of devoted members. This militia clientalism no doubt subsumes within it a dependentrelation on foreign or regional powers, more than any other form of clientalism.35 One need not possess the determinismof dependency theory to hypothesize about the powerful influence that foreign or regional powers have exercised over Lebanese militias. It has been noted that Murabitun,Lebanese Forces, Amal and Hizbullah became the clients of Libya, Israel, Syria and Iran respectively, not to mention the Palestinian groups who have been the clients of Syria, Sudan, Libya, Iraq and others. Inquiring into such relationship brings into focus the fact that domestic forms of clientalism which ramify beyond national boundaries serve as a bridgehead for the penetrationof foreign patronsor regional interest. The crisis conditions in the Arab world - defeats by Israel, the failure to achieve balanced socio-economic development, political oppression, maldistributionof wealth, and the disorienting psycho-cultural impact of Westernization- were exacerbated in the Lebanese sectarian context by The convergence of these crises in problems inherent in the system itself.36 a divided society produced Islamist groups in the late 1970s. Groups such as Hizbullah, al-Jama'ahal-Islamiyya (The Islamic Association), and others found themselves ideologically and strategicallyin a constant confrontation with the Lebanese political system. Although Islamist groups might be categorized and discussed under militia or party-directedclientalism, their emphasis on communitariansharing makes them deserve a separateform. More than any other form of clientalism, this Islamist communitarian clientalism type is supported and reinforced by the patron's and client's shared faith in primordial frameworks. Given the assumption that local politics or municipal work - provision of social services to the community - is a fundamental tenet of faith. The Islamists were able more than the zu'ama, party-directed-clientalismand the militias, at least in the Muslim communities, to create a stronger sense of belonging to the same community and a potential means of access to power centres. In providing social welfare services education, health care, and housing Hizbullah and the Jama'ah, for example, were able to bypass the politics of zu'ama clientalism and overcome this particular feature of Lebanese The logic of the Islamist social welfare services to the community, politics.37 however, instituted an interest in politics. This in turn made Islamists interested in gaining access to political and materialresources commanded Thus the new clientalistic by the state or channelled through its organs.38

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networks of Islamists became communitarian- not only operating in the public arena but also having strong private connotations. This was clearly demonstrated in their participation in the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections and the municipal elections of 1998. As Hizbullah and the Jama'ah invested energies and resources to show hospitality, generosity, benevolence and concern for voters as their clients, they stressed that rendering services to the community is sanctioned by faith and religion, independentlyof any specific act of exchange. For the client, on the other hand, although the relationship is independent of any specific act of exchange, the renderingof services and the allocation of resources remains the means of proving one's success to the community. The experience of both Hizbullah and the Jama'ah in the Lebanese parliamentand in many of the municipal councils they won indicates a durabilityof relationshipwith their clients. Clearly, more than any other form of clientalism, Hizbullah and the Jama'ah exert religious and emotional hold over their clients, thus minimizing the possibility of other patrons, zu'ama or secular parties, enticing away their wards through simple materialpromises. However, the public arena or communitarian clientalism has not developed nationally beyond the Muslim community,and has remainedsectarianor confessional.

The foregoing analysis of clientalism suggests thatthe patron-clientrelationship, ratherthan dying out, may merely have taken one more turn along an evolutionary track. Clearly each of the five forms, though not mutually exclusive, made its appearanceand was generated by social, political and economic vulnerabilities. Whether patrimonial, zu'ama, party politics, militia and Islamist forms of clientalism, they continue to differ in their moral content of the relationship, the asymmetry in power between the parties and the nature of social exchange, although the basis of their patronageremains mainly personal and confessional. Like confessionalism, this vulgar clientalism has been institutionalized into Lebanon's political system, thus makingthe Lebanese state an association of a varietyof patrons. In addition, clientalism did not lead to either democracy or modernizationin Lebanon. On the contrary,it has had a constrainingeffect on the enactmentof universalisticpolicies and discouragedthe development of Lebanese citizen participationin an alreadyfragile consociational type of democracy. Even in party-linkedclientalism, including the Islamist parties, which implies an electoral framework, the participationof the individual has remainedvertical and fragmentedratherthan horizontalwhich is a main characteristic of modern party directed-clientalism. Moreover, clientalism has not succeeded in being an adaptive instrumentof modernization.Once threatened, particularly in the zu'ama form, by political and economic

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modernization which was supposed to alter the bargaining relationship between traditionalpatronsand their clients, it respondedby giving birth to sectarian political parties or militias using cruder forms of coercion and repression. In fact, clientalism has failed to meet secular and rational demands of modernization such as political adaptation, openness, and receptivity to change. In its present configuration, the Lebanese state cannot be expected to overcome the resistance of clientalism without significant measures or universalistic policies that encourage the development of citizen participation, as democracy empowers people with the notion of representation.Yet, the long term fate of clientalism in Lebanon is likely to be affected by at least two additionalfactors: the evolution of the Lebanese political system and Lebanon's economic situation. Clearly a shift in the Lebanese political system from a confessional structureto a secular one would contribute greatly to the decline of clientalism or at least to a shift from the vertical forms of participation to horizontal networks - that is modern party-directed clientalism. Moreover, the future course of clientalism will depend on the ability of the Lebanese government to accommodate Lebanon's poorer classes, which can bring tangible benefits to them regardless of sectarianaffiliation. Beyond these two internal factors, the future course of clientalism, in particularmilitia clientalism, will also depend on the extent domestic forms of clientalism will ramify beyond Lebanon's national boundaries. Clearly resolving acute conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict will contribute greatly to the decline of the militia form, which has served as the bridgehead for the penetrationof regional or foreign interest.
NOTES 1. For the ubiquity of patronage and clientalism in modem societies see E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (eds.), Patrons and Clients in MediterraneanSocieties (London:Duckworth, 1977); S.N. Eisenstadt and R. Lemarchand(eds.), Political Clientalism, Patronage, and Development(London:Sage, 1981); C. Clapham(ed.), Private Patronageand Public Power (New York: St. Martin Press, 1982); S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, Patron, Clients and Friends (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1984). 2. For clientalism and the logic of social exchange see S.N. Eisenstadtand L. Roniger, 'Patronclient Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange', ComparativeStudies in Society and History, Vol.22, No.1 (1980), pp.42-77, R. Lemarchand, 'Comparative Political Clientalism: Structure,Process and Optic', in Eisenstadtand Lemarchand(eds.), Political Clientalism,pp.7-32; L. Graziano, 'Issue on Political Clientalism', InternationalPolitical Science Review, Vol.4, No.4 (1983), pp.425-34. 3. For clientalismand the centralinstitutionalcore of the society see CarlLande, 'Introduction: The Dyadic Basis of Clientalism', in S. Shmidt, et al., Friends, Followers and Factions (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1977), pp.xiii-xxxvii; L. Roniger and A. GunesAtaya (eds.), Democracy, Clientalism and Civil Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).

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4. For roots of clientalism see M. Kenny, 'Patternsof Patronagein Spain', Anthropological Quarterly, Vol.8 (1960), pp.14-23; M. Gilsenan, 'Against Patron-Client Relations', in (eds.), Patrons and Clients, pp.167-83; S. Kettering,'The Historical Gellner and Waterbury Development of Political Clientalism', Journal of InterdisciplinarvHistory, Vol.18, No.3 (1988), pp.419-47. 5. See I. Harik, 'The Iqta System in Lebanon: A ComparativePolitical View', Middle East Journal (Autumn 1965), pp.405-12; M. Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868 (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1959); L. Binder 'Political Change in Lebanon', in L. Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon (New York:John Wiley & Sons, 1966). 6. Harik, 'The Iqta System', pp.409-10. 7. Kerr,' Lebanonin the Last Year', p.3. 8. Harik, 'The Iqta System', p.41 1. 9. Waterbury, 'An Attemptto Put Patronsand Clients in TheirPlace', in Gellnerand Waterbury (eds.), Patron and Clients, pp.336-7. 10. Harik, 'The Iqta System', p.420. 11. Ibid. (eds.), Patrons 12. S. Khalaf, 'ChangingFormsof Political Patronage',in GellnerandWaterbury and Clients, p. 190. 13. I. Harik, Politics and Change in Traditional Society: Lebanon 1711-1845 (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1968), p.221. 14. Khalaf, 'ChangingForms', p.193. 15. K. Salibi, The ModernHistory of Lebanon (London:Weidenfeld, 1965), p.1 1. 16. Ibid, pp.111-12. 17. The three forms of 'political patronage'- feudal, administrativeand pseudo-ideological the ascriptive identifiedby S. Khalaf were consideredto have much in common, particularly ties of family solidarity.See S. Khalaf, 'ChangingForms', p.201. political 18. Many writershave stressedthe clan system or familism over the sect in perpetuating clientalism in Lebanon,see R. Dekmejian,Patternsof Political Leadership:Lebanon,Israel, Egypt (Albany: State University of New YorkPress, 1975), pp.13-14; S. Khalaf, 'Changing Forms'. 19. Dekmejian,Patterns, p.14. 20. S. Khalaf, 'ChangingForm', p.194. Patrons and 21. M. Johnson, 'Political Bosses and Their Gangs', in Gellner and Waterbury, Clients, p.209; Khalaf, p.203. 22. Lebanon:A CountryStudy(Libraryof Congress:FederalDivision Research, 1987), p.1. 23. al-Nahar, 'Elections:Fifty Years', Special Issue, 1972, Jan., pp.39-60. 24. Dekmejian,Patterns of Political Leadership,p. 18. 25. L. Roniger,Democracy, Clientalism,p.12. 26. Johnson, 'Political Bosses', p.209. 27. L. Roniger,Democracy, Clientalism,p. 12. 28. Khalaf, 'ChangingForms', p.198. 29. J. Waterbury, 'An Attemptto Put Patronsand Clients in their Place', p.339. 30. See Michael W. Sulieman, Political Parties in Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966). 31. Ayse Gunes-Ayata,'Clientalism:Premodern,Modern, Postmodern'in Roniger and GunesAyata,Democracy, Clientalismand Civil Society, p.22. 32. Lemarchand,ComparativePolitical Clientalism, p.25; N. Kassfir, The ShrinkingPolitical Arena (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1976), p.267. 33. For a full translatedtext of the Taif agreementsee Beirut Review (Spring 1991) pp.119-60. 34. Lemarchand,ComparativePolitical Clientalism,p.25. 35. Ibid., see 'Clientalismand Dependency', p.27. 36. RichardDekmejian,Islam in Revolution:Fundamentalism in the Arab World(Syracuse,NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p.162. 37. For Islamists' social welfare services see A. Nizar Hamzeh, 'Islamismin Lebanon:A Guide to the Groups',Middle East Quarterly(September 1997), pp.47-54. 38. Roniger, 'Clientalismand Civil Society', p.12.

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