East Asia (2011) 28:135155 DOI 10.

1007/s12140-011-9140-5

In the Shadow of Pacifism: Foreign Policy Choices of Germany and Japan in Afghanistan
Patrick Hein

Received: 4 October 2010 / Accepted: 17 January 2011 / Published online: 16 February 2011 # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract This paper explores the policy choices of Germany and Japan for contributing to international security and stability in Afghanistan. Both countries have been closely involved with Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 2001. It is argued that the policy choice of Japan with a low military element and high civilian element differs significantly from the German military centered approach. An analysis of the goals and motives behind the foreign policy choices reveals that in Germany the military involvement has been justified with humanitarian reasons, national self interests and the right to unlimited sovereignty. This logic has ultimately led to the acceptance of civilian casualties and participation into offensive counterinsurgency operations. It is suggested that elite driven discourses have determined foreign policy strategy. In the case of Japan the paper claims that the conservative LDP elite had been pushing for intensified military involvement which materialized in the dispatch of military vessels to the Indian Ocean and ground forces to Iraq. Similar to Germany these moves towards gaining international reputation were rooted in domestic politics. Keywords Japan . Germany . Afghan war . Collective defense . Pacifism . Human security

Introduction The international Afghanistan Conference in Kabul on July 20, 2010 was a key signal that responsibility was to be handed over to the Afghan authorities. The Afghan Government has translated the political commitments made at the London
P. Hein (*) Tokyo, Japan e-mail: p_heinjp@yahoo.co.jp

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Conference into concrete reform plans with deadlines. One key outcome of the Kabul Conference was broad support for President Karzais goal that Afghan security forces assume responsibility for security throughout the country by 2014. The transition is to be carried out gradually in coordination between the Afghan Government and NATO. Following in the footsteps of President Obama, who decided to increase the US troop contingent to 100,000 men, both Germany and Japan stepped up their efforts to support the Afghan Government. On February 26, 2010 Germanys participation in ISAF was extended until February 28, 2011 by the Bundestag. It pledged to increase troops on the ground to a maximum of 5,350 soldiers. On the other hand, Japan has committed in November 2009 to spend a total of 5 billion dollars over five years for stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan. While the readiness to assume a larger international security role has grown, Germany and Japan have exhibited different trajectories in dealing with Afghanistan. Germany has moved from military absence in the 1990/91 Gulf War to the deployment of ground forces in Afghanistan in 2001. For its part, the Japanese Government dispatched Self Defence Force (SDF) vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations against international terrorism in Afghanistan in November 2001 and deployed military non-combat units to Iraq from 2004 to 2006, but scaled down its physical military presence in the region to zero by January 2010. Some observers have seen in this move a return to the past checkbook diplomacy. As perceptions mask sometimes reality it may not surprise that US scholars gave high scores to Germany for its strong US loyalty and questioned at the same time Japans determination: Even countries with constitutional constraints similar to Japans,likewise born of their unpleasant military histories, acted more boldly. Germany declared its full military support for the United States, and departing from the restraint that had characterized all German uses of force beyond Europe since World War II, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder staked the future of his government on legislation that would permit Germany to join the allied war effort. German soldiers were among the first to die in Afghanistan, and Germany even offered to assume leadership of the subsequent peacekeeping operation (Heginbotham and Samuels, Foreign Affairs, [9], p. 116). This paper argues that the German determination has somehow faded into harsh realities since then. The question why Germany is present in Afghanistan has repeatedly been raised and the answer given is to ensure freedom and security. General David Petraeus, commander in chief of the ISAF troops, has formulated what is also Germanys self-understanding of the war objectives: The core object, the reason we've all come here is to make sure that Afghanistan is not becoming a sanctuary for terrorists and other extremists who intend to attack European and other societies. (Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,718285-2,00.html) Despite the shared understanding of the common goal to establish and ensure security, the paths chosen by Germany and Japan in choosing the means to achieve this goal could not be more different. Whereas Japan favors civilian nation-building measures relying on financial and economic assistance, Germany has given preference to the military element, even though it has been insisting that post-

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conflict nation-building, democratic state structures, human rights and the rule of law should deserve priority. It is the purpose of this paper to ascertain that for Germany remote Afghanistan has presented an opportunity to assert national self-interests and get rid of the constraints of limited sovereignty (former Chancelor Gerhard Schroeder). For Schroeder, Afghanistan has been instrumental in eliminating the historical restrictions put on Germanys sovereignty: The Bundestag's decision put an end to the chapter of Germany's limited sovereignty after World War II. It made us an equal partner in the international community of nations, one that had obligations to meet, such as those that have arisen from the NATO alliance in the case of Afghanistan. (Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,607205,00.html). As a result of elite driven political choices the German strategy which experienced a political legitimacy crisis with the resignation of German President Horst Koehler in May 2010 as well as a moral legitimacy crisis with the deadly Kunduz airstrike against civilians in September 2009 - has come under increased public criticism and scrutiny [24]. Consequently, the gap between the war supportive political elites in parliament on one side and a sceptical public opinion on the other side has widened. According to a poll released in June 2010, 58% of Germans and 53% of Japanese want the US and NATO troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan (See Appendix). German soldiers, who have returned from Afghanistan, feel abandoned by their political leadership and have accused politicians of pursuing questionable objectives in Afghanistan ([8], p.10). Japan has chosen a non-military, soft path in Afghanistan for various reasons. Most importantly the peace constitution bans the deployment of military in out of area combat zones; second Japan is not accountable to a multilateral military structure such as NATO or the European Defence Agency. Under the bilateral USJapan Security Treaty, the US is obliged to defend Japan if it is attacked, but Japan is not required to defend the US [30,31]. Third, Japanese NGOs and the semigovernmental overseas cooperation agency JICA, though strongly interwoven with the Foreign Ministry, act as independent, neutral, civilian relief and development actors in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a large portion of government assistance has been channeled through international civilian institutions (UNHCR, ADB, WFP, UNDP). This has increased the credibility with the recipients. Forth, Japan has been kept busy with more pressing domestic security issues struggling to assert its sovereignty over disputed territories and secure its own borders (unresolved territorial disputes with China, Taiwan, Korea, Russia; military threat by North Korea). Fifth, Japan has taken the lead under Sadako Ogata, former head of the UNHCR, to enhance an alternative, civilian people centered concept of human security from a global perspective. The first part of the paper sheds light on the domestic internal dynamics behind the Afghan involvement since 2001 in both countries. The second section explores the theme of humanitarian intervention in the case of Germany and how this strategy has not only failed to fully respond to the needs and expectations of the Afghans but also raised the political and moral questioning of the legitimacy of military involvement by German citizens. The third section explores the non-military, human security centered approach advocated by Japans Sadako Ogata, aiming at improving

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the livelihoods of local residents. The forth section looks at the German-Japanese police training projects intended to strengthen civilian capacity-building. The article concludes by submitting the premises and outcomes of both countries policy choices to a critical review.

Section 1 Japan: In Search of a Civilian, Pacifist Purpose for the Military Public opinion in Japan has traditionally been rather hostile to one of the main obligations of permanent membership in the Security Council, namely a military contribution to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations (PKO). Many, if not most, Japanese hold that Japans constitution (Article 9) prohibits such activities. Former Prime Minister Kaifu was the first to lay the foundations for overseas Self-Defence Forces (SDF) missions. In September 1990 he presented a plan to send a UN peace cooperation team to Saudi Arabia and thereafter he tried to push the dispatch of five SDF airplanes for airlifts to Iraq through parliament, but without avail. He succeeded in dispatching SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf without seeking or getting the required approval from parliament. The most important step towards overseas deployment was doubtlessly the dramatic passage of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in 1992. The so-called PKO Law set five conditions for the Japanese SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations: 1. Agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflicts. 2. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japans participation in the force. 3. The peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favoring any party in the conflict. 4. Should any of the above requirements cease to satisfy the Government of Japan, it may withdraw its contingent. 5. Use of weaponry shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel. The bill became law on the evening of 15 June 1992 with a vote of 329 to 17 in its favor with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) boycotting it and the Communist Party voting against it. Backed by the new law Japan became enabled to send peacekeeping troops to Cambodia and Mozambique and participate in refugee relief efforts in Rwanda later on. The PKO Law was revised twice (in 1998 and 2001) in order to loosen the strict conditions under which SDF units operating abroad may use weapons. In 1993 when two Japanese nationals were killed in Cambodia while assisting the United Nations mission to rebuild that country, Junichiro Koizumi, then minister of postal service and telecommunications, stated that although the kind of contribution Japan should make to the international community had been debated at length, nobody ever imagined that blood would have to be shed in the process. He urged the government to withdraw Japanese personnel from the peacekeeping operation on

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the grounds that Japan was a special case. A decade later, Koizumi was the driving force behind a significant expansion in the scale and nature of Japans international contribution to the Coalition of the Willing in and around both Afghanistan and Iraq. A Diet resolution from 1954 had prohibited the overseas dispatch of SDF forces. This taboo had been upheld with some exceptions until 2001. With the 9/11 attacks the LDP saw a chance to overcome the limitations put on SDF operations abroad. The question if Japanese military should participate in missions abroad or not and under what conditions was shifted from an UN perspective to the fight against terror and thereafter to a collective defence perspective. As Ishizuka [13] has pointed out, Japans decision to dispatch the SDF to Iraq but not to Sudan was inconsistent with the conditions set forth by the 1992 PKO law: The Five Principles were secured in Sudan, but the Japanese Government declined the request for the dispatch to the Sudan mission. However, Iraq was still in a chaotic situation, which means the Five Principles were not yet achieved. ([13], p. 16). The preference given to the military mission in Iraq over UN peacekeeping in Sudan was a choice influenced by domestic considerations. Domestic considerations influenced also the foreign policy choices with regard to the Indian Ocean refueling mission of the SDF. Japans Afghanistan Policy: From a Military Focus to Civilian Nation-building Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's announced in January 2007 in a speech to NATO that Japan would enhance its activities in Afghanistan and mapped Japans contributions and commitments: support the Afghan National Development Strategy, in areas such as road and airport construction as well as agricultural development; enhance assistance in the area of security, disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups, capacity building for the Afghan police forces; intensify cooperation with NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams' humanitarian activities; fight against narcotics and terrorism by reinforcing the border control capabilities of the Afghan Government, in collaboration with Germany, the U.S. and the EU. Since 2007, Japan has provided financial support to basic human needs projects in various regions of Afghanistan. Japan has been eager under the conservative LDP to seek ways to allow for SDF forces to engage in collective defence activities similar to the NATO mechanism of mutual assistance in case of an attack on a member State. The new Ministry of Defence (Defence Agency) launched in 2007, recognizes the right to collective self-defence but restricts it at the same time: () Japan has the right of collective self-defence under international law. It is, however, not permissible to use the right, that is, to stop armed attack on another country with armed strength, although Japan is not under direct attack, since it exceeds the limit of use of armed strength as permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution. (Source: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp01.html)

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In other words Japan has the right of collective self-defence but cannot exercise that right under the Constitution, an interpretation some lawmakers and even some legal experts say appears possibly at odds. The prohibition of use of armed strength has not prevented Japan from participating in the war against terror. In 2001 under then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi the duty to join the international fight against terrorism became a key argument in supporting the war on terror in Afghanistan. Under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enacted in 2001, the SDF were authorized to provide non-combat and humanitarian support to the US-led coalition in the Indian Ocean. Destroyers and combat support ships of the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) were dispatched to the Indian Ocean from 2001 to 2008 to participate in OEFMIOs (Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation). Their mission was to prevent the marine transportation of illegal weapons and ammunition, and the drugs which fund terrorist activity. Since 2004, the JMSDF had provided ships of foreign forces with fuel for their ships and ship-based helicopters, as well as fresh water. This was the third time Japanese military vessels had been dispatched overseas since World War II, following the deployments of mine-sweeping units during the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War. In the end, the anti-terrorism legislation that authorized the Indian Ocean refueling operations did expire on November 1, 2007, and Japans naval vessels temporarily returned home. Due to a veto to a new bill authorizing the mission by the opposition-controlled Upper Chamber of the Japanese Diet a new law was subsequently passed when the Lower Chamber overruled the veto, and the mission was resumed in the beginning of 2008. The government drafted new legislation that removed any reference to Afghanistan, and specifically barred refueling for anything other than MIOs. Any and all connections between Japans refueling operations and Afghanistan were cut. The new law was voted with a two third majority of the LDP against the opposition of the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) submitting its own counter-proposal. It contained the DPJ's idea of providing assistance to civilians in Afghanistan within the framework of UN activities. The DPJ said it could consider participation by the SDF in a maritime operation aimed at cracking down on ships related to terrorism if the mission was authorized by the United Nations. At the time, Japanese officials acknowledged great disappointment with the wording of the replacement legislation, as it marked a major step backward from the decade-long effort to bring about Japanese acceptance of the right of collective self-defence [27]. In 2008 the US put renewed pressure on Japan to send troops on the ground to Afghanistan. Then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda agreed to send a fact-finding team to investigate whether to send troops to Afghanistan on a reconstruction mission but finally declined to do so because of expected fierce internal opposition to his plans. After the termination of the Indian refuel mission, Japan has been reconsidering what role it should play in future peace-building operations in the region [28]. Since May 2002, it has been playing the lead donor role in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) measures and the subsequent Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program as part of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the wake of the demise of the Taliban regime [10,12,14,22,30,31]. The disarmament expert Kenji Isezaki, a former special representative of the Japanese Government in Afghanistan,

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made crucial contributions to the initiation of DDR [12]. Without disarmament of the warlords, the other four pillars, namely building a national army (responsibility of the United States), organizing the police (Germany), establishing a judicial system (Italy), and countering narcotics (U.K.) would have had no effect. It is an irony, that the process did not include destroying the weapons, but rather transferring them to the new National Afghan Army. Japan has carefully avoided any military involvement or assistance in the security sector and, despite major financial contributions, only a small number of Japanese experts have worked for DDR and DIAG implementation according to Miyahara, a former Kabul based diplomat ([22], p. 127). All of them were civilians. From the beginning of the conflict there has been a strong consensus to keep the SDF completely out of Afghanistan in line with Japans strict policy of not using force or endangering the lives of soldiers or civilians. Defence expert Yoshizaki has suggested that the SDFs stance of not firing a shot and causing not a single casualty in Irak may offer lessons for future non-military peace building efforts ([30,31], p.177). On the other hand, there are limitations to the benefits of military soft power as the SDF can only operate if other nations-such as the Dutch army in Irak-ensure the safety of Japanese soldiers. The new DPJ government has re-confirmed its non-military approach. It announced a massive aid package of 5 billion USD in November 2009 to enhance post-conflict state building in Afghanistan. On July 20, 2010 Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada disclosed the most comprehensive plan so far at the Kabul conference to stabilize the country and contribute to nation-building focusing on three priority areas of security, reintegration and development. First, top priority should be given to improving security and putting in place the machinery of government. To this end, it is imperative to strengthen Afghanistans security forces, notably the police. Second, political initiatives are required if the security situation is to be improved. Specifically, it is vital for the stabilization of the country that efforts are made, under the lead of the Afghan Government and with assistance from the international community, to reintegrate moderate factions among the militants into the countrys political life. Third, it is essential to bring more stability to the daily lives of Afghans and build a solid economic foundation, thus allowing improvements in infrastructure in the areas of agriculture and village life that ordinary Afghan citizens can see with their own eyes. In addition to the above, the new strategy incorporates the basic principle that what is most effective is to help Afghans improve their capability to tackle problems on their own and that the international community should remain behind the scenes. Japan pledged to train the Afghan police force, financially support reconciliation initiatives with the insurgents such as the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program and the launching of the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund; and to launch development initiatives in various fields including infrastructure development, agriculture and engineering. Furthermore, Japan pledged to continue its cooperation in the areas of education and health, good governance, finance and anti-corruption actions. In line with the Kabul proposal to promote internal reconciliation between the conflict parties, the Afghan scholar Yuji Uesugi has urged that: Japan should assist Afghanistan, first and foremost, in creating a political arena in which a negotiated settlement between the Karzai government and the insurgency can be sought [29].

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A New Policy Orientation under DPJ Rule? The DPJ has pledged in its election manifest of 2009 to play a role in peacebuilding in Afghanistan and elsewhere, examine the participation of Self-Defence Forces in peacekeeping operations and civilians in activities contributing to international society and aim to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Source: DPJ Manifest 2009). First it has refused the deployment of Japanese Ground Self-Defence Forces to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, as proposed in the Diet by then-DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa in October 2007. Second, it terminated the operation of SDF vessels in the Indian Ocean. In January 2010, the defence minister ordered the Japanese navy to return from the Indian Ocean, fulfilling a DPJ pledge to end the eight-year refueling mission. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had refused to renew the law authorizing the mission, ignoring requests from the US Government for continuation and emphasized that Japan should think of sending the SDF to UN led missions instead. What this means in concrete terms has remained unclear. The new DPJ government in power has not made it clear if and how it intends to make use of the military in future UN mandated peace operations. In a recent policy strategy document theNational Security Council has issued its thoughts on the future role and responsibilities of the SDF: Traditionally, Japan has responded to these (security PH) challenges through contributions focused in non-military fields. However, experience in the field of international efforts, as in Afghanistan, shows that there are certain kinds of activities that only military forces can carry out, such as reconstruction assistance in dangerous areas, and the protection of civilians who work there. It is indispensable for Japan to use its defence force more proactively in the field of international peace cooperation, so that Japan can assume responsibility for maintaining and constructing an international system (Source: The Council on Security and Defence Capabilities, August 2009, p 38, accessed at http://www. kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampob). In August 2010 the DPJ announced that it will create a new body within the Cabinet secretariat of the Prime Minister s Office to streamline and centralize Afghanistan support activities. Japan is currently reconsidering how it can effectively contribute to UN peacekeeping operations without jeopardizing the spirit of its peace constitution. Germany: Elite Consensus as Driving Force With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Germany has come under growing pressure from its allies to assume a greater international security role [4,5]. After voting for the ISAF mission with a great majority in December 2001, the German Bundestag approved also German participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in November 2002. Soon after the ousting of the Taliban regime, Germany tried to integrate NATO into post-conflict reconstruction. The Ministry of Defence, in particular, pushed for NATO support for the ISAF troops despite its former reservations on the expansion of NATO operations [26]. In 2003, the NATO Council

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agreed to the German request that the Alliance should take over ISAF command. The UN mandate has authorized ISAF to take all necessary measures, including the use of military force, in order to implement its mission. Although German troops have mainly operated in the relatively quiet north of the country, the Bundeswehr has suffered several casualties. As of December 2010, 45 German soldiers and 3 policemen had died in Afghanistan. On top of this, there are additional German civilian casualties such as development aid workers. Despite or because of the military restrictions all major parties except the Die Linke (Leftist) Party have generally supported Germanys commitment to Afghanistan and avoided explicit calls for withdrawal of troops. In keeping with this cross-party consensus, Germanys decision to increase troops had the endorsement not just of the new governing coalition of Christian (CDU) and Free Democrats (FDP) but also the main opposition party, the SPD. The CDU is probably the most direct supporter of these operations. SPD and the Greens do not oppose the engagement in principle but demand a closer focus on civilian support and clear exit strategies for Afghanistan. The Greens have called for an end to Operation Enduring Freedom and called it irresponsible to conduct two missions -OEF and ISAF- in parallel [18]. While the junior liberal coalition partner the free democrats (FDP) has a very critical stance on the German military involvement in Afghanistan as well, it still supports the Bundeswehr s engagement there.

Section 2 In Search of a Just Cause for Military Intervention This section will seek an answer to the question why German public support for the war in Afghanistan has declined over time and why the elites on the left and the right have not followed suit, but continue to believe that the military deployment is a nonoffensive, humanitarian mission benefiting the Afghan civilian population. The decision to send German troops to Afghanistan was taken by the coalition government led by the social democrat SPD and the Green Party under the clear assumption that Germany would not be participating in a war or engaged in coercive combat operations and that ISAF was supposed to be a routine security stabilization mission after the military defeat of the Taliban. By contrast to direct combat operations, stabilization operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Part of the problems the German soldiers face on the ground today can be explained by the fact that the Afghan mission was right from the start not meant to be a traditional peacekeeping mission, which requires a political willingness of the conflict parties to settle a conflict peacefully and consists in monitoring ceasefires, disarming local forces, election supervision, medical assistance, patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting the transport of weapons and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons. Although the initial invasion of Afghanistan was not mandated by a specific UN Security Council Resolution, relying on the justification of self-defence, the Security Council moved

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quickly to authorise a military operation to stabilize the country [30,31]. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 of December 2001 laid down the initial mandate for a 5,000-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to deploy to the region in and immediately around Kabul, in order to provide security and to assist in the reconstruction of the country under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It allows the Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace and security". While UN-mandated, the ISAF force was not deployed under leadership of the UN. Until August 2003, when NATO assumed command, the ISAF operation was conducted as an UN-mandated coalition of the willing. What had Germany in mind when it decided to get involved in Afghanistan? The driving force to give a new international purpose to the German military was Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister from 1998 to 2005, who justified the deployment in Afghanistan with the need for humanitarian intervention [6,11]. The political and moral reasons invoked to go to Afghanistan were twofold: Foreign Minister Fischer (as well as Chancellor Schroeder) were persuaded that the Taliban held the Afghan people hostage, had no legitimate support base and assumed they were terrorists who posed a serious threat to the rest of the world. In a speech in 2002 Fischer justified the dispatch of the German army with the duty to liberate Afghanistan: The readiness to free the Afghan people from the frightful yoke of the Taliban is of central importance to the success of the international coalition against terrorism. Its about nothing less than the war of the civilized world against international terrorism, irrational fanaticism, and misanthropic criminality (cited by [20], p.118). It should be noted, that Fischer has remained a strong advocate of increased military involvement of Germany in Afghanistan and voiced his strong concerns on any troop withdrawal plans. By contrast to Japan poised in its steadfast pacifist peace constitution, the Greens in Germany gave up part of their pacifist principles under Fischer out of duty and conviction to help Afghanistan. An argumentative turn in policy analysis made it possible for Green pacifism to approve the selective use of military force the sake of a just cause. For the Greens the use of force could only be strictly defensive in nature and restricted within the context of civilian reconstruction. They continued to opposing (only) aggressive force, invasions of another country and in particular military force to achieve selfish national interest goals ([6], p. 342). Unlike for Iraq, the general support for the Afghanistan mission was almost unanimous at the beginning. Nevertheless, the military parliamentary mandate that was formulated, reflected a cautious, reluctant and maybe even delusive national perspective. It appeared to serve the purpose of individual self-defence and selfprotection of German soldiers based on foreign territory. Out of the five tasks mentioned in the mandate three were strictly defensive: Self-protection; if necessary, self-evacuation and relocation (German: Eigensicherung, im Bedarfsfall Eigenevakuierung sowie Rckverlegung; Source: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/793 from 21. 12. 2001).

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The mandate stated clearly that Germany did not feel responsible for the security of Afghans: The responsibility for public security and order lies with the Afghans themselves (German: Dabei liegt die Verantwortung fr die ffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung bei den Afghanen selbst; Source: Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 14/7930 vom 21. 12. 2001). In 2010, the acting new conservative-liberal coalition government, subject to public criticism, shifted the focus from prior distant watching to offering support to the Government of Afghanistan to maintain security especially for the protection of the population (German:Untersttzung der Regierung von Afghanistan bei der Aufrechterhaltung der Sicherheit, auch und besonders zum Schutz der Bevlkerung; Source: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/654 vom 09. 02. [7]) but announced in the same document that the responsibility for security would be handed over to Afghan authorities by the beginning of 2011 and that the German gradual withdrawal of troops would probably start by then. As a result of a seemingly protracted logic the operational mandate of the Bundeswehr, which was fixed in very restrictive terms on paper, did not match the reality on the battleground [24]. Even worse, the decision to move to the secure northern part of Afghanistan and refrain from engaging in warfare caused a split in the alliance as Kornelius puts it: The relocation of the German contingent to the north led to an irrevocable split in the multinational force. The fact was that the security situation in the various parts of the country could not have been different. But instead of acknowledging this fact and at least providing moral support for the NATO units stationed in the south, German policymakers began to pretend that they knew better. They praised the exemplary nature of the German reconstruction concept in the north, and at the same time criticized the tactics of the troops operating in the south, in particular those of the Americans ([19], p. 28). Kornelius has claimed that the military mandate was ill-defined from the beginning. The paradox outcome of this situation has been that the soldiers have been unsecure of what they are supposed to accomplish. According to him, the soldiers are the real victims of a grand kind of self-deceit ([19], p.5). One should not forget to mention the civilian Afghan casualties. The misguided mandate and the silence kept about civilian casualties are linked to the core problem that surrounds the German mission: a military strategy relying on premises and assumptions that contradict the reality on the battleground and the particular human security needs of the Afghan population. Despite or because of the very restrictive and defensive engagement rules, German soldiers have become increasingly involved in direct combat operations involving not only Taliban but also civilians. As a matter of fact the German intervention has slipped into a mission including counter-insurgency operations. In an interview with the German weekly Spiegel

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dated September 19, 2010, ISAF Commander General David Petraeus has praised German offensive combat tactics: The Germans have done wonderful work. Not long ago, a German battle group battalion conducted a very impressive counterinsurgency operation in a portion of Baghlan province. I think these are the first counterinsurgency operations conducted by any German element after World War II. And they did a very impressive job. (Source: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,718285-2,00.html Kreps has claimed that the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan has evolved from a war of necessity to a war of choice over time: the current operation is a war of choice, which is to say that national interest is no longer directly at stake as it was in the initial phases of the war ([16], p. 25). If that was true one cannot but wonder why the German (and Japanese) elites continue to view Afghanistan as a hotbed of international terrorism. In a major government declaration on Afghanistan from 2009 Chancellor Merkel justified the mission to: protect the lives of people in Germany from the evil of international terrorism (German:Leib und Leben der Menschen hier in Deutschland vor dem bel des internationalen Terrorismus zu schtzen Source: http://www. bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Regierungserklaerung/2009/2009-09-08regerkl-merkel-afghanistan.html). The German Foreign Ministry has repeatedly claimed that threats to the national security of Germany justify the continuation of the military intervention: There are two central issues here our own security and Afghanistans future. The threat scenarios are not a figment of our imagination as shown by the attacks in London and Madrid and by the German Sauerland group (a terrorist network composed of Germans trained by the Taliban in Afghanistan, PH). (Source: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/Regionale Schwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/Mission-Statement-AFG.html One might add here, that one of the side effects of the war has been the growing readiness of radical, militant German citizens fighting on the side of the Taliban. Back to Gunboat Diplomacy? The Resignation of German President Horst Koehler The public discontent with the war in Afghanistan took a new turn when the German President himself tried to justify foreign military interventions with national interest and the right to national self-defence. On 31 May 2010, Koehler announced his resignation as President of Germany after he had been publicly criticized for statements given in an interview. The president had become the target of intense criticism following remarks he made during a surprise visit to soldiers of the German army in Afghanistan on May 22. In an interview with a German radio reporter who accompanied him on the trip, he seemed to justify his country's military missions abroad with the need to protect economic interests: "In my estimation, though, weincluding [German] society as a wholeare coming to the general understanding that, given this [strong] focus and

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corresponding dependency on exports, a country of our size needs to be aware that where called for or in an emergency, military deployment, too, is necessary if we are to protect our interests such as ensuring free trade routes or preventing regional instabilities which are also certain to negatively impact our ability to safeguard trade, jobs and income. All of this should be discussed and I think the path we are on is not so bad." (Source: http://www.dradio.de/aktuell/1191138/) It sounded as though Koehler was justifying wars for the sake of national economic interests in the context of the Afghan mission which is highly controversial in Germany. He subsequently stated that his comments referred to piracy off the coast of Somalia. By justifying military overseas intervention with the protection of national interests the President touched upon the question of safeguarding national sovereignty including the use of military force, regardless of existing international UN frameworks for conflict prevention or peaceful conflict settlement. Instead of referring to international instruments that have been established to solve conflicts and prevent unilateral military action the President reinforced the idea that German military sovereignty serves the national interest and cannot be restricted by international agreements and collective security and peace arrangements. Targeting Civilians? The Kunduz Airstrike A fatal airstrike in 2009 has shaken the self-understanding of Germanys presence in Afghanistan in the eyes of public opinion. For the first time during an overseas deployment of German forces after the Second World War a large number of civilians had been killed by an airstrike under German commandment. The NATO rules of engagement only allow for sending F-15 jets if German groups are endangered. However in this case the information turned out to be false. After a conversation with the pilots in which various requests by them regarding the imminent danger of the people on the ground as well as the possibility of warnings took place, the German commander decided to attack the civilians with the goal of hitting a large number of local Taliban leaders. After several allied tank trucks hijacked by Taliban got stuck in a river sandbank, the commander gave the order to drop two bombs on a crowd, who had gathered around the trucks. In this airstrike up to 140 people were killed, among them not only members of the Taliban but also many civilians. The German Ministry of Defence officially recognized 102 victims as result of the air strike of 4 September 2009, among them 91 persons killed. Most of the dead were men and boys, who went to the riverbank to get fuel from the tankers or who went there just out of curiosity. Kornelius has argued that force under the German mandate may only be used if there exists an imminent danger and civilian lives will not be put at risk: True, the use of force is permitted, but only as a last resort,only in cases of imminent danger, and only if collateral damage can be excluded ([19], p. 30). In criminal law self-defence may be invoked in the face of an imminent threat of death or grave bodily harm. In general, the threat must be immediate and the

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response must not be pushed beyond what is reasonably required to repel that threat. In Kunduz both preconditions for the use of force were reportedly not given. Two German journalists based in Kabul published a detailed account of what happened on 4th September 2009 [21]. According to their findings the internal NATO investigation report found that there was no evidence to support the assumption that there had been an imminent attack by Taliban insurgents on the German PRT([21], p.25; German: Der sptere Untersuchungsbericht hlt fest, dass es keine sicheren Erkenntnisse gegeben habe, die auf einen geplanten Angriff der Talibanauf das deutsche PRT hingewiesen htten, kurzum: Es habekeine akute Bedrohung gegeben). It was later revealed that the Taliban had decided to distribute the tank fuel to local people as they did not manage to move the tanks out of the muddy sand bank. Most Taliban commanders had left the scene already when the bombs were dropped and only a few remained to supervise the distribution of fuel to civilians. How could it be that civilians became the innocent target of an airstrike? According to the two journalists, the German commander failed to follow the strict field operation manual guidelines issued by the US commandment to make sure no civilians become unintended targets of NATO airstrikes. The new rules, issued in July 2009, had been enforced to prevent troops from shooting at the Taliban, if there is a risk of civilian casualties [30]. The tactical directive highlights that this is the case even if it means to allow the enemy to escape. Furthermore the German commander decided on his own to launch the airstrike without consulting with his immediate superiors or the US airforce operations centre in Kuwait according to Mettelsiefen and Reuter. In the aftermath of the fatal airstrike the government denied the facts. Initially the Bundeswehr did not investigate the results of the air strike, and for months acted as if there had been no civilian casualties. Germany's then Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung, who had repeatedly denied civilians had been killed in the attack, resigned in November 2009 amid allegations of a cover-up. Meanwhile, the German parliament has established an ongoing parliamentary commission to investigate the military airstrike. So far the victims have not been compensated by the German state. Criminal charges were not filed. Whenever a civilian abroad of any nationality is killed in a situation involving a German soldier, the public prosecutor starts an investigation into the incident. In this case the prosecution and army commandment decided not to bring criminal or disciplinary charges against the German commander who ordered the airstrike. The two US air force pilots who dropped the bombs were reportedly punished for violating the internal rules of engagement. It might be an irony that Germany, who has blamed the US for its failed military strategy, violated US rules of engagement meant to protect civilians (former Chancellor Schroeder for example blamed the Bush administration in a recent essay for its failed Afghanistan strategy, see http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,607205,00.html).

Section 3 Human Security as a Third Way in Afghanistan? The Global Commission on Human Security issued in 2003 a report which argued that human security was a public good that, in the aftermath of conflict situations,

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should be provided by states and communities instead of military interventions by the international community. The Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former head of UNHCR, and Noble Prize laureate Amartya Sen had been created by Japan in 2001 as an attempt to examine new responsibilities with a focus on communities and states in the process of development. In its final report, Human Security Now, the Commission defined human security as the necessity to protect vital freedoms by building on peoples strengths and aspirations and by protecting them from hostile incursions and disruptions. According to this new approach the end of military intervention marks the beginning of human security and civilian nation-building. Sadako Ogata has taken a lead role in pushing for a nonintrusive human security agenda based on her experience with refugees. According to her, a successful human security approach that goes beyond mere state security implies both a state centered top down and a people centered bottom up mechanism: Protection refers to the norms, processes, and institutions required to shield people from critical and pervasive threats. It implies a top-down approach, such as establishing the rule of law, institutional accountability and transparency, and democratic governance structures. States have the primary responsibility to implement such a protective infrastructure. Meanwhile, the concept of empowerment emphasizes people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their vital freedoms. This implies a bottom-up approach ([25], p 10). To the traditional narrative of military security she opposes human security in terms of democratic state structures complemented by peoples stable livelihoods. Ogata, a former special envoy to Afghanistan under the Koizumi administration from 2001 to 2003, has been involved before that as former head of UNHCR with Afghan affairs. She showed convinced that Afghanistan would fulfill the conditions for enhancement of human security projects. She mentioned in 2004 that, the UN and the international community are working to support the Afghan authorities to set up political institutions, rules of law, basic education, and health and other services that protect the citizens. This approach, arguably, is the first step towards achieving human security. () One area that needs to be strengthened further in Afghanistan is the bottom-up approach to empower the communities ([25], p. 13). This is namely where Ogata has made positive contributions by incorporating the new vision of human security in the daily work of her own workplace, the JICA cooperation agency and governmental development aid programs (ODA). In this regard, it is noteworthy that some Japanese NGOs-such as the organization Peshawar-Kai, which has been successfully assisting the local Afghan population with medical humanitarian aid and grassroots public works projects including digging wells and building water channels- have demonstrated that it is possible to pursue a human security based approach without involving the military [23]. The importance of building up the basic infrastructure and caring for basic human needs first has been recognized as critical for civilian nation-building [15]. It is Ogatas merit that Japan took additional initiatives to enhance human security in Afghanistan within and outside the framework of the UN. She has always kept a

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critical distance to national governments -including her own- and has repeatedly questioned the need for military interventions. In 2002 she warned in a speech that: terrorism in a globalizing world cannot be counteracted by military power or government control. (Source: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ogata_ogden.html) In 2009 she expressed her deep concerns about the ongoing difficulties in Afghanistan in diplomatically wrapped terms: There is a lot of international support but alsomaybe intervention is the right wordwhich complicate the process. (Source: http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/president/speeches/2009/091107.html)

Section 4 Civilian Police Force? Training of Afghan Police by Germany and Japan The establishment of the rule of law is considered to be one of the key tasks and preconditions for civilian reconstruction and human security in Afghanistan. In March 2010 the Afghan Government presented its first ever National Police Strategy valid from 2010 to 2015 [1]. The program, which will probably include sending thousands of officers abroad for training, is designed to rebuild and restructure a force of more than 90,000 Afghans. Despite the various foreign police training projects initiated since 2002, civilian police capacity building in Afghanistan has been hampered by the general militarization of security and the privatization of security in the hands of -legally acting- local militia and foreign private security providers. It is an irony that the police which is supposed to be essentially a civilian force acts de facto as a complement to military units. The report recognizes, that ongoing insecurity has caused the police to train and prepare their patrols in a similar manner to the military ([1], p.6). The report recognizes that the police is very militaristic and can intimidate the people instead of serving it (p.8). There are many other issues raised in the report, which add to the problems such as a very high illiteracy ratio among policemen from between 70% to 85% (Source: [7], p.44) ineffective training, low pays, high turnover through desertion, tolerance of legal private militia (Afghan Public Protection Force) besides regular police units, drug abuse, or corruption. The Afghan police is the key to creating a secure and lawful society but, in its present condition, also the main obstacle towards achieving that goal. The report states, that is will be therefore crucial to increase the publics confidence and public perception of the police ([1], p.12). German Police Training in Afghanistan Germany is the most active European country in the field of police capacity-building in Afghanistan. This support began in 2002 as a bilateral project with the German Police Project Team and since 2007 has been complemented by the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan). The German Police Project Team (GPPT) took on the task of advising the Afghan National Police (ANP) on its reform efforts, training Afghan police officers and coordinating the contributions of

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international partners. More than 30,000 policemen have been trained by Germany since 2002 according to data from the German Government [7]. Germany has built police training facilities and financed police salaries through an international trust fund. As of mid 2010, around 200 German police officers have been working on the ground as part of this bilateral police project. This number is scheduled to increase to 260 in 2010. In addition, 45 military police officers from Germanys armed forces are also involved in the training. By 2014, 134,000 Afghan policemen are scheduled to be in active service. At the moment, there are just around 100,000 registered policemen. It is estimated that out of the 100,000 only 70,000 are able to actually perform their job. It goes beyond the scope of this article to discuss the German concept and strategy for police training in detail but suffice is to say that the German Government seems overall satisfied with the work and progress done since 2002 (see [2,3,7]) although no independent evaluation has been completed so far. With regard to training goals, the needs assessment analysis of the German Government contrasts somehow with the National Police Strategy report of the Afghan Government. The German Government estimates that the Afghan police is in need of a modular training in the military sense ([7], p. 35) by German army instructors by keeping in mind that the fight against insurgents is the responsibility of the Afghan army ([7], p. 50). The Afghan Government on the other side, estimates that the Afghan national civil order police (ANCOP(G) or Gendarmerie) must be enabled to conduct counterinsurgency operations in cooperation with the Afghan national army ([1], p.15). However, as Germany is not at all involved in the training for the Afghan Gendarmerie units, the question if the German police training strategy is at odds with the military, counter-insurgency oriented training strategy pursued by the Afghan authorities must be raised. Is a militarized police engaged in paramilitary operations able to fulfill civilian tasks based on the rule of law? Japans Contribution to Afghan Police Training Japan has been the second biggest donor (319 Mio USD as of mid 2010) after the US (6.2 Billion USD) for reconstructing the police force (Source: [7], p 5). Over the past nine years, Japans police contribution has been limited to financial assistance and the building of infrastructure. It has recently decided to go a step further and train Afghan police in Turkey. The project will be carried out in cooperation with the Turkish Government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and others, using police training facilities in Turkey. It is aimed at both improving security in Afghanistan and indirectly supporting the US Government, which is bearing a huge financial burden. The government and the ruling DPJ have been looking for ways to continue supporting Western operations in Afghanistan without dispatching SDF personnel. Japanese police are expected to teach their Afghan counterparts how to do crime lab work, fight drug trafficking and set up a Japanese style police box (koban) system, among other things. The police training project will be the core of Japan's security assistance for Afghanistan. The government, which is already paying part of salaries of about 80,000 Afghan police officers, decided on the police training project in an Islamic third country after concluding it would be problematic to dispatch Japanese police officers to Afghanistan.

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A preliminary assessment of German and Japanese police training goals and activities substantiates the argument that civilian police capacity building is a shared policy goal of both Germany and Japan. However there is a risk that the Afghan police strategy might endanger the civilian goals of the German police training program by putting too much emphasis on military training aspects and counterinsurgency tasks. Summary Conclusion The article elaborated on the policy choices of Germany and Japan in Afghanistan and found that the Japanese civilian centered approach appears more adapted to the human security needs of the Afghan people, compared to the German military centered approach build upon the premise of military stabilization and securitization. Motives and reasons behind the foreign policy choices have been largely influenced by domestic assumptions and considerations in the case of Germany [17]. The comparison revealed that German pacifism had faded because there was a large political consensus among the political elite in the German legislative branch to intervene militarily in Afghanistan. The Greens invoked the duty to humanitarian intervention because they wrongly assumed that the Taliban had no local support base and were Al-Kaida terrorists; the SocialDemocrats declared themselves champions of unlimited national sovereignty and the conservative Christian Democrats vowed to protect the lives and safety of German citizens. The explicit military loyalty to NATO expressed in terms of Buendnisfaehigkeit (will to ally) only reinforced these national self-interests. The defensive mandate given to soldiers did not match the reality on the battleground. Hence, the military mandate remained contradictory. The military inconsistency and self-deceit [19] resulted in the tragic and unnecessary loss of lives and the entanglement of German soldiers in offensive counter-insurgency operations. German police training has seemed at odds with the police militarization strategy pursued by the Afghan Government. In Japan foreign policy considerations in Afghanistan were greatly influenced by domestic factors in the early 1990s when the LDP allowed the SDF to participate in overseas operations by invoking the duty to fight terrorism (Indian refuel mission, reconstruction mission to Iraq, increased cooperation with NATO) and again in 2008 when it reconsidered a US request for sending troops to Afghanistan. Pacifist attitudes had gradually regained strength after the controversial SDF dispatch to Iraq. Collective defence obligations similar to NATOs mutual assistance clause were rejected as a viable political and military option. The 2007 DPJ decision to oppose the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and subsequent election victory was the trigger for a policy change. By January 2010 the Japanese military presence in the region had been terminated. The findings for Japan suggested, that there has been an overwhelming consensus among the political elite not to engage in dangerous military operations, to stick to the five very restrictive PKO law principles and to pursue a civilian nation-building strategy focused on disarmament activities, civilian police training, infrastructure development projects and humanitarian relief. The Japanese initiatives to achieve human security centered goals in Afghanistan offer an alternative, non-military perspective towards conflict resolution and peace-building.

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The Japanese choice not to get entangled militarily in Afghanistan has been congruent with its civilian pacifist attitudes. The German deliberate choice to use military force on humanitarian grounds has not produced the expected results in terms of public security, civilian reconstruction and rule of law. The electorate and even the soldiers on the ground seem to doubt that civilian nation-building can be achieved with questionable military means.

Appendix Opinion poll on war in Afghanistan Japan and Germany released on June 17, 2010 Source: http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/ 2/#chapter-1-views-of-the-u-s-and-american-foreign-policy

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