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Daniel Weeks is Policy Director of Americans for incumbent vote. And tales of millionaire
Campaign Reform and a Marshall Scholar in Political Theory
at Oxford. He received his BA in Political Science from Yale candidates flooding the airwaves with negative
in 2006, with a concentration in American elections. attacks, to the tune of $5 million or more, only
strengthen the underlying assumption that big
For many Americans, money is one of the most money is a determining factor in modern
troubling aspects in modern election campaigns. election campaigns.
The reasons voters give are simple: money is seen But the true picture of campaign
as a barrier to seeking and winning public office; spending and its implications for electoral
as a means of undue private influence by special success is more nuanced
interest groups; and as a distraction to politicians than the vote-buying hypo- Nearly 9 in 10
from doing the job for which they were elected. thesis suggests. Simply put, citizens believe
Conventional wisdom holds that money buys campaign dollars are not that good people
elections, if not the candidates themselves, and created equal. The force of are discouraged
that politics in Washington are tainted as a result. the first dollar spent in from seeking
Money matters, to be sure, as the terms of its vote-getting office because of
following data show. Since 1992, spending on effect for the candidate is the high cost of
congressional elections has more than doubled to considerably greater than campaigns.2
$1.3 billion, with winning House candidates that of the millionth. Half a
spending an average of $1.4 million in 2006 1. million dollars in challenger spending goes
Nine times out of ten, the higher-spending further in netting actual votes than as many
candidate won. The rise in campaign spending incumbent dollars in a typical congressional
has been accompanied by a decline in electoral campaign. And once a million has been spent, in
competition, as measured by near-perfect rates of all but the costliest of districts, additional
incumbent reelection since 1998 and a steady rise spending by incumbents and challengers alike
in the number of uncontested races and share of means almost nothing at all. 2
____________________________
Of the 3,480 races and nearly 7,000 general election candi-
Methodology This paper analyzes the marginal effective- dates running for House between 1992 and 2006, only uncon-
ness of campaign spending for incumbent, challenger, and tested candidates and those spending $5,000 or less are
open seat congressional candidates between 1992 and 2006. excluded from the data. Controls for candidate quality, district
Panel data for U.S. House of Representatives general partisanship, and national political trends are incorporated in
elections only are considered, as primary spending figures and some of the analyses below. All spending figures are adjusted
vote returns are not available across the time period observed. for inflation and represented in 2006 dollars.
The reliance on data from House races is appropriate given Acknowledgment I am grateful to Prof. Gary Jacobson for
the large sample size and relative inter-comparability of House providing the congressional campaign spending source data
districts in contrast with U.S. Senate seats and the Presidency. used in the analysis and for general guidance.
As the following analysis shows, there is a Figure 1: Average cost of unseating a House
reasonable level of spending on federal incumbent [1992-2006]
campaigns beyond which money has little or no $2,500,000
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part of challenger and open seat candidates the race for U.S. 56
Senate from New 42
underscores the need for sufficient spending Jersey, vowing to
thresholds to credibly compete—and the “spend what it 28
takes” to succeed. 14
infrequency with which such funding levels are A political new-
obtained. Of the more than 5,000 general election comer who had left 0
his mark on Wall Spending ($m) Votes (%)
challengers seeking election to
Street as head of Corzine
Not since 1974 the House of Representatives Goldman Sachs, Corzine was Franks
has a challen- between 1972 and 2006, only one hardly the first millionaire can-
didate to enter the world of politics, but the scale of
ger with less candidate with spending of less his effort was unprecedented. Investing $62 million
than $100,000 than $100,000 was elected, in of his own money in a highly professionalized,
television-driven campaign, Corzine defeated his
in spending 1974 5. Approximately half of all Republican opponent in the open general election
been elected c h a l l e n g e r s f e l l i n t o t h i s while earning for himself the dubious reputation of
to Congress. lowest-spending category, and having “bought” his Senate seat.
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majority of challengers from 1992-2006 spent Figures 3-5: Number of House candidates (win-
$500,000 or less on their campaigns, and a ners inset) per $100,000 spending [1992-2006]
majority did not even reach the $100,000 250
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
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.2
.3
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.6
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.9
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$3
between 1992-2006 spent less than the $500,000 100
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
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.2
.3
.4
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.7
.8
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$2
$2
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$2
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$2
$2
parties, showed a greater range of candidate
spending, with a large majority surpassing the 1000
Fig. 4: Challengers [all]
12
[winners]*
$500,000 mark. 900
10
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
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.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
$0
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$0
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$1
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$1
$1
$1
$1
$1
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$1
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
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$2
bias whereby higher quality potential candidates 300
opt not to run until the incumbent retires, and the 200
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
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.7
$0
$0
$0
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$1
$1
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$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
quality and challenger spending are interrelated
variables, with higher quality challengers
Fig. 5: Open seat candidates [all]
40
[winners]
attracting greater resources, thereby improving 80
35
25
50 10
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
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.6
.7
.8
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.3
.4
.5
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M
30
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known already, as in the case of incumbent or * Outlying set of winners in the $300,000-$400,000 spending
celebrity candidates—is a necessary but not range ran in 1992 and 1994 only
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sufficient condition for electoral success. What Figure 6: Avg. spending of winning House incumbent,
level of spending is required, and the impact of challenger, and open seat candidates. [1992-2006]
$1.0
$0.8
$0.6
II. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH $0.4
$0.0
For candidates with sufficient resources to Incumbent Challenger Open Seat
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Figure 7: House incumbent share of general election votes by millions spent [1992-2006]
100
90
80
70
60
Series1
Poly. (Series1)
50
40
30
20
10
$0 $1 $2 $3
Millions
90
Figure 8: Incumbent votes against competitively financed challengers by millions spent* [1992-2006]
80
70
60
Series1
50
Poly. (Series1)
40
30
20
10
$0 $1 $2 $3
Millions
instance of a highly competitive, well-financed without a gain in votes. The subset of races in
challenge, where the incumbent is unlikely to which an incumbent faced a challenger with
receive a large majority of votes under any competitive spending of $500,000 or more yields
circumstance, spending rises to the maximum a static vote share of around 55 percent for the
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average incumbent, regardless of the spending rational appreciation for the hurdles they face by
level deployed. By controlling for challenger virtue of their status is greater than that of less
quality, this latter finding in Figure 8 provides a experienced challengers, from running is a
more accurate indication of the real effect—or prudent goal14. Incumbent fundraising “war
lack thereof—of additional incumbent spending chests” serve this deterrant function by
in terms of votes. Both findings nevertheless producing a sense of inevitability in the minds of
support the hypothesis that incumbents do not potential challengers and their backers. The
earn additional votes as the level of campaign inflationary spending effect is compounded by
spending is increased11. perverse incentives surrounding consultants, the
The intuition is clear: incumbents begin drivers of campaign strategy, whose individual
the campaign season with high levels of name profits are pegged to increased spending on paid
recognition and considerable institutional advertising, direct mail, and the like. As a result,
advantages which place them on a competitive a pattern of over-spending relative to the
electoral footing even before the level of requirements of a competitive campaign has
campaign spending is considered. A more emerged on the part of incumbents, with
accurate accounting of the financial resources of average incumbent spending for the House of
incumbents relative to challengers would Representatives exceeding $1.2 million in 2006.
therefore take into consideration the availability
of taxpayer-funded travel, franking privileges,
free media, and the like to produce an effective
communication value equivalent to several Challengers
hundred thousand dollars in challenger Where incumbents, on average, receive static or
spending12 . Although incumbents depend upon a declining vote shares as spending totals rise,
certain degree of funding in the event of challengers profit handsomely from increased
challenger attacks, the evidence suggests that campaign funds—to a point. The intuition is
they are considerably less reliant upon spending, straightforward enough:
per se, than their non-incumbent counterparts. since most challengers be- So long as a
Why the big spending if the results do not gin the campaign season competitive fun-
add up? One theory put forward by political with little or no name rec- ding threshold is
scientists is that incumbents, with their virtually ognition, the more money reached, challen-
unlimited ability to mobilize campaign funds via challengers have to spend gers are defined
existing funding networks, raise money as a sign the better able they are to less by money
of strength in the interest of deterring a communicate their mes- than by the myriad
significant challenge13 . Assuming a primary sage and give voters a rea- other factors of
objective is to win reelection, no strategy is more son to prefer them over the concern to voters.
effective than to discourage a potential challenger incumbent. Research in
from entering the race at all, as is the case in political psychology has shown that voters, with
approximately one fourth of congressional the exception of party enthusiasts, are less likely
contests today (“token” challengers with to go to the polls in support of a candidate
spending below $5,000 excluded). Short of that, whose name is unfamiliar to them, as demon-
discouraging more qualified candidates, whose strated by the reduced turnout and wider vote
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Figure 9: House challenger share of general election votes by millions spent [1992-2006]
80
70
60
50
Series1
40
Poly. (Series1
30
20
10
0
$0 $1 $2 $3
Millions
margins in financially uncompetitive races 15. In- tangible gains of approximately 1.5 percent, up
deed, the considerable differential in voter turn- to 47 percent of the vote for the average chal-
out between presidential election years—in lenger with spending of $1 million. The steadily
which considerably more resources are mobilized increasing trend line is consistent with the hy-
by candidates, parties, and independent groups pothesis that challengers benefit from the added
to attract the attention of voters—compared with name recognition that each additional unit of
mid-term elections, is taken to support the con- campaign spending provides, until the point at
tention that money matters when it comes to which market saturation has been achieved.
building a baseline of voter support. As a result, Equally significant is the lack of addi-
the “growth potential” in expected votes per unit tional gains in the share of challenger vote once
of additional challenger spending is very great. the competitive funding threshold is reached. At
For the period 1992 to 2006, congressional $2 million in spending between 1992-2006, chal-
challengers spending $1 million or more received lengers were no more likely to succeed than
a full 50 percent more votes than the majority of those spending half that sum, while at $3 million
their counterparts with spending of $100,000 or the share of votes even declined to a modest de-
less. Below $100,000, the average challenger re- gree. Indeed, any amount of spending beyond
ceived barely a third of total votes cast—roughly the competitive threshold of approximately $1
equal to the percentage of partisan voters ex- million did not correlate to additional votes, nor
pected to turn out for a given party in a typical did the ratio of winning challengers improve. So
congressional election. For each additional long as the competitive funding level is reached,
$100,000 spent, however, candidates received in other words, challengers are defined less by
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money than by the myriad other factors of con- controling for spending and other key variables
cern to voters in deciding for whom to vote: pol- of electoral success, economist David Lee has
icy positions, past experience, honesty and integ- found “striking evidence that incumbency has a
rity, to name a few. significant causal effect on raising the
The relationship between challenger probability of subsequent electoral success 17.”
spending and general election votes has been Building on Lee’s premise, political scientists
consistently observed over time, with analysis by Gelman and King estimate the precise value of
political scientist Gary Jacobson and others in the incumbency at 11 percent in expected increased
1980s demonstrating a positive vote-getting effect vote share for the average officeholder18 . And
of increased challenger spending up to a competi- Ansolabehere et al confirm the 11 percent finding
tive threshold 16. According to Jacobson’s analysis and estimate that it represents a 9 point increase
of congressional campaign spending for the pe- in the benefit associated with incumbency 50
riod 1972-1982, the estimated effect per additional years ago19 . Although these findings provide
$100,000 in challenger spending was approxi- little encouragement to the average challenger,
mately 3 percent up to $400,000, a modest im- they are consistent with the hypothesis that
provement over the 1992-2006 estimate of 2.5 per- challenger spending matters to the point at
cent per $100,000 spending, and one that is con- which voters can make an informed choice, and
sistent with the lower overall cost of campaigns. not beyond. Rather than ensuring electoral
Consistent with the diminishing returns hypothe- success, competitive spending enables the
sis, Jacobson observed already in 1985 that “the challenger to compete on the basis of more
proportion of victories does not increase substantive criteria with which the voters are
systematically with increasingly higher levels of most concerned.
spending.”
The findings are consistent with the data Open Seat Candidates
on incumbent spending, above. Since challengers,
by definition, tend to face highly qualified and Like challengers, candidates seeking election to
competitively resourced opponents, they are no an open congressional seat from 1992-2006
more likely to see gains in campaign spending experienced substantial improvements in their
beyond the competitive threshold than are the prospects of success as spending totals increased
minority of incumbents whose challengers have to the competitive threshold, but not beyond.
adequate funds. Even as the large majority of mil- Where unfunded challengers received an
lion dollar challengers were outspent by their in- average 30 percent of the vote, those at the
cumbent rival, the share of votes received did not maximum competitive level of $1 million in
measurably change. Indeed, the average spending saw gains of 25 points to a winning 55
challenger-incumbent vote margin of 8-10 percent percent. The average 2.5 percent increase in
for the subset of competitively financed cam- votes per $100,000 spent was even more
paigns closely comports with longstanding esti- pronounced in the lower spending range, with
mates of the intrinsic electoral advantage enjoyed candidates at $500,000 in spending receiving a
by incumbents. full 20 percent more votes than their unfunded
Using a variety of regression models to counterparts, putting them over the top. Indeed,
estimate the value of incumbency while for any open seat candidate with half a million
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to spend, the odds of winning office were in their measurably improve their chances of success:
favor, while those at $1 million enjoyed the when both candidates in an open congressional
highest prospects of all. Consistent with the race raised $2 million or more, the higher
challenger trend above, however, spending spending candidate was no more likely to win
beyond the $1 million threshold did not net office than his lower spending counterpart; for
additional votes and even exhibited a modest races of $1 million spending or more on the part
decline for the highest spending and most hotly of each campaign, the higher spending
contested races. candidate enjoyed only marginally higher
It is important to note the considerable prospects of success. Meanwhile, the average
spread in data for open seat elections. Since open cost to win an open congressional seat was $1.2
seat races are inherently more competitive than million.
those in which an established incumbent defends Although the spread in data for open seat
stands, the caliber of candidates when measured candidates is greater overall than that of either
by previous experience in elective office, incumbents or challengers, it is noteworthy to
fundraising potential, etc. is greater than that of observe the relative closeness of fit for the first
the average challenger. $500,000 in spending. As demonstrated in Figure
When both Increased candidate quality, 10, the vast majority of low spending candidates
candidates for an in turn, results in a higher for open congressional seats between 1992-2006
open congressional percentage of races in the received less than half the vote, and only once
seat surpass the f i n a n c i a l l y c o m p e t i t i v e the $500,000 spending level came into view did
competitive funding column where money ceases the correlation between money and votes
threshold, the to play a determining role. decline. For candidates with more than half a
higher spending Likewise, the incentives for million to spend, meanwhile, the likelihood of a
candidate is no party and interest group landslide result (with less than 40 percent or
more likely to involvement, independent greater than 60 percent of the vote) was
succeed. of the candidate’s own relatively high and is not closely correlated to
spending, are considerable, spending. The conclusion, consistent with the
thereby limiting still further the predictive power findings on challenger spending, above, is that
of individual candidate spending on election spending is highly correlated to votes up to a
outcomes. Nevertheless, for the minority of open “sufficient” competitive threshold of not more
seat candidates who fail to achieve a level of than $1 million, but not beyond.
competitive spending, the outcome is clear.
Like challengers, the instance of open seat Limitations
candidates winning office with less than the
competitive spending threshold is extremely rare. The trends in campaign spending and vote totals
Of the 365 successful open seat candidates detailed above apply to congressional races
seeking office since 1992, only one candidate had aggregated across the period 1992-2006. They
spending of less than $100,000 while 90 percent have limited predictive power when applied to
spent $500,000 or more. Indeed, for the latter any single congressional race in a given election.
category of well-financed candidates, the Case study analysis of individual campaigns
availability of additional funds did not reveals that adequate funding is one ingredient
10
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Figure
90 10: Share of general election votes by millions spent, House open seat candidates [1992-2006]
80
70
60
Series1
50
Poly. (Series1)
40
30
20
10
$0 $1 $2 $3
Millions
11
POLICY PAPER PB08-1
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qualified challengers is expected to meaningfully ed.). New York: Longman; adjusted for inflation (in 2002 dollars)
increase the level of competition in congressional
6 Estimate based on percentage of challengers from 1992-2006
improve candidate prospects across the board, the Illinois 5th and Kansas 4th congressional districts in 1994, and
in New Hampshireʼs 1st congressional district in 2006; all figures
but the greater availability of funds is likely to are adjusted for inflation (2006 dollars)
attract higher quality potential challengers who 8 Center for Responsive Politics “Cost of Beating a US House In-
candidates should be adequate—but they need not sional elections,” 1972-1982. Public Choice, 47(1), 7-62.
17 Lee (2001)
be equal—to provide a vigorous campaign that is 18 Gelman, A and King, G (1991) “Systematic Consequences of
not defined by money. Although parity in Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections.” American Journal
of Political Science 35: 110–38.
candidate funding is a common objective in 19 Ansolabehere, S, Stewart, C and Snyder, J (2000) “Old Voters,
public financing reforms, there is little evidence New Voters, and the Personal Vote.” American Journal of Political
Science 44, p. 17.
that candidates who outspend a competi-
12