ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERA G.R. No. L-3609 J!"#!

$% &', '9 3 (!)*s+ Petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement thereby for and in consideration of P55,430.00, the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a special condition that should private respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the painting of his residential house on said lot within two (2 years, petitioner, as owner, has agreed to refund to private respondent the amount of P!0.00 per s"uare meter. #hen the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private respondent, accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and re"uested for his refund amounting to P4,$20.00. %pon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, ,$-v!*. $.s,o"/."* filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with *0. C-*% Co#$* o1 M!"-2!, B$!")0 II 3MTC4 against petitioner. &his petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his complaint, being less than P!0,000.00, is within the e'clusive (urisdiction of the city court. Iss#.+ #hether or not the city court ( )&* has (urisdiction over the case. +o, it is the ,&*. H.2/+ &he action involved in this case is one 1o$ s,.)-1-) ,.$1o$5!"). and not for a sum of money and wherefore incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent see-s is the performance of petitioner.s obligation under a written contract to ma-e a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or established. /n a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation because the obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. 0ut when a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. &he payment of a sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to be in"uired into. 1lthough private respondent.s complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private respondent see-s is the performance of petitioner.s obligation under the written contract to ma-e the refund of the rate of P!0.00 per s"uare meter or in the total amount of P4,$20.00, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioner.s obligation, a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation. &herefore, the complaint filed by the private respondents in the *ity *ourt of )anila, 0ranch // ()&* , is hereby ordered dismissed for lac- of (urisdiction. /t should be filed in the *ourt of 2irst /nstance (+ow ,&* . 6G.R. No. 90703. S.,*.58.$ &9, '990.: NESTOR SANDO;AL, Petitioner, v. HON. DOROTEO CA<EBA, P$.s-/-"= J#/=., RTC, M!"-2!, B$!")0 &0, DEPUTY SHERI(( O( MANILA 3RTC, M!"-2!, B$!")0 &04, !"/ ESTATE DE;ELOPERS & IN;ESTORS CORPORATION, Respondents. The iss#. in this petition is whether or not the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot. (ACTS+ 3n 1ugust 20, !4$5 private respondent filed a complaint in the ,egional &rial *ourt (,&* of )anila for the

collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot, pursuant to a promissory note, plus interest. 3n 6anuary 24, !4$$ the trial court rendered a decision.

/t appears that petitioner was declared in default so much so that after receiving the evidence of private respondent, the trial court rendered its decision on 6anuary !4, !4$$. 3n 7eptember 2$, !4$$ the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of e'ecution to enforce its decision that had become final and e'ecutor. 3n 7eptember 30, !4$$ petitioner filed a motion to vacate (udgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the lower court has no (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter and that its decision is null and void. 1 motion for reconsideration of the writ of e'ecution was also filed by petitioner. 1n opposition to both motions was filed by private respondent to which a reply was filed by petitioner. 3n 2ebruary !5, !4$4 the trial court denied the motion to vacate the (udgment on the ground that it is now beyond the (urisdiction of the *ourt to do so. 8ence the herein petition wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion . The iss#. in this petition is whether or not the ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot. HELD: &he petition is impressed with merit. %nder 7ection ! of Presidential 9ecree +o. 455 the +ational 8ousing 1uthority (+81 was given the e'clusive (urisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as follows: ;7<*&/3+ !. /n the e'ercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential 9ecree +o. 455, the +ational 8ousing 1uthority shall have e'clusive (urisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: 1. %nsound real estate business practices:0. *laims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the pro(ect owner, developer, dealer, bro-er or salesman= and= *. *ases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, bro-er or salesman. &he language of this section, particularly, the second portion thereof, leaves no room for doubt that e'clusive (urisdiction over the case between the petitioner and private respondent is vested not on the ,&* but on the +81. &he +81 was re>named 8uman 7ettlements ,egulatory *ommission and thereafter it was re>named as the 8ousing and ?and %se ,egulatory 0oard (8?%,0 . %ndeniably the sum of money sought to be collected by private respondent from petitioner represented unpaid installments of a subdivision lot which the petitioner purchased. Petitioner alleges that he suspended payments thereof because of the failure of the developer to develop the subdivision pursuant to their agreement. *onsidering that the trial court has no (urisdiction under the circumstances obtained in the past cases, the decision it rendered is null and void ab initio. /t is as if no decision was rendered by the trial court at all. &he trial court, rather than reiterating the issuance of a writ of e'ecution in this case, which it did, should have recalled and cancelled the writ of e'ecution of the (udgment.

C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO J. HIBIONADA G.R. No. 09'6 Nov.58.$ 9, '990 (ACTS+ &he petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville 9evelopment *orporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent <fren 9iongon. &he installment payments having been completed, 9iongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the sub(ect land. #hen neither the petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific performance and damages in the ,&* of +egros 3ccidental. &he case was set for initial hearing. /t was then that *.&. &orres <nterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lac- of (urisdiction, contending that the competent body to hear and decide the case was the 8ousing and ?and %se ,egulatory 0oard. &he trial court denied the motion to dismiss. 8ence, this petition. ISSUES !"/ RULING+ (! #hether the 8ousing and ?and %se ,egulatoy 0oard has the (urisdiction to try and hear the case. (@<7 /n holding that the complaint for specific performance with damages was (usticiable under the *ivil *ode and so came under the (urisdiction of the regular courts under 0.P. !24, the trial court failed to consider the e'press provisions of P.9. +o. !344 and related decrees. /t also erred in supposing that only the regular courts can interpret and apply the provisions of the *ivil *ode, to the e'clusion of the "uasi>(udicial bodies. P.9. +o. 455, promulgated 6uly !2, !45A and otherwise -nown as ;&he 7ubdivision and *ondominium 0uyers. Protective 9ecree,; provides that the +ational 8ousing 1uthority shall have e'clusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and business. P.9. +o. !344, promulgated 1pril 2, !45$, and empowered the +ational 8ousing 1uthority to issue writs of e'ecution in the enforcement of its decisions under P.9. +o. 455, specified the "uasi>(udicial (urisdiction of the agency as follows: 7<*&/3+ !. /n the e'ercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential 9ecree +o. 455, the +ational 8ousing 1uthority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: 1. ' ' '= 0. ' ' '= and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, bro er or salesman! (Emphasis supplied) %nder <.3. +o. A4$, the regulatory functions conferred on the +ational 8ousing 1uthority under P.9. +os. 455,!344 and other related laws were transferred to the 8uman 7ettlements ,egulatory *ommission, which was renamed 8ousing and ?and %se ,egulatory 0oard by <.3. +o. 40 dated 9ecember !5, !4$A. /t is clear from 7ection !(c of the above "uoted P9 +o. !344 that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by 9iongon with the ,egional &rial *ourt of +egros 3ccidental comes under the (urisdiction of the 8ousing and ?and %se ,egulatory 0oard. 9iongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot see-ing specific performance of the seller.s obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate of title.

(2

#hether the petition is premature because no motion for reconsideration of the "uestioned order of trial court. (+3 &he argument of the private respondents that the petition is premature because no motion for reconsideration of the "uestioned order of trial court had been filed stresses the rule but disregards the e'ception. /t is settled that the motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with if the issue raised is a "uestion of law, as in the case at bar. &he issue pleaded here is lac- of (urisdiction. /t could therefore be raised directly and immediately with this *ourt without the necessity of an antecedent motion for reconsideration.

G.R. Nos. '0&'93-99 M!% '0, '99> MS. EMILY YU (AJARDO, SPOUSES SAL;ADOR petitioners, vs. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, -" 0-s )!,!)-*% !s *0. P$.s-/-"= J#/=. o1 *0. R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$*, B$!")0 39, C!2!58!, L!=#"!, , respondents. (ACTS+ Private respondents /sabelo 6areBo and Purita 6areBo are the owners and developers of a subdivision -nown as the *alamba *entral *ompound. &hey as sellers, and the petitioners as buyers signed separate contracts, each designated as a contract to sell, under which, for a consideration, they bound themselves to sell to the petitioners the sub(ect lots.

3n the other hand, private respondent 2ernando ,ealty and 9evelopment *orporation sold a property to petitioner <mily @u 2a(ardo after concluding a contract to sell under which for the considerations therein stated, 2ernando agreed to sell to 2a(ardo ?ot +o. !0, 0loc- +o. 3, also located at the *alamba *entral *ompound 7ubdivision. /t appears that the 6areBos sold the aforesaid lots sub(ect of the different contracts to sell to private respondent ,uben 8abacon under separate documents denominated as ; Kasulatan ng ilihan.; 8abacon thereafter caused the cancellation of the certificates of title covering the said lots and the issuance of new ones in his name. #hen the petitioners learned of these, they filed separate complaints with the court a quo for annulment of the sales in favor of 8abacon and of the new certificates of title issued to him, for reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those issued to him, and for accounting and damages. &he trial court dismissed the aforesaid civil cases for lac- of (urisdiction. &he *ourt does not agree with the plaintiffsC contention that it is the trial court, and not the 8?,0, which has (urisdiction over the complaint. &he trial court ruled P9 +o. 455 as amended by P.9. +o. !344 gives the +ational 8ousing 1uthority now the 8uman 7ettlement ,egulatory *ommission e'clusive (urisdiction to hear and, decide cases of ;unsound real estate business practices;. 2urther, it ruled that 7ection !4(2 of 0.P. 0lg. !24, being a general law, should yield to P.9. +o. 455, as amended by P.9. +o. !344, which is a special law. &he motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was dismissed hence, this petition.

ISSUE+ #hether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing, for lac- of (urisdiction, the complaints filed by the petitioners. !"# the trial court was correct in ruling that it has no jurisdiction over case. RULING+ 0efore resolving the issue raised, the 7upreme *ourt ruled on the procedural aspect of the case at bar. Denerally, an order of dismissal# whether right or wrong# is a final order# and hence a proper subject of appeal# not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 1ccordingly, although the special civil action

of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inade"uate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the in(urious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inade"uate and ineffectual. +evertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner.s own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. &his petition should therefore be dismissed on the ground that it was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. 1ssuming arguendo that there is no procedural defect in this case, it must still fail for the trial court correctly ruled that it has no (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter in the civil cases filed by petitioners. 6urisdiction thereon was originally vested in the +ational 8ousing 1uthority (+81 under P.9. +o. 455, as amended by P.9. +o. !344. %nder <.3. +o. A4$, this (urisdiction was transferred to the 8uman 7ettlements ,egulatory *ommission (87,* which, , was renamed as the 8ousing and ?and %se ,egulatory 0oard. &he *ourt agrees with the trial court that the complaints do involve unsound real estate business practices on the part of the owners and developers of the subdivision who entered into *ontracts to 7ell with the petitioners. 0y virtue of 7ection ! of P.9. +o. !344 and the doctrine laid down in $olid %omes# &nc. vs. 'ayawal, the +81, now 8?,0, has the e'clusive (urisdiction to hear and decide the matter. /n addition to involving unsound real estate business practices, the complaints also involve specific performance of the contractual and statutory obligations of the owners or developers of the subdivision. &he claims for annulment of the ;Kasulatan ng ilihan; in favor of 8101*3+ and the certificates of title issued to him and for damages are merely incidental. BENGUET CORPORATION vs. LE;ISTE 21*&7: Private respondent, 8elen 9iEon>,eyes alleged that she is the claimowner of !! mining claims all located in the province of Fambales. 7he e'ecuted a 7pecial Power of 1ttorney constituting her father, *elestino ). 9iEon, as her attorney>in>fact with full powers to ;transfer, assign and dispose of her !! mining claims.; 3n 6anuary 2!, !4A5, *elestino ). 9iEon, acting as such attorney>in>fact for private respondent and other claimowners, entered into an 1greement, with 9iEon )ine whereby the latter was granted the right to e'plore, develop, e'ploit and operate the 55 mining claims owned by the claimowners including the !! claims of private respondent. 7even (5 years later, private respondent and the other claimowners e'ecuted a 9eed of ,atification of 1ssignment, confirming the assignment, transfer and conveyance unto 9iEon )ines and its assigns and successors of the rights to possess, occupy, e'plore, develop and operate all the aforesaid mining claims. 1lmost three (3 months after the 9eed of ,atification was e'ecuted, private respondent revo-ed 7pecial Power of 1ttorney of 6anuary !5, !4A5, stating that ;while there is no "uestion that / still have complete and full trust and confidence in the (udgment and wisdom of my father, it is not my wish to add any more to his already many a mounting problems.; +otice of the revocation was served on 9iEon )ines on )arch 20, !455 and on 0enguet on 1ugust 2A, !455. 8owever, in spite of said notice, 9iEon )ines and 0enguet entered into an 3perations 1greement whereby the former transferred to the latter the possession of the 55 mining claims. 8elen now claims that the 3peration 1greement lac-s legal basis due to her revocation of the 7P1, private respondent prayed that the 3perations 1greement be declared null and void and inoperative insofar as it covers her eleven (!! lode mining claims. /n the alternative, private respondent prayed that should the validity of the 3perations 1greement be upheld,

defendants therein be ordered to observe and comply with the sharing of profits stipulated in the 1greement of 6anuary 2!, !4A5. 7he further prayed for the award of attorney.s fees and e'penses of litigation as may be proved during the trial. 0enguet filed a )otion to 9ismiss on the following grounds: ! the court is without (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter and nature of the action= 2 the action is barred by prior (udgment and laches= 3 the action to declare invalid the 9eed of ,atification has prescribed= and 4 the venue of the action was improperly laid. 9iEon )ines filed its own motion to dismiss. /77%<: #3+ the ,&* has (urisdiction over an action for annulment of operations agreement entered into by and between two mining companies. 8<?9: +o 6urisdiction. Presidential 9ecree +o. !2$! which too- effect on 6anuary !A,!45$ vests the 0ureau of )ines with (urisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for andGor grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases andGor operators thereof, including mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned. &o effectively discharge its tas- as the Dovernment.s arm in the administration and disposition of mineral resources, 7ection 5 of P.9. +o. !2$! confers upon the 0ureau "uasi>(udicial powers as follows: 7ec. 5. /n addition to its regulatory and ad(udicative functions over companies, partnerships or persons engaged in mining e'ploration, development and e'ploitation, the 0ureau of )ines shall have original and e'clusive (urisdiction to hear and decide case involving: ''' ''' ''' (c cancellation andGor enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimownerGoperator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof. /n the case at bar, it is not disputed that the sub(ect agreement is a mining contract and private respondent, in see-ing a (udicial declaration of its nullity, does not wish to abide by its terms and conditions. &hese elements alone bring the action within the ambit of 7ection 5 of P.9. !2$!. #hatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the contract.s terms and conditions, the basic issue remains one of its cancellation, which is precisely what P.9. +o. !2$! places within the e'clusive original (urisdiction for the 0ureau. &he reason underlying such refusal is indeed an irrelevant matter insofar as (urisdictional competence is concerned, for to ma-e (urisdiction dependent thereon would not only be ;ratifying two (udicial bodies e'ercising (urisdiction over an essentially the same sub(ect matterHa situation analogous to split (urisdiction which is obno'ious to the orderly administration of (ustice; but also clearly ignoring the ob(ect of P.9. !2$! to ma-e the ad(udication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. #8<,<23,<, the instant petition is D,1+&<9. &he assailed orders of )arch 2A, !4$2 and 6une 20, !4$3 are set aside and *ivil *ase +o. I>30!5! of the ,egional &rial *ourt of IueEon *ity, 0ranch J*K//, is ordered 9/7)/77<9. G.R. No. '09093 Nov.58.$ &0, '997 MACHETE vs. COURT O( APPEALS !"/ CELESTINO ;ILLALON, respondents. (!)*s+ 3n 2! 6uly !4$4 private respondent *elestino Killalon filed a complaint for collection of bac- rentals and damages before the ,&* of &agbilaran *ity against petitioners. &he complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold

agreement with respect to private respondent.s landholdings at Poblacion +orte, *armen, 0ohol, under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. 8owever, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason, petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him bac- rentals and damages. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lac- of (urisdiction of the trial court over the sub(ect matter. &hey contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the sub(ect matter of the complaint fell s"uarely within the (urisdiction of the 9epartment of 1grarian ,eform (91, in the e'ercise of its "uasi> (udicial powers under 7ec. !, pars. (a and (b , ,ule // of the ,evised ,ules of the 9epartment of 1grarian ,eform 1d(udication 0oard. &he trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and denied the motion for reconsideration. Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before respondent *1 which rendered (udgment reversing the trial court and directing it to assume (urisdiction over the case on the basis of its finding that the *1,? (,1 AA55 and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform cannot be seen to encompass a case of simple collection of bac- rentals by virtue of an agreement, as the one at bar, where there is no agrarian dispute to spea- of (since the allegation of failure to pay the agreed rentals was never controverted in the motion to dismiss nor the issue raised on application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of these laws. 3n !$ 6anuary !443 the appellate court re(ected the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence= the dispute is agrarian in nature. &he laws governing its e'ecution and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily ,.1. 3$44, ,.1. AA55 and other pertinent agrarian laws. *onsidering that the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which have been vested in the 91,, this case is outside the (urisdiction of the trial court. ISSUE: 1re ,egional &rial *ourtsC vested with (urisdiction over cases for money claims particularly collection of bac- rentals from leasehold tenantsL RULING+ +3M 7ection !5 of <.3. 224 vested the 91, with "uasi>(udicial powers to determine and ad(udicate agrarian reform matters as well as e'clusive original (urisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform e'cept those falling under the e'clusive original (urisdiction of the 9epartment of 1griculture and the 9epartment of <nvironment and +atural ,esources in accordance with law. <'ecutive 3rder !24>1, while in the process of reorganiEing and strengthening the 91,, created the 91,10 to assume the powers and functions with respect to the ad(udication of agrarian reform cases. 3n !5 6une !4$$ ,.1. AA55 was passed containing provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the 91, e'clusive (urisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. 8owever it may be mentioned in passing that the ,egional &rial *ourts have not been completely divested of (urisdiction over agrarian reform matters. 7ection 5A of ,.1. AA55 confers ;special (urisdiction; on ;7pecial 1grarian *ourts,; which are ,egional &rial *ourts designated by this *ourt H at least one (! branch within each province H to act as such. &hese ,egional &rial *ourts designated as 7pecial 1grarian *ourts have, according to 7ec. 55 of the same law, original and e'clusive (urisdiction over: (a all petitions for the determination of (ust compensation to landowners, and (b the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the 1ct. *onse"uently, there e'ists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is e'clusively cogniEable by the 91,10. &he failure of petitioners to pay bac- rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is

clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. &he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the (urisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. &hus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume (urisdiction over this case. 1t any rate, the present legal battle is ;not altogether lost; on the part of private respondent because as this *ourt was "uite emphatic in (uismundo v. )ourt of *ppeals, the resolution by the 91, is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary e'pertise on the matter. 2urther, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be ad(udicated in a (ust, e'peditious and ine'pensive proceeding L#,!"=)o vs Co#$* o1 A,,.!2s G.R. No. 9939& A,$-2 &9, '9 (!)*s+ P,* issued ,esolution +o. !05 as parts of its ;1dditional /nstructions to <'aminess,; to all those applying for admission to ta-e the licensure e'aminations in accountancy. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to ta-e the licensure e'aminations in accountancy, filed with the ,&* a complaint for in(unction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary in(unction against respondent P,* to restrain the latter from enforcing the above>mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Iss#.+ *an the Professional ,egulation *ommission lawfully prohibit the e'aminess from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the li-e 3 days before the date of the e'aminationL R#2-"=+ #e realiEe that the "uestioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is ;to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure e'aminations.; 8owever, its good aim cannot be a cloa- to conceal its constitutional infirmities. 3n its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an e'aminee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the li-e, or receive any hand>out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the li-e or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. &he unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from ta-ing future e'aminations conducted by the respondent P,*. 2urthermore, it is inconceivable how the *ommission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every e'aminee during the three days before the e'amination period. /t is an ai'iom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. &o be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. /f shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authoriEed to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. ,esolution +o. !05 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the e'aminees. right to liberty guaranteed by the *onstitution. ,espondent P,* has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure e'aminations. &hey cannot be restrained from ta-ing all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. &hey have every right to ma-e use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.

NONITO J. BERNARDO, petitioner, vs. CALTE? 3PHILIPPINES4, INC., respondent 21*&7:

&he appeal on certiorari at bar ' treats of the (urisdiction of the ,egional &rial *ourt over the controversy between petitioner and respondent in light of 7ections 3 (par. 2 NaO and 5 of <'ecutive 3rder +o. !52 and ;7ection 2, ,ule K/// of the ,ules and ,egulations Doverning the <stablishment, *onstruction, 3peration, ,emodelling, andGor ,efurbishing of Petroleum Products ,etail 3utlets o 7ec. 2. 1ll disputes between any operatorGdealer and an oil company regarding dealership agreement e'cept those arising out of their relationship as debtor and creditor shall be under the (urisdiction of the 3il /ndustry *ommission &he ;operatorGdealer; involved is the petitioner, +onito 6. 0ernardo, and the ;oil company,; the respondent *alte' (Philippines , /nc. (hereafter referred to simply as *alte' . 0ernardo 3perates two (2 *alte' gasoline stations. 3n 9ecember 3, !440, 0ernardo placed with the *alte' Pandacan &erminal an order for !0,000 liters of diesel fuel. 8e made full payment therefor in the sum of P55,435.50 on the same day, the payment being evidenced by an official receipt. 3n 9ecember 4, !440, 7 he placed with the same terminal another order, this time for !0,000 liters of premium gasoline H for which he also made full payment in the amount of P$4,!43.50 on 9ecember 5, !440, the payment being evidenced by an official receipt issued on said day. 0ernardo sent his tan-er to the Pandacan &erminal as early as !!:20 o.cloc- in the morning of 9ecember 5, !440, to ta-e delivery of the petroleum products thus purchased. 9 0ut despite waiting until A P.). on that day, the tan-er.s driver failed to ta-e delivery, because *alte'.s computer system had allegedly malfunctioned and bro-en down as early as 3:45 1.). and remained out of order up to !2:!0 P.). on that day, 9ecember 5. /t appears that on that same day, 9ecember 5, !440, the <nergy ,egulatory 0oard announced an increase in the prices of petroleum products effective at A o.cloc- in the evening of that day. 1ccording to *alte', ;(a t e'actly A:00 in the evening of 9ecember 5, !440, . . . (it had to cut>off the delivery or hauling by dealers of products in order to ma-e the necessary ad(ustments in its computers as a result of the price increase . . . (and after that time all orders, even for those pre>paid and delivered e'>plant, were invoiced at the new rates . . . in accordance with the Purchase and 7ale 1greement . 9emands subse"uently made by 0ernardo for delivery of the petroleum products paid for by him, '0 were refused by *alte' unless 0ernardo paid the difference between the old and new prices. *alte' claimed, in (ustification of its refusal, '' that when 0ernardo demanded ;delivery of his orders, the prices had already increased due to the <,0 order on 9ecember 5, !440,; and 0ernardo was bound to pay the increased price in accordance with 7ection 3 of his ;Purchase and 7ale 1greement; with *alte' providing as follows: 3 '+&)E$, Prices to be paid by 0%@<, e' 7<??<,.s storage point shall be at 7<??<,.s official wholesale selling price e' storage point at Pandacan &erminal in effect on date of delivery. 3n 6anuary $, !44!, 0ernardo filed a complaint in the ,egional &rial *ourt at IueEon *ity praying that *alte' be ordered to deliver the petroleum products in "uestion and to pay compensatory, e'emplary and nominal damages *alte' moved to dismiss: the ground that (a venue was improperly laid - it being provided in the parties. Purchase and 7ale 1greement that in case ;of any (udicial proceedings to enforce any or all of the terms or conditions of . . . (said 1greement, 0%@<, shall submit itself to the (urisdiction of the *ourt of the *ity of )anila or to 7<??<,.s places of transactions at 7<??<,.7 option=; '> and (b the plaintiff had no cause of action against it H *alte' having ;cut>off the delivery or hauling by dealers of products in order to ma-e the necessary ad(ustment in its computers as a result of the price increase; (set by <,0 on 9ecember 5, !440 ,

and accordingly invoiced ;all orders, even for those pre>paid and delivered e'>plant, . . . at the new rates,; as was allegedly its right under Paragraph (3 of the Purchase and 7ale 1greement !. 1ll orders that have (been invoiced and paid for before the effectively of a wholesale 7elling Price increase but are not yet delivered to or pic-ed>up by the customers as of the effectivity of the price increase shall be cancelled and a new invoice shall be prepared using the new priceGs. . &rial *ourt denied *alte'.s motion to dismiss and issued a preliminary mandatory in(unction re"uiring immediate delivery by *alte' *alte'/t also asserted the ;special and affirmative defense; that it was the <nergy ,egulatory 0oard, not the &rial *ourt which had (urisdiction of the sub(ect matter of the case since it involved ;a dispute between an oil company and its dealer, particularly as to the price by which petroleum products are to be sold 3n 1ugust !4, !44!, the &rial *ourt promulgated an 3rder dismissing 0ernardo.s suit for lac- of (urisdiction. &he *ourt cited the (udgment of the *ourt of 1ppeals in *1>D.,. 7P +o. 2404!, supra, holding inter alia that ;there is still an unsettled dispute as regards the pricing of the . . . (petroleum products; in "uestion, to the effect that it ;is not the suitable forum for debate; regarding the wisdom of policy or the logic behind increases in oil prices, in relation to the powers of the <nergy ,egulatory 0oard (a ;to fi' and regulate the prices of petroleum products,; ' and of (b supervision and (urisdiction '9 @ . . . over all persons, corporations, firms or entities engaged in the business of importing, e'porting, re> e'porting, shipping, transporting, processing or refining of indigenous and imported crude oil or other petroleum products, storing, mar-eting, distributing, or selling, both at wholesale and retail, and other crude or refined petroleum products, and shall regulate and supervise the operations and activities of said persons and entities. . . .

/77%<: 0ernardo submits for resolution the "uestion, ;which body has the original (urisdiction over the instant case, the <nergy, ,egulatory 0oard or . . . (the *ourt a quo.; 8<?9: &he situation in this case is similar to that in .obil "il 'hilippines# &nc. v. )ourt of *ppeals, %pon these facts, the *ourt ruled that since plaintiff Pedrosa.s ;prepaid order was prepared on the same date by . . . ()obil 3il.s credit man and after being thus approved by . . . ()obil 3il.s credit man, . . . (Pedrosa paid for the price therein indicated by tendering a Prudential 0an*ashier.s *hec- P!4452. 0ecause of this, . . . )obil became duty bound to deliver the gasoline to private respondent on 2ebruary !5, !454 and the price paid for by . . . (Pedrosa was that price then prevailing which was the amount indicated in . . . (Pedrosa.s cashier.s chec- . . . . 0y actually delivering the gasoline on )arch A, !454, petitioner committed a contractual breach and incurred in delay that should ma-e it liable for damages.; &' &he *ourt further held that the ;prepaid order form was a perfected contract of sale the moment it was approved and accepted by )obil through its proper representative on the same day and paid for by . . . Pedrosa li-ewise on the same day . . . . 3n the part of Pedrosa it can even be said that the contract was consummated as far as he was concerned since he e'ecuted his part of the contract by his prepayment of the order.; /t thus appears to the *ourt that as in that case, a contract of sale of petroleum products was here perfected between *alte' and its ;operatorGdealer,; 0ernardo= that in virtue of the payment admittedly made by 0ernardo, *alte' became a ;debtor; to him in the sense that it was obligated to ma-e delivery to 0ernardo.s of the petroleum products ordered by him= and that the only issue is the manner by which *alte' shall perform its commitment in 0ernardo.s favor, or more precisely, what "uantity of petroleum products it is bound to deliver to 0ernardo: that corresponding to (or at the rate of the price at the time of the payment effected by 0ernardo or the higher price fi'ed by the <nergy ,egulatory 0oard on 9ecember 5, !440= and that the controversy between them cannot be characteriEed as a dispute within the original (urisdiction of the <nergy ,egulatory 0oard,

which as already stated, e'tends to ;(a ll disputes between any operatorGdealer and an oil company regarding dealership agreement e'cept those arising out of their relationship as debtor and creditor . . . .; /t is rather one cogniEable by the ,egional &rial *ourt, as a dispute indeed ;arising out of their relationship as debtor and creditor.; 1s the facts ma-e clearly apparent, there is no ;unsettled dispute as regards the pricing of the . . . (petroleum products,; as the ,egional &rial *ourt opines in its challenged 3rder of 1ugust !4, !44!. 3n the contrary, the parties are in agreement about the prices of the petroleum products in "uestion which became effective on 9ecember 5, !440 at A o.cloc- P.)., and those prevailing prior thereto. &heir disagreement is as regards which of the two sets of prices shall apply to the transactions sub(ect of 0ernardo.s complaint. +either do the parties impugn the validity or the propriety or wisdom of the specific e'ercise by the <nergy ,egulatory 0oard of its power ;to fi' and regulate the prices of petroleum products,; or its power of supervision over the operations and activities, generally, of persons and entities dealing in oil and petroleum products, as said ,egional &rial *ourt posits in its order of 1ugust !4, !44!. #hat the controversy is all about, to repeat, is simply the prices at which the petroleum products shall be deemed to have been purchased from *alte' by 0ernardo in 9ecember, !440. &his is obviously a civil law "uestion, one determinable according to the provisions of the *ivil *ode and hence, beyond the cogniEance of the <nergy ,egulatory 0oard of the 3il /ndustry *ommission. JUAN M. SERRANO !"/ SIL;ER LINERS, INC. vs. MU<OA 3HI4 MOTORS INC., DM TRANSIT CORPORATION, BENITO MACROHON, !s S0.$-11 o1 B#.Co" C-*%, !"/ ENRIBUE MEDINA, !s P#82-) S.$v-). Co55-ss-o".$ D.,. +o. ?>25545 +ovember 25, !4A5 (ACTS+

6uan ). 7errano was granted by the Public 7ervice *ommission (P7* in case $3!04 a certificate of public convenience to operate in )anila and IueEon *ity eight auto>truc-s for passengers and freight. 7errano mortgaged this certificate to )uBoE (8i )otors, /nc. ()8)/ , as additional collateral to secure an indebtedness on account of the purchase of four buses. &he parties to this chattel mortgage thereafter applied to the P7* for approval thereof. 1t the instance of the )8)/, the sheriff of IueEon *ity foreclosed the chattel mortgage and e'ecuted a certificate of sale in favor of the )8)/ as the highest bidder. &he )8)/ sold some units and certificates of public convenience, among them, the certificate granted to 7errano in P7* case $3!04, to the 9) &ransit *orporation (9)&* . 1cting on the petition filed (ointly by the )8)/ and the 9)&*, the P7*, thru *ommissioner )edina, provisionally approved the said sale, and authoriEed the 9)&* to operate ;under the provisional authority here granted.; 7errano sold to the 7ilver ?iners, /nc. (7?/ the line he was authoriEed to operate by virtue of the certificate of public convenience issued in P7* case $3!04, and authoriEed the latter to file with the P7* the corresponding application for approval of the said sale. 1t the instance of the )8)/ the sheriff of IueEon *ity ;once more announced the foreclosure of the chattel mortgages. /n view of this development, 7errano and the 7?/ filed the present complaint the pertinent and important portions of which read: A. &hat the plaintiff, 6uan ). 7errano, and the defendant, )uBoE (8/ )otors, /nc., filed the corresponding application for the approval of the chattel mortgage of said certificate with the Public 7ervice *ommission. 8owever, before the Public 7ervice *ommission could decide the application, the plaintiff, 6uan, ). 7errano, filed

a motion withdrawing the same on the ground that the mortgagee, 9efendant )uBoE (8/ )otors, /nc., had violated their agreement. ''' ''' ''' !!. &hat the issuance of the provisional approval presupposes the e'istence of a sale and transfer of the certificate of public convenience issued in *ase +o. $3!04 by the 7heriff of IueEon *ity to )uBoE (8/ )otors, /nc., which is not a fact. 8ence the defendant, <nri"ue )edina, is liable for damages for the issuance of the provisional approval under 1rt. 32 of the *ivil *ode of the Philippines because the plaintiff, 6uan ). 7errano, was deprived of his property without due process of law. ''' ''' ''' !4. &hat the announced sale on 6une !4, !4A5 is at once illegal and violative of the rights of the plaintiffs. !5. &hat as a conse"uence of the issuance of the provisional approval, the plaintiffs have been unable to operate the eight ($ units attached to the certificate of public convenience issued in *ase +o. $3!04 and the plaintiff, 6uan ). 7errano, has been unable to substitute four (4 of said units 1cting on the complaint and on an urgent motion subse"uently filed by the plaintiffs for the issuance of an ex parte writ of preliminary in(unction, the court directed the parties to maintain the status quo upon the filing by the plaintiffs of a P5,000 bond, and set the motion for hearing *ommissioner )edina moved for the dismissal of the complaint against him on three grounds: that the *2/ has no (urisdiction over not only the sub(ect matter of the action but as well his person as Public 7ervice *ommissioner= that the complaint states no cause of action against him= and that ;1rticle 32 of the *ivil *ode is not applicable to (udicial orders.; &he *2/ dismissed the complaint as against *ommissioner )edina. &he plaintiffs moved to have this order set aside or clarified, because it did not specify any ground for the dismissal. &he *2/ held in abeyance consideration of the plaintiffs. prayer for preliminary in(unction, to afford the plaintiffs opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration and to give the rest of the defendants e"ual opportunity to file motions to dismiss, ;so that the court can ma-e a clear cut ruling on the "uestion of (urisdiction over the instant case.; &he )8)/ and the 9)&* moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court has no (urisdiction over the sub(ect> matter of the action. &he *2/ dismissed the complaint for lac- of (urisdiction over the sub(ect>matter thereof and denied the plaintiffs. motion to set aside the order.

ISSUES+ !. #hether or not the *ourt of 2irst /nstance of IueEon *ity has (urisdiction over civil case $$35 before it. 2. #hether or not the *2/ err in dismissing the complaint, even if it prayed for damages against *ommissioner )edina, for failure to state a sufficient cause of action. 3. #hether or not the *2/ err in dismissing the complaint against the rest of the defendants. RULING+ !. &n 'ere/ )ardenas vs. )amus, the *ourt held that (urisdiction over the sub(ect>matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein H a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. +or may the (urisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the "uestion of (urisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.

/t is in the view of the *ourt that the resolution of this aspect of the case falls within the e'clusive province of the P7*. %nder section 20(g of the Public 7ervice ?aw, the P7* is the body invested with the power and authority to approve a sale or transfer of a certificate of public convenience. &he *ourt has indeed sustained the power and authority of the P7* (a to approve provisionally the transfer of a certificate of public convenience where the conditions laid down by section 20(g are satisfied, A and (b to grant provisional authority to a vendee to operate a franchise pending determination of the legality of the sale.5 <ntirely apart from the above considerations, the *ourt notes from the order of )arch 4, !4A5 that 7errano has filed an ;urgent motion to set (it aside;. 3rderly procedure demands that the P7* pass upon this phase of the controversy= from an adverse resolution thereon, the appellants may yet appeal to this *ourt. NtOhe commission having (urisdiction to determine whether a corporation has the right to do or not to do a thing for which the commission.s approval is sought, orderly procedure re"uires that the commission pass upon that phase of the controversy before the court ad(udge it. &he obvious reason for this is stated in 7t. *lair 0orough v. &oma"ua Q Pottsville <lec. ,y. *o., 254 Pa. 4A2, !03 1. 2$5, 2$4, 5 1.?.,. 20: ;3therwise different phases of the same case might be pending before the commission and the courts at one time, which would cause endless confusion.; 4 &he order of the P7* did not deprive 7errano of his property !0 ;without due process of law;. &he order is provisional in nature, ;may be modified or revo-ed by the *ommission at any time;,is ;sub(ect to whatever action that may be ta-en on the basic application; for the sale and transfer filed by the )8)/ in favor of the 9)&*, and is ;valid only during the pendency of said application; but not beyond 7/J (A )3+&87 from the date hereon ()arch 4, !4A5 ,; which period, by the way, has already e'pired. +either were the appellants deprived of their day in court. 2or, the P7*, in its order of 1pril 5, !4A5, clearly stated that ;in fairness to all; and ;to give all the parties sufficient and ample opportunity to present their evidence, pro and con, in support of their respective allegations;, ;the hearing of this case should be postponed. 2. . &he *2/ li-ewise did not err in dismissing the complaint, even if it prayed for damages against *ommissioner )edina, for failure to state a sufficient cause of action. 1rticle 32 of the *ivil *ode, relied upon by the appellants in support of their claim for damages, provides in its last paragraph that the responsibility for damages ;herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the 'enal )ode or other penal statute .; &he *ourt does not now decide H as the *ourt believes that it is not called upon to do so H whether article 32 of the *ivil *ode may be utiliEed as the legal basis of an action for damages against a P7* commissioner. 0ut assuming that the said provision of law does authoriEe recovery of damages from a member of the P7* in proper cases, the dismissal must yet be sustained. 3. 2inally, the *2/ did not err in dismissing the complaint against the rest of the defendants. &he complaint does not state a cause of action against them. Paragraph A thereof alleges that 7errano filed a motion with the P7* withdrawing the application filed by him and the )8)/ for approval of the chattel mortgage over the certificate of public convenience in "uestion, ;on the ground that the mortgagee, 9efendant )uBoE (8/ )otors, /nc., had violated their agreement;, and, on that basis, paragraph !4 asserts that ;the announced sale on 6une !4, !4A5 is at once illegal and violative of the rights of the plaintiffs;, and that if the sheriff of IueEon *ity be not immediately restrained from proceeding with the intended foreclosure and sale of the said certificate, they ;will suffer great and irreparable in(ury;. &hese averments are altogether too imprecise and therefore cannot be dignified as constituting a legally sufficient statement of the ;ultimate facts; re"uired in the formulation of a cause of action= they are at best mere conclusions of law which, obviously, cannot ta-e the place of ;ultimate facts.; !5 HEIRS O( JUANITA PADILLA, REPRESENTED BY CLAUDIO PADILLA ;S. DOMINADOR MAGDUA.

6G.R. No. '96 7 + S.,*.58.$ '7, &0'0:

(!)*s+ &his case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the 3rders of the ,egional &rial *ourt (,&* of &acloban *ity, 0ranch 34. 6uanita Padilla (6uanita , the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land in ?eyte. 1fter 6uanita.s death, petitioners, as legal heirs of 6uanita, sought to have the land partitioned. 8owever, the petitioners were surprised to find out that ,icardo, their eldest brother, had declared the land for himself, pre(udicing their rights as co>heirs. P.*-*-o".$s 1-2./ !" !)*-o" D-*0 *0. RTC o1 T!)2o8!" C-*%, B$!")0 3>, 1o$ $.)ov.$% o1 oD".$s0-,, ,oss.ss-o", ,!$*-*-o" !"/ /!5!=.s. P.*-*-o".$s !2so so#=0* *o /.)2!$. vo-/ *0. s!2. o1 *0. 2!"/. 9ominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lac- of (urisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the (urisdiction of the )unicipal &rial *ourt of &anauan, ?eyte. &he ,&* dismissed the case for lac- of (urisdiction and e'plained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of P540.00 was less than the amount cogniEable by the ,&* to ac"uire (urisdiction over the case. 3n the other hand, petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. 7ince actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the (urisdiction of the ,&*. Iss#.+ #hether or not )&* has (urisdiction over the case. +o, it is the ,&*. H.2/+ ,&* did not err in ta-ing cogniEance of the case. %nder 7ection ! of ,epublic 1ct +o. 5A4! (,1 5A4! , amending 0atas Pambansa 0lg. !24, the ,&* shall e'ercise e'clusive (urisdiction on the following actions: 7ection !. 7ection !4 of 0atas Pambansa 0lg. !24, otherwise -nown as the ;6udiciary ,eorganiEation 1ct of !4$0;, is hereby amended to read as follows: ;7ec. !4. 6urisdiction in civil cases. > ,egional &rial *ourts shall e'ercise e'clusive original (urisdiction. ;(! /n all civil actions in which the sub(ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation=

;(2 /n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved e'ceeds &wenty &housand Pesos (P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in )etro )anila, where such value e'ceeds 2ifty &housand Pesos (P50,000.00 e'cept actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original (urisdiction over which is conferred upon the )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts, and )unicipal *ircuit &rial *ourts= ' ' ' 3n the other hand, 7ection 3 of ,1 5A4! e'panded the (urisdiction of the )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts and )unicipal *ircuit &rial *ourts over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside )etro )anila where the assessed value does not e'ceed &wenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00 . &he provision states: 7ection 3. 7ection 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows: ;7ec. 33. 6urisdiction of )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts and )unicipal *ircuit &rial *ourts in *ivil *ases. > )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts, and )unicipal &rial *ircuit &rial *ourts shall e'ercise: ' ' '

;(3 <'clusive original (urisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not e'ceed &wenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00 or, in civil actions in )etro )anila, where such assessed value does not e'ceed 2ifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00 e'clusive of interest, damages of whatever -ind, attorney.s fees, litigation e'penses and costs: Provided, &hat in cases of land not declared for ta'ation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the ad(acent lots.; /n the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P540.00 according. 0ased on the value alone, being way below P20,000.00, the )&* has (urisdiction over the case. 8owever, petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. 7ince annulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the ,&* has (urisdiction over the case. #hen petitioners filed the action with the ,&* they sought to recover ownership and possession of the land by "uestioning (! the due e'ecution and authenticity of the 1ffidavit e'ecuted by 6uanita in favor of ,icardo which caused ,icardo to be the sole owner of the land to the e'clusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and 3&4 *0. v!2-/-*% o1 *0. /../ o1 s!2. .E.)#*./ 8.*D.." R-)!$/oFs /!#=0*.$s !"/ Do5-"!/o$. 7ince the principal action sought here is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cogniEable by the ,&*. #ell>entrenched is the rule that (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. &herefore, petition is granted and orders of ,&* &acloban are reversed and set aside. EBUITABLE PCI BANG, INC., P.*-*-o".$ v. HON. SAL;ADOR Y. APURILLO -" 0-s )!,!)-*% !s P$.s-/-"= J#/=., R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$* o1 T!)2o8!" C-*%, B$!")0 , !"/ YGS REALTY DE;ELOPMENT, INC., R.s,o"/."*s 21*&7: @R7 ,ealty 9evelopment, /nc. was a client of Philippine *ommercial /nternational 0an- (P*/0 and <"uitable 0an-ing *orporation (<0* , the predecessors of herein petitioner <"uitable P*/ 0an-, /nc. /n their commercial transactions, P*/0 and <0* granted @R7 a series of loans and credit facilities secured by real estate mortgages. <0* granted @R7 a credit line of 53 million. @R7 availed of the amount of !0.4 million out of the 53 million credit line. 3n )arch !2, 200!, <0* demanded @R7 to pay its outstanding obligations, but the latter failed to heed the demand. 3n )ay 23, 200!, <0* filed before the 3ffice of the *ler- of *ourt, of the ,egional &rial *ourt (,&* of &acloban *ity, an e'tra(udicial petition for the sale of the mortgaged properties in order to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness in the amount of !0.4 million. &he credit lineGloan accommodation with P*/0 was secured by real estate mortgages over the properties of @R7 in &acloban *ity. &he total obligation of @R7 was P!40,4A5,!20.3A, the purpose of which is for Swor-ing capitalT and that it would mature si' years after date or on 9ecember !5, 2004.

1s a result of the filing of the two petitions for sale, @R7 filed before the ,&* a *omplaint for 9eclaratory ,elief, 1nnulment or 9eclaration of +ullity of 2oreclosure, 1pplication for 2oreclosure, +otice of 2oreclosure 7ale, 9ocuments, /nterest, <tc., ,elease of )ortgages, /n(unction, and 9amages. &he ,&* granted @R7 a #rit of Preliminary /n(unction. &he *1 upheld the ,&* decision granting the writ. /77%<: #G+ the ,&* acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary in(unction en(oining the foreclosure and public auction of @R7C property during the proceedings and pending determination of the main cause of action for annulment of foreclosure. 8<?9: +3. &he ,&* committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting @R7C plea for in(unctive relief. &o be entitled to an in(unctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. &he writ of preliminary in(unction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the right of a party in a pending case rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. 8owever, if the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in its issuance, such that the act amounts to e'cess or lac- of (urisdiction, the same may be nullified through a writ of certiorari or prohibition. 1 Petition for *ertiorari, under ,ule A5 of the ,ules of *ourt, is intended for the correction of errors of (urisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac- or e'cess of (urisdiction. <'cess of (urisdiction as distinguished from absence of (urisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authoriEed, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authoriEe the e'ercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. #ithout (urisdiction means lac- or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. /t means lac- of power to e'ercise authority. MANCHESTER DE;ELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL vs. COURT O( APPEALS G.R. No. 979'9 M!% 9, '9 9 (ACTS+ 1 complaint for specific performance was filed by )anchester 9evelopment *orporation against *ity ?and 9evelopment *orporation to compel the latter to e'ecute a deed of sale in favor )anchester. )anchester also alleged that *ity ?and forfeited the formerCs tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to )anchester amounting to P5$,550,000.00. &his amount was alleged in the 039@ of their *omplaint but it was not reiterated in the P,1@<, of same complaint. )anchester paid a doc-et fee of P4!0.00 only. 7aid doc-et fee is premised on the allegation of )anchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. &he court ruled that there is an under assessment of doc-et fees hence it ordered )anchester to amend its complaint. )anchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P!0). 7aid amount was however again not stated in the P,1@<,. ISSUE+ #hether or not the amendment complaint should be admitted. (+3 HELD+

P*/0 demanded from @R7 the payment of its total obligation. @R7 refused and as-ed for a brea-down of the amount. 3n )ay 23, 200!, petitioner filed a Petition for 7ale for the e'tra(udicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.

&he designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. &he doc-eting fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint. 1s reiterated in the )agaspi case the rule is well>settled ;that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the doc-et fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . &hus, in the present case the trial court did not ac"uire (urisdiction over the case by the payment of only P4!0 as doc-et fee. +either can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest (urisdiction upon the *ourt. 2or an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. *onse"uently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subse"uent proceedings and actions ta-en by the trial court are null and void. *1 aptly ruled that the basis of assessment of the doc-et fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. &he *ourt cannot close this case without ma-ing the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P5$ million is alleged in the body of the complaint. &his is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the doc-et cler- in the assessment of the filing fee. &his fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this *ourt had ta-en cogniEance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being as-ed for in the body of the complaint. /t was only when in obedience to the order of this *ourt of 3ctober !$, !4$5, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners. counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P!0,000,000 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. &he design to avoid payment of the re"uired doc-et fee is obvious. &o put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. 1ny pleading that fails to comply with this re"uirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be e'punged from the record. &he *ourt ac"uires (urisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee. 1n amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest (urisdiction in the *ourt, much less the payment of the doc-et fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. G.R. Nos. 99939-3 (.8$#!$% '3, '9 9 SUN INSURANCE O((ICE, LTD., 3SIOL4, E.B. PHILIPPS !"/ D.J. HARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MA?IMIANO C. ASUNCION, P$.s-/-"= J#/=., B$!")0 '0>, R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$*, B#.Co" C-*% !"/ MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents. 21*&7:

compensatory, moral, e'emplary and li"uidated damages, attorney.s fees, e'penses of litigation and costs of the suit. 1lthough the prayer in the complaint did not "uantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about 2ifty )illion Pesos. 3nly the amount of P2!0.00 was paid by private respondent as doc-et fee which prompted petitioners. counsel to raise his ob(ection. 7aid ob(ection was disregarded by respondent 6udge 6ose P. *astro who was then presiding over said case. )eanwhile, the *ourt en banc issued a ,esolution in 1dministrative *ase +o. $5>!0>$552>,&* directing the (udges in said cases to reassess the doc-et fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. %pon submission of amended complaint and reassessment of doc-et fees respondent was re"uired to pay P34,5$A.00 as doc-et fee. &his was subse"uently paid by private respondent. 3n 3ctober !A, !4$A, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional doc-et fee of P$0,34A.00 and another PA2,432.40 on 1pril 2$, !4$$.

/77%<: !. #hether or not the *ourt of 1ppeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not ac"uire (urisdiction over case on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper doc-et fee. +3 2. #hether or not the principle laid down in )anchester case may be applied retroactively. @<7 ,%?/+D: !. PetitionersC contend that while private respondent had paid the amount of P!$2,$24.40 as doc-et fee, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is PA4,A0!,A23.50 the doc-et fee that should be paid by private respondent is P255,$!0.44, more or less. +ot having paid the same, the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. /n support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the *ourt in .anchester 0evelopment )orporation vs. )*, as follows: &he *ourt ac"uires (urisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee. 1n amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest (urisdiction in the *ourt, much less the payment of the doc-et fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. &he court ruled that the principle in .anchester could very well be applied in the present case. &he pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the doc-et fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. 8owever, in .anchester, petitioner did not pay any additional doc-et fee untilO the case was decided by this *ourt. &hus, in .anchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this *ourt held that the court a quo did not ac"uire (urisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void. /n the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unli-e )anchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional doc-et fees as re"uired. &he promulgation of the decision in )anchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional doc-et fee as ordered by the respondent court. /t triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional doc-et fee as may be ordered. 8ence, the 7* directed the doc-et cler- to determine the proper doc-et fee that must be furnished by respondent.

Petitioner 7un /nsurance 3ffice, ?td. (7/3? for brevity filed a complaint with the ,egional &rial *ourt of )a-ati, )etro )anila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the (udicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent )anuel %y Po &iong. Private respondent filed a complaint in the ,egional &rial *ourt of IueEon *ity for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. &he complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,

&hus, the *ourt rules as follows: &t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading# but the payment of the prescribed doc1et fee# that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. 2here the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the doc1et fee# the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims# third party claims and similar pleadings# which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2here the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but# subsequently# the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading# or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court# the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. &t shall be the responsibility of the )ler1 of )ourt or his duly authori/ed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. 2. Private respondent claims that the ruling in .anchester cannot apply retroactively to his case for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such .anchester ruling as yet. 2urther, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this )ourt in .agaspi v. +amolete# wherein this *ourt held that the trial court ac"uired (urisdiction over the case even if the doc-et fee paid was insufficient. &he contention that .anchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. 7tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e'tent. D.,. +os. $$055>55 9ecember 20, !4$4 MA?IMO TACAYvs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT O( TAGUM (!)*s+ U R.s,o"/."* P-"./! instituted an !)*-o" 1o$ $.)ov.$% o1 ,oss.ss-o" against &acay, Panes and +oel at the RTC o1 T!=#5 D!v!o /.2 No$*.. U P-"./! is the owner of the land measuring 540s" meters and that the previous owner allowed the defendants to occupy such by mere tolerance. U #hen P-"./! came in need for the use of the land, he demanded them to vacate the land and to pay rentals but the latter refused. U P-"./! then instituted a complaint praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that the defendants pay monthly rentals since 2ebruary !4$5 as well as nominal, actual and moral damages and attorneyCs fees and that Pineda be granted further reliefs and remedies. U &he /.1."/!"*s then filed for dismissal alleging that the T$-!2 )o#$* /-/ "o* !)I#-$. J#$-s/-)*-o" ov.$ *0. )!s. for the reason that the K)o5,2!-"* 1!-2./ *o s,.)-1% *0. !5o#"*s o1 /!5!=.s !"/ 1o$ 1!-2#$. *o !22.=. *0. 8!s-) $.I#-$.5."* !s *o *0. !ss.ss./ v!2#. o1 *0. s#8J.)* 2o* -" /-s,#*.L. U &he motion to dismiss was later on denied by 6udge )atas. U &he motions to dismiss in *ivil *ases 22!! and 2204 were also denied: NaO declaring that since the ;action at bar is for ,eivindicatoria, 9amages and 1ttorney.s fees definitely this *ourt has the e'clusive (urisdiction,; (b that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages ;are only one aspect of the cause of action,; and (c because of absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they should be ;e'punged from the records.;

U &he /.1."/!"*s later on filed a (oint petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for &,3 praying that the orders be annulled on the ground of grave abuse of discretion and re>asserts that the court did not ac"uire (urisdiction. Iss#.+ HON *0. RTC !)I#-$./ J#$-s/-)*-o" H.2/+ YES U &he actions are "o* basically for the $.)ov.$% o1 s#5s o1 5o".%. U &hey are principally for $.)ov.$% o1 ,oss.ss-o" o1 $.!2 ,$o,.$*%, in the nature of an accion publiciana. M D.*.$5-"!*-v. o1 *0. )o#$*Fs J#$-s/-)*-o" -" *0-s *%,. o1 !)*-o"s -s *0. "!*#$. *0.$.o1, "o* *0. !5o#"* o1 *0. /!5!=.s !22.=./2% !$-s-"= 1$o5 o$ )o"".)*./ D-*0 *0. -ss#. o1 *-*2. o$ ,oss.ss-o", !"/ $.=!$/2.ss o1 *0. v!2#. o1 *0. ,$o,.$*%. U 1 real action may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or e'emplary damages= and such an action would fall D-*0-" *0. .E)2#s-v., o$-=-"!2 J#$-s/-)*-o" o1 *0. R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$*. U B!*!s P!58!"s! B-2!"= '&9 provides that R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$*s s0!22 .E.$)-s. .E)2#s-v. o$-=-"!2 J#$-s/-)*-o" inter alia over 3all civil actions which involve the title to# or possession of# real property# or any interest therein# except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings# original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon .etropolitan Trial )ourts# .unicipal Trial )ourts# and .unicipal )ircuit Trial )ourts.3 U &he rule applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not. U &he rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages= the amount of those damages would be immaterial to the "uestion of the *ourt. PILIPINAS SHELL vs. COURT O( APPEALS G.R. No. 96''9 A,$-2 '0, '9 9 21*&7: Private respondent 1drian dela PaE is a holder of ?etters Patent +o. !4!32 issued by the Patent 3ffice on 2ebruary 25, !4$! for his alleged invention, *oco>diesel fuel for diesel engines and its manufacture. 3n )arch 5, !4$3 private respondent filed a complaint with the ,egional &rial *ourt for infringement of patent with prayer for payment of reasonable compensation and for damages herein petitioners Pilipinas 7hell Petroleum *orporation, *alte' (Phil. , )obil 3il Philippines, /nc., and Petrophil *orporation. &here was no mention in the complaint of the amount of damages being claimed but private respondent alleged, among others, that the conservative estimate of the combined gross sales of defendants (petitioners herein and Petrophil *orporation of plaintiffs (private respondents herein invention is P434,2!3,5$0.00 annually computed at the rate of 20 million barrels (volume being yearly sold by the mar-eting arms of defendants at the price of P2.43$ per liter. /n the hearing of +ovember !3, !4$4 private respondent estimated the yearly royalty due him from defendants (petitioners herein and Petrophil *orporation to be P23A,552,350.00. Petitioners discovered that private respondent paid only as filing fee the amount of P252.00 based on his claim for attomey.s fees in the amount of P200,000.00 and orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint for failure of private respondent to pay the correct filing fee. &he trial court issued an order allowing private respondent to pay the re"uired additional doc-et fee after the prosecution of the case, to be deducted from whatever (udgment in damages shall be awarded by the *ourt.

10

/77%<: #3+ a party can file a complaint without specifying the amount of damages he is claiming and as a result defer the payment of the proper fees until after trial on the merits. ,%?/+D: +3. &he ,ule applicable to this case is 7ection 5(a of ,ule !4! of the ,ules of *ourt. &he third paragraph of the same section provides: /n case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. (<mphasis supplied /t will be observed that the above provision clearly contemplates an initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim sub(ect to ad(ustment as to what later may be proved. *onversely, nowhere can a (ustification be found to convert such payment to something a-in to a contingent fee which would depend on the result of the case. %nder the circumstances, the *ourt would stand to lose the filing fees should the party be later ad(udged to be not entitled to any claim at all. 2iling fees are intended to ta-e care of court e'penses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of e"uipments, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man hours used in handling of each case. &he payment of said fees therefore, cannot be made dependent on the result of the action ta-en, without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the (udiciary in particular. DR. OLI;IA S. PASCUAL, -" 0.$ )!,!)-*% !s s,.)-!2 !/5-"-s*$!*$-E o1 *0. .s*!*. o1 *0. 2!*. DON ANDRES PASCUAL !"/ !s .E.)#*$-E o1 *0. *.s*!*. .s*!*. o1 *0. 2!*. DO<A ADELA S. PASCUAL, petitioner, vs! COURT O( APPEALSN JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$* o1 P!s-=, B$!")0 '6&N DEPUTY SHERI(( CARLOS G. MAOGN !"/ ATTY. JESUS I. SANTOS, respondents! 21*&7: &he e'traordinary action to annul a final (udgment is restricted to the grounds provided by law, in order to prevent it from being used by a losing party to ma-e a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and e'ecutory. 0efore us is a Petition for ,eview on )ertiorari 9on 1ndres Pascual died intestate on 3ctober !2, !453 and was survived by (! his widow, 9oBa 1dela 7oldevilla Pascual= (2 the children of his full blood brother= (3 the children of his half blood brother= (4 the intestate estate of his full blood brother and (5 the ac-nowledged natural children of his full blood brother <ligio Pascual >> 8ermes 7. Pascual and 3livia 7. Pascual (herein petitioner . 3n 9ecember !!, !453, 9oBa 1dela (the surviving spouse filed with the then *ourt of 2irst /nstance (*2/ of Pasig, ,iEal, a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her husband. *2/ appointed her special administratri'. iN4O &o assist her with said proceedings, 9oBa 1dela hired, on 2ebruary 24, !454, 1tty. 6esus /. 7antos, herein private respondent, as her counsel for a fee e"uivalent to fifteen (!5 percent of the gross estate of the decedent #hen 0atas Pambansa 0lg. !24 too- effect, the petition was reassigned to the ,egional &rial *ourt (,&* of Pasig 3n +ovember 4, !4$5, the heirs of the decedent moved for the approval of their *ompromise 1greement, stipulating that three fourths (3G4 of the estate would go to 9oBa 1dela and one fourth (!G4 to the other heirs

3n 1ugust !$, !4$5, while the settlement was still pending, 9oBa 1dela died, leaving a will which named the petitioner as the sole universal heir 3n 7eptember 30, !4$5, the ,&* of Pasig denied the motion to reiterate hereditary rights, which was filed by petitioner and her brother. &he *ourt reasoned that, as illegitimate children of the brother of the decedent, they were barred from ac"uiring any hereditary right to her intestate estate under 1rticle 442 of the *ivil *ode. iiN5O 3n 9ecember !5, !4$5, it ordered that the private respondentCs lien on the hereditary share of 9oBa 1dela be entered into the records. 7i' years after 9oBa 1delaCs death 6udge Padolina rendered a 9ecision. 1fter said 9ecision had become final and e'ecutory, the private respondent filed on )arch 25, !444 a )otion for the /ssuance of a #rit of <'ecution insofar as the payment of his attorneyCs fees was concerned. 9espite opposition from the petitioner, the motion was granted in the 1pril !4, !444 3rder of the intestate court, directing Sthe issuance of a writ of e'ecution in the partial amount of P2,000,000.00 in favor of movantN,O 1tty. 6ose /. 7antos to be implemented against the V share of 9oBa 1dela 7. Pascual, upon payment by the movant of the prescribed doc-et fees for the said partial amount.T iiiN5O &he following day, 1pril 20, !444, 0ranch *ler- of *ourt 1rturo K. *amacho issued a #rit of <'ecution= ivN$O and 7heriff *arlos D. )aog, a +otice of Darnishment to the 7an 2rancisco 9el )onte ,ural 0an- (729) 1venue, IueEon *ity , garnishing deposits and shares of stoc-s belonging to the estate of 9oBa 1dela sufficient to cover the amount of P2 million.vN4O &wo days later, petitioner moved for the reconsideration and the "uashal of the #rit of <'ecution, viN!0O which the ,&* of Pasig denied in its 3rder of 6une 24, !444. viiN!!O Private respondent countered with two motions to order petitioner to comply with the writ of garnishment and to compel her to appear and e'plain her failure to comply with the writ. 2eeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with the *ourt of 1ppeals (*1 a petition for annulment of the award of attorneyCs fees in the 6anuary !4, !444 9ecision of the trial court= the 3rder of 1pril !4, !444, granting a #rit of <'ecution= the #rit of <'ecution dated 1pril 20, !444= and the 3rder of 6une 24, !444, denying petitionerCs motion for reconsideration. 1s stated earlier, the appellate court dismissed the petition, ruling that the intestate court had (urisdiction to ma-e the "uestioned award and that petitioner had been accorded due process upheld the (urisdiction of the intestate court on the ground that, although not incurred by the deceased during his lifetime, the monetary claim was related to the ordinary acts of administration of the estate. &he *1 similarly declared that the petitioner had been accorded due process. /t noted that, despite -nowledge of the claim, she did not oppose or hint at any resistance to the payment of said claim. 7he also chose not to move for reconsideration or to file an appeal after the award had been made. /ndubitably, the award became final and e'ecutory. &hey claim that, without any hearing or notice to them, the (udge approved and awarded the attorneyCs fees of private respondent, who was purportedly his classmate and compadre. 2inally, petitioner replaced *orne(o as (udicial administrator on )arch A, !4$4 five months after the latter had served as such &he /ssues &he *ourt believes that the resolution of this case hinges on the following issues: (! 9id the trial court have (urisdiction to ma-e the "uestioned award of attorneyCs feesL (2 #ere the heirs of 9oBa 1dela, who were represented by petitioner, deprived of due processL ,%?/+D: &he Petition is devoid of merit.

11

&he failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period fi'ed by law renders the decision final and e'ecutory. *onse"uently, no court can e'ercise appellate (urisdiction to review such decision. viiiN!5O %pon the other hand, the e'traordinary action to annul a final (udgment is limited to the grounds provided by law and cannot be used as a stratagem to reopen the entire controversy and thereby ma-e a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and e'ecutory. i'N!AO 1ccordingly, this review shall consider only matters pertaining to the (urisprudential grounds for the annulment of a final (udgment: 'N!5O S''' 1nnulment of (udgment may ''' be based on the ground that NeitherO a (udgment is void for want of (urisdiction or the (udgment was obtained by e'trinsic fraud. Petitioner does not allege e'trinsic fraud, but bases her petition only on alleged lac- of (urisdiction and due process. 2irst /ssue: 4urisdiction over the 'erson of the 0efendant Petitioner insistently argues that the 6anuary !4, !444 ,&* 9ecision, insofar as it awarded attorneyCs fees, was void from the beginning because the intestate court had lost (urisdiction over the person of 9oBa 1dela (the attorneyCs client due to her death. &he argument is untenable. &he basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of the rules on the e'tinction of a civil action'iN!4O in special proceedings. &he death of 9oBa 1dela did not ipso facto e'tinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or re"uire him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her testate estate. 8ad he filed the claim against 9oBa 1dela personally, the rule would have applied. 8owever, he did so against the estate of 9on 1ndres. &hus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is 7ection 2, ,ule $2 of the ,ules of *ourt, which re"uires the appointment of a new administrator 'ayment of $eparate 0oc1et 5ees &s !ot !ecessary #hile not e'actly a ground for annulment, the *ourt has held that it is the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee that vests a trial court with (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter or nature of the action. 'iiN24O Petitioner avers that the intestate court had no (urisdiction to award the disputed attorneyCs fees before private respondent paid doc-et fees, as re"uired in 6acson v. +eyes.'iii &he argument is untenable. &he *ourt re"uired in 6acson the payment of a separate doc-et fee, since the lawyerCs Smotion for attorneyCs feesT was in the Snature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his client.T /n contrast, the private respondent filed a claim for his attorneyCs fees against the estate of 9on 1ndres. &he difference in the modes of action ta-en renders 6acson inapplicable to the case at bar. 7econd /ssue: %eirs of 0o7a *dela 2ere !ot 0eprived of 0ue 'rocess 1sserting that she and the other heirs of the deceased administratri' were denied due process of law, petitioner disputes the following finding of the *1:'iv S#e can neither view with favor the petitionerCs contention that the award was made without giving the heirs of 9oBa 1dela due process of law. /t must be remembered that long before the ''' 6udgeCs "uestioned 9ecision was rendered, the petitioner was named special administratri' of the V share of 9oBa 1dela in the estate of 9on 1ndres '''. 1s such special administratri', the petitioner should have been aware of all her duties and responsibilities, one of which was to protect the

estate from any disbursements based on claims not chargeable to the estate. 7he should have -nown that notice to her of the attorneyCs lien would have amounted to notice to the heirs of 9oBa 1dela as well.T 1ccording to her, want of due process prevented the heirs from contesting the claim and submitting evidence to show that partial payments had been previously given to private respondent. &he *ourt is not convinced. /f admitted by the administrator or e'ecutor, a claim according to ,ule $A of 7ection !! 'vN2$O may be allowed by the court without any hearing. ,espondent court found that the claim was indeed admitted and uncontested S&hen, after becoming aware of the rendition of the respondent 6udgeCs 9ecision wherein the "uestioned award of attorneyCs fees was decreed, which was as good a time as any to assail its propriety, the petitioners maintained her silence and chose not to file any motion for the reconsideration of the 9ecision or appeal therefrom. 9ue to the petitionerCs own fault and negligence, the 9ecision became final and e'ecutory. &he petitioner must therefore bear the conse"uences of the ma'im WN<O"uity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their right &hird /ssue: 5actual and 6egal ases of the *ward of *ttorney8s 5ees Petitioner alleges that the award of attorneyCs fees contained in the fallo is void ab initio# as the intestate court failed to state the factual or legal bases therefor in the body of the 9ecision, in violation of 1rticle K///, 7ection !4 of the *onstitution. 'vi &he *ourt disagrees. &he legal and factual bases of the award were stated in the body of the 6anuary !4, !444 ,&* 9ecision. /n recounting the Ssignificant events leading to NtheO eventual culminationT 'viiN33O of the case, the trial court revealed the importance of the services of private respondent, who represented the estate, argued for the intestate courtCs approval of the *ompromise 1greement, and rendered legal advice on the final distribution of the properties of the estate. 3ne must also consider that, unli-e in the cases cited by petitioner, 'viiiN34O the award of attorneyCs fees herein is not in the concept of damages based on 1rticle 220$ of the *ivil *ode which, as an e'ception to the general rule not to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, is but a compensation for services rendered. &hus, the legal proceedings that too- place and the agreement between attorney and client were more than sufficient proof of the legality of the award. &hese factual and legal bases, unli-e in cases where attorneyCs fees are granted in the concept of damages, are not un-nown to the parties in the case at bar.

ERIBERTO M. SUSON vs. HON. COURT O( APPEALS !"/ DA;ID S. ODILAO, JR. D.,. +o. !2A544 1ugust 2!, !445 (ACTS+ Private respondent 3dilao filed a P5.!5 million civil suit for damages against petitioner 7uson before the ,egional &rial *ourt of 7an 6uan (0ranch 2A , 7outhern ?eyte. Private ,espondent claimed that petitioner made false and groundless accusations of graft and corruption against him before the 3ffice of the 3mbudsman, and thereafter caused their publication. Private respondent paid the sum of P25,A00.00 in doc-et fees to the ,egional &rial *ourt (0ranch 2A of 7outhern ?eyte covered by 3fficial ,eceipts. Petitioner 7uson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of private respondent 3dilao on the ground of improper venue, alleging therein that 3dilao resides in &alisay, *ebu and not in 8imonganan, 7outhern ?eyte. 2inding merit in

12

petitionerCs arguments in his motion to dismiss, the lower court (,&* 7outhern ?eyte granted petitionerCs aforesaid motion. Private respondent went to the ,egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity to re>file the same complaint. Private respondent avers that upon showing the official receipts as proof of payment of the doc-et fees in the ,egional &rial *ourt of 7outhern ?eyte (0ranch 2A to the *ler- of *ourt of the ,egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (0ranch A , the latter advised his counsel to file a formal re"uest with this *ourt, thru the *ourt 1dministrator, for an SauthorityT to apply the payment for doc-et fees previously made to the ,egional &rial *ourt (0ranch 2A , 7outhern ?eyte to the doc-et fees to be paid to the ,egional &rial *ourt *ebu *ity (0ranch A . Private respondent, thru counsel, wrote a letter addressed to the 7* *ourt 1dministrator, re"uesting for an authoriEation to consider the filing fees previously paid to the ,egional &rial *ourt (0ranch 2A of 7an 6uan, 7outhern ?eyte as payment for the filing fees to be paid in the ,egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (0ranch A where the case was to be re> filed. &he 7upreme *ourt 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator 0ernardo P. 1besamis sent a reply informing the private respondent that he can re(> file the case at the ,&* *ebu *ity and present the official receipt corresponding to the filing fees paid at ,&*, 0ranch 2A 7an 6uan, 7outhern ?eyte. Private respondent presented the letter>reply of 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator 1besamis to the cler- of court of the ,&* (0ranch A of *ebu *ity upon re>filing his complaint. 3n the basis of the aforesaid letter>reply, the cler- of court doc-eted private respondentCs complaint without re"uiring private respondent to pay anew the prescribed doc-et fees. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of lac- of (urisdiction and lac- of cause of action. Petitioner argued that private respondent Sdid not pay (even a single centavo of the filing fee= hence, the court (,&* of *ebu *ity, 0ranch A did not ac"uire (urisdiction over the case.T &he ,&* of *ebu *ity (0ranch A , presided over by 6udge ?oreto 9. de la Kictoria, issued an order denying petitionerCs motion to dismiss. Petitioner elevated 6udge de la KictoriaCs order for review on certiorari to the *ourt of 1ppeals which agreed with the trial courtCs dispositions. /n his present petition, petitioner contends that Sto relieve 3dilao from paying the doc-et fee in the *ebu *ourt by (ust presenting the receipts issued by the ?eyte *ourt would be tantamount to a withdrawal of the doc-et fee paid to the ?eyte *ourt.T Petitioner further contends that the case later filed in the ,egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (0ranch A by private respondent is a Sdistinct and separate case from that of the ?eyte court as it has a new doc-et number. Private respondent 3dilao contends that Sit is incorrect for petitioner to insist that 3dilao failed to pay the re"uired filing fees.T 8e (3dilao was not granted an Se'emptionT from the payment of filing fees by 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator 1besamis but merely an authority to apply the filing fees he paid.

2rom a procedural point of view, therefore, to Sre>fileT the case before the same court would be an obvious faux pas. 1s a remedial measure, the plaintiff whose complaint was dismissed due to improper venue can still file another complaint, but this time in the court of proper venue. +ote, however, that the dismissal of the complaint filed in the court of proper venue did not stop the running of the prescriptive period within which to file his complaint in the court of proper venue. &heoretically, the plaintiff may decide to file a complaint containing substantially the same allegations and prayer as the previously dismissed complaint, or he may decide to amend the same and pray for a different relief. /n this case, the principle remains unchanged, that is, the court (of proper venue will only ac"uire (urisdiction over the case only upon payment of the prescribed doc-et fee thereon. *onse"uently, the 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator committed an error when he stated in his letter reply to private respondentCs counsel that he can Sre>file the complaint in the ,&* *ebu *ity (0ranch A and present the official receipt corresponding to the filing fees paid in the ,&* 0ranch 2A, 7an 6ose, 7outhern ?eyte.T &here is no way for the 3*1 letter to be misinterpreted by 3dilaoCs counsel because the tenor of the letter of 3dilao to the 3*1 dated 20 6une !444 clearly stressed that he was re"uesting for an authoriEation (from the 3*1 to apply the filing fees he paid in *ivil *ase +o. P>4!5 to cover the filing fees in a case he intends to file with the ,&* of *ebu *ity (0ranch A . /n fact, both the ,egional &rial *ourt of *ebu *ity (0ranch A and the *ourt of 1ppeals held the opinion that this procedural remedy can be obtained from the 3ffice of the 9eputy *ourt 1dministrator. &he 3*1 has neither the power nor the authority to e'empt any party not otherwise e'empt under the law or under the ,ules of *ourt in the payment of the prescribed doc-et fees. &he principles laid down by this *ourt in )anchester and in 7un /nsurance were formulated en banc, no less than the *onstitution mandates that no doctrine or principle laid down by the court in a decision en banc may be modified or reversed e'cept by the court sitting en banc. &o now e'empt or otherwise authoriEe private respondent 3dilao not to pay the prescribed filing fees would not only be in derogation of this principle but also of the general rule in pleadings, practice and procedure that the mista-e of counsel binds his client. &he *ourt 1dministrator cannot grant any relief or remedial measure which is beyond his powers and functions. /t may be noteworthy to mention here that even in the 7upreme *ourt, there are numerous instances when a litigant has had to re>file a petition previously dismissed by *ourt due to a technicality (violation of a pertinent *ircular , and in these instances, the litigant is re"uired to pay the prescribed doc-et fee and not apply to the re>filed case the doc-et fees paid in the earlier dismissed case. *oming bac- to the case at bar, and pursuant to the rules laid down by this *ourt in 7un /nsurance, we hold that under the peculiar circumstances of this case private respondent did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee. 8is counsel simply strayed away from the rules to e'plore the possibility of an e'tra legal remedy. 7ince his case has already been doc-eted as *ivil *ase +o. !A33A in the ,&* 0ranch A *ebu *ity, the procedural remedy of paying the prescribed doc-et fees is still available to him provided, of course, that the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet set in. SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON !"/ ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON, ,.*-*-o".$s, v. THE COURT O( APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, (EDERICO ELAYDA !"/ DANILO ELAYDA, $.s,o"/."*s. 21*&7: Private respondents filed in the ,egional &rial *ourt of IueEon *ity a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2 parcels of land against petitioners.

ISSUE+ #hether respondent 3dilao may re>file in another *ourt the case that was dismissed on the ground of improper venue without having to pay again the doc-et fee of P25,A00 that he has paid in the earlier case. RULING+ /n the case at bar, in the strict sense, private respondentCs complaint cannot be deemed to have been Sre>filedT in the ,&* of *ebu *ity (0ranch A because it was not originally filed in the same court but in the ,&* of 7outhern ?eyte (0ranch 2A . &hus, when private respondentCs complaint was doc-eted as *ivil *ase +o. *<0>!A33A by the cler- of court of the ,&* *ebu *ity (0ranch A , it became an entirely separate case from *ivil *ase +o. P>4!5 that was dismissed by the ,&* of ?eyte due to improper venue. 1s far as *ivil *ase +o. P>4!5 is concerned, while undoubtedly the order of dismissal is not an ad(udication on the merits of the case, the order, nevertheless, is a final order. &his means that when private respondent did not appeal therefrom, the order became final and e'ecutory for all legal intents and purposes.

13

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not ac"uire (urisdiction over the case by reason of private respondentsC nonpayment of the correct amount of doc-et fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for P!00,000.00 for attorneyCs fees, private respondents should have paid doc-et fees in the amount of P2!,A40.00, based on the alleged value of the two (2 parcels of land sub(ect matter of the contract of sale sought to be annulled. &he trial court denied petitionersC motion to dismiss but re"uired private respondents to pay the amount of doc-et fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation. &he appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the doc-et fees should not be based on the value of the real property, sub(ect matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded. /77%<: #G+ in assessing the doc-et fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property, sub(ect matter of the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action should be considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00. 8<?9: +3. 1lthough eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. #here the money claim is purely incidental to, or a conse"uence of, the principal relief sought, li-e in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance and in actions for support, or for annulment of a (udgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this *ourt has considered such actions as cases where the sub(ect of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cogniEable e'clusively by the ,egional &rial *ourt. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs! COURT O( APPEALS, HON. ARSENIO J. MAGPALE, !"/ JOSE MA. P. JACINTO G.R. No. '&3&'7. (.8$#!$% &, '999 (!)*s+ Private respondent 6acinto was the former owner of record of !00 shares of stoc- of the )anila Dolf and *ountry *lub ()D** now owned by and registered in the name of petitioner +7*. /n his complaint, he alleged that he was the owner of the shares of stoc- until )D**/ cancelled and transferred it in the name of +7* without his consent. 6acinto filed in ,&* )a-ati a complaint ordering the +7* to e'ecute a deed of assignment re> transferring the said shares to 6ose )a. P. 6acinto. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of lac- of (urisdiction. &he actual value of the )D**/ share certificate when the complaint was filed, was P5,5!!,000.00 hence the correct doc-et fee for the filing of plaintiffCs complaint is appro'imately P2A,$05.00 and not P4,040.00 which is the amount plaintiff actually paid. &he failure of plaintiff to pay the correct filing fees on meant that this court did not ac"uire (urisdiction over plaintiffCs action. Iss#.+ 2or purposes of computing the doc-et fee, is the action filed by 6acinto an action for recovery of property or an action for specific performance, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation L ,ecovery of Property>,&* H.2/+ &he action in this case is for recovery of property (shares of stoc-s rather than specific performance, hence doc-et fees should be based on the value of the property sought to be recovered. 6acintoCs primary purpose here is to regain the ownership and possession of the said shares of stoc-s.

('etitioner8s contention regarding the wrong doc1et fees paid would have been meritorious if he timely questioned the +T)8s lac1 of jurisdiction. %ere8s the more detailed ruling as to !$) being barred by estoppel for bringing up the question regarding the +T)8s jurisdiction for the first time on appeal to )*. ) 1ccordingly, as petitioner +7* contends, private respondent 6acinto should pay doc-et fees based on the value of the shares of stoc- and the amount of damages he see-s to recover. /t does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failure of private respondent to pay the correct amount of doc-et fees. 1lthough the payment of the proper doc-et fees is a (urisdictional re"uirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the e'piration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. /f 6acinto fails to comply with this re"uirement, the +7* should timely raise the issue of (urisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. 8owever, the petitioner only raised the issue regarding (urisdiction for the first time in its 0rief filed with the public respondent (*1 . 1fter vigorously participating in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invo-ing the trial courtCs authority in order to as- for affirmative relief, the petitioner is effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courtCs (urisdiction. 1lthough the issue of (urisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel. &he deficiency in the payment of the doc-et fees must, however, be considered a lien on the (udgment which must be remitted to the cler- of court of the court a quo upon the e'ecution of the (udgment. /n the case at bar, petitioner +7* filed in !440 a motion to dismiss but did not raise this point. /nstead it based his motion on prescription. %pon the denial by the trial court of its motion to dismiss, it filed an answer, submitted its pre>trial brief, and participated in the proceedings before the trial court. /t was only in !443 V more than three years after filing its motion to dismiss V that petitioner +7* again filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of lac- of (urisdiction. *learly, petitioner is estopped from raising this issue. /ndeed, while the lac- of (urisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such "uestion may be estopped if he has actively ta-en part in the very proceedings which he "uestions and he only ob(ects to the courtCs (urisdiction because the (udgment or the order subse"uently rendered is adverse to him. HHERE(ORE, the decision of the *ourt of 1ppeals is 122/,)<9. &he deficiency in the payment of the doc-et fees shall be a lien on any (udgment which may be rendered in favor of private respondent 6ose P. 6acinto. LACSON HERMANAS, INC., 0.$.-" $.,$.s."*./ 8% -*s P$.s-/."* MR. ODILON L. LACSON, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS O( CENON IGNACIO, 0.$.-" $.,$.s."*./ 8% *0.-$ !**%--"-1!)*, AMALIA IGNACIO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH > , CITY O( SAN (ERNANDO, ,$.s-/./ 8% *0. HON. JUDGE SERA(IN B. DA;ID, ,espondents. 3G.R. No. '67993, J#". &9, &007, Y"!$.s-S!"*-!=o4 (ACTS 3n 1pril 24, 2004, private respondents, 8eirs of *enon /gnacio, filed a complaint for recovery of real property against petitioner ?acson 8ermanas, /nc. &hey alleged that their predecessor>in>interest, *enon /gnacio (*enon , purchased from petitioner a !,000 s"uare meter portion of a parcel of land for P50,000.00 which was fully paid on 7eptember 24, !4$4. *enon thereafter too- possession of the sub(ect area and fenced the boundaries thereof for the construction of 7eventh 9ay 1dventist *hapel. 3n 6anuary !!, !44A, however, *enon died. 7ometime in 2002, private respondents demanded the delivery of the lotCs title and the segregation of the portion sold to *enon but was informed by petitioner that the same lot has been sold to ,owena &. *oleman. 8ence, the instant case to compel petitioner to e'ecute the necessary deed of sale and to deliver the ownerCs duplicate copy of title.

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Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contendingthat the case is cogniEable by the 8ousing and ?and %se ,egulatory 0oard (8?%,0 and not the trial court because it is sued as a subdivision developer and the property involved is a subdivision lot. &he trial court denied the motion to dismiss holding that it has (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter= that the allegation that the lot involved is a subdivision lot is not a ground to deprive the court of its (urisdiction. PetitionerCs motion for reconsideration was denied. 8ence, the instant petition. ISSUE #hether or not the case at bar is cogniEable by the 8?%,0. HELD &he petition lac-s merit. 7ection ! of P9 !344 vests the +ational 8ousing 1uthority (now 8?%,0 with e'clusive (urisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: (a unsound real estate business practice= (b claims involving refund and any other claims filed by s#8/-v-s-o" 2o* o$ )o"/o5-"-#5 #"-* 8#%.$ against the ,$oJ.)* oD".$, /.v.2o,.$, /.!2.$, 8$oO.$, o$ s!2.s5!" = and (c cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by 8#%.$s o1 s#8/-v-s-o" 2o* o$ )o"/o5-"-#5 #"-* against the oD".$, /.v.2o,.$, /.!2.$, 8$oO.$ o$ s!2.s5!". /t is a settled rule that (urisdiction over the sub(ect matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint and is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. 3therwise, (urisdiction would become dependent upon the whims of the defendant. &he allegations in private respondentsC complaint clearly vest (urisdiction in the trial court. +othing therein shows that the "uestioned property is a subdivision lot and sold by petitioner as a subdivision developer. )ere assertion by petitioner that it is a subdivision developer and the land involved is a subdivision lot, will not automatically strip the trial court of its (urisdiction and authoriEe the 8?%,0 to ta-e cogniEance of the complaint. /ndeed, it does not always follow that each sale made by petitioner is underta-en in its capacity as a subdivision developer, in the same manner that sales made in such capacity are not at all times intended for subdivision development. &here is no allegation in the complaint that the lot purchased by petitioners is part of a tract of land partitioned primarily for residential purposes into individual lots and offered to the public for sale. &here is li-ewise no allegation that the tract of land includes recreational areas and open spaces. +or does the ;*ontract to 7ell;, which forms part of the complaint, describe the sub(ect property as a subdivision lot. #hat the contract strongly suggests is that the property is simply a lot offered by respondents, as vendors, to the petitioners, as vendees, for sale on installment. 1s can be clearly gleaned from the same contract, respondents are not acting as subdivision owners, developers, bro-ers or salesmen, nor are they engaged in the real estate business. #hat is plain is that the parties are acting only as ordinary sellers and buyers of a specific lot, a portion of a big tract of land co>owned by the heirs of )ariano 2araon. +either are there underta-ings specified in the contract that respondents shall develop the land, li-e providing for the subdivision concrete roads and sidewal-s, street lights, curbs and gutters, underground drainage system, independent water system, landscaping, developed par-, and 24>hour security guard service. <ven the rights and obligations of the sellers and buyers of a subdivision lot are not provided in the agreement. 1ll these provisions are usually contained in a standard contract involving a sale of a subdivision lot. /n the instant case, the parties never mentioned if the contract was embodied in a written instrument which may shed light on the nature of their transaction. 1t any rate, the allegations in private respondentsC complaint which determine the tribunal that may lawfully ta-e cogniEance of the case, clearly show that (urisdiction in the present controversy is lodged with the trial court and not with the 8?%,0.

HEIRS O( BERTULDO HINOG vs. HON. ACHILLES MELICOR 6G.R. No. '>097>. A,$-2 '&, &007: (ACTS+ 3n )ay 2!, !44!, private respondents *ustodio, ,ufo, &omas and 8onorio, all surnamed 0alane, filed a complaint for S,ecovery of 3wnership and Possession, ,emoval of *onstruction and 9amagesT against 0ertuldo 8inog. &hey alleged that: they own a !,344 s".m parcel of land in )alayo +orte, *ortes, 0ohol, designated as ?ot +o. !5!4. /n )arch !4$0, they allowed 0ertuldo to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light materials at a nominal annual rental of P!00 only, considering the close relations of the parties= after the e'piration of the ten> year period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but 0ertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property. Private respondents sought to oust 0ertuldo from the premises of the sub(ect property and restore upon themselves the ownership and possession thereof, as well as the payment of moral and e'emplary damages, attorneyCs fees and litigation e'penses Sin amounts (ustified by the evidence. 0ertuldo filed his 1nswer and alleged ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a 9eed of 1bsolute 7ale dated 6uly 2, !4$0, e'ecuted by one &omas Pahac with the -nowledge and conformity of private respondents. 0ertuldo started his direct e'amination. 8owever, on 6une 24, !44$, 0ertuldo died without completing his evidence. Petalcorin filed a motion to e'punge the complaint and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct doc-et fees= and that under )anchester 9evelopment *orporation vs. *1, non>payment of the correct doc-et fee is (urisdictional. 1tty. Petalcorin further alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct doc-et fee since the main sub(ect matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction. /n their ,e(oinder, petitioners manifested that the lapse of time does not vest the court with (urisdiction over the case due to failure to pay the correct doc-et fees. 1s to the contention that deficiency in payment of doc-et fees can be made as a lien on the (udgment, petitioners argued that the payment of filing fees cannot be made dependent on the result of the action ta-en. &he trial court held that the *ourt can ac"uire (urisdiction over this case only upon the payment of the e'act prescribed doc-etGfiling fees for the main cause of action, plus additional doc-et fee for the amount of damages being prayed for in the complaint, which amount should be specified so that the same can be considered in assessing the amount of the filing fees. %pon the complete payment of such fees, the *ourt may ta-e appropriate action in the light of the ruling in the case of )anchester 9evelopment *orporation vs. *ourt of 1ppeals, supra. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court. &he trial court held that the )anchester rule was rela'ed in 7un /nsurance 3ffice, ?td. vs. 1suncion. +oting that there has been no substitution of parties following the death of 0ertuldo, the trial court directed 1tty. Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of 7ection !A, ,ule 3 of the ,ules of *ourt. &he trial court also reiterated that the 3rder reinstating the case was not assailed by petitioners within the reglementary period, despite receipt thereof. &hus, petitioners filed before 7* this present petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after private respondents paid the doc-et fee deficiency since the trial court had earlier e'punged the complaint from the record and nullified all proceedings of the case and such ruling was not contested by the private respondents. )oreover, they argue that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be filed and denying the manifestation with motion to dismiss, despite the defect in the complaint which prayed for damages without specifying the amounts, in violation of 7* *ircular +o. 5, dated )arch 24, !4$$.

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/n their *omment, private respondents aver that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency doc-et fees because petitioners did not ob(ect thereto within the reglementary period. 0esides, 1tty. Petalcorin possessed no legal personality to appear as counsel for the heirs of 0ertuldo until he complies with 7ection !A, ,ule 3 of the ,ules of *ourt. ISSUE+ (! #3+ the petitioners may challenge the courtCs (urisdiction. (+3 = and (2 #3+ the non>payment of the proper doc-et fee at the time of the filing of thecomplaint automatically causes the dismissal of the action.(+3 RULING+ 1lthough the 7upreme *ourt, *ourt of 1ppeals and the ,egional &rial *ourts have concurrent (urisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, "uo warranto, habeas corpus and in(unction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. &he rationale for this rule is two>fold: (a it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this *ourt= and (b it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the ad(udication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better e"uipped to resolve the issues because this *ourt is not a trier of facts. &hus, this *ourt will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and e'ceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, (ustify the availment of the e'traordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the e'ercise of its primary (urisdiction. /n this case, no special and important reason or e'ceptional and compelling circumstance analogous to any of the above cases has been adduced by the petitioners so as to (ustify direct recourse to this *ourt. &he present petition should have been initially filed in the *ourt of 1ppeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. 2ailure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition at bar. &he unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is borne out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the 3rder which they never sought reconsideration of despite receipt thereof on )arch 2A, !444. /nstead, petitioners went through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied, or after more than three months have passed, did they raise the issue that the complaint should not have been reinstated in the first place because the trial court had no (urisdiction to do so, having already ruled that the complaint shall be e'punged. 3'4 1fter recogniEing the (urisdiction of the trial court by see-ing affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courtCs (urisdiction. /f a party invo-es the (urisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the courtCs (urisdiction in the same case. +evertheless, there is a need to correct the erroneous impression of the trial court as well as the private respondents that petitioners are barred from assailing the 3rder which reinstated the case because it was not ob(ected to within the reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof. /t must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental matter which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. /t is an interlocutory order since there leaves something else to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case. 1s such, it is not sub(ect to a reglementary period. ,eglementary period refers to the period set by the rules for appeal or further review of a final (udgment or order, i.e., one that ends the litigation in the trial court. )oreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to ta-e an appeal in the manner authoriEed by law. 3nly when the court issued such order without or in e'cess of (urisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford ade"uate and e'peditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. 7uch special circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case.

3&4 &ime and again, the *ourt has held that the )anchester rule has been modified in 7un /nsurance 3ffice, ?td. (7/3? vs. 1suncionN45O which defined the following guidelines involving the payment of doc-et fees: a. /t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee, that vests a trial court with (urisdiction over the sub(ect>matter or nature of the action. #here the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the doc-et fee, the court may allow payment of the fees within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. b. &he same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third>party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. &he court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. c. #here the trial court ac"uires (urisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subse"uently, the (udgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the (udgment. /t shall be the responsibility of the *ler- of *ourt or his duly authoriEed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee is a (urisdictional re"uirement, even its non>payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.N4AO &hus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the )anchester rule does not apply. %nder the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement of the complaint was (ust and proper considering that the cause of action of private respondents, being a real action, prescribes in thirty years, and private respondents did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed doc-et fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for inade"uate assessment because the cler- of court made no notice of demand or reassessment. 2urthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment of damages Sin amounts (ustified by the evidenceT does not call for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of 7* *ircular +o. 5 which re"uired that all complaints must specify the amount of damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be accepted and admitted for filing. 7un /nsurance effectively modified 7* *ircular +o. 5 by providing that filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally granted by the trial court. &hus, while the doc-et fees were based only on the real property valuation, the trial court ac"uired (urisdiction over the action, and (udgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven during trial would still be sub(ect to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the (udgment. /t would then be the responsibility of the *lerof *ourt of the trial court or his duly authoriEed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees. /t is worth noting that when 0ertuldo filed his 1nswer he did not raise the issue of lac- of (urisdiction for non>payment of correct doc-et fees. /nstead, he based his defense on a claim of ownership and participated in the proceedings before the trial court. /t was only in 7ept. 22, !44$ or more than seven years after filing the answer, and under the auspices of a new counsel, that the issue of (urisdiction was raised for the first time in the motion to e'punge by 0ertuldoCs heirs. 1fter 0ertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invo-ed the trial courtCs authority in order to as- for affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that they merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courtCs (urisdiction. 1lthough the issue of (urisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel. )oreover, no formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of death of 0ertuldo, as re"uired by 7ection !A, ,ule 3 of the ,ules of *ourt. +on>compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and (udgment of the trial court infirm because the court ac"uires no (urisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the (udgment would be binding. &hus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court to ac"uire (urisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the

16

litigation against 0ertuldo or that he did not authoriEe 1tty. Petalcorin to represent him. 3's* /-v4 G.R. No. '6 3 0 (.8$#!$% , &009 MANUEL ;. BA;IERA, vs. ESPERANAA PAGLINAHAN & G.R. No. '9060& (.8$#!$% , &009 MANUEL ;. BA;IERA, vs. STANDARD CHARTERED BANG 21*&7: )anuel 0aviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former head of the 8, 7ervice 9elivery and /ndustrial ,elations of 7tandard *hartered 0an->Philippines. 7*0 did not comply with the conditions set forth by the 07P. 1lthough unregistered with the 7<*, 7*0 was able to sell securities worth around PA billion to some A45 investors. Petitioner entered into an /nvestment &rust 1greement with 7*0 wherein he purchased %7X$,000.00 worth of securities upon the ban-Cs promise of 40Y return on his investment and a guarantee that his money is safe. 1fter si' (A months, however, petitioner learned that the value of his investment went down to %7X5,000.00. 8e tried to withdraw his investment but was persuaded by 1ntonette de los ,eyes of 7*0 to hold on to it for another si' (A months in view of the possibility that the mar-et would pic- up. &he trend in the securities mar-et, however, was bearish and the worth of petitionerCs investment went down further to only %7X3,000.00. 3n 3ctober 2A, 200!, Petitioner then filed with the 07P a letter>complaint demanding compensation for his lost investment. 0ut 7*0 denied his demand on the ground that his investment is ;regular.; 3n 6uly !5, 2003, petitioner filed with the 9epartment of 6ustice (936 , represented herein by its prosecutors, public respondents, a complaint charging the above>named officers and members of the 7*0 0oard of 9irectors and other 7*0 officials, private respondents, with syndicated estafa. 2or their part, private respondents filed the following as counter>charges against petitioner: (! blac-mail and e'tortion and blac-mail and per(ury. 3n 7eptember 24, 2003, petitioner also filed a complaint for per(ury against private . 3n 2ebruary 5, 2004, petitioner also filed with the 936 a complaint for violation of 7ection $.! 4 of the 7ecurities ,egulation *ode against private respondents, 3n 2ebruary 23, 2004, the 936 rendered its 6oint ,esolution dismissing all the complaints and counter>charges filed the herein parties. Petitioner filed with the *ourt of 1ppeals a petition for certiorari alleging that the 936 acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac- or e'cess of (urisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated estafa and a separate petition for certiorari assailing the 936 ,esolution dismissing the case for violation of the 7ecurities ,egulation *ode. Petitioner claimed that the 936 acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lac- or e'cess of (urisdiction in holding that the complaint should have been filed with the 7<*. 3n 6anuary 5, 2005, the *ourt of 1ppeals promulgated its 9ecision dismissing the petition. /t sustained the ruling of the 936 that the case should have been filed initially with the 7<*. )eanwhile, on 2ebruary 2!, 2005, the *ourt of 1ppeals rendered its 9ecision involving petitionerCs charges and respondentsC counter chargesdismissing the petitions on the ground that the purpose of a petition for certiorari is not to evaluate and weigh

the partiesC evidence but to determine whether the assailed ,esolution of the 936 was issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lac- of (urisdiction. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was denied . 8ence, the instant petitions for review on certiorari. /77%<: #hether or not the *ourt of 1ppeals erred in concluding that the 936 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitionerCs complaint for= v-o2!*-o" o1 S.)#$-*-.s R.=#2!*-o" Co/. !"/ 1o$ s%"/-)!*./ estafa! 8<?9 : (2or violation of 7ecurities ,egulation *ode +3. &he *ourt of 1ppeals held that under 7ection 53.! of the said *ode provides, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule administered by the 7<* must first be filed with the latter. /f the *ommission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the 936. 7ince petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural re"uirement, the 936 did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint. %nder the doctrine of primary (urisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a "uestion within the (urisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the "uestion demands the e'ercise of sound administrative discretion re"uiring the specialiEed -nowledge and e'pertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact 3(o$ S%"/-)!*./ Es*!1!4= +3. 7ection 5, ,ule !!0 of the 2000 ,ules of *riminal Procedure, as amended, provides that all criminal actions, commenced by either a complaint or an information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. &his mandate is founded on the theory that a crime is a breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very sovereignty of the 7tate. /t follows that a representative of the 7tate shall direct and control the prosecution of the offense. 1 public prosecutor is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffers. "uare# v! Platon *oncomitant with his authority and power to control the prosecution of criminal offenses, the public prosecutor is vested with the discretionary power to determine whether a prima facie case e'ists or not. 1 preliminary investigation is essentially an in"uiry to determine whether (a a crime has been committed= and (b whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. &hus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. &he rule in this (urisdiction is that courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations or in the determination of what )o"s*-*#*.s s#11-)-."* probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an offender. *ourts are not empowered to substitute their own (udgment for that of the e'ecutive branch. &he prosecutorCs findings on the e'istence of probable cause are not sub(ect to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. /n $uare/ previously cited, this *ourt made it clear that a public prosecutorCs duty is two>fold. 3n one hand, he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons where the complainantCs evidence is ample and sufficient to show prima facie guilt of a crime. @et, on the other hand, he is li-ewise duty>bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution. HHERE(ORE, we DENY the petitions and A((IRM the assailed 9ecisions of the *ourt of 1ppeals in *1>D.,. 7P +o. $532$ and in *1> D.,. 7P +o. $505$. DACANAY vs. YRASTORAA 21*&7:

17

3n 6uly !4, !442, petitioner Kicente 9acanay, as administrator of the testate estate of &ereso 9. 2ernandeE, filed in the ,egional &rial *ourt (,&* of *ebu *ity a case for recovery of real property against respondent spouses ?uissa and ,aul 7amaco and ,oberta and 0ryan Rersaw. 3n 9ecember 22, !442, respondent spouses 7amaco filed their answer with counterclaim. 3n )ay !2, !443, petitioner amended his complaint to implead respondent 6ohnson )ercader. 3n 1ugust 3, !443, respondent )ercader filed his answer with counterclaim. ,espondent spouses Rersaw were declared in default as they did not file an answer despite service of summons by publication. 3n )ay !5, !444, petitioner filed his second amended complaint which the court granted. 3n )arch 30, !444, respondent spouses 7amaco filed their answer with counterclaim, while respondent )ercader filed his on )ay 30, !444. 3n 9ecember !2, !445, the ,&* dismissed petitionerCs complaint for lac- of merit. +ot satisfied, petitioner appealed to the *ourt of 1ppeals (*1 . 3n 3ctober 25, !444, the *1N!5O affirmed the ,&* in toto. Petitioner then filed in the 7upreme *ourt a motion for e'tension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. 8is motion was denied in a minute resolutionN!AO because of procedural lapses on his part. 3n 6uly !2, 200!, respondent )ercader filed a motion for e'ecution of the ,&* decision. Petitioner opposedN22O the motion, contending that he should not be made personally liable for the amount awarded by the ,&*. &he ,&* (udgment should be considered as a claim against the estate of &ereso 2ernandeE. &hus, the writ of e'ecution should be referred to the court where the estate of &ereso 2ernandeE was being settled. 3n 1ugust 30, 200!, the ,&* granted respondent )ercaderCs motion for e'ecution.N23O 1ccording to the ,&*, there was no impediment to the e'ecution of its decision because it had already become final and e'ecutory. )oreover, considering that the decision sought to be e'ecuted S(did not involve money claims,T the writ of e'ecution could not be directed against the estate of &ereso 2ernandeE. PetitionerCs motion for reconsideration went unheeded. ,efusing to give up, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari in this *ourt. 8e reiterates his position that he should not be made personally liable to pay the P50,000 awarded by the ,&* in favor of respondent spouses 7amaco and respondent )ercader. /77%<: #3+ petitioner can still "uestion the (udgement rendered by the ,&*, through a petition for certiorari. 8<?9: 1t the outset, we note that petitioner filed his petition for certiorari directly in this *ourt. &his is a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. 8e should have filed his petition in the *1 before see-ing relief from this *ourt. &hus, this petition can be dismissed outright for being procedurally infirm. Mo$.ov.$, *0. ,.*-*-o" 2!)Os 5.$-*. T0. RTC /.)-s-o" so#=0* *o 8. .E.)#*./ 0!s 2o"= !**!-"./ 1-"!2-*%. H.")., ,.*-*-o".$ )!" "o 2o"=.$ I#.s*-o" -*.

O"). ! J#/=5."* !**!-"s 1-"!2-*%, -* 8.)o5.s -55#*!82. !"/ #"!2*.$!82.. A 1-"!2 !"/ .E.)#*o$% J#/=5."* 5!% "o 2o"=.$ 8. 5o/-1-./ -" !"% $.s,.)*, .v." -1 *0. 5o/-1-)!*-o" -s 5.!"* *o )o$$.)* D0!* -s ,.$).-v./ *o 8. !" .$$o".o#s )o")2#s-o" o1 1!)* o$ 2!D !"/ $.=!$/2.ss o1 D0.*0.$ *0. 5o/-1-)!*-o" -s !**.5,*./ *o 8. 5!/. 8% *0. )o#$* $."/.$-"= -* o$ 8% *0. 0-=0.s* )o#$* o1 *0. 2!"/. &his is the /o)*$-". o1 1-"!2-*% o1 J#/=5."*. /t is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the ris- of occasional errors, the (udgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fi'ed by law. 3therwise, there will be no end to litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of (ustice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling (usticiable controversies with finality. &hus, respondent )ercader properly moved for the e'ecution of the ,&* decision on 6uly !2, 200!. 2or the same reason, there was no legal impediment to the ,&*Cs issuance of a writ of e'ecution of its final and e'ecutory decision on 1ugust 30, 200!. G.R. No. '&66&3 D.).58.$ '&, '999 ERNESTO MORALES, petitioner, vs. COURT O( APPEALS, HON. AL(REDO J. GUSTILO, !s P$.s-/-"= J#/=. o1 RTC, P!s!% C-*%, B$!")0 ''6 !"/ PEOPLE O( THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The 1ey issue in this case is whether# in light of +.*. !o. 9:;< as interpreted in 'eople v. $imon# and +.*. !o. 9:<=# +egional Trial )ourts have jurisdiction over violations of +.*. !o. :>?;# otherwise 1nown as the 0angerous 0rugs *ct of =<9?# as amended# when the imposable penalty is not more than six (:) years. (!)*s+ &he petitioner was charged with the violation of 7ection !5 in relation to 7ection 20 of ,.1. +o. A425, as amended by ,.1. +o. 5A54, in an information filed before the ,egional &rial *ourt (,&* of Pasay *ity when <rnesto )orales y 9e la *ruE sell and deliver to another 0.45$5 grams of )etamphetamine 8ydrochloride (shabu , a regulated drug on march !!, !44A 7ubse"uently, the petitioner filed a )otion to 9ismiss on the ground that the ,&* had no (urisdiction to try the case considering that pursuant to 7ection 20 of ,.1. +o. 5A54 as construed in People v. 7imon, the penalty imposable for the offense charged should not e'ceed prision correccional or si' (A years and under ,.1. +o. 5A4! it is the )etropolitan &rial *ourt which has (urisdiction over the case. /n its 3rder, the ,&* denied the motion. /t held cases punishable with penalties of not more than si' (A years are within the e'clusive (urisdiction of the )etropolitan &rial *ourts. 8owever, the e'ceptions are ;cases falling within the e'clusive original (urisdiction of the ,&*. . .; %nder 7ection 34 of the 9angerous 9rugs 1ct of !452, the *2/ now the ,&* and the 6uvenile and 9omestic ,elations *ourt, which no longer e'ist, ;shall have concurrent original (urisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this 1ct.; /t is therefore clear that this case, which is a violation of ,epublic 1ct +o. A425, although punishable by a penalty of less than si' (A years, falls within the (urisdiction of the ,egional &rial *ourt. &he petitioner filed with respondent *1 a petition for certiorari under ,ule A5. &he 37D agreed with the petitioner that the ,&* had no (urisdiction to try the criminal case. /t, however, asserted that the *1 had no (urisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari, as the same involved only the "uestion of (urisdiction of an inferior court, hence, cogniEable by the 7upreme *ourt alone pursuant to 7ection 4 of 0atas Pambansa 0ilang !24, in connection with 7ection 5(2 (c , 1rticle K/// of the !4$5 *onstitution and 7ection !5 of ,epublic 1ct +o. 5440. &he 37D then recommended that the case be elevated to the 7upreme *ourt for disposition, or that the *ourt of 1ppeals grant the petition and set aside the challenged order of the ,&* should it rule that it had (urisdiction over petition. &he *1 dismissed the petition for certiorari for lac- of (urisdiction over the action. &he 7olicitor Deneral contended that this *ourt has no (urisdiction over the petition for it properly falls within the e'clusive (urisdiction of the 7upreme *ourt pursuant to 7ection 5, 1rticle K/// of the *onstitution.

18

ISSUE+ !. #hether or not the *1 has (urisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari in der rule A5 where the issue is the (urisdiction of the ,&* 6udge to try the alleged violation of ,.1. A425 2. #hether or not respondent ,&* has the (urisdiction to try over violations of ,.1. A425 or 9angerous 9rugs act. RULING+ '.4 &he *ourt of 1ppeals erred in holding that it had no (urisdiction over petitioner.s special civil action for certiorari under ,ule A5 of the ,ules of *ourt. &his error of the *ourt of 1ppeals was due to its misapplication of 7ection 5(2 (c of 1rticle K/// of the *onstitution and of that portion of 7ection !5 of the 6udiciary 1ct of !44$ vesting upon the 7upreme *ourt e'clusive (urisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final (udgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the (urisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. /t forgot that this constitutional and statutory provisions pertain to the appellate H not original H jurisdiction of the 7upreme *ourt, as correctly maintained by the petitioner. 1n appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a new action, such as that of a special civil action for certiorari. &he general rule is that a denial of a motion to dismiss or to "uash in criminal cases is interlocutory and cannot be the sub(ect of an appeal or of a special civil action for certiorari. &.4 1pplying by analogy the ruling in 'eople v. $imon, the imposable penalty in this case which involves @.>;A9 grams of shabu should not e'ceed prision correccional. #e say by analogy because these cases involved mari(uana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu . *learly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in *riminal *ase would at most be only prision correccional whose duration is from A mos and one (! day to si' (A years. 9oes it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the ,&* has no (urisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of 7ection 32 of 0.P. 0lg. !24 by ,.1. +o. 5A4!, which vested upon )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts, and )unicipal *ircuit &rial *ourts. e'clusive original (urisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not e'ceeding si' (A years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penaltiesL $ec. B?. 4urisdiction of .etropolitan Trial )ourts# .unicipal Trial )ourts and .unicipal )ircuit Trial )ourts in )riminal )ases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of +egional Trial )ourt and of the $andiganbayan# the .etropolitan Trial )ourts# .unicipal Trial )ourts# and .unicipal )ircuit Trial )ourts shall exercise, ?) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (:) years irrespective of the amount of fine# and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties# including the civil liability arising from such offender or predicated thereon# irrespective of 1ind# nature# value or amount thereof, 'rovided# however# That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence# they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. &he e'ception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. 0y virtue thereof, the e'clusive original (urisdiction of the )etropolitan &rial *ourts, )unicipal &rial *ourts, and )unicipal *ircuit &rial *ourts in criminal cases does not cover those cases which by provision of law fall within the e'clusive original (urisdiction of ,&* and of the 7andiganbayan regardless of the prescribed penalty. 3therwise put, even if such cases are punishable by imprisonment not e'ceeding si' years (i.e., prision correccional# arresto mayor, or arresto menor , (urisdiction, thereon is retained by ,&* or the 7andiganbayan, as the case may be. &he aforementioned e'ception refers not only to 7ection 20 of 0.P. 0lg. !24 providing for the (urisdiction of ,egional &rial *ourts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge in ,&* e'clusive (urisdiction over specific criminal cases, e.g., (a 1rticle 3A0 of the ,evised Penal *ode, as amended by ,.1. +os. !2$4 and 43A3 on written defamation or libel= (b 9ecree on intellectual Property (P.9. +o. 44, as amended , which vests upon *ourts of 2irst /nstance e'clusive (urisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty= and (c more appropriately for the case at bar, 7ection 34

of ,.1. +o. A425, as amended by P.9. +o. 44, which vests on *2/, *ircuit *riminal *ourts, and the 6uvenile and 9omestic ,elations *ourts concurrent e'clusive original (urisdiction over all cases involving violations of said 1ct. ,.1. +o. 5A4! can by no means be considered another special law on (urisdiction but merely an amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the 6udiciary ,eorganiEation 1ct of !4$0. /n a manner of spea-ing, ,.1. +o. 5A4! was absorbed by the mother law, the 6udiciary ,eorganiEation 1ct of !4$0. &hat *ongress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting e'clusive (urisdiction in the ,&*s over certain cases is clearly evident from the e'ception provided for in the opening sentence of 7ection 32 of 0.P. 0lg. !24, as amended by ,.1. +o. 5A4!. &hese special laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (7ection A of ,.1. +o. 5A4!. +either can it be successfully argued that 7ection 34 of ,.1. +o. A425, as amended by P.9. +o. 44, is no longer operative because 7ection 44 of 0.P. 0lg. !24 abolished the *ourts of 2irst /nstance, *ircuit *riminal *ourts, and 6uvenile and 9omestic ,elations *ourts, this *ourt should not lose sight of the fact that the ,&* merely replaced the *ourts of 2irst /nstance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of 7ection 44. /n short, there was a change in name only H from *ourts of 2irst /nstance to +egional Trial )ourts. &he /nterim ,ules and Duidelines ,elative to the /mplementation of 0.P. 0lg. !24 promulgated by this *ourt on !! 6anuary !4$3 also provides that the reference to the courts of first instance in the ,ules of *ourt shall be deemed changed to the regional trial courts. *onse"uently, it is not accurate to state that the ;abolition; of the *ourts of 2irst /nstance carried with it the abolition of their e'clusive original (urisdiction in drug cases vested by 7ection 34 of ,.1. +o. A425, as amended by P. 9. +o. 44. &he same 1dministrative 3rder +o. !04>4A recogniEes that violations of ,1. +o. A42A, as amended, regardless of the "uantity involved, are to be tried and decided by the ,&* therein designated as special courts. &he ,&* then did not commit any error in denying petitioner.s motion to dismiss *ivil *ase. C#8.$o vs L!=#"! M#2*--,#$,os. Coo,. (!)*s+ *ubero along with some other fol-s enter into a 6K1 with 0elle *orp to develop several hectares of *1,P land owned by *ubero and fol-s in &anuan 0atangas. %pon learning of this deal, ?aguna #est files 4 e' parte motions to have adverse claims attached on the sub(ectlots, claiming that ?# had a prior 6K1 with the predecessors in interest of *ubero and fol-s and that these same 6K1.s were registered as adverse claims over the previous titles of thesub(ects lots. 0elle for its part alleges that the 6K1 between ?# and the predecessors in interest are void ab initio since they were e'ecuted within the !0 year prohibitory period under ,1 AA55 (*1, law of .$$ . ,&* dismisses the case, holding that the matter must be brought before the 91,10 first since it involves a "uestion over which 91,10 has primary (urisdiction. &he ), is re(ected hence the present petition for review on certiorari. Iss#.+ 9oes 91,10 have original (urisdiction over this matterL H.2/+ @es. /n the recent case of /slanders *1,P>2armers 0eneficiaries )ulti>Purpose *ooperative 9evelopment, /nc. v. ?apanday 1gricultural and 9evelopment *orp.,23 this *ourt elucidated on the scope of an agrarian dispute, viE:&he 9epartment of 1grarian ,eform (91, is vested with primary (urisdiction to determine and ad(udicate agrarian reform matters, with e'clusive original (urisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform e'cept those falling under the e'clusive (urisdiction of the 9epartment of 1griculture and the 9epartment of <nvironment and +atural ,esources. &he 9epartment of 1grarian ,eform 1d(udication 0oard (91,10 has (urisdiction to determine and ad(udicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the *omprehensive 1grarian ,eform ?aw (*1,? . /ncluded in the definition of agrarian disputes are those arising from other tenurial arrangements beyond the traditional landowner>tenant or lessor>lessee relationship. <'pressly, these arrangements are recogniEed by ,epublic 1ct +o. AA55 as essential parts of

19

agrarian reform. &hus, the 91,10 has (urisdiction over disputes arising from the instant 6oint Production 1greement entered into by the present parties./n cases where allegations of violation or circumvention of land reform laws have been raised, this *ourt has declined to address them, it stating that petitioners must first plead their case with the 91,10. &here is no reason why this *ourt should now hold otherwise. 0onus ,eading: (9istinction between original and e'clusive (urisdiction: 3riginal (urisdiction means (urisdiction to ta-e cogniEance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass (udgment upon the law and facts, while e'clusive (urisdiction precludes the idea of co>e'istence and refers to (urisdiction possessed to the e'clusion of others. DEPARTMENT O( AGRARIAN RE(ORM, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA !"/ Ho". AL(ONSO B. COMBONG JR., -" H-s C!,!)-*% !s *0. P$.s-/-"= J#/=. o1 *0. R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$*, B$!")0 63, L! C!$2o*! C-*%, (ACTS+ 1ll controversies on the implementation of the *omprehensive 1grarian ,eform Program (*1,P fall under the (urisdiction of the 9epartment of 1grarian ,eform (91, , even though they raise "uestions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. 1ll doubts should be resolved in favor of the 91,, since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and ad(udicate agrarian matters. Petition for ,eview! under ,ule 45 of the ,ules of *ourt ,esolution3 of the *ourt of 1ppeals;1s previously stated, the principal issue raised in the court below involves a pure "uestion of law. &hus, it being clear that the court a "uo has (urisdiction over the nature and sub(ect matter of the case below, it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed order denying petitionerCs motion to dismiss and granting private respondentCs application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary in(unction. ,oberto 6. *uenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in 0rgy. 8aguimit, ?a *arlota *ity and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane, +oe 2ortunado, )unicipal 1grarian ,eform 3fficer ()1,3 of ?a *arlota *ity issued and sent a +3&/*< 32 *3K<,1D< to private respondent *uenca placing the above>described landholding under the compulsory coverage of ,.1. AA55, otherwise -nown as the *omprehensive 1grarian ,eform Program (*1,P . &he +3&/*< 32 *3K<,1D< also stated that the ?and 0an- of the Philippines (?0P will determine the value of the sub(ect land pursuant to <'ecutive 3rder +o. 405 dated !4 6une !440. ,espondent *uenca filed with the ,egional &rial *ourt, 0ranch A3, ?a *arlota *ity, a complaint against +oe 2ortunado and ?and 0an- of the Philippines for W1nnulment of +otice of *overage and 9eclaration of %nconstitutionality of <.3. +o. 405, 7eries of !440 *uenca alleged, inter alia, that the implementation of *1,P in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced and should have been completed between 6une !4$$ to 6une !442, as provided in the *omprehensive 1grarian ,eform ?aw (*1,? = that the placing of the sub(ect landholding under *1,P is without the imprimatur of the Presidential 1grarian ,eform *ouncil (P1,* and the Provincial 1grarian ,eform *oordinating *ommittee (P1,*3) as re"uired by ,.1. 5405= that <'ecutive 3rder +o. 405 dated !4 6une !440 amends, modifies andGor repeals *1,? and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that on !4 6une !440, then President *oraEon 1"uino no longer had law>ma-ing powers= that the +3&/*< 32 *3K<,1D< is a gross violation of P9 344 dated 2$ 2ebruary !454. ;Private respondent *uenca prayed that the +otice of *overage be declared null and void ab initio and <'ecutive 3rder +o. 405 dated !4 6une !440 be declared unconstitutional. ;3n 05 3ctober !444, )1,3 +oe 2ortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a "uo has no (urisdiction over the nature and sub(ect matter of the action, pursuant to ,.1. AA55.

the respondent 6udge issued a &emporary ,estraining 3rder directing )1,3 and ?0P to cease and desist from implementing the +otice of *overage. ;&he 9epartment of 1grarian ,eform (91, Nthereafter filed before the *1O a petition for certiorari under ,ule A5 of the !445 ,ules of *ivil Procedure, assailing the writ of preliminary in(unction issued by respondent 6udge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac- of (urisdiction. ;/t is the submission of the petitioner that the assailed order is Win direct defianceZ of ,epublic 1ct AA55, particularly 7ection 55 and A$C ;Petitioner contends that by virtue of the above provisions, all lower courts, such as the court presided over by respondent 6udge, Ware barred if not prohibited by law to issue orders of in(unctions against the 9epartment of 1grarian ,eform in the full implementation of the +otice of *overage which is the initial step of ac"uiring lands under ,.1. AA55.C ;Petitioner also contends that the nature and sub(ect matter of the case below is purely agrarian in character over which the court a "uo has no (urisdiction and that therefore, it had no authority to issue the assailed in(unction order.;5 R#2-"= o1 *0. Co#$* o1 A,,.!2s *1 ruled that the ,egional &rial *ourt (,&* had (urisdiction over the case. *onsonant with that authority, the court a "uo also had the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties. &he appellate court li-ewise held that petitionerCs reliance on 7ections 55 and A$ of ,1 AA55 had been misplaced, because the case was not about a purely agrarian matter. /t opined that the prohibition in certain statutes against such writs pertained only to in(unctions against administrative acts, to controversies involving facts, or to the e'ercise of discretion in technical cases. 0ut on issues involving pure "uestions of law, courts were not prevented from e'ercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. Iss#.s ;!. &he 8onorable *ourt of 1ppeals committed serious error by not ta-ing into cogniEance that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private respondent, which see-s to e'clude his land from the coverage of the *1,P, is an agrarian reform matter and within the (urisdiction of the 91,, not with the trial court. T0. Co#$*Ps R#2-"= &he Petition has merit. (-$s* Iss#.+ $urisdiction /n its bare essentials, petitionerCs argument is that private respondent, in his *omplaint for 1nnulment of the +otice of *overage, is as-ing for the e'clusion of his landholding from the coverage of the *omprehensive 1grarian ,eform Program (*1,P . 1ccording to the 91,, the issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter over which the 91, has original and e'clusive (urisdiction, pursuant to 7ection 50 of the *omprehensive 1grarian ,eform ?aw (,1 AA55 . 3n the other hand, private respondent maintains that his *omplaint assails mainly the constitutionality of <3 405. 8e contends that since the *omplaint raises a purely legal issue, it thus falls within the (urisdiction of the ,&*. #e do not agree.

20

*onflicts involving (urisdiction over agrarian disputes are as tortuous as the history of Philippine agrarian reform laws. &he changing (urisdictional landscape is matched only by the tumultuous struggle for, and resistance to, the brea-ing up and distribution of large landholdings. %wo &asic Rules 2irst, (urisdiction is conferred by law. $ 1nd second, the nature of the action and the issue of (urisdiction are shaped by the material averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 4 'rant of $urisdiction 1ll the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the then *ourts of 2irst /nstance !2 (now the ,&*s were granted to the *1,s. &he latter were further vested by the 1gricultural ?and ,eform *ode (,1 3$44 with original and e'clusive (urisdiction over the following matters: ;(! 1ll cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money claims arising from agrarian relations: ''' ;(2 1ll cases or actions involving violations of *hapters / and // of this *ode and ,epublic 1ct +umber eight hundred and nine= and ;(3 <'propriations to be instituted by the ?and 1uthority: ' ' '.;!3 Presidential 9ecree (P9 +o. 44A thereafter reorganiEed the *1,s, streamlined their operations, and e'panded their (urisdiction &he *1,s were abolished, however, pursuant to 7ection 44!4 of 0atas Pambansa 0lg. !24!5 6urisdiction over cases theretofore given to the *1,Cs was vested in the ,&*s. !A &hen came <'ecutive 3rder +o. 224. !5 %nder 7ection !5 thereof, the 91, shall e'ercise ;"uasi>(udicial powers to determine and ad(udicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have e'clusive (urisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, e'cept those falling under the e'clusive original (urisdiction of the 9<+, and the 9epartment of 1griculture N91O.; &he 91, shall also have the ;powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions.; /n Iuismundo v. *1,!$ this provision was deemed to have repealed 7ection !2 (a and (b of Presidential 9ecree +o. 44A, which vested the then *ourts of 1grarian ,elations with ;original e'clusive (urisdiction over cases and "uestions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.; %nder 7ection 4 of <'ecutive 3rder +o. !24>1, the 91, was also made ;responsible for implementing the *omprehensive 1grarian ,eform Program.; +onetheless, we have held that the ,&*s have not been completely divested of (urisdiction over agrarian reform matters. 7ection 5A of ,1 AA55 confers special (urisdiction on ;7pecial 1grarian *ourts,; which are actually ,&*s designated as such by the 7upreme *ourt. 22 %nder 7ection 55 of the same law, these 7pecial 1grarian *ourts have original and e'clusive (urisdiction over the following matters: ;! Wall petitions for the determination of (ust compensation to land>owners,C and ;2 Wthe prosecution of all criminal offenses under ' ' ' NtheO 1ct.C; &he above delineation of (urisdiction remains in place to this date. 1dministrative *ircular +o. 24>2002 23 of this *ourt stresses the distinction between the "uasi>(udicial powers of the 91, under 7ections 50 and 55 of ,1 AA55 and the (urisdiction of the 7pecial 1grarian *ourts referred to by 7ections 5A and 55 of the same law.

#e stress that the main sub(ect matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not the issue of compensation (the sub(ect matter of <3 40525 . +ote that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the 91,. 8ence, there was no occasion to invo-e the courtCs function of determining (ust compensation. 2$ &o be sure, the issuance of the +otice of *overage 24 constitutes the first necessary step towards the ac"uisition of private land under the *1,P. Plainly then, the propriety of the +otice relates to the implementation of the *1,P, which is under the "uasi> (udicial (urisdiction of the 91,. &hus, the 91, could not be ousted from its authority by the simple e'pediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian. /n view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by respondent in relation to the (urisdictional issue. #e need only to point that in case of doubt, the (urisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, ;even if the "uestionNsO involved NareO also (udicial in character,;30 as in this case. SIMEON M. ;ALDEA vs. CHINA BANGING CORPORATION D.,. +o. !55004 1pril !2, 2005 (ACTS+

3n 6anuary !!, !45$, respondent C0-"! B!"O-"= Co$,o$!*-o" (*hinaban- , represented by its senior vice>president Dilbert 9ee, and C$.!*-v. T.EDoo/ Co$,o$!*-o" (*,<1&/K< , represented by its president, herein petitioner S-5.o" M. ;!2/.C, e'ecuted a )redit *greement whereunder *hinaban- agreed to grant *,<1&/K< a credit facility in the amount of %7X!,000,000.00 to finance the latterCs importation of raw materials, spare parts and supplies for its manufacturing pro(ects.

/n order to assure payment of the credit facility thereunder granted, *,<1&/K< e'ecuted in favor of *hinaban- a 'romissory !ote for the same amount, underta-ing to pay said amount. *,<1&/K<, as principal and petitioner, as surety, further e'ecuted in favor of *hinaban- a $urety *greement

whereunder petitioner KaldeE bound himself unto *hinaban- the prompt payment on maturity date of the aforesaid promissory note. Pursuant to said credit agreement, *hinaban- drew and issued a chec- for %7X!,000,000.00 with *,<1&/K< as payee. 7ubse"uently, *,<1&/K< indorsed the chec- bac- to *hinaban- for payment, which the latter did. 2ollowing the failure of both *,<1&/K< and petitioner to comply with their obligations despite repeated demands, *hinaban- filed against both a complaint for a sum of money before the ,egional &rial *ourt at )anila.

/n his separate answer, petitioner interposed the defense that the sub(ect )redit *greement is fictitious and simulated= that

he signed said agreement and 'romissory !ote in his official capacity as president of *,<1&/K< and not in his personal capacity= and that the 7urety 1greement attached to the complaint is not the one e'ecuted and signed by him because what he signed was a pro>forma document with blan- spaces still unfilled. &he trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of plaintiff *hinaban- to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. 8owever, upon *hinaban-Cs motion for reconsideration, the trial court reinstated the complaint, and, on *hinaban-Cs further motion, declared defendant *,<1&/K< as in default and allowed *hinaban- to adduce ex parte its evidence against the former. /n a decision, the trial court rendered (udgment for plaintiff *hinaban- and against defendants *,<1&/K< and petitioner. /n its decision, the trial court held that petitionerCs liability to *hinaban- arose from his e'ecution of the same agreement where he warranted unto *hinaban- the prompt payment at maturity date of the promissory note. &he trial court also

21

debun-ed petitionerCs protestation in his memorandum that his liability under the same surety agreement was e'tinguished pursuant to 1rticle 2054 of the *ivil *ode when *hinaban- granted *,<1&/K< an e'tension of time for the payment of the loan. 2rom the aforementioned decision of the trial court, both *hinaban- and petitioner went to the *ourt of 1ppeals. &he appellate court dismissed petitionerCs appeal and affirmed the appealed decision of the trial court. ISSUES+ !. #hether or not the decision of the trial court which he and respondent *hinaban- appealed to the *ourt of 1ppeals in *1 D.,. *K +o. 2444A was vacated when *hinaban-Cs similar appeal therefrom was dismissed with finality. 2. Petitioner claims failure on the part of respondent *hinaban- to establish that the credit agreement between it and *,<1&/K< is supported by a consideration. Petitioner argues that *hinaban- is practically with no cause of action at all. %nfortunately, so petitioner adds, respondent *hinaban- did not present any such document. 3. Petitioner insists that he could not be liable to *hinaban- because he did not consent to the e'tension for the repayment of the original loan of %7X!,000,000.00. RULING+ !. PetitionerCs argument lac-s legal moorings. %nder 7ection 4 (3 of 0atas Pambansa 0lg. !24, as amended, the *ourt of 1ppeals has e'clusive appellate (urisdiction over final (udgments or decisions of regional trial courts. 8ere, there is no issue at all that petitioner had perfected his appeal from the decision of the trial court. &he well>settled rule is that (urisdiction, once ac"uired, continues until the case is finally terminated.5 7ince petitioner invo-ed the authority of the *ourt of 1ppeals when he filed his appellantCs brief in that court, that same court can resolve petitionerCs appeal regardless of the dismissal of that of his adversaryCs. 2. #e are not persuaded. 1s aptly noted by the appellate court, it is already too late in the day for petitioner to raise an issue on the alleged deficiency of allegations in *hinaban-Cs complaint to bolster his theory of lac- of alleged consideration for the partiesC credit agreement. %nder ,ule 4, 7ection !, of the ,ules of *ourt, defenses which were not raised in the answer are deemed waived. Petitioner never pleaded in his answer the defense he presently invo-es, namely, the alleged lac- of consideration for the sub(ect credit agreement. 8is newly minted defense of lac- of consideration must therefore be struc- down, the time for interposing the same having been already passe. /n any event, absence of consideration is the least persuasive argument petitioner could proffer, if at all he could, colliding as it does with the very allegations in his answer. 3. PetitionerCs argument cannot hold water. 1s it is, petitioner is attempting to create a new issue of fact at this late stage of the proceedings. 1 perusal of his answer fails to yield any indication of his intent to craft an issue based on the inconsistency between the amount appearing in the promissory note and that demanded by *hinaban-. &o allow petitioner to pursue such a defense would undermine basic considerations of due process. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. /t would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory not ventilated before the trial court. &he *ourt is the neutral administrator of (ustice, not the corrector of unsound business (udgments. 8aving freely assumed the obligations of a surety, petitioner cannot now evade those obligations by raising factual issues not proper in this *ourt. %nder ,ule 45 of the ,ules of *ourt, this *ourtCs main preoccupation is to resolve "uestions of law not issues of facts. HILLY TAN % CHUA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE O( THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

()C%":

3n !2 9ecember !44A, petitioner #illy &an was found guilty of bigamy by the ,egional &rial *ourt, 0ranch 55, of 7an )ateo, ,iEal. 3n 23 9ecember !44A, petitioner applied for probation. 3n $ 6anuary !445, the application was granted by the trial court but the release order was withheld in view of the filing by the prosecution, on 2! 6anuary !445, of a motion for modification of the penalty. &he prosecution pointed out that the penalty for bigamy under 1rticle 344 of the ,evised Penal *ode was prision mayor and the imposable penalty, absent any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, should be the medium period of prision mayor. &hus, the prosecution argued, petitioner was not eligible for probation.chanrob!es virtua! !aw !ibrary &he trial court denied the motion of the prosecution for having been filed out of time since the decision sought to be modified had already attained finality. /ndeed, petitioner had meanwhile applied for probation. &he *ourt of 1ppeals, in a decision, dated !$ 1ugust 2000, dismissed petitionerCs appeal on the ground that petitioner raised a pure "uestion of law. *iting 1rticle K///, 7ection 5(2 (e , of the *onstitution, the appellate court e'plained that (urisdiction over the case was vested e'clusively in the 7upreme *ourt and that, in accordance with ,ule !22, 7ection 3(e , of the ,ules of *riminal Procedure, the appeal should have been brought up by way of a petition for review on certiorari with this *ourt and not by merely filing a notice of appeal before the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, on !$ )ay 200!, was denied by the appellate court. *""+E: ;//. &8< *3%,& 32 1PP<1?7 <,,<9 /+ 83?9/+D &81& &8< 7%P,<)< *3%,& 817 <J*?%7/K< 1PP<??1&< 6%,/79/*&/3+ 3+ P%,< I%<7&/3+7 32 ?1#. ;///. &8< *3%,& 32 1PP<1?7 D,1K<?@ <,,<9 /+ 83?9/+D &81& 0<*1%7< &8< 1PP<1? ,1/7<9 P%,< I%<7&/3+7 32 ?1#, /& /7 #/&83%& 6%,/79/*&/3+ &3 ,<73?K< &8< /77%< ,1/7<9 /+ &8< 1PP<1?. ;/K. &8< *3%,& 32 1PP<1?7 D,1K<?@ <,,<9 /+ 9/7)/77/+D &8< 1PP<1? 3%&,/D8& /+7&<19 32 9<*?1,/+D &8< 1)<+9<9 9<*/7/3+ K3/9 23, %&&<, #1+& 32 6%,/79/*&/3+. ;K. &8< *3%,& 32 1PP<1?7 <,,<9 /+ 83?9/+D &81& ,%?< A5 /7 &8< P,3P<, ,<)<9@ &3 ,1/7< &8< /77%< 32 6%,/79/*&/3+ 1+9 /2 73 /+ +3& &,<1&/+D &8< 1PP<1? 17 1 7P<*/1? */K/? 1*&/3+ 23, *<,&/3,1,/.; 3 /n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law. 4 #hile this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, itself a right guaranteed by the *onstitution. &he rule is plain and unambiguous H the remedy of ordinary appeal by notice of appeal, although not necessarily preclusive of other remedies provided for by the rules, is open and available to petitioner. &he notice of appeal was timely filed by petitioner on !3 6uly !44$, three days after the "uestioned decision was promulgated. A /t was a remedy that the law allowed him to avail himself of, and it threw the whole case effectively open for review on both "uestions of law and of fact whether or not raised by the parties.chanrob!es virtua! !aw !ibrary +either the *onstitution nor the ,ules of *riminal Procedure e'clusively vests in the 7upreme *ourt the power to hear cases on appeal in which only an error of law is involved. 5 /ndeed, the *ourt of 1ppeals, under ,ule 42 and 44 of the ,ules of *ivil

22

Procedure, is authoriEed to determine ;errors of fact, of law, or both.; $ &hese rules are e'pressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases, 4 and they do not thereby divest the 7upreme *ourt of its ultimate (urisdiction over such "uestions. 1nent the argument that petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under ,ule A5, it might be pointed out that this remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and ade"uate remedy in the ordinary course of law. !0 1ppeal, being a remedy still available to petitioner, a petition for certiorari would have been premature. /n fine, petitioner had ta-en an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal with the trial court. 3rdinarily, the *ourt should have the case remanded to the *ourt of 1ppeals for further proceedings. &he clear impingement upon petitionerCs basic right against double (eopardy, !! however, should here warrant the e'ercise of the prerogative by this *ourt to rela' the stringent application of the rules on the matter. #hen the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of bigamy after it had already pronounced (udgment and on which basis he then, in fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict could only be deemed to have lapsed into finality. S.,!$!*. O,-"-o"s

/t did not direct as it does in ,ule 4! that appeal in criminal cases on pure "uestions of law shall only be to the 7upreme *ourt. #hat the rule directs is that when an appeal is to be made to the 7upreme *ourt the appeal shall be by petition for review. ,ule 4! cannot li-ewise be applied by analogy in appeals in criminal cases since ,ule 4! is not among the rules that was e'pressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases. %nder 7ection !$ of ,ule !24. &he e'clusion of ,ule 4! which refers to appeals in civil cases from ,ule !22 which refers to appeals in criminal cases clearly indicates that the modes of appeal in ordinary civil actions is not applicable in criminal cases. 3n the other hand, 7ection !$ of the ,ule !22 e'pressly provides that ,ule 44 on procedure in the *ourt of 1ppeals in ordinary appealed cases shall be applied in criminal cases. 1s will hereafter be shownN,O ,ule 44, li-e ,ules 42 and 43 alternatively allows assignment of errors on "uestions of fact or of law, meaning aNnO assignment of error only on pure "uestions of law are allowable in appeals to the *ourt of 1ppeals. 7ection !$ clearly connotes that when the rules allow the application of a particular rule in a particular situation, it does so e'pressly. +ote that ,ule 45 on 1nnulment of 6udgments was also e'cluded. / respectfully disagree with the ma(ority ruling for the following reasons:

)<+93F1, 4., dissenting: &he reasons for my disagreement with the ma(ority will be spelled out in detail, but in brief they are as follows: (! &he case before the *ourt of 1ppeals did not involve an error of (udgment but an alleged error of (urisdiction and, therefore, appeal was not the appropriate remedy to bring the matter to that court. (2 <ven assuming the case involved an error of (udgment and therefore appeal was the appropriate remedy open to petitioner, the appeal should have been brought before this *ourt and not the *ourt of 1ppeals, and it should not be by mere notice of appeal but by a petition for review. (3 &he correct remedy is certiorari. (4 <ven e"uity will not e'cuse petitionerCs failure to observe the rules for see-ing a review, and this *ourt is not (ustified in deciding the issue which petitioner should have first brought before the *ourt of 1ppeals. ,ule !22, [3 of the ,ules of *riminal Procedure provides:chanrob!es virtual !aw library 8ow appeal ta-en. H (a &he appeal to the ,egional &rial *ourt, or to the *ourt of 1ppeals in cases decided by the ,egional &rial *ourt in the e'ercise of its original (urisdiction, shall be ta-en by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the (udgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. (b &he appeal to the *ourt of 1ppeals in cases decided by the ,egional &rial *ourt in the e'ercise of its appellate (urisdiction shall be by petition for review under ,ule 42. (c &he appeal to the 7upreme *ourt in cases where the penalty imposed by the ,egional &rial *ourt is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a of this section. (d +o notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the ,egional &rial *ourt. &he same shall be automatically reviewed by the 7upreme *ourt as provided in section !0 of this ,ule. (e <'cept as provided in the last paragraph of section !3, ,ule !24, all other appeals to the 7upreme *ourt shall be by petition for review on certiorari under ,ule 45.

5irst. *ppeal is not the appropriate remedy because it is not an error of judgment# but an error of jurisdiction allegedly committed by the trial court, which petitioner was raising in the *ourt of 1ppeals. &he "uestion whether the trial court could correct an error in computing the penalty after its decision had become final was not passed upon by the trial court in deciding the criminal case before it but was determined by it only as an incident of the case. /ndeed, the issue in that case was whether petitioner #illy &an y *hua was guilty of bigamy as the trial court found. /f petitioner did not agree with his conviction, an appeal by mere notice to that effect would have been perfectly correct under ,ule !22, 7econd. <ven assuming that appeal was the appropriate remedy, because it was a "uestion of law that petitioner wanted to raise, the appeal should have been to this *ourt, not the *ourt of 1ppeals, and it should have been by petition for review on certiorari, not by mere notice of appeal. 1rt. K///, [5(2 (e of the *onstitution provides that the 7upreme *ourt shall have appellate (urisdiction over ;all cases in which only an error or "uestion of law is involved.; &his (urisdiction of the 7upreme *ourt is e'clusive by reason of [!5, par. 4(4 of the 6udiciary 1ct of !44$, which provides: 7<*. !5. 6urisdiction of the 7upreme *ourt. H . . . &hird. PetitionerCs remedy was to file a petition for certiorari under ,ule A5, [! for, as already shown, the "uestion raised is not an error of law but an alleged error of (urisdiction. 7uch petition should be filed in the *ourt of 1ppeals pursuant to 0.P. 0lg. !24, [4 by means of a special civil action of certiorari. 7uch petition should have been brought within A0 days from notice to petitioner of the ruling of the trial court, which is now long over. +onetheless, the ma(ority argues that this *ourt should rela' the rules and decide directly the "uestion raised by petitioner in the *ourt of 1ppeals, namely, whether the trial court could correct the penalty imposed on petitioner after its decision had become final. /t is contended that this is necessary because a constitutional right of petitioner has been violated, i.e., the right of petitioner not to be placed in double (eopardy. &o summariEe then, petitioner had remedies available to him for the correction of an error allegedly committed by the trial court. 0ut he lost those remedies by default. #e cannot set aside the rules (ust so he will be able to raise the "uestions which he sought to raise in the *ourt of 1ppeals. #e must abide by our rules. &his is the essence of the ,ule of ?aw.

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/ vote therefor to affirm the decision of the *ourt of 1ppeals. ROBIN M. CANO, ,.*-*-o".$, vs. THE CHIE(, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, EDGAR C. GAL;ANTE, !s Po2-). D-$.)*o$ 1o$ P.$so"".2 !"/ R.)o$/s M!"!=.5."*, PNP, !"/ *0. DEPARTMENT O( INTERIOR AND LOCAL GO;ERNMENT, $.s,o"/."*s. &his petition for review on certiorari assails (a the order of ,&* of IueEon *ity dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner against respondents for payment of bac- salaries and allowances amounting to P30!,0!$= and (b the order of ,&* denying his motion for reconsideration. (ACTS+ 2or the alleged bungled investigation of the <ileen 7armenta and 1llan DomeE rape>slay, a complaint for grave misconduct was filed with the +ational Police *ommission(+P* under the 9epartment of /nterior and ?ocal Dovernment against petitioner, then Police *hief /nspector of the *alauan Police 7tation. &he *hief of the P+P found petitioner guilty and ordered his summary dismissal from the service, in a decision on 6uly !2, !445. Petitioner appealed his dismissal to the +ational 1ppellate 0oard of the +ational Police *ommission (+1P3?*3) . +1P3?*3) reversed the decision of the P+P *hief. &he +1P3?*3) decision having been allowed by both parties to become final and e'ecutory, petitioner was restored to full duty status effective )ay !5, !445. 8e also received all benefits and emoluments pertaining to his post pursuant to P+P 7pecial 3rder +o. !34!. #ith the modification of his penalty to 3 months suspension, petitioner filed a claim for payment of bac- salaries and other allowances corresponding to the period he was allegedly un(ustly discharged from service until he was restored to full duty status, or from 1ugust 5, !445 to )ay !5, !445. 8owever, this claim, computed by the P+P ,egional Police *omptrollership and 2inance 9ivision to be P30!,0!$ was denied by respondent Police 9irector <dgar *. Dalvante of the P+P 9irectorate for Personnel and ,ecords )anagement (9P,) on the strength of a )emorandumG3pinion from the P+P ?egal 7ervice. Petitioner as-ed for a reconsideration of the denial but the same was re(ected. 3n account of said denial, petitioner filed on 9ec. 23, !44$ a complaint before ,&* of IueEon *ity for the recovery of his bac- salaries and other allowances for the said period. &he court a "uo dismissed the complaint in an order dated )ay !5, !444. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the trial courtCs decision, but his motion was denied. &hus, petitioner filed the instant appeal via petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES+ (! #hether or not the petitioner is entitled to his claim for bac- salaries and allowances under the terms of the decision of the +1P3?*3) 1ppellate 0oard= and (2 #hether petitioner failed to e'haust the administrative remedies available to him so as to render the filing of the complaint with the trial court premature. RULING+ #e note that the principal issue raised before us is a mi'ed "uestion of fact and law. &here is a "uestion of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts, and there is a "uestion of law where the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. 8ere, petitioner see-s to recover bac- salaries and allowances allegedly due him from 1ug. 5, !445, when he was un(ustly

discharged from the service, to )ay !5, !445, when he was restored to full duty status. &he determination of petitionerCs entitlement to said bac- salaries and allowances is a mi'ed "uestion as it involves the determination of his duty status for the period of his claim and the resolution of whether the petitioner was ac"uitted by the +1P3?*3) 1ppellate 0oard in its decision finding him liable only for simple misconduct, not gross misconduct. %nder 7ection ! of ,ule 45 of the ,ules of *ourt, an appeal by certiorari to this *ourt should raise only "uestions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the petition. /t is elementary that a review is not a matter of right, but of sound (udicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. 1s the error raised herein includes one of fact and law, and not a proper sub(ect for a petition for review on certiorari, we are constrained to decline e'ercise of our e"uity (urisdiction in this case. 1t any rate, petitioner also failed without (ustifiable cause to observe due regard for the hierarchy of courts. <ven on this reason alone, we are constrained to deny the petition. &he policy of this *ourt respecting the hierarchy of courts and prohibiting the filing of a petition in this *ourt in view of the concurrent (urisdiction with the lower courts has been consistently observed in the absence of any compelling reason for departing from such policy. Pursuant to 7ection 2, ,ule 4! of the ,ules of *ourt, petitioner should have ta-en his appeal to the *ourt of 1ppeals.

ENGR. APOLINARIO DUE<AS, Petitioner, vs. ALICE GUCE-A(RICA, ,espondent. (ACTS+

/n 6anuary !44$ respondent 1frica entered into a *onstruction *ontract 5 with petitioner for the demolition of the ancestral house and the construction of a new four>bedroom residential house. &he parties agreed that respondent would pay P500,000.00 to the petitioner, who obliged himself to furnish all the necessary materials and labor for the completion of the pro(ect. Petitioner li-ewise undertoo- to finish all interior portions of the house on or before )arch 3!, !44$, or more than two wee-s before her sisterCs wedding wedding. 3n 1pril !$, !44$, however, the house remained unfinished. &he wedding ceremony was thus held at the *lub Kictorina and respondentCs relatives were forced to stay in a hotel. 8er mother lived with her children, transferring from one place to another. ,espondent filed a *omplaint for breach of contract and damages against petitioner before the ,egional &rial *ourt of Pasig *ity. 7he alleged, among others, that petitioner started the pro(ect without securing the necessary permit from the *ity <ngineerCs 3ffice of ?ipa *ity. 8owever, and despite -nowledge that the construction of the house was intended for the forthcoming marriage of respondentCs sister, petitioner un(ustly and fraudulently abandoned the pro(ect leaving it substantially unfinished and incomplete. 7everal demands were made, but petitioner obstinately refused to ma-e good his contractual obligations. #orse, petitionerCs wor-manship on the incomplete residential house was substandard. Petitioner on the other hand, maintained that he cannot be held liable for the amounts claimed by the respondent in her complaint considering that he had faithfully complied with the terms and conditions of the *onstruction *ontract. &he ,&* gave more credence to respondentCs version of the facts, finding that> *learly, 9ueBas Nherein petitionerO failed to tender performance in accordance with the terms and conditions of the construction contract he e'ecuted with 1frica Nherein respondentO. 8e failed to construct a four>bedroom residential house suitable and ready for occupancy on a stipulated date. 9ueBas was fully aware that 1frica needed the new house for a long scheduled family event precisely a completion date was included and specified in the transaction.

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9espite -nowledge and receipt of payment from 1frica, 9ueBas failed to deliver what was incumbent upon him under the underta-ing. 8e un(ustifiably incurred delay in the construction of the new building and wrongfully deprived 1frica and her family of the use and en(oyment of the sub(ect property.

LINGER !"/ (ISHER vs. IAC 21*&7: 9<%&*8< )/?*8#<,R< 9,. 1. 71%<, (9)# for brevity was a firm in #est Dermany manufacturing P,39%*&7 (probably chemicals under the trademar-s 2/771+, etc. Private respondent Philippine *hemical ?aboratories, /nc. (P8/?*8<), for brevity is a local company which apparently also manufactures and sells chemicals. 3n 2ebruary 2$, !4A3, 9)# and P8/?*8<) e'ecuted a so>called 1gency 1D,<<)<+& the basic provision of which was that P8/?*8<) would be the e'clusive importer of the P,39%*&7 into the Philippines. &he benefit to P8/?*8<) would be the profits realiEed from re>sale in this country of imported P,39%*&7. 7ubse"uently, the 9)# interests were ac"uired by ?/+D+<, Q 2/78<, D)08 ?/+D+<, for brevity . 3n other hand, ?/+D+<, was a subsidiary of 0<<*81) D,3%P ?&9. which, through 0<<*81) P,39%*&7 /+&<,+1&/3+1? (0<<*81), for brevity , had opened an office in this country at %nit 1, Padilla 0uilding, <merald 1venue, Pasig, )etro )anila, under the supervision or managership of one named &1++<,. ?/+D+<, and 0<<*81) can be deemed to constitute a single personality. 7ubse"uent reference to ?/+D+<, will include reference to 9)# and 0<<*81). &he 1D,<<)<+& was automatically renewed once, or up to 2ebruary 2$, !453, and finally terminated on 1ugust 3!, !455. &he events relative to the termination were as follows: 0efore 2ebruary 2$, !453, the parties agreed to e'tend the 1D,<<)<+& up to 2ebruary 2$, !455. /f it is not terminated by prior notice si' months before 2ebruary 2$, !455, as it was not, it would be e'tended for a further two years up to 2ebruary 2$, !455. 0y letter dated 2ebruary 25, !455, through the law ?aw 2irm, P8/?*8<) was advised that ?/+D+<, was interested in continuing business relationship with P8/?*8<) and will be interested in negotiating a new contract and that, prior to the signing of a new contract, ?/+D+<, was proposing that the old contract be e'tended by mutual agreement for a period of si' (A calendar months beginning )arch !, !455 to e'pire automatically on 1ugust 3!, !455 if no contract is entered into. &he proposal was accepted by P8/?*8<), and no new contract having been signed by 1ugust 3!, !455, the 1D,<<)<+& terminated on that date, 3n 6uly 20, !454, P8/?*8<) presented a claim to ?/+D+<, for P!,055,000.00 under the ,3@1?&@ *?1%7<. &he claim was discussed between P8/?*8<) and &1++<, of 0<<*81) with the intervention of the ?aw 2irm. +o settlement having been arrived at, P8/?*8<), on 1ugust A, !4$0, filed a complaint against 0<<*81) alone in *ivil *ase +o. 3$0$A of the then *ourt of 2irst /nstance of ,iEal. &he summons issued could not be served on 0<<*81), the 7heriff having reported that 0<<*81) was neither a company registered in the Philippines, nor resident at the given address of %nit 1, Padilla 0uilding, <merald 1venue, Pasig, )etro )anila. P8/?*8<) then filed an amended complaint, this time ma-ing ?/+D+<, and 0<<*81) as the defendants, and pleading that summons could be served on the ?aw 2irm as an agent of the defendants. &he ?aw 2irm submitted a special appearance in the case on behalf of 6&!C!E+, and, also on behalf of 6&!C!E+, moved for dismissal on the grounds (a that ?/+D+<, was not a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines and hence could not be sued locally, and, (b that ?/+D+<, could not be served with summons through the ?aw 2irm. ,&* denied the )otion to 9ismiss, assuming that ?/+D+<, could be sued in this (urisdiction, and holding that ?/+D+<, can be served with summons through the ?aw 2irm.

&he parties brought the matter to the *ourt of 1ppeals assailing the 9ecision of the ,&*. &he appellate court, however, found no cogent reason to depart from the trial courtCs conclusion. &hus, on 1pril 24, 2004, it rendered the herein assailed 9ecision affirming with modification the ,&*Cs ruling.

ISSUE+ #hether or not the 7upreme *ourt may be necessitated to determine the weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence presented by the parties to a litigation. RULING+ Petitioner endeavors to convince the *ourt to determine, yet again, the weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence presented. &his cannot be done in this petition for review on certiorari under ,ule 45 of the ,ules of *ourt where only "uestions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the 7*. 1 "uestion of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a "uestion of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 2or a "uestion to be one of law, the same must not involve an e'amination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. &he resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 3nce it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the "uestioned posed is one of fact. &hus, the test of whether a "uestion is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such "uestion by the party raising the same= rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a "uestion of law= otherwise, it is a "uestion of fact. /t has already been held that the determination of the e'istence of a breach of contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under ,ule 45. #e will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the *ourt of 1ppeals especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are not a trier of facts.&he established rule is that the factual findings of the *ourt of 1ppeals affirming those of the ,&* are conclusive and binding on us. #e are not wont to review them, save under e'ceptional circumstances as: !. 2. 3. 4. 5. A. 5. $. when the inference made is manifestly mista-en, absurd or impossible= when there is grave abuse of discretion= when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or con(ectures= when the (udgment of the *ourt of 1ppeals is based on misapprehension of facts= when the *ourt of 1ppeals, in ma-ing its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee= when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based= when the *ourt of 1ppeals manifestly overloo-ed certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would (ustify a different conclusion= and when the findings of fact of the *ourt of 1ppeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

<'cept with respect to the first ground advanced by the petitioner which will be discussed later, none of the above e'ceptions obtain in this case. 8ence, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the ,&* and affirmed by the *ourt of 1ppeals that petitioner was negligent in the construction of respondentCs house and thus liable for breach of contract.

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?/+D+<, went on certiorari to the /ntermediate 1ppellate *ourt where it reiterated the plea that summons could not be validly served on it through the ?aw 2irm. /77%<: #3+ the *1 erred in denying the re"uest for evidentiary hearing. 8<?9: &he 1ppellate *ourt acted correctly in denying the re"uest for an evidentiary hearing. <vidence necessary in regards to factual issues raised in cases falling within the 1ppellate *ourt.s original and appellate (urisdiction contemplates ;incidental; facts which were not touched upon, or fully heard by the trial or respondent *ourt. &he law could not have intended that the 1ppellate *ourt would hold an original and full trial of a main factual issue in a case, which properly pertains to &rial *ourts. /t is our view that evidence as to whether ?/+D+<, was doing business in the Philippines, even before the &rial *ourt, is no longer necessary in view of the fact that P8/?*8<) and ?/+D+<, were contractees in the 1D,<<)<+& and the claim of P8/?*8<) is based on the ,3@1?&@ *?1%7< of that 1D,<<)<+&. #hether ?/+D+<, is or is not doing business in the Philippines will not matter because the parties had e'pressly stipulated in the 1D,<<)<+& that all controversies based on the 1D,<<)<+& ;shall fall under the (urisdiction of Philippine courts;. /n other words, there was a covenant on venue to the effect that ?/+D+<, can be sued by P8/?*8<) before Philippine *ourts in regards to a controversy related to the 1D,<<)<+&. 1 case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. /t should be difficult to conceive, for e'ample, that when a defendant personally appears before a *ourt complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. 1n alias summons can be actually served on said defendant. 1**3,9/+D?@, the (udgment under review of the /ntermediate 1ppellate *ourt (&hird 7pecial *ases 9ivision is hereby upheld insofar as it sustained the 3rders, dated 1ugust 24, !4$! and 9ecember !$, !4$!, of the then *ourt of 2irst /nstance of ,iEal, 0ranch J/, Pasig, denying petitioner.s )otion to 9ismiss and the subse"uent )otion for ,econsideration, albeit on grounds different from those relied upon by the /ntermediate 1ppellate *ourt. &he now ,egional &rial *ourt, to which the case below has been assigned, is hereby directed to allow private respondent Philippine *hemical ?aboratories, /nc., to apply for the issuance of alias summons on petitioner ?ingner and 2ischer D)08 by publication under the provisions of 7ection !5, ,ule !4 in relation to ,ule 4 of the ,ules of *ourt, and after issues have been (oined, to proceed to trial and (udgment accordingly.

*ase 2. 7<*>7<* en banc>*1>7* 1ntecedent 2acts: 7i'to *risostomo, 2elipe *risostomo (deceased , Keronica Palanca, 6uanito *risostomo, *arlos *risostomo, ,icardo 1lfonso, ,egino *risostomo and <rnesto *risostomo (-nown as the *risostomo group were the original stoc-holders of the %nited 9octors )edical *enter (%9)* &hey owned appro'imately 40Y of %9)*.s outstanding capital stoc-, while the A0Y ma(ority belonged to the members of the %nited )edical 7taff 1ssociation (%)71 . 9espite their minority status, the *risostomo group has managed %9)* from its inception. /n !4$$, %9)* defaulted in paying its loan obligation of appro'imately P55 million to the 90P. &o stave off the threatened foreclosure, %9)*, through its officers, persuaded the @amadas and <natsu (7ho(i @amada and &omotada <natsu are 6apanese doctors to invest fresh capital in %9)*. &he wife of &omotada <natsu, <dita <natsu, is a 2ilipina. &hey invested appro'imately P55 million in %9)*. 0oth transactions were duly authoriEed by the board of directors and stoc-holders of %9)*. %pon the completion of the governmental approval process, shares of stoc-, duly signed by %9)*.s authoriEed officers, were issued to the @amadas and <natsus. &his capital infusion not only saved the assets of the %9)* (especially the hospital from foreclosure but also freed the *risostomos from their individual and solidary liabilities as sureties for the 90P loan. 1s it had been agreed in the 1mended )emorandum of 1greement between %9)* and the 6apanese group that upon the latter.s ac"uisition of the controlling interest in %9)*, the corporation would be reorganiEed, a special stoc-holders. meeting and board of directors. meeting were scheduled to be held on 1ugust 20, !4$$. 8owever, on the eve of the meetings, i.e., on 1ugust !4, !4$$, 7i'to *risostomo, supposedly acting for himself, filed $E) )ase !o. B>?@ against 6uanito *risostomo, ,icardo 1lfonso, 7ho(i @amada, )ichiyo @amada, &omotada <natsu and <dita <natsu, praying, among other things, (! to stop the holding of the stoc-holder.s and board of directors. meetings= ''' TDo D..Os 2!*.$, C$-sos*o5o 1-2./ Civil Case ,o! --./-01 -" *0. R.=-o"!2 T$-!2 Co#$* o1 M!O!*-, M.*$o M!"-2!, D0.$. 0. !2so so#=0* ! ,$.2-5-"!$% -"J#")*-o" !"/ *0. -/."*-)!2 $.2-.1s ,$!%./ 1o$ 8% 0-5 -" SEC. I* D!s /-s5-ss./ 8% *0. *$-!2 )o#$* 1o$ 2!)O o1 J#$-s/-)*-o" (yes -ay sa 7<* ni dapat !"/ -s ,."/-"= !,,.!2 -" *0. Co#$* o1 A,,.!2s 3*1>D.,. +o. 202$5>*K. &he hearing officer, 1ntonio <steves, granted the application for a writ of preliminary in(unction en(oining the respondents from holding the special meeting of the stoc-holders and of the 0oard of 9irectors of %nited 9octors )edical *enter, N/nc.O (%9)* .

SI?TO P. CRISOSTOMO vs SECURITIES AND E?CHANGE COMMISSION, SPOUSES SHOJI YAMADA !"/ MICHIYO YAMADA !"/ SPOUSES TOMOTADA ENATSU !"/ EDITA ENATSU G.R. Nos. 9097 & 9777 Nov.58.$ 6, '9 9 (!)*s+ &his is a petition for certiorari, which see-s to annul and set aside the en banc resolution of the 7ecurities and <'change *ommission in 7<* and its orders directing the corporate secretary of the %nited 9octors )edical *enter, /nc. (hereafter ;%9)*; to call a special meeting of the stoc-holders to elect the officers and directors in the implementation of the 7<*.s aforementioned en banc resolution which the *ourt of 1ppeals affirmed in its decision. *ase !. ,&*>*1

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&he private respondents. motion for reconsideration of this order was denied by the hearing officer. &he respondents appealed by certiorari to the 7<* en banc. 7<* set aside the preliminary in(unction issued by <steves and directed that a special stoc-holders. meeting of %9)* be held for the purpose of allowing the stoc-holders of record of the corporation to elect a new board of directors. S-E*o C$-sos*o5o so#=0* ! $.v-.D o1 *0. SECFs en banc $.so2#*-o" -" *0. Co#$* o1 A,,.!2s (*1>D.,. 7P +o. !5435. *1 dismissed his petition and lifted the temporary restraining order that it had issued against the 7<*.s resolution. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration *1 denied the petitionerDs motion to reinstate the writ of preliminary injunction. 8ence this petition for certiorari in the 7*. Iss#. $.2!*./ * )-v-2 ,$o)./#$.+ H0.*0.$ o$ "o* CA 0!s J#$-s/-)*-o" o" !,,.!2s 1$o5 ." 8!") $.so2#*-o"s o1 *0. SEC. &he case did not answer this issue >-ay a-o ray nagbuhat ani -ay wala ni gitac-le sa -aso. +agfocus ra man gud ang -aso sa forum shopping ug constitutional provisions on the A0Y 2ilipino policy. Pero it appears in the facts of this case that *1 does have (urisdiction from 7<* en bancCs decision before 'a automatically musa-a sa 7*. Iss#. o" 1o$#5-s0o,,-"=+ 9id the petitioner violate the anti>forum shopping lawL @<7. H.2/+ &he records show that *risostomo had two actions pending in the *ourt of 1ppeals (*1>D.,. +o. 7P !5435 and *1> D.,. +o. 202$5 *K when he filed the petition for certiorari (D.,. +o. $4045 in this *ourt on 6uly 25, !4$4. &he case doc-eted as *1>D.,. +o. 202$5>*K, is his appeal from the decision of the ,egional &rial *ourt of )a-ati, dismissing his complaint for annulment of the )emorandum of 1greement and the 7toc- Purchase 1greement between %9)* and the 6apanese investors. *1>D.,. +o. 7P !5435 is his petition for certiorari to review the 7<*.s en banc resolution upholding those transactions and ordering the holding of a stoc-holders meeting to elect the directors of the %9)*, and of a board of directors meeting to elect the officers. +otwithstanding the pendency of those two cases in the *ourt of 1ppeals, *risostomo filed this petition for certiorari ! and prohibition on 6uly 25, !4$4 where he raises the same issues that he raised in the *ourt of 1ppeals.

&he investments in %9)* of 9octors @amada and <natsu do not violate the *onstitutional prohibition against foreigners practising a profession in the Philippines (7ection !4, 1rticle J//, !4$5 *onstitution for they do not practice their profession (medicine in the Philippines, neither have they applied for a license to do so. &hey only own shares of stoc- in a corporation that operates a hospital. +o law limits the sale of hospital shares of stoc- to doctors only. &he ownership of such shares does not amount to engaging (illegally, in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. /f it were otherwise, the petitioner.s stoc-holding in %9)* would also be illegal. R#2-"= o" *0. Co"12-)* 8.*D.." SECPs o$/.$s !"/ *0. CA &he 7<*.s orders (directing the secretary of %9)* to call a stoc-holders. meeting, etc. are not premature, despite the petitioner.s then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the *ourt of 1ppeals. &he lifting by the *ourt of 1ppeals of its writ of preliminary in(unction in *1>D.,. 7P +o. !5435 cleared the way for the implementation by the 7<*.s en banc resolution. &he 7<* need not wait for the *ourt of 1ppeals to resolve the petitioner.s motion for reconsideration for a (udgment decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary in(unction is immediately e'ecutory. /t 3shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is ta1en or during the pendency of an appeal.3 (7ec. 4, ,ule 34, ,ules of *ourt 8ence, these petitions were dismissed for lac- of merit. &he petitioner and his counsel were censured for engaging in forum> shopping and were further ordered to pay double costs in this instance.

G.R. No. '0>996 M!$)0 6, '99 SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON !"/ ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON, petitioners, vs. THE COURT O( APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, (EDERICO ELAYDA !"/ DANILO ELAYDA,respondents. (!)*s+ 3n 1ugust $, !44!, private respondents filed in the ,&* of IueEon *ity a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2 parcels of land against petitioners. %pon the filing of the complaint, the cler- of court re"uired private respondents to pay doc-et and legal fees in the total amount of PA!0.00. 3n 7eptember 2A, !44!, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not ac"uire (urisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents. nonpayment of the correct amount of doc-et fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for P!00,000.00 for attorney.s fees, private respondents should have paid doc-et fees in the amount of P2!,A40.00, based on the alleged value of the two (2 parcels of land sub(ect matter of the contract of sale sought to be annulled= that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the doc-et fees to be paid by private respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the property, sub(ect matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of [5(b of ,ule !4!. 7ince private respondents alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest as heirs, had been sold for P4,35$,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be considered the estimated value of the land for the purpose of determining the doc-et fees. Private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that outright dismissal of their complaint was not warranted on the basis of the alleged nonpayment of the correct amount of doc-et fees, considering that the amount paid by them was that assessed by the cler- of court

Iss#. o" *0. )o"s*-*#*-o"!2-*% o1 *0. 1o$.-=" -"v.s*5."*+ #hether or not the transfer or conveyance to the foreign investors in this case is constitutional. @<7 H.2/+ #hile $2Y of %9)*.s capital stoc- is indeed subscribed by the 6apanese group, only 30Y (e"uivalent to !5!,52! shares or P!5,!52.00 is owned by the 6apanese citiEens, namely, the @amada spouses and &omotada <natsu. 52Y is owned by <dita <natsu, who is a 2ilipino. 1ccordingly, in its application for approvalGregistration of the foreign e"uity investments of these investors, %9)* declared that 9@E of its capital stoc1 is owned by 5ilipino citi/ens, including <dita <natsu.

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3n 3ctober 2!, !44!, the trial court 7 denied petitioners. motion to dismiss but re"uired private respondents to pay the amount of doc-et fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the trial court. &hey therefore, brought the matter to the *1 which, on 2ebruary 2A, !442, rendered a decision annulling the orders of the trial court. &he appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the doc-et fees should not be based on the value of the real property, sub(ect matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in a resolution dated )arch 25, !442 of the appellate court. 8ence, the petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE+ #hether in assessing the doc-et fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property, sub(ect matter of the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action should be considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in ,ule !4!, sec. 5(b (! of the ,ules of *ourt. RULING+ 1n action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, so, the doc-et fees should be the fi'ed amount of P400.00 in ,ule !4!, [5(b (! . /n support of their argument, they cite the cases of 6apitan v. $candia, &nc. 9 and autista v.6im. /n ?apitan this *ourt, in an opinion by 6ustice 6.0.?. ,eyes, held SZin determining whether an action is one the sub(ect matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this *ourt has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. /f it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether (urisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. 8owever, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a conse"uence of, the principal relief sought, li-e in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance and in actions for support, or for annulment of a (udgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this *ourt has considered such actions as cases where the sub(ect of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cogniEable e'clusively by courts of first instance. &he rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an in"uiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the 6udiciary were enacted allocating (urisdiction (1ct !3A of the Philippine *ommission of 6une !!, !40! . +o award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an in"uiry into matters which would (ustify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to ma-e findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation e'pressly held to be so by this *ourt. /ssues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. /t is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be ta-en as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation H a prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.T &hus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. &he *ourt of 1ppeals correctly applied these cases to the present one. 7ince the action of petitioners Nprivate respondentsO against private respondents NpetitionersO is solely for annulment or rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action should not be confused and e"uated with the ;value of the property; sub(ect of the transaction= that by the very nature of the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint,

sans any prayer for recovery of money andGor value of the transaction, or for actual or compensatory damages, the assessment and collection of the legal fees should not be intertwined with the merits of the case andGor what may be its end result= and that to sustain private respondents. Npetitioners.O position on what the respondent court may decide after all, then the assessment should be deferred and finally assessed only after the court had finally decided the case, which cannot be done because the rules re"uire that filing fees should be based on what is alleged and prayed for in the face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of the complaint. #8<,<23,<, the decision of the *ourt of 1ppeals is 122/,)<9.

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