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141

AIR COMMAND AND COLLEGE STAFF

STAFFOMNIAN CAR OL LUEGEZ

OF INFLUENCES LATER MARON C AND AND S L AN IDEAS NES I S S. JO
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DISCLAIME R The views and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the author. They are not intended and should not be thought to represent official ideas, attitudes, or policies of any agency of the United States Government. The author has not had special access to official information or ideas and has employed only open-source material available to any writer on this subject. This document is the property of the United States Government. It is available for distribution to the general public. A loan copy of the document may be obtained from the Air University Interlibrary Loan Service (AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112) or the Defense Technical Information Center. Request must include the author's name and complete title of the study. This document may be reproduced for use in other research reports or educational pursuits contingent upon the following stipulations:
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This notice must be included with any -reproduced or adapted port: ions of this
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..

REPORT NUMBER

85-1370

INFLUENCES OF HENRI JOiINI AND CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

AUTHOR(S)

MAJIOR FRANC[S S.

JONES,

USAF

FACULTYADVISOR

DR.

DONALD D. CHIIPMAN,

SOS/CAE

SPNO

TCOL BERNARD D. CLAXTON,

ACSC/EDCJ2

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AFB, AL

0isdnmju4

36112
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b' m-71~ p'd~l !or l-i dtubIwbl

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ANALYSTS

AND COMPARISON

OF THE IDEAS

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Jones, Francis S., Major, USAF

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AND LATER INFLUENCES OF HENRI JOMINI AND CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and Identify by block number) SUB. GR.

GROUP

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reuerse if necessary and identify by block number)

This paper reviews the lives of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. It also covers the main concepts contained in their greatest works and the influence they had on subsequent warfare and military thinking. Jomini's influence is traced through the American Civil War to current military docLrinc. Clausewitz' influence is traced from the post Napoleonic period, Lhrough the two world wars, to current military doctrine.

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(205)293-2483
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EDITION OF I JAN 73 IS OBSOLETE

. . . . .. FD

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PREFA CE

:___

This paper is written in order to give the reader a flavor for the many contributions of both Jomini and Clausewitz to the TL is intended to be an introduction to the art of warfare.
subject and not an in-depth study.

The author would like to thank the staff of the Air University. Library for their help locating and obtaining many of the listed The author would like to also recognize Major Rich references. Coodwin, Air Command and Staff College, for his help in locating Finally, the author many of the source materials on Jomini. gratefully acknowledges the indispensable editorial efforts of Dr. Donald D. Chipman, Squadron Officer School, and Major Bob Ostrander, Air Command and Staff College.

Accession For

NTIS

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DTIC TAB

Unannounced Justification ByDistribution/

Availability Codes
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Francis S. Jones wrote this article while a course officer at Air Command and Staff College, Maiwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Before attending this school, he served four years as a B-52 Standardization/Evaluation Radar Navigator, Castle Air Force Base, California. Prior to that assignment, he served two years as a B-52 Instructor Radar Navigator, also at Castle Air Force Base, California, and four years as a B-52 Radar Navigator, Major Jones holds a B.S. Degree Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. in Mathematics from the Citadel and a M.S.A. Degree in Management from Georgia College. He has completed some post graduate work in mathematics at the University of South Carolina.

I
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___ __

___

__TABLE

OF CONTENTS

PAGE Pre fac.......................... .. ..... ho........................iv About the CHAPTER ONE *CHAPTER
-

. .. .

..

..

. .. I

INTRODUCTION.....................................

TWO - JOMINI: THEORIST OF WARFARE..............7 Biography.............................8 .......... Main Ideas and Concepts......... Tnflucnces...............................18

12

PHILOSOPHER OF WARFARE . . 27 27. CHAPTER THREE - CLAUSEW[TZ: Biography................................28 ............. 32 Main Ideas and Concepts......... Inf tuences.............................37 CHAPTER FOUR
-

COMPARISON

AND CONTRAST.............43

Bibliography..............................47

v-

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were very turbulent years in Europe. The Napoleonic Wars raged between France and a

series of three coalitions of European countries from 1792 to 1815. These bloody conflicts not only revolutionized warfare,

but also produced one of the greatest military geniuses of all. time. Napoleon Bonaparte was one of the new generals to emerge Historians acclaimed him as a

from the 1789 French Revolution.

great strategist, not so much for his inventiveness as for his development and application of existing theories. (2:136) But

Napoleon left no written record of his concepts and philosophies *'.except for 115 maxims which are merely military cliches. (4:xxi)

The world primarily owes a debt to two men for recording and interpreting his contributions to strategy and Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869) 1831). the art of war:

and Carl von Clausewitz (1780-%

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the reader to their lives, their ideas, and the main But first, a

these two great thinkers:

influences of their work on subsequent warfare.

brief synopsis of the violence that rocked Europe during their I if et imes is necessary.

FII
*

The French Revolution, which marked an end to feudal oppression and despotism in France, began with the fall of ti' on July 14, 1789. Bastille

The people organized a constitutional governLouis XVI, the French

ment with a National Assembly in control.

King, retained an extensive appointing power and a royal veto much like that of an American President. (1:114) 1791, But in June of

the King lost these powers and was, in effect, a prisoner Neighboring countries, with close ties to the On

of the Assembly.

French throne, sympathized with Louis XVI and tensions rose. April 20, 1792, France declared war on Austria and Prussia for not accepting the principles of the French Revolution. (1:167)

Enraged over the execution of the French King in January of 1793, England, Spain, Holland, and Sardinia joined Austria and Prussia in what became known as the First Coalition. (1:192) Thus, the

stage was set for a series of wars which would rage in Europe for the next 23 years. France appeared doomed to defeat until, in August of 1793, the French government instituted the "levee en masse, which

permanently requisitioned all Frenchmen for service in the army. Within a year, the French took the offensive. By 1795, the

Coalition was broken and Spain, Holland, and Prussia signed peace treaties with France. (7:77) In 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte arrived

on the scene receiving his first command at the age of only 26. He led his army through the Maritime Alps into Northern Italy where, with speed and precision of movements, he split
Si i d i ii i its

the

e AutsI r i i ns . I Iom t Ii

After crushiii)g

lie Sardinia i

2
.L. . . . . . . . . . . . .

7-

army, forced

he turned his attention

to the Austrians.

In

1797,

he

them into signing the treaty of Campo Formio. same year, Napoleon the

(7:77)

Later that ,.1id

launched an expedition to Egypt he Bat I lv of I ho Syria (June 1799) 1798).

:;vi'ia.

lie deleated

E,:gylpt ians al I

Pyramids and to (1:252)

(JuLy 1798) but lost to the Turks in

the BrLtish at

the naval Battle of the Nile (August

In Europe, the French Empire was Austria, :

.France.

deteriorating.

Britain,

and Russia joined (7:77)

to form the Second Coalition against

A Russo-Austrian army drove the French out of an Anglo-Russian army landed in Northern

Italy and Germany and 1Holland. moved I&Il

The Austrians remained in Italy while the Russians There, in September the French The 1799, they Lhe

north into Switzerland. prey to the French. in

Shortly after, lboLland at Bergen.

defeated

Russians and Russia

British

following January, returned Lo

withdrew from

the coalition.

(2:257)

Napoleon

France, gathered his armies, and moved south, Austrians at at in the Battle I taly the Battle of Marengo. (1:262)

defeating the The French victory further advances February with the to last of

of tlohenlinder (December 1800) and peace with the Austrians in

brought about The

1801.

(2:302)

British

finaLly agreed

to peace

signing of about In Third

the Treaty

of Amiens.

This peace wa- only

one year, 1802 to 1803.

1805,

(7:78)

Napoleon,

now Emperor of France, went to war with a Russia, and later

Coalition consisting of England, Austria,

Prussia.

Napoleon assembled his army quickly and moved so rapidly

that he cut off the Austrian advanced troops and captured 30,000 men at Ulm. resistance. lie then moved on Vienna, which he entered without

lie encountered the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz

where he won the battle which ended the war with those two countries. At this point, Napoleon would have turned his attention to an invasion of England, but, on the day before Ulm was captured, Admiral Nelson and the English fleet destroyed the French fleet at Trafalgar. Napoleon met his remaining enemies in quick succes-

sion, destroying Prussia at the Battle of Jena (1806) and persuading Russia to accept an alliance after the Battle of Friedland (1807). The resulting Treaty of Tilsit marked the height of

Napoleon's power. (7:78) In an effort to diminish England's control of the seas, Napoleon set about acquiring a superior navy. Combining the To gain a

French, Russian, and Dutch fleets gave him 129 ships.

three-to-two advantage uver the British, he needed either the Danish or Portugese fleet. After Britain destroyed the Danish The result was a

fleet, Napoleon sent an army toward Portugal.

seven-year war in Spain against Wellington's Anglo-Portugese army. (9:24) Austria rebelled in 1809 but was quickly defeated

at Wagram in the same year. (7:78) In 1812, Napoleon plunged into the disastrous campaign against Russia who had turned pro-British and anti-French. of this campaign are well known: most of the French armies. another army. The results

a crushing defeat and loss of

Napoleon returned to Paris and raised he attempted to hold Germany

fn the 1813 campaign,

0i

and destroy the advancing allied forces consisting of Russian and British troops.
Ssi ve st ruggles of it I n anid

rhis proved to be one of the longest, most expenthe Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon won victories at

Ba ut zen which

resu ILted

in a t Itree-mon I h ar- i st i (e.

(2:898)

But this peace was broken when Austria joined forces The French won the Battle of Dresden

with Napoleon's enemies. but,

in October of 1813, the allies defeated them at the Battle

of the Nations around Leipzig, thus settling Napoleon's fate. (7:78) After a one year exile to Elba in the spring of 1814,

Napoleon returned to France, raised another French army, and again made war on the other great European powers in what came to be known as the Campaign of the Hundred Days. He was finally

defeated at Waterloo and exiled to Corsica where he remained unt i I his death. Thus ended the NapoLeonic great influence on ,Jomini and Clausewitz. Wars and Napoleon's

,.
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.......................................................................................................

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Chapter Two

JOMINI:

THEORIST OF WARFARE

Baron Henri Antoine Jomini was the first great military thinker to analyze the Napoleonic way of war. A staff officer

for his entire military career in both the French and Russian armies, he never attained a command of his own and his participation in military action was limited to his normal staff duties. Historians claim that he once remarked that he had never actually witnessed a charge with the bayonet, let alone taken part in one. (7:82) Jomini was an ambitious, yet frustrated, soldier whose

forte was his ability to analyze and record the basic concepts of war. lie sought to devise a theoretical system for winning battles

using his understanding of both Napoleon's failures and successes. (11:10) As pointed out so astutely in Edward Mead Earle's Makers

of Modern Strategy: In his attempt to explain Napoleon's career, Gencral Jomini made his own contribution to the innovations of the age. lie began, not indeed the study of war, but the characteristically modern, systematic study of t.he subWith ject in the form it has retained ever since. Clausewitz, whom he antedates a bit, Jomini may be said to have done for the study of war something akin to that which Adam Smith did for the study of economics. ... The work Jomini did was in effect scientific pioneering - not the first daring penetrations of an unknown country, but the first really good map making. (7:79,85)

[ PREVOUS P'AGE
IS BLANK

Before reviewing Jomini's greatest work, Summary of War, and

the Art

of

its influence of subsequent warfare, a short biographiprove helpful.

cal sketch will

BIOGRAPHY Jomini. was born in Canton of Vaud, 1779 in the small town of Payerne in the (11:4) He was the son of a

French Switzerland.

good, middle class family that had emigrated from Italy several generations earlier. He received a conventional bourgois educabanking before taking

tion and completed an apprenticeship in employment in Paris in campaign of that regiment under (17 years old), 1796.

Inspired by Napoleon's Italian a Swiss mercenary

same year, Jomini entered (5:726)

French pay.

Because of his young age

he was assigned to a minor unpaid staff position In 1802. he was a lieuten-

dealing with routine 'supply matters.

ant colonel in the Canton of Vaud militia. first met his mentor, Marshal Ney.

Ic was here that he

Jomini returned to commercial

life after the Treaty of Amiens and, with the help of Ney, wrote parts of his first significant military work, Traite des Grandes Operations Militaires (Principles of Large Military Operations). This great treatise on the campaigns of Frederick the Great compari-

contains certain generalizations in military thought and sons between Joinini Frederick's generalship and that of Napoleon. the French Army

returned

to service as a major in

in

1805

and served

on Ney's staff,

fighting the Third Coalition in the (5:727)

Ulm and Austerlitz campaigns.

8
_0.

Sent to Vienna with dispatches for Napoleon, Jomini managed to get a presentation copy of his writing to the emperor.
I he

During

ull I fol[owing the French victory at Austerlitz, Napoleon Lime to read a coupl.e of chapters. lie was so impressed

found

with the way the author had captured the true nature of the Napoleonic military method that he made the 27 year old Jomini a regular colonel in the French army and a member of his personal staff. In September of 1806, Jomini reported to Napoleon at

Mainz and began his new duties. Jomini was a brilliant staff officer who claimed to be a diviner of Napoleon's intentions. In one story, he recollected

that at the end of a planning conference for the 1806 Jena campaign against Prussia, he asked if he might join Napoleon later at Bamberg. sna pped: The emperor, believing his destination was secret, "The map of

"Who told you that I am going to Bamberg?"

Germany, sire, and your campaigns of Marengo (1800) and Ulm (1805)," the Jomini replied. Whether this account is true or not,

facts remain that Jomini possessed a clear understanding of

Napoleon's strategic thought and that Napoleon appreciated the value of Joinini's writing. with Jomini 's great ambition The emperor's appreciation, together for a seat among the French high

command, started a bitter feud with his rival, Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff. The great animosity between the two

officers would eventually frustrate Jomini's career. In July of 1808, Napoleon made Jomini a Baron of the Empire and appointed him Marshal Ney's chief of staff. In late 1808, he

-J:

":-.":':'-".:

I"9

Lon Napoleon's staff.

-- - - -- - ----

accompanied Ney to Spain. (5:728)

Shaken by the savagery of the

growing guerilla warfare, Jomini was relieved of duty shortly after the Battle of Wagram (1809). He subsequently tendered his

resignation rather than accept reassignment to work under Berthier In lieu of losing this great military mind,

Napoleon promoted Jomini to general de brigade and assigned him to special duty in Paris for the purpose of writing a history of the Italian campaigns. It was there that he received a Russian

commission as a brigadier general which he held in reserve. In early 1812, Jomini was assigned to the imperial headquarters as the Official Historian of the Grande Arm~e. Later that

year, he refused to take part in the invasion of Russia and Napoleon appointed him governor of Vilna and later Smolensk. (7:82) Moscow. Jomini rejoined the Grande Arm~e during its retreat from Napoleon sent him ahead to scout for supplies and road He fell ill during the Berezina river crossing and

conditions.

was unable to serve again until May 1813. Jomini finally joined Marshal Ney shortly before the Battle of Lutzen (1813). At the Battle of Bautzen (1813), Napoleon's

orders to Ney were held up at a critical moment of the battle. Understanding Napoleonic strategy, Jomini advised a course of action which Ney executed. This course of action eventually

proved to be in accord with Napoleon's orders when they finally arrived. In recognition of his successes, Noy recommended .Jomini Berthier effectively

for promotion to general de division.

blocked the promotion by countering it with an order for Jomini's

10
0i

:::::::::::::::::::: :.::: - -=.- - - - - =- - =-:::::::::::::::::::::::: -::::: :'-.

- .- . . .

- - .

arrest

for an alleged thal

.1i1d

failure could

to submit

certain

reports on

time.

'rhiis was :ill

::{e ea.,l I iraie:,

.}oiini
I in.il ly,

bear-.

lie tendered his resignal ion .dvi

e, elv. lvd l I) he

aglili::l Nvy':M

allies

taking up his commission

in

the

Russian Army.

(7:82)

Although he refused to assist in the invasion of Switzerland and France in 1814, Jomini remained rest of his life. in the Czar's service for the Nations the

After the Battle of

(Leipzig 1813),

Jomini devoted himself to his writings.

He published Traite des

Grandes Operations Militaire (Principles of Large Military OperaLions), Histoire Critique et Militaire (Critical and Military History of des Guerres de la Revolution the Revolution), and Military the and

the Wars of (Political

Vie Politique Life of

et Militaire de Napoleon From

Napoleon).

1823 to 1829 he was military tutor to

Tzaravich (later Czar Nicholas I).

This teaching position inf]u-

enced his writing Introduction a l'Etude des Grandes Combinations do la Strategie et de la Tactique (Introduction to the Study of Large Combinations of Strategy and Tactics) in Western intervention Jomini into the 1829. During the

1828 Greek revolt against Turkey, In 1832, Jomini residence to St.

served as military advisor to the Czar.

established the Russian Staff College. after 1829 was Brussels, between

While his primary 1856 he returned

1853 and

POtersburg to advise the Czar during the Crimean War. Through his works, Jomini gained a reputation as one of Europe's leading strategists. before the [talian campaign of Paris at the age of 90. Even 1859. Napoleon -1I in consulted Jomini in

1869, Jomini died

11

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This great master's works can be classified into two categories: historical and theoretical. During his years in Brussels, a history, Precis Politique et

he wrote his last two treatises:

Militaire de la Campagne de 1815 (Political and Military Summary of the Campaign of 1815) in 1839 and his greatest theoretical work, Precis de l'Art de la Guerre (Summary of the Art of War) in
1838. Like many of his later works, Jomini wrote this latter

treatise as a "book most suitable or statesman." (11:44)

for the instruction of a prince

For this reason, together with the fact

that it was in many ways the final consolidation of his doctrine and theory, Summary of the Art of War provides an excellent framework for analyzing his main ideas on warfare.

MAIN IDEAS AND CONCEPTS Joinini's major contributions to the art of war concern the tangible aspects of warfare. this subject is four maxims: (1) To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own. (2) To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces. (3) On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. (4) To so arrange that these masses shall not onLy be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall
engage al the proper t im1s amid with energy. (13:70)

Underlying all of his theories on

a fundamental principle which he propounds in

12

The art of war, according to Jomini, consists of "Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of Arms, where and the Art of the Eng i neer " (13:66)

five

parts:

the Different

"St rategy (10C ides grand

to act;

logi.stics brings the troops to this point; the manner of execution and Tactics of

tacti.cs troops."

decides (13:69)

the emp]oyment of the inte-

the different arms deals with

grating the infantry, artillery, and

cavalry while the art of the fortifications. the offensive system

engineer concerns the attack and defense of Jomini also stresses the importance of of operation.

Since the art of war consists of throwing the bulk the decisive points, Jomini Therefore, felt it necessary it

of one's army upon

for one to take the initiative. was almost always advantageous that

he believed that

to take the offensive. advantages:

lie claimed

the offensive has moral and political . . . it carries the war upon foreign assailant's country from devastation, resources and diminishes those of his the morale of his army, and generally adversary. (13:72)

soil, saves the increases his enemy, elevates depresses the

As a grand

strategy,

the offensive is risky because an invasion to mention the hostility invaded country. of

leads to long lines of operation not the inhabitants and

tiry

geography of the

The mili-

jdvantage

is

that

the enemy will be struck in a vital area.

Depri ved of his resources, he will be compelled to seek a speedy termination to hostilities. (13:72) the defensivP strategy despite its advantage resources. Jomini wrote:

Jomini condemned of draining . . . to

an opponent's strength and

bury an army

in entrenchments where it may be outflanked

13
0

and surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly; and it is hoped that we shall never see another instance of it." (13:154) But, he believed that. if

one's forces are inferior to the enemy's, then a defensiveoffensive strategy can be used to restore equality. Jomini

explained that this active type of defense (taking the offensive

at times),

"promises many chances for success . . . [and] com(13:74) Jomini is also a

bines the advantages of both systems." proponent of the element of surprise.

He states that "it is

sufficient to attack [an enemy] in force at the point intended before preparations can be made to meet the attack." (13:209) further cites confusion of the enemy as an advantage. Jomini described military objectives in war as geographic places. Lines of communication, the capitals of warring counlie

tries and the decisive points in an enemy's lines of operation are just a few examples. He also defined the theater of opera-

tion as the general area "upon which the parties may assail each other" (13:74), a zone of operation as a battlefield, and the base of operation as a point from which an army operates. (13:74,77,66) His rule for the location of this base of opera-

tion is to place it "where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the same time, insure a safe retreat." (13:84)

The basic tenet in Jomini's concept of war is the emphasis on the use of interior and simple lines of operation.
07

A Line of

14
40

J..

operat Lin

he defined covers

as in

that

part

of the whole zone of operations Lts mission. UI llii

I ii I
.1

which an army ox i:1. w:, leii I

carrying out

A simple line (1( ll' .

ilie

l Iearimy

;m Is

as ;i

:s

ilig

wl eill

it is split into two groups. obtained when an army whose of iLs enemy can,

Interior lines of

operation are

lines are closer together than those

by a strategic movement, split and overwhelm the other, by reuniting alternately

the enemy forces one after the mass of its forces.

(7:86) the parts played by the different

Jomini also addressed branches lery of the Army.

He noted

the practice

of using the artil-

to soften the it.

decisive point of an enemy's lines prior to "the principal value of cavalry

attacking is derived

He also explained

from its rapidity and mobility."

(11:19)

Considering it's

his idea of

territory or places as the objectives of war,

not surprising that Jomini wrote: the most important arm Another of Jomini the attention
.. . "

"The infantry is undoubtedly

(13:290)
to the art of war was

s great contributions He

he focused on supply. tied

believed that

this func-

Lion of war was closely limited both believed that influenced In

to war fighting and definitely lie further

strategic and the

tactical operations.

placement of supply installations greatly these operations. the functions of a mi itary

the outcome of

his teachings

concerning

stiff, Jomini probing deeply ships.

explained several specific

duties as well as and staff relation-

into the question of command that a staff existed

lie felt

to assist the commander in

15
0 f

executing his duties thus giving him additional time for problem solving.
his staff,

On the harmonious relationship between a commander and

Jomini warned,
" .

woe to an army where these

authorities cease to act in concert!" (13:257) Jomini also touched briefly on the intangible aspects of war in the first two chapters of his Summary of the Art of War: "Statesmanship in its Relation to War" and "Military Policy." (13:9) In the first chapter, he defines, in political terms, the ideological, economic,

kinds of war in which a country can engage:

popular, defense of the balance of power, ally assistance, and assertion of national rights. Remembering his own experiences

fighting in Spain, Jomini warns of the dangers of guerilla warfare stating: No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system applied to a great nation unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself. (13:32) As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first, . . .
as at Fontenoy . . . preferring them to the frightful

epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers. (13:34-35) fie also addresses the use of alliances to help banish "wars of extermination [total war] from the code of nations," (13:34)

fn the second chapter, Jomini discusses the domestic aspects

i . l 1. l 1 y I, 1, y: p r) , 1,v in 1 ', dl II ly orI-ga
. i

,I0 1.1 e
tig

11 . re

1 e,, I' I 1(c ,

I IN:,11 1 111;0. Im I,v :;,

Ideq ua I v

te I lns,

e x pend it u res,

and

mil

i ng

16

KJ
making arrangements good general. for military command, and the qualities of a technology on

lie also discusses the effects of

.

warfare citing the need of "governments congress to proscribe . Referring to his .

to combine in a (13:48)

. inventions of destruction."

diagrams and maxims concerning strategy,

many academics, including his contemporary, Clausewitz, Jiomini for thinking of war in

fault

geometric terms and absolute rules. diagrams in his

But Jomini refutes his critics stating that the work were "not to be understood precisely as

the geometrical

figures indicate them. line of battle as would (13:95)

A general who would expect to arrange his

regularly as upon paper or on a drill-ground

be greatly mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat." lie also wrote that precision is certain what that "theories cannot teach men with they should do in every possible

mathematical case, but it

they wilt always

point out errors

which should Jomini ciples, felt

be avoided." that

(13:323) theories, founded and upon added right printo accurate

"correct

sustained

by actual events

of wars,

military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals skill war." to
. . .

they will at least

produce

generals

of sufficient

take rank next after the natural masters of the art of This belief was shared by a majority of military Jomini's now principles look at military the

(13:325)

minds of

the nineteenth the test

century and many of of time.

have survived part Jominian

This paper will played in

theory ultimately

subsequent

thinking.

17

INFLUENCES Jomini's greatest work, Summary of the Art of War, was first published in 1838. Translated into all the major languages, it

remained the world's foremost textbook on warfare until the easy Prussian victories of 1870 and 1871 had European military minds clamoring for books written by German generals. thought survived in the United States. Jomini's teachings were first introduced in America with the rebirth of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1817. French. The few textbooks available at that time were written in In fact, Captain O'Connor's translation of Gay de Vernon's But Jominian

A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortifications was, for

years, the standard text on the science and art of war. Although

this work primarily emphasized the engineering aspects of war, Captain O'Connor also included a summary of Jomini's strategic precepts. (8:32) Cadets also encountered Jomini's teachings in the classes of Professor Dennis Mahan, a protege of Alfred Thayer (the West Point). An father of

1824 graduate of the Academy, Dennis Mahan

joined the faculty in 1832 after three years of study and travel abroad. Art illerists (8:73) (ations,
reLurn

He attended the French Military School of Engineers and at Metz, the premier school of its in artillery kind in field Europe. fortili0n h is
t-he a(ademi

lie completed courses permanent

tactics,

fortifications,
he rose

and the art of war.

of

to the Academy,

to become chairman

board and principal instructor in warfare as well as in engineeriing.

18

...................

Thro,

hi s

tea h it i

gs,

lie

he ame an

i nt e I I

aI

lc her a Id meifat lie integrated

tor to generations of American military leaders, the Jominian principles he had learned course

in Europe into a nine-hour 25:109) In 1848, a pocket-

for seniors on the art of war. (19:84; volume of

lie publ ished his own short size

Jominian theories:

book that is usually referred to by its short title Outpost.

(19:87) The first English translation of Jomini's Summary of the Art of War appeared in the early 1850's. this Dennis Mahan incorporated

treatise into the academy's curriculum around 1860 but

subsequently dropped it in favor of abridgements by other authors. (20:41,89) But Jominian influence prevailed at the Academy and, American Civil War, had quite a following.

by the outbreak of the

Historians place West Point graduates in command of both armies in 56 of the 60 major battles of the Civil War and four. (20:36) in 997

command of one army officers war, (359

in the remaining

In total,

confederate and 638 union), from West Point between

who participated

in the

graduated

1833 and 1861.

(25:108) Pickett, President there were

Most notable Beauregard,

for the South were Lee, Jackson, Stuart, Bragg, Longstreet, J.E. Johnston, and the

of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis.

For the North,

McClelLan, Burnside, Hooker, Custer, Meade, Buell, Hallek, Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, Thomas, Hancock, and Rosecrans. All studied

under Dennis Mahan and were exposed to Jominian strategies and tactics; but none of these men had, before 1861, any actual Except for a

experience in directing large numbers of troops.

19

__..

% ...

handful of these officers who had visited Europe, none had ever seen an army larger than the 14,000 men of Winfield Scott or Zachary Taylor in the Mexican War. (20:37) Thus, the picture

painted by some historians of Civil War generals riding into battle with "a sword in one hand and Jomini's Summary of the Art of War in the other" is not so far fetched. (11:2) Early in the fighting, commanders on both sides subscribed directly to Jomini's principles of war. The North's generals

professed Jomini's ideas of places as objectives and concentration of force. In one instance shortly after taking command of

the Union's Eastern army, McClellan stubbornly refused to move his army away from Washington DC and against the Confederates until he felt it was strong enough to undertake any Jominian movements. (20:46) le, as most Northern generals, held that the principle

of concentration of force meant one big effort at a time in one theater. The South, on the other hand, was even more Jominian in It had adopted Jomini's strategy of offensive-

its strategies. defensive.

Not only did the Confederates believe in places as

military objectives and economy of force, but also in mass, interior lines, and unity of command. Outnumbered and often outgunned,

such commanders as Robert E. Lee, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, and James Longstreet, translated these Jominian tactics into a They saw no reason

series of frustrations to Union invasion plans.

to ever change their way of war.

Their minds were unreceptive to

new ideas and, therefore, they ignored several important technological changes which outdated some of Jomini's rules on warfare.

20

."; . ... % i .> . '.. . . v......

.......

i<

'.'< .:"-

'-

. - -?

-?.

.. ''. i* *-

-. -

.- . -*'l<

Rifled muskets reversed an earlier advantage enjoyed by field artillery (;etIysburg and gave and( Cold infantrymen an edge in range and Harbor are grim remi nders of accuracy.

the power of

this new weaponry.

railroad and tion of

What the rifle did to Jomini's tactics, the

(6:97) The introducof

telegraph did to his strategy.

the railroad and telegraph meant that the superiority

interior lines of communication, which Jomini so stressed and upon which valid. the Confederates so securely relied, was no longer compelled both sides to modify their

Thus, technology

strategies. (6:99) During the latter half of the war, the South made only minor modifications in its strategy. the Changes included entrenchment and The North, on the that

use of artillery as a defensive weapon.

other hand, abandoned Jominian theory for a new kind of war; according to Grant and Sherman. Grarnt was "an officer who ranked low in his class at West Point and who claimed little

knowledge of the literature of war."

(19:139)
never read

Once asked his opinion of Jomini, he remarked that he'd

the master. Grant believed that strategic concepts lie claimed "the art Get at

were nothing more of war

than common sense. (17:7)

is simple enough. you can.

Find out where the enemy is. Strike at him as hard as (20:51)

him as soon as

you can and as

often as you can,

and keep moving on."

Sherman was a typical Jominian at the

beginning of the war

but later became a great proponent of the economic and psychological aspects of war. B. H. Liddell Hart depicts him as the

21

0:-- ::: -:i-::i:

::.: ;:: i:

. ..

. .

. .

greatest general of the Civil War claiming Sherman realized the true object of strategy is to minimize fighting. (20:52) famous march to the sea, In his By

Sherman put this principle to use.

using a campaign of terror and destruction aimed at the enemy people, he attempted to destroy their zest for war. Some historians believe Jominian influence on the Civil War is overexaggerated citing lessons leaders on both sides learned during the Mexican-American War. All that can be said, with

certainty, is that Jomini's principles had some influence on some Civil War leaders. But Jominian influence on naval warfare after

1890 is another story. Alfred Thayer Mahan, son of Dennis Mahan of West Point, was perhaps America's first legitimate theoretical strategist. 1859 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, his naval career, up to 1880, was less than outstanding. Then, while An

preparing lectures on naval history, Alfred Mahan turned to Jomini's strategies and tactics. Like Jomini, Alfred Mahan

believed that "correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of war" (13:325) were the keys to naval doctrine. all He possessed "a good working knowledge of most

the important naval campaigns of the years 1660 to 1815 and (18:77) Using this history

thv tactics of the various battles." and the principles he extracted

from Jomini's History of the the Arl oh

Campaigns of the Revolut:ion and Empire and Summary of War, Alfred Mahan developed an analogy fie found

between land and naval

warfare.

that many of Jomini's principles could be

22

adapted to naval warfare with only a change from army to navy terminol.ogy, while others required slight modifications. indelible impression.

As Louis Hacker indicates, Mahan left an

Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 16601783 at once circled the globe, for it was translated into all the important languages; it was read eagerly and studied closely by every great ch.incellory and shaped the imperial policies of Germany admiralty; it and Japan; it supported the position of Britain that its greatness lay in farflung empire; and it once more turned America toward those seas where it had been a power up to 1860, but which it had abandoned to seek its destiny in the conquest of its own continent. (1O:V) No other strategy. book has This exerted greater weight with regard to naval

treatise truly won Alfred Mahan an international Jomini of naval strategy. the years, way of war.

reputation as the

Many of Jomini's principles became obsolete over while others found a permanent place in the American

The first the

list

of the American principles of war was published in 10-5 and

1921 War Department Training Regulation No.

i nc Luded a. b. c. d.
e.

f. g. h. i.

The The The The The The The The The

Principle Principle Principle Principle Principle Principle Principle Principle Principle

of of of of of of of of of

the Objective the Offensive Mass Economy of Force Movement Surprise Security Simplicity Cooperation (19:213) U. S.
For

Jomini defined each of these principles in his writings.

rmilitary minds adopted

them making only minor modifications.

instance, Jomini saw geographic points as objectives for operations. After the Civil War, however, the U. S. military adopted

23

the concept of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight as the objectives of war. Many of Jomini's other definitions also

continued to hold prominent places in the American art of warfare. An examination of the U. S. Army's Field Service ReguLa-

tions--Operations (FM 100-5, 15 June 1944), reveals striking similarities to Jomini's concepts. An example is the Field

Service Regulation's definition of the theater of war which contains important Jominian thoughts: "that the 'theater of war'

includes the areas which are involved in the war as well as the areas which might be involved." (11:11) The Field Service Regu-

lation's explanation of the capabilities and employment of the different arms is also quite similar to the approach used by Jomini in his Summary of the Art of War. (11:12) Today, United

States Air Force Basic Aerospace Doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-1, still contains striking similarities to the Jominian concepts discussed earlier [emphasis added]:

(1) Unless offensive action is initiated, military victory is seldom possible. (27:2-6) (2) Commanders seek to maneuver their strengths selectively against an enemy's weakness while avoiding engagement with forces of superior strength. (27:2-7) (3) Surprise is the attack of an enemy at a time, place, and manner for which the enemy is neither prepared nor expecting an attack. The principle of surprise is achieved when an enemy is unable to react effectively to an attack. (27:2-6) (4) The basic objective of land forces is to win the land battle--to gain and/or maintain control of vital territories. (27:1-3)

24

2.

Jomini appears to have met the goals that he set out to

achieve when succeeded the art in he wrote his Summary IogicaLly clarifying of the Art of War. lie the study not worth hold of of

and systematizing Jomini "is

of war.

As Napoleon once wrote, however as a (14:14) the writer,

much as a soldier; some sound ideas."

he has gotten

This perception least. Jomini's

may have been an influence carried on

understatement,

to say

long and strong after his death, and his ideas are still worthy of study today.

07

25

0%

Chapter Three

CI,AUSEWITZ:

PIllIOSOPIII'R OF WARFARE
the best known, most quoted,

Carl. von Clausewitz is probably

and least understood of all military theorists read the eighteenth, nineteenth, and

or studied in A

possibly twentieth centuries.

combat and staff

officer in both the

Prussian and Russian armies great thinker to

during the Napoleonic era, he was the first delve into the philosophy of war. understand creases least in

His greatest desire was to

"

the true nature of war and the heads

to iron out many .

.

of strategists and statesmen point to be considered

. and

at

to show

the real

in War."

(14:22)

This goal

was echoed when he wrote of his greatest

work, On War:

But it was in my wish also in this to avoid everything common, everything that is self-evident, that has been said a hundred times, and is commonly accepted; for my ambition was to write a book that would not be forgotten in two or three years, and which anyone interested in the subject would be sure to read more than once. (3:63) Several hisLorians paint the picture of an intellectual whose

literature was dominated by frustrated great soldier. (4:17)

the legend of a disappointed and* However, a close examination of this

strategist's distinguished combat as his profound theoretical,

record as a junior officer and political

as well

historical,

writings show the

fallacy of such a misperception and explain the

27

general

and lasting value of his ideas.

(14:23)

Therefore, this

paper will review Clausewitz's life and analyze the concepts he presented in his great treatise, On War. It will also examine

the influence this great military philosopher had on subsequent warfare. BIOGRAPHY Carl von Clausewitz was born at Burg, a small town 70 miles southwest of Berlin, Prussia, in the summer of 1780. (19:14) family had emigrated from Poland near the beginning of that century and his father served as a lieutenant in the Prussian Army under Frederick the Great. At the end of the Seven Years' 1.is

War, Carl's father, being a middle class volunteer and not of the nobility, was retired from the service and made a tax collector. Due to low wages, his family lived on the edge of poverty. To

allow Carl and his brothers the opportunity of seeking military careers (normally reserved only for nobles), the family claimed to be of nobility (hence the "von" in their name); but this title

did not rest on the firmest of foundations.

Little is known of

Carl's first 12 years except that he attended an inferior school and learned the fundamentals of grammar and arithmetic, together with a smattering of Latin and French. (16:18) In the spring of

1792, the 12-year-old Clausewitz entered the Prussian army as a cadet. His regiment remained garrisoned despite Prussia's involveFrance. lie In January R iii e . 1793, his

ment in the First Coalition against Ii I 1*1i y i11.l1 ie d i .l1 I i ll

I1 (-.11

1. 1l i 1i c w

28

* ::::: ::::::::::-i

" "

- '" ="-

* ""

"

his first year.

taste of war at the Siege of Mainz in Following that bloody victory, to a(t as a reserve.

June of that was ordered

this time to

his regiment used

to

(anionments

ClausewitZ

I u r liee ihis educ ation by rea(ing. Basle,

Just prior to Lhe Peace ()f No longer able to

lie was promoted to Second-Lieutenant.

gain promotion on the battlefield, Clausewitz enrolled in a local school and learned mathematics, history and French. (16:29) the autumn of 1801, In

he took leave from his regiment and managed

to pass the entrance exam for The Institution for the Young Officers in Berlin. There, he not only received an education in

science, tactics, and strategy, but also met his mentor, Gerhard von Scharnhorst. The father-son relationship that developed

guaranteed Clausewitz's career and led to his appointment as a i de-de-(amp to Pri.nce August of Prussia. his studies in le held this post graduated

while lie continued Sat

Berlin and in

1804,

the head of his class.

In 1805, Ctausewitz advanced to the remained neutral during the war of

rank of Captain.

Prussia had

the Second Coalition and had entered a servile partnership with Napoleon. This did not last long as King Friedrich Wilhelm III

ordered Prussian mobilization; thus, Prussia entered the War of the Third Coalition allied with Austria, Russia, and Britain. As

Prince August's aide-de-camp, Clausewitz was able to observe the reaction of the Prussian High Command to Napoleon's Ulm-Austerlitz campaign as well as their clumsy military and diplomatic efforts
to prepare Prussia for war.

29
0-

.*

..

..

...

. .

Clausewitz experienced the results of these chaotic condiA ztions in the Prussian High Command at Auerstadt, where Davout's outnumbered French corps out-maneuvered and out-fought the proud Prussian Army. Thereafter, he was part of Hohenlohe's disinte-

grating command, struggling northward until intercepted and captured by Murat at Prenzlau. (14:19) Reportedly, he showed

considerable bravery and determination as a combat officer in this campaign. Now, as a prisoner, he had time to analyze the

Prussian mistakes. After his release in 1807, Clausewitz accepted a commission as a major in the Scharnhorst-designed Prussian general staff. In this position, he played an active role in the secret reform and moral regeneration of the Prussian army and state. In August

of 1809, he accepted instructor duties at his old school in Berlin and was appointed military instructor to Crown Prince Frederick William. Marie von Bruhl. In 1810, Clausewitz married the Countess

The following year, he and his fellow Prussian

army reformers began pushing for guerilla warfare against France should Napoleon begin hostilities with Russia. (16:131) When Napoleon forced Prussia into a military "collaboration" in 1812, Clausewitz, upset with his country's leadership, defected to the Russian army. He held the rank of lieutenant colonel and His

served as staff officer with several Russian commands. ignorance of until,

the 1 anguage I imi ted him to the rol e of observer he took part in Lalks betweenI

at the end of that year,

Russian authorities and the commander of the Prussian corps in

30
07

...........................................

the Grande Armee.

These talks (Convention of Tauroggen) led important ( 10:20) separation of the

to

the st rategical ly and politically 1)russi an forces from

FI 'rench control.

Clausew[ttZ was

active in organizing militia units in Russian-occupied East Prussia and otherwise preparing for war against France. remained in the Russian army until the Allied victory in fie 1814.

Clausewitz distinguished himself at Bautzen serving as chief of staff to the Allied army. He rejoined the Prussian army in Paris. In 1815, he

the grade of Colonel after was chief of staff campaign. rest (14:20)

the First Peace of

to Thielmann' s corps during With the demise of Napoleon,

the Waterloo Prussia, like the

of Europe, sank back into reactionary apathy. After three years of duty with the troops on the Rhine fron-

tier, of the

Clausewitz was promoted Berlin War Academy.

to general

(1818) and made director

His assignment was strictly adminisHe

trative which gave him time to pursue his academic endeavors. used his wife's drawing room as a study which he had accumulated

to work through the notes

during his service. the second On the out-

In August 1830, Clausewitz was made chief of artillery district, with headquarters at Breslau.

break of hostilities during a Polish revolt, Clausewitz became chief of staff under Gneisenau. A cholera epidemic broke out in

the rebellion area and both Clausewitz and his superior succumbed; Clausewitz on (14:21) 16 November 1831, after his return to Breslau.

31
0

., '
.

Clausewitz's works can be categorized into two classifications: historical and philosophical. A prolific writer, he published His greatest work, Zum Kriege In an

very little during his lifetime.

(On War), was only partially completed before his death.

unfinished note, presumably written in 1830, Clausewitz stated: The manuscript on the conduct of major operations that will be found after my death can, in its present state, be regarded as nothing but a collection of materials from which a theory of war was to have been distilled. I am still dissatisfied with most of it and can call Book Six only a sketch. . . . Book Seven . . . was meant to deal with "Attack" and Book Eight with "War Plans," in which I intended to concern myself particularly with war in its political and human aspects. . . The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished. (3:70) His wife and brother-in-law, the Count Friedrich von Bruhil, collected Clausewitz's notes and assembled the manuscript into the best order they could for publication. To add congruency, editors

and translators have found it necessary to sprinkle the resulting dull and ponderous work with comments and modifications, some of which Clausewitz probably would diaowa. (14:23) Despite all of

this, On War provides an exceptional medium for a study of Clausewitz's important concepts concerning warfare.

MAIN IDEAS AND CONCEPTS Clausewitz primarily dealt with the nature and essential spirit of war. Although he recognized certain principles, he d(id The basic

not attempt to develop any system for waging war.

premise underlying his great treatise, On War, is that "war is

not hi ing hu)t I he coni t i iit L o00 01f po

icy wiLh othe r means*' not a mere act of pol icy,

(3:

))

He l urther exp I ai ned

that "war

is

but a

32
0"

true

political instrument, a continuation of (3:87) this In a note written on

political activity 10 July 1827, he

by other means." exp)lained: facilLtate "If

is kept in mind

throughout, [war] and "If

it will greatly

the study of the subject (3:69)

He

the whole will be is all a con-

easier to analyze."

wrote:

it [war]

calculati.on of probabilities based on given individuals and ditions, the polLtical object, which was the factor in the

original motive, (3:80) lie employ

must become an essential

equation."

bel ieved war was just one of the many means a state could to achieve a particular end and, province of social life. therefore, it belonged

to the

This thought brings unity

to many of

Clausewitz's ideas an concepts, the more important of which will be reviewed in this paper. factors which should be consid-

Clausewitz saw two inseparable ered when making war: and the totaZ

means at your enemy's disposal As for the military objec-

the strength of his will.

(3:77)

tive ol that it

war, Clausewitz returned

to his basic

premise stating lie added:

is determined by the political objective,

So~meLimes the political objective is the same--for examIn other cases the ple, the conquest of a province. political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations. (3:81) Clausewitz, therefore, saw this military objective changing proportionally to changes in the claimed, leads to political objectives. that "wars have all This, he of

the conclusion

degrees

tmportance and [absolute war]

intensity, ranging from a war of

extermination (3:81) In hi~s

down to simple armed observation."

33

notes to On War, Clausewitz clarified this concept stating:

War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the

objective is to overthrow the enemy--to render him politically helpless or militarily impoteit, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations. (3:69) This concept of two kinds of war did not really become clear to Clausewitz until he was writing his chapters on the defense. By

his notes, we know that he planned to edit his work differentiaLing between the two kinds of war throughout. Since he died after

only completing the rewrite on chapter one, the remainder of his work deals primarily with what he referred to as absolute or total war. Clausewitz defined war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." (3:75) To accomplish this, he believed This, he said, "is the true aim

that the enemy must be disarmed. of warfare." that, war." (3:75)

But later in his work, Clausewitz states

"destruction of the enemy is the overriding principle of (3:258) Here again we see reference to his concept of

total war.

"The first task, then, in planning for a war is to

identify the enemy's center of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one." (3:617) Clausewitz's center of gravHe gave three examThe second

ity was merely the enemy's center of power. ples:

the enemy's army, capital, or allies. (3:596)

task is to ensure that the main forces to be used against that

o ii1
;lI

.1re ( oil( en
(gy viI

r a Ied ,o I'o " a i.1in o f ( ens i ve.

I o

(3:
i

0 7) cr

'"The Iesi
a ,
1(I

. IwayS Ws

very

s1. rong; n

fi

11 ge

he eI

34

at

the decisive t han

point ol

. . . there is no higher and simpler keeping one's forces concent ral ed,

law of (3:204)

st ratt gy

[hat

CLausewitz defined the relationship between strategy and tactics as follows:

". . .

tactics teaches the

use of armed

forces in the engagement; object ority One of of the war."

strategy the use of engagements for the "In tactics as in strategy, superi(3:194)

(3:127)

of numbers is the most common element of victory." the principles

that Clausewitz believed necessary for He wrote: "When the time parts

victory was that of economy of force. for action comes, the must act; enemy's

first requirement should be that all

even the least appropriate task will occupy some of the reduce his overall strength, while completely for the time being." (3:213)

forces and

inactive troops are neutralized

Clausewitz was also a strong proponent of the defensive form of strategy. (3:357) He referred to the defense as "the parrying of a

blow."

But CLausewitz did not believe in a passive

". .

defense.

lie stated:

a war in which victories were intention of

used

only defensively without the

counterattacking would of absolute

be as absurd as a battle in which the principle defense--passivity, (3:358) that is--were to

dictate every action." as he claimed, "a means

His concept of

the defense was,

to win a victory that enables one to take the offensive after superiority has been gained; object of the war." (3:370) that is to proceed to the active "A sudden

lie went on to explain:

powerful

transition to the offensive--the flashing sword of

the greatest moment for the defense." (3:370) But

vengeance--is

35

.*

*" .- ..-........

'-..."""''""-''-.... . . .

. .....--. '.

..

.- '

7.. .

'* ....

....

....

....

..

he later states:

"As soon as the objective has been attained (3:526)

the

aLtack ends and the defensive takes over."

One of the most popular of Clausewitz's ideas was that of friction in war. lie described this term by stating:

Countless minor incidents--the kind you can never really foresee--combine to lower the general level of performance so that one always falls far short of the intended
goal. .
.

. Friction is the only concept that more or

less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. (3:119) Examples of Clausewitz's friction would include the weather, mechanical breakdown, or any other unknown factors of war. Many passages from On War can be taken out of context to connote an entirely different meaning. few examples: We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms. (3:260) Battle is the bloodiest solution. While it should not
. . . is be considered as mutual murder--its effect

The following are just a

rather a killing of the enemy's spirit than of his men-it is always true that the character of battle, like its name, is slaughter, and its price is blood. (3:260) These quotes exemplify the passion Clausewitz felt towards the
horrors of war.

His real intent was to convey the message that

war is not merely a pastime, but a serious means to a serious end'. However, as he had feared, such passages proved "liable to (3:70) Ih(v resul tiig misulder t.nd-

cidl(I ess misint er pretat ion."

ings had a dramatic impact on subsequent warfare.

36
-7

I NFI.IJ EN CES The first edition of On War was published in 1832. Twenty

years later, with the 1500 copies of the first edition still not exhausted, a second edition was published in which the Count von Bruhl clarified many of the obscurities of the original text. (3:27) But this really did not help, for even Clausewitz consid-

ered his unfinished work a "formless mass" of ideas. (3:69) Wilhelm Rustow summed up Clausewitz's early influence on warfare Ln his 1867 work, The Art of War in the Nineteenth Century, writing that Clausewitz was "well-known but little read." (3:27)

Famous German military leaders and writers were responsible for focusing world attention on Clausewitz around 1870-71. Helmuth von Moltke, Colmar von der Goltz, Von Blume, Meckel, and many others declared themselves to be pupils of Clausewitz and claimed that Germany owed to him her success on the battlefield. (24:61) Mottke, as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, not only

use(d Clausewitzian principles during his successful campaigns against echoed the Austrians at Sadowa and the French at Sedan, but aiso them in his own writings. (21:99) Moltke did not, how-

ever, agree with Clausewitz on the relationship of polit ics to war. MoItke's views dominated German military thinking until the

end of the nineteenth century. Tn 1880, a fourth edition of On War was published and gained much attention. Goltz described Clausewitz's influence at that

time when he wrote: A military writer who after Ciausewitz, writes upon war, runs the risk of being likened to the poet who, after

0
. . .

37

Goethe, attempts Faust, or, after Shakespeare, a Hamlet. Everything of any importance to be said about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the words left behind by that greatest of military thinkers. (3:31) By the early 1900's, Clausewitz's theory had really taken hold of German military thinking. Their textbooks on warfare echoed the the object of strategy was the

great master's teaching stressing:'

destruction of the enemy armed forces by battle; and the greater the battle, the more effectively could that object be achieved. Annihilation of the enemy was the ultimate goal of war. must be bloody to be successful. (3:35) Battle

In his introduction to the

1905 edition of On War, Count von Schlieffen, then Chief of the

German General Staff, wrote that Clausewitz
. . .

kept alive the

.

conception of 'true war' within the Prussian officers' corps

the entire German army owes the great thinker everlasting thanks." (3:34; 21:97) But, as mentioned earlier, Clausewitz's theory was

also becoming popular elsewhere in the world. A French translation of On War was published as early as 1849 but gained little attention until 1870. In 1884, Lucien Cardot,

an instructor at the Ecole de Guerre, lectured on Clausewitz after reading the writings of von de Goltz. (3:37) This was to

influence a generation of French officers, including Ferdinand Foch, author of the book, Principles of War, and the man who would later lead the allies to victory over the Germans in World War 1. Clausewitz's influence also inspired a complete reorganiStaff. (21 :99) from General von

zat ion of tihe French General The Japanese

learned Ctausewitz's principl.es

Meckel and a Japanese translation of On War.

They used these

38

i-.

principles effectively during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Von der Goltz trained the Turkish General Staff. (24:61) [n 1874, Colonel J. J. Graham produced the first English tr;inslat[on of: On War. The Briti sh scorned Clausewi Lz and his

theories until their humiliation during the Boer Wars, 1899-1902. (3:38) tion. In 1909, 1'. M. Maguire published a new, condensed transla-

That same year, Colonel Graham republished his translation

with a new introduction .hich stressed the importance of learning German strategy. Clausewitz's theory was introduced to British maritime strategy by the leading naval historian, Sir Julian Corbett. (3:38)
American interest in Clausewitz's writings grew very slowly after

the Franco-Prussian War and, like the British, did not really catch hold until World War I.

The greatest influence that Clausewitz's works had on actual warfare occurred (luring World War 1, in which his disciples carrLed his teachings to an extreme. The distortions and misinof tactics and strategy

terpretations of Clauseitz's philosophy led to what Michael Howard termed the

"Bloodthirsty Prussianism."

(3:39)

He summarized

some of the misunderstandings stating:

The skepticism for strategic maneuver force at the decisive point in order to defeat the enemy main force in battle; the conduct of operations so as to inflict the greatest possible number of losses on the enemy and compel him to use up his reserves at a greater rate than one was expending one's own; the dogged refusal to be put off by heavy casualties; all these familiar Clausewitzian principles were deployed to justify the continuation of attacks on the Western Front by British commanders who almost self-consciously embodied those qualities of calm, determination and perseverance which Clausewitz had praised so highly. (3:39)

39

".0,. ,: : " -: i' : i , "- ." ' ' - - " ' - ' ,:'''.-"'' .: ' -" .,,, ' -,: i :

-'.: : " .. ,.. -" 7 .--- , " -,.-

When the German's Schlieffen Plan and French Gallipoli campaLgn failed to yield decisive results, a war aimed at logistical attrition developed. (23:978) This led to a defensive type of

war which dragged out the bloodshed resulting in senseless loss of life. After the war, reliance on the defense resulted in creation of the ill-fated French Maginot Line. Lid(le] Hart became the greatest critic utilized during World War I. In Britain, Captain B. 11. of Clausewitz's theory

Hart blamed the obscurity of

Clausewitz's writings for most of the tragedy that unfolded in that war. In his book The Ghost of Napoleon, Hart explained: war," the the argupolicy by of strategy. not beyond

lie was the source of the doctrine of "absolute fight to a finish theory which, beginning with ment that "war is only a continuation of state other means," ended by making policy the slave . . . Clausewitz looked only to the end of war, war to the subsequent peace. (3:40)

Hart's writing on The Strategy of the Indirect Approach and The British Way in Warfare finally shut the door on most of Clausewitz's teachings in Britain. Clausewitz's theQry continued, however, thinking in Germany between the wars. 0 to dominate military

The commander-in-chief of

the new German army, General von Blomberg, at a 1933 celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of Schlieffen's birth, stated: "In spite of the fundamental transformation of all technical

modalities, Clausewitz's book On War remains for all time the basis for any rational 9103 (levelopment in the Art of War." (3:41) In

, I le Ger man Acadmy

for Aer La I War Ia re

I oun(I C ausew i Iz

applicable to modern aerial warfare. (22:138)

It was also during

(I

40

0::

i--

Y " G

.Z._

.Z-?'ZZZ

.I.? ?Z Z K

Z ZZZZZZ:.

"Z -Z Z" .Z LZ: --. Z .

-.-.-

Z. : '

thI.s Lime that Clausewitz's doctrine the Atlantic. The American it had army had adopted

finally found

its way across

some of Clausewi The

ideas

Ihal

witnessed during World War I.

1923 Army Field

Service

Regulation bears witness to this fact stating: objective of all military enemy

"The ultimate

operations is the destruction of the Decisive defeat in battle breaks (3:42)

s armed forces by battle.

the enemy's will

to war and forces him to sue for peace."

But this shift to Clausewitzian principles was very slow and limited. Now, before discussing World War II, a brief review of Clausewitz's influence on Russia and Lenin is necessary. to WorLd War 1, Clausewitz had little influence on movement in Russia. Tn 1,857, EngeLs wrote Marx: Prior

the Communist

Among other things, I am now reading Clausewitz's On War. A strange way of philosophizing, but very good on his subject. To the question whether war should be called an art or a science, the answer given is that war is most like trade. Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade, for it actually to occur, everything is directed toward it, and eventually, it must take place all the same and must be decisive. (21:99) When Lenin became the interpreter of Marxist policy, the Communists adopted Clausewitz's doctrine about the relationship of war to policy as the foundation for thinking. that "war theiriown military

In 1933, referring to Clausewitz's famous statement is politics continued by other means," Lenin wrote: the foundation

"The Marxists have always considered for the meaning of every war."

this axiom as

(21:99)

Lenin also claimed that:

411

41 i"1

Politics determines the social character, the historical significance of war--progressive or reactionary the nature of political aim is of decisive influence on ; War is an instrument of politics . . the conduct of war Every war is a continuation of politics. (6:27) The Communists successfully employed several of Clausewitz's principles against their enemies in the civil war following the Bolshevik Revolution and in World War II. (21:99) The strat-

The Second World War was typically Clausewitzian.

egy decisions of all sides, save Japan, were completely under political control. (12:69) Hitler's concept of "total war" and

his use of his armed forces as instruments of his policy also derived from Clausewitz's theory. The part public opinion played

in the formulation of Allied strategy and the advent of the policy of "unconditional surrender" are also examples of Clausewitz's influence during that war. Clausewitz's concept of "limited warfare" was finally realized during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. But it was not until writers

such as Robert Osgood and Bernard Brodie began generously acknowledging Clausewitz's contributions that Americans began studying this great thinker seriously. Today, Clausewitz's influence is very much alive. Soviet

military thinking is still founded on Clausewitz's principles. In America, one needs only to open a copy of the Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force to find principles conforming to this master's teachings.
a V11
(

Because of the continuing

C l ll:(,w ii i. i I I l i i ,,d

rele.11

v' o

11

I hi

w r iIi

ngs;,

42

Chapter

Four

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST This paper has now completed an examination of major concepts, and influences of the lives,

Baron llenri Antoine Jomini and

Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps the two greatest military writers of the Napoleonic era. that By now, it should be apparent to the reader

there are many striking similarities and very subtle differ-

ences between these two 19th century strategists. Inspired by 19th century warfare, devoted their lives both of these great writers

to interpreting Napoleon's strategic contriConsidering their backgrounds, it's

butions to the art of war.

not surprising that their concepts are very similar in nature. The fundamental difference is that while Jomini explored the on

physical aspects of war as it exists, Clausewitz concentrated the psychological and philosophical side. This tends to make

Jominj easy to read and understand and Clausewitz almost and confusing to the average person. intangible side of war when he morale and the

boring

Jomini did touch on the the great importance of Clausewitz,

talked of

forever changing character of battle.

likewise, wrote a little on strategic and thinkers,

the tangible aspects of war examining On these issues, these two great Their ideas on the kinds of

tactical methods. to agree.

again, appear

43

war only differ slightly:

Jomini using the different reasons for

war as a basis for his categorization and Clausewitz using the intensity level of warfare. They both used similar definitions

of strategy and tactics and stressed the necessity for simplicity in battle planning. radrama."
(11:15)

Also, both frequently referred to war as a

But in some ways these two individuals were quite different. To begin with, their personalities were almost opposites. Clausewitz was very quiet and retiring, almost to the point of
being shy. (11:14) Jomini, on the other hand, tended to be a

very vain person who recognized himself as an expert.

This fact

is evidenced in several quotations from his Summary of the Art of War. Writing of Clausewitz's work, On War, Jomini stated: "This

work made a great sensation in Germany and, that it

for my part, I regret

was written before the author was acquainted with my

Summary of the Art of War, persuaded that he would have rendered to it some justice." (11:42) Later he wrote:

If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning." (13:325) Jomini also possessed a violent temper as evidenced by his confrontations with his archrival, Berthier.

C[ausewitz and Jomini also disagreed on several issues in their writings. Clausewitz was a strong proponent of the

44

defensive strategy, whereas Jomini favored the offensive approach in battle. ac(quisiLion They also disagreed on the object of war: of territory (strategic Jomini saw

decisive points) as the prithe

mary aim and Clausewitz believed the goal of warfare was disarmament

of one's enemy so as to force him to do one's will. their writings to attack each other's ideas. refuted several of

They both used

In his book, On War, Clausewitz subtly Jomini's theories stating: numbers as of the art the one and only of war
".

. . to accept superiority of and to reduce the whole secret at a

rule,

to the formula

of numerical superiority

certain time in a certain place was an oversimplification that would not have stood up for a moment against the realities of life." (3:135) lHe went on to write:

As a reaction to that fallacy, another geometrical that of so-called interior principle was then exalted: on solid ground--on tenet rests Even though this lines. the only effective means * he fact that the engagement is makes it of war--its purely geometrical character, still another lopsided principle that could never govern a real situation. (3:136) But Jomini directly attacked Clausewitz's ideas when he wrote in

his Summary of

the Art of War:

One cannot deny to General Clausewitz great learning and But this pen, at times a little vagrant, a facile pen. is above all, too pretentious for a didactic discussion, [n which simplicity and clearness ought to come first. Besides that, the author shows himself, by far, too skeptical in point of military science. (11:42) In conclusion, some historians erroneously teachings became outdated and less. Such is not the case. claim that Jomini's time-

that those of Clausewitz are

In fact, many of Jomini's concepts

45

are still relevant to today's warfare and can be found principles of war professed by many nations.

in the

Also, the reader The

should note, much of what Clausewitz wrote is also outdated. works of these two great theorists complement one another and,

together, provide students of war with a comprehensive look at its tangible, as well as intangible, aspects. Together, they

reinforce the notion that there really is an art to war.

I4

46

BIBLIOGRAPHY
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__

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2. 3.

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47

0l

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0J

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_______
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CONTINUED_________

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"The Pied Piper of Kleinman, Forrest K., Master Sergeant. Military Review, No. 37 Modern Military Thought." (November 1957), pp. 56-64. West Morrison, James L. "Educating the Civil War Generals: Military Affairs, No. 38 (September Point, 1833-1861." 1974), pp. 108-111. "Clausewitz and PeL I cc ia, Antonio, Brigadier GeneraL. Military Review, Soviet Politico-Military Strategy." No. 56 (August 1976), pp. 23-33.

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Books

Edited by Hans W. Principles of War. Claisewiiz, Carl von. Military Service Gatzke, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Publishing Company, The Telegraph Press, 1948.
Downing, Harry, Jr., Colonel. Von Clausewitz' Principles of War

and the Air Defense of the United States. Air War College, 1948. Base, Alabama:

Maxwell Air Force

49 S .. . . .. ... .". . -v '-G " . - .: -. ._ . . -7q :'' "'' ,.--.:.-,

__CONTINUED
Gallie, W. B. Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engles, and Tolstoy. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Leonard, Roger Ashley. A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War. York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967. New

Greene, Joseph I., Colonel. The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz. Edited by Alfred 0. Mendel, New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1943. Traster, Stuart J., Major. Project Warrior: On War. MaxweLl Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983.

Articles and Periodicals Aron, Raymon. "Clausewitz's Conceptual System." Armed Forces and Society, No. 1 (November 1974), pp. 49-59. Cole, James L., Jr., Lieutenant Colonel. "On War Today?" 1980), pp. 20-23. University Review, No. 31 (May-June Air

"Jomini and Clausewltz." Edmonds, J. E., Brigadier General. Canadian Army Journal, Vol. V, No. 2 (May 1951), pp. 64-69. Etzold, Thomas li. "Clausewitzian Lessons for Modern Strategists." Air University Review, No. 31 (May-June 1980), pp. 24-28. Foote, Evelyn P., Colonel. "Drucker, Clausewitz and 'US. Military Review, No. 60 (July 1980), pp. 51-54. Franklin, William D. "Clausewitz on Limited War." Review, No. 47 (June 1967), pp. 23-29.
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"Clausewitz on the Moral Forces in War . ;i1) bs, Norman II. N vl W ,, ( I e o Rov w, No1.27 (. i. , y- Fe1),,.i i y I)7',). '. II I' , 2 .

05

CONTINUED
ilobe, Walter von, Colonel. "Clausewitz." Military (March 1981), pp. 56-61. Review, No. 61

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"Clausewitz and Limited 55 (April 1975),

A Conceptual "Clausewitz and Jomini: Nitz, Theodore A., Captain. Framework for the Study of Strategy." Education Journal, No. 20 (Spring 1978), pp. 40-43. O'Meara, Andrew P., Lieutenant Colonel. "The Democratic Army and Parameters, No. 8 (June 1978), pp. 35-44. the Nation-State."

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51

L
1