1:13-cv-00482 #30

Case 1:13-cv-00482-CWD Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 1 of 3
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ATTORNEY GENERAL STEVEN L. OLSEN Chief of Civil Litigation Division W. SCOTT ZANZIG, ISB # 9361 CLAY R. SMITH, ISB # 6385 Deputy Attorneys General Civil Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General 954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor P. O. Box 83720 Boise, ID 83720-0010 Telephone: (208) 334-2400 Fax: (208) 854-8073 scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov clay.smith@ag.idaho.gov Attorneys for Defendant Christopher Rich
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

SUSAN LATTA and TRACI EHLERS, LORI WATSEN and SHARENE WATSEN, SHELIA ROBERTSON and ANDREA ALTMAYER, AMBER BEIERLE and RACHAEL ROBERTSON, Plaintiffs, vs. C.L. BUTCH OTTER, as Governor of the State of Idaho, in his official capacity, and CHRISTOPHER RICH, as Recorder of Ada County, Idaho, in his official capacity, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD
DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
Defendant Christopher Rich hereby requests dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), AND AS GROUNDS THEREFOR states that the complaint fails to state a claim against him for which relief may be granted for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum. DATED this 9th day of January 2014. STATE OF IDAHO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL By: /s/ W. SCOTT ZANZIG CLAY R. SMITH Deputy Attorneys General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of January 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant Christopher Richs Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following Persons: Deborah A. Ferguson d@fergusonlawmediation.com Craig Harrison Durham craig@chdlawoffice.com Shannon P. Minter sminter@nclrights.org Christopher F. Stoll cstoll@nclrights.org Thomas Perry tom.perry@gov.idaho.gov Cally Ann Younger cally.younger@gov.idaho.gov
/s/ W. SCOTT ZANZIG
Case 1:13-cv-00482-CWD Document 30-1 Filed 01/09/14 Page 1 of 26
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ATTORNEY GENERAL STEVEN L. OLSEN Chief of Civil Litigation Division W. SCOTT ZANZIG, ISB # 9361 CLAY R. SMITH, ISB # 6385 Deputy Attorneys General Civil Litigation Division Office of the Attorney General 954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor P. O. Box 83720 Boise, ID 83720-0010 Telephone: (208) 334-2400 Fax: (208) 854-8073 scott.zanzig@ag.idaho.gov clay.smith@ag.idaho.gov Attorneys for Defendant Christopher Rich
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

SUSAN LATTA and TRACI EHLERS, LORI WATSEN and SHARENE WATSEN, SHELIA ROBERTSON and ANDREA ALTMAYER, AMBER BEIERLE and RACHAEL ROBERTSON, Plaintiffs, vs. C.L. BUTCH OTTER, as Governor of the State of Idaho, in his official capacity, and CHRISTOPHER RICH, as Recorder of Ada County, Idaho, in his official capacity, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. II. III. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... APPLICABLE RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARDS .......................................... ARGUMENT .............................................................................................. A. BAKER v. NELSON BARS PLAINTIFFS CHALLENGE TO IDAHOS LAWS DEFINING MARRIAGE AS A UNION BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN ............................ 1. 2. B. Bakers Presumed Controlling Status ................................... Bakers Continued Controlling Status .................................. 1 1 2
2 2 4
IDAHO NEED ONLY SATISFY THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD TO SUSTAIN THE CHALLENGED LAWS ................................................................... 1. 2. 3. Substantive Due Process ....................................................... Equal Protection .................................................................... Rational Basis Standard ........................................................
6 7 9 9
C.
IDAHOS INTEREST IN FURTHERING THE STABILITY OF FAMILY STRUCTURES THROUGH BENEFITS TARGETED AT COUPLES POSSESSING BIOLOGICAL PROCREATIVE CAPACITY IS SUBSTANTIAL AND EASILY SATISFIES THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD .................................................. 1. 2 3. 4. Relevant Idaho Demographic Data ....................................... Focusing Governmental Resources to Encourage Stable Biological Parents Households ................................. Application of Rational Basis Standard to Article III, Section 28 and 32-201 .................................................. Application of Rational Basis Standard to 32-209.............
11 12 13 15 17 19
IV. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................
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TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES Cases Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) ........................ Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) ............................................................. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) ................................. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1994)....................................................... Bd. of Natural Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993) .................................. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) ................................................................. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) ..................................................... Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) ............... City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) ........................ City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commcns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986) ............... Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)........................... Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) .................................................... Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ......................................................... Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) .................................................................... FCC v. Beach Commcns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) ............................................ Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) ..................... Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................. 11 8, 11
passim 2 11 15 2 6 9 10 16
17 7 16 17 9 2
- ii -
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ........................................................................ Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) ................................................................. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................... In re Duncan, 83 Idaho 254, 360 P.2d 987 (1961) ................................................. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) ......................................... In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 95 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................ Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Haw. 2012) ........................... Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013) ...................................................................................... Kadrmas v. Dickenson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) ....................................... Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) ............................................................... Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................... Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010) ..................................... Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) .................................................................... Obergefell v. Wymoyslo, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 6726688 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2013) ................................................................................... Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1986) .................. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977) ................................................................ Massachusetts v. Dept of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) ................................................................................... Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) .................................................................... Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) ............................. Mintun v. Peterson, No. CV06-447-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338148
- iii -
10 3
9 18 3 1 passim
8, 17 5 4, 5, 8 2 17 8
18 2 3
6 11 10
(D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2010) ..................................................................................... M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)..................................................................... Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) .......................................... Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) .................................................. Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997) ..................................................... Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) .................................................................... Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) ...................................... Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................ Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ............................. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ...................................................... South Carolina State Highway Dept v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) ............................................................................................ Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) ....................... Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) ...................................................................... Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) .................... United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).................................................. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)...................................... Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ................................................... Witt v. Dept of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008)....................................... Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................. Wright v. Lane County Dist. Ct., 647 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981) .............................
9 16 7
6 9 4, 9 6 11 11, 17 8
17 2 11 10 passim 11 7 9
10 3
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Zager v. Lara (In re Lara), 731 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir. 1984) .................................... United States Constitution Art. IV, 1 .......................................................................................................... United States Code 1 U.S.C. 7 .......................................................................................................... 28 U.S.C. 1738C .................................................................................................. 42 U.S.C. 1983 .................................................................................................... Idaho Constitution
10
18
5 18 17
Art. III, sec. 28 ........................................................................................................ 1, 6, 15 Art. XX, sec. 1 ........................................................................................................ 11 Idaho Statutes Idaho Code 32-201 .............................................................................................. Idaho Code 32-209 .............................................................................................. Idaho Session Laws 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 104, 3 ....................................................................... 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 331, 1 ....................................................................... 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws H.J.R. No. 2 ...................................................................... Other Authorities Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, 15 Future of Children No. 2 (Fall 2005).............................................................. Kristen Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Childs Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It?, Child Research Brief (June 2002) ...................................................... Benjamin Scafide, Principal Investigator, The Taxpayer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Childbearing: First Ever Estimate for the Nation and All Fifty States (2008) ............................................................................................... Elizabeth Wildsmith et al., Childbearing Outside of Marriage: Estimates and Trends in the United States, Child Research Brief (No. 2011) .................... W. Bradford Wilson et al., Why Marriage Matters: Thirty Conclusions from Social Sciences (3d ed. 2011) .....................................................................
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passim passim
1 1 1
14
14
15 15 13
I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs are same-sex couples who seek to invalidate several Idaho marriage laws on the alleged ground that they violate the United States Constitution. They challenge Article III, section 28 of the Idaho Constitution; Idaho Code 32-201; and Idaho Code 32-209. Plaintiffs contend that these laws deprive them of due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Article III, section 28 of the Idaho Constitution provides: A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this state. Section 32-201 of the Idaho Code provides in relevant part: Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman. Section 32-209 of the Idaho Code provides: All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid by the laws of the state or country in which the same were contracted, are valid in this state, unless they violate the public policy of this state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state. None of these provisions is of immediate vintage. Article III, section 28 was proposed by the Legislature (2006 Idaho Sess. Laws H.J.R. No. 2) and approved by the Idaho electorate as a constitutional amendment in November 2006 pursuant to Article XX, section 1. Sections 32-201 and -209 were enacted, respectively, in 1995 and 1996. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 104, 3; 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 331, 1. II. APPLICABLE RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARDS Under the basic Rule 12(b)(6) standard, [a]ll allegations of material fact are accepted as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. In re
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
Syntex Corp. Sec. Litigation, 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996). Conclusory allegations of law, however, are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. Although generally matters outside the complaints allegations may not be considered (e.g., Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990)), this Circuit has recognized that [a] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2002); see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). A court also may consider documents referred to by the complaint when authenticity is not challenged. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). III. ARGUMENT A. BAKER v. NELSON BARS PLAINTIFFS CHALLENGE TO IDAHOS LAWS DEFINING MARRIAGE AS A UNION BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN 1. Bakers Presumed Controlling Status. In Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), Minnesota interpreted its marriage statute to prohibit same-sex marriage. A same-sex couple challenged the constitutionality of the statute as applied. They argued, among other things, that they were deprived of due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 186. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these arguments. It held that there is no fundamental right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties. Id. at 186-87. The court also held that the marriage statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 187. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed the
appeal for want of a substantial federal question. 409 U.S. 810. The Supreme Courts summary dismissal constituted a decision on the merits. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975). As such, lower courts are bound by summary decisions by [the Supreme] Court until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are not. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344-45 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wright v. Lane County Dist. Ct., 647 F.2d 940, 941 (9th Cir. 1981) ([s]ummary dismissals for want of a substantial federal question are decisions on the merits that bind lower courts until subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court suggest otherwise). The core, and
dispositive, question here is whether the Supreme Court has inform[ed] the lower courts that Baker is no longer binding. It has not. Summary . . . dismissals for want of a substantial federal question . . . reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam). The jurisdictional statements presented to the United States Supreme Court in Baker follow: 1. Whether appellees refusal to sanctify appellants marriage deprives appellants of their liberty to marry and of their property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. Whether appellees refusal, pursuant to Minnesota marriage statutes, to sanctify appellants marriage because both are of the male sex violates their rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3. Whether appellees refusal to sanctify appellants marriage deprives appellants of their right to privacy under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 137 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). The first two issues
presented in the jurisdictional statement in Baker are identical to the issues plaintiffs raise in their claims challenging Idahos laws that limit marriage to a union between a man and a womani.e., whether the States refusal to permit same-sex marriage violates the
Fourteenth Amendments Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Baker compels dismissal of plaintiffs claims. 2. Bakers Continued Controlling Status.
Accordingly,
Plaintiffs presumably will
attempt to negate Bakers precedential bar by arguing that the decision has been overruled. This Court should reject such an argument. The Supreme Court has never stated explicitly that Baker does not remain a settled proposition as to the questions presented in the jurisdictional statement and, indeed, has seen no need to cite, much less overrule, its opinion in subsequent cases. Not only has none of its sexual orientation decisions established a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, but those decisions also reflect, as the discussion below demonstrates, that the Court took care not to resolve that highly sensitive issue. In short, the task of overruling Bakershould that be deemed appropriatemust be performed by the Supreme Court, not this Court. The Supreme Court has addressed substantive due process and equal protection claims involving sexual orientation three times since Baker: Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). Of the three, only Windsor has true relevance, and its analysis supports the proposition that the Court is reserving to itself the question whether a States limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples infringes a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect classification of individualsthereby requiring application of a heightened standard of review. Romer invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited enactment or enforcement of any law or policy designed to protect . . . homosexual persons or gays and lesbians. 517 U.S. at 624. The Court expressly applied the rational basis standard in reaching its holding. Id. at 631 (if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end); id. at 635 (a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, . . . and Amendment 2 does not)
(citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988)). opinion makes no mention of same-sex marriage or Baker.
The Courts
In Lawrence, the Court held that a Texas statute forbidding persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause. The Court noted that the case did not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. 539 U.S. at 578. The decision instead focused on the right of two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle . . . without intervention of the government. Id. Here, plaintiffs seek such intervention to secure access to certain governmental benefits through formal recognition of their private relationship through marriage. In Windsor, the Court held that a federal statute, section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. 7, was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 133 S. Ct. at 2695. DOMAs section 3 provided a federal definition of marriage and spouse that applied to all federal laws. It provided that the word marriage means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife. Id. at 2683. The Court noted that the definition and regulation of marriage is within the authority and realm of the separate States, id. at 2689-90; certain States have chosen to recognize same-sex marriage; and section 3 of DOMA impermissibly deprived same-sex couples married in those States of the rights and responsibilities that should have come along with their state-sanctioned same-sex marriages. Id. at 2694; see also id. at 2693-94 ([t]he Act's demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law) (emphasis added). Windsor did not mention Baker. It also did not hold that all States are required constitutionally to permit or recognize same-sex marriage. Quite the contrary, the Court
went out of its way to make clear that the flaw in section 3 was Congress failure to give effect to a Statesthere, New Yorksdetermination as to who is eligible to enter into the marriage relationship. It neither held nor suggested that States really have no choice in the exceptionally sensitive area of whether marriage should be limited to opposite-sex couples. Whatever else Windsor may stand for, it did not alter Bakers control over the issues in this casea control that had been acknowledged repeatedly. B.
2 1
IDAHO NEED ONLY SATISFY THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD TO SUSTAIN THE CHALLENGED LAWS Baker binds this Court. Even were the contrary true, plaintiffs challenge must be
measured against the rational basis standard, not any species of heightened review. This is so because neither a fundamental right protected under the Due Process Clause nor a suspect class for equal protection purposes exists here. The Idaho laws easily pass
Justice Scalias concern about the implications of the majoritys reasoning as to future challenges to provisions like Article III, section 28 and 32-201 and -209 does not further plaintiffs cause. 133 S. Ct. at 2710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). First, his dissent spoke only on behalf of himself and Justice Thomas as to that concern. Id. at 2697. Second, Justice Scalia spoke prospectively through his reference to the view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage as being indicated beyond mistaking by todays opinion. Id. at 2709. His prediction says nothing about whether lower courts have leeway to ignore Baker. 2 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Dept of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012); Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 870 (8th Cir. 2006); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (D. Nev. 2012); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1084-88 (D. Haw. 2012). The Sevcik court noted, given Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), a potentially applicable argument that some limited portion of the plaintiffs claims might not be barred by Baker. 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. However, Perrys subsequent vacatur on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds voided the Court of Appeals merits determination and any attendant law-of-circuit weight. Even were the contrary true, the Perry majority expressly distinguished Baker because the question as to the California constitutional amendment was whether the people of a state may by plebiscite strip a group of a right or benefit, constitutional or otherwise, that they had previously enjoyed on terms of equality with all others in the state. 671 F.3d at 1082 n.14. The challenged Idaho constitutional and statutory provisions, in contrast, substantially predated plaintiffs application to marry in Idaho or their marriages in California and New York. There is also no allegation that Idaho has ever authorized same-sex marriages to be contracted within its territorial jurisdiction or has ever recognized such marriages contracted to in any other State.
muster under the rational basis standard. 1. Substantive Due Process. Substantive due process challenges to state
laws that do not implicate a fundamental right are subject to rational basis review. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (challenged state action must implicate a fundamental right before courts will require more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest). Plaintiffs substantive due process claims are subject to rational basis review because same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right. The doctrine of substantive due process is not favored in the law. [B]ecause guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended, courts should be reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. As the Supreme Court has explained: By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court. Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992), and citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)). Before a court will recognize a right as fundamental, it must undertake a careful, two-step analysis. First, in order to warrant heightened protection, a right or interest must be, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (internal quotation omitted). It must be implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed. Id. at 721. Second, the fundamental liberty interest at stake must also be subject to a careful description. Id. The crucial guideposts for responsible decision-making in
evaluating the existence of a fundamental right are the nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. Id. The question is whether the right is so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has ever held that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right. Plaintiffs may argue that, because the Supreme Court has deemed marriage between heterosexuals to be a fundamental right, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), this Court should expand that right to include same-sex marriage. This Court should reject such a request. All of the Supreme Court decisions recognizing the fundamental right to marry involved opposite-sex couples. Jackson,
884 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. Plaintiffs request that this Court create a new fundamental right to same-sex marriage ignores the fact that same-sex marriage is a relatively new phenomenon first judicially sanctioned not because it involved a fundamental right but because limiting its availability to opposite-sex couples was held to be impermissible sex discrimination under a state constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 56 (Haw. 1993) ([t]he foregoing case law demonstrates that the federal construct of the fundamental right to marrysubsumed within the right to privacy implicitly protected by the United States Constitutionpresently contemplates unions between men and women).3 Samesex marriage cannot satisfy the requirement that it be deeply rooted in the nations history and tradition. It is instead a radical modification of such history and tradition.
Accordingly, there is no historical basis for extending fundamental status to same-sex marriage. Lacking the necessary crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking, the Court should decline plaintiffs request to expand substantive due process in this area.
The recent decision in Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013), relied principally upon Lawrence for the conclusion that the Supreme Court has removed the only groundmoral disapprovalon which the State could have at one time relied to distinguish the rights of gay and lesbian individuals from the rights of heterosexual individuals. Id., at *18. As Glucksberg reiterated, however, fundamental rights protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not suddenly arise but must be drawn with close attention to their historically settled nature. Whatever else may be said about the civil institution of marriage, it has historically been limited to heterosexual partnersa fact reflected in every Supreme Court marriage decision discussed by the Kitchen court. Id., at *10-*13.
3
2.
Equal Protection. Plaintiffs equal protection claims are subject to review
under the rational basis standard. When a law is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, the rational basis standard applies unless the law burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630. As discussed above, there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Accordingly Idahos marriage laws do not burden plaintiffs fundamental rights. Nor do those laws target a suspect class. Plaintiffs claim that Idahos marriage laws discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. In this Circuit, such claims are subject to rational basis review. The Court of Appeals has held that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990). Subsequent Ninth Circuit authority has confirmed the holding in High Tech Gays and continued to apply the rational basis standard in sexual orientation cases. See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) (High Tech Gays controlled and precluded strict scrutiny); accord Witt v. Dept of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008); Mintun v. Peterson, No. CV06447-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338148, at *10 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2010). In an apparent effort to avoid the force of Ninth Circuit precedent requiring rational basis review of plaintiffs claims, plaintiffs also allege that this Court should view their claims as sex discrimination claims and thereby subject the Idaho laws to heightened, intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living There is a fundamental flaw in plaintiffs
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
argument: Idahos marriage laws do not treat men and women differently. Neither is permitted to marry a person of the same sex. Accordingly, the vast majority of courts considering the issue have held that an opposite-sex definition of marriage does not constitute gender discrimination. Jackson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. 3. Rational Basis Standard. [E]qual protection is not a license for courts to
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. FCC v. Beach Commcns,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Fourteenth Amendments requirement of equal protection is satisfied so long as there is a plausible justification for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decision-maker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Bd. of Natural Res. v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 1993) (the governments lethargy in proffering a rationale for the classification is of no significance). The Supreme Court further has made clear that a legislature need not strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way, . . . and that a legislature may implement [its] program step by step, . . . adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (citation omitted)); accord Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1142 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification because a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). It is thus entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. Beach Commcns, 508 U.S. at 315; see also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commcns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (distinguishing reasonableness standards applicable to First Amendment-protected expressive conduct from those applicable to Fifth Amendment-based equal protection challenges). The test is simply whether the involved distinction or classification is at least debatable. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464; see Zager v. Lara (In re Lara), 731 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding usury exemption for licensed real estate
brokers rational under the Fourteenth Amendment solely on the basis of legislative findings). Once plausible grounds are asserted, the inquiry is at an endi.e., rebuttal is not permitted. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); see also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485, 1494 (9th Cir. 1993) ([i]t is enough that plausible reasons for Congress action exist). The rational-basis test, in short, is a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is primarily a task of the legislative branch. Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). C. IDAHOS INTEREST IN FURTHERING THE STABILITY OF FAMILY STRUCTURES THROUGH BENEFITS TARGETED AT COUPLES POSSESSING BIOLOGICAL PROCREATIVE CAPACITY IS SUBSTANTIAL AND EASILY SATISFIES THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD Until the Hawaii Supreme Courts construction of its States equal protection provision in Baehr, the notion of same-sex marriage would have been deemed oxymoronic. The reason is obvious: Marriage has served traditionally as the primary societal basis for ordering conjugal relationships whose purpose or practical effect lie in the creation of new human life. As the Supreme Court recognized in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), [i]t is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress. Id. at 211. The Court reiterated this fundamental proposition in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), with the observation that [m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. Id. at 541. This is not to say that the only purpose for heterosexual marriage lay in encouraging family stability for rearing the couples biological offspring; it is to say, however, that such stability furthers a core and
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (recognizing that marriages are expressions of emotional support and public commitment to which spiritual significance and governmental benefits may be attached).
4
4
uncontested public interest in the childs wellbeing. Marriage, for present purposes, is simply another arrow in a quiver of constitutional and statutory protections used to advance that interest. The question here is whether Idahos determination to target its limited resources on fostering long-lived opposite-sex relationships through the availability of marital status benefits is rational when those relationships produce virtually all children and also account for a sizable majority of family households in the State. That determination plainly is. 1. Relevant Idaho Demographic Data. Several demographic facts inform First, 2010 Census data reflect that husband-wife
Idahos marriage policy choice.
households in Idaho constituted 55.3 percent of all householdsthe second highest of any State. Dkt. 30-2 at 10. Idaho also ranked second at 24 percent as to husbandwife households with their own children under 18 years of age, or 73.4 percent of all family households with such children. Id. The national averages were 20.2 and 68 percent respectively. Id. Second, these percentages are unsurprising because the Idaho marriage rate in 2011 was 8.6 percentthe third highest of any State in the nation if the matrimonial destination outliers of Hawaii and Nevada are excluded (Dkt. 30-4)and its 2012 preliminary data birth rate was 14.4 percentthe fifth highest State in the nation (Dkt. 30-5 at 14). Third, the preferred percentages derived from the 2010 Census reflect that same-sex couples account for .4 percent of all households in Idaho. Dkt. 30-2 at 16. Given these data, one may conclude reasonably that a minute fraction, presumably less than .2 percent of total households, of same-sex couples in Idaho have resident children under the age of 18.
5
The distinguishing characteristics of opposite-sex and same-sex couples for
The United States Census Bureau estimated [a]bout 0.1 percent of all households in the United States in 2010 . . . [were] same-sex partner households with own children of the householder present. Dkt. 30-2 at 9. That percentage, if applied to Idaho, equals 5795 households. Id. at 10.
marriage purposes are, in short, the procreative capacity of the former and the statistically minute fraction of the latter, not the participants sexual orientation. The Idaho
Legislature in 1995, as well as the Idaho electorate in 2006, thus had a rational basis to conclude that targeting the very tangible legislative benefits of marriage to opposite-sex couples would further the States interest in encouraging stable families for child-rearing purposes and that extending such benefits to same-sex couples was not warranted in light of the miniscule number of households affected and the corresponding de minimis likely impact on the public interest. 2.
6
Focusing Governmental Resources to Encourage Stable Biological
Parents Households. Key to resolution of plaintiffs substantive due process and equal protection claims is a single clearly reasonable, if not uncontested, proposition: Children generally thrive best in intact family structures where their biological parents are married. A recent report from the Institute for American Values, National Marriage Project, stated: Children are less likely to thrive in cohabiting households, compared to intact, married families. On many social, educational, and psychological outcomes, children in cohabiting households do significantly worse than children in intact, married families, and about as poorly as children living in single-parent families. And when it comes to abuse, recent federal data indicate that children in cohabiting households are markedly more likely to be physically, sexually, and emotionally abused than children in both intact, married families and singleparent families. . . . Only in the economic domain do children in cohabiting households fare consistently better than children in single-parent families. W. Bradford Wilson et al., Why Marriage Matters: Thirty Conclusions from Social Sciences at 7 (3d ed. 2011) (Dkt. 30-6). Others have concluded that [r]esearch findings linking family structure and parents marital status with childrens well-being are very consistent and that it is not simply the presence of two parents, . . . but the presence of
6
Census Bureau data indicate a national increase in the preferred estimate of same-sex couples from .03 percent in the 2000 Census to .06 percent in the 2010 Census. Dkt. 30-2 at 15. Thus, although the number of same-sex couples roughly doubled between the 2000 and 2010 Census counts, it remained a miniscule portion of all family households generally and, as explained above, an even smaller portion of those households with children under 18.
two biological parents that seems to support childrens development. Kristen Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Childs Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It?, Child Research Brief at 1-2 (June 2002) (Dkt. 30-7). Even if some details of the proposition remain open for further analysis, its central premise is plainly plausible. See Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, 15 Future of Children No. 2 at 79 (Fall 2005) (Amato) (If cohabiting parents marry after the birth of a child, is the child at any greater risk than if the parents marry before having the child? Correspondingly, do children benefit when their cohabiting parents get married? To the extent that marriage increases union stability and binds fathers more strongly to their children, marriage among cohabiting parents may improve childrens long-term well-being. Few studies, however, have addressed this issue.) (Dkt. 30-8). Correlative to this core proposition is the keen interest that States have in encouraging marriage between opposite-sex partners. As Professor Amato observed, [s]ince social science research shows so clearly the advantages enjoyed by children raised by continuously married parents, it is no wonder that policymakers and practitioners are interested in programs to strengthen marriage and increase the proportion of children who grow up in such families. Amato, 15 Future of Children No. 2 at 85 (Dkt. 30-8). He estimated, for example, that if the share of adolescents living with two biological parents increased to its 1960 level, the share of adolescents repeating a grade would fall to 21 percentor approximately 750,000 less repeaters. Id. at 87, 88; id. at 90 (interventions that increase the share of children growing up with two continuously married biological parents will have modest effects on the percentage of U.S. children experiencing various problems, but could have substantial effects on the number of children experiencing them). Another set of researchers has concluded that [r]educing nonmarital childbearing and promoting marriage among unmarried parents remain important goals of federal and state policies and programs designed to improve
the well-being of children and to reduce their reliance on public assistance. Elizabeth Wildsmith et al., Childbearing Outside of Marriage: Estimates and Trends in the United States, Child Research Brief at 5 (Nov. 2011) (Dkt. 30-9). A third study has concluded that [r]esearch suggests that many of the social problems and disadvantages addressed by federal and state government programs occur more frequently among children born to and/or raised by single parents than among children whose parents get and stay married and leads to higher costs to taxpayers through higher spending on antipoverty programs and throughout the justice and educational systems, as well as losses to government coffers in foregone tax revenues. Benjamin Scafide, Principal Investigator, The Taxpayer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Childbearing: First Ever Estimate for the Nation and All Fifty States at 9 (2008) (Dkt. 30-10). The study conservatively estimated family fragmentation costs to be at least $112 billion each year for the nation as a whole. Id. at 5. Family fragmentation, in sum, not only imposes these very substantial fiscal burdens on the public fisc but also forces federal and state policymakers to make difficult, cost-based choices that may run counter to affected childrens best interests. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 615 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ([t]he Government's insistence that a child living with an AFDC mother relinquish its child support deeply intrudes on the father-child relationship, for child support is a crucial means of sustaining the bond between a child and its father outside the home). 3. Application of Rational Basis Standard to Article III, Section 28 and
32-201. Marriages relationship to fostering stable environments for childrearing by biological parents constitutes a rational basis for Idahos determination to limit the availability of marital status to opposite-sex couples. See Jackson, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (the legislature could rationally conclude that defining marriage as a union between a man and woman provides an inducement for opposite-sex couples to marry, thereby decreasing the percentage of children accidentally conceived outside of a stable,
long-term relationship). Heterosexual couples possess the unique ability to create new life and, with that ability, the responsibility for raising the offspring of their conjugal relationship. Although same-sex partners may have a child in their household
biologically attributable to one member, they cannot have a child attributable to both. Distinguishing between opposite and same-sex couples under this rationale accordingly relates not to their sexual orientation but to their procreative capacity. Idaho cannot be faulted for determining to select opposite-sex couples for marital status given its function as a gateway to various governmental benefits and an incentive for those couples to create long-lived familial environments where both biological parents reside and which account for a large percentage of such households.
7
Same-sex couples, in contrast, approach a virtual statistical null set on the demographic scalecontributing as discussed earlier to likely less than .2 percent (.002) of households with children under 18. As explained above, the rational basis standard does not require a legislature to address social and economic issueshere providing incentives for family structures conducive to childrens thrivingin the most
The fact that not all opposite-sex couples may desire to have children or may be incapable of having them does not negate the reasonableness of Idahos policy choice. Any inquiry into the issue of why two persons, other than minors, wish to marry or whether they intend to raise a family would be precluded by substantive due process-based privacy rights. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) ([c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance in our society, . . . rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect) (citation omitted); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974) ([t]his Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Predicating the distinction on broad biological distinctions rationally attempts to walk between Scyllathe constitutional privacy rightand Charybdisthe objective of encouraging stable families composed of fathers, mothers and their biological children. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some reasonable basis, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.) (internal quotations omitted).
7
comprehensive manner so long as the manner selected is reasonably calculated to achieve the desired end. See Skinner, 348 U.S. at 489 (the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems the most acute to the legislative mind). Here, it is fairly debatable that the de minimis presence of same-sex
households with children does not warrant extending the marital status incentive to those couples. South Carolina State Highway Dept v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938) ([w]hen the action of a Legislature is within the scope of its power, fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness, wisdom, and propriety are not for the determination of courts, but for the legislative body, on which rests the duty and responsibility of decision). The incentives purpose, again, is directed at encouraging the childs biological parents to form a permanent legal union. 4.
8
Application of Rational Basis Standard to 32-209. The challenge to

9
32-209 by four plaintiffsLatta, Ehlers, and the Watsensfails for identical reasons.
That section merely complements the definition of marriage in 32-201 and, as such,
The district court in Kitchen rejected what the court characterized as the responsible procreation justification offered by the defendants for Utahs constitutional prohibition of samesex marriages. 2013 WL 6697874, at *25. It reasoned that the defendants had presented no evidence that the number of opposite-sex couples choosing to marry each other is likely to be affected in any way by the ability of same-sex to marry. Id. Even if one ignores the lack of any duty on the defendants part to come forward with evidence of the hypothesized disincentive, the analysis above focuses not on any perceived impact on opposite-sex couples acquiring marital status from denying such status to same-sex couples but on Idahos desire to focus its resources where they will best advance the objective of creating stable households for biological parents and their offspring. 9 Defendant Rich has no enforcement responsibility with respect to 32-209 because any recognition of an out-of-state marriage arises by operation of law and not issuance of a marriage license under 32-401 to -404. Because no effective relief can be entered against him with respect to Plaintiffs claim predicated on that statute, he is entitled to its dismissal as against him regardless of whether he acts as a local government or state official with respect to administration of Idahos marriage statutes. E.g., Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2010) (under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a municipality may be held liable when execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury) (internal quotation omitted); Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) (under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), [t]he individual state official sued must have some connection with the enforcement of the act) (internal quotation omitted).
8
partakes of the same legitimate purpose identified above. As a threshold matter, these Plaintiffs neither challenge section 2 of DOMA, 28 U.S.C. 1738C, nor otherwise claim that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. Art. IV, 1, requires recognition of their out-of-state marriage. They therefore stand in no different position than other samesex couples desiring to acquire marital status in Idaho. Indeed, a contrary conclusion would lead to the anomalous result of those couples being able to circumvent the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples by simply marrying in another State. That simple workaround, in turn, would undermine and potentially eviscerate the objective of focusing availability of marital status benefits to couples with inter sese procreative capacity. It would also eviscerate the long-established precept that the incidents,
benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; see In re Duncan, 83 Idaho 254, 259-60, 360 P.2d 987, 990 (1961) (States possess the power to regulate the qualifications of the contracting parties and the proceedings essential to constitute a marriage). challenge to 32-209, in short, rises or falls with the validity of 32-201. To the extent that the ruling in Obergefell v. Wymoyslo, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 6726688 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2013), found unpersuasive the argument that legislators could conclude rationally that children raised by heterosexual couples are better off than children raised by gay or lesbian couples because Ohios marriage recognition bans do not prevent gay couples from having children (id., at *20), no such claim need be resolved here. The issue, once more, is whether Idaho is constitutionally prohibited from deciding to focus its governmental resources on incentivizing couples capable of conjugal procreation to form permanent legal relationships through the civil contract of marriage. Even if children reared in same-sex households thrive equally well to those in households with married biological parents, it remains reasonable for Idaho to use marital status as a mechanism to further the stability of the latter households; i.e., if
The
same-sex household children in fact do thrive equally well without marriage, less need to incentivize those households stability exists than in the opposite-sex context where the correlation of marital status to improved outcomes is plainly plausible. IV. CONCLUSION The Court should grant defendant Richs Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismiss plaintiffs claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. DATED this 9th day of January 2014. STATE OF IDAHO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL By: /s/ W. SCOTT ZANZIG CLAY R. SMITH Deputy Attorneys General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of January 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendant Christopher Richs Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following Persons: Deborah A. Ferguson d@fergusonlawmediation.com Craig Harrison Durham craig@chdlawoffice.com Shannon P. Minter sminter@nclrights.org Christopher F. Stoll cstoll@nclrights.org Thomas Perry tom.perry@gov.idaho.gov Cally Ann Younger cally.younger@gov.idaho.gov
/s/ W. SCOTT ZANZIG
ATTACHMENT A (Part 1) Households and Families: 2010 2010 Census Briefs (Pages 1-16)
Households and Families: 2010

2010 Census Briefs
Issued April 2012
C2010BR-14
INTRODUCTION
The 2010 Census enumerated 308.7 million people in the United States, a 9.7 percent increase from 281.4 million in Census 2000. Of the total population in 2010, 300.8 million lived in 116.7 million households for an average of 2.58 people per household. This was down from an average of 2.59 in 2000 when 273.6 million people lived in 105.5 million households. The remaining 8.0 million people in 2010 lived in group-quarters arrangements such as school dormitories, nursing homes, or military barracks. This report presents information on the number and types of living arrangements of American households in 2010 derived from the relationship question on the 2010 Census.
Figure 1.
Reproduction of the Question on Relationship to Householder From the 2010 Census
By Daphne Lofquist, Terry Lugaila, Martin OConnell, and Sarah Feliz
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census questionnaire.
of the householder in 2010: biological, adopted, or stepchild. Relatives identified in the questionnaire are spouses, brothers, sisters, and parents of the householder, as well as grandchildren, parents-in-law, and sons/daughters-in-law. Those who live in households but who were not related to the householder were identified as housemates/roommates, roomers or boarders, and unmarried partners of the householder. This latter group includes people who initially identified themselves as being same-sex spouses of the householder. The tables with same-sex couples show these groups in two ways. One estimate shows households as originally reported on the census forms. The second presents improved and preferred estimates of the same-sex household population, accounting for marking errors that inadvertently overestimated that
HOUSEHOLD RELATIONSHIP QUESTION

The relationship item (Figure 1), a version of which has been on the census since 1880, asks the relationship of each member of the household to the householder or the person designated as the individual who owns or rents the housing unit.1 This question provides information about individuals as well as the composition of families and households. Three separate categories describe the sons and daughters
1 In a case of joint ownership, one individual is hosen as the householder. If this choice cannot be c made, the first person 15 years and over listed on the form is chosen as the householder.
U.S. Department of Commerce

Economics and Statistics Administration
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU

Table 1.
Relationship to Householder by Age: 2010

(For information on condentiality protection, nonsampling errors, and denitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf)
Number Relationship type Total Total household population. . . . . Householder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Spouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Biological son or daughter. . . . . . . . . . . . . Adopted son or daughter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stepson or stepdaughter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brother or sister. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Father or mother . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grandchild. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Parent-in-law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Son-in-law or daughter-in-law . . . . . . . . . . Other relative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roomer or boarder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Housemate or roommate .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Unmarried partner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other nonrelative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(X) Not applicable Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1.
Under 18 years 73,920,881 28,297 8,793 60,466,596 1,527,020 2,784,531 298,242 (X) 5,825,229 (X) 25,063 1,631,262 142,899 42,515 11,651 1,128,783
18 to 29 years 47,903,506 13,862,048 4,863,702 16,007,784 403,558 1,100,511 1,125,419 (X) 1,117,324 (X) 593,674 1,268,787 559,814 3,163,824 2,622,772 1,214,289
30 to 44 years 59,766,531 30,758,709 17,524,307 3,941,728 99,376 217,220 848,247 128,343 180,096 10,178 428,186 774,403 376,180 1,084,638 2,724,034 670,886
45 to 64 years 80,357,019 46,247,402 24,935,103 2,093,818 41,282 61,226 922,338 1,187,041 16,926 281,266 158,997 648,580 363,573 769,490 2,020,431 609,546
65 years and over 38,810,278 25,819,836 9,178,472 72,132 1,076 2,398 239,705 1,717,619 26 634,269 10,379 339,640 83,744 162,898 365,823 182,261
300,758,215 116,716,292 56,510,377 82,582,058 2,072,312 4,165,886 3,433,951 3,033,003 7,139,601 925,713 1,216,299 4,662,672 1,526,210 5,223,365 7,744,711 3,805,765
populations size.2 This report uses this set of estimates in the text, as it represents the best set of numbers from the 2010 Census. People related to the householder Despite the diversity of households in the United States, three relationship categories made up the majority of people in 2010. The householder, his or her spouse, and his or her sons and daughters comprised 262.0 million people or 87 percent of the population (Table 1). Of the 88.8 million children of householders, 93 percent were biological children. There were approximately twice as many stepchildren (4.2 million) as adopted children (2.1 million). As expected, most of the children living with their parents were under 18 years old. These three child types exhibit different age distributions. About 73 percent of either biological or adopted
2 See Martin OConnell and Sarah Feliz, Same-sex Couple Household Statistics From the 2010 Census, SEHSD Working Paper Number 2011-26, September 27, 2011, <www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data /decennial.html>.
children were under 18, compared with 67 percent of stepchildren. Stepchildren were more likely to be young adults ages 18 to 29 years (26 percent) than either biological or adopted children (19 percent each). Stepchildren were older in general as they reflect the blending of two different families where the spouse already has older children from a prior marriage. In the same generation as the children of the householder are the sons-in-law and daughters-in-law of the householder. They numbered 1.2 million in 2010, and almost half of them were young adults who depended on their in-laws for housing assistance. Given their age, most were probably recently married. About one-third of all brothers and sisters of the householder (3.4 million) were 18-to-29 years old. Another 1.1 million young adults were grandchildren of the householder. This age group made up 16 percent of the 7.1 million grandchildren living with their grand parentsthe majority of these grandchildren were under 18 (82 percent). At the other end of
the generational continuum were the parents and parents-in-law of the householder, comprising about 3.0 million and 926,000 relatives, respectively. Unlike people in any other relationship category, the majority of these were 65 years and over57 percent of parents and 69 percent of parents-in-law were this age. Although not specified by detailed type in the 2010 Census, another 4.7 million were other relatives who lived in households. About one-third of them were under 18 and were often nephews and nieces of the householder.3 Nonrelatives of the householder People who were not related to the householder numbered 18.3 million in 2010 (6.1 percent of the household population), up from 14.6 million in 2000 (5.2 percent of the household population). In fact, 1 out of every 8 homes in
3 There were 845,000 nephews and nieces of the householder under 18 in Census 2000. See Terry Lugaila and Julia Overturf, Children and the Households They Live In: 2000, Census 2000 Special Reports, CENSR-14 (March 2004), Table 1.
U.S. Census Bureau

for the household population as a whole. Housemates or roommates who were coequals with the householder and who shared maintenance of the housing unit had more economic equality with the householder. Looking at the age structure of these 5.2 million people, 61 percent were young adults ages 18 to 29 who might be sharing living expenses. The percentage declined sharply for the next older age group, 30 to 44 years old (21 percent). Overall, the unmarried partner population numbered 7.7 million in 2010 and grew 41 percent between 2000 and 2010, four times as fast as the overall household population (10 percent). Unmarried partners were generally older than housemates: 2.6 million (34 percent) were 18 to 29 years old, while 2.7 million (35 percent) were 30 to 44 years old. In addition, 26 percent of unmarried partners were 45-to-64 year olds, compared with 15 percent of housemates. This difference in age profiles reflects the transitions occurring first when a young person shares expenses as a housemate or roommate after leaving the parents home and later when that person develops a more permanent and personal relationship with an unmarried partner.
UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS

An unmarried partner household consists of a householder and a person living in the household who reports that he or she is (1) an unmarried partner of the householder and of the opposite sex; (2) an unmarried partner of the householder and of the same sex; or (3) a spouse of the householder and of the same sex. Procedures for the 2010 Census edited same-sex spouse households as unmarried partner households, and these households appear as such in published Summary File 1 tabulations. During the review of the data, counts of same-sex spouses appeared inflated due to mismarking errors in the gender item on the census forms. Up to 28 percent of the total number of same-sex unmarried partner households may actually be opposite-sex households: 62 percent of reported samesex spouses were probably marked in error compared with 7 percent of reported same-sex unmarried partners. This report presents data both for same-sex households as shown in Summary File 1 tabulations and for a set of preferred estimates that attempts to remove statistically same-sex households that are likely oppositesex households.
2010 contained one or more people not related to the householder.4 Roomers or boarders comprised 1.5 million individuals who represented a wide array of people such as students, migrants to an area waiting for better accommodations, or people who could not afford
to rent their own home.5 About 143,000 (9.4 percent) of roomers and boarders were less than 18 years old, suggesting they might be children of displaced families living in boarding homes. Another 61.3 percent (936,000) were in the prime working ages of 18 to 44 years, compared with 35.8 percent
5 A historical perspective and the growth and characteristics of roomers and boarders is presented in Melissa Scopilliti and Martin OConnell, Roomers and Boarders: 18802005, paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Population Association of America, New Orleans, LA, April 1719, 2008, <www.census.gov/population /www/documentation/paa2008/ScopillitiOConnell-PAA-2008.ppt>.
4 Proportion derived from U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1, Table P27.
U.S. Census Bureau

HOUSEHOLDS
All of these various relationship types contribute to the formation of households, both family and nonfamily households. Who lives in a household has important consequences for economic resources available to housing units and for access to everyday social support systems such as care for young children or older parents. The following sections show the different types of households in 2010 and their growth over the decade. The number of households grew by over 11 million since 2000. The number of households in the United States increased 11 percent, from 105.5 million in 2000 to 116.7 million in 2010. While family households increased 8 percent, from 71.8 million in 2000 to 77.5 million in 2010, nonfamily households increased faster, 16 percent, from 33.6 million in 2000 to 39.2 million in 2010. As a proportion of all households, family households declined from 68 percent in 2000 to 66 percent in 2010, while the proportion of nonfamily households increased from 32 percent to 34 percent, respectively. Table 2 shows that husband-wife households numbered 56.5 million in 2010 and made up 73 percent of all family households in 2010 (households containing at least one person related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption).
HOUSEHOLD DEFINITIONS
A household includes all of the people who occupy a housing unit. One person in each household is designated as the householder. In most cases, this is the person, or one of the people, in whose name the home is owned, being bought, or rented. If there is no such person in the household, any household member 15 years old and over can be designated as the householder. A family consists of a householder and one or more other people living in the same household who are related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption. Biological, adopted, and stepchildren of the householder who are under 18 are the own children of the householder. Own children do not include other children present in the household, regardless of the presence or absence of the other childrens parents. A family household may also contain people not related to the householder. A family in which the householder and his or her spouse of the opposite sex are enumerated as members of the same household is a husband-wife household. In this report, husband-wife households only refer to opposite-sex spouses and do not include households that were originally reported as same-sex spouse households. Same-sex spousal households are included in the category, same-sex unmarried partner households but may be either a family or nonfamily household depending on the presence of another person who is related to the householder. The remaining types of family households not maintained by a husband-wife couple are designated by the sex of the householder. A nonfamily household consists of a householder living alone or with nonrelatives only, for example, with roommates or an unmarried partner.
Family households maintained by a female householder with no spouse present numbered 15.3 million, more than twice the number maintained by a male householder with no spouse present (5.8 million). Among nonfamily households, one-person households predominated (31.2 million) and were more than three times as common as
nonfamily households with two or more people (8.0 million). More women than men lived alone (17.2 million and 13.9 million, respectively). A geographic look at oneperson households follows later in this report. Despite increases in both the number of households and of people in the United States since 2000, the
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Table 2.
Households by Type: 2000 and 2010

Household type Total households .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Family household. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Husband-wife households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Female householder, no spouse present.. . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Male householder, no spouse present. . . . . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nonfamily households. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Male householder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Living alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not living alone .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Female householder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Living alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Not living alone .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unmarried couple households1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opposite-sex partners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Same-sex partners2 Summary File 1 counts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preferred estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Average household size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Average family size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(X) Not applicable.
2000 Number 105,480,101 71,787,347 54,493,232 24,835,505 29,657,727 12,900,103 7,561,874 5,338,229 4,394,012 2,190,989 2,203,023 33,692,754 15,556,103 11,779,106 3,776,997 18,136,651 15,450,969 2,685,682 5,475,768 4,881,377 594,391 358,390 2.59 3.14 Percent 100.0 68.1 51.7 23.5 28.1 12.2 7.2 5.1 4.2 2.1 2.1 31.9 14.7 11.2 3.6 17.2 14.6 2.5 5.2 4.6 0.6 0.3 (X) (X)
2010 Number 116,716,292 77,538,296 56,510,377 23,588,268 32,922,109 15,250,349 8,365,912 6,884,437 5,777,570 2,789,424 2,988,146 39,177,996 18,459,253 13,906,294 4,552,959 20,718,743 17,298,615 3,420,128 7,744,711 6,842,714 901,997 646,464 2.58 3.14 Percent 100.0 66.4 48.4 20.2 28.2 13.1 7.2 5.9 5.0 2.4 2.6 33.6 15.8 11.9 3.9 17.8 14.8 2.9 6.6 5.9 0.8 0.6 (X) (X)
Change, 2000 to 2010 Number 11,236,191 5,750,949 2,017,145 1,247,237 3,264,382 2,350,246 804,038 1,546,208 1,383,558 598,435 785,123 5,485,242 2,903,150 2,127,188 775,962 2,582,092 1,847,646 734,446 2,268,943 1,961,337 307,606 288,074 0.01 0.00 Percent 10.7 8.0 3.7 5.0 11.0 18.2 10.6 29.0 31.5 27.3 35.6 16.3 18.7 18.1 20.5 14.2 12.0 27.3 41.4 40.2 51.8 80.4 (X) (X)
1 Unmarried couple households can be family or nonfamily households depending on the relationship of others in the household to the householder. In this table, it is the sum of opposite-sex partners and same-sex partners from Summary File 1 counts. 2 Summary File 1 counts in this table are consistent with Summary File 1 counts shown in American FactFinder.
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1 and 2010 Census Summary File 1.
average household size decreased over the decade, from 2.59 to 2.58, but average family size stayed the same, 3.14.6 These indicators show a slowing of the downward trends that have existed since the end of the Baby Boom in the 1960s. In 1960, the average household size was 3.29 people per
6 Average family size is the number of family members in the household (persons related to the householder including the householder) per family household. This computation excludes persons not related to the householder.
household, and the average family size was 3.65 people per family.7 The number of households within each category type increased in the last 10 years, including husbandwife households, which increased
7 Average household size for 1960may be found inFrank Hobbsand Nicole Stoops, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century, Census 2000 Special Reports, CENSR-4 (November 2002), Figure 5-3. Average family size for 1960may be found in U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population, Supplementary Reports, PC(S1)-38,Families in the United States:1960, Table 280.
by 2.0 million. Figure 2 shows that, despite this increase, in 2010 less than half of all households (48 percent) were husband-wife households, down from 52 percent in 2000 and 55 percent in 1990. This is the first time that husband-wife families fell below 50 percent of all households in the United States since data on families were first
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Figure 2.
Households by Type: 1990, 2000, and 2010

(Percent distribution. For information on confidentiality protection, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf) Husband-wife family household Female householder, other family Male householder, other family 55.2 51.7 48.4 Two or more people, nonfamily One person, nonfamily
34.3 11.6 3.4 5.2 12.2 35.9 4.2 6.1
13.1 5.0 6.8
24.6
25.8
26.7
1990
2000
2010
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010 Summary File 1; Census 2000 Summary File 1; 1990 Census of Population, Summary Population and Housing Characteristics, United States (1990 CPH-1-1).
tabulated in 1940.8 For each of the other types of households shown in Figure 2, the percentage share has increased since 1990. Opposite-sex unmarried partner households increased by 40 percent
8 See the Census Bureaus Families and Living Arrangements Web page, Historical Table HH-1, <www.census.gov/population /socdemo/hh-fam/hh1.xls>.
since 2000, almost four times the national average. For same-sex households, the preferred estimates for 2000 and 2010 showed an 80 percent increase. However, same-sex partner households made up less than 1 percent of all households in both 2000 and 2010.
Household types varied by race of householder in 2010. Two-thirds of all households in the United States were family households (Table 3). This proportion varied considerably by race: 64 percent of non-Hispanic White alone households were family households, compared with 78 percent of Hispanic or Latino households.
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Households containing husbandwife families varied as well: 29 percent of all Black or African American alone households were husband-wife households, while 60 percent of Asian alone households were husband-wife families. Three in 10 Black or African American alone households were female householder, no spouse present families, three times as high as White alone households (9.9 percent) and Asian alone households (9.5 percent). The majority of female family households with no spouse present contained own children of the householder, except for Asian alone households. Male family households with no spouse present represented 5 percent of all households. Almost one-half of all of these households contained own children of the householder. Households containing unmarried couples can be family or nonfamily households, depending on the presence of relatives of the householder. Nationally, 6.6 percent of all households were unmarried partner households. American Indian and Alaska Native alone households reported the largest percentage of unmarried partner households (10.9 percent). Asian alone households had the lowest proportion of unmarried couple households, 3.6 percent. The majority of all
DEFINITION OF RACE CATEGORIES USED IN THE 2010 CENSUS

The U.S. Census Bureau collects race and Hispanic origin information following the guidance of the U.S. Office of Management and Budgets (OMB) 1997 Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity. These federal standards mandate that race and Hispanic origin ( ethnicity) are separate and distinct concepts and that when collecting these data via self-identification, two different questions must be used.Individuals who responded to the question on Hispanic origin are classified as either Hispanic or as non-Hispanic. Individuals who responded to the question on race by indicating only one race are referred to as the race-alone population or the group that reported only one race category (e.g., White alone, Black or African American alone, American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Asian alone, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, and Some Other Race alone). Individuals who chose more than one of the six race categories are referred to as the Two or More Races population in this report. All respondents who indicated multiple races (more than one race) or races in combination with each other can be collapsed into the Two or More Races population category, which, combined with the six race-alone categories, yields seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. Thus, the six race-alone categories and the Two or More Races category sum to the total population. As a matter of policy, the Census Bureau does not advocate the use of the alone population over the alone-or-in-combination population or vice versa. The use of the alone population in sections of this report does not imply that it is a preferred method of presenting or analyzing data. The same is true for household and family tables presented in Summary Files 1 or 2 that show the alone-or-incombination population. Data on race from the 2010 Census can be presented and discussed in a variety of ways.
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Table 3.
Household Type by Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010

(For information on condentiality protection, nonsampling errors, and denitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf) American Indian and Alaska Native alone Native Hawaiian and Pacic Asian Islander alone alone 143,932 100.0 77.0 51.3 29.0 6.1 8.2 14.7 22.2 17.0 9.8 2.2 2.3 5.3 7.2 8.7 4.3 1.3 0.9 2.0 4.4 23.0 15.7 7.3 9.3 8.2 4.3 3.9 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.6
Household type Total Total households (number) . . . . . . . . . . . . Total households (percent). . . . . . . . . . . . . Family households .. . . . . . . . . . . Husband-wife households . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . Under 6 years only. . . . . . Under 6 years and 6 to 17 years. . . . . . . . . 6 to 17 years only. . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . Female householder, no spouse present. . . . . . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . Under 6 years only. . . . . . Under 6 years and 6 to 17 years. . . . . . . . . . 6 to 17 years only. . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . Male householder, no spouse present. . . . . . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . Under 6 years only. . . . . . Under 6 years and 6 to 17 years. . . . . . . . . . 6 to 17 years only. . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . Nonfamily households. . . . . . . . . One person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Two or more people. . . . . . . . . Unmarried couple households1. . Opposite-sex partner. . . . . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . Same-sex partner Summary File 1 counts2. . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . . Same-sex partner Preferred estimates3 .. . . . . . . With own children. . . . . . . . . Without own children . . . . . .
NonWhite Hispanic alone White alone
Black or African American alone
Some Other Race alone
Two or more races
Hispanic or Latino of any race 13,461,366 100.0 78.4 50.1 31.3 6.4 9.4 15.5 18.8 19.2 12.1 2.4 2.9 6.9 7.1 9.1 4.7 1.5 1.1 2.1 4.4 21.6 15.2 6.4 9.4 8.6 5.2 3.3 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4
116,716,292 89,754,352 82,333,080 14,129,983 100.0 66.4 48.4 20.2 4.6 4.4 11.3 28.2 13.1 7.2 1.5 1.3 4.4 5.9 5.0 2.4 0.7 0.4 1.4 2.6 33.6 26.7 6.8 6.6 5.9 2.3 3.6 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.5 100.0 65.4 51.2 19.9 4.5 4.1 11.3 31.2 9.9 5.2 1.1 0.8 3.3 4.7 4.3 2.1 0.6 .03 1.3 2.2 34.6 27.6 7.0 6.4 5.6 1.9 3.7 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.5 100.0 64.3 51.1 19.0 4.4 3.7 10.9 32.1 9.2 4.7 1.0 0.7 3.1 4.5 4.0 2.0 0.5 0.2 1.2 2.0 35.7 28.6 7.1 6.2 5.4 1.7 3.7 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.5 100.0 64.9 28.5 12.8 2.3 3.0 7.5 15.7 30.1 17.4 3.6 3.7 10.1 12.7 6.3 2.9 0.8 0.5 1.6 3.4 35.1 29.7 5.4 7.0 6.4 3.3 3.1 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3
939,707 4,632,164 100.0 70.4 40.1 19.4 3.6 5.1 10.7 20.7 21.4 12.3 2.6 2.8 6.8 9.2 8.9 4.6 1.3 0.9 2.3 4.3 29.6 22.6 7.0 10.9 10.0 5.4 4.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 100.0 73.9 59.7 31.8 8.9 6.3 16.6 27.9 9.5 4.1 0.7 0.5 2.8 5.5 4.7 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.9 3.2 26.1 19.0 7.2 3.6 3.1 1.0 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3
4,916,427 2,199,727 100.0 80.8 49.6 34.2 6.9 10.8 16.5 15.4 20.2 13.6 2.6 3.4 7.6 6.6 10.9 5.7 1.8 1.4 2.5 5.3 19.2 12.6 6.6 10.2 9.4 6.1 3.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 100.0 67.6 41.0 23.0 5.7 6.0 11.3 18.0 19.2 12.3 3.0 2.6 6.8 6.9 7.3 3.8 1.2 0.7 1.8 3.5 32.4 23.4 9.0 9.8 8.8 4.3 4.5 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.6
1 Unmarried couple households can be family or nonfamily households depending on the relationship of others in the household to the householder. In this table it is the sum of opposite-sex partners and same-sex partners from Summary File 1 counts. 2 Summary File 1 counts in this table are consistent with Summary File 1 counts shown in American FactFinder. 3 Preferred estimates remove likely numbers of opposite-sex couples included in same-sex tabulations.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1.
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unmarried partner households were opposite-sex partner households. Also shown in Table 3 are the preferred estimates for same-sex partner households by race and Hispanic or Latino origin. The preferred estimates removed the households that were likely to have been opposite-sex households as judged by inconsistencies between their first names and their responses to the gender item.9 This resulted in a reduction of same-sex households as a percentage of all households from 0.8 percent to 0.6 percent. About 0.1 percent of all households in the United States in 2010 were estimated to be same-sex partner households with own children of the householder present, the highest being 0.3 percent for Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander alone households. Thirty-one percent of all households were in four states. Table 4 shows that four states contained 31 percent of all households enumerated in 2010: California (12.6 million), Texas (8.9 million), Florida (7.4 million), and New York
9 See OConnell and Feliz, op. cit., for a detailed discussion of this statistical procedure.
(7.3 million).10 These states also had the most households in 2000, although Florida, which had the fourth-highest number of households in 2000, was the third highest in 2010, topping New York. Sixteen states had less than 1.0 million households, with Wyoming having the fewest (227,000). Nevada, which had 751,000 households in 2000, had slightly over 1.0 million households in 2010. No state experienced a decline in the number of households in 2010. On a regional basis, more households were located in the South (43.6 million) than any other region in the country.11 The average number of people per household in 2010 ranged from a
10 These four states (California, Texas, Florida, and New York) also were the states with the largest populations. 11 There were four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). The Northeast region includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Midwest region includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The South region includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The West region includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
low of 2.30 in North Dakota to a high of 3.10 in Utah, the only state in 2010 that averaged more than 3 people per household. The District of Columbia averaged only 2.11 people per household, a decline from 2.16 in 2000. Regionally, the West had the highest average number of people per household (2.74), while the lowest average was in the Midwest (2.49). Utah had the highest average number of people per family (3.56), followed by California (3.45) and Hawaii (3.42). Ten states averaged less than 3 people per family in 2010: Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont in the Northeast; West Virginia and Kentucky in the South; Iowa, North Dakota, and Wisconsin in the Midwest; and Montana and Wyoming in the West.
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION
Utah had the highest proportion of husband-wife households in 2010. Sixty-one percent of all households in Utah were married husband-wife couple households, the highest in the country. New York and Louisiana had the lowest proportions of husband-wife households (44 percent). Husband-wife couples
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Table 4.
Households and Families for the United States, Regions, States, and for Puerto Rico: 2000 and 2010
(For information on condentiality protection, nonsampling errors, and denitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf) Percent of households in 2010 All households Area Husband-wife households With own children under 18 years 20.2 19.5 19.7 19.7 22.1 18.5 22.7 19.5 18.9 23.4 21.4 20.9 18.3 7.9 16.6 21.1 20.1 24.0 21.0 19.9 20.0 21.3 19.1 17.6 16.7 20.4 19.7 18.9 21.2 17.8 18.9 17.8 21.2 19.6 20.4 23.3 17.9 18.7 19.6 18.6 18.2 19.7 18.7 18.3 17.6 17.7 19.7 18.7 23.7 31.7 17.6 21.1 20.4 17.0 19.4 19.6 18.2 Family households Female family households1 With own children under 18 years 7.2 6.9 6.9 7.8 6.6 8.1 6.8 7.1 7.7 6.8 6.0 7.1 7.6 7.9 7.1 8.9 5.2 5.9 6.9 7.3 5.9 6.5 7.1 9.3 6.0 7.6 6.8 7.3 5.9 10.0 7.1 5.4 6.2 7.0 5.7 6.6 7.8 7.5 7.8 5.2 7.5 7.0 6.1 6.5 7.7 8.4 6.2 7.5 8.0 5.5 6.0 6.7 6.2 5.7 6.4 5.6 10.9 Male family households1 With own children under 18 years Total 5.0 2.4 4.7 4.6 4.9 5.6 4.6 6.0 5.6 4.7 6.0 4.6 4.4 5.0 3.9 5.0 4.9 5.8 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.2 4.5 4.8 5.5 4.5 4.8 4.2 4.8 4.3 5.2 4.6 4.5 4.2 6.6 4.5 4.8 6.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.8 5.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.8 5.5 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.8 2.0 3.5 3.0 2.4 2.8 2.5 1.9 2.4 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.2 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.3 2.5 2.0 3.4 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.6 2.0 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.2 Nonfamily households One person With householder 65 years Total and over 26.7 9.4 28.1 28.1 26.4 24.8 27.4 25.6 26.1 27.1 23.3 27.9 27.3 25.6 44.0 27.2 25.4 23.3 23.8 27.8 26.9 28.4 27.8 27.5 26.9 28.6 26.1 28.7 27.9 28.0 26.3 28.3 29.7 28.7 25.7 25.6 25.2 28.0 29.1 27.0 31.5 28.9 27.5 27.4 28.6 29.6 26.5 29.4 26.9 24.2 18.7 28.2 26.0 27.2 28.4 28.2 28.0 23.8 10.7 10.1 9.0 8.4 9.8 5.4 9.1 10.1 8.1 7.8 10.6 9.7 9.7 11.1 7.5 8.1 8.8 9.7 9.5 11.1 9.9 9.8 8.9 11.3 8.7 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.5 10.1 10.7 10.4 7.9 9.2 10.1 9.3 10.5 9.1 11.0 10.4 9.9 9.7 11.4 11.3 9.2 10.9 9.4 7.2 6.4 10.3 8.5 8.7 11.6 10.2 8.8 9.5 Average number of people in 2010
United States . . . REGION Northeast .. . . . . . . . . . Midwest. . . . . . . . . . . . South. . . . . . . . . . . . . . West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STATE Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . Arkansas. . . . . . . . . . . California. . . . . . . . . . . Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . Connecticut. . . . . . . . . Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . District of Columbia. . . Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . Idaho. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Illinois .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Indiana .. . . . . . . . . . . . Iowa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kansas .. . . . . . . . . . . . Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana. . . . . . . . . . . Maine .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . Massachusetts .. . . . . . Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi. . . . . . . . . . Missouri. . . . . . . . . . . . Montana .. . . . . . . . . . . Nebraska. . . . . . . . . . . Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . New Hampshire. . . . . . New Jersey . . . . . . . . . New Mexico. . . . . . . . . New York . . . . . . . . . . . North Carolina. . . . . . . North Dakota. . . . . . . . Ohio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . Oregon .. . . . . . . . . . . . Pennsylvania. . . . . . . . Rhode Island. . . . . . . . South Carolina .. . . . . . South Dakota .. . . . . . . Tennessee. . . . . . . . . . Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vermont. . . . . . . . . . . . Virginia .. . . . . . . . . . . . Washington . . . . . . . . . West Virginia. . . . . . . . Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . Puerto Rico . . . . . . . .
1
April 1, April 1, 2000 2010 105,480,101 116,716,292 20,285,622 24,734,532 38,015,214 22,444,733 1,737,080 221,600 1,901,327 1,042,696 11,502,870 1,658,238 1,301,670 298,736 248,338 6,337,929 3,006,369 403,240 469,645 4,591,779 2,336,306 1,149,276 1,037,891 1,590,647 1,656,053 518,200 1,980,859 2,443,580 3,785,661 1,895,127 1,046,434 2,194,594 358,667 666,184 751,165 474,606 3,064,645 677,971 7,056,860 3,132,013 257,152 4,445,773 1,342,293 1,333,723 4,777,003 408,424 1,533,854 290,245 2,232,905 7,393,354 701,281 240,634 2,699,173 2,271,398 736,481 2,084,544 193,608 1,261,325 21,215,415 26,215,951 43,609,929 25,674,997 1,883,791 258,058 2,380,990 1,147,084 12,577,498 1,972,868 1,371,087 342,297 266,707 7,420,802 3,585,584 455,338 579,408 4,836,972 2,502,154 1,221,576 1,112,096 1,719,965 1,728,360 557,219 2,156,411 2,547,075 3,872,508 2,087,227 1,115,768 2,375,611 409,607 721,130 1,006,250 518,973 3,214,360 791,395 7,317,755 3,745,155 281,192 4,603,435 1,460,450 1,518,938 5,018,904 413,600 1,801,181 322,282 2,493,552 8,922,933 877,692 256,442 3,056,058 2,620,076 763,831 2,279,768 226,879 1,376,531
Total 48.4 46.9 48.8 48.3 49.5 47.9 49.4 48.1 49.5 49.4 49.2 49.0 48.3 22.0 46.6 47.8 50.5 55.3 48.2 49.6 51.2 51.1 49.3 44.4 48.5 47.6 46.3 48.0 50.8 45.4 48.4 49.2 50.8 46.0 52.1 51.1 45.3 43.6 48.4 48.6 47.2 49.5 48.3 48.2 44.5 47.2 50.1 48.7 50.6 61.0 48.5 50.2 49.2 49.8 49.6 50.9 45.0
Total 13.1 13.3 11.9 14.2 12.2 15.3 10.7 12.4 13.4 13.3 10.1 12.9 14.2 16.4 13.5 15.8 12.6 9.6 12.9 12.4 9.3 10.4 12.7 17.2 10.0 14.6 12.5 13.2 9.5 18.5 12.3 9.0 9.8 12.7 9.7 13.3 14.0 14.9 13.7 8.2 13.1 12.3 10.5 12.2 13.5 15.6 9.7 13.9 14.1 9.7 9.6 12.4 10.5 11.2 10.3 8.9 22.6
Two or more people 6.8 7.0 6.5 6.3 8.0 4.8 8.2 7.7 5.3 8.0 8.1 6.5 7.0 13.7 7.6 6.1 7.7 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.9 6.2 5.6 6.0 8.4 6.8 8.3 6.2 7.4 4.6 6.4 7.5 6.5 9.1 8.0 5.5 6.5 7.3 6.3 7.7 6.2 5.8 9.1 6.5 7.6 5.9 6.4 5.7 5.9 6.1 9.3 7.0 8.4 5.8 7.4 7.4 3.1
Per household 2.58 2.53 2.49 2.56 2.74 2.48 2.65 2.63 2.47 2.90 2.49 2.52 2.55 2.11 2.48 2.63 2.89 2.66 2.59 2.52 2.41 2.49 2.45 2.55 2.32 2.61 2.48 2.49 2.48 2.58 2.45 2.35 2.46 2.65 2.46 2.68 2.55 2.57 2.48 2.30 2.44 2.49 2.47 2.45 2.44 2.49 2.42 2.48 2.75 3.10 2.34 2.54 2.51 2.36 2.43 2.42 2.68
Per family 3.14 3.12 3.06 3.10 3.30 3.02 3.21 3.19 3.00 3.45 3.08 3.08 3.06 3.01 3.01 3.17 3.42 3.16 3.20 3.05 2.97 3.06 2.98 3.10 2.83 3.15 3.08 3.05 3.05 3.11 3.00 2.91 3.04 3.20 2.96 3.22 3.13 3.20 3.01 2.91 3.01 3.04 3.00 3.02 3.04 3.01 3.00 3.01 3.31 3.56 2.85 3.06 3.06 2.88 2.99 2.96 3.17
No spouse present in household. Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1 and 2010 Census Summary File 1.
10
U.S. Census Bureau

Table 5.
Top Ten Places of 100,000 or More Population With the Highest Percentage of One-Person Households: 2010
Place1 Total households 185,142 266,707 133,420 68,082 142,057 136,217 98,050 283,510 44,032 263,107 Number 81,555 117,431 57,941 29,564 60,468 56,823 40,516 117,054 17,933 106,828
Atlanta city, Georgia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington city, District of Columbia . . . . . Cincinnati city, Ohio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexandria city, Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . St. Louis city, Missouri. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pittsburgh city, Pennsylvania. . . . . . . . . . . . Arlington CDP, Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Seattle city, Washington .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cambridge city, Massachusetts.. . . . . . . . . Denver city, Colorado. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
One-person households With householder 65 years and over Percent of one-person Percent of total Number households 44.0 15,832 19.4 44.0 25,913 22.1 43.4 13,230 22.8 43.4 4,882 16.5 42.6 14,424 23.9 41.7 16,469 29.0 41.3 6,523 16.1 41.3 24,611 21.0 40.7 4,242 23.7 40.6 23,686 22.2
1 The 2010 Census showed 282 places in the United States with 100,000 or more population. They included 273 incorporated places (including 5 city-county consolidations) and 9 census designated places (CDPs) that were not legally incorporated.
maintained only 22 percent of households in the District of Columbia. Regional patterns in the proportion of husband-wife households show that the highest percentage was in the West (50 percent) while the lowest percentage was in the Northeast (47 percent). Over a quarter of households were one-person households. In 2010, 31.2 million households consisted of one person living alone.12 This represents a 4.0 million increase in one-person households since 2000. Although this increase from 2000 to 2010 was smaller than the growth experienced between 1990 and 2000 (4.6 million), the proportion of oneperson households grew slightly from 26 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2010. About one-third of
One-person households are a subset of nonfamily households. In one-person households the householder lives alone.
12
all one-person households in 2010 had householders who were 65 years and over, compared with 22 percent of all householders (Table 1). Table 5 shows the top ten places with the highest proportion of one-person households and the percentage of these households maintained by a person 65 and older. In 2010, one-person households were the most common form of household type in Atlanta, Georgia, and Washington, DC (both 44 percent), followed by St. Louis, Missouri; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Alexandria, Virginia, with 43 percent. People over the age of 65 occupied less than 20 percent of one-person households in Atlanta; Arlington, Virginia; and Alexandria. These areas may represent cities inhabited by younger adults who may move in search of job opportunities.
Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c are maps showing the percentage of oneperson households and their geographical concentration at the county level.13 Figure 3a shows a high percentage of one-person households concentrated along the upper and central Midwest extending down into northeastern New Mexico. Figure 3b shows a much smaller proportion of Midwestern counties with high concentrations of persons living alone for those aged 15 to 64 years. Figure 3c specifically examines one-person households composed of individuals 65 years and older. It shows that the high percentages noted in Figure 3a in the Midwest are the result of the elderly living alone, perhaps staying in or not moving far from homes or towns where
13 A reference to state includes states and their statistically equivalent entities. A reference to county includes counties and their statistically equivalent entities.
U.S. Census Bureau
11
12
Figure 3a.
Households With Person Living Alone, All Ages: 2010

For information on confidentiality protection, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf.
Percent by county U.S. percent 26.74 31.0573.91 26.7431.04 22.6526.73 10.1522.64

U.S. percent does not include Puerto Rico.
U.S. Census Bureau
Figure 3b.
U.S. Census Bureau
Households With Person Living Alone, Ages 15 to 64: 2010

Percent by county U.S. percent 17.32
22.3047.83 17.3222.29 14.3117.31 5.8314.30

13
14
Households With Person Living Alone, Ages 65 and Older: 2010

Figure 3c.
Percent by county
U.S. percent 9.42
13.0826.09 9.4213.07 7.189.41 2.587.17

U.S. Census Bureau

they were born.14 Note that in Alaska the reverse is true: relatively high numbers of counties with younger people living alone and very low concentrations of people 65 years and over living alone. This may result from the presence of industries such as mining and loggingthat attract younger people. Unmarried partner households increased from 2000 to 2010. The unmarried partner category identifies people with a close and personal relationship to the householder that goes beyond sharing household expenses. Two people may live together as an unmarried couple for a variety of reasons. For young men and women, the arrangement may represent a transitory or trial relationship, while for others it may be a precursor to an eventual marriage. For older couples that have been formerly married, it could represent an alternative lifestyle to the one they previously experienced, especially if they do not anticipate any future childbearing or childrearing activities. Unmarried partners can be either opposite-sex couple households or same-sex couple households. There were 4.9 million oppositesex unmarried partner households in 2000, increasing to 6.8 million by 2010 (Table 2). Opposite-sex unmarried partner households accounted for 4.6 percent of all households in 2000, while in 2010 they accounted for 5.9 percent of all households. State-level data in Table 6 show that Maine had the highest percentage of oppositesex unmarried partner households
14 Data from the 2010 American Community Survey indicated that the Midwest region had the highest proportion of people living in the state where they were born. See Ping Ren, Lifetime Mobility in the United States: 2010, American Community Survey Briefs, ACSBR/10-07 (November 2011), <www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10 -07.pdf>.
(8.4 percent), followed by Vermont (8.1 percent). The only states with less than 5 percent of households reporting as opposite-sex unmarried partner households were Utah and Alabama (3.9 percent and 4.1 percent, respectively). Puerto Rico recorded 5.9 percent of its households as opposite-sex unmarried partner households. Using the preferred set of estimates for measuring same-sex unmarried partner households shows there were 358,000 same-sex unmarried partner households in 2000, increasing to 646,000 in the 2010 Census (Table 2). In 2000, samesex unmarried partner households accounted for 0.3 percent of all households, doubling in proportion to 0.6 percent of all households in 2010. Regionally, same-sex unmarried partner households were most common in the West (0.7 percent) and least common in the Midwest (0.4 percent). Of all areas, Washington, DC, had the highest percentage of same-sex unmarried partner households (1.8 percent). Among the states, proportions of 0.8 percent were found only on the east coast (Delaware, Massachusetts, and Vermont) and the west coast (California and Oregon). North Dakota and South Dakota had the lowest percentages (0.2 percent). Puerto Rico reported only 0.3 percent of all households were same-sex partner households. Multigenerational families numbered 5.1 million in 2010. A topic of growing interest is that of multigenerational families family households consisting of three or more generations of relatives, such as a householder living with his or her children and
grandchildren.15 Multigenerational households may be more likely to reside in areas where new immigrants live with their relatives, in areas where housing shortages or high costs force families to double up their living arrangements, or in areas that have relatively high percentages of children born to unmarried mothers and where unmarried mothers live with their children in their parents homes. In 2000, there were 3.9 million multigenerational households; that number increased to 5.1 million in 2010.16 In 2000, multigenerational households made up 3.7 percent of all households, while in 2010 they made up 4.4 percent of all households. Hawaii had the highest percentage of multigenerational households, which accounted for 8.8 percent of all households in that state. Other states exceeding 5 percent in 2010 tended to be in the West and in the South, including California (6.7 percent), Georgia (5.1 percent), Louisiana (5.2 percent), Maryland (5.1 percent), Mississippi (5.7 percent), Nevada (5.1 percent), and Texas (5.8 percent). The state with the smallest percentage of multigenerational households was North Dakota (1.4 percent), which was also the state with the highest proportion of
15 The numbers in this report only identify three types of commonly encountered multi generational households: (1) householderchild-grandchild, (2) parent/parent-in-law of householder-householder-child, and (3) parent/parent-in-law of householderhouseholder-child-grandchild. These numbers, then, represent a subset of all possible multigenerational households but were the most common combinations; they made up 98.1 percent of all households in 2000 with three or more generations of relatives. See Frank Hobbs, Examining American Household Composition: 1990 and 2000, Census 2000 Special Reports, CENSR-24 (August 2005), Table 7, <www.census.gov /prod/2005pubs/censr-24.pdf>. 16 The data in this section referring to numbers for 2000 are from Tavia Simmons and Grace ONeill, Households and Families: 2000, Census 2000 Briefs, C2KBR/01-8 (September 2001). The data for 2010 are from the U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010 Summary File 1.
U.S. Census Bureau
15

Table 6.
Household Indicators for the United States, Regions, and States, and for Puerto Rico: 2010
(For information on condentiality protection, nonsampling errors, and denitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf) Percent of all households Unmarried partner households Area Same-sex partners Opposite-sex Summary File 1 partners counts1 United States .. . . . . . . . . REGION Northeast .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Midwest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . South. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STATE Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arkansas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . California. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Connecticut. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . District of Columbia. . . . . . . . . . . Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Idaho. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Illinois .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indiana .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iowa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kansas .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maine .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Massachusetts .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Missouri. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Montana .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nebraska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Hampshire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Mexico. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . North Carolina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . North Dakota. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ohio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oregon .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pennsylvania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rhode Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . South Carolina .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . South Dakota .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tennessee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vermont. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Virginia .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Puerto Rico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Preferred estimates2 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
Multigenerational households 4.4 4.1 3.2 4.7 5.3 4.4 3.7 4.9 3.8 6.7 3.2 3.7 4.7 3.9 4.6 5.1 8.8 3.0 4.4 3.4 2.0 2.8 3.5 5.2 2.2 5.1 3.5 3.4 2.2 5.7 3.2 2.3 2.2 5.1 2.8 5.0 5.0 4.6 3.8 1.4 3.2 3.7 3.0 3.5 3.8 4.6 2.2 4.2 5.8 4.6 1.9 4.0 3.2 3.2 2.2 2.4 6.6
Presence of With nonrelatives in individuals the household under 18 years 12.1 11.9 11.2 11.4 14.5 8.8 15.1 13.9 9.8 15.3 12.6 11.2 12.8 18.3 13.4 11.4 15.5 11.6 11.1 11.3 11.2 10.6 10.3 11.4 13.9 12.6 12.8 10.9 11.9 9.7 11.1 11.8 10.8 16.4 13.1 10.5 12.8 12.7 10.9 11.4 10.9 10.6 14.9 10.9 12.7 10.8 10.9 10.4 11.1 11.1 14.8 11.8 14.1 10.4 11.8 12.3 8.3 33.4 31.5 32.0 34.0 35.4 33.1 36.4 33.6 33.0 37.5 32.7 32.7 32.5 20.7 29.8 36.8 34.3 35.7 33.5 33.3 30.6 33.2 32.6 34.7 27.8 34.3 30.8 31.6 31.6 35.8 31.8 28.4 32.0 33.9 31.0 35.0 33.7 31.7 33.3 27.9 31.3 33.3 30.1 29.9 30.1 32.8 31.1 32.6 38.9 43.3 28.3 33.4 31.9 28.6 30.6 30.9 37.0
With individuals 65 years and over 24.9 26.7 24.5 24.8 24.2 25.5 16.0 26.4 26.2 24.7 20.2 26.5 27.0 20.4 31.4 21.2 30.3 23.9 24.2 23.9 25.5 23.7 24.4 23.7 27.1 23.9 25.6 25.4 22.8 25.1 25.0 25.6 23.9 24.0 24.4 26.9 25.3 26.3 23.9 23.9 25.3 25.0 25.3 27.9 26.6 25.5 24.9 24.9 21.2 20.0 25.4 23.3 22.8 28.5 24.0 22.0 29.6
5.9 5.9 6.0 5.4 6.3 4.1 7.8 6.9 5.1 6.2 5.6 5.8 6.4 5.8 6.5 5.1 6.3 5.7 5.7 6.3 6.2 5.3 5.7 6.1 8.4 5.6 6.0 5.8 6.2 5.1 6.1 6.1 5.5 7.7 7.4 5.2 7.3 5.9 5.2 6.0 6.1 5.3 7.1 6.0 6.7 5.3 6.1 5.2 5.2 3.9 8.1 5.0 6.7 6.0 6.7 6.6 5.9
0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
Summary File 1 counts in this table are consistent with Summary File 1 counts shown in the American FactFinder. 2 Preferred estimates remove likely numbers of opposite-sex couples included in same-sex tabulations. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1.
16
U.S. Census Bureau
ATTACHMENT A (Part 2) Households and Families: 2010 2010 Census Briefs (Pages 17-21)

one-person households (31.5 percent, Table 4). Puerto Rico recorded 6.6 percent of households as multi generational households. Thirty-three percent of households included people under 18 years, and 25 percent included people 65 years and over. There were 38 million households in 2000 with individuals under the age of 18, representing 36 percent of all households.17 By 2010, this number slightly increased to 39 million households, but the proportion of these households declined to 33 percent. Utah, in 2010, had the highest percentage of households with individuals under the age of 18 years, accounting for 43 percent of all households in Utah. States with less than 28 percent of households with individuals under the age of 18 years were Maine and North Dakota, while the District of Columbia recorded 21 percent. In 2000, 25 million households had individuals aged 65 years and over, which amounted to 23 percent of all households. In 2010, the number of households with people aged 65 and over increased to 29 million, which accounted for 25 percent of households. Only two states had a person aged 65 years and over living in at least 30 percent of the states households: Florida (31 percent) and Hawaii (30 percent). These areas probably reflect popular retirement destinations. Alaska and Utah had the lowest percentages of households with a person 65 years and over (16 percent and 20 percent, respectively). Interracial couples were most prevalent in the West. In 2010, almost 7 percent of married couple households included a householder and spouse of different races (Table 7).18 Four to 6 percent of married couples in the Midwest, the Northeast, and the South consisted of spouses of different races, compared with 11 percent in the West. Hawaii had the highest proportion (37 percent), followed by Oklahoma and Alaska (both about 17 percent). Because these states have high proportions of native populations (for example, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islanders, and American Indian and Alaska Natives, respectively), these states may have greater potential for the likelihood of interracial marriage. Unmarried partner households consistently had higher percentages of partners of different races than do married couple households at national and regional levels and for individual states.19 Nationally, the percentage for both oppositesex and same-sex couples was 14 percent.20 For opposite-sex unmarried partner households, the
18 The seven race groups used in this report were White alone; Black or African American alone, American Indian and Alaska Native alone, Asian alone, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone; Some other race alone; and Two or more races. If either spouse or partner was not in the same single race as the other spouse or partner, or if at least one spouse or partner was in a multiplerace group, then the couple was classified as an interracial couple. 19 Since unmarried partner relationships are often short-term or trial relationships, the partners may be less likely to choose partners with the same characteristics, such as race or ethnicity, as do married couples. See Robert Schoen and Robin M. Weinick, Partner Choice in Marriage and Cohabitations, Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 55, No. 2 (1993), pp. 408414. 20 Data in this section refer to same-sex households using preferred estimates. About 85 percent of the 255,000 misclassified same-sex households in the Summary File 1 counts are estimated to be married oppositesex households (OConnell and Feliz, op. cit., Appendix Table 6b).
highest percentage of mixed-race partnerships was in the West (21 percent) while the lowest was in the Midwest (11 percent). Over half (56 percent) of these households in Hawaii had partners of different races, followed by Alaska and Oklahoma (28 percent each). Regional patterns and levels for same-sex unmarried partner households were similar to those for opposite-sex unmarried partner households. Again, as with opposite-sex unmarried partners, same-sex unmarried partners had the highest percentage of mixedrace partnerships in the West (21 percent) while the lowest was in the Midwest (11 percent). Fifty percent of same-sex unmarried partner households in Hawaii had partners of different races, followed by California, Oklahoma, and Alaska (23 percent each). Four percent of married couple households had one Hispanic partner and one non-Hispanic partner. Nationally, 4.3 percent of married couples had partners where one is Hispanic and the other is not of Hispanic origin, compared with 8.2 percent of opposite-sex unmarried partners and 10.4 percent of samesex unmarried partners (Table 7). Similar to the geographic pattern noted for interracial partners, the highest percentages of Hispanic/ non-Hispanic partner households for all three types of households were in the West. New Mexico had twice the national average of the proportion of households having only one Hispanic partner for each household type. West Virginia had the lowest proportions for both opposite-sex married and unmarried partners (0.9 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively), while Mississippi had the lowest
17 See Simmons and ONeill, op. cit. The data for 2010 are from the U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010 Summary File 1.
U.S. Census Bureau
17

Table 7.
Percent of Households With Partners of a Dierent Race or Hispanic Origin for the United Sates, Regions, and States, and for Puerto Rico: 2010
(For information on condentiality protection, nonsampling errors, and denitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf) Householders with partner of a different race Unmarried partner households Area Same-sex partners Husbandwife United States . . . . REGION Northeast .. . . . . . . . . . . Midwest. . . . . . . . . . . . . South. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STATE Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arkansas. . . . . . . . . . . . California. . . . . . . . . . . . Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . Connecticut. . . . . . . . . . Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . . District of Columbia. . . . Florida. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hawaii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Illinois .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indiana .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Iowa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kansas .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana. . . . . . . . . . . . Maine .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maryland. . . . . . . . . . . . Massachusetts .. . . . . . . Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi. . . . . . . . . . . Missouri. . . . . . . . . . . . . Montana .. . . . . . . . . . . . Nebraska. . . . . . . . . . . . Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Hampshire. . . . . . . New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . New Mexico. . . . . . . . . . New York . . . . . . . . . . . . North Carolina. . . . . . . North Dakota. . . . . . . . Ohio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . Oregon .. . . . . . . . . . . . Pennsylvania. . . . . . . . Rhode Island. . . . . . . . South Carolina .. . . . . . South Dakota .. . . . . . . Tennessee. . . . . . . . . . Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vermont. . . . . . . . . . . . Virginia .. . . . . . . . . . . . Washington . . . . . . . . . West Virginia. . . . . . . . Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . Puerto Rico . . . . . . . .
1
Householders with partner of a different Hispanic origin Unmarried partner households Same-sex partners
Householders with partner of a different race or origin Unmarried partner households Same-sex partners
Opposite- Summary Opposite- Summary Opposite- Summary sex File 1 Preferred Husbandsex File 1 Preferred Husbandsex File 1 Preferred 1 2 1 2 partners counts estimates wife partners counts estimates wife partners counts1 estimates2 14.2 12.3 11.1 12.7 20.9 9.3 28.4 18.0 11.0 22.6 16.1 13.8 13.3 13.8 12.7 11.0 56.4 12.3 11.7 10.2 9.6 15.6 9.5 9.4 6.5 12.8 12.3 11.2 12.4 7.1 10.4 11.7 12.7 23.6 6.7 14.5 19.7 14.3 12.4 10.8 10.4 28.5 15.7 9.9 14.1 10.5 12.8 9.9 15.2 15.4 5.8 14.3 19.6 7.2 10.6 11.0 20.8 12.6 11.0 9.4 10.5 19.1 6.6 22.2 15.2 8.6 21.3 14.2 10.1 9.6 18.7 10.2 9.3 47.2 9.3 11.7 8.4 7.1 11.3 7.0 7.8 5.2 12.3 9.9 8.9 10.2 5.3 9.0 11.0 9.5 20.5 5.7 11.6 17.2 13.7 9.1 9.6 8.3 21.1 13.4 8.3 10.9 7.4 9.1 7.4 12.8 10.8 6.1 11.7 17.0 5.4 8.6 9.9 19.7 14.5 12.8 11.1 12.1 20.9 7.8 22.9 16.7 10.3 23.4 15.2 11.5 10.6 19.1 11.3 11.0 49.7 10.6 13.8 9.8 8.6 12.9 8.4 9.0 5.6 14.0 11.1 10.5 11.7 7.3 10.6 11.8 11.1 22.4 6.5 13.5 18.8 15.9 10.5 12.3 9.7 23.1 14.2 10.2 11.8 9.2 12.6 8.6 14.8 12.2 6.7 13.4 18.5 7.3 10.3 12.0 22.1 4.3 3.2 2.4 3.9 7.5 1.4 4.8 8.3 2.0 8.6 7.7 3.7 2.7 5.1 5.9 2.7 7.6 4.2 3.6 2.3 1.8 3.9 1.3 2.6 1.1 2.9 2.4 2.5 1.8 1.3 2.1 2.7 2.8 7.9 1.7 4.5 13.2 4.1 2.4 1.3 1.7 3.6 4.4 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.7 7.1 5.0 1.3 3.2 4.4 0.9 2.1 5.1 1.4 8.2 7.1 5.4 7.2 13.4 2.8 6.8 15.1 4.0 14.9 13.6 9.2 6.1 6.4 10.0 4.7 14.2 9.0 7.5 4.8 4.7 8.7 2.9 3.8 2.0 4.5 6.5 5.5 4.4 2.2 4.0 5.4 7.3 13.9 3.4 10.0 20.2 8.5 4.6 3.6 3.9 7.6 8.4 4.8 6.9 3.6 4.0 3.4 13.3 11.6 2.2 5.4 8.5 1.7 5.4 10.3 1.5 8.8 7.3 5.1 7.6 13.9 2.3 7.8 14.4 3.0 16.1 13.5 7.3 4.5 12.1 11.0 5.2 11.8 7.2 8.2 4.0 4.0 6.7 2.3 4.6 2.3 5.3 5.9 4.3 4.3 1.8 4.4 4.7 6.0 14.1 3.4 9.1 19.4 9.7 3.9 3.6 3.5 5.4 8.2 4.5 4.7 3.1 3.2 3.2 13.8 9.7 3.2 5.6 8.3 1.8 5.2 7.3 2.1 10.4 8.7 6.1 9.2 15.6 2.8 9.0 16.3 3.5 17.9 14.8 8.7 4.7 12.7 12.7 6.2 12.6 8.6 9.9 4.4 5.0 8.1 2.8 5.5 2.9 6.1 6.8 5.2 5.2 2.4 5.4 5.0 6.6 15.8 4.0 10.9 21.8 11.3 4.6 4.8 4.2 6.5 9.0 5.7 5.1 3.8 4.1 3.7 16.8 11.4 3.6 6.6 9.3 2.7 6.3 9.0 2.8 9.5 7.5 6.0 8.8 15.9 4.8 19.7 14.3 5.9 17.6 13.5 8.0 7.3 14.1 10.9 6.8 39.2 8.6 7.6 5.4 4.2 8.8 4.1 6.1 4.0 8.8 7.0 6.3 5.5 3.7 5.8 7.8 6.0 17.6 4.7 9.3 19.4 9.3 6.6 4.6 4.9 19.1 11.4 4.7 7.1 5.3 5.2 4.9 12.2 9.4 4.3 9.2 13.4 3.2 5.1 8.9 16.7 18.3 16.0 13.9 16.5 26.8 10.5 31.3 25.2 12.7 28.9 23.2 18.2 16.2 17.6 18.8 13.2 58.9 16.7 15.6 12.5 12.1 19.9 10.8 11.4 7.7 15.1 15.6 14.3 14.6 8.1 12.5 14.8 16.1 29.5 8.6 19.8 29.7 18.7 14.4 12.7 12.4 31.4 19.8 12.3 17.1 12.2 14.6 11.5 22.0 20.9 7.1 16.9 23.4 8.1 13.3 16.5 21.8 17.7 15.4 12.4 15.3 26.4 8.0 26.1 23.1 10.3 29.8 21.7 14.6 12.2 26.8 18.2 12.6 50.1 13.0 16.5 10.5 9.4 15.0 8.3 10.8 6.7 15.6 13.6 11.5 12.4 6.3 11.6 13.5 12.9 27.4 8.0 17.2 28.2 19.6 11.2 11.2 10.4 23.7 18.2 10.9 13.4 9.2 10.7 9.2 21.2 16.0 8.1 15.1 21.3 6.5 11.6 14.2 21.2 20.6 18.1 14.7 18.1 29.2 9.4 27.8 25.8 12.2 32.9 23.6 16.9 13.4 27.6 20.6 14.8 52.9 15.1 19.7 12.3 11.5 17.6 10.0 12.7 7.4 17.8 15.4 13.6 14.5 8.5 13.8 14.2 14.9 30.2 9.2 20.3 31.3 22.7 13.1 14.8 12.2 26.2 19.5 13.5 14.5 11.4 14.4 10.8 25.2 18.3 9.0 17.6 23.3 9.1 14.1 17.2 24.0
6.9 5.3 4.4 6.2 11.6 3.9 17.1 9.3 4.7 12.8 8.8 5.5 5.7 10.6 6.5 5.2 37.2 6.1 5.2 4.0 3.1 6.4 3.3 4.3 3.2 6.9 5.4 4.7 4.4 2.9 4.5 6.1 4.4 13.3 3.6 6.2 11.1 6.6 5.2 3.8 3.8 17.2 8.8 3.5 5.7 4.1 4.3 3.8 7.6 6.5 3.3 7.2 10.9 2.6 3.8 5.8 15.7
Summary File 1 counts in this table are consistent with Summary File 1 counts shown in the American FactFinder. 2 Preferred estimates remove likely numbers of opposite-sex couples included in same-sex tabulations. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1.
18
U.S. Census Bureau

proportion for same-sex unmarried partners (2.4 percent). This, of course, reflects the below-national proportions of people in these states who are Hispanic or Latino.21 Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c summarize state variations in coupled households with partners of either a different race or Hispanic origin for the three types of coupled households.22 The maps show the state variations within each type of coupled household, the similarity in these geographical variations among the types of households, and the differences in the levels of these proportions. Overall, 10 percent of oppositesex married couples had partners of a different race or Hispanic origin. States with higher percentages of couples of a different race or Hispanic origin were primarily located in the western and southwestern parts of the country. These areas tend to have a high Hispanic population. Hawaii had the highest percentage of spouses of a different race or Hispanic origin (39 percent). Alaska, New Mexico, and Oklahoma also had about 19 percent of opposite-sex married couples where the partner is of a different race or Hispanic origin than the householder. This reflects the high proportion of American Indian and Alaska Native alone population in Alaska and Oklahoma and the high proportion of Hispanics or Latinos in New Mexico. Another interesting pattern of relatively low percentages (less than 5 percent) emerges in a range of states extending from the Gulf Coast states of Mississippi and Alabama through Appalachia to Ohio and Pennsylvania, and
21 Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Rios-Vargas, and Nora Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010, 2010 Census Briefs, C2010BR-04 (May 2011), Table 2. 22 A reference to state includes states and their statistically equivalent entities.A reference to county includes counties and their statistically equivalent entities.
another cluster emerges among the New England states of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. States in the South had a history of interracial marriage laws that prohibited marriage between Whites and Blacks. These laws were not repealed until 1967 in the Supreme Court decision of Loving v. Virginia.23 The low proportions noted in the New England states likely reflect the small proportions of the population in those states that are either Black or Hispanic (1 percent to 2 percent).24 Although opposite-sex unmarried couples were approximately twice as likely to have partners of a different race or Hispanic origin (18 percent) as opposite-sex married couples (10 percent), they have a similar pattern of state percentages. Figure 4b shows that the states with the highest percentages of opposite-sex unmarried partners of a different race or Hispanic origin were in the western and southwestern United States, including Hawaii and Alaska.25 Diverse populations in terms of both racial and ethnic origins characterize these areas. Along with the areas mentioned earlier, above-average percentages of couples of different racial and ethnic origins were noted in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas in the West Central part of the United States, Florida in the South, and New Jersey and New York in the Northeast.
The final map (Figure 4c) shows that same-sex unmarried partners with a partner of a different race or Hispanic origin were about 2 percentage points higher than for opposite-sex unmarried partners. However, both household types had similar geographical patterns.26 As with opposite-sex unmarried couples, the states with the highest percentages of different-race same-sex unmarried partners were in the western and southwestern United States, along with Hawaii and Alaska. New Jersey, New York, and the District of Columbia had higher than average percentages on the east coast. The lowest percentages of interracial/ ethnic same-sex couples were in a band of states extending from the lower Mississippi Valley through Appalachia and in upper New England. The striking similarity in state variations among the three household types suggests that the racial and ethnic composition of populations strongly influenced the patterns shown among the states, while the type of householdmarried or unmarriedwas an important factor that affected the proportionate level of mixed race and ethnic partners.
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES OF DATA

This report uses decennial census data primarily for the years 2000 and 2010. Unrounded data are used to compute all derived values. For readability, most whole numbers in the text are expressed in millions or rounded to the nearest thousand, and most percentages are rounded to the nearest whole percent. In the tables, whole numbers are unrounded, and percentages
26 The correlation between the percentages of partners of a different race and Hispanic origin between opposite-sex and same-sex unmarried couples for the 50 states and the District of Columbia is 0.961.
23 Alabama did not officially remove language prohibiting interracial marriage from its state constitution until 2000. Alabama removes ban on interracial marriage, USA Today, November 7, 2000. 24 See Ennis, Rios-Vargas, and Albert, op. cit., Table 2, and Sonya Rastogi, Tallese D. Johnson, Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, and Malcom P . Drewery, Jr., The Black Population: 2010, 2010 Census Briefs, C2010BR-06 (September 2011), Table 5. 25 The correlation between the percentages of partners of a different race and Hispanic origin between opposite-sex married and unmarried couples for the 50 states and the District of Columbia is 0.980.
U.S. Census Bureau
19
20
4b. Opposite-Sex Unmarried Couple Households
U.S. percent 18.26
Figures 4a.4c.
Households With Partners of a Different Race or Hispanic Origin: 2010
4a. Opposite-Sex Married Couple Households
U.S. percent 9.50
4c. Same-Sex Unmarried Couple Households
Percent by state
25.00 and over 20.0024.99 15.0019.99 10.0014.99 5.009.99 0.004.99
U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. percent 20.65
Sources: Figures 4a and 4b: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1. Figure 4c: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Summary File 1 (Preferred estimates from Table 7 of this report). For information on confidentiality protection, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1.pdf.

are rounded to the nearest tenth. Maps are created using unrounded data. designed to help families and children. The information derived from the relationship item helps to identify, for example, areas that have experienced changes in the number of children, elderly people living alone or with their children, and single-parent households so that government agencies can develop and evaluate programs that assist these populations. Housing agencies and developers use this information to determine community needs for different types of housing, such as multibedroom housing for areas with large household populations or special needs housing for the elderly. Businesses use the data to find potential new markets or to change their product mix in neighborhoods to reflect changes in family structure and associated consumer habits. areas are available on the Internet at <factfinder2.census .gov>. Information on confidentiality protection, nonsampling error, and definitions is available on the Census Bureaus Web site at <www.census .gov/prod/cen2010/doc/sf1>. Information on other population and housing topics is presented in the 2010 Census Briefs series located on the U.S. Census Bureaus Web site at <www.census.gov /prod/cen2010/>. This series presents information about race, Hispanic origin, age, sex, and housing tenure and type. If you have questions or need additional information, please call the Customer Services Center at 1-800-923-8282. You can also visit the Census Bureaus Question and Answer Center at <ask.census.gov> to submit your questions online.
ABOUT THE 2010 CENSUS

Why was the 2010 Census conducted? The U.S. Constitution mandates that a census be taken in the United States every 10 years. This is required in order to determine the number of seats each state is to receive in the U.S. House of Representatives. The data collected in the census is used to provide states with the small-area data they need to redraw state legislative districts to distribute over $400 billion in federal program funding per year and to help a variety of stakeholders in tasks such as planning services for their communities or researching the diversity of their neighborhoods. Why did we ask the household relationship question? The relationship question measures the changing composition of families and households in the United States and provides essential information for the planning and carrying out of federal programs
FOR MORE INFORMATION

For more information on families and households in the United States and additional 2010 Census tables on interracial spouses and partners, visit the U.S. Census Bureaus Web site at <www.census.gov/hhes /families>. Data on families and households for state and local
U.S. Census Bureau
21
ATTACHMENT B Marriage Rates by State: 1990, 1995, and 1999-2011

Marriage rates by State: 1990, 1995, and 1999-2011 [Rates are based on provisional counts of marriages by state of occurrence. Rates are per 1,000 total population residing in area. Population enumerated as of April 1 for 1990, 2000, and 2010 and estimated as of July 1 for all other years] State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California 1 Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Marriage rate 2005 2004 2003 9.2 8.2 6.6 12.9 6.4 7.6 5.8 5.9 4.1 8.9 7.0 22.6 10.5 5.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 8.7 8.0 8.2 6.9 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.8 7.0 7.4 7.0 57.4 7.3 5.7 6.6 6.8 7.3 6.8 6.5 7.3 7.3 5.8 7.0 8.3 8.4 10.9 7.8 9.8 8.9 8.2 6.5 7.4 6.1 9.3 9.4 8.5 6.7 13.4 6.4 7.4 5.8 6.1 5.2 9.0 7.9 22.6 10.8 6.2 7.8 6.9 7.0 8.8 8.0 8.6 6.9 6.5 6.2 6.0 6.1 7.1 7.5 7.1 62.1 8.0 5.9 7.4 6.8 7.3 6.9 6.6 6.5 8.1 5.9 7.7 8.2 8.4 11.4 8.0 9.9 9.4 8.3 6.5 7.5 6.2 9.3 9.6 8.1 6.5 13.4 6.1 7.8 5.5 6.0 5.1 9.0 7.0 22.0 10.9 6.5 7.1 6.9 6.9 9.1 8.2 8.4 6.9 5.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 7.2 7.2 7.0 63.9 8.1 5.8 6.9 6.8 7.4 7.1 6.7 --7.2 5.9 7.8 9.0 8.4 11.9 8.1 10.2 9.7 8.4 6.5 7.5 6.2 9.3
2011 8.4 7.8 5.7 10.4 5.8 7.0 5.5 5.2 8.7 7.4 6.6 17.6 8.6 5.6 6.8 6.7 6.3 7.5 6.4 7.2 5.8 5.5 5.7 5.6 4.9 6.6 7.8 6.6 36.9 7.1 4.8 8.0 6.9 6.7 6.7 5.9 6.9 6.6 5.3 6.0 7.2 7.5 9.0 7.1 8.6 8.3 6.8 6.1 7.2 5.3 7.8
2010 8.2 8.0 5.9 10.8 5.8 6.9 5.6 5.2 7.6 7.3 7.3 17.6 8.8 5.7 6.3 6.9 6.4 7.4 6.9 7.1 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.3 4.9 6.5 7.4 6.6 38.3 7.3 5.1 7.7 6.5 6.6 6.5 5.8 7.2 6.5 5.3 5.8 7.4 7.3 8.8 7.1 8.5 9.3 6.8 6.0 6.7 5.3 7.6
2009 8.3 7.8 5.6 10.7 5.8 6.9 5.9 5.4 4.7 7.5 6.6 17.2 8.9 5.7 7.9 7.0 6.4 7.6 7.1 7.1 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.3 4.8 6.5 7.3 6.6 40.3 6.5 5.0 5.0 6.5 6.6 6.4 5.8 6.9 6.6 5.3 5.9 7.3 7.3 8.4 7.1 8.4 8.7 6.9 6.0 6.7 5.3 8.0
2008 8.6 8.4 6.0 10.6 6.7 7.4 5.4 5.5 4.1 8.0 6.0 19.1 9.5 5.9 8.0 6.5 6.7 7.9 6.8 7.4 5.9 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.1 6.8 7.6 6.9 42.3 6.8 5.4 4.0 6.6 6.9 6.5 6.0 7.1 6.9 5.5 6.1 7.3 7.7 9.4 7.3 9.0 7.9 7.2 6.3 7.1 5.6 8.6
2007 8.9 8.5 6.4 12.0 6.2 7.1 5.5 5.7 4.2 8.5 6.8 20.8 10.0 6.1 7.0 6.6 6.8 7.8 7.5 7.4 6.5 5.9 5.7 5.8 5.4 6.9 7.5 6.8 48.6 7.1 5.4 5.6 6.8 7.0 6.6 6.1 7.3 7.2 5.7 6.4 7.9 7.8 10.1 7.4 9.6 8.5 7.5 6.4 7.3 5.7 9.0
2006 9.2 8.2 6.5 12.4 6.3 7.2 5.5 5.9 4.0 8.6 7.3 21.9 10.1 6.2 7.0 6.7 6.8 8.4 --7.8 6.6 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.7 6.9 7.4 6.8 52.1 7.2 5.5 6.8 6.9 7.3 6.7 6.3 7.3 7.3 5.7 6.6 7.8 8.0 10.6 7.6 9.2 8.6 7.8 6.5 7.3 6.0 9.3
2002 9.9 8.3 6.7 14.3 6.2 8.0 5.7 6.4 5.1 9.4 6.5 20.8 11.0 6.6 7.9 7.0 7.3 9.0 8.1 8.4 7.1 5.9 6.5 6.5 6.4 7.3 7.1 7.5 67.4 8.3 6.0 7.9 7.3 7.7 6.8 7.0 --7.1 5.7 7.8 9.3 8.8 13.1 8.4 10.4 9.8 8.6 6.5 8.1 6.3 9.5
2001 9.4 8.1 7.6 14.3 6.5 8.2 5.4 6.5 6.2 9.3 6.1 19.6 11.2 7.2 7.9 7.1 7.5 9.0 8.4 8.6 7.0 6.2 6.7 6.6 6.5 7.5 7.1 7.9 69.6 8.5 6.4 7.6 7.6 7.4 6.5 7.2 --7.5 5.8 8.1 9.9 8.9 13.5 9.1 10.2 9.8 8.8 7.0 7.9 6.5 10.0
2000 10.1 8.9 7.5 15.4 5.8 8.3 5.7 6.5 4.9 8.9 6.8 20.6 10.8 6.9 7.9 6.9 8.3 9.8 9.1 8.8 7.5 5.8 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.8 7.3 7.6 72.2 9.4 6.0 8.0 7.1 8.2 7.2 7.8 --7.6 6.0 7.6 10.6 9.4 15.5 9.4 10.8 10.0 8.8 6.9 8.7 6.7 10.0
1999 10.8 8.6 8.2 14.8 6.4 8.2 5.8 6.7 6.6 8.7 7.8 18.9 12.1 7.0 8.1 7.9 7.1 10.9 9.1 8.6 7.5 6.2 6.8 6.8 7.8 8.1 7.4 7.5 82.3 7.9 5.9 8.0 7.3 8.5 6.6 7.8 6.8 7.6 6.1 7.5 10.2 9.1 14.7 9.1 9.6 10.0 9.2 7.2 7.5 6.7 9.9
1995 9.8 9.0 8.8 14.4 6.3 9.0 6.6 7.3 6.1 9.9 8.4 15.7 13.1 6.9 8.6 7.7 8.5 12.2 9.3 8.7 8.4 7.1 7.3 7.0 7.9 8.3 7.6 7.3 85.2 8.3 6.5 8.8 8.0 8.4 7.1 8.0 8.6 8.1 6.2 7.3 11.9 9.9 15.5 9.9 10.7 10.3 10.2 7.7 6.1 7.0 10.6
1990 10.6 10.2 10.0 15.3 7.9 9.8 7.9 8.4 8.2 10.9 10.3 16.4 13.9 8.8 9.6 9.0 9.2 13.5 9.6 9.7 9.7 7.9 8.2 7.7 9.4 9.6 8.6 8.0 99.0 9.5 7.6 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.5 9.0 10.6 8.9 7.1 8.1 15.9 11.1 13.9 10.5 11.2 10.9 11.4 9.5 7.2 7.9 10.7
--- Data not available. Marriage data includes nonlicensed marriages registered. Note: Rates for 2001-2009 have been revised and are based on intercensal population estimates from the 2000 and 2010 censuses. Populations for 2010 rates are based on the 2010 census. Source: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.
ATTACHMENT C Births: Preliminary Data for 2012 National Vital Statistics Reports
National Vital Statistics Reports

Volume 62, Number 3 September 6, 2013
Births: Preliminary Data for 2012

by Brady E. Hamilton, Ph.D.; Joyce A. Martin, M.P.H.; and Stephanie J. Ventura, M.A., Division of Vital Statistics
Abstract
ObjectivesThis report presents preliminary data for 2012 on births in the United States. U.S. data on births are shown by age,
live-birth order, race, and Hispanic origin of mother. Data on marital status, cesarean delivery, preterm births, and low birthweight are also presented. MethodsData in this report are based on 99.96% of 2012 births. Records for the few states with less than 100% of records received
180
1991
2012
Rates per 1,000 women aged 1519 in specified group
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20 0
NonHispanic white
NonAmerican Asian or Hispanic Indian or Pacific 1 black Alaska Native Islander1 15 17 years
Hispanic
NonHispanic white
NonAmerican Asian or Hispanic Indian or Pacific 1 black Alaska Native Islander1 18 19 years
Hispanic
Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mother's reported race. SOURCE: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.
Figure 1. Birth rates for teenagers aged 1517 and 1819, by race and Hispanic origin: United States, final 1991 and preliminary 2012
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Health Statistics National Vital Statistics System

2 National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 62, No. 3, September 6, 2013
are weighted to independent control counts of all births received in state vital statistics offices in 2012. Comparisons are made with final 2011 data. ResultsThe preliminary number of births for the United States in 2012 was 3,952,937, essentially unchanged (not statistically significant) from 2011; the general fertility rate was 63.0 births per 1,000 women aged 1544, down only slightly from 2011, after declining nearly 3% a year from 2007 through 2010. The number of births and fertility rate either declined or were unchanged for most race and Hispanic origin groups from 2011 to 2012; however, both the number of births and the fertility rate for Asian or Pacific Islander women rose in 2012 (7% and 4%, respectively). The birth rate for teenagers aged 1519 was down 6% in 2012 (29.4 births per 1,000 teenagers aged 1519), yet another historic low for the United States, with rates declining for younger and older teenagers and for nearly all race and Hispanic origin groups. The birth rate for women in their early 20s also declined in 2012, to a new record low of 83.1 births per 1,000 women. Birth rates for women in their 30s rose in 2012, as did the birth rate for women in their early 40s. The birth rate for women in their late 40s was unchanged. The nonmarital birth rate declined in 2012 (to 45.3 birth per 1,000 unmarried women aged 1544), whereas the number of births to unmarried women rose 1% and the percentage of births to unmarried women was unchanged (at 40.7%). The cesarean delivery rate for the United States was unchanged in 2012 at 32.8%. The preterm birth rate fell for the sixth straight year in 2012 to 11.54%. The low birthweight rate also declined in 2012, to 7.99%. Keywords: birth rates maternal and infant health vital statistics
200 180
Number
160 Rate per 1,000 women aged 15 44 140
Millions of births
3 Rate
120 100
80 60
40 20
0 0 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012 Year
NOTES: Beginning with 1959, trend lines are based on registered live births; trend lines for 19201958 are based on live births adjusted for underregistration. SOURCE: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.
Figure 2. Live births and general fertility rates: United States, final 19202011 and preliminary 2012
Introduction
This report from the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) presents preliminary data on births and birth rates [including births to teenagers (Figure 1)] and selected maternal and infant health characteristics for the United States in 2012. The findings are based on nearly 100% of registered vital records occurring in calendar year 2012, which were received and processed by NCHS as of April 24, 2013. Trends in the preliminary reports for 19952011 births were confirmed by the final vital statistics for each year (1,2). Comparisons are based on the final data for 2011 and earlier years (2). Changes and differences presented in this report are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, unless noted otherwise. State-specific detailed tables for 2012 births, based on preliminary datashowing the percentages of births to unmarried women, delivered by cesarean, born preterm, and of low birthweightare available on the NCHS website (see Internet Tables I1 through I4 at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_03_tables.pdf).
2007 through 2010, the trend in the number of births was down, with births declining steadily from 2007 through 2010, then slowing from 2010 to 2011. From 2011 to 2012, the trend in births appears to have flattened (3). Births declined for non-Hispanic white and Hispanic women (down 1% each) and were essentially unchanged for nonHispanic black and American Indian or Alaska Native (AIAN) women. Births for Asian or Pacific Islander (API) women, however, rose in 2012, by 7%. + In 2012, the preliminary general fertility rate (GFR) was 63.0 births per 1,000 women aged 1544, down slightly (less than 1%) from the record low rate reported for the United States in 2011 (63.2) (Tables 1, 2, and 4 and Figure 2) (2,4). As with the number of births, the trend in the fertility rate declined steadily from 2007 through 2010 (down nearly 3% per year), then slowly from 2010 to 2011 (down 1%). Rates declined in 2012 for Hispanic women (down 2%) and non-Hispanic black women (down 1%). The rate for non-Hispanic white women was unchanged. The rates for non-Hispanic black and Hispanic women in 2012 were again at record lows (2). The GFR for AIAN women was down 1% in 2012, whereas the rate for API women rose 4%. From 2011 to 2012, birth rates declined for women aged 1529, but rose for women aged 3044. The rates for women aged 1014 and 4549 were unchanged. The birth rate for teenagers continued to fall in 2012, reaching 29.4 births per 1,000 teenagers aged 1519, down 6% from 2011
Results
Births and birth rates
Key findings are listed below: + In 2012, the preliminary number of births for the United States was 3,952,937, essentially unchanged (not statistically significant) from 2011 (3,953,590) (Tables 13 and Figure 2) (2). From +

National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 62, No. 3, September 6, 2013 3
(31.3). The rate in 2012 was an historic low for the United States (see Tables 2, 4, and 5 and Figure 1 for 1991 and 2012) (2,5). Since 2007, the rate has dropped almost one-third (from 41.5) and more than one-half in the years from 1991 (61.8) to 2012 (6). + The number of births to teenagers aged 1519 dropped 7% during 20112012, to 305,420, the fewest since the end of World War II. The 2012 total was almost one-third fewer than in 2007 (444,899) and less than one-half the total in 1970, the all-time peak year for the number of teen births (644,708). The birth rate for the youngest teenagers, aged 1014, remained at 0.4 births per 1,000 in 2012. Because the female population in this age group declined very slightly, the number of births to mothers under age 15 declined as well during 20112012 to 3,674, the fewest since 1946. Birth rates fell significantly from 2011 to 2012 for teenagers in age groups 1517 and 1819 years. Consistent with recent trends, the rate for younger teenagers fell more during 20112012 than the rate for older teenagers, 8% compared with 5%. Since 1991, the rate for ages 1517 fell 63%, to 14.1 per 1,000 in 2012, while the rate for ages 1819 dropped 45%, to 51.4. Among racial and ethnic groups, declines from 2011 to 2012 for teenagers aged 1519 ranged from 3% for AIAN teenagers to 5%7% for non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, API, and Hispanic teenagers. The largest decline for any population group since 2007 was reported for Hispanic teenagers, down 39%, to 46.3 per 1,000 in 2012. Birth rates for teenagers aged 1517 fell significantly from 2011 to 2012 in all racial and ethnic groups; rates for ages 1819 were significantly lower in 2012 for all groups except for AIAN and API teenagers.
200
2529 years
200
100
3034 years 1519 years 2024 years
100
50
Rate per 1,000 women
50
3539 years
20
4044 years
20
10
10
1 1990 1995 2000

Year
NOTE: Rates are plotted on a logarithmic scale. SOURCE: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.
2005
1 2010 2012
Figure 3. Birth rates, by selected age of mother: United States, final 19902011 and preliminary 2012
The birth rate for women aged 2024 was 83.1 births per 1,000 women in 2012, 3% lower than the rate in 2011 (85.3) and another record low for the United States (Tables 24 and Figure 3) (4). The rate for women in this age group has declined steadily since 2007 at nearly 5% annually. The number of births to women in their early 20s declined 1% in 2012 (Tables 24). The rate for women aged 2529 was 106.5 births per 1,000 women, down 1% from the rate in 2011 (107.2) (2). The rate for women in this age group has declined 2% a year since 2008. The number of births to women in their late 20s also declined slightly from 2011 to 2012. The birth rate for women aged 3034 was 97.3 births per 1,000 women, an increase of 1% over the rate in 2011 (96.5) (Tables 2 and 4 and Figure 3). The number of births to women in this age group also increased in 2012, by 3%. The rate for women aged 3539 increased 2% to 48.3 births per 1,000 women, from 47.2 in 2011 (2). The number of births to women in this age group increased 2% from 2011 to 2012. The birth rate for women aged 4044 was 10.4 births per 1,000 women in 2012, 1% above the rate in 2011 (10.3) (2). The rate for women in this age group has risen steadily since 2000 at 2% annually (4). The number of births to women in their early 40s was essentially unchanged in 2012. The rate for women aged 4549 (which includes births to women aged 50 and over) remained at
0.7 births per 1,000 women; the number of births to women in this age group was essentially unchanged (Tables 24). The preliminary total fertility rate (TFR) for the United States in 2012 was 1,880.5 births per 1,000 women, 1% below the rate in 2011 (1,894.5). The rate has declined steadily since 2007, falling an average of more than 2% annually (2). The TFR estimates the number of births that a hypothetical group of 1,000 women would have over their lifetimes, based on the age-specific birth rates in a given year. + In 2012, the TFR was below replacement, the level (2,100 births per 1,000 women) at which a given generation can exactly replace itself. The rate had been above replacement in 2006 and 2007, but has been below since then, and was also below replacement from 1972 through 2005 (2). The TFRs declined for nearly all race and Hispanic origin groups, falling 2% for Hispanic and AIAN women and 1% for non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black women. However, the rate for API women rose in 2012, by 4%.
The preliminary first birth rate for the United States in 2012 was 25.2 births per 1,000 women aged 1544, another record low, down 1% from the rate in 2011 (25.4) (Table 4) (2,4). First-birth rates declined for women aged 1529, rose for women aged 3039, and were essentially unchanged for women in all other age groups. The second-order birth rate for women aged 1544 also declined in 2012 (down 1%). However, the third-order birth rate was unchanged at 10.4 and the rate for fourth- and higherorder births increased to 7.5 in 2012 from 7.4 in 2011.

The GFR decreased for 13 states from 2011 to 2012 (Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and North Carolina) and Puerto Rico, and increased for 4 states (Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, and Ohio). GFRs for the remaining 33 states, the District of Columbia, and remaining territories were essentially unchanged. Rates by state ranged from 50.2 births per 1,000 women aged 1544 in New Hampshire to 83.1 in Utah (Table 6). The nonmarital birth rate declined 2% in 2012 to 45.3 births per 1,000 unmarried women aged 1544. The rate has dropped for 4 consecutive years, falling 13% since 2008 (51.8 per 1,000), according to preliminary data. The 2012 rate was the lowest reported since 2003. Until the current decline began, the rate had risen steadily, increasing 19% from 2002 (43.6) to 2007 (51.8). + The total number of births to unmarried women increased by 1% in 2012 to 1,609,912, the first increase since 20072008. From 2008 to 2011, the number fell by 7% overall. Nonmarital births dropped for teenagers and increased for women aged 20 and over. The proportion of all births to unmarried women in 2012 was unchanged from 2011 at 40.7%. The proportions increased significantly for births to non-Hispanic white, AIAN, and Hispanic women; changes for other race and Hispanic origin groups were not significant (Tables 1 and 7). Unmarried teenagers accounted for 17% of all nonmarital births in 2012, the lowest percentage ever reported. In 1970,
teenagers accounted for 50% of births to unmarried women (7). The percentage of births to unmarried women increased significantly in 10 states and declined in 4 states. Changes in the other 36 states and the District of Columbia were not significant (Table I1).
Maternal and infant health birth characteristics

Key findings are listed below: + The 2012 cesarean delivery rate was 32.8%, unchanged since 2010. The recent stabilization in the cesarean rate follows more than a decade of steady increase of nearly 60% from 1996 through 2009 (Table 8) (2). + The rate of cesarean delivery declined among non-Hispanic white women for the third straight year to 32.3% in 2012. The 2012 cesarean rates rose, however, among non-Hispanic black (35.8%) and Hispanic (32.2%) women to the highest levels reported since data on this topic first became available on birth certificates in 1989. Rates for AIAN (28.6% in 2012) and API mothers (33.2%) were essentially unchanged.
The preterm birth rate fell for the sixth straight year in 2012, to 11.54%, down 2% from 2011, and 10% from 2006. This rate (the percentage of births delivered at less than 37 completed weeks
20
18 Non-Hispanic black 16
Percent
14 All races and origins 12 Hispanic 10 Non-Hispanic white
0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
SOURCE: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.
Figure 4. Preterm birth rates, by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 19902011 and preliminary 2012

of gestation) rose by more than one-third from 1981 to 2006 (see Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 4) (2). + Declines from 2011 to 2012 were seen among both early preterm (less than 34 completed weeks of gestation) and late preterm (3436 completed weeks) deliveries. The early preterm rate was 3.41% in 2012, down from 3.44% in 2011 and 3.66% in 2006. The late preterm birth rate declined from 8.28% to 8.13% from 2011 to 2012, and is down 11% from the 2006 high (Table 9). Preterm birth rates declined among non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and API infants from 2011 to 2012; rates were essentially stable for Hispanic and AIAN infants (Table 8). Since 2006, preterm rates have declined 12% for non-Hispanic white, 10% for non-Hispanic black, and 5% for Hispanic infants (2). The 2012 preterm rate among black infants (16.53%), although higher than that for other race and Hispanic origin groups, represents another record low (comparable data available since 1989). Declines in preterm rates are observed from 2006 to 2012 in 44 states and the District of Columbia. Changes in rates in the remaining six states were not statistically significant (Table I3).
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The 2012 low birthweight (LBW) rate was 7.99, down 1% from 2011 and 3% from the 2006 high (Table 8) (2). The LBW rate (the percentage of infants born at less than 2,500 grams or 5 pounds, 8 ounces) rose during the mid-1980s through 2006, peaking at 8.26% of all births (2). The rate of very low birthweight (less than 1,500 grams or 3 pounds, 4 ounces) was 1.42% in 2012, down from 1.44% in 2011 and 1.49% for 20052007 (Table 8) (2). The percentage of infants born moderately low birthweight (1,500 grams2,499 grams) also declined in 2012, to 6.57% from 6.66% in 2011, and is down from 6.77% in 2006 (data not shown). + Modest downward trends in LBW rates are observed for non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black infants between 2011 and 2012 and from 2006 to 2012. Since 2006, rates are down 5% and 6%, respectively for the two groups. LBW among Hispanic births has been essentially stable from 2006 to 2012 (Table 8) (2).
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References
1. Hamilton BE, Martin JA, Ventura SJ. Births: Preliminary data for 2011. National vital statistics reports; vol 61 no 5. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2012. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_05.pdf. Martin JA, Hamilton BE, Ventura SJ, et al. Births: Final data for 2011. National vital statistics reports; vol 62 no 1. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2013. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_01.pdf. Hamilton BE, Sutton PD. Recent trends in births and fertility rates through December 2012. NCHS Health E-Stat. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2013. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/births_fertility_december_2012/ births_fertility_december_2012.htm. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital statistics of the United States, 2003, volume I, natality. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus.htm. 17.
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Ventura SJ, Mathews TJ, Hamilton BE. Births to teenagers in the United States, 19402000. National vital statistics reports; vol 49 no 10. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2001. Hamilton BE, Mathews TJ, Ventura SJ. Declines in state teen birth rates by race and Hispanic origin. NCHS data brief, no 123. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2013. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db123.pdf. Ventura SJ. Changing patterns of nonmarital childbearing in the United States. NCHS data brief, no 18. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2009. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf. Hamilton BE, Martin JA, Ventura SJ. Births: Preliminary data for 2005. National vital statistics reports; vol 55 no 11. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2007. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_11.pdf. National Center for Health Statistics. 2011 addendum to the user guide to the 2011 natality public use file. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. Annual product 2013. Available from: ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Dataset_Documentation/ DVS/natality/UserGuide2011.pdf. National Center for Health Statistics. U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth. 2003. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/birth1103final-ACC.pdf. National Center for Health Statistics. Report of the Panel to Evaluate the U.S. Standard Certificates. National Center for Health Statistics. 2000. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vital_certificate_ revisions.htm and http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/panelreport_ acc.pdf. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Revisions to the standards for the classification of federal data on race and ethnicity. Fed Regist 62(210):5878290. 1997. Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ omb/fedreg_1997standards. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Race and ethnic standards for federal statistics and administrative reporting. Statistical Policy Directive 15. 1977. Ingram DD, Parker JD, Schenker N, et al. United States Census 2000 population with bridged race categories. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital Health Stat 2(135). 2003. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_02/sr02_135.pdf. Johnson D. Coding and editing multiple race. Presented at the 2004 Joint Meeting of NAPHSIS and VSCP. Portland, Oregon. June 610, 2004. Weed JA. NCHS procedures for multiple-race and Hispanic origin data: Collection, coding, editing, and transmitting. Presented at the 2004 Joint Meeting of NAPHSIS and VSCP. Portland, Oregon. June 610, 2004. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/ Multiple_race_docu_5-10-04.pdf. Hamilton BE, Ventura SJ. Characteristics of births to single- and multiple-race women: California, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington, 2003. National vital statistics reports; vol 55 no 15. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2007. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_15.pdf. National Center for Health Statistics. Vintage 2012 postcensal estimates of the resident population of the United States (April 1, 2010, July 1, 2010July 1, 2012), by year, county, single-year of age (0, 1, 2, .., 85 years and over), bridged race, Hispanic origin, and sex. 2013. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/bridged_race.htm. U.S. Census Bureau. International data base. Population by single years of age and sex, 2012. Available from: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/information Gateway.php [Accessed May 13, 2013].

6 20. National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 62, No. 3, September 6, 2013 U.S. Census Bureau. Annual estimates of the resident population by single year of age and sex for the United States, states, and Puerto Rico Commonwealth: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012. 2013. Available from: http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/PEP/2012/PEPS YASEX/0400000US72. Ventura SJ, Bachrach CA. Nonmarital childbearing in the United States, 194099. National vital statistics reports; vol 48 no 16. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2000. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_16.pdf. U.S. Census Bureau. DataFerrettCurrent Population Survey, March 2012. Washington, DC.
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List of Detailed Tables

1. Selected demographic characteristics, by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Births by age, race, and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Births by age of mother, live-birth order, and race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, preliminary 2012 . . . . . . . . . . 4. Birth rates, by age of mother, live-birth order, and race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, preliminary 2012. . . . 5. Birth rates for women aged 1019, by age and race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 1991, 2007, and 20102011, and preliminary 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Births by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States and each state and territory, preliminary 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Births to unmarried women, by age: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. Selected characteristics of births, by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012 . . . . . . 9. Distribution of preterm births (prior to 37 completed weeks of gestation): United States, final 1990, 2006, 2010, and 2011, and preliminary 2012. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. Total count of records and completeness of preliminary file of live births: United States, each state and territory, preliminary 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 11 12
13 14 16 16
16
17
List of Internet Tables

Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_03_tables.pdf
I1. Births to unmarried mothers: United States, each state and territory, final 2011 and preliminary 2012 I2. Births by cesarean delivery: United States, each state and territory, final 2011 and preliminary 2012 I3. Preterm and late preterm births: United States, each state and territory, final 2011 and preliminary 2012 I4. Low birthweight births: United States, each state and territory, final 2011 and preliminary 2012

Table 1. Selected demographic characteristics, by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012
[Data for 2012 are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures for 2012 are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual. Birth rates are the total number of births per 1,000 population in specified group. Fertility rates are the total number of births (regardless of the age of the mother) per 1,000 women aged 1544 in specified group. Total fertility rates are sums of birth rates for 5-year age groups in specified group multiplied by 5] Number Race and Hispanic origin of mother All races and origins1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic white2. . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic black2. . . . . . . . . . . . . American Indian or Alaska Native total2,3 Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 . . . . . . Hispanic4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 2
Birth rate 2011 2012 12.6 10.7 14.6 10.5 15.1 17.1 2011 12.7 10.8 14.7 10.7 14.5 17.6
Fertility rate 2012 63.0 58.7 65.0 47.0 62.2 74.4 2011 63.2 58.7 65.4 47.7 59.9 76.2
Total fertility rate 2012 1,880.5 1,761.5 1,898.5 1,350.0 1,770.0 2,188.5 2011 1,894.5 1,773.5 1,919.5 1,373.5 1,706.5 2,240.0
Percent of births to unmarried women 2012 40.7 29.4 72.2 66.9 17.1 53.5 2011 40.7 29.0 72.3 66.2 17.2 53.3
2012 3,952,937 2,133,115 583,080 46,093 272,949 907,405
3,953,590 2,146,566 582,345 46,419 253,915 918,129
. . . . .
. . . . .
Includes births to race and origin groups not shown separately, such as white Hispanic and black Hispanic women, and births with origin not stated. Race and Hispanic origin are reported separately on birth certificates. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Race categories are consistent with the 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported multiple-race data in 2012. The multiple-race data for these states were bridged to the single-race categories of the 1977 OMB standards for comparability with other states; see Technical Notes. Multiple-race reporting areas vary for 20112012; see Technical Notes. 3 Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mothers reported race; see Technical Notes. 4 Includes all persons of Hispanic origin of any race; see Technical Notes. NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.

Table 2. Births by age, race, and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012
[Data for 2012 are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures for 2012 are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual, so categories may not add to totals. Rates per 1,000 women in specified age and race and Hispanic origin group] 2012 Age in years and race and Hispanic origin of mother All races and origins1 Total . . 1014 . 1519 . 1517 . 1819 . 2024 . 2529 . 3034 . 3539 . 4044 . 45543 .
2
2011 Rate Number Rate
Number
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3,952,937 3,674 305,420 86,440 218,980 916,868 1,124,010 1,013,473 472,206 109,535 7,750
63.0 0.4 29.4 14.1 51.4 83.1 106.5 97.3 48.3 10.4 0.7
3,953,590 3,974 329,772 95,538 234,234 925,200 1,127,583 986,682 463,849 108,920 7,610
63.2 0.4 31.3 15.4 54.1 85.3 107.2 96.5 47.2 10.3 0.7
Non-Hispanic white4 Total2 . . 1014 . 1519 . 1517 . 1819 . 2024 . 2529 . 3034 . 3539 . 4044 . 45543 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,133,115 866 119,777 29,008 90,769 444,371 641,353 602,549 261,509 58,515 4,174 58.7 0.2 20.5 8.4 37.9 70.2 104.4 100.5 46.8 9.1 0.6 2,146,566 869 129,329 31,461 97,868 451,939 647,520 591,266 260,596 60,724 4,323 58.7 0.2 21.7 9.0 39.9 71.8 105.2 100.1 45.8 9.3 0.6
Non-Hispanic black4 Total2 . . 1014 . 1519 . 1517 . 1819 . 2024 . 2529 . 3034 . 3539 . 4044 . 45543 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583,080 1,263 71,271 20,553 50,719 187,386 149,548 107,768 51,461 13,360 1,022 65.0 0.8 43.9 21.9 74.1 109.0 101.7 75.1 38.9 9.6 0.7 582,345 1,378 78,558 23,659 54,899 186,229 147,708 104,274 50,245 12,952 1,001 65.4 0.9 47.3 24.6 78.8 112.3 101.7 73.9 37.8 9.3 0.7
American Indian or Alaska Native total4,5 Total2 . . 1014 . 1519 . 1517 . 1819 . 2024 . 2529 . 3034 . 3539 . 4044 . 45543 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46,093 89 6,478 1,856 4,621 15,168 12,290 7,871 3,355 778 64 47.0 0.5 34.9 17.0 60.6 81.7 73.9 49.7 23.3 5.5 0.5 46,419 95 6,802 2,014 4,788 15,569 12,477 7,380 3,292 772 32 47.7 0.5 36.1 18.2 61.6 86.6 75.4 47.3 23.1 5.5 0.2
See footnotes at end of table.

Table 2. Births by age, race, and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012Con.
[Data for 2012 are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures for 2012 are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual, so categories may not add to totals. Rates per 1,000 women in specified age and race and Hispanic origin group] 2012 Age in years and race and Hispanic origin of mother Asian or Pacific Islander total Total . . 1014 . 1519 . 1517 . 1819 . 2024 . 2529 . 3034 . 3539 . 4044 . 45543 .
2 4,5
2011 Rate Number Rate
Number
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272,949 62 5,544 1,414 4,131 28,580 74,254 97,986 53,392 12,196 935
62.2 0.1 9.7 4.2 17.8 41.4 95.8 121.4 68.1 16.1 1.4
253,915 65 5,708 1,532 4,176 27,783 70,461 88,660 49,474 10,963 801
59.9 0.1 10.2 4.6 18.1 41.9 93.7 114.9 64.1 15.2 1.2
Hispanic6 Total2 . . 1014 . 1519 . 1517 . 1819 . 2024 . 2529 . 3034 . 3539 . 4044 . 45543 .
1 2
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907,405 1,397 102,698 33,756 68,942 241,049 244,403 193,106 99,820 23,657 1,275
74.4 0.6 46.3 25.5 77.2 111.4 119.6 94.3 51.5 13.2 0.8
918,129 1,576 109,660 36,979 72,681 243,724 248,269 192,517 98,340 22,807 1,236
76.2 0.7 49.6 28.0 81.5 116.0 121.3 95.2 51.3 13.1 0.8
Includes births to race and origin groups not shown separately, such as white Hispanic and black Hispanic women, and births with origin not stated. Includes births to women of all ages. The rate shown for all ages is the fertility rate, which is defined as the total number of births (regardless of the age of the mother) per 1,000 women aged 1544. 3 The birth rate for women aged 4549 is computed by relating the number of births to women aged 45 and over to women aged 4549 because most of the births in this group are to women aged 4549. 4 Race and Hispanic origin are reported separately on birth certificates. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Race categories are consistent with the 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported multiple-race data in 2012. The multiple-race data for these states were bridged to the single-race categories of the 1977 OMB standards for comparability with other states; see Technical Notes. Multiple-race reporting areas vary for 20112012; see Technical Notes. 5 Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mothers reported race; see Technical Notes. 6 Includes all persons of Hispanic origin of any race; see Technical Notes. NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion; see reference 8.

Table 3. Births by age of mother, live-birth order, and race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, preliminary 2012
[Data are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual, so categories may not add to totals] Age of mother in years Live-birth order and race and Hispanic origin of mother All races and origins1 1st child . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over . Not stated . . . . . . Non-Hispanic white2 . 1st child . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over . Not stated . . . . . . Non-Hispanic black2 . 1st child . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over . Not stated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . All ages 3,952,937 1,569,943 1,244,555 650,242 465,673 22,524 2,133,115 894,666 696,630 328,230 205,299 8,289 583,080 222,583 165,147 99,070 90,059 6,222 46,093 15,959 12,417 8,269 9,175 274 272,949 122,656 97,554 33,589 17,850 1,300 907,405 310,139 270,546 180,492 142,489 3,739 Under 15 3,674 3,580 60 8 8 18 866 841 16 2 2 5 1,263 1,224 26 3 1 9 89 88 1 62 61 1 1,397 1,367 17 3 5 4 1519 305,420 250,985 45,522 6,380 865 1,668 119,777 102,656 14,894 1,624 174 428 71,271 56,747 11,498 1,956 304 767 6,478 5,203 1,062 162 24 26 5,544 4,591 818 101 11 22 102,698 82,119 17,349 2,539 353 338 2024 916,868 461,445 298,047 111,071 41,077 5,229 444,371 242,556 140,806 45,605 13,655 1,750 187,386 86,698 59,390 26,470 12,844 1,984 15,168 6,225 5,152 2,497 1,205 90 28,580 17,236 7,885 2,450 880 130 241,049 108,456 84,965 34,155 12,556 917 2529 1,124,010 421,522 369,862 202,018 124,590 6,017 641,353 271,221 214,683 100,746 52,321 2,382 149,548 41,729 46,090 31,949 28,283 1,497 12,290 2,698 3,531 2,947 3,041 72 74,254 41,112 22,055 7,066 3,649 373 244,403 63,681 83,094 59,355 37,228 1,045 3034 1,013,473 299,379 346,482 201,814 160,074 5,723 602,549 195,337 217,794 111,875 75,210 2,334 107,768 23,818 31,087 23,986 27,692 1,186 7,871 1,229 1,880 1,795 2,920 46 97,986 40,721 39,290 11,600 5,932 443 193,106 36,556 55,389 52,308 48,019 834 3539 472,206 106,715 151,769 105,269 105,457 2,996 261,509 65,928 89,648 56,268 48,585 1,079 51,461 9,581 13,546 11,762 15,950 620 3,355 428 644 725 1,526 31 53,392 15,361 22,708 9,794 5,264 265 99,820 14,561 24,499 26,406 33,889 466 4044 109,535 24,208 30,851 22,471 31,219 786 58,515 14,857 17,657 11,476 14,243 282 13,360 2,537 3,281 2,780 4,618 144 778 84 129 135 424 6 12,196 3,284 4,512 2,430 1,910 60 23,657 3,149 4,982 5,520 9,880 126 4554 7,750 2,109 1,960 1,211 2,383 87 4,174 1,270 1,132 634 1,110 29 1,022 247 228 164 367 15 64 3 17 7 34 3 935 291 284 150 204 6 1,275 250 250 207 559 9
American Indian or Alaska Native 1st child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4th child and over . . . . . . . . Not stated . . . . . . . . . . . . . Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 1st child . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . 4th child and over . . . . . . . Not stated . . . . . . . . . . . . Hispanic4 . . . . . . . . 1st child . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over . Not stated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
total2,3 . ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quantity zero. 1 Includes births to race and origin groups not shown separately, such as white Hispanic and black Hispanic women, and births with origin not stated. 2 Race and Hispanic origin are reported separately on birth certificates. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Race categories are consistent with the 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported multiple-race data in 2012. The multiple-race data for these states were bridged to the single-race categories of the 1977 OMB standards for comparability with other states; see Technical Notes. 3 Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mothers reported race; see Technical Notes. 4 Includes all persons of Hispanic origin of any race; see Technical Notes. NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.

Table 4. Birth rates, by age of mother, live-birth order, and race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, preliminary 2012
[Data are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Rates per 1,000 women in specified age and race and Hispanic origin group] Age of mother in years Live-birth order and race and Hispanic origin of mother All races and origins 1st child . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over Non-Hispanic white4. 1st child . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over Non-Hispanic black4 1st child . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over
3 1
1544 63.0 25.2 19.9 10.4 7.5 58.7 24.7 19.2 9.1 5.7 65.0 25.1 18.6 11.2 10.1 47.0 16.4 12.7 8.5 9.4 62.2 28.1 22.3 7.7 4.1 74.4 25.5 22.3 14.9 11.7
1014 0.4 0.4 0.0 * * 0.2 0.2 * * * 0.8 0.8 0.0 * * 0.5 0.5 * * * 0.1 0.1 * * * 0.6 0.6 * * *
1519 29.4 24.3 4.4 0.6 0.1 20.5 17.6 2.6 0.3 0.0 43.9 35.3 7.2 1.2 0.2 34.9 28.2 5.7 0.9 0.1 9.7 8.0 1.4 0.2 * 46.3 37.1 7.8 1.1 0.2
2024 83.1 42.1 27.2 10.1 3.7 70.2 38.5 22.3 7.2 2.2 109.0 51.0 34.9 15.6 7.5 81.7 33.7 27.9 13.5 6.5 41.4 25.1 11.5 3.6 1.3 111.4 50.3 39.4 15.8 5.8
2529 106.5 40.2 35.2 19.2 11.9 104.4 44.3 35.1 16.5 8.6 101.7 28.7 31.7 21.9 19.4 73.9 16.3 21.4 17.8 18.4 95.8 53.3 28.6 9.2 4.7 119.6 31.3 40.8 29.2 18.3
3034 97.3 28.9 33.4 19.5 15.5 100.5 32.8 36.4 18.7 12.6 75.1 16.9 21.9 16.9 19.5 49.7 7.8 11.9 11.4 18.5 121.4 50.7 48.9 14.4 7.4 94.3 17.9 27.2 25.6 23.5
3539 48.3 11.0 15.6 10.8 10.9 46.8 11.9 16.1 10.1 8.7 38.9 7.4 10.4 9.0 12.2 23.3 3.0 4.5 5.1 10.7 68.1 19.7 29.1 12.6 6.7 51.5 7.6 12.7 13.7 17.6
4044 10.4 2.3 2.9 2.1 3.0 9.1 2.3 2.8 1.8 2.2 9.6 1.9 2.4 2.0 3.3 5.5 0.6 0.9 1.0 3.0 16.1 4.3 6.0 3.2 2.5 13.2 1.8 2.8 3.1 5.5
4549 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 * * * 0.3 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American Indian or Alaska Native total4,5 1st child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4th child and over . . . . . . . . . . . . Asian or Pacific Islander total4,5 . 1st child . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4th child and over . . . . . . . Hispanic6 . . . . . . . 1st child . . . . . . 2nd child . . . . . . 3nd child . . . . . . 4th child and over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.0 Quantity more than zero but less than 0.05. * Figure does not meet standards of reliability or precision; based on fewer than 20 births in the numerator. 1 The rate shown is the fertility rate, which is defined as the total number of births, regardless of age of mother, per 1,000 women aged 1544. 2 The birth rate for women aged 4549 is computed by relating births to women aged 45 and over to women aged 4549 because most of the births in this group are to women aged 4549. 3 Includes births to race and origin groups not shown separately, such as white Hispanic and black Hispanic women, and births with origin not stated. 4 Race and Hispanic origin are reported separately on birth certificates. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Race categories are consistent with the 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported multiple-race data in 2012. The multiple-race data for these states were bridged to the single-race categories of the 1977 OMB standards for comparability with other states; see Technical Notes. 5 Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mothers reported race; see Technical Notes. 6 Includes all persons of Hispanic origin of any race; see Technical Notes. NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.

Table 5. Birth rates for women aged 1019, by age and race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 1991, 2007, and 20102011, and preliminary 2012
[Rates per 1,000 women in specified age and race and Hispanic origin group. Population based on counts enumerated as of April 1 for 2010 and estimated as of July 1 for all other years] Year Age and race and Hispanic origin of mother 1014 years All races and origins1 . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic white2 . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic black2 . . . . . . . . American Indian or Alaska Native Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 . Hispanic4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... ..... total2,3 . ..... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.2 1.4 0.7 0.2 1.2 1.4 0.5 4.9 1.6 0.8 2.4 11 14 33 43 29 50 50 71 60 84 69 88 75 2012 2011 2010 2007 1991 20112012 Percent change 20072012 19912012
1519 years All races and origins1 . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic white2 . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic black2 . . . . . . . . American Indian or Alaska Native Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 . Hispanic4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... ..... total2,3 . ..... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.4 20.5 43.9 34.9 9.7 46.3 31.3 21.7 47.3 36.1 10.2 49.6 34.2 23.5 51.5 38.7 10.9 55.7 41.5 27.2 62.0 49.3 14.8 75.3 61.8 43.4 118.2 84.1 27.3 104.6 6 6 7 3 5 7 29 25 29 29 34 39 52 53 63 59 64 56
1517 years All races and origins1 . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic white2 . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic black2 . . . . . . . . American Indian or Alaska Native Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 . Hispanic4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... ..... total2,3 . ..... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.1 8.4 21.9 17.0 4.2 25.5 15.4 9.0 24.6 18.2 4.6 28.0 17.3 10.0 27.4 20.1 5.1 32.3 21.7 11.9 34.6 26.1 7.4 44.4 38.6 23.6 86.1 51.9 16.3 69.2 8 7 11 7 9 9 35 29 37 35 43 43 63 64 75 67 74 63
1819 years All races and origins1 . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic white2 . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic black2 . . . . . . . . American Indian or Alaska Native Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 . Hispanic4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ..... ..... total2,3 . ..... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.4 37.9 74.1 60.6 17.8 77.2 54.1 39.9 78.8 61.6 18.1 81.5 58.2 42.5 85.6 66.1 18.7 90.7 71.7 50.4 105.2 86.3 24.9 124.7 94.0 70.6 162.2 134.2 42.2 155.5 5 5 6 5 28 25 30 30 29 38 45 46 54 55 58 50
Difference not statistically significant. 1 Includes births to race and origin groups not shown separately, such as white Hispanic and black Hispanic women, and births with origin not stated. 2 Race and Hispanic origin are reported separately on birth certificates. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Race categories are consistent with the 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported multiple-race data in 2012. The multiple-race data for these states were bridged to the single-race categories of the 1977 OMB standards for comparability with other states; see Technical Notes. Multiple-race reporting areas vary for 2007 and 20102012; see Technical Notes. 3 Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mothers reported race; see Technical Notes. 4 Includes all persons of Hispanic origin of any race; see Technical Notes. NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.

Table 6. Births by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States and each state and territory, preliminary 2012
[By place of residence. Data are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual, so categories may not add to totals. Birth rates are total births per 1,000 total population; fertility rates are total births per 1,000 women aged 1544] Number of births All races and origins1 Non-Hispanic white2 2,133,115 35,149 5,770 38,838 25,913 142,695 39,995 21,265 6,139 2,816 97,020 60,488 4,722 18,408 86,193 63,799 32,075 29,437 46,688 33,359 11,780 33,159 44,510 79,046 50,065 20,157 57,346 9,962 19,172 14,969 10,956 47,941 7,674 116,131 67,141 8,161 104,133 33,539 31,767 99,514 6,710 32,817 9,048 54,702 135,567 39,982 5,598 59,981 55,351 19,582 49,729 6,154 Non-Hispanic black2 583,080 18,090 360 4,445 7,297 29,435 3,120 4,716 2,911 4,784 49,350 44,417 487 181 27,274 10,043 2,006 2,959 5,071 23,868 399 23,867 6,558 21,542 6,960 16,499 11,319 77 1,787 3,709 201 16,173 443 38,478 28,465 269 23,267 4,916 1,157 21,206 856 18,161 308 16,644 44,528 500 94 21,972 4,348 788 6,695 81 American Indian or Alaska Native total2,3 46,093 211 2,811 5,856 312 3,462 759 246 24 29 404 266 83 482 225 153 274 328 77 351 129 212 162 751 1,436 246 400 1,469 513 444 28 182 3,638 1,080 1,929 1,043 297 6,075 886 385 149 227 2,084 198 1,232 784 21 221 2,162 22 1,002 332 Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 272,949 1,073 1,132 3,667 911 77,919 2,877 2,346 592 557 7,553 6,240 12,511 463 10,081 2,239 1,311 1,401 1,232 1,531 241 5,723 6,669 4,140 5,462 463 2,131 158 839 3,105 495 12,253 568 26,932 5,514 208 3,890 1,583 2,749 6,906 625 1,271 219 2,184 19,073 1,846 164 8,123 10,141 185 3,338 113 Birth rate, all races 12.6 12.1 15.3 13.2 13.0 13.2 12.6 10.2 12.0 14.9 11.0 13.2 13.6 14.4 12.4 12.7 12.6 14.0 12.7 13.6 9.6 12.4 10.9 11.4 12.8 13.0 12.5 12.1 14.0 12.7 9.3 11.8 13.0 12.3 12.3 14.4 12.0 13.8 11.6 11.2 10.4 12.1 14.5 12.4 14.7 18.0 9.6 12.6 12.7 11.2 11.8 13.1 Fertility rate, all races 63.0 60.9 75.9 67.5 66.9 63.3 62.0 53.2 61.4 55.4 59.0 62.5 71.6 74.1 60.9 64.7 66.8 72.3 65.4 67.0 53.9 60.8 53.6 59.6 65.7 64.2 64.3 66.6 72.3 63.0 50.2 60.3 67.8 59.7 61.0 74.6 62.6 70.5 59.0 58.7 51.7 61.3 78.1 62.6 69.9 83.1 51.6 61.6 63.5 61.3 61.8 69.5
Area
Hispanic4 907,405 3,922 722 33,906 3,853 244,926 17,791 7,947 1,354 1,373 57,875 17,514 2,963 3,496 34,787 7,032 3,151 6,291 2,731 3,732 207 10,218 12,314 7,378 4,831 1,280 4,052 468 3,834 12,759 558 27,609 14,869 55,703 17,952 378 6,526 6,880 8,559 14,055 2,467 4,592 547 6,988 182,982 7,645 97 12,897 15,759 193 6,575 864
United States5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,952,937 Alabama. . . . . . . Alaska . . . . . . . . Arizona . . . . . . . Arkansas . . . . . . California . . . . . . Colorado . . . . . . Connecticut . . . . . Delaware . . . . . . District of Columbia Florida . . . . . . . . Georgia . Hawaii . . Idaho . . Illinois . . Indiana . Iowa . . . Kansas . Kentucky Louisiana Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58,424 11,186 86,441 38,331 503,746 65,183 36,545 11,017 9,414 213,121 130,638 18,967 22,961 159,160 83,225 38,701 40,338 55,756 62,629 12,794 72,870 72,523 113,090 68,769 38,666 75,441 12,114 25,941 34,913 12,347 104,214 27,066 240,874 119,809 10,104 138,503 52,754 45,060 142,488 10,927 57,103 12,103 80,358 382,719 51,462 6,006 102,991 87,446 20,834 67,293 7,571
Maryland . . . . Massachusetts . Michigan . . . . Minnesota . . . . Mississippi . . . Missouri . . . . . Montana . . . . . Nebraska . . . . Nevada . . . . . New Hampshire New Jersey . . New Mexico . New York . . . North Carolina North Dakota . Ohio . . . . . . Oklahoma . . . Oregon . . . . Pennsylvania . Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . .
South Carolina . South Dakota . . Tennessee . . . Texas . . . . . . Utah . . . . . . . Vermont . . . . . Virginia . . . . . Washington . . . West Virginia . . Wisconsin . . . . Wyoming . . . .
See footnotes at end of table.

Table 6. Births by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States and each state and territory, preliminary 2012Con.
[By place of residence. Data are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual, so categories may not add to totals. Birth rates are total births per 1,000 total population; fertility rates are total births per 1,000 women aged 1544] Number of births All races and origins1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,017 --* 1,163 --Non-Hispanic white2 2,502 --* ----Non-Hispanic black2 308 --* ----American Indian or Alaska Native total2,3 ----* --Asian or Pacific Islander total2,3 ----* 1,162 --Birth rate, all races 10.6 --* 21.2 --Fertility rate, all races 51.9 --* 89.0 ---
Area Puerto Rico . . . . . Virgin Islands . . . . Guam . . . . . . . . American Samoa. . Northern Marianas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hispanic 36,032 --* -----
- - - Data not available. Quantity zero. * Figure does not meet standards of reliability or precision; less than 75% of data for the area were available as of release of the preliminary file; see reference 8. 1 Includes births to race and origin groups not shown separately, such as white Hispanic and black Hispanic women, and births with origin not stated. 2 Race and Hispanic origin are reported separately on birth certificates. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Race categories are consistent with the 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported multiple-race data in 2012. The multiple-race data for these states were bridged to the single race categories of the 1977 OMB standards for comparability with other states; see Technical Notes. 3 Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mothers reported race; see Technical Notes. 4 Includes all persons of Hispanic origin of any race; see Technical Notes. 5 Excludes data for the territories. NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.

Table 7. Births to unmarried women, by age: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012
[Data for 2012 are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures for 2012 are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual so categories may not add to total] Number Age of mother in years All ages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Under 20 . Under 15 1519 . . 1517 . 1819 . 2024 . . . 2529 . . . 3034 . . . 3539 . . . 40 and over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2012 1,609,912 274,528 3,640 270,888 82,503 188,385 593,969 393,931 222,382 97,862 27,240 2011 1,607,773 295,675 3,939 291,736 91,053 200,683 592,554 387,354 212,974 93,155 26,061 2012 40.7 88.8 99.1 88.7 95.4 86.0 64.8 35.0 21.9 20.7 23.2 Percent 2011 40.7 88.6 99.1 88.5 95.3 85.7 64.0 34.4 21.6 20.1 22.4
NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.
Table 8. Selected characteristics of births, by race and Hispanic origin of mother: United States, final 2011 and preliminary 2012
[Data for 2012 are based on a continuous file of records received from the states. Figures for 2012 are based on weighted data rounded to the nearest individual] Preterm Number Race and Hispanic origin of mother All races and origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic white . . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-Hispanic black7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . American Indian or Alaska Native total7,8 . Asian or Pacific Islander total7,8 . . . . . . Hispanic9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 2
Low birthweight Late3 Total4 2012 7.99 6.97 13.18 7.61 8.21 6.96 2011 8.10 7.09 13.33 7.55 8.36 7.02 Very low birthweight5 2012 1.42 1.13 2.94 1.33 1.13 1.22 2011 1.44 1.14 2.99 1.32 1.18 1.20
Cesarean rate1 2011 2012 32.8 32.3 35.8 28.6 33.2 32.2 2011 32.8 32.4 35.5 28.4 33.2 32.0
Total2 2012 11.54 10.29 16.53 13.25 10.15 11.58 2011 11.73 10.50 16.77 13.50 10.40 11.65
2012 3,952,937 2,133,115 583,080 46,093 272,949 907,405
2012 8.13 7.44 10.59 9.26 7.47 8.31
2011 8.28 7.62 10.74 9.64 7.62 8.40
3,953,590 2,146,566 582,345 46,419 253,915 918,129
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
All births by cesarean delivery per 100 live births. Born prior to 37 completed weeks of gestation. 3 Born between 34 and 36 completed weeks of gestation. 4 Birthweight of less than 2,500 grams (5 pounds, 8 ounces). 5 Birthweight of less than 1,500 grams (3 pounds, 4 ounces). 6 Includes births to race and origin groups not shown separately, such as white Hispanic and black Hispanic women, and births with origin not stated. 7 Race and Hispanic origin are reported separately on birth certificates. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Race categories are consistent with the 1977 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported multiple-race data in 2012. The multiple-race data for these states were bridged to the single-race categories of the 1977 OMB standards for comparability with other states; see Technical Notes. Multiple-race reporting areas vary for 20112012; see Technical Notes. 8 Includes persons of Hispanic, non-Hispanic, and origin not stated, according to the mothers reported race; see Technical Notes. 9 Includes all persons of Hispanic origin of any race; see Technical Notes. NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.
Table 9. Distribution of preterm births (prior to 37 completed weeks of gestation): United States, final 1990, 2006, 2010, and 2011, and preliminary 2012
[Data for 2012 are based on a continuous file of records received from the states] Percent Gestational age Under 32 weeks . . . . . 3233 weeks . . . . . . . Total under 34 weeks 3436 weeks . . . . . . . Total under 37 weeks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2012 1.93 1.49 3.41 8.13 11.54 2011 1.93 1.52 3.44 8.28 11.73 2010 1.96 1.53 3.50 8.49 11.99 2006 2.04 1.62 3.66 9.15 12.80 1990 1.92 1.40 3.32 7.30 10.62
NOTE: For information on the relative standard errors of the data and further discussion, see reference 8.

Table 10. Total count of records and completeness of preliminary file of live births: United States, each state and territory, preliminary 2012
[By place of occurrence] Live births Area United States1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alabama . . . . . . . Alaska . . . . . . . . Arizona . . . . . . . Arkansas . . . . . . California . . . . . . Colorado. . . . . . . Connecticut . . . . . Delaware . . . . . . District of Columbia Florida . . . . . . . . Georgia . Hawaii . . Idaho. . . Illinois . . Indiana. . Iowa . . . Kansas. . Kentucky. Louisiana Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Counts of records 3,959,188 56,941 11,052 87,207 37,326 504,634 65,643 37,292 11,376 13,906 213,402 131,861 18,974 22,482 155,814 84,204 38,427 41,173 53,360 62,567 12,594 70,415 71,563 112,154 68,054 37,787 76,412 12,071 26,282 34,625 12,578 101,611 26,147 242,217 118,986 123,231 121,132 11,507 139,066 51,753 45,557 141,981 11,652 54,259 12,713 85,600 389,895 52,514 5,686 101,400 87,345 21,146 66,975 6,856 38,903 --2,396 1,163 --Percent completeness 99.956 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.984 100.000 99.506 100.000 99.848 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.996 98.158 99.996 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.941 99.996 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.973 99.983 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.998 99.992 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.929 100.000 99.985 99.601 --66.482 100.000 ---
Maryland. . . . . Massachusetts . Michigan . . . . . Minnesota . . . . Mississippi. . . . Missouri . . . . . Montana . . . . . Nebraska . . . . Nevada . . . . . New Hampshire
New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Mexico. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New York (excluding New York City). New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Oregon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tennessee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Puerto Rico . . . . . Virgin Islands . . . . Guam . . . . . . . . American Samoa . . Northern Marianas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- - - Data not available. 1 Excludes data for Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and Northern Marianas. NOTE: Percent completeness = Number of records in preliminary file * 100 / Count of records.

Technical Notes
Nature and sources of data
Preliminary data for 2012 are based on nearly all births for that year (99.96%, see Table 10), with levels for 37 states at 100% and levels for the remaining 13 states and the District of Columbia above 98%. Preliminary 2012 data are based on continuous receipt and processing of statistical records through April 24, 2013, by the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). NCHS receives the data from the states vital registration systems through the Vital Statistics Cooperative Program. In this report, U.S. totals include only events occurring within the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Data for Puerto Rico and American Samoa are included in tables showing data by state, but are not included in U.S. totals (see Tables 6 and 10 and state-specific Internet tables at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_03_tables.pdf). Data for Northern Marianas and the Virgin Islands were not available and less than 75% of data for Guam were available as of release of the 2012 preliminary file. Accordingly, data for these territories are not included in this report (8). Detailed information on reporting completeness and imputation procedures may be found in the User Guide to the 2011 Natality Public Use File (9). To produce the preliminary estimates shown in this report, records in the file were weighted using independent control counts of all 2012 births by state of occurrence. Detailed information on weighting and the reliability of estimates also may be found elsewhere (8).
Hispanic origin and race

Hispanic origin
Hispanic origin and race are reported separately on the birth certificate. Data shown by race (i.e., American Indian or Alaska Native and Asian or Pacific Islander) include persons of Hispanic or non-Hispanic origin, and data for Hispanic origin include all persons of Hispanic origin of any race. Data for non-Hispanic persons are shown separately for white and black mother given the substantial differences in fertility and maternal and infant health characteristics between Hispanic and non-Hispanic white women and Hispanic and non-Hispanic black women. Items asking for the Hispanic origin of the mother have been included on the birth certificates of all states and the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Guam since 1993, on the birth certificate of Puerto Rico starting in 2005, and on the birth certificate of Northern Marianas starting in 2010 (9). American Samoa does not collect this information.
Single, multiple, and bridged race

The 2003 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth allows the reporting of more than one race (multiple races) for each parent (10) in accordance with the revised standards issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1997 (12). Information on this change is presented elsewhere (9,1316). In 2012, 41 states and the District of Columbia reported multiple races. Multiple-race reporting areas include the 39 revised or partially revised states (see the 1989 and 2003 U.S. Standard Certificates of Live Birth) and the District of Columbia, which used the 2003 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth, as well as Hawaii and Rhode Island, which used the 1989 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth, but which collected multiple-race data comparable to data of the states using the revised certificate. Puerto Rico, which revised its birth certificate in 2005, continued to report race according to the 1989 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth (that is, as an open-ended question in which only one response is accepted). The 41 states and the District of Columbia accounted for 90% of U.S. births in 2012. Data from the vital records of the remaining 9 states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, New Jersey, and West Virginia) are based on the 1989 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth that follows the 1977 OMB standard, allowing only a single race to be reported (13,14). To provide uniformity and comparability of the data during the transition period, before all or most of the data are available in the new multiple-race format, it was necessary to bridge the responses of those who reported more than one race (multiple race) to one, single race. The bridging procedure for multiple-race mothers and fathers is based on the procedure used to bridge the multiple-race population estimates (see Population denominators) (1416). Information detailing the processing and tabulation of data by race is presented elsewhere (9). A previous report describes multiple-race birth data for 2003 (17).
The 1989 and 2003 U.S. Standard Certificates of Live Birth

This report includes selected 2012 data on items that are collected on both the 1989 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth (unrevised) and 2003 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Live Birth (revised). The 2003 revision is described in detail elsewhere (2,911). Thirty-eight states (California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Northern Marianas had implemented the revised birth certificate as of January 1, 2012. One additional state, Virginia, implemented the revised birth certificate in 2012, but after January 1. The 38 revised states and the District of Columbia that implemented as of January 1, 2012, represent 86% of all births in 2012. Data items exclusive to either the 1989 or the 2003 birth certificate revision are not shown in this report. A forthcoming report and data release based on 2012 final data will present selected data exclusive to the 2003 revised certificate.
Age of mother
For information and discussion of age of mother, see User Guide to the 2011 Natality Public Use File (9).
Marital status
For information and discussion of marital status, see User Guide to the 2011 Natality Public Use File (9). Data on mothers

marital status at time of birth for Puerto Rico have been excluded from Table I-1 due to inaccurate reporting.
Method of delivery, gestation, and birthweight

For information and discussion of method of delivery, gestational age, and birthweight, see User Guide to the 2011 Natality Public Use File (9).
Population denominators
U.S. national and state-level birth and fertility rates for 2012 shown in this report are based on population estimates derived from the 2010 census, as of July 1, 2012. These population estimates are available on the NCHS website (18). The production of these population estimates is described in detail elsewhere (14). Birth and fertility rates for the territories shown in this report are based on population estimates provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (19,20). Rates by state and territory shown in this report may differ from rates computed on the basis of other population estimates. Rates for states and territories with smaller populations, or groups with smaller populations, are more likely to be affected by differences in population base. Information on the national estimates of births to unmarried women (i.e., methods of determining marital status) and the computation of the preliminary birth rates for unmarried women is presented elsewhere (2,9,21). The birth rate for unmarried women for 2012 is estimated on the basis of the population distributions by marital status provided by the U.S. Census Bureau as of March 2012 and applied to the national population estimates as of July 1, 2012, which is derived from the 2010 census (18,21,22). The populations for the United States used in this report were produced under a collaborative arrangement with the U.S. Census Bureau and are consistent with the 2010 census counts by age, race, and sex. Reflecting the guidelines issued in 1997 by OMB, the 2010 census included an option for persons to report more than one race as appropriate for themselves and household members (12). Beginning with births occurring in 2003, several states began reporting multiple-race data. This number has increased to 41 states and the District of Columbia in 2012 (see Single, multiple, and bridged race). To produce birth and fertility rates by race during the transition period, the bridging of population data for multiple-race persons back to single-race categories was necessary. Once all states revise their birth certificates to be compliant with the 1997 OMB standards, the use of bridged populations can be discontinued. For detailed information on the revised OMB standards on race reporting and procedures used to produce the bridged populations, see United States Census 2000 with Bridged Race Categories (14).
Computing rates and percentages and reliability of estimates

For information and further discussion on computing rates and percentages and the relative standard errors of the data, see Births: Preliminary Data for 2005 (8).

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Health Statistics 3311 Toledo Road, Room 5419 Hyattsville, MD 20782 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $ 300
FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE & FEES PAID CDC/NCHS PERMIT NO. G-284
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 62, No. 3, September 6, 2013
Contents
Abstract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Births and birth rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Maternal and infant health birth characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 4 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 List of Detailed Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 List of Internet Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Technical Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared under the general direction of Delton Atkinson, Acting Director of the Division of Vital Statistics (DVS) and Stephanie J. Ventura, Chief of the Reproductive Statistics Branch (RSB). Nicholas F. Pace, Chief of the Systems, Programming, and Statistical Resources Branch (SPSRB), and Steve J. Steimel and Annie S. Liu provided computer programming support and statistical tables. Steve J. Steimel and Annie S. Liu of SPSRB prepared the natality file. Sharon Kirmeyer and Marie E. Thoma of RSB provided content review. Staff of the Data Acquisition and Evaluation Branch carried out quality evaluation and acceptance procedures for the state data files on which this report is based. The Registration Methods staff of DVS consulted with state vital statistics offices regarding the collection of birth certificate data. This report was edited and produced by NCHS/Office of Information Services, Information Design and Publishing Staff: Betsy M. Finley edited the report; typesetting was done by Annette F. Holman; and graphics were produced by Jessica Newman (contractor).
Suggested citation
Hamilton BE, Martin JA, Ventura SJ. Births: Preliminary data for 2012. National vital statistics reports; vol 62 no 3. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2013.
Copyright information
All material appearing in this report is in the public domain and may be reproduced or copied without permission; citation as to source, however, is appreciated.
National Center for Health Statistics Charles J. Rothwell, M.S., Acting Director Jennifer H. Madans, Ph.D., Associate Director for Science Division of Vital Statistics Delton Atkinson, M.P.H., M.P.H., P.M.P., Acting Director
For e-mail updates on NCHS publication releases, subscribe online at: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/govdelivery.htm. For questions or general information about NCHS: Tel: 1800CDCINFO (18002324636) TTY: 18882326348 Internet: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs Online request form: http://www.cdc.gov/cdc-info/requestform.html DHHS Publication No. 20141120 CS243693
ATTACHMENT D W. Bradford Wilson et al., Why Marriage Matters: Thirty Conclusions from Social Sciences (3d ed. 2011)
A Report from Family Scholars
Why Marriage Matters, Third Edition Thirty Conclusions from the Social Sciences
Institute for American Values National Marriage Project
the Institute for American Values and the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia. The sponsors are grateful to The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, The William H. Donner Foundation, and Fieldstead and Company for their generous support.
HIS STATEMENT
comes from a team of family scholars chaired by
W. Bradford Wilcox of the University of Virginia. The statement is sponsored by the Center for Marriage and Families at
On the cover: Woman Writing List That Binds Two Hearts by Bonnie Timmons. Bonnie Timmons/The Image Bank/ Getty Images.
2011, Institute for American Values. No reproduction of the materials contained herein is permitted without the written permission of the Institute for American Values. First edition published 2002. Second edition 2005. Third edition published 2011.
ISBN #978-1-931764-24-7 Institute for American Values 1841 Broadway, Suite 211 New York, NY 10023 Tel: (212) 246-3942 Fax: (212) 541-6665 Website: www.americanvalues.org Email: info@americanvalues.org

Table of Contents The Authors............................................................................................. 4 Introduction............................................................................................. 6 Five New Themes............................................................................. 7 A Word about Selection Effects........................................................ 9 Our Fundamental Conclusions........................................................ 11 The Thirty Conclusions: A Snapshot...................................................... 12 The Thirty Conclusions........................................................................... 14 Family................................................................................................ 14 Economics......................................................................................... 23 Physical Health and Longevity......................................................... 28 Mental Health and Emotional Well-Being........................................ 33 Crime and Domestic Violence.......................................................... 37 Conclusion............................................................................................... 42 Appendix: Figures................................................................................... 44 Endnotes.................................................................................................. 47

The Authors W. BRADFORD WILCOX is associate professor of sociology and director of the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia. JARED R. ANDERSON is assistant professor of marriage and family therapy at Kansas State University. WILLIAM DOHERTY is professor of family social science and director of the Citizen Professional Center at the University of Minnesota. DAVID EGGEBEEN is associate professor of human development and sociology at Pennsylvania State University. CHRISTOPHER G. ELLISON is the Deans Distinguished Professor of Social Science at the University of Texas at San Antonio. WILLIAM GALSTON is Ezra K. Zilkha Chair and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. NEIL GILBERT is Chernin Professor of Social Welfare and co-director of the Center for Child and Youth Policy at the University of California at Berkeley. JOHN GOTTMAN is professor emeritus of psychology at the University of Washington. RON HASKINS is a senior fellow in the Economic Studies Program and codirector of the Center on Children and Families at the Brookings Institution, and a senior consultant at the Annie E. Casey Foundation.
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ROBERT I. LERMAN is an institute fellow at the Urban Institute and professor of economics at American University. LINDA MALONE-COLN is chair of the Department of Psychology and executive director of the National Center on African American Marriages and Parenting at Hampton University. LOREN MARKS holds the Kathryn Norwood and Claude Fussell Alumni Professorship and is associate professor of family studies at Louisiana State University. ROB PALKOVITZ is professor of human development and family studies at the University of Delaware. DAVID POPENOE is professor emeritus of sociology at Rutgers University. MARK D. REGNERUS is associate professor of sociology at the University of Texas at Austin. SCOTT STANLEY is a research professor and co-director of the Center for Marital and Family Studies at the University of Denver. LINDA WAITE is the Lucy Flower Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago. JUDITH WALLERSTEIN is senior lecturer emerita at the School of Social Welfare at the University of California at Berkeley.
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Why Marriage Matters, Third Edition
Thirty Conclusions from the Social Sciences

Introduction
divorce posed the biggest threat to marriage in the United States. Clinical, academic, and popular accounts addressing recent family changefrom Judith Wallersteins landmark book, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce, to Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefurs award-winning book, Growing Up with a Single Parent, to Barbara Dafoe Whiteheads attention-getting Atlantic article, Dan Quayle Was Rightfocused largely on the impact that divorce had upon children, and rightly so. In the wake of the divorce revolution of the 1970s, divorce was the event most likely to undercut the quality and stability of childrens family lives in the second half of the twentieth century. No more. In fact, as divorce rates have come down since peaking in the early 1980s, children who are now born to married couples are actually more likely to grow up with both of their parents than were children born at the height of the divorce revolution (see figure 1). In fact, the divorce rate for married couples with children has fallen almost to predivorce revolution levels, with 23 percent of couples who married in the early 1960s divorcing before their first child turned ten, compared to slightly more than 23 percent for couples who married in the mid 1990s. Today, the rise of cohabiting households with children is the largest unrecognized threat to the quality and stability of childrens family lives. In fact, because of the growing prevalence of cohabitation, which has risen fourteen-fold since 1970, todays children are much more likely to spend time in a cohabiting household than they are to see their parents divorce (see figure 2).1 Now, approximately 24 percent of the nations children are born to cohabiting couples, which means that more children are currently born to cohabiting couples than to single mothers.2 Another 20 percent or so of children spend time in a cohabiting household with an unrelated adult at some point later in their childhood, often after their parents marriage breaks down.3 This means that more than four in ten children are exposed to a cohabiting relationship. Thus, one reason that the institution of marriage has less of a hold over Americans than it has had for
N THE LATTER HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,
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most our history is that cohabitation has emerged as a powerful alternative to and competitor with marriage. For this reason, the third edition of Why Marriage Matters focuses new attention on recent scholarship assessing the impact that contemporary cohabitation is having on marriage, family life, and the welfare of children. This edition also picks up on topics that surfaced in the first two editions of the report, summarizing a large body of research on the impact of divorce, stepfamilies, and single parenthood on children, adults, and the larger commonweal. The report seeks to summarize existing family-related research into a succinct form useful to policy makers, scholars, civic, business, and religious leaders, professionals, and others interested in understanding marriage in todays society.
Five New Themes
1. Children are less likely to thrive in cohabiting households, compared to intact, married families. On many social, educational, and psychological outcomes, children in cohabiting households do significantly worse than children in intact, married families, and about as poorly as children living in single-parent families. And when it comes to abuse, recent federal data indicate that children in cohabiting households are markedly more likely to be physically, sexually, and emotionally abused than children in both intact, married families and single-parent families (see figure 3). Only in the economic domain do children in cohabiting households fare consistently better than children in single-parent families.
2. Family instability is generally bad for children. In recent years, family scholars have turned their attention to the impact that transitions into and out of marriage, cohabitation, and single parenthood have upon children. This report shows that such transitions, especially multiple transitions, are linked to higher reports of school failure, behavioral problems, drug use, and loneliness, among other outcomes. So, it is not just family structure and family process that matter for children; family stability matters as well. And the research indicates that children who are born to married parents are the least likely to be exposed to family instability, and to the risks instability poses to the emotional, social, and educational welfare of children.
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3. American family life is becoming increasingly unstable for children (see figure 4).4 Sociologist Andrew Cherlin has observed that Americans are stepping on and off the carousel of intimate relationships with increasing rapidity.5 This relational carousel spins particularly quickly for couples who are cohabiting, even cohabiting couples with children. For instance, cohabiting couples who have a child together are more than twice as likely to break up before their child turns twelve, compared to couples who are married to one another (see figure 5). Thus, one of the major reasons that childrens lives are increasingly turbulent is that more and more children are being born into or raised in cohabiting households that are much more fragile than married families.
4. The growing instability of American family life also means that contemporary adults and children are more likely to live in what scholars call complex households, where children and adults are living with people who are half-siblings, stepsiblings, stepparents, stepchildren, or unrelated to them by birth or marriage. Research on these complex households is still embryonic, but the initial findings are not encouraging. For instance, one indicator of this growing complexity is multiple-partner fertility, where parents have children with more than one romantic partner. Children who come from these relationships are more likely to report poor relationships with their parents, to have behavioral and health problems, and to fail in school, even after controlling for factors such as education, income, and race. Thus, for both adults and children, life typically becomes not only more complex, but also more difficult, when parents fail to get or stay married.
5. The nations retreat from marriage has hit poor and workingclass communities with particular force. Recent increases in cohabitation, nonmarital childbearing, family instability, and family complexity have not been equally distributed in the United States; these trends, which first rose in poor communities in the 1970s and 1980s, are now moving rapidly into working-class and lower-middleclass communities. But marriage appears to be strengthening in more educated and affluent communities. As a consequence, since the early 1980s, children from college-educated homes have seen their family lives stabilize, whereas children from less-educated homes have seen their family lives become increasingly unstable (see figure 6). More generally, the stratified character of family trends means that
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the United States is devolving into a separate-and-unequal family regime, where the highly educated and the affluent enjoy strong and stable [families] and everyone else is consigned to increasingly unstable, unhappy, and unworkable ones.6 We acknowledge that social science is better equipped to document whether certain facts are true than to say why they are true. We can assert more definitively that marriage is associated with powerful social goods than that marriage is the sole or main cause of these goods.
A Word about Selection Effects
Good research seeks to tease out selection effects, or the preexisting differences between individuals who marry, cohabit, or divorce. Does divorce cause poverty, for example, or is it simply that poor people are more likely to divorce? Scholars attempt to distinguish between causal relationships and mere correlations in a variety of ways. The studies cited here are for the most part based on large, nationally representative samples that control for race, education, income, and other confounding factors. In many, but not all cases, social scientists used longitudinal data to track individuals as they marry, divorce, or stay single, increasing our confidence that marriage itself matters. Where the evidence appears overwhelming that marriage causes increases in well-being, we say so. Where marriage probably does so but the causal pathways are not as well understood, we are more cautious. We recognize that, absent random assignment to marriage, divorce, or single parenting, social scientists must always acknowledge the possibility that other factors are influencing outcomes. Reasonable scholars may and do disagree on the existence and extent of such selection effects and the extent to which marriage is causally related to the better social outcomes reported here. Yet, scholarship is getting better in addressing selection effects. For instance, in this report we summarize three divorce studies that follow identical and nonidentical adult twins in Australia and Virginia to see how much of the effects of divorce on children are genetic and how much seem to be a consequence of divorce itself. Methodological innovations like these, as well as analyses using econometric models, afford us greater confidence that family structure exercises a causal influence for some outcomes.
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Departures from the norm of intact marriage do not necessarily harm most of those who are exposed to them.7 While cohabitation is associated with increased risks of psychological and social problems for children, this does not mean that every child who is exposed to cohabitation is damaged. For example, one nationally representative study of six- to eleven-year-olds found that only 16 percent of children in cohabiting families experienced serious emotional problems. Still, this rate was much higher than the rate for children in families headed by married biological or adoptive parents, which was 4 percent.8 While marriage is a social good, not all marriages are equal. Research does not generally support the idea that remarriage is better for children than living with a single mother.9 Marriages that are unhappy do not have the same benefits as the average marriage.10 Divorce or separation provides an important escape hatch for children and adults in violent or high-conflict marriages. Families, communities, and policy makers interested in distributing the benefits of marriage more equally must do more than merely discourage legal divorce. But we believe good social science, despite its limitations, is a better guide to social policy than uninformed opinion or prejudice. This report represents our best judgment of what current social science evidence reveals about marriage in our social system.
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Our Fundamental Conclusions
1. The intact, biological, married family remains the gold standard for family life in the United States, insofar as children are most likely to thriveeconomically, socially, and psychologically in this family form.
2. Marriage is an important public good, associated with a range of economic, health, educational, and safety benefits that help local, state, and federal governments serve the common good.
3. The benefits of marriage extend to poor, working-class, and minority communities, despite the fact that marriage has weakened in these communities in the last four decades.
are only one factor contributing to child and social well-being. Our discussion here is not meant to minimize the importance of other factors, such as poverty, child support, unemployment, teenage childbearing, neighborhood safety, or the quality of education for both parents and children. Marriage is not a panacea for all social ills. For instance, when it comes to child wellbeing, research suggests that family structure is a better predictor of childrens psychological and social welfare, whereas poverty is a better predictor of educational attainment.11
AMILY STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES
But whether we succeed or fail in building a healthy marriage culture is clearly a matter of legitimate public concern and an issue of paramount importance if we wish to reverse the marginalization of the most vulnerable members of our society: the working class, the poor, minorities, and children.
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The Thirty Conclusions: A Snapshot
Family
1. Marriage increases the likelihood that fathers and mothers have good relationships with their children. 2. Children are most likely to enjoy family stability when they are born into a married family. 3. Children are less likely to thrive in complex households. 4. Cohabitation is not the functional equivalent of marriage. 5. Growing up outside an intact marriage increases the likelihood that children will themselves divorce or become unwed parents. 6. Marriage is a virtually universal human institution. 7. Marriage, and a normative commitment to marriage, foster highquality relationships between adults, as well as between parents and children. 8. Marriage has important biosocial consequences for adults and children.
Economics
9. Divorce and unmarried childbearing increase poverty for both children and mothers, and cohabitation is less likely to alleviate poverty than is marriage. 10. Married couples seem to build more wealth on average than singles or cohabiting couples. 11. Marriage reduces poverty and material hardship for disadvantaged women and their children. 12. Minorities benefit economically from marriage also. 13. Married men earn more money than do single men with similar education and job histories. 14. Parental divorce (or failure to marry) appears to increase childrens risk of school failure. 15. Parental divorce reduces the likelihood that children will graduate from college and achieve high-status jobs.
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Physical Health and Longevity
16. Children who live with their own two married parents enjoy better physical health, on average, than do children in other family forms. 17. Parental marriage is associated with a sharply lower risk of infant mortality. 18. Marriage is associated with reduced rates of alcohol and substance abuse for both adults and teens. 19. Married people, especially married men, have longer life expectancies than do otherwise similar singles. 20. Marriage is associated with better health and lower rates of injury, illness, and disability for both men and women. 21. Marriage seems to be associated with better health among minorities and the poor.
Mental Health and Emotional Well-Being
22. Children whose parents divorce have higher rates of psychological distress and mental illness. 23. Cohabitation is associated with higher levels of psychological problems among children. 24. Family breakdown appears to increase significantly the risk of suicide. 25. Married mothers have lower rates of depression than do single or cohabiting mothers.
Crime and Domestic Violence
26. Boys raised in non-intact families are more likely to engage in delinquent and criminal behavior. 27. Marriage appears to reduce the risk that adults will be either perpetrators or victims of crime. 28. Married women appear to have a lower risk of experiencing domestic violence than do cohabiting or dating women. 29. A child who is not living with his or her own two married parents is at greater risk of child abuse. 30. There is a growing marriage gap between college-educated Americans and less-educated Americans.
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The Thirty Conclusions
Family
1. Marriage increases the likelihood that fathers and mothers have good relationships with their children.
Mothers as well as fathers are affected by the absence of marriage. Single mothers on average report more conflict with and less monitoring of their children than do married mothers.12 As adults, children from intact marriages report being closer to their mothers on average than do children of divorce.13 In one nationally representative study, 30 percent of young adults whose parents divorced reported poor relationships with their mothers, compared to 16 percent of children whose parents stayed married.14 But childrens relationships with their father depend even more on marriage than do childrens relationships with their mother. Sixty-five percent of young adults whose parents divorced had poor relationships with their fathers (compared to 29 percent from non-divorced families).15 On average, children whose parents divorce or never marry see their fathers less frequently16 and have less affectionate relationships with their fathers17 than do children whose parents got and stayed married. Studies of children of divorce suggest that losing contact with their father in the wake of a divorce is one of the most painful consequences of divorce.18 Divorce appears to have an even greater negative effect on relationships between fathers and their children than remaining in an unhappy marriage.19 These detrimental relationship effects may be longterm; unpartnered disabled elderly individuals who divorced receive less in the way of social support and practical assistance from their children than those who were widowed. Those who remarried were less likely to receive cash transfers from their children.20 Some evidence suggests even cohabiting, biological fathers who live with their children are not as involved and affectionate with their children as are married, biological fathers who reside with their children,21 although others have found no difference between these types of fathers or even a positive effect of cohabitation.22 Even so, the effect of marriage on higher-quality parenting practices is even stronger for social fathers (i.e., stepfathers) than for biological fathers.23 And fathers who are married to the mother of their children prior to birth are much more likely to maintain a long-term relationship with their children than fathers who are not married at birth.24
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2. Children are most likely to enjoy family stability when they are born into a married family.
There is an emerging scholarly consensus that family stability in and of itself is linked to positive child outcomes.25 By contrast, children who are exposed to family transitionsfrom a divorce to the breakup of a mothers romantic relationship with a live-in boyfriendare more likely to experience behavioral problems, drug use, problems in school, early sex, and loneliness. The evidence also suggests that multiple transitions (where children are exposed to more than one breakup or new relationship) are especially harmful for children.26 Family transitions are thought to harm a mothers ability to interact positively with her child(ren) by affecting her economic, social, and psychological resources. They also necessitate the establishment of new routines and relationships that may be difficult for children to navigate.27 Selection may also be at work; that is, pre-existing maternal attributes made lead both to multiple union transitions and poor child outcomes, though selection does not appear to tell the whole story.28 Children born to married parents are the most likely to enjoy family stability over their childhood. According to data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, which follows children in twenty cities around the U.S., only 13 percent of children born to married parents experience a maternal partnership transition (i.e., the end or start of a relationship) by age 3, compared to 50 percent of those born to cohabiting parents, 69 percent of those born to visiting (i.e., dating but not cohabiting) parents, and 74 percent of those born to a single mother (i.e., a mother no longer in a romantic relationship with the father).29 Indeed, a number of studies suggest that cohabitation in a range of cultural and national contexts is less stable than marriage.30 Latino and African American children born into cohabiting unions were more likely to see their parents break up than their peers who were born to married parents.31 Cohabitations are unstable not just in the United States. In one study of seventeen Western countries, parental cohabitation was associated with higher risk of parental separation, even in Sweden where parental cohabitation is very common (although the difference between parental cohabitation and marriage in Sweden is less pronounced than in other countries).32 In fact, one new study of family instability in Sweden found that children born to cohabiting couples are more than 70 percent more likely to see their
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parents separate by age fifteen, compared to children born to married couples.33 Unfortunately, in part because childbearing and childrearing in a cohabiting household is becoming more common in the United States, family stability has declined for children in the United States over the course of the last three decades even though the divorce rate has declined.34 This overall decline in family stability for children is particularly striking because children born to married couples now enjoy more stability than they did thirty years ago. This decline is also striking because the deinstitutionalization of marriage has largely been limited to working-class and poor communities in the United States. For both economic and cultural reasons, more educated and affluent Americans are now markedly more likely to succeed in marriage than their less privileged fellow citizens.35 This means that children in poor and working-class communities are triply disadvantaged: they have fewer economic resources, their parents are less likely to be married, and they are more likely to be exposed to numerous family transitions over the course of their lives.
3.
Children are less likely to thrive in complex households.
Over the last four decades, increases in divorce, cohabitation, and nonmarital childbearing have increased the prevalence of complex householdswhere children share a household with stepsiblings, half-siblings, stepparents, or with adults with whom they are unrelated by marriage, adoption, or blood. Children are more likely to suffer economically, psychologically, and socially when they live in complex households, in part because such households often do not have clear norms, boundaries, and a clear family identity to provide stability, direction, and purpose to their members, and to the relationships within these households. Research indicates that children in stepfamilies are more likely to experience school failure, delinquency, teenage pregnancy, and incarceration than children growing up in intact, married families.36 This is in part, as Andrew Cherlin has pointed out, because stepfamilies are incomplete institutions that have fewer commonly understood norms, roles, and rituals than intact, married families.37 As a consequence, stepparents often have more difficulty relating to their stepchildren than do biological parents, which is one reason that stepchildren are less likely to thrive than children from intact, married families.
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Children whose parents have engaged in multiple-partner fertility (MPF), where adults have children with two or more partners, have similar problems. Because MPF can be associated with baby mama drama (i.e., conflict between former romantic partners or spouses who had a child together, or between one of them and a new romantic partner of the other partner or spouse), and because it is practically difficult for mothers and fathers to invest financially, emotionally, and temporally in children across different households, children from such MPF families are more likely to suffer health problems, externalizing behaviors such as fighting, lower academic achievement, and lower quality relationships with their parents, compared to children in intact, married families.38 Interestingly, even children living in a family with their own biological, married parents appear to be more likely to suffer if they are exposed to complexity, in the form of step- or half-siblings located in their own household. New research suggests that children living with their married biological parents were more likely to fail in school, to suffer from depression, and to engage in delinquent behavior if they live with stepsiblings from a parents prior union.39 This is probably because the stresses of stepfamily living and the challenges of supporting a former spouse can undercut the parenting of mothers and fathers who head up a blended family. This new research provides more evidence that children are more likely to thrive when their parents succeed in channeling their reproductive lives into one marriage.
4.
Cohabitation is not the functional equivalent of marriage.
As a group, cohabitors in the United States more closely resemble singles than married people, though cohabitation is an exceptionally heterogenous status, with some partners treating it as a prelude to marriage, others as an alternative to marriage, others as an opportunity to test for marriage, and still others as a convenient dating relationship.40 Adults who live together are more similar to singles than to married couples in terms of physical health41 and emotional well-being and mental health,42 as well as in assets and earnings.43 Children with cohabiting parents have outcomes more similar to the children living with single (or remarried) parents than children from intact marriages. 44 In other words, children living in cohabiting unions do not fare as well as children living in intact,
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married families. For instance, one recent study found that teenagers living in cohabiting unions were significantly more likely to experience behavioral and emotional difficulties than were teenagers in intact, married families, even after controlling for a range of socioeconomic and parenting factors. 45 Another problem is that cohabiting parents are less likely to devote their financial resources to childrearing. One study found that cohabiting parents devoted a larger share of their income to alcohol and tobacco, and a smaller share of their income to childrens education, compared to married parents. 46 Selection effects account for a portion of the difference between married people and cohabitors. As a group, cohabitors (who are not engaged) have lower incomes and less education.47 Couples who live together also, on average, report relationships of lower quality than do married coupleswith cohabitors reporting more conflict, more violence, and lower levels of satisfaction and commitment.48 This lower relationship quality among cohabitors explains their higher levels of depression compared to married individuals.49 Even biological parents who cohabit have poorer quality relationships and are more likely to part than parents who marry. 50 Cohabitation differs from marriage in part because Americans who choose solely to live together are less committed to each other as partners and their future together. 51 Partly as a consequence, cohabiting couples are less likely than married couples to pool their income. 52 Another challenge confronting cohabiting couples is that partners often disagree about the nature and future of their relationshipfor instance, one partner may anticipate marriage and the other partner may view the relationship as a covenient form of dating. 53 New research also suggests that the instability and lower levels of commitment associated with cohabitation can be deleterious for the elderly, who appear to be more likely to be institutionalized or abandoned if they are cohabiting rather than married. 54 In a society that still largely reveres marriageeven if marriages are less and less likely to happennonmarriage often means something relative to marriage. Marriage is a clear, mutual, nonambiguous signal of commitment; in contrast, cohabitation is widely recognized as ambiguous when it comes to signaling commitment in the absence of some other strong signal of marital intention such as engagement. 55
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5. Growing up outside an intact marriage increases the likelihood that children will themselves divorce or become unwed parents.
Children whose parents divorce or fail to marry are more likely to become young unwed parents, to enter their marriages with lower commitment, to experience divorce themselves someday, to marry as teenagers, and to have unhappy marriages and/or relationships.56 Daughters raised outside of intact marriages are approximately three times more likely to end up young, unwed mothers than are children whose parents married and stayed married.57 Parental divorce increases the odds that adult children will also divorce by at least 50 percent, partly because children of divorce are more likely to marry prematurely and partly because children of divorce often marry other children of divorce, thereby making their marriage even more precarious.58 Divorce is apparently most likely to be transmitted across the generations when parents in relatively low-conflict marriages divorced.59 There is ongoing debate about whether the link between parental and offspring divorce has weakened over time (as divorce rates increased up through the early 1980s and then fell slightly), but there is consensus that this association remains significant.60 Moreover, remarriage does not appear to help children. For instance, girls in stepfamilies are slightly more likely to have a teenage pregnancy compared to girls in a single-parent family, and much more likely to have a teenage pregnancy than girls in an intact, married family.61 Children who grow up in stepfamilies are also more likely to marry as teenagers, compared to children who grow up in single-parent or intact, married families.62 Finally, research also indicates that the effects of divorce cross three generations: that is, grandchildren of couples who divorced are significantly more likely to experience marital discord, negative relationships with their parents, and low levels of educational attainment, compared to grandchildren whose grandparents did not divorce.63
6.
Marriage is a virtually universal human institution.
Marriage exists in virtually every known human society.64 The shape of marriage varies considerably in different cultural contexts, but at least since the beginning of recorded historyin all the flourishing varieties of human cultures documented by anthropologistsmarriage has been a universal human institution. As a virtually universal human idea, marriage involves regulating the reproduction of children, families, and society. While marriage systems differ (and not every person or class
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within a society marries), marriage across societies is a publicly acknowledged and supported sexual union that creates kinship obligations and resource pooling between men, women, and the children that their sexual union may produce.
7.
Marriage, and a normative commitment to marriage, foster high-quality relationships between adults, as well as between parents and children.
Some say that love, not marriage, makes a family. They argue that family structure per se does not matter; rather, what matters is the quality of family relationships.65 Others argue that the marital ethic of lifelong commitment needs to be diluted if we seek to promote high-quality relationships; instead, the new marital ethic should be conditional, such that spouses should remain together only so long as they continue to love one another.66 However, these arguments overlook what we know about the effect of marriage, and a normative commitment to the institution of marriage, on intimate relationships. By offering legal and normative support and direction to a relationship, by providing an expectation of sexual fidelity and lifelong commitment, and by furnishing adults a unique social status as spouses, marriage typically fosters better romantic and parental relationships than alternatives to marriage. 67 For all these reasons, in part, adults who are married enjoy happier, healthier, and less violent relationships, compared to adults who are in dating or cohabiting relationships. 68 Even among older adults who were previously married, remarriage seems to lead to happier relationships than cohabitation, though differences on several other aspects of relationship quality are not evident. 69 Parents who are married enjoy more supportive and less conflictual relationships with one another, compared to parents who are cohabiting or otherwise romantically involved with one another. 70 In turn, as we have seen, married parents generally have better relationships with their children than do cohabiting, divorced, unmarried, or remarried parents. 71 Some of the associations between family structure and family process are products of selectionthat is, couples with better relationships are more likely to get and stay married. But, as this report makes clear, the research also suggests that social, legal, and normative supports provided by marriage foster better intimate relationships and parentchild relationships.
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But so does the idea of marriage. Individuals who value the institution of marriage for its own sakethat is, who oppose easy divorce, who believe that children ought to be born into marriage, and who think marriage is better than cohabitationare more likely to invest themselves in their marriages and to experience high-quality marital relationships. Ironically, individuals who embrace a conditional ethic to marriagethat is, one that suggests marriages ought to continue only so long as both spouses are happyare less happy in their marriages. One longitudinal study found that individuals who oppose divorce are more likely to devote themselves to their spouse, even after controlling for the initial quality of the marriage.72 Two studies show that spouses, particularly husbands, are more likely to sacrifice for their spouse if they are strongly committed to the future of their marriages.73 A recent study finds that womens marital happiness, and their reports of happiness with their husbands affection and understanding, are strongly and positively linked to high levels of shared spousal commitment to pro-marriage norms.74 Another study found that fathers who are normatively commited to marriage are significantly more likely to praise and hug their children than fathers who are not committed to marriage.75 Scholars speculate that a strong normative commitment to marriage makes married adults less likely to look for alternative partners and more conscious of the long-term character of their relationship, both of which encourage them to invest more in their current relationship.76 Thus, adults who hold a strong normative commitment to marriage appear to enjoy higher-quality relationships with family members, compared to adults who are not strongly committed to the institution of marriage.
8.
Marriage has important biosocial consequences for adults and children.
Marriage has biological consequences for adults and children. We are just beginning to discover the myriad ways that marriage seems to promote good outcomes in what social scientists call the biosocial area of lifethe connection between our social relationships and how our bodies function. In the last decade, two marriage-related biosocial outcomes have emerged as particularly important. First, marriage appears to reduce mens testosterone levels. More than five studies analyzing different populations find that married men (especially married fathers) have lower testerone levels than similar men who are never-married or divorced.77 For this outcome, however, cohabiting
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men appear to be affected just as much as are married men. What seems to matter for mens testorone levels are intimate, ongoing, and everyday relationships with one woman.78 Given that testosterone is associated with aggression, sensation-seeking, and a range of other antisocial behaviors, one of the ways that marriage may influence men is by reducing their levels of testosterone.79 Of course, there may be selection effects at work: that is, it may be that men with lower levels of testosterone are less likely to engage in antisocial behavior and more likely to marry. The two longitudinal studies done so far have obtained mixed results. One strongly suggests that, for men, marriage plays a causal role in driving down testosterone (as well as cortisol).80 The other has found no effect of becoming partnered (defined as a long-term monogamous relationship) on mens testosterone level.81 Future research will have to further unpack the relationships between marriage, testosterone, fatherhood, and antisocial behavior among men. Second, girls appear to benefit in their sexual development from growing up in an intact, married family. Extensive research by psychologist Bruce Ellis and others indicates that adolescent girls who grow up apart from an intact, married household are significantly more likely to have early menstruation, premature sexual activity, and a teenage pregnancy.82 He finds that girls who have close, engaged relationships with their fathers have menstruation at a later age and that girls who lose their biological father as young children have menstruation at an earlier age. Moreover, girls who live with an unrelated male (e.g., stepfather, mothers boyfriend) have menstruation even earlier than girls living in a single-mother household. Ellis speculates that girls sexual development is influenced by the male pheromonesbiological chemicals that individuals emit to one another, which have been associated with accelerated sexual development in mammalsthey encounter in their social environment. The pheromones of their father appear to inhibit premature sexual development, while the pheromones of an unrelated male appear to accelerate such development. In Elliss words: These findingsare broadly consistent with the hypothesis that pheromonal exposure to the biological father inhibits pubertal development in daughters.83 Early sexual development, in turn, is associated with significantly higher levels of premature sexual activity and teenage pregnancy on the part of girls, even after controlling for economic and psychological factors in the household that might otherwise confound the relationship between family structure and girls sexual activity.84 So this line of research strongly suggests that an intact, married household protects girls from premature sexual development and, consequently, teen pregnancy. One
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genetically-informed study, however, suggests that much of this association may be due to selection into family structure by genetic predisposition (i.e., both mother and daughter have an underlying biological makeup that makes them more likely to have early menstruation). In a study of children of sisters, including twin sisters, there was no difference in age at first sex for the offspring of twin sister dyads where one child had a father in the home and the other did not, but there was for the children of non-twin sisters.85 Future research will have to determine if genes, environment, or some combination thereof account for the association between father absence and early menstruation among adolescent girls.
Economics
9. Divorce and unmarried childbearing increase poverty for both children and mothers, and cohabitation is less likely to alleviate poverty than is marriage.
Research has consistently shown that both divorce86 and unmarried childbearing87 increase the economic vulnerability of both children and mothers. The effects of family structure on poverty remain powerful, even after controlling for race and family background. Changes in family structure are an important cause of new entries into poverty (although a decline in the earnings of the household head is the single most important cause). Child poverty rates are high in part because of the growth of single-parent families.88 In fact, some studies indicate that all of the increase in child poverty since the 1970s can be attributed to increases in single parenthood due to divorce and nonmarital childbearing.89 When parents fail to marry and stay married, children are more likely to experience deep and persistent poverty, even after controlling for race and family background. The majority of children who grow up outside of intact, married families experience at least one year of dire poverty (family incomes less than half the official poverty threshold).90 Divorce as well as unmarried childbearing plays a role: between one-fifth and one-third of divorcing women end up in poverty following the divorce.91 Cohabitation does not alleviate poverty as well as marriage does. The ratio of income to needs for children in cohabiting families is .43 points lower than that of those in married families.92 The effect of divorce on womens incomes persists in contemporary America, but it appears to have lessened since 1980 as womens labor market position has improved.93 Single mothers income gains have been only marginal across the same time period.94
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10. Married couples seem to build more wealth on average than singles or cohabiting couples.
Marriage seems to be a wealth-creating institution. Married couples build more wealth on average than do otherwise similar singles or cohabiting couples, even after controlling for income.95 Analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979 cohort), which tracked respondents from adolescence to their early forties, reveals that the per person net worth of married individuals is 93 percent higher than it is for single individuals, and divorced individuals have a per person net worth 77 percent lower than single respondents.96 The economic advantages of marriage stem from more than just access to two incomes. Marriage partners appear to build more wealth for some of the same reasons that partnerships in general are economically efficient, including economies of scale and specialization and exchange. Marital social norms that encourage healthy, productive behavior and wealth accumulation (such as buying a home) also appear to play a role. Married parents also more often receive wealth transfers from both sets of grandparents than do cohabiting couples; single mothers almost never receive financial help from the childs fathers kin.97 Interestingly, the effect of fatherhood on asset accumulation varies by marital status: married fathers increased their rate of asset accumulation after becoming fathers while unmarried fathers saw their rate of asset accumulation decline.98
11. Marriage reduces poverty and material hardship for disadvantaged women and their children.
A growing body of research by economist Robert I. Lerman and others indicates that the economic benefits of marriage extend even to women who come from disadvantaged backgrounds. Focusing on low-income families, Lerman found that married couples with children generally had lower levels of material hardshipthat is, they were less likely to miss a meal or fail to pay their utilities, rent, or mortgagecompared to other families, especially single-mothers living alone.99 In another study, he found that mothers with low academic abilities who married saw their living standards end up about 65 percent higher than similar single mothers living with no other adult, over 50 percent higher than single mothers living with another adult, and 20 percent higher than mothers who were cohabiting.100 Other research has found that disadvantaged mothers are significantly less likely to be in poverty if they had their first child in marriage, compared to similar mothers who had their first child
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out-of-wedlock. This research found that 35 percent of disadvantaged African American mothers who had a nonmarital first birth are below the poverty line, compared to 17 percent of African American mothers who had a marital first birth. The protective effect of marriage is even stronger among women at high risk of poverty versus those at low risk.101 Why is marriage more likely to help poor women and children than cohabitation? Married couples appear to share more of their income and other property, they get more support from extended families and friends, and they get more help from civic institutions (churches, food pantries, etc.).102 There are two caveats to this work. First, marriage does not produce as many benefits for women who have a premarital birth.103 Second, marriage also does not produce much of an economic boost for women who go on to divorce, and divorce is more common among women with comparatively low levels of income and education.104 So women, particularly poor women, do not much benefit economically from marriage unless their marriages are stable.
12.
Minorities benefit economically from marriage also.
The economic benefits associated with marriage are not limited to whites. Research also suggests that African Americans and Latinos benefit materially from marriage. Studies find marriage effects at the community and individual levels. At the societal level, black child poverty rates would be almost 20 percent lower than they currently are had the proportion of black children living in married families not fallen below 1970 levels.105 At the individual level, one study found that black single mothers who marry see their income rise by 81 percent (compared to an income increase of 45 percent for white single mothers). This same study found that the income of black children fell by 53 percent two years after a divorce.106 Another study of older women indicates that married African American women enjoy significantly more income than their widowed, divorced, and never married peers.107 Both black and Hispanic older women experience declines in household income and assets following marital disruption, be it divorce or widowhood.108 Black men who marry also see a significant increase in their income, about $4000 according to one estimate.109 Black men see bigger increases in their household incomes than do white men (increases of 31 percent and 23 percent, respectively) because black women are more likely to work than white
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women.110 Finally, African Americans and Latinos who are married also enjoy significantly higher levels of household equity, compared to their peers who are not married.111
13. Married men earn more money than do single men with similar education and job histories.
A large body of research, both in the United States and other developed countries, finds that married men earn between 10 and 40 percent more than do single men with similar education and job histories.112 While selection effects may account for part of the marriage premium (insofar as men with more stable and better-paying jobs are more likely to marry),113 the most sophisticated, recent research appears to confirm that marriage itself increases the earning power of men on the order of 21 to 24 percent.114 A study of identical twin pairs, which was able to account more rigorously for selection effects, similarly found an earnings increase of 26 percent.115 Why do married men earn more? The causes are not entirely understood, but married men appear to have greater work commitment, more strategic approaches to job searches, and healthier and more stable personal routines (including sleep, diet, and alcohol consumption). One study found that married men were more likely to quit with a new job in hand, less likely to quit without a new job in hand, and less likely to be fired, compared to unmarried men.116 Husbands also benefit from both the work effort and emotional support that they receive from wives.117 A study of German men finds that married men may also be less content with their earnings, which may spur them to work harder and earn higher wages.118 All of the findings along these lines are consistent with the larger proposition advanced by sociologist Steven Nock that men undergo an important average transformation in their sense of themselves and their responsibilities in the transition from nonmarriage to marriage.119
14. Parental divorce (or failure to marry) appears to increase childrens risk of school failure.
Parental divorce or nonmarriage has a significant, long-term negative impact on childrens educational attainment. Children of divorced or unwed parents have lower grades and other measures of academic
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achievement, are more likely to be held back, and are more likely to drop out of high school. The effects of parental divorce or nonmarriage on childrens educational attainment remain significant even after controlling for race, family background, and genetic factors.120 Another nationally-representative study of more than 1,000 adolescents that controlled for differences in parental education and income found that teenagers were 60 percent less likely to graduate from high school if they came from cohabiting families, compared to their peers who came from intact, married families.121 Likewise, kindergarteners living with cohabiting parents have lower reading, math, and general knowledge scoreswhether they are living with their biological cohabiting parents or one parent and a cohabiting partner. The differences in math and general knowledge are explained by differences in parenting practices and maternal depression, but differences in reading ability remain even after having accounted for these factors.122 Adolescents who live in stable cohabiting families become less engaged in school than those in stable biological married families, single-mother families, or married stepfamilies. Those in single-mother families have decreased engagement compared to those in stable biological married families. Transitioning into a cohabiting family lowers school engagement as well, as does transitioning from a cohabiting family to a married stepfamily.123 Indeed, family transitions in general have been linked to poorer academic achievement,124 and both family structure and transitions appear to matter for educational outcomes.125 Children whose parents divorce end up with significantly lower levels of education than do children in single-mother families created by the death of the father.126 Children whose parents remarry do no better, on average, than do children who live with single mothers.127 It is not yet clear if the effects of family structure vary by race. Some studies indicate that African American educational performance is affected more than white performance by father absence, whereas other studies come to the opposite conclusion.128
15. Parental divorce reduces the likelihood that children will graduate from college and achieve high-status jobs.
Parental divorce appears to have long-term consequences on childrens socioeconomic attainment. While most children of divorce do not drop out of high school or become unemployed, as adults, children of divorced parents have lower occupational status and earnings and have increased rates of unemployment and economic hardship.129 They are less likely to attend and graduate from college and also less
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likely to attend and graduate from four-year and highly selective colleges, even after controlling for family background and academic and extracurricular achievements.130 One reason for this may be that divorced parents contribute significantly less money to their childrens college education. While married parents contribute a median of $1,804 per year to college costs, divorced (and not remarried) parents contribute just $502, and remarried parents just $500differences that persist after controlling income and other relevant factors. Divorced parents may have underreported their ex-spouses contribution, but even so their contribution is not likely to rise anywhere near the level of married parents.131
Physical Health and Longevity

16. Children who live with their own two married parents enjoy better physical health, on average, than do children in other family forms.
Divorce and unmarried childbearing appear to have negative effects on childrens physical health and life expectancy.132 Longitudinal research suggests that parental divorce and cohabitation increase the incidence of health problems in children.133 For example, in one recent longitudinal study the probability that a five-year-old child with stably-married parents was in excellent health was .69, compared to probabiliies of .65 for those whose parents divorced, .62 for those whose parents stably cohabited, and .59 for those whose parents dissolved their cohabitation.134 The health advantages of married homes remain, even after taking socioeconomic status into account. Even in Sweden, a country with an extensive social welfare system and a nationalized health care system, children who grow up outside an intact family are much more likely to suffer serious disadvantages. One recent study of the entire Swedish population of children found that boys who were reared in single-parent homes were more than 50 percent more likely to die from a range of causese.g., suicide, accidents, or addictionthan boys who were reared in two-parent homes. Moreover, even after controlling for the socioeconomic status and psychological health of parents, Swedish boys and girls in singleparent families were more than twice as likely as children in twoparent families to suffer from psychiatric diseases, suicide attempts, alcoholism, and drug abuse; they were also more likely to experience traffic injuries, falls, and poisonings than their peers in two-parent families.135
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The health effects of family structure extend into adulthood. One study that followed a sample of academically gifted, middle-class children for seventy years found that parental divorce reduced a childs life expectancy by four years, even after controlling for childhood health status and family background, as well as personality characteristics such as impulsiveness and emotional instability.136 Another analysis found that forty-year-old men whose parents had divorced were three times more likely to die in the next forty years than were forty-year-old men whose parents stayed married. [I]t does appear, the researchers conclude, that parental divorce sets off a negative chain of events, which contribute to a higher mortality risk among individuals from divorced homes.137
17. Parental marriage is associated with a sharply lower risk of infant mortality.
Babies born to married parents have lower rates of infant mortality. On average, having an unmarried mother is associated with an approximately 50 percent increase in the risk of infant mortality.138 While parental marital status predicts infant mortality in both blacks and whites, the increased risk due to the mothers marital status is greatest among the most advantaged: white mothers over the age of twenty.139 The cause of this relationship between marital status and infant mortality is not well known. There are many selection effects involved: Unmarried mothers are more likely to be young, black, less educated, and poor than are married mothers. But even after controlling for age, race, and education, children born to unwed mothers generally have higher rates of infant mortality.140 While unmarried mothers are also less likely to get early prenatal care,141 infant mortality rates in these instances are higher not only in the neonatal period, but through infancy142 and even early childhood.143 Children born to unmarried mothers have an increased incidence of both intentional and unintentional fatal injuries.144 The sharp differences in infant mortality between married women who list a fathers name on the birth certificate and both married and unmarried women who dont, compared to the smaller (but still signficant) difference between married and unmarried women who list a fathers name on the birth certificate, suggests paternal involvement may be a key factor in avoiding infant mortality and explaining the marital advantage.145 Marital status remains a powerful predictor of infant mortality, even in countries with nationalized health care systems and strong supports for single mothers.146
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18. Marriage is associated with reduced rates of alcohol and substance abuse for both adults and teens.
Married men and women have lower rates of alcohol consumption and abuse than do singles (including cohabitors). Longitudinal research confirms that young adults, particularly men, who marry tend to reduce their rates of alcohol consumption and illegal drug use.147 Children whose parents marry and stay married also have lower rates of substance abuse, even after controlling for family background and the genetic traits of the parents.148 Twice as many young teens in singlemother families and stepfamilies have tried marijuana (and young teens living with single fathers were three times as likely). Young teens whose parents stay married are also the least likely to experiment with tobacco or alcohol.149 Data from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse show that, even after controlling for age, race, gender, and family income, teens living with both biological parents are significantly less likely to use illicit drugs, alcohol, and tobacco.150 How does family fragmentation relate to teen drug use? Many pathways are probably involved, including increased family stress, reduced parental monitoring, and weakened attachment to parents, especially fathers.151
19. Married people, especially married men, have longer life expectancies than do otherwise similar singles.
Married people live longer than do otherwise similar people who are single or divorced.152 Husbands as well as wives live longer on average, even after controlling for race, income, and family background.153 In most developed countries, middle-aged single, divorced, or widowed men are about twice as likely to die as married men, and nonmarried women face risks about one-and-a-half times as great as those faced by married women.154 These differences by marital status have persisted over time, and the differences between married and widowed individuals may even have intensified in recent years.155 One recent study argues that rather than crude measures of marital status, marital historiesthe nexus of marital status, timing, transitions, and durationare predictive of mortality. Indeed, marital status was the least robust indicator of longer life, and accumulation of marriage duration the most robust. Nevertheless, each of these marital factors was important in predicting survival. The effect of marriage on life expectancy
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begins in young adulthood and accrues across the life course as individuals remain in, exit, and reenter marital relationships.156 Thus, even for adults, the stability of married life across the life course plays an important role in fostering adult health.
20. Marriage is associated with better health and lower rates of injury, illness, and disability for both men and women.
Both married men and women enjoy better health on average than do single, cohabiting, or divorced individuals.157 Selection effects regarding divorce or remarriage may account for part of this differential, although research has found no consistent pattern of such selection.158 Married people appear to manage illness better, monitor each others health, have higher incomes and wealth, and adopt healthier lifestyles than do otherwise similar singles.159 For example, one recent study finds married men have higher serum carotenoid levels than never-married, divorced, or widowed men, and married women have higher levels of the same than do widowed women, suggesting marriage promotes diets higher in fruit and vegetable intake.160 A recent study of the health effects of marriage drawn from 9,333 respondents to the Health and Retirement Survey of Americans between the ages of fifty-one and sixty-one compared the incidence of major diseases, as well as functional disability, in married, cohabiting, divorced, widowed, and never-married individuals. Without exception, the authors report, married persons have the lowest rates of morbidity for each of the diseases, impairments, functioning problems and disabilities. Marital status differences in disability remained dramatic even after controlling for age, sex, and race/ethnicity.161 Another study from the federally-funded Centers for Disease Control found that married adults were less likely to be in poor health, to have activity limitations, to have headaches, to suffer serious pyschological distress, to smoke, and to have a drinking problem, compared to widowed, divorced, and cohabiting adults.162 However, studies also suggest that the health effects of marriage vary by marital quality, especially for women. Research by psychologist Janice Kiecolt-Glaser and her colleagues indicates that womens health is particularly likely to suffer when they are in poor-quality relationships and thrive when they are in high-quality relationships. For instance, negative marital behaviors (e.g., criticisms, put-downs, sarcasm) are associated with increased levels of stress hormones (epinepherine, ACTH, and
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norepinephrine), with higher blood pressure, and with declines in immune functioning.163 So, particularly for women, marital quality, not simply marital status, is strongly correlated to better health outcomes. Moreover, there is a negative effect of poor marital quality on self-rated health that appears to grow with age,164 and remaining in a long-term, low-quality marriage may actually be worse for ones overall health than getting divorced.165 Low marital quality has been implicated as one reason why single mothers who marry do not reap the marital benefits that childless women who marry do.166 Marital conflict also appears to be tied to functional impairment among midlife and older adults.167 As with studies of marriage and mortality, marital status may not adequately gauge the effect of marital history on physical health. For both men and women, marriage duration is associated with lower rates of disease. For women, early marriage (at or before age eighteen) and number of divorce transitions predict poorer health outcomes; for men, divorce duration and widowhood transitions are important.168 But here, again, the research suggests that a stable, lifelong marriage typically benefits women and mens health. Despite the overall health advantages for married individuals, the transition to marriage is associated with at least one disadvantage: weight gain.169 In one recent study, researchers found that those who married had BMI scores 1.129 units higher, on average, than those who remained unmarried three years laterthe equivalent of gaining eight pounds for a person 510 tall and weighing 170 pounds.170 Both men and women who marry are more than two times more likely to become obese than those who are in a non-cohabiting, dating relationship.171 Here, adults who marry probably feel less pressure to stay fit to attract or keep a partner, compared to their unmarried peers.
21. Marriage seems to be associated with better health among minorities and the poor.
A recent report from the Centers for Disease Control indicates that African American, Latino, and low-income adults also enjoy health benefits from marriage. African American and Latino adults who are married are less likely to be in poor health, to have activity limitations, to smoke, to have a drinking problem, and to suffer serious pyschological distress, compared to cohabiting, never-married, divorced, and widowed adults who were African American or Latino. Poor married adults were less likely to be in poor health, to have activity limitations, to smoke, to have
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a drinking problem, or to suffer serious psychological distress, compared to cohabiting, divorced, and widowed adults. (However, they did not do consistently better than never-married adults).172 Nevertheless, marriage may also increase the risk of obesity for African American women.173 Marriage also has implications for child health. Studies indicate that Latino and African American infants are significantly more likely to die at or around birth, suffer from low birth weight, or be born premature if they are born outside of marriage.174 More research needs to be done on the health consequences of marriage for low-income and minority populations to confirm and extend these findings.
Mental Health and Emotional Well-Being

22. Children whose parents divorce have higher rates of psychological distress and mental illness.
In the last four decades, a large body of research on divorce has accumulated that generally indicates that divorce often causes children considerable emotional distress and doubles the risk that they will experience serious pyschological problems later in life.175 Children of divorce are at higher risk for depression and other mental illness over the course of their lives, in part because of reduced educational attainment, increased risk of divorce, marital problems, and economic hardship.176 A twenty-five-year study by psychologist Judith Wallerstein and her colleagues found that that the effects of divorce on children crescendoed as they enter adulthood. Their relationships with the opposite sex were often impaired by acute fears of betrayal and abandonment, and many also complained that they had never witnessed a man and a woman in a happy relationship and doubted that achieving such a relationship was possible.177 Indeed, the recent growth of cohabitation flows in part from the loss of confidence that many children of divorce have in marriage.178 Having witnessed divorce up close, many young adults are afraid that they will not achieve lifelong love and they feel handicapped in their search for love and marriage by their lack of models of a happy relationship between a man and a woman, their lack of knowledge about how to resolve differences, and their expectation of betrayal and abandonment by their lover, wife, or husband.179 So they cohabit, date, or hookup instead of marrying. Since Wallerstein published her pioneering book, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children a Decade After Divorce, which suggested
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that divorce was associated with a fear of abandonment, sleeplessness, a rise in aggression, and chronic anxiety among the children of divorce, a large body of research on divorce has accumulated, which generally indicates that divorce often causes children considerable emotional distress and doubles the risk that they will experience serious pyschological problems later in life. Children of divorce are at higher risk for depression and other mental illness over the course of their lives, in part because of reduced educational attainment, increased risk of divorce, marital problems, and economic hardship. The timing of the breakup may matter as well. Family instability prior to the end of kindergarten (be it divorce or another type of parental breakup) but not from first through fourth grades heightens externalizing behavior problems and lowers peer compentency among fifth graders.180 There is mixed evidence as to whether these higher rates of psychological distress are causally related to parental divorce or instead to some genetic factor(s). Studies from two sitesAustralia and Virginia conducted by the same research team report very different results. Two of these studies followed identical and nonidentical twins in Australia who married and had children. Some of these twins went on to divorce. By comparing the children of divorce with children from intact families in this sample, the researchers were able to determine the role that genetic factors played in fostering psychological problems among the children of divorce. Specifically, these studies found that children of divorce were significantly more likely to suffer from depression, alcohol and drug abuse, delinquency, and thoughts of suicide.181 In the researchers own words: The results of the modeling indicated that parental divorce was associated with young-adult offspring psychopathology even when controlling for genetic and common environmental factors related to the twin parent.182 However, in a similarly-designed study of Virginians, the researchers found that the apparent effect of parental divorce on emotional problems could be attributed to genetic differences among parents who divorced, even as genetics did not explain the association between parental divorce and alcohol problems.183 The researchers note that cross-cultural differences, measurement differences, or sampling differences may account for the discrepancy. There is some additional evidence that the psychological effects of divorce differ depending on the level of conflict between parents prior to divorce. When marital conflict is high and sustained, children benefit psychologically from divorce. When marital conflict is low, children
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suffer psychologically from divorce. Unfortunately, about two-thirds of divorces appear to be taking place among low-conflict spouses.184
23. Cohabitation is associated with higher levels of psychological problems among children.
Studies find that children in cohabiting families are significantly more likely to experience depression, difficulty sleeping, feelings of worthlessness, nervousness, and tension, compared to children in intact, married households.185 For example, one nationally-representative study of six- to eleven-year-olds found that 15.7 percent of children in cohabiting families experienced serious emotional problems (e.g., depression, feelings of inferiority, etc.), compared to just 3.5 percent of children in families headed by married biological or adoptive parents.186 Kindergartners in cohabiting stepfamilies report more sadness and loneliness than those who live with their married biological parents. Those who cohabit with their biological parents do not differ from those who live with their married parents. Both types of cohabiting families, however, are associated with lower levels of self-control among kindergartners.187 Adolescents in stably cohabiting stepfamilies experience more increases in depression than their counterparts in stable biological parent families, and transitioning from a cohabiting stepfamily to a married stepfamily also appears to increase depression among adolescents.188 The effect of cohabitation may be contingent on its social institutionalization. For example, children born born to Latina mothers in countries where cohabitation is more prevalent and accepted exhibit less externalizing behavioral problems than those born in countries where it is less institutionalized.189 But, in the United States at least, cohabitation is a risk factor for childrens mental health.
24. Family breakdown appears significantly to increase the risk of suicide.
High rates of family fragmentation are associated with an increased risk of suicide among both adults and adolescents.190 Divorced men and women are more than twice as likely as their married counterparts to attempt suicide.191 Married individuals were also substantially less likely to commit suicide than were divorced, widowed, or never-married individuals.192 In the last half-century, suicide rates among teens and
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young adults have tripled. The single most important explanatory variable, according to one new study, is the increased share of youths living in homes with a divorced parent. The effect, note the researchers, is large, explaining as much as two-thirds of the increase in youth suicides over time.193 Another study suggests that if family structure remained as it was in 1970, 179,000 fewer children per year would consider suicide and 71,000 fewer children would attempt suicide.194
25. Married mothers have lower rates of depression than do single or cohabiting mothers.
The absence of marriage is a serious risk factor for maternal depression. Married mothers have lower rates of depression than do cohabiting or single mothers. Cohabiting mothers are more likely to be depressed because they are much less confident that their relationship will last, compared to married mothers.195 Married mothers also perceive that they receive more support from their child(ren)s father.196 Single mothers are more likely to be depressed by the burdens associated with parenting alone. One study of 2,300 urban adults found that, among parents of preschoolers, the risk of depression was substantially greater for unmarried as compared to married mothers.197 Single mothers who marry (and remain married), moreover, receive the same mental health benefits as childless women who marry.198 Marriage protects even older teen mothers from the risk of depression. In one nationally representative sample of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old mothers, 41 percent of single white mothers having their first child reported high levels of depressive symptoms, compared to 28 percent of married white teen mothers in this age group.199 Longitudinal studies following young adults as they marry, divorce, and remain single indicate that marriage boosts mental and emotional wellbeing for both men and women.200 We focus on maternal depression because it is both a serious mental health problem for women and a serious risk factor for children.201 Not only are single mothers more likely to be depressed, the consequences of maternal depression for child well-being are greater in single-parent families, probably because single parents have less support and because children in disrupted families have less access to their (nondepressed) other parent.202 One study found that single mothers who are no longer in a romantic relationship (of any kind) with their childs father one year after the birth exhibit the most mental health problems, but even those who are
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cohabiting with the father or in a romantic, non-cohabiting relationship with the father have more mental health problems than married mothers. In this study, about 29 percent of mothers who were no longer in a romantic relationship with their childs father report at least one mental health problem, compared to 24 percent of those in a romantic, noncohabiting relationship, 23 percent of those in a cohabiting relationship, and 16 percent of those who were married. These differences persisted even after controls for relevant background characteristics.203
Crime and Domestic Violence 26. Boys raised in non-intact families are more likely to engage in delinquent and criminal behavior.
Even after controlling for factors such as race, mothers education, neighborhood quality, and cognitive ability, one recent study found that boys raised in single-parent homes are about twice as likely (and boys raised in stepfamilies are more than two-and-a-half times as likely) to have committed a crime that leads to incarceration by the time they reach their early thirties. (The study found that slightly more than 7 percent of boys were incarcerated at some point between the ages of fifteen and thirty.)204 Teens in both one-parent and remarried homes display more deviant behavior and commit more delinquent acts than do teens whose parents stayed married.205 Teens in one-parent families are on average less attached to their parents opinions and more attached to their peer groups. Combined with lower levels of parental supervision, these attitudes appear to set the stage for delinquent behavior.206 However, some research indicates that the link between single-parenthood and delinquency does not hold for African American children.207 The research on cohabiting families and youth crime and delinquency is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, studies indicate that adolescents in cohabiting families are more likely to engage in delinquent behavior, to cheat, and to be suspended from school.208 Moreover, white and Latino adolescents in cohabiting households were more likely to have behavioral problems than adolescents living in intact, married households and adolescents living in single-mother households.209 One reason that teens in cohabiting households appear to do worse than teens living in singleparent homes is that cohabiting households are usually led by their mother and an unrelated male. Such boyfriends are more likely to be
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abusive than a married father, and they are also more likely to compete with the child for the attention of the mother.210 Family transitions are also related to increases in delinquency among adolescents. Specifically, moving from a two-biological parent family to a single-mother family and moving from a single-mother family to either a cohabiting or married stepfamily is associated with an increase in delinquency for adolescents. However, moving to a single-mother family from a married or cohabiting stepfamily does not appear to matter, nor does moving from a cohabiting stepfamily to a married stepfamily. In other words, children who transition out of a stable, intact, married family are more likely to engage in delinquent behavior.211
27. Marriage appears to reduce the risk that adults will be either perpetrators or victims of crime.
Overall, single and divorced women are four to five times more likely to be victims of violent crime in any given year than are married women. Single and divorced women are almost ten times more likely than are wives to be raped, and about three times more likely to be the victims of aggravated assault. For instance, the U.S. Department of Justice estimates that the violent victimization rate was 17 per 1000 married women compared to more than 60 per 1000 single and divorced women in 19921993. Similarly, compared to husbands, unmarried men are about four times as likely to become victims of violent crime.212 Marriage also plays a crucial role in reducing male criminality.213 A study of five hundred chronic juvenile offenders found that those who married and enjoyed high-quality marriages reduced their offense rate by two-thirds, compared to criminals who did not marry or who did not establish good marriages.214 Research by sociologist Robert Sampson indicates that murder and robbery rates in urban America are strongly tied to the health of marriage in urban communities. Specifically, he found that high rates of family disruption and low rates of marriage were associated with high rates of murder and robbery among both African American and white adults and juveniles.215 In his words, Family structure is one of the strongest, if not the strongest, predictor of variations in urban violence across cities in the United States.216 Another recent study comes to a similar conclusion, claiming that the difference in family structure between whites and blacks is one of the most consistent explanations for the black-white homicide gap.217 Marriage also reduces criminality in the Netherlands, indicating the
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effect is not unique to the American context.218 Other research indicates that declines in marriage rates among working-class and poor men in the 1970s drove crime rates markedly higher in that decade. The reason? Married men spend more time with their wives, who discourage criminal behavior, and less time with peers, who often do not.219 Some of the most rigorous research on the causal relationship between marriage and crime finds that marriage reduces the odds of a man committing a crime by about 35 percent.220
28. Married women appear to have a lower risk of experiencing domestic violence than do cohabiting or dating women.
Domestic violence remains a serious problem both inside and outside of marriage. While young women must recognize that marriage is not a good strategy for reforming violent men, a large body of research shows that being unmarried, and especially living with a man outside of marriage, is associated with an increased risk of domestic abuse.221 One analysis of the National Survey of Families and Households found that cohabitors were over three times more likely than spouses to say that arguments became physical over the last year (13 percent of cohabitors versus 4 percent of spouses). Even after controlling for race, age, and education, people who live together are still more likely than married people to report violent arguments.222 Mothers of infants likewise report higher incidence of partner violence when they are either cohabiting or in a non-cohabiting romantic relationship.223 During young adulthood, however, when marriage is less normative and dating more so, there does not appear to be differences in relationship violence between marrieds and daters. Even so, the difference between marrieds and cohabitors persists for young adult women.224 Another study of domestic violence among African Americans found that African American women were more likely to be victimized if they were living in neighborhoods with higher proportions of cohabiting couples.225 Overall, as one scholar sums up the relevant research, Regardless of methodology, the studies yielded similar results: Cohabitors engage in more violence than do spouses.226 Selection effects play a powerful role. Women are less likely to marry, and more likely to divorce, violent men. So, one reason that women in cohabiting relationships are more likely to have a violent partner is that cohabiting women in nonviolent relationships are more likely to move
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into marriage, whereas cohabiting women in violent relationships are less likely to move on to marriage; this means that the most violent relationships are more likely to remain cohabiting ones.227 However, scholars suggest that the greater integration of married men into the community, and the greater investment of spouses in each other, also play a role.228 Married men, for example, are more responsive to policies such as mandatory arrest policies, designed to signal strong disapproval of domestic violence.229
29. A child who is not living with his or her own two married parents is at greater risk of child abuse.
Children living with single mothers, mothers boyfriends, or stepfathers are more likely to become victims of child abuse.230 Children living in single-mother homes have increased rates of death from intentional injuries.231 Another national study found that 7 percent of children who had lived with one parent had experienced sexual abuse, compared to 4 percent of children who lived with both biological parents, largely because they had more contact with unrelated adult males.232 Other research found that, although boyfriends contribute less than 2 percent of nonparental childcare, they commit half of all reported child abuse by nonparents. The researcher concludes that a young child left alone with a mothers boyfriend experiences elevated risk of physical abuse.233 A recent federal report on child maltreatment found that [c]hildren living with two married biological parents had the lowest rate of overall Harm Standard maltreatment, at 6.8 per 1,000 children, whereas [c]hildren living with one parent who had an unmarried partner in the household had the highest incidence of Harm Standard maltreatment (57.2 per 1,000).234 Another study focusing on fatal child abuse in Missouri found that preschool children were 47.6 times more likely to die in a cohabiting household, compared to preschool children living in an intact, married household.235 Stepfathers also present risks to children. As psychologists Martin Daly and Margo Wilson reported, Living with a stepparent has turned out to be the most powerful predictor of severe child abuse yet.236 Studies have found that young children in stepfamilies are more than fifty times more likely to be murdered by a stepparent (usually a stepfather) than by a biological parent.237 One study found that a preschooler living with a stepfather was forty times more likely to be sexually abused than one living with both of his or her biological parents.238
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30. There is a growing marriage gap between college-educated Americans and less-educated Americans.
As late as the 1970s, the vast majority of adult Americans were living in an intact marriage, and almost nine in ten children were born into married families. No longer. Now, less than half of adults are married, and almost half white high-school educated Americans.239 Clearly, the nations retreat from marriage has dramatically reshaped the nature of adult life, and the context of family life for children. But this retreat from marriage has hit poor, working-class, and minority communities with particular force. By contrast, marriage trends among more educated and affluent Americans have largedly stabilized or taken a turn for the better. For instance, nonmarital childbearing rose more than six-fold from 5 percent in 1982 to 34 percent in 20062008 among white high-school educated Americans. Over this same period, it did not rise at all for white college-educated Americans, among whom only 2 percent of children were born ou tside of marriage in the 1980s and the 2000s. Similarly, over this same period, family instability rose among Americans who did not have college degrees, but fell among college-educated Americans. Since 1982, the percentage of fourteen-year-olds living with both of their parents has declined for children living with parents who do not have college degrees, while it has increased for children whose parents have college degrees.240 Thus, in the United States today, there is a growing marriage gap such that the educated and the affluent are enjoying more stable and highquality marriages, and the less educated and less affluent are experiencing lower-quality and less stable marriages. Indeed, poor and workingclass Americans are increasingly foregoing marriage entirely, opting instead for cohabiting unions that often do not serve them and their children well over the long term. The growing marriage gap is troubling for at least two reasons. It leaves working-class and poor adults more distanced from an institution that has historically lent purpose, meaning, responsibility, mutual aid, and a sense of solidarity to the lives of countless men and women. And it leaves children in poor and working-class communities doubly disadvantaged, insofar as children in these communities have access to fewer socioeconomic resources and fewer intact, married families.
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Conclusion
It is also a social good. This is not to claim that every person can or should marry. Or that every child raised outside of marriage is damaged as a result. Marriage is not a panacea that will solve all of our social problems. But marriage matters. Children in average intact, married families are more likely to thrive than children in average single- and stepparent families, and families headed by cohabiting couples. Communities where good-enough marriages are common have better outcomes for children, women, and men than do communities marked by high rates of divorce, unmarried childbearing, cohabition, and high-conflict or violent marriages. Moreover, as we have seen, the benefits of a strong marriage culture extend across lines of race, ethnicity, and class. Indeed, if we adapt a public health perspective in thinking about the effects of marriage on the commonweal, we can see that the effects of marriage areat the societal levelquite large. Sociologist Paul Amato recently estimated the effects of returning marriage rates for households with children to the level they were in 1980. This is what he found:
Increasing marital stability to the same level as in 1980 is associated with a decline of nearly one-half million children suspended from school, about two hundred thousand fewer children engaging in delinquency or violence, a quarter of a million fewer children receiving therapy, about a quarter of a million fewer smokers, about 80,000 fewer children thinking about suicide, and about 28,000 fewer children attempting suicide.241
ARRIAGE IS MORE THAN A PRIVATE EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP.
So the institutional strength of marriage in our society has clear consequences for children, adults, and the communities in which they live. If policy makers are concerned about issues as varied as poverty, crime, child well-being, rising economic inequality, and the fiscal limits of the contemporary welfare state, they should recognize that the nations retreat from marriage is closely connected to all of these issues. To strengthen marriage, more funding is needed for research that points the way toward new public policies, community initiatives, and public campaigns to help strengthen marriage, particularly in minority and low-income communities most affected by the retreat from marriage. We also need ongoing, basic scientific research on marriage, cohabitation,
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and family instability that contributes to the development of strategies and programs that help strengthen marriage and slow the relational merry-go-round that all too many adults and children now find themselves riding.242 There is promising evidence of successful strategies,243 but such strategies should continue to be informed by ongoing research. We need to answer questions like the following: What are the long-term consequences for children of growing up in increasingly unstable and complex families? How can we prevent nonmarital childbearing and bridge the marriage gap? How can families, marriage educators, therapists, and public policy help working-class and poor parents recognize that cohabitation does not compare to marriage when it comes to starting a family? How can communities be mobilized to promote a marriagefriendly culture? And how do we bring together those who are doing the grassroots work of strengthening marriage with researchers and public officials in order to create synergies of knowledge, practice, and public policy? If marriage is not merely a private preference, but also a social and public good, concerned citizens, as well as scholars, need and deserve answers to these and similar questions.
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Appendix: Figures
FIGURE 1. PERCENT OF FIRST CHILDREN EXPERIENCING PARENTAL DIVORCE BY AGE 10, BY PARENTS YEAR OF MARRIAGE (1960-1997)
28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20
1960
TO
PERCENT
1965
TO
1970
TO
1975
TO
1980
TO
1985
TO
1990
TO
1995
TO
1964
1969
1974
1979
1984
1989
1994
1997
Source: SIPP Data, 2001, 2004, and 2008. Women with premarital births excluded.
FIGURE 2. PERCENT OF CHILDREN EXPERIENCING PARENTAL DIVORCE/SEPARATION AND PARENTAL COHABITATION, BY AGE 12; PERIOD LIFE TABLE ESTIMATES, 2002-07
50 42% 40 PERCENT 30 24% 20 10 0 PARENTAL DIVORCE PARENTAL COHABITATION
Source: Kennedy and Bumpass, 2011. Data from National Survey of Family Growth. Note: The divorce/separation rate only applies to children born to married parents.
Page 44
FIGURE 3. INCIDENCE PER 1,000 CHILDREN OF HARM STANDARD ABUSE BY FAMILY STRUCTURE AND LIVING ARRANGEMENT, 2005-2006
Married biological parents Other married parents
20 15 10 5
1.9 9.8 8.2
19.5
Cohabiting biological parents Parent with cohabiting partner Single parent, no partner Neither parent
9.9 8.2 5.9 6.8 4.3 2.4 0.5 2.4 0.8 5.3 5.0 2.5 2.9 4.0
PHYSICAL ABUSE
SEXUAL ABUSE
EMOTIONAL ABUSE
Source: Figure 5-2 in Fourth National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS-4): Report to Congress.
FIGURE 4. PERCENT OF 16-YEAR-OLDS LIVING WITH MOTHER AND FATHER, 1978-1984 AND 1998-2004
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
66% 55%
PERCENT
1978-1984
1998-2004
Source: General Social Survey, 1980-2010.
Page 45
BY
FIGURE 5. PERCENT OF CHILDREN EXPERIENCING PARENTAL SEPARATION BY AGE 12 MOTHERS RELATIONSHIP STATUS AT BIRTH; PERIOD LIFE TABLE ESTIMATES, 2002-07
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
65%
PERCENT
24%
MARRIED MOTHER
COHABITING MOTHER
Source: Kennedy and Bumpass, 2011. Data from National Survey of Family Growth.
FIGURE 6. PERCENT OF 14-YEAR-OLD GIRLS LIVING WITH MOTHER AND FATHER, BY MOTHERS EDUCATION AND YEAR
1974-1981 2000-2007
100 80 65% PERCENT 60 58% 52% 80% 74% 81%
40 20
MOTHER HAD NO HIGH SCHOOL DEGREE
MOTHER HAD HIGH SCHOOL DEGREE, NO FOUR-YEAR COLLEGE DEGREE
MOTHER HAD FOUR-YEAR COLLEGE DEGREE
Source: National Survey of Family Growth, 1982 and 2006-08.
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Endnotes Endnotes are located online at: http://www.americanvalues.org/wmm/endnotes.php
Page 47

About the Institute for American Values The Institute for American Values, founded in 1987, is a private, nonpartisan organization devoted to research, publication, and public education on issues of family well-being and civil society. By providing forums for scholarly inquiry and debate, the Institute seeks to bring fresh knowledge to bear on the challenges facing families and civil society. Through its publications and other educational activities, the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between scholarship and policy making, bringing new information to the attention of policy makers in the government, opinion makers in the media, and decision makers in the private sector.
About the National Marriage Project The National Marriage Project, founded in 1997 at Rutgers University, is a nonpartisan, nonsectarian, and interdisciplinary initiative now located at the University of Virginia. The Projects mission is to provide research and analysis on the health of marriage in America, to analyze the social and cultural forces shaping contemporary marriage, and to identify strategies to increase marital quality and stability.
Institute for American Values 1841 Broadway Suite 211 New York, NY 10023 Tel: (212) 246-3942 Fax: (212) 541-6665 info@americanvalues.org www.americanvalues.org
National Marriage Project The University of Virginia P.O. Box 400766 The Dynamics Building Charlottesville, VA 22904-4766 Tel: (434) 321-8601 Fax: (434) 924-7028 marriage@virginia.edu www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/
ATTACHMENT E W. Kristen Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Childs Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It? Child Research Brief (June 2002)
Note: This Child Trends brief summarizes research conducted in 2002, when neither same-sex parents nor adoptive parents were identified in large national surveys. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn from this research about the wellbeing of children raised by same-sex parents or adoptive parents.
Carol Emig President Child Trends
Kristin A. Moore, Ph.D. Senior Scholar Child Trends
RESEARCH BRIEF
Marriage from a Childs Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do about It?
By Kristin Anderson Moore, Ph.D., Susan M. Jekielek, M.A., and Carol Emig, M.P.P. June 2002
4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 100, Washington, DC 20008 Phone 202-362-5580 Fax 202-362-5533 www.childtrends.org
verview Policies and proposals to promote marriage have been in the public eye for several years, driven by concern over the large percentages of American children growing up with just one parent.
The Bush Administration has proposed improving childrens well-being as the overarching purpose of welfare reform, and its marriage initiative is one of its chief strategies for doing so. In this context, what does research tell us about the effects of family structure and especially of growing up with two married parents on children? This brief reviews the research evidence on the effects of family structure on children, as well as key trends in family structure over the last few decades. An extensive body of research tells us that children do best when they grow up with both biological parents in a low-conflict marriage. At the same time, research on how to promote strong, low-conflict marriages is thin at best. This brief also discusses promising strategies for reducing births outside of marriage and promoting strong, stable marriages. This brief is one of a series prepared by researchers at Child Trends to help inform the public debate surrounding this years reauthorization of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, the centerpiece of the 1996 welfare law. Children born to unmarried mothers are more likely to be poor, to grow up in a single-parent family, and to experience multiple living arrangements during childhood. These factors, in turn, are associated with lower educational attainment and a higher risk of teen and nonmarital childbearing.2 Divorce is linked to academic and behavior problems among children, including depression, antisocial behavior, impulsive/hyperactive behavior, and school behavior problems.3 Mental health problems linked to marital disruption have also been identified among young adults.4 Children growing up with stepparents also have lower levels of well-being than children growing up with biological parents. 5 Thus, it is not simply the presence of two parents, as some have assumed, but the presence of
Family Structure and Child Well-Being

Research findings linking family structure and parents marital status with childrens well-being are very consistent. The majority of children who are not raised by both biological parents manage to grow up without serious problems, especially after a period of adjustment for children whose parents divorce.1 Yet, on average, children in single-parent families are more likely to have problems than are children who live in intact families headed by two biological parents.
two biological parents that seems to support childrens development. Of course, the quality of a marriage also affects children. Specifically, children benefit from a low-conflict marriage. Children who grow up in an intact but high-conflict marriage have worse emotional well-being than children whose parents are in a low-conflict marriage. 6 Indeed, domestic violence can be very destructive to childrens development.7 Although research is limited, when researchers have compared marriage to cohabitation, they have found that marriage is associated with better outcomes for children. One reason is that cohabiting unions are generally more fragile than marriage. This fragility means that children born to unmarried, cohabiting parents are likely to experience instability in their living arrangements, and research shows that multiple changes in family structure or living arrangements8 can undermine childrens development.9 Thus research clearly finds that different family structures can increase or decrease childrens risk of poor outcomes, for a variety of reasons. For example, families are more likely to be poor or low-income if they are headed by a single parent. Beyond this heightened risk of economic deprivation, the children in these families have poorer relationships with their parents, particularly with their biological father, and receive lower levels of parental supervision and monitoring.10 In addition, the conflict surrounding the demise and breakup of a marriage or relationship can be harmful to children.
rising rates of divorce, nonmarital childbearing, and cohabitation. Rising divorce rates accounted for the initial increase in single parenthood during the latter half of the twentieth century. Single-parent families formed by widowhood were the initial impetus for providing welfare and Social Security benefits for children in the 1930s. In the 1970s, however, divorce began to supplant widowhood as the primary cause of single-parent families.11 Divorce rates continued to increase into the 1970s and early 1980s, before stabilizing and then declining in the late 1980s and 1990s.12 Births to unmarried women increased steadily during the post-war decades, accelerating in the 1980s. This trend also contributed to an increase in single parenthood. Over the last 40 years, an historic shift occurred in the percentage of children living with a parent who has never married. In the early 1960s, less than 1 percent of children lived with a parent who had never married. By 2000, nearly one in ten children lived with a never-married parent.13 In addition, today nearly one-third of all births occur to unmarried women (including nevermarried, divorced, and widowed women), accounting for more than a million births annually.14 Contrary to popular perceptions, teenagers account for less than three in ten nonmarital births, with women in their twenties accounting for more than half. 15 Moreover, nonmarital births are not all first births. Only about half of all nonmarital births in 1998 were first births,16 and more than one-third of unmarried mothers already have children by an earlier partner.17 Recent data indicate that the nonmarital birth rate stabilized during the late 1990s. While this development has been hailed as good news, a closer examination of the data reveals a more complex picture. The overall decline in the nonmarital birth rate has been driven by declining
Trends in Family Structure and Childrens Living Arrangements

Given these consequences for children, it is a source of concern that an increasing percentage of children have been growing up with just one parent over recent decades. This circumstance has occurred for a variety of reasons, including
FIGURE 1
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Birth Rates for Unmarried Women by Age of Mother, Women 15-29 Years Old
Births per 1,000 unmarried women
74.5
c b a
62.2
39.6
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Age in Years
15-19
20-24
25-29
Source: Martin, J.A., Hamilton, B.E, Ventura, S.J., Menacker F., & Park M.M. Births: Final Data for 2000, Table18. National Vital Statistics Reports; Vol. 50, no. 5. Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics. 2000.
birth rates among teens. Among women in their twenties, the nonmarital birth rate continued to increase in the late 1990s18 (see Figure 1). Cohabitation has increased markedly over the last several decades. An unmarried parent is not necessarily a parent without a partner. The increase in families headed by a never-married parent has been driven by a dramatic increase in cohabiting couples men and women who, while not legally married, nevertheless live together in a marriage-like relationship. And many of these couples have children. The percentage of adults who have ever cohabited jumped from 33 percent in 1987 to 45 percent in 1995, for example.19
FIGURE 2
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
1955 9.1%(1960) 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
The proportion of children living with two parents declined for several decades but has recently increased slightly. The percentage of children in the United States living with two parents decreased from about 88 percent in 1960 to 68 percent in 1996 20 (see Figure 2). There is some indication that this trend might be reversing, as the percentage of children living with two parents increased slightly to 69.1 percent by the year 2000, and the percentage of children living with just one parent decreased from 27.9 percent in 1996 to 26.7 percent in the year 2000.21
Percent of Children under 18 Years Old Living in Two-Parent and One-Parent Families
87.7%(1960) 69.1%(2000) 68.0%(1996)
27.9%(1996) 26.7%(2000)
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Living with two parents
Living with one parent
Source: Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present. U.S. Bureau of the Census, online. Available: http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabCH-1.xls; accessed 01/28/02.
Trend data are less available on whether or not children in two-parent families are living with both biological parents or in a stepfamily. Recent data indicate that slightly less than twothirds of all children live with both biological parents (63.6 percent in 1999, according to data from the National Survey of Americas Families). 22 Welfare reform is only one factor that might explain the slight decrease in the percent of children living with only one parent. The teen birth rate has been declining since 1991, when it was at its peak, and the nonmarital birth rate has been relatively stable since 1994. Also, low levels of unemployment and the generally strong economy that characterized much of the late 1990s probably made many men more attractive marriage partners. These same factors may have increased womens economic independence, however, lessening their financial need to marry. Also, changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit have increased family incomes, but the marriage penalty may discourage marriage. Rising male incarceration rates have also been cited as contributing to a diminished pool of marriageable men.23 Thus welfare reform is one of many factors that may be contributing to changes in family structure, but it is not the only or even the most important factor. Also, researchers will need to follow this trend over time to determine whether this recent, slight decline of children living in single-parent families will continue.
Approximately eight in ten pregnancies to teens and never-married adults are unintended at the time of conception,24 and 63 percent of pregnancies to formerly-married adults are unintended.25 Helping couples avoid unintended pregnancies is therefore one logical strategy for increasing the likelihood that children are born to two married parents who are ready to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. However, while there is a growing knowledge base about how to discourage teen childbearing, there is not yet an equivalent body of research about how to reduce births outside of marriage by adult partners. Preventing Teen Pregnancy. Several pregnancy prevention programs targeted at teens have been shown to be effective.26 While purely informational sex education does not seem to change sexual behavior, education about pregnancy, contraception, and sexually transmitted diseases is more effective when it meets certain criteria: it is focused on specific behaviors; it is based on theory; it gives a clear message; it provides basic, accurate information; it includes activities, participant involvement models, and practice; it uses a variety of teaching methods; it helps teens develop communication skills; it uses trained staff; and it uses approaches appropriate for the age, culture, and experience of its students.27 In addition, programs that combine youth development and sexuality education, and service learning approaches that provide a sense of connectedness and positive alternatives such as the Childrens Aid Society program in New York City have reduced adolescent sexual activity or childbearing in a number of sites. A similar result is associated with two high-quality early childhood intervention programs, notably the Abecedarian program, which operated in North Carolina, and the High/Scope Perry Preschool Project of Ypsilanti, Michigan.28 In light of this evidence and strong public consensus for reducing teen childbearing, policy attention to such approaches for preventing teen pregnancy are likely to be fruitful.29
Promoting Healthy Marriages and Reducing Nonmarital Childbearing

While research clearly indicates that children benefit from growing up with both biological parents in a low-conflict marriage, there has been very little rigorous research on how to promote and sustain healthy marriages. This is particularly the case for disadvantaged populations, such as parents likely to be affected by welfare reform. 4
Preventing Nonmarital Childbearing among Adults. The majority of births outside of marriage are to adults ages 20 and over, not teens. At this point, though, other than providing contraceptive services, little is known about how to reduce nonmarital pregnancy among adults. Accordingly, it seems prudent to conduct studies of varied approaches to reduce sexual risk-taking, build relationships, and increase contraceptive use among couples older than twenty, as well as among teens. Helping Unmarried Parents to Marry. Nearly half of all the births that take place outside of marriage occur to cohabiting couples,30 making them a likely target of opportunity for marriage promotion efforts. Although many cohabiting couples have one or more children, the families they form are often fragile, with less than half of these relationships lasting five years or more.31 Another kind of fragile family structure is what social scientists call a visiting relationship.32 This refers to an unmarried mother and father who, while not living together, are romantically involved and have frequent contact. Analyses of data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study provide insights into both types of unions.33 The study follows a group of approximately 5,000 children born to mostly unwed parents in urban areas at the turn of the 21st century. Of these children, half were born to unmarried mothers who were living with the father at the time of the birth, while another third were in visiting relationships. In both situations, most fathers were highly involved during the pregnancy and around the time of the birth, and a majority of the couples were optimistic about a future together.34 Moreover, the study found that many unmarried mothers and fathers hold pro-marriage attitudes and want to marry the other parent of their newborn children. 35 These insights suggest that unmarried parents may be most receptive to marriage promotion efforts immediately around the time of birth.
Successful efforts to increase employment and education among disadvantaged adults may also indirectly promote marriage. Non-experimental analyses of data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study suggest that the ability of either the mother or the father to get and keep a job (as indicated by levels of education and recent work experience) increases the likelihood that an unmarried couple with a child will marry. These same analyses also suggest that the likelihood that a couple will marry decreases if the mother has a child by a previous partner36 another reason to discourage teen childbearing. Eliminating or reversing the tax penalty for married couples on the Earned Income Tax Credit and in the income tax code may also remove a disincentive to marriage.37 Strengthening Existing Marriages and Relationships. The research consensus is that a healthy marriage and not just any marriage is optimal for child well-being. Marriages that are violent or high conflict are certainly unhealthy, for both children and adults.38 Research provides some guidance on marital practices that are highly predictive of divorce, including negative communication patterns such as criticism, defensiveness, contempt, stonewalling, and rejection of a wifes influence.39 At this point, though, researchers are only beginning to understand how to promote strong, stable marriages. The knowledge gap is particularly acute for highly disadvantaged couples, many of whom have economic and social as well as relationship problems. The Becoming a Family Project is a rare instance of a marriage promotion effort that has been rigorously evaluated (though not for disadvantaged couples). Couples were recruited for this project from the San Francisco Bay Area. Results suggest that a preventive intervention can both enhance marital stability and promote child well-being. 40 The program was designed to support communication

between partners as they make the transition to becoming parents (a period during which marital satisfaction often declines). Results of an experimental investigation revealed that couples who took part in the program reported less decline in marital satisfaction in the first two years of parenthood than couples with no intervention. There were no separations or divorces among the parents participating in the couples groups until the children were three, whereas 15 percent of the couples without the intervention had already separated or divorced.41 The longer-term evaluation was mixed. By the time the children completed kindergarten, there was no difference in divorce rate between the experimental and control groups, but the intervention participants who had stayed together maintained their marital satisfaction over the whole period, while satisfaction of couples in the control group continued to decline. These results suggest that the potential positive effects of an early intervention for partners becoming parents might be maintained longer with periodic booster shots.42 The Prevention and Relationship Enhancement Program (PREP) has received considerable attention in policy circles, in part because it is at the heart of Oklahomas much-publicized marriage promotion efforts. PREP is an educational approach available both to married and unmarried couples that emphasizes strategies that help marriages succeed. Nonexperimental studies of PREP suggest that couples who plan to marry can be recruited to participate in the program43 and that such couples who complete the program can improve their relationship skills. 44 The National Institute of Mental Health is currently funding a rigorous, large-scale evaluation to test the programs effectiveness. Providing Premarital Counseling. Unmarried couples with plans to marry may be stronger targets for strengthening relationships than those without plans to marry. Compared to unmarried parents with low expectations of marrying, unmarried parents with a greater likelihood of marrying have higher levels of agreement in their relationships, regardless of their living arrangements. Both 6 groups, however, rate lower on agreement than married couples. However, couples with plans to marry are similar to married couples when it comes to incidents of abuse and levels of supportiveness.45 Relationship counseling might help couples decide whether to marry and also help them to strengthen their relationship. Finally, evidence that unmarried couples who marry have higher levels of acquired skills and education suggests that efforts to provide job training and education for fathers, as well as mothers, may enhance their marriage prospects.
Implications for Public Policy

Marriage, divorce, and childbearing (particularly childbearing by teens and unmarried women) are highly controversial social issues in the nation today. They are also intensely personal and profound individual decisions, with the potential to alter for better or worse the life trajectories of adults and children. Not surprisingly, then, there is relatively little societal consensus on the role of public policy the role of government in this arena. At least three conclusions drawn from research may help shape a productive public dialogue on these issues. First, research clearly demonstrates that family structure matters for children, and the family structure that helps children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a low-conflict marriage. Children in single-parent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships face higher risks of poor outcomes than do children in intact families headed by two biological parents. Parental divorce is also linked to a range of poorer academic and behavioral outcomes among children. There is thus value for children in promoting strong, stable marriages between biological parents. Second, while there may not be societal consensus on nonmarital childbearing, there is consensus that childbearing by teens is undesirable for the teen, for her baby, and for the larger society. There is also mounting evidence that a variety of programs and interventions are effective at discouraging teen

pregnancy. While specific interventions (such as sex education, abstinence education, and the provision of contraceptives) may be controversial, the knowledge that a variety of effective approaches exist to prevent teen childbearing should help parents, communities, and government make progress on this front. In particular, programs that combine youth development and sexuality education, and community service approaches are effective.46 Further, evidence indicates that highquality early childhood programs can prevent adolescent childbearing a decade or more later. Finally, there is not yet a proven approach for building strong marriages, particularly for disadvantaged unmarried couples only promising insights from research studies and existing programs. This is an area in which carefully designed and rigorously evaluated demonstration programs could inform both private decisions and public policies. Child Trends, founded in 1979, is an independent, nonpartisan research center dedicated to improving the lives of children and families by conducting research and providing sciencebased information to the public and decision-makers. Child Trends gratefully acknowledges the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for support of our Research Brief series, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation for support of this brief. Additional support for Child Trends communications efforts is generously provided by Annie E. Casey Foundation. Editor: Harriet J. Scarupa Research Assistant: Kristy Webber
Sandefur, G. (1994). Growing up with a single parent: What hurts, what helps. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
3Peterson,
J.L., & Zill, N. (1986). Marital disruption, parent-child relationships, and behavior problems in children. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 48, 295-307. Amato, P. R. (2000). The consequences of divorce for adults and children. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62(4), 1269-1287.
4Cherlin,
A., Chase-Lansdale, P. L., & McRae, C. (1998). Effect of parental divorce on mental health. American Sociological Review, 63(2), 239-249.
5Coleman,
M., Ganong, L., & Fine, M. (2000). Reinvestigating remarriage: Another decade of progress. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62(4), 1288-1307. P.R. (2000).
6Amato,
7Domestic
violence and children. The Future of Children, Winter 1999, 9(3). Los Altos, CA: The David and Lucile Packard Foundation.
8Graefe,
D.R. & D.T. Lichter. (1999). Life course transitions of American children: Parental cohabitation, marriage and single motherhood. Demography, 36(2), 205-217.
9Wu,
L. L. & Martinson, B.C. (1993). Family structure and the risk of a premarital birth. American Sociological Review, 58, 210232; Wu, L.L. (1996). Effects of family instability, income, and income instability on the risk of premarital birth. American Sociological Review, 61(3), 386-406; Moore, K.A., Morrison, D.R., & Glei, Dana A. (1995). Welfare and adolescent sex: The effects of family history, benefit levels, and community context. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 16(2/3), 207-238.
10Amato,
Paul P.R. (2000).
A.J. (1992) Marriage, divorce, remarriage. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

12U.S.
11Cherlin,
Census Bureau (2000). Statistical Abstract of the United States. The National Data Book. Table Number 77; http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm
13U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. (2001). Indicators of welfare dependence. Annual report to Congress 2001. Table Birth 4. Washington, D.C.
14Ventura, S., Backrach, C., Hill, L., Kaye, K., Holcomb, P., & Koff, E. (1995). The demography of out-of-wedlock childbearing. Report to Congress on out-of-wedlock childbearing. Hyattsville, Maryland: Public Health Service. 15Ventura
S.J. & Bachrach, C.A. (2000). Nonmarital childbearing in the United States, 1940-1999. National Vital Statistics Reports; Vol. 48, no. 16. Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics.
16Terry-Humen, E., Manlove, J., & Moore, K. A. (2001, April). Births outside of marriage: Perceptions vs. reality. Research Brief. Washington, DC: Child Trends. 17Mincy R. & Huang, C. C. (2001). Just get me to the church: Assessing policies to promote marriage among fragile families. Paper prepared for the MacArthur Network Meeting. 18Martin
J.A., Hamilton B. E., Ventura S. J., Menacker F., & Park M. M. (2000) Births: Final data for 2000, Table 18. National Vital Statistics Reports; Vol. 50, no. 5. Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics. L. & Lu, H. H. (2000). Trends in cohabitation and implications for childrens family contexts in the United States. Population Studies, 45, 29-41.
19Bumpass,
20Source: Living arrangements of children under 18 years old: 1960 to present. U.S. Bureau of the Census, online. Available: http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabCH-1.xls; accessed 01/28/02. 21Ibid.
Endnotes
M.E. & Kelly, J. (2002). For better or for worse: Divorce reconsidered. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
2Seltzer, J. (2000). Families formed outside of marriage. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62(4), 1247-1268; McLanahan, S. & 1Hetherington
See also Dupree, A. & Primus, W. (2001). Declining share of children lived with single mothers in the late 1990s. Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Acs, G. & Nelson, S. (2001) Honey, Im home: Changes in living arrangements in the late 1990s. Assessing the New Federalism Policy Brief, B38. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Cherlin, A. & Fomby, P. (2002). A closer look at changes in living arrangements in lowincome families. Welfare, children, and families: A three-city study. Working paper 02-01. Bavier, R. (2002). Recent increases in the share of young children living with married mothers. (Unpublished manuscript). Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget.

22Vandivere,
S., Moore, K.A., & Zaslow, M. (2000). Childrens family environment. Snapshots of Americas families II: A view from the nation and 13 states. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute and Child Trends. Census Bureau (2000). Statistical Abstract of the United States. The National Data Book. Table Number 268.
36Mincy, 37Horn,
R. & Huang, C. C. (2001)
W. & Sawhill, I. (2001). Fathers, marriage, and welfare reform. In Blank, R. & Haskins, R. (Eds.), The new world of welfare. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
23U.S.
38See, Domestic violence and children. The Future of Children, Winter 1999, 9(3). Los Altos, CA: The David and Lucile Packard Foundation. 39Gottman,
24Henshaw,
S. (1998). Unintended pregnancy in the United States. Family Planning Perspectives, 30(1), 24-29. S. (1998).
25Henshaw, 26Kirby,
D. (2001a). Emerging answers. Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy.
27Kirby,
J. M. (1994). What predicts divorce: The relationship between marital processes and marital outcomes. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates. Gottman, J. M., Coan, J., Carrere, S., & Swanson, C. (1998). Predicting marital happiness and stability from newlywed interactions. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 60(1), 5-22.
D. (2001a).
28 Kirby, D. (2001b). Understanding what works and what doesnt in reducing adolescent sexual risk-taking. Family Planning Perspectives, 33(6), 276-281. 29 Sawhill,
40Cowan, C. and Cowan, P. (2000). When partners become parents: The big life change for couples. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates. 41Schultz,
M.S., & Cowan, C. P. (2001). Promoting healthy beginnings: Marital quality during the transition to parenthood. Paper presented at the Society for Research in Child Development, Minneapolis, MN. M.S., & Cowan, C. P. (2001).
I. (2002). Testimony before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. April 11, 2002. & Lu (2000). & Lu (2000).
42Schultz, 43Halweg,
30Bumpass 31Bumpass
K., Markman, H. Thurmaier, F., Engl, J., & Eckert, V. (1998). Prevention of marital distress: Results of a German prospective longitudinal study. Journal of Family Psychology, 12(4), 543-556. H., Floyd, F., Stanley, S., & Storaasli, R. (1988). Prevention of marital distress: A longitudinal investigation. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56(2), 210-217. C. (2002).
32McLanahan,
S., Garfinkel, I., & Mincy, R.B. (2001). Fragile families, welfare reform, and marriage. Welfare Reform and Beyond Policy Brief #10, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute. study is at the Center for Research on Child Wellbeing at Princeton University and Columbia University. S., Garfinkel, I., & Mincy, R.B. (2001).
44Markman,
33This
45Osborne, 46Child
34McLanahan, 35Osborne,
Trends (2002, May). Preventing teenage pregnancy, childbearing, and sexually transmitted diseases: What the research shows. Research Brief. Washington, DC: Child Trends.
C. (2002). A new look at unmarried families: Diversity in human capital, attitudes, and relationship quality. Center for Research on Child Wellbeing working paper.
2002 Child Trends
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ATTACHMENT F Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation 15 Future of Children No. 2 (Fall 2005)
The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation
Paul R. Amato
Summary
How have recent changes in U.S. family structure affected the cognitive, social, and emotional well-being of the nations children? Paul Amato examines the effects of family formation on children and evaluates whether current marriage-promotion programs are likely to meet childrens needs. Amato begins by investigating how children in households with both biological parents differ from children in households with only one biological parent. He shows that children growing up with two continuously married parents are less likely to experience a wide range of cognitive, emotional, and social problems, not only during childhood but also in adulthood. Although it is not possible to demonstrate that family structure causes these differences, studies using a variety of sophisticated statistical methods suggest that this is the case. Amato then asks what accounts for the differences between these two groups of children. He shows that compared with other children, those who grow up in stable, two-parent families have a higher standard of living, receive more effective parenting, experience more cooperative co-parenting, are emotionally closer to both parents, and are subjected to fewer stressful events and circumstances. Finally, Amato assesses how current marriage-promotion policies will affect the well-being of children. He finds that interventions that increase the share of children who grow up with both parents would improve the overall well-being of U.S. children only modestly, because childrens social or emotional problems have many causes, of which family structure is but one. But interventions that lower only modestly the overall share of U.S. children experiencing various problems could nevertheless lower substantially the number of children experiencing them. Even a small decline in percentages, when multiplied by the many children in the population, is a substantial social benefit.
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erhaps the most profound change in the American family over the past four decades has been the decline in the share of children growing up in households with both biological parents. Because many social scientists, policymakers, and members of the general public believe that a two-parent household is the optimal setting for childrens development, the decline in such households has generated widespread concern about the well-being of American children. This concern has generated interest among policymakers in programs and interventions to increase the share of children growing up in stable, two-parent families. Not everyone, however, agrees with these policies; many observers believe that it is either inappropriate, or futile, for government to attempt to affect childrens family structures. My goal in this article is to inform this debate by addressing three questions. First, how do children in households with only one biological parent differ in terms of their cognitive, social, and emotional well-being from children in households with both biological parents? Second, what accounts for the observed differences between these two groups of children? And finally, how might current policies to strengthen marriage, decrease divorce, and lower nonmarital fertility affect the wellbeing of children in the United States?
Parental Divorce Early studies generally supported the assumption that children who experience parental divorce are prone to a variety of academic, behavioral, and emotional problems.1 In 1971, psychologists Judith Wallerstein and Joan Kelly began an influential long-term study of 60 divorced families and 131 children. According to the authors, five years after divorce, one-third of the children were adjusting well and had good relationships with both parents. Another group of children (more than one-third of the sample) were clinically depressed, were doing poorly in school, had difficulty maintaining friendships, experienced chronic problems such as sleep disturbances, and continued to hope that their parents would reconcile.2
Despite these early findings, other studies in the 1970s challenged the dominant view that divorce is uniformly bad for children. For example, Mavis Hetherington and her colleagues studied 144 preschool children, half from recently divorced maternal-custody families and half from continuously married two-parent families. During the first year of the study, the children with divorced parents exhibited more behavioral and emotional problems than did the children with continuously married parents. Two years after divorce, however, children with divorced parents no longer exhibited an elevated number of problems (although a few difficulties lingered for boys). Despite this temporary improvement, a later wave of data collection revealed that the remarriage of the custodial mother was followed by additional problems among the children, especially daughters.3 Trying to make sense of this research literature can be frustrating, because the results of individual studies vary considerably: some suggest serious negative effects of divorce,
Research on the Effects of Family Structure on Children

The rise in the divorce rate during the 1960s and 1970s prompted social scientists to investigate how differing family structures affect children. Their research focus initially was on children of divorced parents, but it expanded to include out-of-wedlock children and those in other nontraditional family structures.
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T h e I m p a c t o f F a m i l y F o r m a t i o n C h a n g e o n t h e We l l - B e i n g o f t h e N e x t G e n e r a t i o n
others suggest modest effects, and yet others suggest no effects. Much of this inconsistency is due to variations across studies in the types of samples, the ages of the children, the outcomes examined, and the methods of analysis. To summarize general trends across such a large and varied body of research, social scientists use a technique known as metaanalysis. By calculating an effect size for each study (which reflects the difference between two groups expressed in a common metric), meta-analysis makes it possible to pool results across many studies and adjust for variations such as those noted.4 In 1991, Bruce Keith and I published the first meta-analysis dealing with the effects of divorce on children.5 Our analysis summarized the results of ninety-three studies published in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and confirmed that children with divorced parents are worse off than those with continuously married parents on measures of academic success (school grades, scores on standardized achievement tests), conduct (behavior problems, aggression), psychological well-being (depression, distress symptoms), self-esteem (positive feelings about oneself, perceptions of self-efficacy), and peer relations (number of close friends, social support from peers), on average. Moreover, children in divorced families tend to have weaker emotional bonds with mothers and fathers than do their peers in two-parent families. These results supported the conclusion that the rise in divorce had lowered the average level of child well-being. Our meta-analysis also indicated, however, that the estimated effects of parental divorce on childrens well-being are modest rather than strong. We concluded that these modest differences reflect widely varying experiences within both groups of children. Some children
growing up with continuously married parents are exposed to stressful circumstances, such as poverty, serious conflict between parents, violence, inept parenting, and mental illness or substance abuse, that increase the risk of child maladjustment. Correspondingly, some children with divorced parents cope well, perhaps because their parents are able to separate amicably and engage in cooperative co-parenting following marital dissolution.
Children in divorced families tend to have weaker emotional bonds with mothers and fathers than do their peers in two-parent families.
In a more recent meta-analysis, based on sixty-seven studies conducted during the 1990s, I again found that children with divorced parents, on average, scored significantly lower on various measures of wellbeing than did children with continuously married parents.6 As before, the differences between the two groups were modest rather than large. Nevertheless, the more recent meta-analyses revealed that children with divorced parents continued to have lower average levels of cognitive, social, and emotional well-being, even in a decade in which divorce had become common and widely accepted. Other studies have shown that the differences in well-being between children with divorced and children with continuously married parents persist well into adulthood. For example, adults who experience parental divorce as a child have lower socioeconomic atV O L . 1 5 / N O. 2 / FA L L 2 0 0 5 77
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tainment, an increased risk of having a nonmarital birth, weaker bonds with parents, lower psychological well-being, poorer marital quality, and an elevated risk of seeing their own marriage end in divorce.7 Overall, the evidence is consistent that parental divorce during childhood is linked with a wide range of problems in adulthood.
vorced parents had a teen birth, compared with 37 percent of daughters born outside marriage (the corresponding figure for daughters with continuously married parents was 11 percent).9 Other studies that have compared offspring in these two groups yield similar results with respect to occupational attainment, earned income, depression, and the risk of seeing ones own marriage end in divorce.10 Although it is sometimes assumed that children born to unwed mothers have little contact with their fathers, about 40 percent of unmarried mothers are living with the childs father at the time of birth.11 If one-third of all children are born to unmarried parents, and if 40 percent of these parents are cohabiting, then about one out of every eight infants lives with two biological but unmarried parents. Structurally, these households are similar to households with two married parents. And young children are unlikely to be aware of their parents marital status. Nevertheless, cohabiting parents tend to be more disadvantaged than married parents. They have less education, earn less income, report poorer relationship quality, and experience more mental health problems.12 These considerations suggest that children living with cohabiting biological parents may be worse off, in some respects, than children living with two married biological parents. Consistent with this assumption, Susan L. Brown found that children living with cohabiting biological parents, compared with children living with continuously married parents, had more behavioral problems, more emotional problems, and lower levels of school engagement (that is, caring about school and doing homework).13 Parents education, income, psychological well-being, and parenting stress explained mostbut not allof these differences. In other words, un-
Children Born outside Marriage Children born outside marriage have been studied less frequently than have children of divorce. Nevertheless, like children with divorced parents, children who grow up with a single parent because they were born out of wedlock are more likely than children living with continuously married parents to experience a variety of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral problems. Specifically, compared with children who grow up in stable, twoparent families, children born outside marriage reach adulthood with less education, earn less income, have lower occupational status, are more likely to be idle (that is, not employed and not in school), are more likely to have a nonmarital birth (among daughters), have more troubled marriages, experience higher rates of divorce, and report more symptoms of depression.8
A few studies have compared children of unmarried single parents and divorced single parents. Despite some variation across studies, this research generally shows that the longterm risks for most problems are comparable in these two groups. For example, Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, using the National Survey of Families and Households, found that 31 percent of youth with divorced parents dropped out of high school, compared with 37 percent of youth born outside marriage (the corresponding figure for youth with continuously married parents was 13 percent). Similarly, 33 percent of daughters with di78 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
married cohabiting parents, compared with married parents, had fewer years of education, earned less income, had lower levels of psychological well-being, and reported more stress in parenting. These factors, in turn, partly accounted for the elevated number of problems among their children. The risk of relationship dissolution also is substantially higher for cohabiting couples with children than for married couples with children.14 For example, the Fragile Families Study indicates that about one-fourth of cohabiting biological parents are no longer living together one year after the childs birth.15 Another study of first births found that 31 percent of cohabiting couples had broken up after five years, as against 16 percent of married couples.16 Growing up with two continuously cohabiting biological parents is rare. Using the 1999 National Survey of American Families, Brown found that only 1.5 percent of all children lived with two cohabiting parents at the time of the survey.17 Similarly, an analysis of the 1995 Adolescent Health Study (Add Health) revealed that less than one-half of 1 percent of adolescents aged sixteen to eighteen had spent their entire childhoods living with two continuously cohabiting biological parents.18 Unresolved questions remain about children born to cohabiting parents who later marry. If cohabiting parents marry after the birth of a child, is the child at any greater risk than if the parents marry before having the child? Correspondingly, do children benefit when their cohabiting parents get married? To the extent that marriage increases union stability and binds fathers more strongly to their children, marriage among cohabiting parents may improve childrens long-term well-being. Few studies, however, have addressed this issue.
Death of a Parent Some children live with a single parent not because of divorce or because they were born outside marriage but because their other parent has died. Studies that compare children who experienced the death of a parent with children separated from a parent for other reasons yield mixed results. The Amato and Keith meta-analysis found that children who experienced a parents death scored lower on
The risk of relationship dissolution also is substantially higher for cohabiting couples with children than for married couples with children.
several forms of well-being than did children living with continuously married parents. Children who experienced a parents death, however, scored significantly higher on several measures of well-being than did children with divorced parents.19 McLanahan and Sandefur found that children with a deceased parent were no more likely than children with continuously married parents to drop out of high school. Daughters with a deceased parent, however, were more likely than teenagers living with both parents to have a nonmarital birth.20 Another study found that although adults whose parents divorced or never married during their childhood had lower levels of socioeconomic attainment than did adults who grew up with continuously married parents, adults who experienced the death of a parent as a child did not differ from those with two continuously married parents.21 In contrast, Amato found
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that all causes of separation from a parent during childhood, including parental death, were linked with increased symptoms of depression in adulthood.22 Although the research findings are mixed, these studies suggest that experiencing the death of a parent during childhood puts children at risk for a number of problems, but not as much as does divorce or out-of-wedlock birth.
Discordant Two-Parent Families Most studies in this literature have compared children living with a single parent with a broad group of children living with continuously married parents. Some two-parent families, however, function better than others. Marriages marked by chronic, overt conflict and hostility are intact structurally but are not necessarily good environments in which to raise children. Some early studies compared children living with divorced parents and children living with two married but discordant parents. In general, these studies found that children in high-conflict households experience many of the same problems as do children with divorced parents. In fact, some studies show that children with discordant married parents are worse off than children with divorced parents.23
A more recent generation of long-term studies has shown that the effects of divorce vary with the degree of marital discord that precedes divorce. When parents exhibit chronic and overt conflict, children appear to be better off, in the long run, if their parents split up rather than stay together. But when parents exhibit relatively little overt conflict, children appear to be better off if their parents stay together. In other words, children are particularly at risk when low-conflict marriages end in divorce.24 In a twenty-year study, Alan Booth and I found that the majority of marriages that ended in divorce fell into
the low-conflict group. Spouses in these marriages did not fight frequently or express hostility toward their partners. Instead, they felt emotionally estranged from their spouses, and many ended their marriages to seek greater happiness with new partners. Although many parents saw this transition as positive, their children often viewed it as unexpected, inexplicable, and unwelcome. Children and parents, it is clear, often have different interpretations of family transitions.25
Stepfamilies Although rates of remarriage have declined in recent years, most divorced parents eventually remarry. Similarly, many women who have had a nonmarital birth eventually marry men who are not the fathers of their children. Adding a stepfather to the household usually improves childrens standard of living. Moreover, in a stepfamily, two adults are available to monitor childrens behavior, provide supervision, and assist children with everyday problems. For these reasons, one might assume that children generally are better off in stepfamilies than in single-parent households. Studies consistently indicate, however, that children in stepfamilies exhibit more problems than do children with continuously married parents and about the same number of problems as do children with single parents.26 In other words, the marriage of a single parent (to someone other than the childs biological parent) does not appear to improve the functioning of most children.
Although the great majority of parents view the formation of a stepfamily positively, children tend to be less enthusiastic. Stepfamily formation is stressful for many children because it often involves moving (generally to a different neighborhood or town), adapting to new people in the household, and learning new rules and routines. Moreover, early rela-
tionships between stepparents and stepchildren are often tense. Children, especially adolescents, become accustomed to a substantial degree of autonomy in single-parent households. They may resent the monitoring and supervision by stepparents and react with hostility when stepparents attempt to exert authority. Some children experience loyalty conflicts and fear that becoming emotionally close to a stepparent implies betraying the nonresident biological parent. Some become jealous because they must share parental time and attention with the stepparent. And for some children, remarriage ends any lingering hopes that the two biological parents will one day reconcile.27 Finally, stepchildren are overrepresented in official reports of child abuse.28 Of course, the great majority of stepparents are not abusive. Moreover, survey data have not supported the notion that children in stepfamilies are more likely to be abused than are children in two-parent families.29 Nevertheless, even a slight trend in this direction would represent an additional risk for children in stepfamilies. Although relationships in many stepfamilies are tense, stepparents are still able to make positive contributions to their stepchildrens lives. If stepfamilies survive the early crisis stage, then close and supportive relationships between stepparents and stepchildren often develop. Research suggests that these relationships can serve as important resources for childrens development and emotional wellbeing.30 The increase in nonmarital cohabitation has focused attention on the distinction between married-couple stepfamilies and cohabitingcouple stepfamilies. Christine Buchanan, Eleanor Maccoby, and Sanford Dornbusch found that adolescents had fewer emotional and behavior problems following divorce if
their mothers remarried than if they cohabited with a partner.31 Similarly, two studies of African American families found that children were better off in certain respects if they lived with stepfathers than with their mothers cohabiting partners.32 In contrast, Susan Brown found no significant differences between children in married and cohabiting stepfamilies.33 Although these data suggest that children may be better off if single mothers marry their partners rather than cohabit, the small number of studies on this topic makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions.
Variations by Gender of Child Several early influential studies found that boys in divorced families had more adjustment problems than did girls.34 Given that boys usually live with their mothers following family disruption, the loss of contact with the same-gender parent could account for such a difference. In addition boys, compared with girls, may be exposed to more conflict, receive less support from parents and others (because they are believed to be tougher), and be picked on more by custodial mothers (because sons may resemble their fathers). Subsequent studies, however, have failed to find consistent gender differences in childrens reactions to divorce.
The meta-analyses on children of divorce provide the most reliable evidence on this topic. The Amato and Keith meta-analysis of studies conducted before the 1990s revealed one significant gender difference: the estimated negative effect of divorce on social adjustment was stronger for boys than girls. In other areas, however, such as academic achievement, conduct, and psychological adjustment, no differences between boys and girls were apparent.35 In my meta-analysis of studies conducted in the 1990s, the estimated effect of divorce on childrens conduct problems was
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stronger for boys than for girls, although no other gender differences were apparent.36 Why the earlier studies suggest a gender difference in social adjustment and the more recent studies suggest a gender difference in conduct problems is unclear. Nevertheless, taken together, these meta-analyses provide some limited support for the notion that boys are more susceptible than girls to the detrimental consequences of divorce.
Variations by Race of Child Compared with whites, African Americans have a higher rate of marital disruption and a substantially higher rate of nonmarital births. Because relatively little research has focused on this topic, however, it is difficult to reach firm conclusions about racial differences in childrens well-being in single-parent households. Some research suggests that the academic deficits associated with living with a single mother are less pronounced for black than for white children.37 One study found that growing up in a single-parent family predicted lower socioeconomic attainment among white women, white men, and black women, but not among black men.38 McLanahan and Sandefur found that white offspring from single-parent families were more likely to drop out of high school than were African American offspring from single-parent families.39 African American children may thus adjust better than white children to life in single-parent families, although the explanation for this difference is not clear. Other studies, however, have found few racial differences in the estimated effects of growing up with a single parent on long-term outcomes.40
Some studies suggest that stepfathers play a particularly beneficial role in African American families. One study found that in African American families (but not European American families), children who lived with stepfa82 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
thers were less likely to drop out of high school or (among daughters) have a nonmarital birth.41 Similarly, a study of African Americans living in high-poverty neighborhoods found that girls living with their mothers and stepfathers were less likely than girls living with single mothers to become sexually active or pregnant. Interestingly, the protective effect of a stepfather held only when mothers were married and not when they were cohabiting.42 Another study yielded comparable results: among African Americans, adolescents living with stepfathers were better off in many respects than were adolescents living with single mothers, but adolescents living with cohabiting parents were worse off than those living with single mothers.43 The reasons for these racial differences are not clear, and future research is required to understand how interpersonal dynamics differ in white and African American stepfamilies.
Why Do Single-Parent Families Put Children at Risk?

Researchers have several theories to explain why children growing up with single parents have an elevated risk of experiencing cognitive, social, and emotional problems. Most refer either to the economic and parental resources available to children or to the stressful events and circumstances to which these children must adapt.
Economic Hardship For a variety of reasons documented elsewhere in this volume, most children living with single parents are economically disadvantaged. It is difficult for poor single parents to afford the books, home computers, and private lessons that make it easier for their children to succeed in school. Similarly, they cannot afford clothes, shoes, cell phones, and other consumer goods that give their children status among their peers. Moreover, many live
in rundown neighborhoods with high crime rates, low-quality schools, and few community services. Consistent with these observations, many studies have shown that economic resources explain some of the differences in well-being between children with single parents and those with continuously married parents.44 Research showing that children do better at school and exhibit fewer behavioral problems when nonresident fathers pay child support likewise suggests the importance of income in facilitating childrens well-being in single-parent households.45
the father) can also play an important role. In a meta-analysis of sixty-three studies of nonresident fathers and their children, Joan Gilbreth and I found that children had higher academic achievement and fewer emotional and conduct problems when nonresident fathers were closely involved in their lives.48 We also found that studies of nonresident fathers in the 1990s were more likely than earlier studies to report positive effects of father involvement. Nonresident fathers
Quality of Parenting Regardless of family structure, the quality of parenting is one of the best predictors of childrens emotional and social well-being. Many single parents, however, find it difficult to function effectively as parents. Compared with continuously married parents, they are less emotionally supportive of their children, have fewer rules, dispense harsher discipline, are more inconsistent in dispensing discipline, provide less supervision, and engage in more conflict with their children.46 Many of these deficits in parenting presumably result from struggling to make ends meet with limited financial resources and trying to raise children without the help of the other biological parent. Many studies link inept parenting by resident single parents with a variety of negative outcomes among children, including poor academic achievement, emotional problems, conduct problems, low self-esteem, and problems forming and maintaining social relationships. Other studies show that depression among custodial mothers, which usually detracts from effective parenting, is related to poor adjustment among offspring.47
Although the role of the resident parent (usually the mother) in promoting childrens wellbeing is clear, the nonresident parent (usually
Regardless of family structure, the quality of parenting is one of the best predictors of childrens emotional and social well-being.
may thus be enacting the parent role more successfully now than in the past, with beneficial consequences for children. Nevertheless, analysts consistently find that many nonresident fathers are minimally engaged with their children. Between one-fourth and onethird of nonresident fathers maintain frequent contact with their children, and a roughly equal share of fathers maintains little or no contact.49 Interviews with children reveal that losing contact with fathers is one of the most painful outcomes of divorce.50 Children also thrive when their parents have a cooperative co-parental relationship. When parents agree on the rules and support one anothers decisions, children learn that parental authority is not arbitrary. Parental agreement also means that children are not subjected to inconsistent discipline when they
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misbehave. Consistency between parents helps children to learn and internalize social norms and moral values. Another benefit of a positive co-parental relationship is the modeling of interpersonal skills, such as showing respect, communicating clearly, and resolving disputes through negotiation and compromise. Children who learn these skills by observing their parents have positive relationships with peers and, later, with intimate partners. When childrens parents live in sep-
Conflict between nonresident parents appears to be particularly harmful when children feel that they are caught in the middle.
arate households, however, cooperative coparenting is not the norm. Although some parents remain locked in conflict for many years, especially if a divorce is involved, most gradually disengage and communicate little with one another. At best, most children living with single parents experience parallel parenting rather than cooperative co-parenting.51
contact with a parent (as noted earlier) can be stressful for children. Observing conflict and hostility between resident and nonresident parents also is stressful.53 Conflict between nonresident parents appears to be particularly harmful when children feel that they are caught in the middle, as when one parent denigrates the other parent in front of the child, when children are asked to transmit critical or emotionally negative messages from one parent to the other, and when one parent attempts to recruit the child as an ally against the other.54 Interparental conflict is a direct stressor for children, and it can also interfere with their attachments to parents, resulting in feelings of emotional insecurity.55 Moving is a difficult experience for many children, especially when it involves losing contact with neighborhood friends. Moreover, moves that require changing schools can put children out of step with their classmates in terms of the curriculum. Children with single parents move more frequently than other children do, partly because of economic hardship (which forces parents to seek less expensive accommodation in other areas) and partly because single parents form new romantic attachments (as when a single mother marries and moves in with her new husband). Studies show that frequent moving increases the risk of academic, behavioral, and emotional problems for children with single parents.56 For many children, as noted, the addition of a stepparent to the household is a stressful change. And when remarriages end in divorce, children are exposed to yet more stressful transitions. Indeed, some studies indicate that the number of transitions that children experience while growing up (including multiple parental divorces, cohabitations, and remarriages) is a good predictor of their behavioral and emotional problems as adolescents and young adults.57
Exposure to Stress Children living with single parents are exposed to more stressful experiences and circumstances than are children living with continuously married parents. Although scholars define stress in somewhat different ways, most assume that it occurs when external demands exceed peoples coping resources. This results in feelings of emotional distress, a reduced capacity to function in school, work, and family roles, and an increase in physiological indicators of arousal.52 Economic hardship, inept parenting, and loss of
The Selection Perspective Explanations that focus on economic hardship, the quality of parenting, and exposure to stress all assume that the circumstances associated with living in a single-parent household negatively affect childrens well-being. A quite different explanationand the main alternative to these viewsis that many poorly adjusted individuals either never marry in the first place or see their marriages end in divorce. In other words, these people carry traits that select them into single parenthood. Parents can transmit these problematic traits to their children either through genetic inheritance or inept parenting. For example, a mother with an antisocial personality may pass this genetic predisposition to her children. Her personality also may contribute to her marriages ending in divorce. Her children will thus be at risk of exhibiting antisocial behavior, but the risk has little to do with the divorce. The discovery that concordance (similarity between siblings) for divorce among adults is higher among identical than fraternal twins suggests that genes may predispose some people to engage in behaviors that increase the risk of divorce.58 If parents personality traits and other genetically transmitted predispositions are causes of single parenthood as well as childhood problems, then the apparent effects on children of growing up with a single parent are spurious.
Because researchers cannot conduct a true experiment and randomly allocate children to live with single or married parents, it is difficult to rule out the selection perspective. Nevertheless, many studies cast doubt on it. For example, some have found significant differences between children with divorced and continuously married parents even after controlling for personality traits such as depression and antisocial behavior in parents.59 Others have found higher rates
of problems among children with single parents, using statistical methods that adjust for unmeasured variables that, in principle, should include parents personality traits as well as many genetic influences.60 And a few studies have found that the link between parental divorce and childrens problems is similar for adopted and biological childrena finding that cannot be explained by genetic transmission.61 Another study, based on a large sample of twins, found that growing up in a single-parent family predicted depression in adulthood even with genetic resemblance controlled statistically.62 Although some degree of selection still may be operating, the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that growing up without two biological parents in the home increases childrens risk of a variety of cognitive, emotional, and social problems.
Implications of Policies to Increase the Share of Children in Two-Parent Families

Since social science research shows so clearly the advantages enjoyed by children raised by continuously married parents, it is no wonder that policymakers and practitioners are interested in programs to strengthen marriage and increase the proportion of children who grow up in such families. Realistically speaking, what could such programs accomplish? In what follows, I present estimates of how they could affect the share of children in the United States who experience various types of problems during adolescence.
Adolescent Family Structure and Well-Being in the Add Health Study To make these estimates, I used the Adolescent Health Studya national long-term sample of children in junior high and high schoolsrelying on data from Wave I, conducted in 1995. Table 1 is based on adolesV O L . 1 5 / N O. 2 / FA L L 2 0 0 5 85
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Table 1. Family Structure and Adolescent Well-Being: Share of Adolescents Reporting Problems in Various Scenarios
Percent Family structure, 1995 Problem Repeated grade Suspended from school Delinquency Violence Therapy Smoked in last month Thought of suicide Attempted suicide Two parents 18.8 21.2 36.4 36.0 7.5 13.4 11.3 1.7 One parent 30.3 39.8 44.7 44.1 17.0 22.6 14.5 2.8 Combined 24.0 29.6 40.1 39.6 11.8 17.5 12.7 2.2 Estimated share if family structure were the same as in 1980 22.9 27.9 39.4 38.9 10.9 16.7 12.5 2.1 1970 21.8 26.0 38.5 38.1 9.9 15.8 12.1 2.0 1960 21.4 25.4 38.3 37.8 9.6 15.5 12.0 1.9
Source: National Study of Adolescent Health, 1995. See text for details.
cents responses to questions about behavioral, emotional, and academic problems specifically, whether they had repeated a grade, been suspended from school, engaged in delinquent behavior, engaged in a violent altercation, received counseling or therapy for an emotional problem, smoked cigarettes regularly during the last month, thought about suicide, or attempted suicide. Delinquency involved damaging property, shoplifting, breaking into a house or building to steal something, stealing something worth more than $50, or taking a car without the owners permission. Violence was defined as engaging in a physical fight as a result of which the opponent had received medical attention (including bandaging a cut) or a fight involving multiple people or using a weapon to threaten someone. The results are based on responses from more than 17,000 children between the ages of twelve and eighteen, and the data have been weighted to make them nationally representative.63 Responses are shown separately for adolescents living with continuously married parents and for those living with one parent only.
The results are striking. Adolescents living with single parents consistently report encountering more problems than those living with continuously married parents. Thirty percent of the former reported that they had repeated a grade, as against 19 percent of the latter. Similarly, 40 percent of children living with single parents reported having been suspended from school, compared with 21 percent of children living with continuously married parents. Children in stable, two-parent families also were less likely to have engaged in delinquency or violence, seen a therapist for an emotional problem, smoked during the previous month, or thought about or attempted suicide. These findings are consistent with research demonstrating that children living with continuously married parents report fewer problems than do other children. The increase in risk associated with living without both parents ranged from about 23 percent (for being involved in a violent altercation) to 127 percent (for receiving emotional therapy). To estimate the frequency of these problems in the larger population, I relied on the Add
Health finding that 55 percent of adolescents between the ages of twelve to eighteen lived with both biological parents at the time of the survey. Given that rates of divorce and nonmarital births have not changed much since the mid-1990s, this figure is probably close to the current figure, and it is nearly identical to the estimate provided by Susan Brown from the 1999 National Survey of American Families. (Because most children in the sample were younger than eighteen and could still experience a parental divorce or death before reaching adulthood, these results are consistent with the projection that about half of all children will live continuously with both biological parents until adulthood.) The third column in table 1 shows the estimated share of adolescents in the U.S. population who experience each problem, based on the data in the first two columns.64 How would increasing the share of children growing up in stable, two-parent families affect the overall levels of these problems in the population? To provide estimates, I considered three levels of social change. The fourth column in table 1 provides estimates of adolescent outcomes if the share of adolescents living with two biological parents were the same as it was in 1980, the year in which the share of marriages ending in divorce reached its peak but before the large increase in nonmarital births during the 1980s and early 1990s. The fifth column provides estimates of adolescent outcomes if the share of adolescents living with continuously married parents were the same as it was in 1970, the year just before the massive increase in divorce rates during the 1970s. The final column provides estimates of adolescent outcomes if the share of adolescents living with continuously married parents were the same as it was in 1960, a period of relative family stability in the United States.65
Column four shows that if the share of adolescents living with two biological parents were the same today as it was in 1980, the share of adolescents repeating a grade would fall from 24 percent to about 23 percent. Similarly, if the share of adolescents living with two biological parents returned to its 1970 level, the share of adolescents repeating a grade would fall to about 22 percent. Finally, if the share of adolescents living with two biological parents increased to its 1960 level, the share of adolescents repeating a grade would fall to 21 percent. How is it that increasing the share of children growing up with continuously married parents has such a relatively small effect on the share of children experiencing these problems? The explanation is that many children living with continuously married parents also experience these problems. In general, these findings, which are likely to disappoint some readers, are consistent with a broad, sociological understanding of human behavior. Most behaviors are determined by numerous social, cultural, individual, and biological factors. No single variable, such as family structure, has a monolithic effect on childrens development and behavior. Although increasing the share of children growing up in stable, two-parent families would lower the incidence of all the problems shown in table 1, clearly it is not a panacea for the problems confronting our nations youth.
Individual versus Public Health Perspectives Whether one views the estimated changes in table 1 as small or big depends in large part on whether one adopts an individual perspective or a public health perspective. Attempts during the past twenty years by public health authorities to address cholesterol-related health problems help to illustrate this distincV O L . 1 5 / N O. 2 / FA L L 2 0 0 5 87
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tion. Many epidemiological and clinical studies have shown that a high level of blood cholesterol is a risk factor for cardiovascular disease. How large is the estimated effect of cholesterol on cardiovascular disease? Consider a group of male nonsmokers age fifty with normal blood pressure. Men in this group with high total cholesterol (defined as 250 mg/dL) have a 7 percent chance of suffering a heart attack during the next decade. In comparison, men in this group with low total cholesterol (defined as 190 mg/dL) have only a 4 percent chance. In other words, decreasing total cholesterol from a dangerous level to a safe level would lower the risk of having a heart attack for men in this group by 3 percentage points. Based on projections like these, public health authorities have encouraged people with high cholesterol to lower their cholesterol by eating fewer foods high in saturated fat and cholesterol, losing weight, and exercising more often. Physicians often recommend supplementing these lifestyle changes with cholesterol-lowering medications, such as statin drugs.66 Seen from a different perspective, however, 93 percent of men age fifty with high total cholesterol will not suffer a heart attack in the next decade. There are only 7 chances in 100 that a particular man will have a heart attack, and even if he lowers his cholesterol, he still has 4 chances in 100 of suffering a heart attack. In other words, all the required changes in lifestyle, plus the use of medications, will lower his chances of a heart attack by only 3 chances out of 100. An individual man with high cholesterol, therefore, may well wonder if is worth the effort to change his lifestyle and take medication. At the population level, however, with more than 9 million men in the United States in their early fifties, a 3 percentage point reduction in heart attacks would be seen as a major public
health achievement, because it would mean a quarter of a million fewer heart attacks in this group over a decade. 67 The cholesterol example is relevant to understanding the effects of growing up without both parents in the household. The increase in the risk of cardiovascular disease associated with high blood cholesterol is comparable in many respects to the increase in the risk of behavioral, emotional, and academic problems associated with growing up in a single-parent household. For example, the increase in heart attacks associated with high blood cholesterol represents a 75 percent increase in risk([7 4]/4) x 100a figure comparable to the increased risk associated with single parenthood and repeating a grade, being suspended from school, receiving therapy, or attempting suicide. Adopting a public health view and considering the number rather than the percentage of adolescents who might be affected helps put these findings in perspective. In 2002 there were about 29 million children in the United States between the ages of twelve and eighteenthe age range covered in table 1.68 Table 2 indicates that nearly 7 million children in this age group will have repeated a grade. Increasing the share of adolescents living with two biological parents to the 1980 level, as illustrated in the second column of the table, suggests that some 300,000 fewer children would repeat a grade. Correspondingly, increasing the share of adolescents living with two biological parents to the 1970 level, as illustrated in the third column, would mean that 643,264 fewer children would repeat a grade. Finally, increasing the share of adolescents in two-parent families to the 1960 level suggests that nearly three-quarters of a million fewer children would repeat a grade. Similarly, increasing
Table 2. Well-Being of Adolescents Aged Twelve to Eighteen, 2002 Estimates

Estimated change based on two-parent families in Problem Repeated grade Suspended from school Delinquency Violence Therapy Smoked in last month Thought of suicide Attempted suicide 2002 estimate 6,948,530 8,570,096 11,632,086 11,490,072 3,412,678 5,083,513 3,692,358 636,164 1980 299,968 485,165 216,498 211,282 247,799 239,974 83,469 28,693 1970 643,264 1,040,410 464,269 453,082 531,392 514,611 178,995 61,530 1960 746,587 1,207,523 538,841 525,857 616,745 597,269 207,746 71,413
Source: Authors estimates based on data from the National Study of Adolescent Health, 1995. See text for details.
marital stability to its 1980 level would result in nearly half a million fewer children suspended from school, about 200,000 fewer children engaging in delinquency or violence, a quarter of a million fewer children receiving therapy, about a quarter of a million fewer smokers, about 80,000 fewer children thinking about suicide, and about 28,000 fewer children attempting suicide. Seen from this perspective, restoring family stability to levels of a few decades ago could dramatically affect the lives of many children. Moreover, although the estimated decline in the share of children encountering these problems in table 1 is modest, increasing the number of children growing up with both parents would simultaneously improve all these outcomes, as well as many other outcomes not considered in these tables.
up with two continuously married parents are less likely than other children to experience a wide range of cognitive, emotional, and social problems, not only during childhood, but also in adulthood. Although it is not possible to demonstrate that family structure is the cause of these differences, studies that have used a variety of sophisticated statistical methods, including controls for genetic factors, suggest that this is the case. This distinction is even stronger if we focus on children growing up with two happily married biological parents. Second, what accounts for the observed differences between these two groups of children? Compared with other children, those who grow up in stable, two-parent families have a higher standard of living, receive more effective parenting, experience more cooperative co-parenting, are emotionally closer to both parents (especially fathers), and are subjected to fewer stressful events and circumstances. And third, how might current policies to strengthen marriage, decrease the rate of divorce, and lower nonmarital fertility affect the overall well-being of American children?
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General Conclusion
My goal in this paper has been to inform the marriage debate by addressing three fundamental questions. First, how do children in households with only one biological parent differ from children in households with both biological parents, in terms of their cognitive, social, and emotional well-being? Research clearly demonstrates that children growing
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The projections in tables 1 and 2 suggest that increasing the share of children who grow up with continuously married parents would improve the overall well-being of U.S. children only modestly. The improvements are relatively small because problems such as being suspended from school, engaging in delinquent behavior, and attempting suicide have many causes, with family structure being but one. What are the policy implications of these findings? First, interventions that increase the share of children growing up with two continuously married biological parents will have modest effects on the percentage of U.S. children experiencing various problems, but could have substantial effects on the number of children experiencing them. From a public health perspective, even a modest decline in percentages, when multiplied by the large number of children in the population, represents a substantial social benefit. That children living in stepfamilies do not tend to have better outcomes, on average, than children growing up in single-parent families suggests that interventions to strengthen marital quality and stability would be most profitable if focused on parents in first marriages. Similarly, interventions to strengthen relationships and encourage marriage among cohabiting couples with children would be most profitable if focused on couples with a first child, rather than couples with children from prior relationships. U.S. policymakers also should acknowledge that returning to substantially lower rates of divorce and nonmarital childbearing, although a worthwhile goal, is not realistic, at
least in the short term. Although policy interventions may lower the rate of divorce and nonmarital childbearing, many children will continue to grow up with a single parent. This stubborn fact means that policies for improving childrens well-being cannot focus exclusively on promoting marriage and strengthening marital stability. These policies must be supplemented by others that improve economic well-being, strengthen parent-child bonds, and ease the stress experienced by children in single-parent and stepparent households. Such programs would provide parent education classes for divorcing parents, increase the minimum wage and the earned income tax credit for poor working parents, establish paternity and increase the payment of child support, and improve the quantity and quality of time that nonresident parents, especially fathers, spend with their children. The importance of increasing the number of children growing up with two happily and continuously married parents and of improving the well-being of children now living in other family structures is self-evident. Children are the innocent victims of their parents inability to maintain harmonious and stable homes. The importance of effective policies will become even clearer in the near future, as the baby boom generation reaches retirement age. As this happens, our society will become increasingly dependent on the emotional functioning, economic productivity, and leadership of a declining number of young adults. Although it is a clich to say that children are the future, it has never been as true as it is today.
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Endnotes
1. For examples, see Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor Glueck, Family Environment and Delinquency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962); J. F. McDermott, Divorce and Its Psychiatric Sequelae in Children, Archives of General Psychiatry 23 (1970): 42127. 2. Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce (New York: Basic Books, 1980). 3. E. Mavis Hetherington, Divorce: A Childs Perspective, American Psychologist 34 (1979): 85158; E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox, and R. Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in Nontraditional Families, edited by Michael Lamb (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982), pp. 23388. 4. The effect size for a study is defined as the standardized mean difference on some outcome between two groups of interest, that is, ( x1 x2)/Spooled. For information on meta-analysis, see Harris M. Cooper and Larry V. Hedges, eds., The Handbook of Research Synthesis (New York: Russell Sage, 1994). 5. Paul R. Amato and Bruce Keith, Consequences of Parental Divorce for Childrens Well-Being: A MetaAnalysis, Psychological Bulletin 10 (1991): 2646. 6. Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato and Keith (1991) MetaAnalysis, Journal of Family Psychology 15 (2001): 35570. 7. Paul R. Amato and Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era of Family Upheaval (Harvard University Press, 1997); Paul R. Amato and Juliana M. Sobolewski, The Effects of Divorce and Marital Discord on Adult Childrens Psychological Well-Being, American Sociological Review 66 (2001): 90021; William S. Aquilino, Impact of Childhood Family Disruption on Young Adults Relationships with Parents, Journal of Marriage and the Family 56 (1994): 295313; Alan Booth and Paul R. Amato, Parental Predivorce Relations and Offspring Postdivorce Well-Being, Journal of Marriage and the Family 63 (2001): 197212; Larry L. Bumpass, Theresa C. Martin, and James A. Sweet, The Impact of Family Background and Early Marital Factors on Marital Disruption, Journal of Family Issues 12 (1991): 2242; Andrew J. Cherlin, P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, and Christine McRae, Effects of Divorce on Mental Health throughout the Life Course, American Sociological Review 63 (1998): 23949; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Harvard University Press, 1994); Lawrence L. Wu and B. C. Martinson, Family Structure and the Risk of a Premarital Birth, American Sociological Review 58 (1993): 21032. 8. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7); Paul R. Amato, Parental Absence during Childhood and Adult Depression, Sociological Quarterly 32 (1991): 54356; Paul R. Amato and Bruce Keith, Separation from a Parent during Childhood and Adult Socioeconomic Attainment, Social Forces 70 (1991): 187206; William Aquilino, The Life Course of Children Born to Unmarried Mothers: Childhood Living Arrangements and Young Adult Outcomes, Journal of Marriage and the Family 58 (1996): 293310; Robert Haveman, Barbara Wolf, and Karen Pence, Intergenerational Effects of Nonmarital and Early Childbearing, in Out of Wedlock: Causes and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility, edited by Lawrence L. Wu and Barbara Wolfe (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 287316; Jay D. Teachman, Childhood Living Arrangements and the Intergenerational Transmission of Divorce, Journal of Marriage and Family 64 (2002): 71729; Jay D. Teachman, The Childhood Living Arrangements of Children and the Characteristics of Their Marriages, Journal of Family Issues 25 (2004): 8696.
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9. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7). 10. Amato, Parental Absence during Childhood and Adult Depression (see note 8); Amato and Keith Separation from a Parent (see note 8); Teachman, Childhood Living Arrangements (see note 8). 11. Larry L. Bumpass and Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Childrens Family Contexts in the United States, Population Studies 54 (2000): 2941; Sara McLanahan and others, Unwed Parents or Fragile Families? Implications for Welfare and Child Support Policy, in Out of Wedlock: Causes and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility, edited by Lawrence L. Wu and Barbara Wolfe (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 20228. 12. Susan Brown, The Effect of Union Type on Psychological Well-Being: Depression among Cohabitors versus Marrieds, Journal of Health and Social Behavior 41 (2000): 24155; Susan Brown and Alan Booth, Cohabitation versus Marriage: A Comparison of Relationship Quality, Journal of Marriage and the Family 58 (1996): 66878; Judith Seltzer, Families Formed outside of Marriage, Journal of Marriage and the Family 62 (2000): 124768. 13. Susan Brown, Family Structure and Child Well-Being: The Significance of Parental Cohabitation, Journal of Marriage and the Family 66 (2004): 35167. For a general review of this literature, see Wendy Manning, The Implications of Cohabitation for Childrens Well-Being, in Just Living Together: Implications of Cohabitation for Families, Children, and Social Policy, edited by Alan Booth and Ann Crouter (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), pp. 21152. 14. Nancy S. Landale and Susan M. Hauan, The Family Life Course of Puerto Rican Children, Journal of Marriage and the Family 54 (1992): 91224; Wendy Manning, Pamela Smock, and Debarun Majumdar, The Relative Stability of Marital and Cohabiting Unions for Children, Population Research and Policy Review 23 (2004): 13559. 15. M. Carlson, Sara McLanahan, and Paula England, Union Formation and Dissolution in Fragile Families, Fragile Families Research Brief, no. 4 (Bendheim-Thoman Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, Princeton University, January 2003); see also Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring under the Second Demographic Transition, Demography 41 (2004): 60627. 16. Lawrence L. Wu, Larry L. Bumpass, and Kelly Musick, Historical and Life Course Trajectories of Nonmarital Childbearing, in Out of Wedlock: Causes and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility, edited by Lawrence L. Wu and Barbara Wolfe (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 348. 17. Brown, Family Structure and Child Well-Being (see note 13). 18. The Add Health study was designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris and funded by grant R01-HD31921 from the NICHD, with cooperative funding from seventeen other agencies. Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle provided assistance in the original study design. The analysis was conducted for this paper. 19. Amato and Keith, Consequences of Parental Divorce (see note 5). 20. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7). 21. Amato and Keith, Separation from a Parent (see note 8).
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22. Amato, Parental Absence (see note 8). 23. David Mechanic and Stephen Hansell, Divorce, Family Conflict, and Adolescents Well-Being, Journal of Health and Social Behavior 30 (1989): 10516; James L. Peterson and Nichola Zill, Marital Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, Journal of Marriage and the Family 49 (1986): 295307. 24. Amato and Booth, A Generation at Risk (see note 7); Booth and Amato, Parental Predivorce Relations (see note 7); Susan M. Jekielek, Parental Conflict, Marital Disruption and Childrens Emotional WellBeing, Social Forces 76 (1998): 90535; Thomas L. Hanson, Does Parental Conflict Explain Why Divorce Is Negatively Associated with Child Welfare? Social Forces 77 (1999):1283316. 25. Amato and Booth, A Generation at Risk (see note 7); Booth and Amato, Parental Predivorce Relations (see note 7); Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and Childrens WellBeing, Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 9 (2002): 7194. 26. Paul R. Amato, The Implications of Research on Children in Stepfamilies, in Stepfamilies: Who Benefits? Who Does Not? edited by Alan Booth and Judy Dunn (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994); E. Mavis Hetherington and W. Glenn Clingempeel, Coping with Marital Transitions, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, vol. 57, nos. 23 (University of Chicago Press, 1992); E. Mavis Hetherington and K. M. Jodl, Stepfamilies as Settings for Child Development, in Stepfamilies: Who Benefits? Who Does Not? edited by Alan Booth and Judy Dunn (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994), pp. 5579. 27. For a discussion of how stepchildren view stepparents, see E. Mavis Hetherington and John Kelly, For Better or for Worse: Divorce Reconsidered (New York: Norton, 2002). 28. Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks of Not Living with Both Biological Parents, Ethology and Sociobiology 6 (1985): 197220; Leslie Margolin and John L. Craft, Child Sexual Abuse by Caretakers, 38 (1989): 45055. 29. Richard Gelles and John W. Harrop, The Risk of Abusive Violence among Children with Nongenetic Caretakers, Family Relations 40 (1991): 7883. 30. Phyllis Bronstein and others, Fathering after Separation or Divorce: Factors Predicting Childrens Adjustment, Family Relations 43 (1994): 46979; Margaret Crosbie-Burnett and Jean Giles-Sims, Adolescent Adjustment and Stepparenting Styles, Family Relations 43 (1994): 39499; Lynn White and Joan G. Gilbreth, When Children Have Two Fathers: Effects of Relationships with Stepfathers and Noncustodial Fathers on Adolescent Outcomes, Journal of Marriage and Family 63 (2001): 15567. 31. Christine M. Buchanan, Eleanor E. Maccoby, and Sanford M. Dornbusch, Adolescents after Divorce (Harvard University Press, 1996). 32. Mignon R. Moore and P. L. Chase-Lansdale, Sexual Intercourse and Pregnancy among African-American Girls in High-Poverty Neighborhoods: The Role of Family and Perceived Community Environment, Journal of Marriage and the Family 63 (2001): 114657; Sandi Nelson, Rebecca L. Clark, and Gregory Acs, Beyond the Two-Parent Family: How Teenagers Fare in Cohabiting Couple and Blended Families, series B, no. B-31 (Washington: Urban Institute, 2001). 33. Brown, The Effect of Union Type (see note 12).
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34. Hetherington, Cox, and Cox, Effects of Divorce (see note 3). 35. Amato and Keith, Consequences of Parental Divorce (see note 5). 36. Amato, Children of Divorce (see note 6). 37. E. Mavis Hetherington, K. A. Camara, and David L. Featherman, Achievement and Intellectual Functioning of Children in One-Parent Households, in Achievement and Achievement Motives, edited by J. T. Spence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983). 38. Amato and Keith, Separation from a Parent (see note 8). 39. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7). 40. Amato, Parental Absence (see note 8). 41. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7). 42. Moore and Chase-Lansdale, Sexual Intercourse and Pregnancy (see note 32). 43. Nelson, Clark, and Acs, Beyond the Two-Parent Family (see note 32). 44. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7); Robert H. Aseltine, Pathways Linking Parental Divorce with Adolescent Depression, Journal of Health and Social Behavior 37 (1996): 13348; Donna R. Morrison and Andrew J. Cherlin, The Divorce Process and Young Childrens WellBeing: A Prospective Analysis, Journal of Marriage and the Family 57 (1995): 80012; Ronald L. Simons and Associates, Understanding Differences between Divorced and Intact Families (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1996). 45. Valarie King, Nonresident Father Involvement and Child Well-Being: Can Dads Make a Difference? Journal of Family Issues 15 (1994): 7896; Sara McLanahan and others, Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being: Greater Security or Greater Conflict? in Child Support and Child Well-Being, edited by Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan, and Philip K. Robins (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1996), pp. 23956. 46. Hetherington and Clingempeel, Coping with Marital Transitions (see note 26); Simons and Associates, Understanding Differences (see note 44); Nan Astone and Sara S. McLanahan, Family Structure, Parental Practices, and High School Completion, American Sociological Review 56 (1991): 30920; Elizabeth Thomson and others, Family Structure, Gender, and Parental Socialization, Journal of Marriage and the Family 54 (1992): 36878. 47. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7); Hetherington and Clingempeel, Coping with Marital Transition (see note 26); Buchanan, Maccoby, and Dornbusch, Adolescents after Divorce (see note 31); Simons and Associates, Understanding Differences (see note 44). 48. Paul R. Amato and Joan Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Childrens Well-Being: A Meta-Analysis, Journal of Marriage and the Family 61 (1999): 55773. 49. Paul R. Amato and Juliana Sobolewski, The Effects of Divorce on Fathers and Children: Nonresidential Fathers and Stepfathers, in The Role of the Father in Child Development, edited by Michael Lamb, 4th ed. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 2003), pp. 34167.
50. W. V. Fabricius, Listening to Children of Divorce: New Findings that Diverge from Wallerstein, Lewis, and Blakeslee, Family Relations 52 (2003): 38594. 51. Frank F. Furstenberg and Andrew Cherlin, Divided Families: What Happens to Children When Parents Part (Harvard University Press, 1991). 52. L. I. Pearlin and others, The Stress Process, Journal of Health and Social Behavior 22 (1981): 33756; Peggy A. Thoits, Stress, Coping, and Social Support Processes: Where Are We? What Next? Journal of Health and Social Behavior, extra issue (1995): 5379. 53. Buchanan, Maccoby, and Dornbusch, Adolescents after Divorce (see note 31); Jeanne M. Tschann and others, Conflict, Loss, Change and Parent-Child Relationships: Predicting Childrens Adjustment during Divorce, Journal of Divorce and Remarriage 13 (1999): 122; Elizabeth A. Vandewater and Jennifer E. Lansford, Influences of Family Structure and Parental Conflict on Childrens Well-Being, Family Relations 47 (1998): 32330. 54. Buchanan, Maccoby, and Dornbusch, Adolescents after Divorce (see note 31). 55. Patrick T. Davies and E. Mark Cummings, Marital Conflict and Child Adjustment: An Emotional Security Hypothesis, Psychological Bulletin 116 (1994): 387411. 56. McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent (see note 7); Aseltine, Pathways (see note 44); Simons and Associates, Understanding Differences (see note 44); Buchanan, Maccoby, and Dornbusch, Adolescents after Divorce (see note 31); Michael S. Ellwood and Arnold L. Stolberg, The Effects of Family Composition, Family Health, Parenting Behavior and Environmental Stress on Childrens Divorce Adjustment, Journal of Child and Family Studies 2 (1993): 2336; Irwin Sandler and others, Stability and Quality of Life Events and Psychological Symptomatology in Children of Divorce, American Journal of Community Psychology 19 (1991): 50120; Jay D. Teachman, Kathleen Paasch, and Karen Carver, Social Capital and Dropping Out of School Early, Journal of Marriage and the Family 58 (1996): 77383. 57. Wu and Martinson, Family Structure (see note 7); Paul R. Amato, Reconciling Divergent Perspectives: Judith Wallerstein, Quantitative Family Research, and Children of Divorce, Family Relations 52 (2003): 33239; Bryan Rodgers and Jan Pryor, Divorce and Separation: The Outcomes for Children (York, England: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1998). 58. M. McGue and D. T. Lykken, Genetic Influence on Risk of Divorce, Psychological Science 3 (1992): 36873; V. Jockin, M. McGue, and D. T. Lykken, Personality and Divorce: A Genetic Analysis, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (1996): 28899. For a strong statement of this position, see Judith Harris, The Nurture Assumption: Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do (New York: Touchstone, 1999). 59. Simons and Associates, Understanding Differences (see note 44); Amato, Reconciling Divergent Perspectives (see note 57). 60. See note 7. Cherlin and others used a fixed-effects model, which eliminates all unmeasured variables that do not change over time. McLanahan and Sandefur relied on biprobit analysis, a method that makes it possible to correlate error terms across equations, which is equivalent to adjusting for unmeasured variables that could affect family structure as well as childrens outcomes.
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61. David Brodzinsky, Jennifer C. Hitt, and Daniel Smith, Impact of Parental Separation and Divorce on Adopted and Nonadopted Children, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 63 (1993): 45161; Thomas G. OConnor and others, Are Associations between Parental Divorce and Childrens Adjustment Genetically Mediated? An Adoption Study, Developmental Psychology 36 (2000): 42937. 62. K. S. Kendler and others, Childhood Parental Loss and Adult Psychopathology in Women, Archives of General Psychiatry 49 (1992): 10916. 63. In this analysis, I considered adoptive parents to be the same as biological parents. The one parent category includes adolescents living with one biological parent and a stepparent (or a cohabiting partner of the parent). This category also includes a small percentage of children living with neither parent at the time of the interview. I used logistic regression analysis to adjust the percentages in table 1 for variables that could be associated with family structure as well as child outcomes: mothers education, fathers education, childs race (white, black, Latino, or other), childs age, childs gender, and whether the child was born in the United States. All of the differences reported in table 1 were statistically significant at p < .01. 64. The margin of error for these estimates, based on a 95 percent confidence interval, is about 1 percent. 65. To estimate the percentage of adolescents between the ages of thirteen and eighteen living with two biological parents in 1980, 1970, and 1960, I relied on retrospective data from the 1988 wave of the National Survey of Families and Households. The resulting figures are 64 percent, 74 percent, and 77 percent, respectively. The margin of error for these estimates, based on a 95 percent confidence interval, is about 2 percent. For details on the National Survey of Families and Households, see James Sweet, Larry Bumpass, and Vaughn Call, The Design and Content of the National Survey of Families and Households, NSFH Working Paper 1 (Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988). These estimates should not be equated with levels of program effectiveness, because it is naive to assume that specific, short-term interventions could reverse family trends so strongly. It is possible, however, that a range of interventions, combined with a shift in the larger culture, could result in substantial changes in family structure over a decade or longer. Moreover, the figures used in table 1 are not completely unrealistic, because they correspond to levels of family stability that actually existed in recent U.S. history. Note also that these estimates are based only on changes in family structure and assume no changes in marital quality in two-parent families. If future policies also are capable of improving the quality of existing marriages, then the figures in tables 1 and 2 are underestimates of the total benefit to children. 66. The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, High Blood Cholesterol: What You Need to Know, NIH Publication 01-3290 (May 2001). See also F. B. Hu, J. E. Manson, and W. C. Willett, Types of Dietary Fat and Risk of Coronary Heart Disease: A Critical Review, Journal of the American College of Nutrition 20 (2001): 519; S. Lewington and S. MacMahon, Blood Pressure, Cholesterol, and Common Causes of Death: A Review, American Journal of Hypertension 12 (1999): 96S98S. 67. The estimates for ten-year risk of a heart attack vary with age and gender. The link between cholesterol and cardiovascular disease is stronger for men than for women, and stronger for older individuals than for younger individuals. The margin of error for these estimates, based on a 95 percent confidence interval, is about 1 percent. 68. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Government Printing Office, 2003), table 11.
ATTACHMENT G Elizabeth Wildsmith et al., Childbearing Outside of Marriage: Estimates and Trends in the United States Child Research Brief (Nov. 2011)
Publication #2011-29
RESEARCH BRIEF
4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 350, Washington, DC 20008 Phone 202-572-6000 Fax 202-362-8420 www.childtrends.org
Childbearing Outside of Marriage: Estimates and Trends in the United States

By Elizabeth Wildsmith, Ph.D., Nicole R. Steward-Streng, M.A., and Jennifer Manlove, Ph.D. November 2011
verview. Having children outside of marriagenonmarital childbearinghas been on the rise across several decades in the United States. In 2009, 41 percent of all births (about 1.7 million) occurred outside of marriage, compared with 28 percent of all births in 1990 and just 11 percent of all births in 1970.12,20 Preliminary data suggest that this percentage has remained stable in 2010.6 There are several reasons to be concerned about the high level of nonmarital childbearing. Couples who have children outside of marriage are younger, less healthy, and less educated than are married couples who have children.14 Children born outside of marriage tend to grow up with limited financial resources; to have less stability in their lives because their parents are more likely to split up and form new unions; and to have cognitive and behavioral problems, such as aggression and depression.13 Indeed, concerns about the consequences of nonmarital childbearing helped motivate the major reform of welfare that occurred in 1996,17 and continue to motivate the development of federally funded pregnancy prevention programs among teenagers and marriage promotion programs among adults.17,19
This Research Brief draws from multiple published reports using data through 2009, as well as from Child Trends original analyses of data from a nationally representative survey of children born in 2001, to provide up-to-date information about nonmarital childbearing; to describe the women who have children outside of marriage; and to examine how these patterns have changed over time. As nonmarital childbearing has become more commonplace, the makeup of women having children outside of marriage has changed, often in ways that challenge public perceptions. For example, an increasing percentage of women who have a birth outside of marriage live with the father of the baby in a cohabiting union and are over the age of twenty.7,21 Moreover, the percentage of women having a birth outside of marriage has increased faster among white and Hispanic women than among black women.7,20
TRENDS IN NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING

The percentage of births outside of marriage rose steeply from 1970 to 2009 for all age groups. Between 1970 and 2009, the percentage of all births that took place outside of marriage (the nonmarital birth ratio) increased from 11 to 41 percent (see Figure 1). This increase occurred within every age category (see Figure 2).12,21 n Nonmarital births to teens rose from 30 percent in 1970 to 67 percent in 1990, to 87 percent in 2009. n Nonmarital births to women ages 20-24 rose from 9 percent in 1970 to 37 percent in 1990, to 62 percent in 2009.
Figure 1
Percent of Births to Unmarried Women, 1970-2009

50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%
41%
11%
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
Source: 1970-1999, Ventura SJ, Bachrach CA. Nonmarital childbearing in the United States, 19401999. National vital statistics reports; vol 48 no 16. Hyattsville, Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics. 2000. Martin JA, Hamilton BE, Ventura SJ, Osterman MJK, Kirmeyer S, Mathews TJ, Wilson EC. Births: Final data for 2009. National vital statistics reports; vol 60 no 1. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2011.
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ABOUT THE DATA SOURCE FOR THIS BRIEF

Statistics used for this brief came from two primary sources: birth data (through 2009) that were collected and reported by the National Center for Health Statistics as part of the National Vital Statistics Reports,12,21 and data Child Trends analyzed from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) that were collected by the National Center for Education Statistics within the U.S. Department of Education. The ECLS-B is a nationally representative sample of approximately 10,700 children born in 2001. The study was designed to gather information on childrens early life experiences from birth through kindergarten entry. The analyses presented in this brief used data from the first phase of data collection, a sample of about 10,500 children who lived with their biological or adoptive mothers, who answered the nine-month parent survey. All analyses of the ECLS-B were weighted and accounted for survey design effects. Statistically significant differences presented in this brief are significant at p<.05. Two of the most common measures of nonmarital childbearing are the nonmarital birth ratio, i.e., the percentage of all births that occur to unmarried women; and the nonmarital birth rate i.e., the number of births for every 1,000 unmarried women between the ages of 15 and 44 (or within specific age categories) in any given year. Although different from one another, these two measures are closely related.
Figure 2 Percent of Births to Unmarried Women, 1970, 1990, & 2009

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
87%
67% 62%
1970 1990 2009
The percentage of births outside of marriage also increased for all major racial and ethnic groups. Since 1990, the percentage of all births occurring outside of marriage increased for all major racial and ethnic groups. Although the percentage of nonmarital births is still highest among black women, the greatest increases were seen among white and Hispanic women (see Figure 3).12 n In 1990, 17 percent of births to white women, 67 percent of births to black women, and 37 percent of births to Hispanic women were nonmarital.
37% 30%
34% 21% 13% 4% 4% 5% 19% 14%
18% 9%
15-19
20-24
25-29 Age Categories
30-34
35-39
n In 2009, 29 percent of births to white women, 73 percent of births to black women, and 53 percent of births to Hispanic women were nonmarital. Women in their twenties have the highest rate of births outside of marriage. A common misperception is that teen women have the highest nonmarital birth rate. However, the number of births among unmarried women in their twenties and thirties increased substantially over the past 20 years, while births to teens have declined overall (in spite of an increase in the mid-2000s). In 2009: n Women aged 20-24 had a nonmarital birth rate of 74.6 births per 1,000 unmarried women. n Women aged 25-29 had 72.7 births per 1,000 unmarried women. n In comparison, teen women aged 15-17 had 19.3 births per 1,000 unmarried women and teen
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Sources:Ventura SJ and Bachrach, CA. Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99. National vital statistics reports; vol 48 no 16. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2000. Martin JA, Hamilton BE, Ventura SJ, Osterman MJK, Kirmeyer S, Mathews TJ, Wilson EC. Births: Final data for 2009. National vital statistics reports; vol 60 no 1. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2011.
n Nonmarital births to women ages 25-29 rose from 4 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1990, to 34 percent in 2009. n Nonmarital births to women ages 30-34 rose from 4 percent in 1970 to 13 percent in 1990, to 21 percent in 2009. n Nonmarital births to women ages 35-39 rose from 5 percent in 1970 to 14 percent in 1990, to 19 percent in 2009.
2
Figure 3 Percent of Births to Unmarried Women by Race and Ethnicity, 1990 & 2009
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
17% 29% 37% 67% 73%
Figure 4 Nonmarital Birth Rate (per 1,000 women) by Age, 2009
40-44 Age of Mother (In Years) 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 18-19 15-19
7.9 30.2 57.5 72.7 74.6 58.2 19.3
1990 2009
53%
0
White Black Hispanic
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Rate of Birth Per 1,000 Unmarried Women
Source: Martin JA, Hamilton BE, Ventura SJ, Osterman MJK, Kirmeyer S, Mathews TJ, Wilson EC. Births: Final data for 2009. National vital statistics reports; vol 60 no 1. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2011.
Source: Martin JA, Hamilton BE, Ventura SJ, Osterman MJK, Kirmeyer S, Mathews TJ, Wilson EC. Births: Final data for 2009. National vital statistics reports; vol 60 no 1. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2011.
women aged 18-19 had 58.2 births per 1,000 unmarried women. n Although nonmarital birth rates for women 30 and older are increasing, these rates remain lower than rates for women in their twenties: 57.5 among women aged 30-34, 30.2 among women aged 35-39, and 7.9 among women aged 40-44 (see Figure 4). Teen women account for a diminishing share of all births outside of marriage. Although teen women accounted for almost one-half (49 percent) of all nonmarital births in 1970, by 2009 they were responsible for less than one-quarter of nonmarital births (21 percent). By contrast, in 2009, women in their twenties accounted for the majority (62 percent) of nonmarital births12,21 (see Figure 5). n Women aged 20-24 accounted for 33 percent of nonmarital births in 1970 and 38 percent in 2009. n In 1970, slightly less than one-fifth (18 percent) of all nonmarital births were to women aged 25 and older; however, by 2009 women in this age group accounted for 41 percent of all nonmarital births. Less than one-half of all nonmarital births are first births. Despite the common perception that firstborns account for most nonmarital births, more than one-half of all births in 2009 that
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occurred outside of marriage (59 percent) were second- or higher-order births (results not shown).16 n Fifty-seven percent of births to unmarried women aged 20-24, three-quarters (75 percent) of births to unmarried women aged 25-29, and
Figure 5 Percent of Nonmarital Births to Women in Each Age Category, 1970 and 2009
1970
Ages 30-34 5% Ages 25-29 11%
Ages 35-39 2%
2009
Ages 35-39 5% Teen (15-19) 49% Ages 30-34 12% Ages 25-29 24% Ages 20-24 38%
Ages 20-24 33%
Teen (15-19) 21%
Sources: Ventura SJ and Bachrach, CA. Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99. National vital statistics reports; vol 48 no 16. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2000. Martin JA, Hamilton BE, Ventura SJ, Osterman MJK, Kirmeyer S, Mathews TJ, Wilson EC. Births: Final data for 2009. National vital statistics reports; vol 60 no 1. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2011.
82 percent of births to unmarried women aged 30-39 were higher-order births. n Even among teen women aged 15-19, almost one-quarter (24 percent) of nonmarital births were second- or higher-order. More than one-half of nonmarital births occur within cohabiting relationships. A majority of children born outside of marriage are born into families headed by two unmarried parents. In 2001, 52 percent of all nonmarital births took place within a cohabiting union, compared with 38 percent in the early 1990s.7,15 However, the likelihood that a woman will have a baby within a cohabiting relationship varies substantially by race and ethnicity. Results from Child Trends analyses of data from the ECLS-B show that almost two2 thirds of nonmarital births in 2001 to white (61 percent) and Hispanic (65 percent) women took place within cohabiting unions, compared with less than one-third (30 percent) of nonmarital births to black women (see Figure 6). The majority of nonmarital births are unintended. Unintended births are those that, at the time of conception, were either mistimed (the mother wanted the pregnancy to occur earlier or later than it did) or unwanted (the mother did not want it to occur at that time or any time in the future). Child Trends analyses of ECLS-B data indicate that 65 percent of births to women who were not living with or married to the father of their baby and 50
percent of births to women who were living with their babys father were unintended, compared with just 20 percent of births to married women (see Figure 7). Additional research suggests that men may 3 be more likely than are women to report that births outside of marriage are unintended. For example, 62 percent of unmarried fathers aged 15-24 identified their most recent birth as unintended.11
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This Research Brief has highlighted several important trends that have implications for the well-being of children and the parents who bring them into this world. Nonmarital childbearing has increased substantially, particularly among women in their twenties. Preliminary data from 2010 suggest
Figure 7 Percent of Women who Report that Their Pregnancy was Unintended by Relationship Status at Birth
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%
Married at Birth Cohabiting at Birth Not Married or Cohabiting at Birth 20% 50% 65%
Figure 6 Percent of Unmarried Mothers Cohabiting at Birth of Child, by Race and Ethnicity
80% 70%
61%
Source: Child Trends analyses of Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) , 2001-02
65%
60%
52%
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Total White Black Hispanic 30%
Source: Child Trends analyses of Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) , 2001-02
small declines in the nonmarital birth rate since 2008, as well as no continued increase in the percentage of births that occur outside of marriage.6 However, the overall increase over the past several decades in both the nonmarital birth rate and the percent of births that occur outside of marriage indicate striking changes in the context of childbearing in the United States. The most profound change in the prevalence of nonmarital childbearing has been among women over the age of 19. In 2009, women in their twenties were responsible for the largest share of nonmarital births (62 percent) and had the highest nonmarital birth rates.12 The per-
2011 Child Trends
centage of nonmarital births among teen women, however, has declined substantially, as have teen birth rates. The decline in birth rates among teen women has been attributed to a combination of delays in sexual initiation and increased use of contraception.18 Increases in nonmarital births have been more dramatic among white and Hispanic women than among black women. Although the proportion of nonmarital births remains highest among black women, the proportion of births occurring outside of marriage has increased the most for white and Hispanic women. This trend may be explained partly by greater economic strains, growing acceptance of nontraditional family forms, and increased barriers to marriage, particularly among people of lower socioeconomic status.3,5,14 In fact, some researchers suggest that disadvantaged white and Hispanic women are merely following the pattern of nonmarital childbearing set by disadvantaged black women in earlier decades.5 The rise in the number of children being born outside of marriageamong all groupsis linked to broader changes in family structure, most notably cohabitation. More than one-half of all nonmarital births occur to couples who live together in one household, but are not legally married. In fact, much of the increase in nonmarital childbearing since the 1980s reflects a shift from births to married couples to births to cohabiting couples, rather than an increase in births to women who are either in dating relationships or are single.7,8 However, although cohabiting couples with children have very high expectations of marriage, the likelihood that these couples will marry remains low. 13 Additionally, cohabiting unions generally fail to provide the same level of economic security that marriages do and tend to be of shorter duration than marriages.13 Thus, children born to cohabiting parents are more likely than are those born to married parents to be poor and to see their parents union end. Births that occur outside of marriage are often second- or higher-order births. More than one-half of all babies born to unmarried couples are not firstborns. Some of these babies represent repeat births to the same unmarried couple. However, many children born outside of marriage do not share the same father as their siblings. In fact, research finds that two-thirds (66 percent) of new unmarried mothers with more than one child had at least one child who was fathered by
someone other than the father of the new baby.13 This type of family complexity can introduce additional stresses and strains into family life.14 Births that occur outside of marriage also are often unintended. Child Trends findings indicate that many nonmarital births are unintended, that is, the woman did not intend the baby at that time and maybe did not want to have a baby. Such circumstances, in turn, are associated with negative outcomes for children. For example, children born to women who did not intend to get pregnant have been found to have lower birthweight, poorer mental and physical health, lower educational attainment, and more behavioral problems than do children whose births were intended.9
CONCLUSION
Reducing nonmarital childbearing and promoting marriage among unmarried parents remain important goals of federal and state policies and programs designed to improve the well-being of women and children and to reduce their reliance on public assistance.14,17 In general, research suggests that marriage would bring some economic advantages to unmarried women (and their children), particularly for those from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.8,14 However, research also finds that when unmarried mothers do marry, their marriages are relatively unstable, with particularly negative economic outcomes for women and children if they do dissolve.8 Some existing government programs, such as The Healthy Marriage Initiative, aim to promote healthy marriages among currently married couples and couples contemplating marriage by fostering effective communication, respect, and conflict management skills.4 For those couples who do not marry, programs focused on promoting healthy relationships may still enhance childrens wellbeing. For example, research finds that the better the quality of the biological parents relationship at birth, the better the parenting skills they demonstrate one year after the birth; and this pattern holds across all relationship types, even among parents who do not live together.1 Similarly, positive co-parenting behaviora component of healthy relationshipsis associated with increased involvement of nonresident fathers in childrens lives.2 It is likely that many children will continue to be born outside of marriage into a variety of living
2011 Child Trends
situations. Given this likelihood, it is in everyones best interest to encourage the promotion of healthy relationships among all family members, including those living outside the household, and for the research community to continue to explore factors associated with the positive development of children born to unmarried parents. In addition, efforts to help couples prevent unintended pregnancies continue to be critical; and these efforts need to recognize that many of these couples are not teensbut young adults. Child Trends thanks the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for its support of the research on which this Research Brief was based, as well as the writing, editing, production and dissemination of this publication. The authors also thank Carol Emig, Kristin Moore, and Marci McCoy-Roth for their careful review of and helpful comments on this brief. Editor: Harriet J. Scarupa
11 Manlove, J., Terry-Humen, E., Ikramullah, E., & Holcombe, E. (2008). Sexual and reproductive health behaviors among teen and young adult men: A descriptive portrait. (Research Brief). Washington, DC: Child Trends. 12
Martin, J. A., Hamilton, B. E., Ventura, S. J., Osterman, M. J. K., Kirmeyer, S., Mathews, T. J., et al. (2011). Births: Final data for 2009. National Vital Statistics Reports 60(1). Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.
13 McLanahan, S. (2011). Family instability and complexity after a nonmarital birth: Outcomes for children in fragile families. In M. J. Carlson, & P. England (Eds.), Social class and changing families in an unequal America. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 14
McLanahan, S., Garfinkel, I., Mincy, R., & Donahue, E. (2010). Introducing the Issue The Future of Children, 20(2), 3-16.
15 Mincieli, L., Manlove, J., McGarrett, M., Moore, K. A., & Ryan, S. (2007). The relationship context of births outside of marriage: The rise of cohabitation. Washington, DC: Child Trends. 16 National Center for Health Statistics. (2011). Vital statistics system birth data files for 2009. Retrieved November 4, 2011, from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data_access/Vitalstatsonline.htm 17
Nock, S. L. (2005). Marriage as a public issue. The Future of Children, 15(2), 13-32.
18
Santelli, J., & Melnikas, A. (2010). Teen fertility in transition: Recent and historic trends in the United States. Annual Review of Public Health, 31, 371383.
19 Soloman-Fears, C. (2008). CRS Report for Congress: Nonmarital childbearing: Trends, reasons and public policy interventions. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 20
Ventura, S. J. (2009). Changing patterns of nonmarital childbearing in the United States. National Center for Health Statistics (data brief no. 18). Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.
21
REFERENCES
1
Ventura, S. J., & Bachrach, C. A. (2000). Nonmarital childbearing in the United States, 1940-1999. National Vital Statistics Reports (vol 48, no. 16). Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.
Carlson, M., & McLanahan, S. (2006). Strengthening unmarried families: Could enhancing couple relationships also improve parenting? Social Service Review, 80(2), 297-321.
2 Carlson, M., McLanahan, S., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (2008). Coparenting and nonresident fathers' involvement with young children after a nonmarital birth. Demography, 45(2), 461-488. 3
Cherlin, A. J. (2004). The deinstitutionalization of American marriage. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66, 848-861.
Dion, M. R., Hershey, A. M., Zaveri, H. H., Avellar, S. A., Strong, D. A., Silman, T., et al. (2008). Implementation of the building strong families program: Executive summary: 8935-134.
5 Furstenberg, F. F. (2009). If Moynihan had only known: Race, class, and family change in the late twentieth century. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 621, 94-110. 6
Hamilton BE, Martin JA, Ventura SJ. (2011). Births: Preliminary data for 2010. National vital statistics reports web release 60(2). Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics.
Kennedy, S., & Bumpass, L. (2008). Cohabitation and children's living arrangements: New estimates from the United States. Demographic Research, 19(47), 1663-1692.
8 Lichter, D. T., Graefe, D. R., & Brown, J. B. (2003). Is marriage a panacea? Union formation among economically disadvantaged unwed mothers. Social Problems, 50(1), 60-86. 9 Logan, C., Holcombe, E., Manlove, J., & Ryan, S. (2007). The consequences of unintended childbearing: A white paper. Washington, DC: Child Trends and The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy. 10 Manlove, J., Ryan, S., Wildsmith, E., & Franzetta, K. (2010). The relationship context of nonmarital childbearing in the U.S. Demographic Research, 23(22), 615-654.
Child Trends is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center that studies children at every stage of development. Its mission is to improve outcomes for children by providing research, data, and analysis to the people and institutions whose decisions and actions affect children. For additional information on Child Trends, including a complete set of available Research Briefs, visit our Web site at www.childtrends.org. For the latest information on more than 100 key indicators of child and youth well-being, visit the Child Trends DataBank at www.childtrendsdatabank.org. For summaries of more than 300 experimental evaluations of social interventions for children, visit www.childtrends.org/LINKS
2011 Child Trends
ATTACHMENT H Benjamin Scafide, Principal Investigator, The Taxpayer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Childbearing: First Ever Estimate for the Nation and All Fifty States (2008)
A Report to the Nation Benjamin Scafidi, Principal Investigator
The Taxpayer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Childbearing First-Ever Estimates for the Nation and All Fifty States
Institute for American Values Institute for Marriage and Public Policy
Georgia Family Council Families Northwest
over marriage focuses on the role of marriage as a social, moral, or religious institution. But marriage is also an economic institution, a powerful creator of human and social capital. Increases in divorce and unwed childbearing have broad economic implications, including larger expenditures for the federal and state governments. This is the first-ever report that attempts to measure the taxpayer costs of family fragmentation for U.S. taxpayers in all fifty states. Among its findings: Even programs that result in very small decreases in divorce and unwed childbearing could yield big savings for taxpayers.
OST OF THE PUBLIC DEBATE
The reports principal investigator is Benjamin Scafidi, an economist in the J. Whitney Bunting School of Business at Georgia College & State University. The co-sponsoring organizations are the Institute for American Values, the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, Georgia Family Council, and Families Northwest. The co-sponsoring organizations are grateful to Chuck Stetson and Mr. and Mrs. John Fetz for their generous financial support of the project. The principal investigator is grateful to Deanie Waddell for her expert research assistance.
On the cover: Man and Woman Splitting Dollar by Todd Davidson, Stock Illustration RF, Getty Images.
2008, Georgia Family Council and Institute for American Values. No reproduction of the materials contained herein is permitted without the written permission of the Institute for American Values. ISBN: 1-931764-14-X
Institute for American Values
1841 Broadway, Suite 211 New York, New York 10023 Tel: (212) 246-3942 Fax: (212) 541-6665 Website: www.americanvalues.org Email: info@americanvalues.org
The Taxpayer Costs of Divorce and Unwed Childbearing First-Ever Estimates for the Nation and All Fifty States
Contents
Project Advisors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 I. Why Should Government Care about Marriage? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
II. How Might Marriage Affect Taxpayers? Empirical Literature Review . . . . . . .9 How Much Does Marriage Reduce Poverty? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Does Family Fragmentation Increase Crime? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 III. Is the Methodology Used in This Estimate Reasonable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . What Costs Are Associated with Means-Tested Government Programs? What Costs Are Associated with the Justice System? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . How Are Foregone Tax Revenues Estimated? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 .13 .16 .16
IV. What Is the Total Estimated Cost of Family Fragmentation? . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 V. What Are the Policy Implications? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Appendix A: Testing the Analysis: Is the Estimate of $112 Billion Too High or Too Low? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Appendix B: Explaining the Methodology for State-Specific Costs . . . . . . . . . . .31 Tables Table 1: U.S. Children Residing in Two-Parent Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Table 2: Percent of U.S. Children in a Single-Parent Household that Has... .7 Table 3: Persons and Children Lifted out of Poverty via Marriage . . . . . . .14 Table 4: Household Income and Usage of Food Stamps . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Table 5: Household Income and Usage of Cash Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Table 6: Household Income and Usage of Medicaid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Table 7: Estimated Costs of Family Fragmentation for U.S. Taxpayers . . . .18 Table A.1: Sub-Calculations of State and Federal Taxpayer Costs . . . . . . .32 Notes to Table A.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Table A.2: Sub-Calculations for EITC and Justice System Estimates . . . . . .35 Table A.3: Total Poverty and Family Structure by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Table A.4: Child Poverty and Family Structure by State . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Table A.5: Estimates of State and Local Taxpayer Costs of Family Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
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Project Advisors
Project advisors provided expert review but are not authors of the report. Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Any errors or omissions in this report are the responsibility of the principal investigator and not of the project advisors. James Alm Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University Obie Clayton Morehouse College Ron Haskins The Brookings Institution Brett Katzman Kennesaw State University Robert Lerman Urban Institute Theodora Ooms Center for Law and Social Policy Roger Tutterow Mercer University Matt Weidinger U.S. House Ways and Means Committee W. Bradford Wilcox University of Virginia
About Benjamin Scafidi
Ben Scafidi is an associate professor in the J. Whitney Bunting School of Business at Georgia College & State University. His research has focused on education and urban policy. Previously he served as the Education Policy Advisor for Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue and served on the staff of both of Georgia Governor Roy Barnes Education Reform Study Commissions. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Virginia and his bachelors degree in Economics from the University of Notre Dame. Ben was born and raised in Richmond, Virginia. Ben and Lori Scafidi and their four children reside in Milledgeville, Georgia.
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Executive Summary
HIS STUDY PROVIDES THE FIRST RIGOROUS ESTIMATE
of the costs to U.S. taxpayers of high rates of divorce and unmarried childbearing both at the national and state levels.
Why should legislators and policymakers care about marriage? Public debate on marriage in this country has focused on the social costs of family fragmentation (that is, divorce and unwed childbearing), and research suggests that these are indeed extensive. But marriage is more than a moral or social institution; it is also an economic one, a generator of social and human capital, especially when it comes to children. Research on family structure suggests a variety of mechanisms, or processes, through which marriage may reduce the need for costly social programs. In this study, we adopt the simplifying and extremely cautious assumption that all of the taxpayer costs of divorce and unmarried childbearing stem from the effects that family fragmentation has on poverty, a causal mechanism that is well-accepted and has been reasonably well-quantified in the literature. Based on the methodology, we estimate that family fragmentation costs U.S. taxpayers at least $112 billion each and every year, or more than $1 trillion each decade. In appendix B, we also offer estimates for the costs of family fragmentation for each state. These costs arise from increased taxpayer expenditures for antipoverty, criminal justice, and education programs, and through lower levels of taxes paid by individuals who, as adults, earn less because of reduced opportunities as a result of having been more likely to grow up in poverty. The $112 billion figure represents a lower-bound or minimum estimate. Given the cautious assumptions used throughout this analysis, we can be confident that current high rates of family fragmentation cost taxpayers at least $112 billion per year. The estimate of $112 billion per year is the total figure incurred at the federal, state, and local levels. Of these taxpayer costs, $70.1 billion are at the federal level, $33.3 billion are at the state level, and $8.5 billion are at the local level. Taxpayers in California incur the highest state and local costs at $4.8 billion, while taxpayers in Wyoming have the lowest state and local costs at $61 million. If, as research suggests is likely, marriage has additional benefits to children, adults, and communities, and if those benefits are in areas other than increased income levels, then the actual taxpayer costs of divorce and unwed childbearing are likely much higher.
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How should policymakers, state legislators, and others respond to the large taxpayer costs of family fragmentation? We note that even very small increases in stable marriage rates as a result of government programs or community efforts to strengthen marriage would result in very large savings for taxpayers. If the federal marriage initiative, for example, succeeds in reducing family fragmentation by just 1 percent, U.S. taxpayers will save an estimated $1.1 billion each and every year. Because of the modest price tags associated with most federal and state marriagestrengthening programs, and the large taxpayer costs associated with divorce and unwed childbearing, even modest success rates would be cost-effective. Texas, for example, recently appropriated $15 million over two years for marriage education and other programs to increase stable marriage rates. If this program succeeds in increasing stably married families by just three-tenths of 1 percent, it will be costeffective in its returns to Texas taxpayers. This report is organized as follows: Section I explains why policymakers may have an interest in supporting marriage. Sections II and III explain the methods used to estimate the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation by using evidence about the relationship between family breakdown and poverty. Section IV reveals the national estimate of the taxpayer cost. Estimated costs for individual states are found in appendix B. Finally, a note to social scientists: Few structural estimates exist of the relationships needed to estimate the taxpayer costs of family fragmentation. Therefore, we have used indirect estimates based on the assumption that marriage has no independent effects on adults or children other than the effect of marriage on poverty.
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I. Why Should Government Care about Marriage?
VER THE LAST FORTY YEARS, marriage has become less common and more fragile, and the proportion of children raised outside intact marriages has increased dramatically. Between 1970 and 2005, the proportion of children living with two married parents dropped from 85 percent to 68 percent, according to Census data. About three-quarters of children living with a single parent live with a single mother.
These important changes in family structure stem from two fundamental changes in U.S. residents behavior regarding marriage: increases in unmarried childbearing and high rates of divorce.1 More than a third of all U.S. children are now born outside of wedlock, including 25 percent of non-Hispanic white babies, 46 percent of Hispanic babies, and 69 percent of African American babies.2 In 2004, almost 1.5 million babies were born to unmarried mothers.3 Divorce rates, by contrast, after increasing in the 1960s and 1970s, appear to have declined modestly in recent years. The small decline in divorce after 1980, however, seems to have been offset by increases in unwed childbearing, as the percentage of children living with one parent increased steadily between 1970 and 1998 with only a small drop after 1998. Overall, divorce rates remain high relative to the period before 1970. Todays young adults in their prime childbearing years are less likely to get married, and many more U.S. children each year are born to unmarried mothers. Should Table 1. U.S. Children Residing in Two-Parent Families U.S. taxpayers be concerned about these increases in family fragmentation, and if so, why?
1970 85.2%
Public debate on marriage in this country has focused on the social costs of increases in divorce and unmarried childbearing. Research suggests that the social costs are indeed extensive. When parents part, or fail to marry, their children seem to suffer from increased risks of poverty, mental illness, infant mortality, physical illness, juvenile delinquency and adult criminality, sexual abuse and other forms of family violence, economic hardship, substance abuse, and educational failure, such as increased risk of dropping out of school.4
1998 2005
68.1% 68.3%
(Source: U.S.Bureau of the Census)
Table 2. Percent of U.S. Children in a Single-Parent Household that Has . . .
One Male Parent One Female Parent
21.5% 78.5%
(Source: 2005 American Community Survey)
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But marriage is more than a moral or even social institution; it is also an economic one, a generator of social and human capital, especially when it comes to children. Not much attention has been focused to date on the hard, economic costs of family fragmentation, by which we mean not only the economic costs to affected individuals and families but also to the public purse. There are good reasons for suspecting that taxpayer costs associated with family fragmentation are substantial: To the extent that the decline of marriage increases the number of children and adults eligible for and in need of government services, costs to taxpayers will grow. To the extent that increases in family fragmentation also independently drive social problems faced by communitiessuch as crime, domestic violence, substance abuse, and teen pregnancythe costs to taxpayers of addressing these increasing social problems are also likely to be significant. Pointing out these concerns is not to blame the victim, but rather to launch a serious effort to determine what these costs are. If these costs are deemed substantial, then it is worth thinking carefully about how these costs can be lowered so that resources can be freed for other useful purposes. In 2000, a group of more than one hundred family scholars and civic leaders noted the range of public costs associated with family breakdown, concluding:
Divorce and unwed childbearing create substantial public costs, paid by taxpayers. Higher rates of crime, drug abuse, education failure, chronic illness, child abuse, domestic violence, and poverty among both adults and children bring with them higher taxpayer costs in diverse forms: more welfare expenditure; increased remedial and special education expenses; higher day-care subsidies; additional child-support collection costs; a range of increased direct court administration costs incurred in regulating post-divorce or unwed families; higher foster care and child protection services; increased Medicaid and Medicare costs; increasingly expensive and harsh crime-control measures to compensate for formerly private regulation of adolescent and young-adult behaviors; and many other similar costs. While no study has yet attempted precisely to measure these sweeping and diverse taxpayer costs stemming from the decline of marriage, current research suggests that these costs are likely to be quite extensive.5
In response to public concerns about the negative consequences of divorce and unmarried childbearing for child well-being, the federal government and many states have modestly funded programs aimed at strengthening marriage. Since the mid-1990s, at least nine states have publicly adopted a goal of strengthening marriage, and seven states have dedicated funding (often using a very small
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portion of their federal TANF, or welfare, funds) to various programs designed to strengthen marriage.6 For example, Oklahoma offers marriage skills classes throughout the state, providing the courses at no charge to low-income participants. In 2007, Texas legislators mandated that a minimum of 1 percent of the federal TANF block grant to the state be spent on marriage promotion activities, providing an estimated $15 million per year for two years.7 In addition to the TANF block grants, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provided an additional $150 million annually for a Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Program, administered by the Administration for Children and Families of the Department of Health and Human Services. These monies were specifically allocated for programs designed to help couples form and sustain healthy marriage relationships, with up to $50 million available for responsible fatherhood promotion.8 Overall, less than 1 percent of TANF dollars are spent annually on healthy marriage programming. Evaluation is under way to determine the effectiveness of these programs. In the meantime, this study provides the first rigorous estimate of the costs to taxpayers of the decline of marriage, both at the national level and the state level.9
II. How Might Marriage Affect Taxpayers? Empirical Literature Review
of the social problems and disadvantages addressed by federal and state government programs occur more frequently among children born to and/or raised by single parents than among children whose parents get and stay married.10 The potential risks to children raised in fragmented families that have been identified in the literature include poverty, mental illness, physical illness, infant mortality, lower educational attainment (including greater risk of dropping out of high school), juvenile delinquency, conduct disorders, adult criminality, and early unwed parenthood. In addition, family fragmentation seems to have negative consequences for adults as well, including lower labor supply, physical and mental illness, and a higher likelihood of committing or falling victim to crime.11
ESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT MANY
To the extent that family fragmentation causes negative outcomes for children and adults, it also leads to higher costs to taxpayers through higher spending on antipoverty programs and throughout the justice and educational systems, as well as losses to government coffers in foregone tax revenues.
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A crucial issue for this study is to ascertain to what extent the associations between family fragmentation and these negative outcomes are causal. There are of course powerful selection effects into marriage, divorce, and unwed childbearing, and some portion of the negative outcomes for children in nonmarital families are caused by habits, traits, circumstances, and disadvantages among adults that may also lead to divorce and nonmarital childbearing.12 For example, a dating couple facing an unexpected pregnancy may choose not to marry because the man is unemployed. Depending on how one looks at it, the out-of-wedlock birth may be said to result from the fathers low-earnings or the mother and childs poverty may be said to result from the out-of-wedlock birth. Untangling what causes what is a challenge faced by many researchers who study the family.
How Much Does Marriage Reduce Poverty?
Researchers respond to this challenge by using a variety of methods to control for unobserved selection effects (that is, to account for other factors that could be explaining the finding) and to tease out causal relationships (that is, to untangle what causes what). In this case, the idea that family fragmentation contributes to child poverty has been studied extensively and is widely accepted.13 Marriage can help to reduce poverty because there are two potential wage earners in the home, because of economies of scale in the household, and possibly also because of changes in habits, values, and mores that may occur when two people marry.14 In addition, there is recent, intriguing research that uses naturally occurring evidence to examine whether family fragmentation causes poverty. Elizabeth Ananat and Guy Michaels, for example, use an unusual predictor of whether a married couple will stay married (the predictor is whether their firstborn child is a male, since research has shown that divorce is less likely when this is the case). With this predictor they are able to study married couples who do and do not divorce and conclude that divorce significantly increases the odds that a woman with children is poor.15 Their analysis suggests that almost all of the increase in poverty observed among divorced mothers is caused by the divorce. Less than 1 percent of these women and children live in poverty if their first marriage is intact, while more than 24 percent of divorced women with children are living in poverty.16 Another area of research uses national data to simulate changes in family structure. For example, Robert Lerman used the Current Population Survey (CPS) and simulated plausible marriages by matching single mothers to single males who were the same race and were similar in age and education levels. He found that if these theoretical marriages occurred they would reduce poverty by 80 percent among these single-mother households.17 Adam Thomas and Isabel Sawhill used a similar
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approach and concluded that marriage would reduce poverty among single mothers substantially, by about 65 percent.18 Both Lermans and Thomas and Sawhills estimates assume that getting married has no effect on mens labor supply (and therefore male earnings). Most research on this topic, by contrast, finds that marriage leads to a modest increase in male labor supply, which would further reduce poverty rates. David Ribar did a useful survey of the literature on the impact of marriage on mens earnings.19 Other research that seeks to analyze the impact of marriage on poverty consists of studies that conduct a shift-share analysis, which show what poverty rates would be if the proportion of households in different family structures remained constant over a given time period. Examples of this research include work done by Hilary Hoynes, Marianne Page, and Ann Stevens and by Rebecca Blank and David Card. These studies find that over 80 percent of poverty is related to changes in family structure, such as increases in households headed by single mothers.20 One cautionary note, however, is that these studies could overstate the impact of family structure on income because they do not account for the likelihood that, as Thomas and Sawhill say, single-parent families possess characteristics that disproportionately predispose them to poverty.21 For example, persons struggling with mental illness, substance abuse, or criminal records might find it difficult both to hold a job and to get or stay married. Nevertheless, even studies that attempt to control for these factors strongly suggest that family fragmentation negatively affects the income available to single parents and their children.
Does Family Fragmentation Increase Crime?
In addition to poverty, family fragmentation also appears to have large effects on rates of crime, according to three separate bodies of literature. For example, research that considers entire communities has found a strong association between the percent of single-parent households and crime rates. In one case, Robert OBrien and Jean Stockard found that increases in the proportion of adolescents born outside of marriage were linked to significant increases in homicide arrest rates for fifteen to nineteen year olds.22 A second large body of literatureinvestigations of individual families using variables, such as parent-child relationships or mothers education levelsfinds that a child raised outside of an intact marriage is more likely to commit crimes as a teen and young adult. In one study Cynthia Harper and Sara McLanahan control for a large number of demographic and other characteristics and find that boys reared in single-mother households and cohabitating (or living together) households are
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typically more than twice as likely to commit a crime that leads to incarceration, when compared to children who grow up with both their parents.23 Finally, a body of literature that analyzes future crime rates of juvenile offenders shows that stable marriages reduce the likelihood that adult males will commit additional crimes. With a unique data set of former juvenile offenders spanning several decades, Robert Sampson and his colleagues find evidence that marriage leads these former juvenile offenders to commit fewer crimes as adults, even when controlling for unobserved selection effects.24 Overall, research on family structure suggests a variety of ways marriage might reduce the demand for costly public services. A stable marriage might reduce the likelihood of domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and parental depression, and might increase the human and social capital available to children in the home in ways that (independent of income) improve childrens educational and other outcomes. Two parents in the home might provide more effective supervision of adolescents, reducing the risk of delinquent activities. At the same time, divorce may be sometimes desirable. For example, about one-third of marriages ending in divorce are high conflict marriages, and children, on average, appear to be better off when those marriages end.25 In this analysis, however, we adopt the simplifying and extremely cautious assumption that all of the taxpayer costs of divorce and unmarried childbearing stem solely from the negative effects family fragmentation has on poverty in femaleheaded households. We make this simplifying assumption because the effect of marriage on poverty has been established, is widely accepted, and can be reasonably well-quantified based on existing data.
III. Is the Methodology Used in This Estimate Reasonable?

to estimate the taxpayer costs of family fragmentation. These estimates include calculations of foregone tax revenue in income taxes, FICA (Social Security and Medicare) taxes, and state and local taxes as a result of family fragmentation. They also include the direct costs to taxpayers as a result of increased expenditures on local, state, and federal taxpayerfinanced programs in the following areas:
HIS STUDY USES SEVERAL CALCULATIONS

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Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance Food Stamps Housing Assistance Medicaid State Childrens Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) Child Welfare programs
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) assistance Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) Head Start School Lunch and Breakfast Programs The Justice System26
As noted previously, we assume taxpayer costs are driven exclusively by increases in poverty; that is, we used the most widely accepted and best quantified consequence of divorce and unmarried childbearing. It is important to recognize that if family fragmentation has additional negative effects on child and adult well-being that operate independently of incomeand if these effects increase the numbers of children or adults who need and are served by taxpayer-funded social programs then our methodology will significantly underestimate taxpayer costs. For example, if family fragmentation increases the number of children who suffer from chronic illnesses,27 these additional costs to taxpayers would not be reflected in the estimates provided by this study. To put it another way, the methodology we use assumes that marriage would not improve the habits, mores, or other behaviors of adults or children in ways that lead to reduced social problems or increased productivity.
What Costs Are Associated with Means-Tested Government Programs?
To obtain an estimate of the taxpayer costs of family fragmentation, this study uses the literature and information already described to make three key assumptions:
Assumption 1: Marriage lifts zero households headed by a single male out of poverty. Assumption 2: Marriage lifts 60 percent of households headed by a single female out of poverty. Assumption 3: The share of expenditures on government antipoverty programs that is due to family fragmentation is equal to the percent of poverty that results from family fragmentation.28
Taken as a group, these assumptions err on the side of caution. They are more likely to lead to an underestimate of the actual taxpayer costs of family fragmentation rather than an overestimate. Assumption 1 leads us to understate taxpayer costs because marriage might bring a second wage earner into single-father households and/or allow men to focus more effort on labor market activities that would increase household earnings. Assumption 2 is based on the discussion on pages 1011 of this report, specifically the empirical results provided by Ananat and Michaels and Thomas and Sawhill.29
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Assumption 3 implies that the proportion of poverty that can be attributed to family fragmentation is equal to the proportion of expenditures on a variety of government programs that are caused by family fragmentation. As shown in table 3, if marriage would lift 60 percent of single-mother households out of poverty, then the total number of persons in poverty would decline by 31.7 percent and the total number of children in poverty would decline by 36.1 percent.30 By virtue of assumption 3, marriage would reduce the costs of some government programs by 31.7 percent and the costs of government programs that are exclusively for children by 36.1 percent. Put another way, this assumption suggests that family fragmentation is responsible for 31.7 percent of the costs of government antipoverty programs and is responsible for 36.1 percent of the costs of government programs that are exclusively for children.31
Table 3. Persons and Children Lifted out of Poverty via Marriage
(Source: 2006 CPS)
Number Lifted Out of Poverty via Marriage (thousands) Total U.S. Poverty 2006 (thousands)
@60% of female-headed households in poverty are lifted out of poverty
Percent Lifted Out of Poverty via Marriage 31.7% 36.1%
Total Persons Children
36,460 12,827
11,554 4,629
This crucial assumption seems cautious not only because single-parent households have higher rates of poverty and other negative outcomes but also because at the same income level single-parent households are much more likely than married households to make use of government benefits. In the cautious assumptions used in this analysis, we assume no behavioral effects from marriage on the likelihood of choosing to use government programs, even though (as shown in tables 4, 5, and 6) single-mother households use the Food Stamp, cash assistance, and Medicaid programs at much higher rates than married households with similar incomes.
Table 4. Household Income and Usage of Food Stamps
(Source: 2006 CPS)
Family Type Married Male head no spouse present Female head no spouse present
Percent Receiving Food Stamps All Income Levels 3.9% 8.6% 26.1%
Percent Receiving Food Stamps Families Earning < 200% of Poverty Level 16.2% 21.2% 42.5%
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Table 5. Household Income and Usage of Cash Assistance

(Source: 2006 CPS)
Percent Receiving Cash Assistance All Income Levels 3.6% 7.8% 17.2%
Percent Receiving Cash Assistance Families Earning < 200% of Poverty Level 8.5% 13.2% 24.8%
Table 6. Household Income and Usage of Medicaid

(Source: 2006 CPS)
Percent Receiving Medicaid All Income Levels 15.4% 27.9% 45.6%
Percent Receiving Medicaid Families Earning < 200% of Poverty Level 40.3% 43.9% 62.7%
Assumption 1 means that our analysis focuses on female-headed households only; that is, taxpayer costs associated with single-father households are excluded. Assumptions 2 and 3 allow us to make cautious and straightforward estimates of increased government expenditures on TANF, Food Stamps, housing assistance, Medicaid, SCHIP, child welfare programs, WIC, LIHEAP, Head Start, and school breakfast and lunch programs that result from family fragmentation. (See more details in Notes to Table A.1 on page 33.) For government programs that serve both adults and children (TANF, Food Stamps, housing assistance, Medicaid, WIC, and LIHEAP), we assume that 31.7 percent of these costs are due to family fragmentation. We make this assumption because existing data (as shown in table 3) suggests that family fragmentation is responsible for 31.7 percent of overall poverty, and assumption 3 suggests that family fragmentation is responsible for 31.7 percent of taxpayer costs on these programs. For government programs that serve only or predominantly children (such as SCHIP, child welfare programs, Head Start, and school breakfast and lunch programs), we assume that 36.1 percent of these costs are due to family fragmentation.32 We offer one cautionary note: The taxpayer costs associated with family fragmentation may be real, but this link does not mean that taxpayers would necessarily choose to realize all the tax savings from reductions in family fragmentation.
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Many transfer programs, such as Head Start, Section 8 housing vouchers, and LIHEAP are not entitlements. That means not all individuals or households potentially eligible to receive funding or services under these programs receive them. For non-entitlement programs, savings realized from increases in marriage and marital stability could be reaped by taxpayers or the savings might be passed on to other poor people.33 But if such savings were to occur, legislators and voters could either choose to change the rules and use the money for other government purposes or return it to taxpayers. The next steps in our study were finding ways to estimate any increased costs to the justice system caused by family fragmentation and any foregone tax payments that would result from eliminating family fragmentation. These two sets of calculations require some discussion.
What Costs Are Associated with the Justice System?
Evidence suggests that boys raised in single-parent households are likely to commit crimes at much higher rates than boys raised in married households.34 Further, marriage reduces the likelihood that adult men will commit crimes.35 For the purposes of calculating the impact of family fragmentation on increased costs to the justice system, however, we use the following cautious and simplifying assumption: All of the effects of family fragmentation on crime operate through their impact on childhood poverty rates. In this analysis, we are following Harry Holzer and his colleagues. They created a methodology to estimate the impact of eradicating childhood poverty on costs to the U.S. economy. One cost they consider is the cost to the justice systemwhich includes courts, police, prisons, and jails. Essentially, based on several assumptions taken from the empirical literature on crime, they report that 24 percent of crime is caused by childhood poverty.36 Using this result, we estimate that if marriage were to reduce childhood poverty rates by 36.1 percent, then costs for the justice system would be reduced by approximately $19 billion. (See details of this calculation in table A.1.)
How Are Foregone Tax Revenues Estimated?
To estimate the impact of family fragmentation on foregone tax revenues, we must estimate the increase in taxable income that would result from marriage. We again make the simplifying assumption that marriage has no behavioral effect; in other words, marriage would not increase the labor supply of men and would therefore have no impact on the taxable earnings of single parents who marry. Again, given the rich literature on how marriage impacts male labor supply,37 this is a cautious assumption, which increases our confidence that our analysis does not overestimate the actual taxpayer costs of the decline of marriage.
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Similarly, we assume that all of the effects of family fragmentation on childrens future earnings capacity operate only through their impact on rates of childhood poverty. Given the rich but difficult-to-quantify body of evidence that married parents contribute to increasing the human and social capital of their children in other ways (in addition to income),38 this decision represents another simplifying but cautious assumption, which increases our confidence that our results will not overestimate the taxpayer costs. There is good evidence on the impact of childhood poverty on future productivity. Holzer and his colleagues estimate that childhood poverty reduces income nationally by $170 billion per year. That is, they find that if children in poverty had instead grown up in households that were not in poverty, then these children would as adults earn $170 billion more each year.39 Using Holzers estimate of total costs of childhood poverty on adult annual earnings and the estimate that marriage would reduce childhood poverty by 36.1 percent, we estimate that marriage would increase taxable earnings by over $61 billion per year. To translate this data into an estimate of tax losses from losses in future productivity, we must make simplifying assumptions about tax rates. For this analysis, we assume that all of the increase in earnings is taxed at the 10 percent rate for U.S. income taxes and that all of this increase in earnings is taxed at 15.3 percent for FICA (as tax economists generally find that employees bear the burden of FICA taxation through lower wages). To estimate losses in state and local taxation, we use the national average percentage of income that is paid in state and local taxes11 percentas reported by the Tax Foundation on April 4, 2007.40 (The details of this calculation are shown in table A.1.)
IV. What Is the Total Estimated Cost of Family Fragmentation?
OW MUCH DO HIGH RATES of divorce and unmarried childbearing cost U.S. taxpayers? Here is our estimate:
Family fragmentation costs U.S. taxpayers at least $112 billion each year, or over $1 trillion dollars per decade.41 This $112 billion annual estimate includes the costs of federal, state, and local government programs and foregone tax revenues at all levels of government. Table 7 shows an itemized estimate. To find the cost of family fragmentation in your state, turn to page 38.
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Table 7. Estimated Costs of Family Fragmentation for U.S. Taxpayers*

* These costs include federal, state, and local costs.
in billions Justice System TANF Cash Assistance Food Stamps Housing Assistance Medicaid SCHIP Child Welfare WIC LIHEAP Head Start School Lunch and Breakfast Program Additional U.S. Income Taxes Paid Additional FICA Taxes Paid Additional State & Local Taxes Paid Total U.S. Taxpayer Cost of Family Fragmentation $19.3 $5.1 $9.6 $7.3 $27.9 $2.8 $9.2 $1.6 $0.7 $2.7 $3.5 $6.1 $9.4 $6.8 $112.0
Table A.5 (page 38) reveals state-by-state estimates for the costs of family fragmentation, and appendix B (page 31) describes the methods used to estimate the costs of family fragmentation for state and local taxpayers. These state-by-state estimates are a subset of the $112 billion total taxpayer cost. We are confident this is a minimum figure because of the uniformly cautious assumptions built into our methodology. For those who would like to dig deeper, appendix A (page 22) provides a detailed response to possible arguments that we have overestimated or underestimated taxpayer costs. For example, here are four potential underestimates: First, our estimate focuses exclusively on female-headed households; that is, we assume the taxpayer costs of single-father families are zero. This assumption almost certainly leads to an underestimate. Second, we have excluded from analysis several expensive government programs (because existing data does not allow us to quantify them with confidence), which nonetheless very likely include significant marriage-related taxpayer costs. The taxpayer-funded programs excluded from analysis include the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), public education,42 and Medicare and Medicaid benefits for older adults. The EITC alone is a $40 billion taxpayer-funded program. Estimating the effect of marriage on the EITC involves making complex judgments about who marries whom, and how their income shifts as a result. Since we lack hard data to make
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these judgments with the precision necessary to quantify them, we left this program out of the analysis. While some fraction of currently cohabiting taxpayers might pay a marriage penalty if they were to marry, the overall poverty-reducing effects of marriage are likely to move many more families off the EITC rolls. (See appendix A for more detail.) Similarly, some fraction of public school budgets is likely spent in dealing with social problems created by divorce and unmarried childbearing. Children whose parents stay married are less likely to repeat a grade, exhibit conduct disorders requiring special education outlays, or require expensive special education services generally. Again, none of these costs are reflected in our analysis. We have also excluded one of the largest taxpayer costs on the book: Medicaid for the elderly and Medicare for unmarried adults. They are excluded partly because most people do not think of older single adults when they think of fragmented families. But high rates of divorce and failure to marry mean that many more Americans enter late middle-age (and beyond) without a spouse to help them manage chronic illnesses, or to help care for them if they become disabled.43 Through the Medicare and Medicaid system taxpayers are picking up a large, but difficult to quantify, part of the costs as a result. Third, we have ignored for the purposes of this analysis any behavioral effects of marriage. We have assumed that all the benefits of marriage come solely from reduced rates of poverty for children, ignoring the evidence that stably married parents provide human and social capital to their children other than income in ways that increase childrens well-being and reduce the likelihood they will need or incur expensive government services, from repeating grades at school to ending up in the child protective system or the juvenile justice system. Similarly, we have assumed no behavioral effects of marriage on fathers earning capacity. If stable marriage increases mens earnings, as the literature suggests, and/or decreases the likelihood that they will commit crimes as adults, our methodology most likely underestimates the taxpayer costs associated with unmarried parenthood. Fourth, there is one other major reason we believe $112 billion each year represents a cautious, minimum estimate: For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that households that marry will take up or use government benefits for which they are eligible at the same rate as single-mother households. In reality, existing data shows that lower-income married couples are far less likely to choose to use government benefits for which they are eligible than single-mother households. Overall, single mothers are roughly twice as likely to take advantage of government benefits for which they are eligible than are low-income married couples.44
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Many more details, including a discussion of the empirical literature on which our conclusions are based, are found in appendix A.
V. What Are the Policy Implications?
state legislators, and others respond to these new, rigorous estimates of the large taxpayer costs of family fragmentation?
OW SHOULD POLICYMAKERS,
First, public concern about the decline of marriage need not be based only on the important negative consequences for child well-being or on moral concerns, as important as these concerns may be. High rates of family fragmentation impose extraordinary costs on taxpayers. Reducing these costs is a legitimate concern of government, policymakers, and legislators, as well as civic leaders and faith communities. Second, even very small increases in stable marriage rates would result in very large returns to taxpayers. For example, a mere 1 percent reduction in rates of family fragmentation would save taxpayers $1.12 billion annually. Given the modest cost of government and civic marriage-strengthening programs, even more modest success rates in strengthening marriages would be cost-effective. Texas, for example, recently appropriated $15 million over two years for marriage education and other programs to increase stable marriage rates. If such a program succeeded in increasing stably married families by just three-tenths of 1 percent, it would still save Texas taxpayers almost $9 million per year. Efforts are currently underway to evaluate the impact of these programs.
Conclusion
costs American taxpayers at least $112 billion dollars. These costs are recurringthat is, they are incurred each and every yearmeaning that the decline of marriage costs American taxpayers more than $1 trillion dollars over a decade. These costs are due to increased taxpayer expenditures for antipoverty, criminal justice and school nutrition programs, and through lower levels of taxes paid by individuals whose adult productivity has been negatively influenced by growing up in poverty caused by family fragmentation. This figure represents a minimum or lower-bound estimate. If, as research suggests is likely, marriage has additional economic and social benefits to children, adults, and communitiesbenefits that reduce the need for government services and that operate through mechanisms other than increased incomethen the actual taxpayer costs of the retreat from marriage are likely much higher.
ACH YEAR, FAMILY FRAGMENTATION
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Given the cautious assumptions used throughout this analysis, we can be confident that current high rates of family fragmentation cost taxpayers at least $112 billion a year, or more than $1 trillion over a decade. Finding new ways to strengthen marriage and reduce unnecessary divorce and unmarried childbearing is a legitimate and pressing public concern. Because of the very large taxpayer costs associated with high rates of divorce and unmarried childbearing, and the modest price tags associated with most marriagestrengthening initiatives, state and federal marriage-strengthening programs with even very modest success rates will be cost-effective for taxpayers.
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Appendix A: Testing the Analysis: Is the Estimate of $112 Billion Too High or Too Low?
In this appendix, we consider in detail four arguments that suggest the estimate that the total taxpayer cost of family fragmentation of $112 billion is too high and four arguments that it is too low.
Is $112 Billion Too High?
In this section, we consider four arguments that suggest the $112 billion estimate is too high: 1. If cohabitating households were to marry, most of them receiving transfer payments would receive a marriage bonus from the federal tax and transfer system. 2. The use of Holzers research in this study exaggerates the actual impact of low income on childhood poverty. 3. The use of Thomas and Sawhills research in this study overestimates the impact of marriage on reducing poverty. 4. The main assumption of this studythat the percentage of government program costs due to family fragmentation is proportional to the amount of poverty due to family fragmentationoverestimates the taxpayer costs. 1. If cohabitating couples were to marry, they would receive a marriage bonus from the federal tax and transfer system. The earned income tax credit (EITC) is an approximately $40 billion antipoverty program that provides cash subsidies to low-income working adults, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) is a $16 billion cash assistance program for low-income families. Gregory Acs and Elaine Maag report that of the 1.1 million people living in cohabitating households earning less than 200 percent of the poverty level and receiving the EITC and/or TANF, about three-fourths of these households would receive an average marriage bonus of approximately $2,423, while about 10.5 percent of these households would receive a marriage penalty of $1,742 in 2008. Thus, if the cohabitating adults in these households were to marry, taxpayers would face increased expenditures for these two social programs. Taken together, these estimates from Acs and Maag suggest that taxpayer expenditures for the EITC, TANF, and the child tax credit would increase by about $0.5 billion if all cohabitating couples were to marry.45 Given the results in Acs and Maag, is our estimate of the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation too high by $0.5 billion? In table 7, we ignore any costs of family fragmentation on the EITC. We do so because of complications such as the one pointed out by Acs and Maag that some households would get higher EITC payments if they became married households and nothing else about them (e.g., labor supply) changed. Nevertheless, it appears likely that the net taxpayer costs of family
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fragmentation on the EITC would be positive because marriage would render millions of EITC recipients ineligible for any EITC benefits by adding a second wage earner to the household and/or possible positive effects on male labor supply. If marriage, as discussed in the next subsection, would decrease net expenditures on the EITC, then the approach used in this study would underestimate the taxpayer costs of family fragmentation by ignoring the EITC. 2. The use of Holzers results in this study overestimates the impact of low income in childhood on adult outcomes. We rely on results from Harry Holzers research to make two calculationscosts to the justice system and increased tax payments. Holzer and his colleagues make a case that the assumptions that underlie their estimates are cautious, and we find their case persuasive. However, they make a broad interpretation of the relationship between childhood poverty and life outcomes as follows:
[W]e interpret the causal effects of childhood poverty quite broadly. They include not only the effects of low parental incomes, but also of the entire range of environmental factors associated with poverty in the U.S., and all of the personal characteristics imparted by parents, schools, and neighborhoods to children who grow up with or in them. We define poverty broadly in this way in part because researchers have been unable to clearly separate low income from other factors that affect the life chances of the poor, and also because the set of potential policy levers that might reduce the disadvantages experienced by poor children go beyond just increasing family incomes. Of course, in defining poverty this way, we also assume that the entire range of negative influences associated with low family incomes would ultimately be eliminated if all poor children were instead raised in non-poor households.46 (Holzers emphasis)
Childhood poverty may be a proxy for environmental factors that may or may not be improved by the income gains from marriage. Thus, reliance on Holzers estimates of the costs of childhood poverty could potentially overstate any benefits of marriage that come from marriage reducing childhood poverty. One way to think about this issue carefully is to list the broad pathways (i.e., the environmental factors) through which growing up in poverty is associated with childhood disadvantage: a. Low income may mean lower quality food, shelter, transportation, and medical care for children. b. Low income may necessitate living in worse neighborhoods (fewer parks, more crime, less social trust), and poor neighborhood quality may adversely affect child well-being. c. Low income may mean attending worse schools. d. Low income may negatively affect parenting processes (warmth, monitoring, discipline) because of the stress economic hardship places on otherwise competent parents.
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e. Conversely, parents may have low incomes because they are less motivated and skilled and this lesser competence may be exhibited in parenting as well. f. Low income may hurt children because low-income families are more likely to have only one parent present, and therefore only half the social and human capital available to the child. If absence of money itself is the root cause of the negative effects of childhood poverty, then any strategy that increases income will increase child well-being. With more money, parents can provide better nutrition, education, housing, and medical care. They can move to better neighborhoods and enjoy better schools. It may be the case, however, that not all the potential pathways through which childhood poverty negatively affects child well-being can be treated with more money. More money may lower the income stress but not the emotional stress of single parenting, for example. In addition, there may be less human and social capital that results when one parentonly half the potential talent pool for parentingis available. If marriage increases household income, then marriage would ameliorate the negative effects of childhood poverty that operate through pathways labeled a, b, c, and d above. Marriage may also address at least some of the other pathways through which childhood poverty is associated with relative deprivation (f). But marriage does not address all of the pathways: What if low-income parents are simply less competent generally in parenting as in other domains of life (e)? What if they are less motivated to help their children succeed or have fewer of the skills needed to help their children manage school or work? To the extent that childhood poverty is caused by living with adults who have persistent personality traits or skill deficits that lessen child well-being, neither income supports nor increased marriage alone will treat these problems. Holzer and his colleagues make an adjustment for genetic factors that may be present in the ability to generate labor market earnings that they believe errs on the side of caution. But not all the selection effects may be understood to be genetic in nature. What if single moms or dads simply are people who have lower average parenting skills and less motivation to begin with? If this is the case, then the use of Holzers results for two calculations leads to an overestimate of the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. Like Holzer, this analysis is constrained by the availability and quality of relevant empirical evidence. We believe, however, that the way we use Holzers results does not lead to an overestimate for at least three reasons:
If the assumptions Holzer and his colleagues used are cautious, then that offsets at least some of the environmental effects of having a mother or father with less motivation, whether married or not.
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Our analysis assumes no effect of marriage on the labor supply of parents. The best evidence, as reported in Ribars extensive literature review in 2004, indicates that marriage increases male labor supply and seems not to depress the average female labor supply in the more recent groups of women studied.47 Our analysis assumes no behavioral effect of marriage on parenting skills. If marriage reduces stress on parents, which leads to better parenting, then this approach underestimates the true taxpayer costs of family fragmentation.
Given the limits of the available empirical evidence, we implicitly assume that these three reasons exactly offset any of the effects of childhood poverty that are due to unobserved lower motivation and/or skills present among single parents. To the extent this assumption is wrong and it leads to overstating taxpayer costs because of the use of Holzers research, the magnitude of the overestimate would have to be viewed in light of the magnitude of our underestimates as described in the next subsection. As suggested below, these underestimates are likely quite substantial. 3. The use of Thomas and Sawhills research overestimates the impact of marriage on reducing poverty. Thomas and Sawhill estimate that marriage would lift 65.4 percent of singlemother households out of poverty.48 In their microsimulation they place individuals in the March 1999 CPS in plausible marriages until they obtain a marriage rate similar to 1970. Attempting to marry all single-mother households would likely fall short because of a lack of marriageable menprisoners are disproportionately men, as are the unemployed, and men have lower life expectancies than women. The dearth of marriageable men is one reason that we use a 60 percent figure instead of the 65.4 percent estimate from Thomas and Sawhill. In addition, Thomas and Sawhill assume no behavioral effects of marriage on male labor supply, which suggests they underestimate the effect of marriage on poverty reduction. For these two reasons, our use of Thomas and Sawhills research should not lead to an overestimate of the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. 4. The main assumption of this studythe percentage of the costs of government programs due to family fragmentation is proportional to the percent of poverty due to family fragmentationoverestimates the taxpayer costs. To the contrary, the following thought experiment suggests that this assumption likely leads to an underestimate of the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. Suppose there was an antipoverty program that cost taxpayers a total of $100 billion. Also suppose this program provided $5,000 per year to 10 million married households and $5,000 per year to 10 million single-mother households. In addition, suppose that 20 million married households were eligible for the program but only 10 million used it, while all 10 million single-mother households eligible for the program used it.
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If each of the 10 million single-mother households in this thought experiment were instead married households, consider two questions:
How would the methodology used in this study estimate the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation? What would be the true taxpayer cost of family fragmentation?
Using the methodology of this study, 6 million of the single-mother households (at 60 percent) using this program would no longer use it, which means the cost of family fragmentation would be 6 million multiplied by $5,000, which equals $30 billion. Also, the analysis would assume that the remaining 4 million single-mother households that are now married households would still use the program. Would $30 billion likely be the true costs? We suspect not, because married couples use benefits for which they are income-eligible at a much lower rate than single-parent households: Only 50 percent of initially married households eligible for the program use it. As shown in tables 46, single-mother households are far more likely at any given income level to choose to use government benefits:
Single-mother households with incomes less than 200 percent of the poverty line are 2.6 times more likely to receive Food Stamps than married households earning less than 200 percent of the poverty line. Single-mother households with incomes less than 200 percent of the poverty line are 2.9 times more likely to receive cash assistance than married households earning less than 200 percent of the poverty line. Single-mother households with incomes less than 200 percent of the poverty line are 1.56 times more likely to receive Medicaid than married households earning less than 200 percent of the poverty line.
If we assume that currently single mothers had instead married and that they would use government benefits for which they are eligible at the same rate as other married households (50 percent), then the true taxpayer costs of family fragmentation would be $40 billion ($30 billion + 0.5 x 4 million x $5,000). Thus, using the methodology of this study would understate the true costs by 33 percent using the assumption that married households and single-mother households receive the same average benefit ($5,000 per household in this example), and that single-mother households take up the antipoverty program at a rate twice as large as married households. The main assumption of this study seems to be a reasonable simplifying assumption, because of the much higher take-up rate of antipoverty programs of singleparent households relative to similarly situated married households; this assumption perhaps leads to an underestimate of the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation.
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To sum up, any differences in unobserved levels of average motivation between single and married mothers complicate using much of the existing empirical literature to estimate the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. The assumptions that underlie this analysis, however, are extremely cautious in an attempt not to overstate the taxpayer costs. Specifically, by assuming no beneficial behavioral effects of marriage on adults or children, we are likely underestimating taxpayer costs.
Is $112 Billion Too Low?
In this section, we consider four arguments that suggest that the $112 billion estimate is too low: 1. Ignoring the EITC, public education, and other government programs underestimates the true taxpayer costs of family fragmentation. 2. Ignoring the direct impact of family fragmentation on crime (independent of poverty) underestimates the taxpayer costs. 3. Ignoring any impact of marriage on single fathers understates the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. 4. Ignoring the fact that, given income-eligibility, single-mother households are much more likely than married households to take up subsidies from transfer programs underestimates the likely taxpayer costs of family fragmentation. 1. Ignoring the EITC, public education, and other government programs underestimates the true taxpayer costs of family fragmentation. We ignore EITC expenditures largely because of the lack of empirical information needed to make reasonable assumptions about how marriage will affect usage of the EITC and related programs in our complex tax code. But ignoring potential taxpayer savings produced by marriage on EITC expenditures means ignoring a very expensive government program that is almost certainly affected by marriage rates. Taxpayers spend approximately $40 billion on cash assistance to the working poor under the EITC. As shown in table A.2, using the assumptions in this study, family fragmentation would lead to about $12.68 billion in higher taxpayer costs on the EITC. Adjusting this estimate based on the results of Acs and Maag, as discussed under the first argument in the previous subsection, would reduce that amount by about $0.5 billion, leaving a net taxpayer cost of about $12.18 billion. We have chosen to ignore the EITC expenditures (including potential savings of an additional $12.18 billion each year) because the consequences of marriage for the EITC are complex and would involve multiple assumptions of how marriage would affect mens and womens earnings. In addition to the EITC, this analysis does not assume any costs of family fragmentation to the public school system, which is almost certainly not true. Considerable research suggests that children raised outside of intact marriages are more likely to
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be held back a grade, to be in special education, and to qualify for remedial services, although we do not have hard data on how much of these effects are due to unobserved selection bias and how much are caused by lack of marriage. If marriage were to reduce the percentage of children receiving special or remedial services, then family fragmentation would create significant taxpayer costs for public education, as federal and state funding formulas tend to provide large amounts of extra funding for children receiving these services. (These costs may be offset, however, by more teens dropping out of school as a result of family fragmentation, which reduces the direct taxpayer costs of public education.49) The lack of evidence of exogenous changes in family structure on the likelihood of receiving special education or remedial services or staying in school, and the lack of comparable cost data on remedial and special education services across states, makes it impossible to estimate these costs with confidence. But the lack of data does not mean that family fragmentation has no impact on educational expenditures. Finally, we exclude the approximately 71 percent of Medicaid expenditures devoted to the disabled and the elderly from the analysis, thereby making the cautious assumption that family fragmentation has no impact on these expenditures. Most people do not think of elderly unmarried adults or middle-aged disabled singles as belonging to fragmented families. Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that older adults who are unmarried are more likely to become disabled, to manage chronic diseases less successfully, and to need nursing home care as they age.50 Excluding these large public costs thus likely significantly underestimates the actual costs to taxpayers from the decline in marriage. 2. Ignoring the direct impact of family fragmentation on crime (independent of poverty) underestimates the taxpayer costs. Estimates of the potential impact of family structure on crime, even those that do not control for selection bias, are large and arguably should not be ignored. As discussed in the section on methodology on page 12, it appears that family fragmentation has large effects on crime, both in terms of increasing the likelihood that a child raised outside of marriage will commit crimes51 and the likelihood that adult men will leave criminal activity after they are married.52 While Harper and McLanahan use a large number of control variables to help isolate the effect of family structure on youth crime, they do not control for unobserved selection effects. Nonetheless, their estimated effects of family structure on crime are extremely largetypically children reared in single-mother households are more than twice as likely to engage in criminal activities as children reared in a married household. For example, they report that children living with a single mother are 2.168 times more likely to be incarcerated than children living with both parents, all else being equal.53 Suppose we had assumed that over half their result was due to selection biasthat the single mothers in their sample possessed such poor parenting skills that even if they got married most of the estimated effect Harper and McLanahan reported was due to selection bias. Specifically, suppose that children reared with
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a single mother are only 50 percent more likely to engage in criminal activity than children raised with both parents, all else being equal. As shown in table A.2, using this more aggressive approach yields an estimate that family fragmentation is responsible for about $29 billion in costs to the justice system as opposed to the $19.3 billion estimate used to generate the main result of this study. The $29 billion estimated cost of family fragmentation to the justice system is either too high or too low depending on the true magnitude of any exogenous effects of marriage on criminal activity. The $19.3 billion figure represents about 8.7 percent of all costs to the justice system ($19.3 billion / $222.8 billion = 0.087), while the $29 billion figure represents 13 percent of all costs to the justice system ($29 billion / $222.8 billion = 0.13). To put these two estimates in context, note that, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2002 only 43.6 percent of inmates report that they lived with both parents most of the time while growing up.54 While the majority of inmates did not live with both parents most of the time while growing up, the figure used to generate the main estimate of this study suggests that only 8.7 percent of the costs of the justice system can be attributed to family fragmentation. As stated previously, Sampson and his colleagues endeavor to control for selection effects and find that former juvenile offenders commit fewer crimes as adults when married. Because our estimates here ignore these potential taxpayer savings from marriage, our method is more likely to underestimate than overestimate the taxpayer costs of family fragmentation to the justice system. 3. Ignoring any impact of marriage on single fathers understates the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. Research suggests that married men become more committed workers at least in part as a result of marriage. Therefore, if single fathers were to marry, it is likely that their labor supply would increase leading to increased tax payments. Further, tables 46 show that single-father households have higher take-up rates of antipoverty programs than married households with similar incomes. Adding a second wage earner would render single-father households less likely to receive government assistance via increased income and economies of scale. Economies of scale via marriageessentially savings from sizeimply that by living together, two adults are better able to share expenses and escape poverty. Ribar provides an example of how marriage leads to economies of scale:
Consider the outcomes for a couple with a 9th11th grade education and one child in 2001. The median annual income for a woman with this level of education was $10,330, while the median annual income for a similarly educated man was $19,434. If the mother and child lived apart from the father, their income would have been below the two-person poverty threshold of $12,207; however, if the family lived together, their combined income would have
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exceeded the three-person threshold of $14,255. The mother and child would have also met the gross income requirement for food stamps if they lived apart from the father but would [sic] been ineligible if they lived with him. Even if the mother had no income and the family just depended on the fathers resources, they would have been above the poverty line and ineligible for food stamps if they all lived together.55
4. Ignoring the fact that, given income-eligibility, single-mother households are much more likely than married households to take up subsidies from transfer programs underestimates the taxpayer costs. As shown in tables 46, single-mother households have higher take-up rates of government antipoverty programs than married households with similar incomes. Thus, even if single-mother households that were instead married households were to remain eligible for transfer programs, it appears they would be less likely to use them. The methods used to estimate the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation at $112 billion ignore this likelihood, and suggest this estimate is too low. To sum up, this study is likely underestimating the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation because (1) there likely would be net savings of EITC expenditures due to any increase in marriage rates of non-cohabitating single parents and savings from other programs not considered here; (2) the estimated costs to the justice system are too low if there is a direct effect of marriage on reducing crimewhich seems likely given the research done to date; (3) there are taxpayer costs of single-father households that are ignored here; and (4) the take-up rate of antipoverty programs would likely decline if single-parent households were instead married households that remained eligible for these programs.
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Appendix B: Explaining the Methodology for State-Specific Costs

This appendix describes the methodology used to estimate state-specific taxpayer costs of family fragmentation. These estimates include costs to state and local taxpayers. The methods used to create the state-specific estimates are similar to the methods employed to create the national estimate described in the body of this report. For the state-specific estimates, we used the 2006 Current Population Survey to estimate the state-specific reductions in total poverty and child poverty that would result from marriage. These estimates are shown in the last columns of tables A.3 and A.4 and are based on assumptions 13 described on page 13. These tables include the underlying data used as well as other information that reveal how total and child poverty fall disproportionately on unmarried households, and on households headed by single females in particular. Table A.5 shows the components and the total state and local taxpayer costs of family fragmentation for each state. These taxpayer costs include foregone state and local tax revenue and costs to the justice system, TANF, Medicaid, SCHIP, and child welfare programs. State-specific data for the overall costs of these programs come from the sources listed in the Notes to Table A.1 on page 33. State-specific cost estimates, however, were not available for costs to the justice system, and foregone earnings are not estimated at the state level. To make statespecific estimates for these two line items, we assume that the proportion of taxpayer costs that accrues to a given state is equal to the proportion of poverty caused by family fragmentation in the state. For example, using the information in table A.3, we calculate that 10.2 percent of all childhood poverty in the U.S. that is due to family fragmentation occurs in the state of California. Thus, 10.2 percent of the increase in national income that comes from reducing childhood poverty via marriage is assigned to California. Correspondingly, 10.2 percent of the reduction in state and local justice costs that results from marriage are also assigned to California.56
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Table A.1: Sub-Calculations for Estimates in Table 7

Calculation 1 Justice System (federal, state, & local) Expenditures on Corrections, Police, and Courts Amount of Crime Attributed to Childhood Poverty Reduction in Childhood Poverty via Marriage Cost of Family Fragmentation TANF (federal & state) Expenditures on TANF Cost of Family Fragmentation Food Stamps Persons Receiving Food Stamps Reduction in Food Stamp Receipt via Marriage @31.7% Mean Food Stamp Benet per person per year Cost of Family Fragmentation Housing Assistance HUD Expenditures on Housing Assistance Cost of Family Fragmentation Medicaid (federal & state) Expenditures on Medicaid Cost of Family Fragmentation SCHIP (federal & state) Expenditures on SCHIP Cost of Family Fragmentation Child Welfare Services (federal, state, & local) Expenditures on Child Welfare Services Cost of Family Fragmentation WIC Expenditures on WIC Cost of Family Fragmentation LIHEAP Expenditures on LIHEAP Cost of Family Fragmentation Head Start Expenditures on Head Start Cost of Family Fragmentation School Breakfast and Lunch Expenditures on Subsidized School Breakfast and Lunch Programs Cost of Family Fragmentation
$222,802,421,001 0.24 0.361 $19,303,601,755 = $22,802,422,001*.24*.361
$16,100,000,000 $5,103,700,000 = $16,100,000,000*.317
26,672,000 8,455,024 = 26,672,000*.317 $1,131.24 $9,564,661,350 = $1,131.24*8,445,024
$23,019,000,000 $7,297,023,000 = $24,019,000,000*.317
$303,222,842,723 $27,875,275,932 = $303,222,842,723*.317*.29
$7,884,328,870 $2,846,242,722 = $2,846,242,722*.361
$25,465,943,844 $9,193,205,728 = $25,465,943,844*.361
$4,997,309,299 $1,584,147,048 = $4,997,309,299*.317
$2,181,384,985 $691,499,040 = $691,499,040*.317
10
$7,470,990,545 $2,697,027,587 = $7,470,990,545*.361
11
$9,638,590,455 $3,479,531,154 = $9,638,590,455*.361
12
Forgone Tax Receipts Loss in National Income from Childhood Poverty (Holzer, et al., 2007) $170,000,000,000 Reduction in Childhood Poverty via Marriage 36.1% Loss in National Income from Family Fragmentation $61,370,000,000 Forgone Federal Taxes @ 10% Tax Rate $6,137,000,000 Forgone FICA @ 15.3% Tax Rate $9,389,610,000 Forgone State & Local Taxes @ 11% Average Tax Rate $6,750,700,000
= = = =
$170,000,000,000*.361 $61,370,000,000*.10 $61,370,000,000*.153 $61,370,000,000*.11
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Notes to Table A.1
The numbers at the beginning of each paragraph correspond to the sub-calculations listed in table A.1.
1. This calculation is adapted from a similar calculation by Harry Holzer and his colleagues (see endnote 37). Jens Ludwig estimates that federal, state, and local taxpayers spent $200 billion on the justice systemprisons, police, courts, etc.in 2003 (see The Costs of Crime testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on September 19, 2006, http://judiciary.senate.gov/ testimony.cfm?id-2068&wit_id-5749). If taxpayer expenditures on the justice system increased at the rate of inflation indicated by the CPI-U, then taxpayers spent $222.8 billion on the justice system in 2007. Holzer and his colleagues use what they believe to be a conservative estimate that 24 percent of crime is due to childhood poverty. Combined with the estimate that 36.1 percent of childhood poverty is caused by family fragmentation, then the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation to the justice system is $222.8 billion times 0.24 times 0.361, which equals approximately $19 billion. (In the tables, an asterisk denotes the multiplication function.) 2. We use FY 2005 data on TANF cash assistance expenditures that comes from the National Association of State Budget Officers FY 2005 State Expenditure Report (Washington, DC: NASBO, 2006). We did not inflate the expenditure data for inflation because TANF expenditures seem to be leveling off in recent years. 3. The expenditure on Food Stamps was retrieved from http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd /fssummar.htm and excludes $2.7 billion in administrative costs. Thus, we assume that administrative costs would not decrease due to a caseload decline. 4. The FY 2006 expenditure on federal housing assistance was retrieved from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/budget/hud.pdf. In FY 2006, HUD spent about $23 billion on homeless programs, rental assistance, and public housing. Thus, the calculation excludes expenditures on other housing programs such as the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. We did not inflate FY 2006 expenditure data for inflation because expenditures on housing programs have oscillated in the past few years. 5. FY 2005 Medicaid expenditure data comes from NASBO FY 2005 State Expenditure Report and includes federal and state expenditures. The FY 2005 expenditure for Medicaid was inflated using the CPI-U to make an estimate of FY 2007 expenditures. Since Medicaid expenditures tend to grow faster than the rate of inflation, this FY 2007 estimate is cautious. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation in 2008 (see http://www.statehealthfacts.org/medicaid.jsp), 40 percent of Medicaid expenditures are for the disabled, while another 26 percent are for the elderly. Non-elderly adults and children receive 29 percent of Medicaid expenditures. (The uses of the remaining Medicaid expenditures are reportedly unknown.) For this analysis, we use the cautious assumption that family fragmentation leads to no Medicaid costs for the elderly or the disabled. Thus, only 29 percent of total Medicaid expenditures are potentially impacted by family fragmentation under this assumption. 6. FY 2006 federal and state expenditures on SCHIP were retrieved from the Kaiser Family Foundation website (see http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind-235&cat-4). Given the uncertainty surrounding SCHIP reauthorization, we did not inflate expenditures to 2007 dollars. 7. An estimate of FY 2004 federal and state expenditures on the child welfare system came from C. A. Scarcella et al., The Cost of Protecting Vulnerable Children (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2006). We inflated their FY 2004 estimate for 2007 dollars using the CPI-U. Scarcella and colleagues label the following government programs as child welfare programs: services for children and families to prevent abuse and neglect, family preservation services, child protective services, in-home services, out-of-home placements such as foster care, and adoption services. 8. Information on FY 2003 federal WIC expenditures came from the U.S. House Committee on Ways & Means Green Book (see http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/index.html) and was estimated for FY 2007 using the CPI-U. 9. Information on FY 2003 federal LIHEAP expenditures came from the U.S. House Committee on Ways & Means Green Book (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/index.html) and was estimated for FY 2007 using the CPI-U. 10. Information on FY 2003 federal Head Start expenditures came from the U.S. House Committee on Ways & Means Green Book (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/index.html) and was estimated for FY 2007 using the CPI-U.
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11. Information on FY 2003 federal School Breakfast and Lunch expenditures came from the U.S. House Committee on Ways & Means Green Book (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints /green/index.html) and was estimated for FY 2007 using the CPI-U. 12. Holzer and his colleagues estimate that U.S. national income is $170 billion lower because of childhood poverty. Using the estimate that 36.1 percent of childhood poverty is due to family fragmentation, then the decrease in national income from family fragmentation is approximately $61 billion. To make these calculations we assume that this extra national income would be taxed at a 10 percent federal marginal income tax rate, a 15.3 percent FICA tax rate, and an 11 percent state plus local tax rate. The latter figure is the average percent of income spent on state plus local taxation (see the Tax Foundation website at http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/335.html). We use a 15.3 percent FICA tax rate because tax economists generally believe that employees bear the full burden of the employer share of these payroll taxes via lower wages (see Daniel Hamermesh and Albert Rees, The Economics of Work and Pay, 5th ed. (New York: HarperCollins College Pub., 1993).
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Table A.2: Sub-Calculations for EITC and Justice System Estimates

EITC Expenditures on EITC $40,000,000,000 Cost of Family Fragmentation @ 31.7% cost reduction via marriage $12,680,000,000 = $40,000,000,000*.317 Savings from Family Fragmentation Using Estimates from Acs and Maag (2005) $500,000,000 Net Cost of Family Fragmentation $12,180,000,000 = $12,680,000,000 - $500,000,000 Justice System (federal, state, & local) Expenditures on Corrections, Police Protection, and Courts in U.S. Amount of Crime Attributed to Childhood Poverty Amount of Crime Attributed to Childhood Poverty and Family Fragmentation @ assumed 50% higher likelihood of children reared by single mothers to engage in crime Reduction in Childhood Poverty via Marriage Cost of Family Fragmentation
$222,802,421,001 0.24
0.36 = .24*1.5 0.361 $28,955,402,633 = $222,802,421,001*.361*.36
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Table A.3: Total Poverty and Family Structure by State
(Source: 2006 CPS)
Total Number in Poverty (thousands) AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE DC FL GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VT VA WA WV WI WY 650 58 902 487 4,427 466 275 80 104 2,068 1,172 116 141 1,338 674 301 349 690 713 134 469 758 1,323 422 596 659 125 180 241 71 762 328 2,668 1,225 70 1,371 531 439 1,397 110 474 82 879 3,816 235 48 651 502 277 555 51
Number in Poverty in Husband-Wife Family (thousands) 196 10 361 140 1,732 159 54 27 11 580 300 27 41 274 134 79 91 234 200 29 79 183 315 125 150 228 28 71 66 16 241 116 666 348 14 316 165 158 294 27 127 18 310 1,446 65 12 184 132 96 117 14
Number in Poverty in Unmarried Households with Male Householder (thousands) 88 13 188 67 760 88 49 14 29 383 156 35 30 241 129 67 77 117 96 28 110 166 259 111 67 113 23 40 56 20 121 64 468 188 17 204 103 54 295 17 51 16 129 625 35 10 112 118 46 97 10
Number in Poverty in Unmarried Households with Female Householder (thousands) 366 35 353 280 1,935 220 172 38 64 1,106 716 53 70 823 411 156 182 339 417 77 279 409 749 186 379 318 75 69 120 35 400 148 1,534 689 39 851 263 227 808 66 296 48 441 1,745 135 26 355 253 136 341 27
Percent of Total Poverty Living in Unmarried Household 69.8% 82.8% 60.0% 71.3% 60.9% 65.9% 80.4% 66.3% 89.4% 72.0% 74.4% 76.7% 70.9% 79.5% 80.1% 73.8% 73.9% 66.1% 71.9% 78.4% 83.2% 75.9% 76.2% 70.4% 74.8% 65.4% 77.6% 60.6% 72.6% 77.5% 68.4% 64.6% 75.0% 71.6% 80.0% 77.0% 68.9% 64.0% 79.0% 75.5% 73.2% 78.0% 64.7% 62.1% 72.3% 75.0% 71.7% 73.7% 65.3% 78.9% 72.5%
in Percent of Total Poverty Living in Unmarried Households with Female Householder 56.3% 60.3% 39.1% 57.5% 43.7% 47.2% 62.5% 47.5% 61.5% 53.5% 61.1% 45.7% 49.6% 61.5% 61.0% 51.8% 52.1% 49.1% 58.5% 57.5% 59.5% 54.0% 56.6% 44.1% 63.6% 48.3% 60.0% 38.3% 49.8% 49.3% 52.5% 45.1% 57.5% 56.2% 55.7% 62.1% 49.5% 51.7% 57.8% 60.0% 62.4% 58.5% 50.2% 45.7% 57.4% 54.2% 54.5% 50.4% 49.1% 61.4% 52.9%
Percent Reduction Total Poverty if Marriage Reduced Poverty of Female-headed Households by 60% 33.8% 36.2% 23.5% 34.5% 26.2% 28.3% 37.5% 28.5% 36.9% 32.1% 36.7% 27.4% 29.8% 36.9% 36.6% 31.1% 31.3% 29.5% 35.1% 34.5% 35.7% 32.4% 34.0% 26.4% 38.2% 29.0% 36.0% 23.0% 29.9% 29.6% 31.5% 27.1% 34.5% 33.7% 33.4% 37.2% 29.7% 31.0% 34.7% 36.0% 37.5% 35.1% 30.1% 27.4% 34.5% 32.5% 32.7% 30.2% 29.5% 36.9% 31.8%
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Table A.4: Child Poverty and Family Structure by State
(Source: 2006 CPS)
Total Number of Children in Poverty (thousands) AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE DC FL GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VT VA WA WV WI WY 209 21 329 183 1,724 161 84 25 37 590 499 31 53 472 226 101 137 236 252 37 151 199 469 139 221 247 36 58 81 17 260 120 858 449 23 515 188 143 469 37 163 26 306 1,436 101 12 241 159 83 199 17
Number of Children in Poverty Number of Children in Unmarried in Poverty in Households with Husband-Wife Family Male Householder (thousands) (thousands) 64 3 142 56 788 69 18 10 4 177 142 10 19 130 33 34 38 64 60 9 29 51 104 56 40 100 9 30 29 5 111 52 205 131 6 109 63 67 111 12 44 7 125 593 29 3 72 48 26 56 5 12 3 29 6 149 11 7 2 4 18 13 5 4 23 18 9 14 31 20 4 21 15 48 9 8 20 1 4 6 2 13 12 57 33 2 32 25 8 46 3 8 2 21 86 7 1 12 10 9 5 2
Number of Children in Poverty in Unmarried Households with Female Householder (thousands) 133 15 159 121 787 81 59 13 29 395 344 16 29 319 175 58 85 141 173 25 100 133 316 74 173 127 26 23 46 9 136 55 597 285 15 373 101 68 312 23 110 16 159 756 65 7 157 101 48 138 10
Percent of Total Child Poverty Living in Unmarried Household 63.6% 71.4% 48.3% 66.1% 45.6% 50.3% 70.2% 52.0% 78.4% 66.9% 68.9% 51.6% 54.7% 67.6% 77.4% 57.4% 62.0% 59.7% 68.7% 67.6% 66.2% 66.8% 67.4% 53.2% 78.3% 51.4% 72.2% 39.7% 56.8% 52.9% 52.3% 45.8% 69.6% 63.5% 65.2% 72.4% 53.7% 47.6% 66.5% 62.2% 67.5% 61.5% 52.0% 52.6% 64.4% 58.3% 65.1% 63.5% 57.8% 69.3% 58.8%
Percent of Total Child Poverty Living in Unmarried Households with Female Householder 69.4% 85.7% 56.8% 69.4% 54.3% 57.1% 78.6% 60.0% 89.2% 70.0% 71.5% 67.7% 64.2% 72.5% 85.4% 66.3% 72.3% 72.9% 76.2% 75.7% 80.8% 74.4% 77.8% 59.7% 81.9% 59.5% 75.0% 48.3% 64.2% 70.6% 57.3% 56.7% 76.1% 70.8% 73.9% 78.8% 66.5% 53.1% 76.3% 67.6% 73.0% 73.1% 59.2% 58.7% 71.3% 75.0% 70.1% 69.8% 68.7% 71.9% 70.6%
Percent Reduction in Total Child Poverty if Marriage Reduced Poverty of Female-headed Households by 60% 38.2% 42.9% 29.0% 39.7% 27.4% 30.2% 42.1% 31.2% 47.0% 40.2% 41.4% 31.0% 32.8% 40.6% 46.5% 34.5% 37.2% 35.8% 41.2% 40.5% 39.7% 40.1% 40.4% 31.9% 47.0% 30.9% 43.3% 23.8% 34.1% 31.8% 31.4% 27.5% 41.7% 38.1% 39.1% 43.5% 32.2% 28.5% 39.9% 37.3% 40.5% 36.9% 31.2% 31.6% 38.6% 35.0% 39.1% 38.1% 34.7% 41.6% 35.3%
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Table A.5: Estimates of State and Local Taxpayer Costs of Family Fragmentation (in millions)
State & Local Tax Burden 11.5% 13.8% 9.3% 12.4% 10.8% 10.0% 10.8% 11.2% 10.3% 11.0% 11.6% 10.6% 10.7% 10.2% 8.5% 12.3% 10.8% 12.2% 11.1% 11.0% 10.1% 10.3% 10.9% 10.5% 11.5% 8.8% 11.3% 10.7% 10.4% 9.0% 11.2% 10.0% 11.0% 10.7% 10.9% 9.8% 14.0% 12.7% 10.1% 12.5% 11.9% 10.1% 6.6% 9.7% 12.4% 8.0% 8.8% 9.0% 14.1% 9.9% 9.5% Foregone Tax Revenue $717 $657 $559 $368 $267 $313 $275 $281 $281 $250 $126 $112 $150 $127 $107 $135 $86 $57 $89 $152 $102 $131 $122 $144 $68 $93 $109 $94 $67 $72 $76 $54 $51 $55 $42 $43 $28 $23 $37 $29 $22 $23 $8 $20 $16 $6 $9 $11 $8 $12 $8
State California New York Texas Ohio Pennsylvania Florida Illinois Michigan Georgia North Carolina New Jersey Massachusetts Indiana Virginia Tennessee Wisconsin Maryland Connecticut Washington Louisiana Missouri Arizona Kentucky Mississippi Minnesota Alabama Arkansas South Carolina Colorado Oklahoma Kansas Oregon Iowa Utah West Virginia New Mexico Maine Rhode Island Nevada District of Columbia Nebraska Idaho Alaska Montana Hawaii New Hampshire Delaware South Dakota Vermont North Dakota Wyoming
Justice System $1,621 $1,230 $1,557 $768 $643 $814 $657 $651 $709 $587 $280 $274 $361 $323 $328 $284 $206 $122 $208 $356 $262 $328 $290 $356 $152 $274 $249 $227 $167 $208 $175 $140 $119 $134 $99 $113 $52 $47 $95 $60 $47 $60 $31 $54 $33 $19 $27 $33 $14 $31 $21
TANF $515 $202 $64 $48 $109 $57 $19 $90 $59 $59 $16 $3 $5 $17 $12 $11 $9 $45 $52 $2 $5 $13 $21 $0 $9 $3 $4 $4 $0 $23 $9 $16 $17 $8 $8 $3 $37 $6 $6 NA $6 $0 $7 $5 $10 $8 $1 $3 $5 $3 $12
Medicaid $1,083 $1,184 $635 $1,271 $839 $546 $650 $374 $290 $339 $419 $335 $158 $234 $220 $198 $266 $438 $266 $109 $211 $134 $119 $84 $213 $124 $86 $132 $111 $92 $78 $111 $104 $50 $50 $57 $87 $78 $44 NA $41 $34 $42 $22 $32 $48 $39 $22 $35 $17 $13
SCHIP $153 $73 $46 $32 $36 $43 $98 $30 $49 $21 $47 $46 $15 $23 $0 $15 $30 $3 $1 $13 $9 $10 $8 $10 $11 $10 $6 $3 $11 $9 $6 $7 $6 $4 $3 $1 $4 $9 $5 $1 $3 $2 $3 $2 $2 $1 $1 $1 $0 $1 $1
Child Welfare $739 $322 $96 $251 $421 $181 $250 $135 $72 $73 $115 $175 $150 $51 $89 $95 $127 $48 $95 $37 $75 $38 $92 $10 $121 $44 $16 $8 $99 $26 $45 $33 $61 $25 $29 $12 $7 $43 $13 $72 $23 $8 $22 $10 $18 $18 $11 $7 $12 $5 $7
Total $4,829 $3,668 $2,957 $2,739 $2,315 $1,953 $1,949 $1,562 $1,460 $1,329 $1,003 $945 $839 $776 $757 $737 $724 $712 $711 $670 $664 $654 $654 $605 $574 $548 $471 $469 $454 $430 $389 $361 $359 $276 $231 $230 $214 $206 $199 $162 $142 $127 $114 $113 $112 $99 $88 $77 $74 $69 $61
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Endnotes
1. Of course, the death of ones spouse is another reason why an adult may not be married. 2. U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 American Community Survey. 3. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2004, National Vital Statistics Reports 55, no. 1 (September 29, 2006): 3. 4. W. Bradford Wilcox et al., Why Marriage Matters: 26 Conclusions from the Social Sciences (New York: Institute for American Values, 2005), 1011, and Institute for American Values, The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles (New York: Institute for American Values, 2000), http://center.americanvalues.org/?p=19. 5. Institute for American Values, The Marriage Movement, 11. 6. T. Ooms, S. Bouchet, and M. Parke, Beyond Marriage Licenses: Efforts in States to Strengthen Marriage and Two-Parent Families (Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy, 2004). The welfare reform act of 1996 converted federal welfare funding (now known as TANF or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) into block grants to the states, becoming the first federal law explicitly to promote marriage. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 42 U.S.C. 1305 (P.L. 104193, Aug. 22, 1996). Three of the four purposes of the welfare reform law relate to marriage, giving the states broad latitude in the use of the welfare funds: (1) to provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) to end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work and marriage; (3) to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. 7. 2007 Texas H.B. 2683, fiscal note, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/. Data on Texas program also from personal communication with Bill Coffin, Special Assistant for Marriage Education at Administration for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services. 8. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 7103, P.L. 109171 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 603(a)(2)). Allowable marriage activities under the marriage initiative include the following: (1) public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and the skills needed to increase marital stability and health; (2) education in high schools on the value of marriage, relationship skills, and budgeting; (3) marriage education, marriage skills, and relationship skills programs, that may include parenting skills, financial management, conflict resolution, and job and career advancement, for non-married pregnant women and nonmarried expectant fathers; (4) premarital education and marriage skills training for engaged couples and for couples or individuals interested in marriage; (5) marriage enhancement and marriage skills training programs for married couples; (6) divorce reduction programs that teach relationship skills; (7) marriage mentoring programs which use married couples as role models and mentors in at-risk communities; and (8) programs to reduce the disincentives to marriage in means-tested aid programs, if offered in conjunction with any activity above. 9. To address this issue, we propose the following thought experiment: If all currently unmarried adult women were instead married (which would also mean all children now living with a single mother were instead living with two married parents), how much would taxpayers save? The amount that taxpayers would save if all single women (including mothers) married is the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. (Again, we are not saying that all women should be married, rather that posing such a scenario helps us to capture the costs of family fragmentation.) Throughout the analysis, individuals who are not married or who have experienced a divorce or a nonmarital birth are considered to be living in a fragmented family. As discussed below, we exclude all adults and children living with a male householder with no spouse present from the analysis only in the interest of creating a very cautious estimate of the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation. Further, as shown in table 2, single motherhood occurs much more frequently than single fatherhood. As discussed below, it is likely not theoretically possible (nor necessarily desirable) for all women to be married, and the analysis in this study takes this concern into account. 10. Lack of fulltime work seems to be the biggest cause of poverty in America with family fragmentation being the second largest cause; see Ron Haskins and Isabel Sawhill, Work and Marriage: The Way to End Poverty and Welfare, Policy Brief, Welfare Reform & Beyond #28 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003). See also Paul Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social and Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, The Future of Children 15, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7596; Wilcox et al., Why Marriage Matters; K. A. Moore et al, Marriage from a Childs Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children and What Can We Do about It? Child Trends Research Brief, June 2002; Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Helps, What Hurts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
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11. Wilcox et al., Why Marriage Matters; David Ribar, What Do Social Scientists Know about the Benefits of Marriage? A Review of Quantitative Methodologies, IZA Discussion Paper # 998 (Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, January 2004), http://ftp.iza.org/dp998.pdf. 12. Examples of habits, traits, and disadvantages that may lead to negative life outcomes (which are costly to taxpayers) and to a lack of marriage, to divorce, and to nonmarital childbearing include not considering the impact of present actions and choices on the future, proclivity to violence, and a lack of employment skills. 13. See, for example, P. R. Amato and R. A. Maynard, Decreasing Nonmarital Births and Strengthening Marriage to Reduce Poverty, The Future of Children 17, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 7596. 14. G. S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) provides the seminal economic explanation: specialization and exchange and economies of scale. Ribar, What Do Social Scientists Know? provides an extensive review of the empirical literature on these effects. For example, Ginther and Zavodny suggest that marriage leads to a causal increase in male labor supply; see D. Ginther and M. Zavodny, Is the Male Marriage Premium Due to Selection? The Effect of Shotgun Weddings on the Return to Marriage, Journal of Population Economics 14 (2001): 313328. 15. In a forthcoming article in the Journal of Human Resources titled The Effect of Marital Breakup on the Income Distribution of Women with Children, Elizabeth O. Ananat and Guy Michaels use exogenous variation in the sex of the firstborn child to estimate the impact of divorce on income. Prior studies have shown that marriages in which the firstborn child is male are less likely to end in divorce (see, e.g., K. Bedard and O. Deschenes, Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the Economic Status of Women, Journal of Human Resources 40, no. 2 [Spring 2005]: 411434). 16. Ananat and Michaels, The Effects of Marital Breakup, table 3. 17. Robert Lerman, The Impact of the Changing U.S. Family Structure on Child Poverty and Income Inequality Economica 63 (1996): S119S139. 18. In For Richer or for Poorer: Marriage as an Antipoverty Strategy, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 21, no. 4 (2002): 587599, Adam Thomas and Isabel Sawhill (like Lerman) did not match all single mothers with husbands. They report that there were more than enough single white males to marry all single white mothers in the CPS, but there was a shortage of single black males to marry all single black mothers. In many low-income communities, women probably outnumber marriageable men, because of higher death and incarceration rates of males, meaning it would not be theoretically possible to marry all single mothers. They suggest that the lack of marriageable black males or the reported undercount of minorities in the CPS could be responsible for the dearth of black males available in the CPS. In addition to black males, there is likely also a shortage of elderly males of all races eligible to marry elderly females because of higher death rates at younger ages among males. 19. Ribar, What Do Social Scientists Know? 3846. 20. See Hilary Hoynes, Marianne Page, and Ann Stevens, Poverty in America: Trends and Explanation, Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 4768, published by the American Economic Association; and R. Blank and D. Card, Poverty, Income Distribution and Growth: Are They Still Related? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 48, no.2 (1993): 285340, published by The Brookings Institution. 21. Thomas and Sawhill, For Richer or for Poorer. 22. Robert M. OBrien and Jean Stockard, The Cohort-size Same-size Conundrum: An Empirical Analysis and Assessment Using Homicide Arrest Data from 1960 to 1999, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 19 (2003): 132. 23. Cynthia Harper and Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration, Journal of Research on Adolescence 14, no. 3 (2004): 369397. Harper and McLanahan do not attempt to control for unobserved selection effects, which limits our confidence that all of the large differences in risk of incarceration they found due to family structure are causally related to parents marital status. However, the large number of control variables in their empirical model and the large magnitudes of their results make it hard to believe that the impact of family fragmentation of boys and young mens criminal conduct is zero. 24. Robert Sampson, J. Laub, and C. Wimer, Does Marriage Reduce Crime? A Counterfactual Approach to Within-Individual Causal Effects, Criminology 44, no. 3 (2006): 465504. 25. Paul R. Amato and Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era of Family Upheaval (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 220. While the theoretical and empirical case for marriage having a beneficial impact on men, women, and children may be strong, surely in some cases spouses and children are better off without one parent in the home. For example, a woman and children may be better off without the father when the father is violent or when the marriage is highconflict. In Until Death Do You Part: The Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Spousal Homicides,
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Economic Inquiry 41 (2003): 163183, T. S. Dee finds that unilateral divorce laws, which were found to lead to increases in divorce (see L. Friedberg, Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data, American Economic Review 88 [1998]: 608627), have a negligible effect on the incidence of husbands murdering wives, but unilateral divorce coupled with laws that favored husbands in the division of marital property led to a 21 percent increase of lethal spousal violence against husbands. Contrary to Dees results, B. Stevenson and J. Wolfers (see Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 1 [2006]: 267288) find that no-fault divorce led to a large decline in spousal homicide against wives and no change in spousal homicide against husbands. Dee replicates the results of a 2000 version of Stevenson and Wolfers work and finds that their results are sensitive to a variety of assumptions and specification (see Dee, pp. 177178). It is unclear whether any changes in their analysis that were present in Stevenson and Wolfers published version in 2006 render Dees concerns in 2003 moot, as Stevenson and Wolfers do not directly address these concerns in 2006. Therefore, there does not seem to be definitive evidence that unilateral divorce laws decrease spousal homicide against wives. Nevertheless, Wilcox et al., Why Marriage Matters, 31, summarize evidence that married women are subject to less violence inside and outside the home relative to single and cohabitating women. In addition, Ananat and Michaels find that divorce benefits some women with children financially, as they moved in with relatives with significant incomes and/or the former husband was not contributing anything or very much to family income (see their forthcoming article The Effects of Marital Breakup). Nevertheless, as discussed in the text, Ananat and Michaels also find that divorce greatly increases the odds that women with children are in the lowest income quartile. In some individual cases women and children may be better off without the childrens father because they avoid violence or poverty, but empirical evidence suggests that marriage tends to have the opposite effect by keeping women and children away from violence and increasing material resources. 26. There are other taxpayer-funded programs that likely experience larger expenditures due to family fragmentation such the Earned Income Tax Credit, remedial school programs, and special education programs. These programs were excluded because we did not feel comfortable making reasonable cost estimates given the available empirical literature. The likelihood that these programs would experience reduced costs if more single-adult households became married families suggests that this estimate of the taxpayer cost of family fragmentation is an underestimate of the true costs. Some state funds for TANF programs that benefit children are included in the child welfare calculation below, but other non-cash assistance TANF funds are excluded from this analysis. 27. Some evidence suggests that more children in single-parent families are hospitalized for asthma or childhood diabetes because single parents can be less able to manage the complex stresses of chronic illness for themselves and their children, and because they have less access to adequate health care. See Linda Waite and Maggie Gallagher, The Case for Marriage: Why Married People Are Happier, Healthier, and Better-Off Financially (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 28. Assumption 3 does not imply that only households in poverty are eligible for means-tested programs. Most federal means-tested programs serve significant numbers of households with incomes above poverty thresholds. As marriage would reduce poverty by increasing household incomes, marriage would also increase the income of households that already had incomes above poverty thresholds but were receiving means-tested transfers. At least some of these households would be rendered ineligible for these means-tested transfers due to marriage. 29. Ananat and Michaels, The Effects of Marital Breakup and Thomas and Sawhill, For Richer or for Poorer. 30. In table 3, female-headed households refers to all households with a female householder and no spouse present, including households with and without children. In 2006 there were 12,827,000 children in poverty. Among those, 7,715,000 lived with a single mother. If marriage were to lift 60 percent of these 7,715,000 children out of poverty, then 4,629,000 children would escape poverty. Thus, marriage would lift 4,629,000/12,827,000 or 36.1 percent of these children out of poverty. In 2006 there were 36,460,000 total persons in poverty. Among those, 19,257,000 lived with a female householder with no spouse present or were themselves the female householder with no spouse. If marriage were to lift 60 percent of these 19,257,000 individuals out of poverty, then 11,554,000 people would escape poverty. Thus, marriage would lift 11,554,000/36,460,000 or 31.7 percent of these individuals out of poverty. 31. Based on their estimate of the impact of marriage on the poverty status of female-headed households, Thomas and Sawhill find that the overall 1998 poverty rate would have been 24 percent lower if the proportion of children living in female-headed households in 1998 was the same as had existed in 1970 (see Thomas and Sawhill, For Richer or for Poorer).
Page 41
32. Based on table 3, assumption 2 suggests that family fragmentation is responsible for 36.1 percent of childhood poverty, and assumption 3 suggests that family fragmentation is responsible for 36.1 percent of taxpayer costs on these programs. 33. For example, under current rules, if increases in marriage moved some children off the Head Start rolls (because they are no longer poor), then other children who are eligible but do not currently receive Head Start services would be admitted into newly freed-up Head Start spaces. 34. Harper and McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration. 35. Sampson, Laub, and Wimer, Does Marriage Reduce Crime? 36. Harry Holzer et al., The Economic Costs of Poverty in the United States: Subsequent Effects of Children on Growing Up Poor (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, January 24, 2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/01/pdf/poverty_report.pdf. 37. See, for example, Ribar, What Do Social Scientists Know? 38. See, for example, McLanahan and Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent. 39. Holzer et al., The Economic Costs of Poverty. 40. In the estimates for individual states, we use state-specific average tax rates from TaxFoundation.org, Tax Data: State and Local Tax Burdens Compared to Other U.S. States, 19702007, April 4, 2007, http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/335.html. 41. The specific calculations for each line item and the data sources used are contained in table A.1 and its notes. These taxpayer costs can be considered as annual recurring costs under the assumption that current rates of single motherhood remain constant into the future. 42. For example, the U.S. spends almost $500 billion per year on public education. See Thomas D. Snyder, Mini-Digest of Education Statistics, 2007, NCES 2008-023. (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Educational Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, 2008). 43. See, for example, Waite and Gallagher, The Case for Marriage; and Elizabeth Marquardt, The New Alone, Washington Post, January 27, 2008, B01. 44. As shown in tables 46 based on the 2006 Current Population Survey, single-mother households with income less than 200 percent of the poverty line are 2.6 times as likely to receive Food Stamps, 2.9 times as likely to receive cash assistance, and 1.56 times as likely to receive Medicaid than married couples also earning less than 200 percent of the poverty threshold. 45. Using estimates and calculations from Gregory Acs and Elaine Maag, Irreconcilable Differences? The Conflict between Marriage Promotion Initiatives for Cohabiting Couples with Children and Marriage Penalties in Tax and Transfer Programs (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2005), we estimate the $0.5 billion amount. 46. Holzer et al., The Economic Costs of Poverty, 6. 47. Ribar, What Do Social Scientists Know? 48. Thomas and Sawhill, For Richer or for Poorer. 49. Of course, higher dropout rates would lower future earnings, and government spends considerable resources on attempting to prevent high school students from dropping out and providing services to help dropouts earn a high school diploma or GED. 50. See Waite and Gallagher, The Case for Marriage. 51. Harper and McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration. 52. Sampson, Laub, and Wimer, Does Marriage Reduce Crime? 53. Harper and McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration, table 2. 54. Doris J. James, The Profile of Jail Inmates, 2002, Special Report NCJ 201932 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, July 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/pji02.htm. 55. Ribar, What Do Social Scientists Know? 38. 56. Based on data used by Jens Ludwig in The Costs of Crime testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on September 19, 2006, in the entire U.S., state and local taxpayers spent about $183 billion on the justice system in FY 2007, while the remaining $49 billion was spent by the federal government (see http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2068&wit_id=5749).
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About the Institute for American Values

The Institute for American Values is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization devoted to contributing intellectually to the renewal of family life and the sources of competence, character, and citizenship. For more information, go to www.americanvalues.org or (212) 246-3942.
About the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy

The Institute for Marriage and Public Policy is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to high quality research and public education on ways that law and public policy can strengthen marriage as a social institution. For more information, go to www.imapp.org or (202) 216-9430.
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Case 1:13-cv-00482-CWD Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS

DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

Case 1:13-cv-00482-CWD Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 2 of 3

DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

Case 1:13-cv-00482-CWD Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 3 of 3

/s/ W. SCOTT ZANZIG

DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

Case 1:13-cv-00482-CWD Document 30-1 Filed 01/09/14 Page 1 of 26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Case 1:13-cv-00482-CWD Document 30-1 Filed 01/09/14 Page 2 of 26

IV. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................

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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER RICHS MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

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Plaintiffs presumably will

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Equal Protection. Plaintiffs equal protection claims are subject to review

Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).

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Idahos marriage policy choice.

The distinguishing characteristics of opposite-sex and same-sex couples for

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Focusing Governmental Resources to Encourage Stable Biological

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Application of Rational Basis Standard to 32-209. The challenge to

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/s/ W. SCOTT ZANZIG

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Households and Families: 2010

Issued April 2012

Reproduction of the Question on Relationship to Householder From the 2010 Census

By Daphne Lofquist, Terry Lugaila, Martin OConnell, and Sarah Feliz

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census questionnaire.

HOUSEHOLD RELATIONSHIP QUESTION

U.S. Department of Commerce

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Relationship to Householder by Age: 2010

U.S. Census Bureau