Methodological Individualism Author(s): Joseph Agassi Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 11, No.

3 (Sep., 1960), pp. 244-270 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/586749 . Accessed: 07/08/2012 07:11
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METHODOLOGICALINDIVIDUALISM JosephAgassi
/[Y AIM in the present essayis to argue that individualism and to defend instituiionalistie need not be psychologistic, greatcontrij E g Sindividualism, which I considerto be Popper's of the socialsciences. butionto the philosophy
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areresponsible thatonlyindividuals contends Whenthe individualist thatsocietyis stage,the holistretorts actorson the socialand historical To this retortthe indimore than merelya collectionof individuals. additionalentity which vidualistanswersthat there is no mysterious of individuals into a society;a collection of individuals turnsa collection betweenthem;thisinteraction is a societyif thereis stronginteraction on the acts (rationally) is due to the fact that when any one individual into accountthe existence he talees basisof his own aimsand interests, To this the holistretorts with aims and interests. of otherindividuals missesthe point;that peoples aimsdo not constithat the individualist of diffierent so thatmembers tute a societybut ratherdependon society; in turn societieshave diXerentaims and interests.The individualist setting as answers that the holistmissesthe point, by takingthe social God-givenratherthan as explicablein termsof human action. The holist in turn argues that human action does not determinebut is because by, thesocialsetting(perhaps by, or directed rather constrained individual). than any single socialforcesare much stronger mannerin an in the follossTing This argumentmay be schematized views. t+vo traditional the attemptto characterize haveaimsand inSocietyis the 'whole'svhichis Onlyindividuals (individualism). terests morethanits parts(holism). behavesin a way 2. 'Society'affectsthe individual's The individual to hisaim,givenhis ciradequate aims(collectivism). principle). (rationality cumstances as a and The socialset-upis changeable 3. The socialset-upinfluences action(instiresultof individuals' constrainsthe individual'sbereform). tutional analysis). haviour(institutional 244
I.

(a) Holism

(b) Individualzsm

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It is obviousthat here we have a characterization of two different positions. Yet, so far the characterization is not sufficient to bringout the fact that thesetwo positions are mutuallyincompatible. Traditionally, many individualists have refusedto assumethe existenceof any socialentity because they assumedthat only individuals can have aims and interests. They viewed'the nationalinterest','publicpolicy',and such-like expressions eitheras emptyor as mereshorthand expressions for sum-totals of many individuals' interestsand policies.The holists, however,have traditionally insistedthat nationalaims,class-interests, and destinies of social groups do exist. Logicallythis amountsto altering our schemain the following way:we add to both vie\\rs, holismandindividualism, the following proposition, and reinterpret the otherpropositlonsln ltS.lg lt. +. If 'wholes'exist then they have distinctaims and interestsof their OWll. This additionalproposition 4 rendersI (a) inconsistent with I (b); it also enablesus to reinterpret 2(a) and 2 (b), as well as 3(a) and 3(b), in a mannerwhich rendersthem inconsistent svitheach other.The individualistdoes not deny 2(a) (collectivism) unlessit is reinterpreted in accordwith 4. He does not deny that one's aims can be affectedby others'aims,and he can explainrationally suchphenomena. He merely deniesthat one'saimscan be explainedby reference to the socialaim. Similarly, the holistdoes not deny 2(b) (rationality principle)unlessit is reinterpreted in accordwith 4. He doesnot deny that the individual acts purposefully (rationally). He merelydeniesthat individuals' aims and physicalcircumstances alonedetermine action.He insiststhat the aims of the social groupconstitutea majorfactorin determining the actions of its members.Again, the individualist does not deny 3(a) (institutional analysis) unlessit is reinterpreted according to 4. He does not deny that the behaviour of an individualis constrained and influenced by socialfactorsprovidedthat we can explainsuch constraints and influences as results of choicesof otherindividuals. Only whenthe holistattributes thesesocialconstraints andinfluences to the aim of the social groupdoes the individualist disagreewith him. Similarlyas to 3(b) (institutional reform):the holist denies it only when the set-up which the individualsupposedly changesis the 'society'or the social grouthat is to say society's aimsand destinies; he will not denythat the individual can alterhis materialenvironment, or otherindividuals' tastes,and similar'superficial' factors. Thus, proposition 4 renders the previouspropositions more definite by interpreting holismas the view accordingto whichthe individual's interest is boundto the existingsocialinterest,andindividualism as the view that onlyindividualsexist and have interests.This form of individualismis knownas gbsychologistic individualism, or as individualistic psychologism. 245
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Proposition 4 is not explicitlystatedby writerson the presentcontroversy, and it is not the only proposition whichrenders the two sides of ourschemaincompatible with each other.However, in myview,it is oftenimplicitin manyworkson the controversy, old and new. Indeed it is sometimes so obviouslyimplicitin theseworksthatI findit a little puzzlingthat so few peoplehave noticedit and have foundit worthy of a comment.Whetherproposition 4 is acceptable or not, refraining fromstatingit explicitlymay easilylead to confusion. It is one thingto stateexplicitly thatall individualism is psychologistic and quiteanother thing to confuseindividualism with psychologism. Psychologism is the programme of explainingall social phenomena solelywith the aid of psychological theory.If the psychological theory which is to explain social phenomenais individualpsychology,then our psychologism is of the individualist brand,while if it is collective psychology, then our psychologism is of the collectivist or holistbrand. Thus, svhileFreud'sattemptat a psychological explanationof some socialphenomena(religion, leadership) is lndividualist, Jung's similar attemptis collectivist or holist,sincehe assumes the existence of groupsubconsciousness. Similarly, Plato'stheoryof the stateis an attemptto explainclassstructure, not institutionally, but psychologically-asreflectingthe mentalstructure of the state.\Ve thushave tsvodivisionspsychologism versusinstitutionalism, and individualism versusholism which yield four possibleprogrammes: (a) psycholot3ism-cum-individualism(the main streamof the individualist traditXon); (b) institutionalism-cum-holism (the main streamof holism or collectivism); (c) psychologism-cum-holism (in rareexamples like Plato'sandJung's theories); and perhaps (d) institutionalism-cum-individualisms (It shouldbe added,perhaps,that theseare by no meansall the possibilities;cybernetics, forinstance, fallsinto noneof the fourcategories mentionedhere.) The fourthpossibility(d) is precisely what is deniedby proposition 4*It is the centralthesisof thepresent essaythatproposition 4 is false.
Individualism Psychologism Institutionalism a d Holism
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Admittedly proposition 4 isprima facieveryconvincing. It entailsthat either all statementsabout societiesand social institutions shouldbe takenat theirface value or all of them shouldbe viewedas shorthand assertions aboutmany individuals. It soundsratherad hocto claim, as institutionalist-;ndividualists haveto claim,thatsome of thesestatements (say about the state of war betweenBritainand Germany) have to be 246

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taken at their face value, and some of these statements(about Germany'sdesireto win the war or its Eght againstBritain)havc to be viewed as shorthandassertionsabout individuals.This may partly acceptedproposisocialphilosophers explainthe fact that traditionally lt. c lscusslng nout Wlt tlon 4 4, of proposition in favour argument Andyet, in spiteof thisprimafacie not of course, (though, exist do 'wholes' that asserts He it. rejects Popper in the same sensein which people exist), but they have no (distinct) These 'wholes are socialgroupsas well as socialinstitutions interests. variety,from in the widestsenseof the word, and coveringa ^vide An instistates. to neighbourhoods from and customsto constitutions, or aim, an it give people when only interests and aims have may tution an or society a interest; be its should consider they what with accord act in of its own. cannothave aimsand interests institution both I(a) and I(b) into It is obviousthat Poppercan incorporate holismand psycholoboth with incompatible is which view a consistent providedthat this view containsthe negationof gistic individualism into this view all the otherpro4. And he can incorporate proposition not that they are interpreted provided schema above the positionsin Thus, it. to opposition in rather 4 but proposition with accordance in affectsthe but rathertheirexistence in e(a), not the aimsof institutions a part of the constitute the existinginstitutions behaviour: individual's his which togetherwith his aimsdetermine circumstances individual's psychologistic to according While 2(b). with accordance in behaviour as relevant may be considered only materialconditions individualism may be of institutions to Popperthe existence according circumstances, too. This additionenriches2(b) as relevantcircumstances considered rationalityprincipleinto hat and turns it from the psychologistic logic'. Similarly,3(a) is admittedas instituPoppercalls 'situational constrain tionalanalysisnot by admittingthat the aimsof institutions the individual'sbehaviour,but by admittingthat the existenceand of institutions(as svell as people'sadoptionof definite characteristics according behaviour, the individual's them)constrain towards attitudes of reform, to the logic of his situation.3(b) is the theoryof institutional situationso as to abolishor the way peoplemay alter an institutional and alterotherpeople'sattitudes(by resortenforcesocialconstraints, to the logicof their means according ing to violenceor by democratic . situation) aspectof humanbehaviour Both3(a) and 3(b)relateto an important The instituactions. of individual socialconsequences the unintended tional analysis(3(a)) will showhosvpeopleact under certaincircumtheirosvnaims,and in so doing affectthe stancesin a way to forward thiswill be so when theiractionis a reform socialsystem.In particular of 3(a) and 3(b)which (3(b)). It is the verycombination of institutions and whichamounts so important consequences the unintended renders 247
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to a theoryof soeialehange.It would be deserving of the title 'soeial dynamies' had not this title been useddifferently by somesoeiologists. The holistsoeial dynamiesis but a historicist assertion of the goal or destinyof the socialwhole;it hasno explanatory power.The psyehologistieindividualist soeialdynamies is but an idea aboutthe interaetion of manyindividuals; it is far too eomplieated to be eapableof developmentin any detail.None of theseviewsof soeialdynamies aeeordwith the following sketehof a simpleexampleof socialehange.Gonsider the institutional eircumstanees (3(a))under which some workersfind it profitableto organizea trade union for collectivebargaining(3(b)). In these nesvinstitutional circumstances followingthe formationof a trade union (3(a)),other workerswill find it profitableto organize as well (3(b)).This subsequent situationin which most workersare organized (3(a)) makes it desirablefor the employersto organize (3(b)).The existenceof both workers' and employers' organizations ^villprofoulldly influencethe relationsbetweenworkerand employer (3(a));and it may even bring about the government's intervention, perhapsin the form of new legislation(3(b)).Thus, unintentionally, the firsttradeunionorganisers have starteda socialavalanche. I shouldadd,in parenthesis, that manythinkers seemto havefelt the need for a viamedia betsveen the two traditional sTiews, and even for a eonsistent synthesis betweenthe reasonable elementsin them. I maintain that Popperhas suceeeded in carrying out thisintuitively feit programme,thus rendering explicitthe approach hich in fact underlies the fruitfuland reasonable part of existingsocialstudies,while retaining the eentral thesis of individualism, namely the thesis that only individuals have aimsand responsibilities. In the restof thisessayI shalltryto elaborate pointsstatedin the first seetion.I shall entirelyignorepsychologistie holism,and diseuss, from the methodological aspect,institutionalist holism,psychologistie individualism, and institutionalist individualism. I shalltheneonelude with a eommenton the metaphysical viesvsbehindtheseapproaehes. II In this seetionI shall tIw to criticizeholismfroma methodologieal ratherthanfroma Inetaphysical viesvpoint. I shallnot discuss the existenee or non-existence of group-interests (or of group-minds), but stress the metaphysieal charaeter2 of any assumption eoncerning group-interests, and the danger involved in not recognizingthis metaphysical eharaeter, or in regarding holismas 'scientiSc'. The majorquestionto sivhich holismgivesriseeoncerns the relation betsveen the distinctinterests of the groupand thoseof the individuals belonging to it. Logically, thesetsvokindsof interest maybe in harmony 248

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interests forcesone to admit of individuals' or in conflict.The diversity intermaybe in conflictwithsomeindividuals' thatthe group's interest and the ests.One has to decidethen, in caseof a conflictof individual whichof theseis, or shouldbe, dominant.(I ) One may group's interest, shouldbe dominant. assertthat in case of conflictthe group'sinterests morality.(2) One may a collectivist In this case one merelyadvocates assertthat the group'sinterestis dominant,if not now, then at least members on its individual 'in thelongrun',evenwithoutbeingimposed a fatalistview or who may all act againstit. In this case,one expresses a prophecyabout things to come; Popperhas tried to show (in his of such character the barrenness and unscientific Poverty of Historictsm) prophecies.(3) One may assertthat in case of conflict the group's interestis latent,and comesinto play only whenthe group'smembers' interest. Thisis the patinterests alterso as to coincidewith the group's popularbeliefs.As a naive examplewe may tern of many widespread take the myth that when all Jews keep the Sabbaththe Messiahwill come. The newesttheorywhichfollowsthis patternis that the leader discovers the destinyof his group;this is but a variationon the book metawhichfollowthispatternareobviously of Exodus. A11 the variants physical; its maininterest,I think,lies in its relationto a specificmoral to the collective.(Thiskind responsibility philosophy of the individual's moralitynor of moralityfalls neitherunderthe headingof collectivist morality-the twokindsof morality underthe headingof individualistic (4) The only other alternative discussedin Popper'sOpenSociety.3) manifests seemsto be this: the group'sinterestalwaysand necessarily aims and interests.One itself in, and acts through,some individuals' theorywhilefollowingthis pattern,by specifying may state a scientific and interests the individuals u thoseaimsare identicalwith the group's But then the aims and circumstances. by specifying these individuals' and the group'sinterassertion aboutthe identityof theseindividuals' contain,will be redundantin the sense ests hich that theory+rould posserof that theorywill not that the testabilityof the explanatory is omitted If this assertion of this assertion. diminish sith the omission individualthe patternof institutionalistic the theorywill accord+srith is not omittedone maybe temptedto stickto it ism,but if thisassertion partof the theoryis refuted.For,beingunscientific, hen the scientific this assertionis irrefutableand can be safely upheld, though this two examples of thiskindof I shallnow discuss amountsto dogmatism. and Functionalism. holism,Marxism V\rhat Marxsaid aboutclassinterestis hardlyopen to rationalarguthe way concerning whilehis assertions ment and is thusmetaphysical, actionare open to critiitselfin the individual's classinterestmanifests Marxby pointing Forexample,one can criticize cismand arescientific. interestdoes not alssayscoincideuriththat of his out that a uForker's examples to thiseffect.Of course, fellosv w-orlier, and adduceempirical 249

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one maydismiss suchcriticism as irrelevant on thegrounds thatonlythe workers''shert-run'irlterestscarl conflict, but not their 'lorlg-run' interests.4 This is the attitudeof thosewho are determined to uphold the metaphysical partof Marx's viewdogmatically, evenat the expense of ignoringthe scientificpart of Nfarx's view. Yet, obviously, it is the scientific part whichis moreinteresting and moreimportant. Furthermore this attitudemay easilylead to a collectivist morality. For,by admitting thatthe classinterest mayclashwiththe ('short-run') interestupon which its membersact, one's views come very close to collectivistmorality,and they becomecompletelyso when priorityis explicitlygiven to the class interestitself. Thus, Marxistcollectivist moralitybeginssvithblamingworkers for not behaving in accordwith Maix's predictions. My secondexampleis fromcurrentsocialanthropology. I mention it diffidently, because I am not suiciently familiar withmodern anthropologicalstudies.I understand that in some interpretations functionalismis viewedas the attemptto showhosvthe social-group's interest of self-preservation is manifestin the compatibility of diXerent social roles,when thesecoincideeitherin any one personor in any one situation. The scientific partof thisapproach consists of a varietyof specific assumptions of the compatibility betsseen specific socialrolesand of the criticalexamination of theseassumptions, and is quite independent of any viewsconcerning the group'sinterest. In particuIar it is independent of the metaphysical view that a group'sinterestis manifest in the compatibility of socialroles.Thismetaphysical viewIeadsto the dogma that compatibility mustexistand to the corollary that therecan never be any ('endogenous') socialcausesof socialchange,so thatonly 'alien' bodiesor factors can causesocialchange.Gellner's excellent criticism of thisdogmaiseemsto me to be quiteunanswerable. My pointhereis that thisdogmastemsfromholismandis quiteredundant: the partsof functionalism whicharereasonable andinteresting areentirely independent of it. The same may be said about Gellner's criticism of the functionalist doctrine of survival. According to thisdoctrine socialrelicsdo not exist: no socialinstitution survives its function: if it existstodayit musthave a functiontoday,and thisfunctionwill explainandjustifyits existence independently of its history.In my own view there are two strong methodological pointsbehindthe functionalist doctrine of survival. The firstis a methodological criticism of the approach svhich waswidespread beforethe rise of functionalism ('historism', about which see below, p. 255):the assumption thatan institution onceexisted is not an explanation of its existencenow, that is to say, of its survival.The secondis the methodological rule of attempting to explaina seemingsocialrelic by assuming it to be something of contemporary significance. \Ve do not knowwhich institution is a social relic and svhichis functioning, and 250

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such questons with open minds.Yet these two sse shouldirlvestigate and turned can easilybe exaggerated survivals concerning rules sound does not history that and exist never relics social that claim the into institutions all that view the with identical almost is This all. at matter operate with perfectharmony,and withstandany externaldisturbances by quick and efficientadaptationat the expenseof the quick whoseservicesare no longerrequired. of institutions elimination characterof this holistic and arch-conservative The metaphysical it containswell deserve view are quite obvious,and the exaggerations criticism.This criticismled Gellnerto pose the problemsof Gellner's in socialexplanaandof the placeof history of survivals the explanation tion, problemswhich, I suggest,are capable of solutionin termsof logicallowsforthe existence logic.First,situational situational Popper's of social relics, as well as for the explanationof their survival.For instance,we may explainthe survivalof an obsoletelaw as being due or due to respectfor the to the legislativebody'sbeing overworked, just because becomesignificant lawssometimes printedletter.(Obsolete they were neverformallyabolishedand becausesomepeoplediscover Secondly, to the logicof theirsituations.) them and use themaccording of an instituto explainthe existence thoughit is clearlyunsatisfactory may in the past, this assumption its existence tion merelyby assuming logic brings Situational explanation. in a satisfactory be an ingredient into the explanationof the existenceof an institutionits immediate Given the of individuals. the circumstances history,which constitutes of any one period,sve can try to explainits arrangement institutional or abolition,in the next period,in termsof or reformn preservation, group-interest, Thus, by eliminating behaviour. rationalor purposeful withoutbeingconfined in functionalism we have all that is reasonable to 'static'modelsonly. power,or To conclude,a holistictheoryeitherhas no explanatory powerwhich it would retainwhen the holistic else it has explanatory elementin it is eliminated.Yet if the holisticelementof the theoryis refuted, afterits scientificelementis empirically retained,particularly and perto obscurantism then the holisticelementleadsits adherents arguit) is Popper's This (as I understand morality. hapsto collectivist to societies interests (distinct) mentagainstholism againstattributing conviction or to socialinstitutions quite apartfrom his metaphysical thoughtheydo exist,have no (disand socialinstitutions, that societies tinct) interests. III or indiindividualism In this sectionI shall criticizepsychologistic or simply psychologism(since I shall not vidualisticpsychologism can hardly cause any this abbreviation discussholisticpsychologism 25t

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confusion). As in the previoussection,my criticism will be methodologicalratherthan metaphysical. The metaphysical differences betweeninstitutionalism and psychologism somewhatresembles the differencebetweena drawingand a pointillistpaintingwhichcontainsonly coloureddots but looksas if it contains lines. Psychologism admits institutionsinto the picture of societyin the samemanner in whichthe pointillist admitslinesinto his painting-as mereillusions createdby oversight of details.In this section I shall discussnot this metaphysical view, but the methodology basedon it. Before comingto thatI shouldpointout, in fairness to someadherents of psychologism, tllat originally psychologism was not a programme to explainsocialphenomena but an attemptto designthe ideal rational society. The origin of psychologism seems to me to be the applicationof Bacon'stheoryof T;novledge to social and politicalproblems.6 Bacon explainedthe abilityto contribute to scientific progress purelypsychologically:an individualpossesses this abilityonly if his mind is in its naturalstate only if his mind is free fromsuperstition. And superstition is the resultof impatienceand self-flattery: impatienceleads to guessingand self-flattery leadsto self-deception whichmakesit impossible to get rid of one's originalguesshovever falseit may be and in spite of all refutations. This beingso, he said, sciencecan developonly if we forgetall pastsuperstitions andstartby observing factsas theyare. Baconthusexplained socialphenomena psychologically: ancientscience was due to man's naturalopen-mindedness; the lMediaeval darkness wasdue to man'sself-deception; andmodern scienceis due to forgetting Mediaevalsuperstitions. Obviouslythe applicationof these views to social,political,and legal problems is highlyradicalist (especially since they containthe demandthat +^te shouldstartafresh).Beingconscious of this, and being a conservative,Bacon repeatedlydissuadedhis readers fromattempting to apply his viess to socialand legal-studies. Etetas soon as his viesrssere acceptedas the explanation of Nesrton's incredible success, theyled to the radicalism of the eighteenth century. All past institutions vere dismissed as irrational togetherrtrith all past viewson hich theyrested; tilesevievs ^vere declared to be sheersuperstitions.The institution linoxvn as modernsciencevas vieved not as an institutionbut as tlle resultof the abolitionof the previous(institutionalized)learning (especiallythe teachingin Churchinstitutions) and reversion to man'snaturalcapacityto learn.7SimilarlwT, the hope for socialreformwas the hope not that institutions *vould be replaced by betteronesbut that theybe abolished and give riseto an institutionlesssocietyof (enlightened) naturalmen sho are able to forsard their naturalinterests in the best manner. Practically all the leadingthinkers of the eighteenth centuryagreed
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that the existence of bad institutions vitallydependedon people'sirrational and even superstitious acceptanceof them. 'Nothing appears more surprising', says Hume (in his Essay on TheFirstPrinciples of Government), 'to thosewhoconsider humanaffairs witha philosophic eye, thanthe easiness withwhichthe manyaregoverned by the few,and the implicitsubmission with which men resigntheir own sentiments and passions to thoseof theirrulers.Whenwe enquireby what meansthis wonderis effected, we shallfindthatas forceis alwayson the sideof the governed,the governors have nothingto supportthem but opinion.' Hume emphasized that the opinionof the governed, by whichtyranny is maintained, is quite irrational. Althoughhe opposedthe use of the myth of the socialcontractas a justification of existinginstitutions (in his essay on rThe Original Contract), he himselfendorseda less rosecoloured version of it (in his essayon TheOrigin of Government) in order to explainthe existence of irrational institutions like tyranny.He attributedsome(military) rationality to the act of instituting a government, and explainedits survival(in peace time) afterit had lost its original function by thesubjects' irrational forceof habit.Rousseau hada similar view of tyranny.'The strongest is neverstrongenoughto be alwaysthe masterunlesshe transfers his strengthinto right, and obedienceinto duty', he wrotein his Social Contract (Bk.I, ch. III). Yet he was more concerned to stress the irrationalityof accepting the right of the strongest 'whosesole resultis a massof inexplicable nonsense', than to explain existingsocial circumstances. Similarly,Adam Smith had no intentionto explain slaveryon rationallines; he considered it to be 'absurd'and the most inefficientand expensiveform of labour; at most he was willing to explainit as rootedin people'signoranceand
* a

preJuc

.lce.

Thus, the originalviess behind modernpsychologism is the eighteenth-century theoryaccordingto which almost all previousinstitutionsssere'a massof inexplicable nonsense'. 'The humanistthinkers of the Enlightenment', writesWatkins,8 'regarded historyas a long record of unnecessary suffering; but they repudiated the doctrineof original sin and attributed the suffering partlyto physicalcauseswhich might be revealedby science and controlledby technology,and partly to superstition and ignorance, products of bad educaiionwhich,theysaid, had renderedman's naturalgoodnessimpotent'.Existinginstitutions are rootedin 'badeducation'; 'humannature'is at the rootof the perfectly rationalfuturesociety.The idea that most existinginstitutions are inexplicable with the aid of the rationality principle(2(a)) led to the condemnation of theseinstitutions, not of the principle.Only the ideal liberalUtopiacan be fullyexplainedby the rationality principle, for this society is perfectlyrationalas in it human nature operates unimpeded by institutions, or by the 'massof inexplicable nonsense' on whichinstitutions are based. 253

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Accordingto the humanistthinkers of the Enlightenment, not onhty the idealsocietybut alsoits risecan be explained purelypsychologically by reference to humannaturealone:oncepeoplesee thatthe existing order is superstitious they will cease to accept it, by which very act they will have createdthe ideal society.This naive view was attacked fromtwo sides,the traditionalist and the extremeradicalist. The traditionalistsdefendedsociety'sneed for some blind obedience ('superstition' is the individualists' name for the same). The extremeradicalistsdemandedthat the state (or someother institution) shoulduse radicalmeansto eradicate bad institutions and the superstitious education on ^shichthey rest. The traditionalists naturallymoved towards holism as did those extremeradicalists who noticed that what they demanded was no longerthe abolitionof all institutions but ratherthe establishment of some new institutions in orderto destroysome older ones:theystarted to viewthesceneas a battlefield in whichold andnew institutions(or classes,or social forces)were struggling.(L. Pearce Williams'very interesting paper concerning the debateabout the reformof educationimmediately afterthe FrenchRevolution9 presents a detailedhistorical exampleof such a development.) The eighteenthcenturypsychologistic programme of planninga futureliberalUtopia endedwith its failureto producethis Utopia afterthe FrenchRevoluiion. It has two intellectualheirs,however:the anarchist movement, and the nineteenth-century psychologistic programmeof explaining existing socialphenomena, whosechiefpromoters wereComteandMill. It is a mostinteresting fact that thereis no otherdifference between the eighteenth-century psychologism and the nineteenth-century psycologismbut that the one was a programme to design the perfectly rationalsocietyand the otherwas a programme to explainthe existing societies. Bothhad at theirdisposal nothingbut physical circumstances and the psychologywhich is equally applicableto all individualsnamely,humannature. The nineteenth-century psychologistic programme reflectsa compromisebetweenthe desireto explainsocial entitieswhich could no longerbe explained awayand the traditional (mistaken) individualistic aversionfrom the admission of social entities (or 'holisticentities'as Gellnercalls them).lBut thisin itselfdoesnot explainthe persistence of the idea that only humannatureshouldbe usedin the explanaiion of social phenomena. The persistence of this idea can be explained by referenceto other opinions which were common to both the eighteenthand the nineteenth-century individualists. Common to both groupsis the view that a satisfactory theorymustbe an assertion about the essence of the phenomena explained by that theory;and the essence of all humanphenomena is humannature.Commonto both groups (especially with regardto Alill) is alsothe idea that explaining a social set-uprationally (2(b)) is tantamount tojustifying it. I shallnot discuss 254

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these two ideas, since there is a strongerargumentfor allowingonly humannatureto enterourexplanation of socialphenomena: including the psychology of people as we know them would seem to make our explanation too easy, adhoc, and uninteresting. It would enableus to explain monogamyby the monogamous tendenciesof the individual members of a monogamous society,and polygamyby the polygamous tendencies of the individualmembers of the polygamous society.This unsatisfactory mode of explanation will be ruled out if we allow only humannatureto be usedas the psychological elementin our explanation. For, by definition,human natureis commonto all membersof mankind.For the sakeof clarityI shall call the kind of psychologism whichhas only humannatureat its disposal'traditional psychologism' and the oppositekindof psychologism 'vulgarpsychologism'. Traditional psychologism is a daringprogramme. It is the suggestion that we shouldnot be satisfiedwith any explanationof socialphenomenaunlessthisexplanation is an assertion abouthumannatureand material circumstances. Hence, it is the suggestionthat we should explain the variety of social phenomenaby assuminga variety of materialcircumstances (sincehumannatureis unalterable). But many socialphenomena and theirvarieties hardlydependon material circumstances take language as an obvious example. Hence traditional psychologism seemsto be untenable. The only way out of thisdifficultr is the suggestionthat we should explain today's variety of social phenomena not by reference to the varieties of today'smaterial circumstances,but by reference to the varietiesof materialcircumstances of today as well as of yesterday.(This rendersthe psychologistic programme a version of historism,l1 namely of the programme to explain phenomena by relatingtheirhistory.) But this would not help either. If we want to explain a child's adaptationto an institution without takingas given the fact that its parentsare adapted to it, we have to explainthe parents' being adapted to it by reference to theirchildhood. Thisregress will be an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate statementsabout institutionsfrom our own explanation, unlesswe assumethat therewas at least one momentin the society'shistoryin which only materialenvironment and human naturedetermined rationalaction. Hence traditional psychologism is pushedto the unintended view that everysocietyhad a defiXiite historical beginning. This view is dismissed by Popperas 'the methodological myth of the socialcontract'(Open Society, ii, 93). The methodological myth of the social contractseems to be employedin the creationof variouskindsof historical myths.Sometimes theseare storiesaboutcollectiveeventswhichleft theirimpressions on the furtherdevelopments of the societiesin which they occurred.A famousexampleof sucha mythis Freud'sdescripiion of the beginning of societyand the creationof the Oedipuscomplexas the outcomeof a 255

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specific event of a collective father-killing. Other myths are stories about strong individuals who left their impact on posterity. A famous For my part, I view HeroWorshit. and example of this is Carlyle'sHeroes Carlyle's effort as an attempt to solve a problem within the framework of individualism but in a manner designed to render it as indistinguishable from holism as possible; his solution was intended to be a bridge along which one could easily pass from the individualists'to the holists' camp. Stripped of its holistic hero-worship,however, Carlyle's mythology would be a part of a more general discussion of the contribution of past events to the shaping of our present societies. And the unheroic impression which Cleopatra's nose is alleged to have Inade on poor Antony is as good an instance of such an event as the heroic entry of Carlyle's Odin onto the historical and social stage. I do not wish to challenge the prominence of Cleopatra'snose in the historiographicliterature, but rather to claim that it is too far-fetched as a part of an explanation of today's social set-up. If the psychologistic programme is to be carried out successfully,we have not only to trace the historical origin of a specific social characterisiic, but also to explain how the effect of a historical event has persisted through the ages.l2 Hence, the explanation of today's social set-up must contain a descriptionof yesterday'sset-up and an assumptionwhich explains the emergence of today's set-up from yesterday's set-up. But these two assumptions are quite sufficient, and we should therefore start urith them, although, of course, having provided an explanation of today's set-up, we ma try to explain yesterday's set-up (and its roots in that of the day before esterday). And yet it should be noticed, perhaps, that unlilie holism, traditional psychologism sometimes does lead to theories which are open to criticism and even to empirical criticism. Thus, psychologisticattempts to explain some social events by stressingthe roles of certain individuals (rather than of the institutionalset-up) in history, has provoled admirSimilarly, Mill's andPeace). able criticisms such as Tolstoy's (in War contention that economics is based only on the universal disposition to get rich, though uninteresiing is at least criticizable. Indeed it svas criticized by pointing out that the competitive system does not follov from the disposition to get rich, and that economlc competition is not universal. This criticism led to the psychologistic claim that primitive people, who do not have competition (and are therefore primitive)) do not compete because nf climatic conditions which make people lazy or conterlted etc. Yet co<npetiiion has been found even among some primitive people, though not the competition Mill kneV. Difficulties of this kind are not due to some specific errors but due to the poverty of the tools which the traditional psychologistic programme offiersto its adherent This can be seen more intuitively, look at the past. perhaps, if we look at an imaginary future than if lsTe 256

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Assumethat the futureof mankind is going to be better.Since, ultimately, all the tools the adherents of psychologism can use in order to explain(orpredict)thisfutureare againthe unalterable humannature and physicalconditions,they are almost bound to say that, if the futureis going to be betterin anysense, it is going to be betterbecause of some sort of improvement of our physicalconditions the developmentof scienceand technology. This is why the Utopianists of the Age of Reasonlay such stresson the advancement of learning,as V9atkins rightlyremarks (seep. 253 above).Thisis why RobertOwenexpressed his optimismby claiming that the improvement of man's material conditions is going to causeimprovement of man'sgeneralconditions: according to traditional psychologismultimately there is almost nothingelse which can cause any improsYement. Nowadaysthe error of this view is, regrettably perhaps,only too obvious.We know that the futureof mankinddependsless on technological successand more on our ability or inabilityto create effectiveinstitutional means for preventing the misuseof our technological achievements. So much abouttraditional psychologism. Unliketraditional psychologism,which offerstoo few tools for the explanationof social phenomena, vulgar psychologism offerstoo many tools. It allows one to attributeto individualsall the characteristics of the societyto which they belong. It is not only ad hoc,but also untenable,as it allowsone to assumeconflictingcharacteristics in order to explain conflicting institutions,institutionalizedconflicts, and other undesired social phenomena.For example, adherentsof vulgar psychologism would and did explain unemployment by claiming that workersare lazy. This approach,when pushedfar enough, becomesplainly ridiculous and ceases to be individualistic, as it would render the rationality principle(X(a))inapplicable to messysituations. Adherentsof vulgarpsychologism can hardlybe expectedto have discussedthis criticismexplicitly.Nonetheless, one may view certain ideas as attemptsto mitigateit, as, for instance,the followingsuggestions. (I) Unemployment is desiredby some individuals.(X) Unemployment is not yet understoodfor want of factual information. (3) Unemployment is an unintended consequence of rationalbehaviour. According to the firstsuggestion it is not the unemployed who want to have unemployment, but someother people. This is a versionof what Poppercalls 'the conspiracy theoryof society':l3 everysocialevil is desiredand broughtabout by some wicked people. This theory is entirelymetaphysical. It allegedlyexplains(evil) socialphenomena by attributing (evil) intentions to somepeoplebut it does not tell us why these sinisterpeople ratherthan well-wishers enforcetheir intentions on others. The statementthat those who are engaged in wars are wickedis an unsatisfactory explanation of svars; the statementthat the industrialmagnateslove war (or money or power)is no explanation 257

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the socialcircumconcerning of warsunlessone addsto it assumptions stanceswhich makesthem capableof imposingtheir wills on others. of explanation is due to Marx.)Hence, any admissible (This criticism of someprevious social the existence assumes socialevilsby conspiracy someothersocialevils.The suggestion whichcontained circumstances, that those can be explained by previous conspiracieswould lead myth of the social to a rather funny versionof the methodological contract. beforewe can attemptto explain to the secondsuggestion, According all any social phenomena,we simply have to collect indiscrtminately involvedin the socialsetting about all individuals factualinformation information took place, and when sufficient in which the phenomena and the phenaboutthemis known,theirsocialsettingsvillbe knosvn unemployment, omenain questionexplained.In orderto understand it is suggested,we must know much more about the workers,their etc. etc. I shall call this view 'inductivist employers,their organizers, psychologism'. may be the view that the multitudeof Inductivistpsychologism into a picturejust like the points in the facts will array themselves pointillistpaintingdo. This would only raise the questionof whydo is not detaileddescription the facts fall into pattern;the increasingly the more the morefactswe describe, on the contrary, an explanation; the less the morefactswe describe, we want explanations. Moreover, Those who want to collect will they fall into patternby themselves. morefactsin orderto explaina given fact usuallyadmit all this, but only if ve have knowthey claimthat we can find a good explanation this explanationfromledge of sufficientlymany facts to adduce accordingto the Baconianmethodof induction. Accordingto the Baconianview the propermethodof inquiryis to to adducefromthese collectmanyfacts,to adducefromthemtheories, and to go on inmedia), theoriesmore generaltheories(the axiomata creasingthe generalityof our theoriesuntil we arrive at the most general theory-to the essence of things. The general theory will and, ultimately,it will explain the less generaltheoriesin succession explain the originalfact from which it is adduced.Obviously,then, is humannature,advocating since the essenceof humanphenomena seems the applicationof the Baconianmethodto humanphenomena Moreover,accordingto to be advocatingtraditionalpsychologism.l4 since it prevents raisingproblemsis dangerous Baconianinductivism should Hence inductivists one from observingfacts indiscriminately. not bother about how the general theory of human nature would media), nor need they explain the less generaltheories(the axiomata The social institutions. bother about how it svouldexplainundesired faith in the possibilityof adducingmore and more general theories from observedfacts reassuresone that the most general theory of 258

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human naturewill ultimatelyappearand that then all will be quite clear.The only troublewith this faith is that it is based on logical errors. The third suggestionis Max Weber's individualisticideal type that we shoulddescribethe averageor approach.It is the suggestion typical memberof a given society or social group by attributingto (or preand by tryingto explain typicalsocialcharacteristics him some (especiallythe dict) his having other typical social characteristics of his rationalor purposeful consequence3 ones)as the unintended undesired in his typicalenvironment. behaviour Weberand his followershave succeededin applyinghis approach whichare open theories alongits lillesinteresting producing fruitfully, be viewedas a devulgarized may approach Weber's to criticalargument. Hence, at least one versionof psychoversionof vulgarpsychologism. two pointsin thisconnexion. I wishto stress HowesZer, logismis fruitful. seemsto be that it is an of his approach Weber'sown appraisal Firstn not of vulgar psychoimprovedversionof traditionalpsychologism, in its being applicable is defective logism.SecondlyWeber'sapproach only to a narrowrangeof problems. As to the first point, it explainsthe fullctionof Weber'srepulsive to this theorythe originof any ideal According theoryof the chartsma. type is a historicalindividual who had strong magical hypnotic is Weber'sterm for these powers)which he used powers('charisma' to imitate him. Now in orderto force his friendsand acquaintances this theory seems to be a historicalexplanationof the diversityof to humannaturealone it is societies(or of ideal types)by reference myth of the socialcontract. yet anotherversionof the methodological to according is not individualistic: But Weber'stheoryof the charisma rationalor it the rise of the ideal type is not a resultof individuals' behaviourbut of their being hypnotized.Moreover,the purposeful theorv: in the sameway as the conspiracy theoryis criticizable charisma (like conspiracy)is a (small) part of social life, although chartsma theory(like the conspiracytheory)is no explanationas the charisma yet. we remainwith two other IgnoringWeber'smyth of the charzsma, alternativeways of interpretingWeber's individualisticideal type versionof vulgar The one way is to view it as an improved approach. and the otheris to view it as a versionof institutionalism. psychologism of Weber'sapproach interpretation Accordingto the institutionalist to the ideal may be attributed characteristics only the institutionalized approachthereis no basis type, while accordingto the psychologistic and the uninstitutionalbetweenthe institutionalized forthe distinction of the membersof the society in question.Since ized characteristics of the ideal trpe is that they the wholepoint about the characteristics persist,one can clearlysee that the applicationof Weber'sapproach
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will be moresuccessful and interesting if we attributeto the ideal type only institutionalcharacteristics. This is what Watkins makes of Weber'stheory.He emphasizesl5
that the personality of a man in societycomprises dispositions both of a more private and temperamental kind, and of a more public and institutional kind. Only certainindividuals are disposedto weep during the death-scene in Othello,but all policemenare disposedto blow theirwhistles,undercertain circumstarlces, and any Speakerin the Houseof Commons is disposed to disallowparliamentary criticism of exercises of the Prerogative. And these more public and institutional dispositions, which may vary very little when one man undertakes another'srole, can be abstracted fromthe total, variegated flux of dispositions, and so provide the social scientistwith a fairly stablesubject-matter.

Now I fullyagreewith thiskeenobservation of Watkins', but I have to stressthat though it is a fair and commonsensical commenton Weber'sapproach,it is not a part of it. The commentexplainswhy this approach was successful; but thosewho apply this approach need not know why it is successfuland thereforethey have no need to mention institutions even though the characteristics which they attribute to theirideal typeshappento be institutional. The advantage of speaking of (institutional) characteristics of the ideal type,insteadof speakingof institutions(and of institutionalroles) proper is rather plain:thismodeof speaking evadesthe problemof whether institutions exist (I(a)), and, if they exist, whetherthey have disnct aims and interestsof their own (4). In other words, the whole advantageof Weber'sapproachis that it cen be viewed as psychologistic andit can be viewedas institutionalistic. For thosewho ha?e defidedupon these issues,this advantageof Weber?s approachdisap?ears, while its disadvantages,the great limitations upon its range of applicability, remain.Briefly,they are these. As Watkins haspointedout,Weber's approach allowsone to attribute to the typicalindividualonly public and institutional characteristics, so that it does not enableus to explainsatisfactorily effiects of detailed characteristics of one prominent individualand other detailedevents of (social)history:Weber'sapproachties us too much to the typical. This, it seemsquite obvious,leads to furtherand much more serious limitations. Weber's approach leaves no room for sociologically significantyet untypical characteristics (such as the more abstract institutions which leave no markon any typicalindividual)and the untypicalcasesof specificand uniqueinstitutional reforms.ls At most it allowsone to assume(withoutdebate)changeswhichconstitute the emergenceof a new society (i.e. of ness ideal types). It allosssus to explainsocialevilsas unintended consequences of purposeful behaviour, but it does not allonsroomfor purposeful institutional reform.Consequentlyit is inapplicable even to the case of the typical reformer of
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institutions.And all this is in exchangefor not having to mention nstltutlons exp lcltU y Weber'sapproachis on the borderline betweenpsychologism and institutionalism. At mostit can be made to appearpsychologistic. But we need not insiston thispoint. Evenif it werepsychologistic it would not renderpsychologism a satisfactory programme. It seemsincredible that intendedsocialreform-quite a commonplace in Weber'sdayscould not in his time be placed satisfactorily in any methodological framework. The reasonfor this, I suggest,is the universaland tacit acceptanceof the proposition(4) that if institutionsexist, they are thingswithindependent aims,interests and destinies. Weber's approach was certainlythe best at the time when the tacit acceptanceof this propositioncaused a confusiollbetween individualismand psychologism;it is betterto evadea confusion than to succumbto it; but it is still betterto clearit and to identifythe errorupon whichit is based.
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IV In this sectionI shall try to defendinstitutionalist-individualism by showingthat it does not sufferfrom the centraldifficulties which the two traditional approaches encounter. The main problemsfor holistsconcernsthe relationsbetween the socialaimsand the aimsof individuals. Since,according to institutionalist-individualism, social aims do not exist, it does not raise these problems.The main difficultyof psychologism stems from the impossibilityof explainingdifferentsocial set-upspsychologically. Admittinginstitutions as an elementin sociological explanation, institutionalist-individualism does not encounterthis difficulty. I shall now briefly argue that the two traditional approachesdo not enable us to explain intendedinstitutionalreform,and they do not even enableus to explainthe absenceof reform.lv It is obviousfromgeneralconsiderations that conscious institutional reformcannot be explainedalong eitherof the two traditionallines. For, accordingto holism, any change of an institutionis a natural change be it growth or decay and according to psychologistic individualism institutional reformis but the unintendedconsequence of rationalor purposeful action(sinceinstitutions as suchdo not exist). No doubt thereis much truthin each of these descriptions, or rather in their combination. 'Only a minorityof social institutions are consciouslydesigned,'writesPopper(Open SocieZy5 ii, 93), 'while the vast majority havejust "grown" as the undesigned results of humanactions . . . and we can add that even mostof the successfully designed. . . do not turn out accordingto plan . . .' Yet very many institutions are consciously designed, and for certaindefinitepurposes; and thisis inexplicablealongthe traditional lines. Moreover, as almostall institutions
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may act as a constrainton some personsin some instances,they to induce thesepersonsto attemptto reformthem. are always-prone ssouldbe costlyand lead to In casesin whichit is obviousthat reform little benefit,one would hardlyraisethe questionof reform;and yet, obviousas the answerto it may be, as long as the questionof reform is not quite on the traditional is not a prtori ruled out, our discussion lines. Let us take an exampleof how an obviouscase of the absenceof becauseholismleavesno roomto discuss reformleads to mystification Durkheim's idea that lawLet us consider even the absenceof reform. breakers serve society by remindingits membersof the existenceof idea seemsto be highly the laws which they break.This functionalist to becauseit seemsto be the resultof a determination unsatisfactory, towardssocial cohesion explain any event as one which contributes And yet somehowone tends in the face of schismsand disintegration. idea thanjust this. To my to admit that thereis more to Durkheim's surpriseI found that some studentsof sociologyare still unable to idea. It is, of course, elementin Durkheim's statesimplythe reasonable and that when may be usedas a deterrent; the truismthat punishment the law. Butthisis by no means deterrent it strengthens it is a successful of a specificcaseof a a full explanation the case.Therefore, universally the law has to be which strengthens crimefollowedby a punishment of the followingfacts:that the law was broken(rather an explanation than universallyobserved);that the criminalwas punished (rather ent acted as a and that the punishm than ignored or resvarded); deterrent(and was neitherignorednor opposedby the public). Parts thattheyarenotstatedexplicitly; areoftenso obvious of theexplanation in a holisticfashionthesepartsare is restated but whilethe explanation silentlyomitted. To take anotherexample,sve know that thereexist no public teleof this simpleexplanation in Moscow.The following phonedirectories the fact may be trueor falsebut it is quite open to rationalargument: will be used by prospective fear that telephonedirectories authorities in order to communicateand reformers('counter^revolutionaries') of the organizea reformmovement.The unintendedconsequences behaviourare very interesting,especiallyfor those who authorities' wish to know undersvhatconditionssuch highly centralizedcontrol collapseof the socialsystem.Thus,ourexplanawill lead to a complete for iion of this societyand its abilityor inabilityto remainunaltered of possiblechangesand prospeccontainsa discussion long necessarily tlve retormers. (in all of psychologism svillshowthe inadequacy The sameexamples it (at least again. What distinguishes its versions).Take punishment societies)from personalrevengeis, accordingto some in democratic the consentwhichthejudge'snormsreceive of psychologism, adherents
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from many individuals.This explanationis refuted by any case of which comes after public demandfor reformof the law punishment is basedbut beforethe reformis imple upon which that punishment may now try to modify his mented. The adherentof psychologism theory,but he will have to modifyit while takingaccountof the situation in svhich the refutinginstance has occurred,thus risking his altogether.This point will be more obviouswhen we psychologism take our second example of stringentcentral control over all the citizens'aciivities. of sucha centralcontrolis the mosteloquentevidence, The existence the citizenssubject if evidenceis wanted,for the view that personally to it are highly disposedto reform,and yet it is the (institutional) personally Thus, although controlwhichmakesreformless practicable. are by and largemoredisposedto reformthan nowadays Hungarians to reformthan Hungary. is moredisposed institutionally Britain Britons, will tempt a Adttedly the increaseof individualpeople'sdiscontent rebel in Hungaryto act, but his action, his attempt to prospective institutionalize this discontent,is psychologisticallyinexplicable. of the fact that success blocksthe way to the explanation Psychologism the existingdisand co-ordinating expressing in creatinginstitutions towardsit. step major a or revolution successful a constitutes content view inof psychologism some adherents Admittingsuch criticisms, simulthe as but attitudes new of spread as the not reforms siitutional caused are which decisions individuals' many of occurrences taneous by the spread of the new attitudes. This view is nothing but the of the leavesno roomfor the explanation that psychologism admission fashion. co-ordinated a in act to choose individuals that fact will claim, perhaps,that the boot is The adherentof psychologism exists,but he will co-ordination that admit will He foot. on the other not takeit for and (psychologically) co-ordination this want to exp]ain would. This retortis not void of subgrantedas the institutionalist does allow one to take the existinginstitustance,for institutionalism for granted.Yet ultimatelythe retortis basedon tionalco-ordinations programmeis neither to assume the an error. The institutionalist to explainall of them,but ratherto nor co-ordinations all existenceof in orderto explain the existence co-ordination of some existence the assume to assumethat the only satiserror an is It co-ordinations. of some other whichsay nothing assumptions by is of institutions explanation factory if it werepossible, explanation, an such Admittedly institutions. about wouldbe highlydesirable(as it wouldbe simplerand thus moreopen to criiical argument).But there exists a very obviousreasonwhich It is whatI wouldcall suchexplanation. to produce makesit impossible and it is this.Howreform', of institutional rationalprinciple 'Popper's are a prospective ever bad the existing institutionalco-ordinations will try his best to makeuse of themin his attemptto reform reformer 263

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them or to abolishthem. Therefore, the existingsocial co-ordinaiions will constitutean importantfactor in determiningthe rational or purposeful behaviourof the prospective reformer, in determining the likelihoodof success,the cost of the reform,and the expectedbenefit fromit. In my previous two sectionsI have triedto arguethat all reasonable explanations within the holisticand psychologistic frameworks can be formulated within Popper'sinstitutionalist-individualist methodology -situational logic.In the present sectionI havegonefurther andstated that almost all reasonableexplanationsof social phenomena,when fullystated,cannotbe fittedinto the previous frameworks but can be fittedinto situational logic. In brief,almostall serioussocial thinkers have employedsituationallogic even though Popperwas the first to formulate it. This last assertion of mine may be true or false,but it is certainlyno moreinconsistent than the widelyacceptedasseriion that Euclidusedrulesof mathematical logic (like reductio ad absurdum) long beforemathematical logiciansformulated them. I should even stress that adherents of psychologism were often ardentreformers of social institutions, just as Aristotleoften used inferences which cannotform part of his logic. Althoughthe employment of situational logic is not new, its formulation is. And it formsa great advancerelativeto the untenable holisticscheme andthe untenable psychologistic scheme,and even relativeto WeberXs acceptablethough narrowschemeof individualistic ideal type.
V

This sectionconcernsthe natureof societyand social and political instituiions as such, and is thereforemetaphysical.According to holism societyis a super-individual; according to psychologistic individualism societyis the sum-total of individuals' interactions; according to institutionalistic-individualism societyis the conventional means of co-ordination between individualactions.This last vies is knownas contractualism or con* v

ventlonallsm.

A defenceof any view must constitutein answeringthe criticism launchedagainstthis viess and in showingthat it is preferable to all the existingalternatives to it. More one cannot do, for it is always possible that futurecriticism will showthe unacceptability of that view and futurethinkingmight bringaboutbetteralternatives. In accordance sviththis attitude,I shallnoss try to discussthe criticism of conventionalism or contractualism and then arguethat it is preferable to holismand to psychologism. Thereexisttsvoobjections to conventionalism or contractualism: the one is that the conventionor contractwas neversigned;the other is 264

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that while one may contractout of a conventionor a contractone cannot contractout of society. The first objectionis slight: convenneed not entail the view that a contract tionalismor contractualism giveshis implicitconsentto an existing was ever signed;an individual contractevery time that he acts in accordancewith it, even while attemptingto abolishit. No one ever stops any individualfrom conof the secondobjection Here proposers tractingout of any convention. (like Adam Smith) will point out that such people as policemenand magistrates see to it that no individualcontractsout of the existing But this are not contracts. institutions institutions, and that therefore an individual cannotdo is to forceotherindividuals, is an error.\%lhat The lawpolicemenor no policemen,to contractout of a convention. out; a law, contracts breaker is the personwho, by the act of breaking in his societydo not contractout they will try if the otherindividuals to catch and punish him in accordancewith the laws (namely the conventions) vllich they adopt; if they contractout as well, he will not be punished,and that is all thereis to it. Undoubtedly,any individual'sdecision as to whether or not to contractout of any given conventionmay dependon the questionof are temptedto contractout shetheror not he thinksotherindividuals not only when actionsare co-ordinated, as well. This is how individual but also when (as the unintended they conformto a given convention conseqllence of existingconventionor as the resultof the development of new ideas) they are highly disposed towardsaccepting a new convention or towards abolishing or reformingan existing convention. seem to have missed is that What the critics of conventionalism althoughone person'scontractingout of an institutiondependson other people's choice, it is, ultimately,his own choice. Moreover, they seem to have missedthe point that when one choosesto act one underwhichone acts.Choiceis like the conditions doesnot necessarily choose the lesserevil. Why anii and the aim is to oftenbetweenevils, an objection tyranny as stronger wiew the abidance by conventionalists I do to die on the barricades than the willingness to conventionalism are- to me at any ratenot know. Both of thesekindsof behaviour I think,allowsfor profoundly puzzling.And yet only conventionalism, view amountto both of them; the holisticview andthe psychologistic them. givingup hope ever to understand which they conhave often claimedthat conventions Totalitarians whilethose tractedout of srere'merepiecesof paper'or merecustoms, which suited them were 'real'. The plain fact is that all conventions to abideby it any are 'merepiecesof paper'-that withoutagreement institutionis void. (Otherwisethese tyrants' propagandamachines Thiswasknownalreadyto Hume wouldhavebeenquiteunnecessary.) by and Rousseau(see above,p. 953), and was merelysmoke-screened 265

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holistic propaganda.And yet this holistic propagandacontains a strongpoint whichis this. Althoughany convention may in principlebe discarded, peopledo want to havesomeconventions; it is betterto havealmostany law and order (i.e. conventional co-ordination) than to have none. This antianarchisticcontentioncan be used in order to explain rationally people'sabidanceby tyrannywithoutthereby justifyingtyranny.For it is a poorjustification of a systemthatit is preferable only to complete disorder. Realizingthis,most of thosewho are subjectto tyranny will try to reformit. Admittedly somepeopleaccepttyrannybecausetheir illusionthat it is government by forceratherthan by convention leads them to expectfromit more securityor more efficiency. Admittedly, some people accept tyrannybecausethey beneStfromit, or hope to benefit from it, and some people accept tyrannyjust becausethey admiretyrants.But most people,I contend,abide by tyrannymerely becausethey see no otherway of keepingalive and may wait for the firstopportunity to organizeand overthrow it. And a significant part of this attitude is people'srealizationof the bitter truth that even tyranny may be preferableto total disorder.This realizationmay sometimes be the productof revolutions whichlead to disorder. Thus we can explain the strangehistoryof battles againsttyrannywhich ended by establishing much worsetyrannies, such as the Frenchand Russianterrors: tyranny is sometimes toleratedbecausepeoplerealize that they have no idea of how to overthross successfully the tyranny ratherthan the tyrant.Here people'sopinionsenteras a majorfactor in the socialsituation; but they enternot so muchas personal opinion but ratheras institutional or public opinion (be it scientificor not). Of course, tyranny is not always better than total disorder.The realizationthat an existingtyrannyis worse than disorder, however, may even lead to suicidalrevoltslike the WarsawGhetto Uprising. And in any casesuchraretyrannies lead to statesof affairs in whichthe relationbetweenmasters and oppressed is that of government by brute force. Such relations,not being institutional at all, do not enter the presentdlscusslon. The holisticview explainsthe existenceof institutions whichno one desires, by the suggestion thattheseinstitutions servesocietyas a whole. But holismmissesthe problemto be solved,which is not what is the functionof these institutions, but ratherwhy do people accept them againsttheirsvill?ls Evenif an institution is usefulto society,evenif it is usefulto everybody,the puzzle remains:hy do people abide by it svhiledesiringto overthrow it? The holisticview cannotbe disproved, but one can show that it explainsnothingat all, that it may lead to historicism and dogmatism, and that it may lead to an unacceptable moraloutlook. The psychologistic view explainsthe changesof socialorganizations 266
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by changesin people'ssituationsand attitudes.There is truthin this explanation,but there are two arguments againstthe view that this is the wholeexplanation. First,individuals' attitudesconcernnot only individuals but alsotheirsocialorganization. Societyis not a pointillist picture just because people's aims happen to be co-ordinatedby nature;societyis a picturebecausepeoplewant it to be one, because people are readyto changetheir attitudes,in a give-and-take fashion or by a civil war, but in orderto createor to alterthisor that picture. The second argumentis this. Institutionsare not just the reflection of the psychology of the majority of theirparticipants. (Two identical groupsof individualsin identicalsurroundings, but with somewhat different conventions or rulesof behaviour, will developverydifferently fromeach othernot only sociallybut also psychologically.) As Russell said,l9'institutions mould character and character transforms institutions.Reformin both mustmarchhandin hand'. Beforeconcluding this sectionI wish to draw attentionto an interestingscientifictheorywhich incorporates the conventionalist or contractualist assumption whichI have described above.It is NI.Banton's view concerning the problemof racialprejudices in Britain(White and Coloured, I 959). The traditional psychological approach to racerelations is inapplicable here wherethe rapidemergence of a colouredsection in British societyhas createdthe problem beforewidespread prejudices and emotionalattitudescould emerge.(The uselessness of holismhere need hardly be mentioned.)An importantingredientin Banton's explanation is the assumption that this rapidemergence of a coloured sectionin British societyhas causeda serious gap in the body of social conventions which had somehowto be closedratherquickly,particularly becausethe Britishsocietyis highly conventionalized. I cannot discussBanton's interesting theoryhere;I mentionit as an exampleof the application of conventionalism in proposing a specificsociological explanation. To concludethis sectionI shall repeatthat institutions can be explainedas inter-personal meansof co-ordination, as attitudes whichare acceptedconventionally or by agreement. Not that an agreement was signedby thosewho have the attitude,but the attitudeis maintained by one largelybecauseit is maintainedby many,and yet everyoneis alwaysat liberty to reconsider his attitudeand change it. This idea leaves room for the rational principle of institutionalreform (see above, p. 263). It accordswith the classicalindividualistic idea that socialphenomena are but the interactions betweenindividuals. Yet it does not accord with the classicalindividualistic-psychologistic idea that thisinteraction depends on individuals' aimsand material circumstancesalone;ratherit adds to thesefactorsof interaction the existing inter-personal meansof co-ordination as well as individuals' abilityto use, reform,or abolishthem,on theirown decisionand responsibility. 267

of moralizing programme thispointwe haveto go overto Popper's At to his idea that the task ratherthan politicizingmorals,and politics the planning not of the ideal socialand political philosophyis ones. But at this point I shall of but of the reformof the existing society my discussion. close
part of and ings is, of course,an irrational An earlierversionof sectionsIII 1 Marxism. contemporary to the in ofthe presentessay was read V E. Gellner, 'Time and Theory 5 LXVII, Mind, of E. Gellnerand T. Bottomore seminar Anthropology', Social early I should make it theLondonSchoolof Economics at I958, I82-202. ApriJ, I section of version of functionearlier An sketch my I958. in that clear quite to the A slightly the present essay was read over-simplified. of greatly is alism Sociology for allows School of Economics' formulation London adequate more on Gellner, E. by with resolved debate a be in can Club which conflicts 4, I958; and a subsequent (by ceremony,resigDecember means institutional in was also read to the Theoretical version etc.) . Yet this forrnulation nation, StudyGroup I Sociology which problems Comparative and many raises turn on Association to like only Sociological should British I the of enter into. cannot I am gratefulto my I6, I958. December that it renders functionalism mention Gellner, E. Mr. Mr. P. Cohen, wife, metaphysical, for we can more yet of E. Goodman,WIr.K. Klappholz, hIr. hope to find the method always W. N. J. Mr. does and it if MacRae G. D. NIr. of a conflict-even resolution for reading the MS. in its in a senseit renders \Vatkins exist. Moreover, not suggesvaluable for trivial. For its stages and entirely various functionalism and reinstitutional any tions. that claims is character' hardly be 'metaphysical will term 2 The conflict (others peated to of the societvin used in Popper'ssense, namely members here the by noticed irrefutabilityand lack of exdenote muchlessby theanthropologist) question, to power. The proposal by planatory or later lead to the institusooner will aims to societiesis labelled In attribute of some remediesfor it, at tionalization collectivism'. 'methodological sense that people will Popper same the in least I prefer to use it (or elseperish). with thispaper, hosZesrer, living to used his term 'holism' get same criticism terminology: the made Gellner's has Gellner '(methodowith Popper's synonyrnous is differently: to assert that someurhat existsin a collectivism'. of co-ordination logical) of indisZidual somemethod from tradition folloss even and 3 FortheJesrish trivial, is while the collectise see society tossrards 'society'; srord the of responsibility meaning Social His- the exists my'Jacob Katz on Jewishof to assert that full co-ordination Sociology, ournal view which ex3ewish untenable tory' the to leads especichange.Thus, Elol.I, No. 2, December, I959, any ('endogenous') such a cludes or dogtrivial either is ally p. 264. The existence of there functionalism that viesZs the refutes tradition and matic. svhichare instituexist only tz o kinds of morality inThereexistconflicts philosophy social or relations befeuds, e.g. that a collectivist tionalized, morality. forcesits Functionalism variablyleads to a collectivist in-lasvs. conmeans >hat is t+veen to view institutionalized 4 If 'long-run' here adherents economic in term this co-ordination by social meant of usually find con- flicts as means conflicts.This literature,one can obviously of and as meansof resolving interests 'long-run' his ingenious to flicts between the EsZans-Pritchard 'long-run' led co-ordination of means as differentworkers.B'hen the feuds view of the differentlinehowever,is simplythe (distinct) betveen interest, cohesion or theory of the classas a srholethe be- ages or clans or tribes. \ et this vies interest interests apologetic, and, of the identity of workers' as trite. sounds dangerously it seems philosophers some comes metaphysical as well for the two mean- indeed, The vacillationbetssreen
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to have becomea mysticaldogma. It is probIemspresent at each stage of the by far preferable, I think, to view feuds development of his views,but had never merely as means of protection,and to fullyetorked out hismethodology as such. view the rest of what anthropologists Thus one can see in his Totem andEaboo may call their function as their unin- how his psychologism driveshim to the tended consequences.For such conse- methodological myth of the social conquencesmay be undesirable and lead to tract which he consciouslyacceptsreform. Alternatively,the feud system and how, as soonas he relatedthe myth, may become unnecessarywhen some he becomesmoreand moreawareof the reform leads to a better method of emergentproblemof the persistcnce of protection, and the undesired conse- the contract.And yet, on the whole, as quences of that reform may be the his individualism drove him to psychovanishingof the desirableconsequences logismandashispsychologism drovehim of thefeudsystemwhichEvans-Pritchard to collectivism,ultimately he was left and Gluckman have discovered. with an inconsistent methodology. As to ff The origin of Bacon's theory of his mass-psyche theory,its metaphysical knowledge seemsto be rootedin political character was made manifest by the theory.See Popper'sOpen Society, ch. 9, development, through his own teachon 'canvascleaning'. ings, of social (educational) reforms 7 Psychologism is still takenforgranted which led to the rise of societiesmuch by most writers on the problem of less guilt-ridden than his own. knowledge. Popper's institutionalism 13 The conspiracy theory of society stemsfromhis theoryof knowledge in a has holisticversions; it is, historically, of strange parallel to psychologism.See a lo lStlC Orlgln. his Logicof Scientific Discovery, sections8 14 Durkheim, who was an inductivist, and 27. escapedthis conclusion by claimingthat 8 'The Strange Face of Evil', The social *sholesare observable. This was Lsstener, September30, I954, Vol. 52, pointed out by F. A. Hayek in his The Cotxnter-Revolution of Science. Pp 522-3. 9 L. Pearce Williams, 'The Politics l6'Ideal Types in Historical Explanaof Science in the French Revolution', tion', TheBritish Journalfor thePhilosophy PaperTen, Critical Problems in theHistory of Science, 3, 9, I952, p. 40, reprinted in the Philosophy of Science, of Sc?ence, Ed. MarshallClagett,Univer- in Readings sity of Wisconsin Press,Madison,I 959. edited by H. Feige and M. Brodbeck, 10'Explanationsin History', Proceed- N.Y., I953, p. 74Ie ings of the Aristotelian Society,Supp. lff Mr. Watkinshas drawn my attenvol. 30, I956. Reprintedin Eheories of tion to the followingremarkof Talcott Parsons, in his edition of Max Weber's Hastory,ed. Patrick Gardiner, I 959. of Social andEconom* OrganizaSee also his Reply to Mr. Watkins, TheTheory printedat the very end of that volume. tion(I947), which is appendedto a note 11Historismshould not be confused by Weber referring to an intended with its near relative historicism:his- chapteron revolutions(p. 354 n.): 'no torism explains a phenomenon as a systematic account of revolutions is result of a chain of events in the past available . . . in Weber's published noted that and historicism as a link between past works'.It seernsthat Parsons and future events, as taking its place althoughWeber was very interestedin in the present according to History's socialchanges,he rarelydiscussed them, timetable. Historism should not be being methodologically handicapped; viewed as wholly or mainly a part of cp. ibid., p. 24. Parsonsis in favour of psychologisticindividualism:its main using more boldly holistic ideas where exponents belongto thePlatonic(holistic) Weber's individualistic ideas are inapplicable. tradition. 12 It should be noted that Freud's 17 This point was first made by famous theory of mass-psyche(end of Watkinsin his 'HistoricalExplanation Totem andTaboo) is an attemptto explain in the Social Sciences', The British for thePhilosophy of Science, 7, 30, the persistenceof the (Oedipus)guilt- Journal of feelingwhich he explainshistorically by I957, p. II2 n., reprintedin Theories ed. PatrickGardiner,I959, pp. assuming an event of a collectivefather- History, killing. It is remarkable that Freudwas 509-IO n fully conscious of the methodological 18 rn order to explain why people
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accept an institutionagainst their will Gellner claims that nowadaysnobody one may endorseone of the following takesthis view seriously.I, on the conFirst, experiencetrans- trary,maintainthat most holistssooner terosuggestions. mitted by traditionshowsthe dangerof or later assumeimplicitlythe existence which embracesboth abolishingthem. This is an indisridualist of a group-spirit solutionwhich makesholism redundant the social itlterest and the vehiele (see Popper's 'Towards a Rational which carries the wisdom of abiding Theor> of Tradition', The Rationalist by the (undesired)institutionswhich Secondly,one may postu- serveit. I949). iInnual, Reflections FromMemory, late the existenceof socialsub-conscious- 19Portraits ness or mass-psyche or group-spirit. on my EightiethBirthday. Schoolof Economics London andPoliticalScience