G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915 FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and S !"AR AI , plaintiffs-appellees, vs. #A$!S #. RAFF!

R %, Co&&ec'or o( In'erna& Re)en*e, defendant-appellant. Attorney-General Avancea for appellant. Aitken and DeSelms for appellees.

R!N , J.: The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of ct !o. "##$, effective %uly 1, 1$1&, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight' and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action. This case divides itself into t(o parts and gives rise to t(o main )uestions' (1) that relating to the po(er of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (") that relating to the validity of those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of ct !o. "##$, conferring po(er upon the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is other(ise a nuisance. The first )uestion is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the -overnment. The sections of ct !o. "##$, (hich bear directly upon the subject, are 1#$ and 1&0. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax' the second provides a remedy for any (rong in connection (ith such taxes, and this remedy (as intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by injunction, (hich remedy is claimed to be constitutional. The t(o sections, then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of any tax or to determine any other )uestion connected there(ith, and the )uestion (hether the remedy by injunction is exceptional. .reventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history of the (rit of injunction sho( that it has al(ays been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as distinguished from the common course of the la( to redress evils after they have been consummated. !o injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and (hen there is no ade)uate remedy at la(. The -overnment does, by section 1#$ and 1&0, ta/e a(ay the preventive remedy of injunction, if it ever existed, and leaves the taxpayer, in a contest (ith it, the same ordinary remedial actions (hich prevail bet(een citi0en and citi0en. The ttorney-eneral, on behalf of the defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the paramount la( (hich prohibits such a course. 1hile, on the other hand, counsel for plaintiffs urge that the t(o sections are unconstitutional because (a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved taxpayers of all substantial remedy for the protection of their property, thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property (ithout due process of la(, and (b) they attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them by cts !os. 1#2 and 1$0, (hich jurisdiction (as ratified and confirmed by the ct of *ongress of %uly 1, 1$0".

+n the first place, it has been suggested that section 1#$ does not apply to the tax in )uestion because the section, in spea/ing of a 3tax,3 means only legal taxes' and that an illegal tax (the one complained of) is not a tax, and, therefore, does not fall (ithin the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained by injunction. There is no force in this suggestion. The inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes imposes, or authori0ed to be imposed, by ct !o. "##$. (4nyder vs. 5ar/s, 10$ 6.4., 17$.) nd, furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the la(, by virtue of (hich it is imposed, is unconstitutional, does not authori0e a court of e)uity to restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further sho(ing that there are special circumstances (hich bring the case under some (ell recogni0ed head of e)uity jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate (ill result, and also that there is, as (e have indicated, no ade)uate remedy at la(. This is the settled la( in the 6nited 4tates, even in the absence of statutory enactments such as sections 1#$ and 1&0. (8anne(in/le vs. 5ayor, etc., of -eorgeto(n, 7" 6.4., 9&:' +ndiana 5fg. *o. vs. ;oehne, 177 6.4., 271' <hio Tax cases, "#" 6. 4., 9:2, 97:' .ittsburgh *. *. = 4t. >. ,. *o. vs. ?oard of .ublic 1or/s, 1:" 6. 4., #"' 4helton vs..lat, 1#$ 6.4., 9$1' 4tate ,ailroad Tax *ases, $" 6. 4., 9:9.) Therefore, this branch of the case must be controlled by sections 1#$ and 1&0, unless the same be held unconstitutional, and conse)uently, null and void. The right and po(er of judicial tribunals to declare (hether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has al(ays been considered a grave responsibility, as (ell as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to )uestions involving the interpretation and application of the *onstitution, and approach constitutional )uestions (ith great deliberation, exercising their po(er in this respect (ith the greatest possible caution and even reluctance' and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the *onstitution of the 6nited 4tates, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute (ith the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the (isdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by (hich any la( is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is sho(n beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case (ill the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a la( is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. (2 ,uling *ase >a(, secs. :1, :", and :#, and cases cited therein.) +t is also the settled la( in the 6nited 4tates that 3due process of la(3 does not al(ays re)uire, in respect to the -overnment, the same process that is re)uired bet(een citi0ens, though it generally implies and includes regular allegations, opportunity to ans(er, and a trial according to some (ell settled course of judicial proceedings. The case (ith (hich (e are dealing is in point. citi0en@s property, both real and personal, may be ta/en, and usually is ta/en, by the government in payment of its taxes (ithout any judicial proceedings (hatever. +n this country, as (ell as in the 6nited 4tates, the officer charged (ith the collection of taxes is authori0ed to sei0e and sell the property of delin)uent taxpayers (ithout applying to the courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the la( authori0ing this procedure never has been seriously )uestioned. (*ity of .hiladelphia vs. ABiehlC The *ollector, 9 1all., :"0' !icholl vs. 6.4., : 1all., 1"", and cases cited.) This must necessarily be the course, because it is upon taxation that the -overnment chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations, and it is of the utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of the taxes levied should be summary and interfered (ith as little as possible. !o government could exist if every litigious man (ere permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This principle of public policy must be constantly borne in mind in determining cases such as the one under consideration. 1ith these principles to guide us, (e (ill proceed to in)uire (hether there is any merit in the t(o propositions insisted upon by counsel for the plaintiffs. 4ection 9 of the .hilippine ?ill providesD 3That

no la( shall be enacted in said +slands (hich shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property (ithout due process of la(, or deny to any person therein the e)ual protection of the la(.3 The origin and history of these provisions are (ell-/no(n. They are found in substance in the *onstitution of the 6nited 4tates and in that of ever state in the 6nion. 4ection #""& of the ,evised 4tatutes of the 6nited 4tates, effective since 172:, provides thatD 3!o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.3 4ection 1#$, (ith (hich (e have been dealing, readsD 3!o court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any internal-revenue tax.3 comparison of these t(o sections sho(s that they are essentially the same. ?oth expressly prohibit the restraining of taxes by injunction. +f the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates has clearly and definitely held that the provisions of section #""& do not violate the 3due process of la(3 and 3e)ual protection of the la(3 clauses in the *onstitution, (e (ould be going too far to hold that section 1#$ violates those same provisions in the .hilippine ?ill. That the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates has so held, cannot be doubted. +n *heatham vs. 6nited 4tates ($" 6.4., 79,7$) (hich involved the validity of an income tax levied by an act of *ongress prior to the one in issue in the case of .olloc/ vs. Earmers@ >oan = Trust *o. (19: 6.4., &"$) the court, through 5r. %ustice 5iller, saidD 3+f there existed in the courts, state or !ational, any general po(er of impeding or controlling the collection of taxes, or relieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very existence of the government might be placed in the po(er of a hostile judiciary. (Bo(s vs. The *ity of *hicago, 11 1all., 107.) 1hile a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allo(ed (ithin the departments before the money is finally exacted, the -eneral -overnment has (isely made the payment of the tax claimed, (hether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against (hom the tax is assessed. +n the internal revenue branch it has further prescribed that no such suit shall be brought until the remedy by appeal has been tried' and, if brought after this, it must be (ithin six months after the decision on the appeal. 1e regard this as a condition on (hich alone the government consents to litigate the la(fulness of the original tax. +t is not a hard condition. Ee( governments have conceded such a right on any condition. +f the compliance (ith this condition re)uires the party aggrieved to pay the money, he must do it.3 gain, in 4tate ,ailroad Tax *ases ($" 6.4., 9:9, 21#), the court saidD 3That there might be no misunderstanding of the universality of this principle, it (as expressly enacted, in 172:, that 3no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.3 (,ev, 4tat., sec. #""&.) nd though this (as intended to apply alone to taxes levied by the 6nited 4tates, it sho(s the sense of *ongress of the evils to be feared if courts of justice could, in any case, interfere (ith the process of collecting taxes on (hich the government depends for its continued existence. +t is a (ise policy. +t is founded in the simple philosophy derived from the experience of ages, that the payment of taxes has to be enforced by summary and stringent means against a reluctant and often adverse sentiment' and to do this successfully, other instrumentalities and other modes of procedure are necessary, than those (hich belong to courts of justice.3 nd again, in 4nyder vs. 5ar/s (10$ 6.4., 17$), the court saidD 3The remedy of a suit to recover bac/ the tax after it is paid is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The remedy so given is exclusive, and no other remedy can be substituted for it. 4uch has been the current of decisions in the *ircuit *ourts of the 6nited 4tates, and (e are satisfied it is a correct vie( of the la(.3
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+n the consideration of the plaintiffs@ second proposition, (e (ill attempt to sho( (1) that the .hilippine courts never have had, since the merican occupation, the po(er to restrain by injunction the collection of any tax imposed by the +nsular -overnment for its o(n purpose and benefit, and (") that assuming that our courts had or have such po(er, this po(er has not been diminished or curtailed by sections 1#$ and 1&0. 1e (ill first revie( briefly the former and present systems of taxation. 6pon the merican occupation of the .hilippine, there (as found a fairly complete system of taxation. This system (as continued in force by the military authorities, (ith but fe( changes, until the *ivil -overnment assumed charge of the subject. The principal sources of revenue under the 4panish regime (ere derived from customs receipts, the so-called industrial taxes, the urbana taxes, the stamp tax, the personal cedula tax, and the sale of the public domain. The industrial and urbana taxes constituted practically an income tax of some 9 per cent on the net income of persons engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits and on the income of o(ners of improved city property. The sale of stamped paper and adhesive stamp tax. The cedula tax (as a graduated tax, ranging from nothing up to .#:.90. The revenue derived from the sale of the public domain (as not considered a tax. The merican authorities at once abolished the cedula tax, but later restored it in a modified form, charging for each cedula t(enty centavos, an amount (hich (as supposed to be just sufficient to cover the cost of issuance. The urbana tax (as abolished by ct !o. ""#, effective 4eptember 2, 1$01. The 35unicipal *ode3 ( ct !o. 7") and the .rovincial -overnment ct (!o. 7#), both enacted in 1$01, authori0e municipal councils and provincial boards to impose an ad valorem tax on real estate. The 5unicipal *ode did not apply to the city of 5anila. This city (as given a special charter ( ct !o. 17#), effective ugust #0, 1$01' 6nder this charter the 5unicipal ?oard of 5anila is authori0ed and empo(ered to impose taxes upon real estate and, li/e municipal councils, to license and regulate certain occupations. *ustoms matters (ere completely reorgani0ed by ct !o. #99, effective at the port of 5anila on Eebruary :, 1$0", and at other ports in the .hilippine +slands the day after the receipt of a certified copy of the ct. The +nternal ,evenue >a( of 1$0& ( ct !o. 117$), repealed all existing la(s, ordinances, etc., imposing taxes upon the persons, objects, or occupations taxed under that act, and all industrial taxes and stamp taxes imposed under the 4panish regime (ere eliminated, but the industrial tax (as continued in force until %anuary 1, 1$09. This +nternal ,evenue >a( did not ta/e a(ay from municipal councils, provincial boards, and the 5unicipal ?oard of the city of 5anila the po(er to impose taxes upon real estate. This ct (!o. 117$), (ith its amendments, (as repealed by ct !o. "##$, an act 3revising and consolidating the la(s relative to internal revenue.3 4ection 7& of ct !o. 7" provides that 3!o court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, . . . .3 This inhibition (as inserted in section 1: of ct !o. 7# and applies to taxes imposed by provincial boards. The inhibition (as not inserted in the 5anila *harter until the passage of ct !o. 1:$#, effective <ctober 1", 1$0:. ct !o. #99 expressly ma/es the payment of the exactions claimed a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by dissatisfied importers. 4ection 9" of ct !o. 117$ provides 3That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction restraining the collection of any taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this ct, but the remedy of the taxpayer (ho claims that he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from him by the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue and by action to recover bac/ the sum claimed to have been illegally collected.3

4ections 1#$ and 1&0 of ct !o. "##$ contain, as (e have indicated, the same prohibition and remedy. The result is that the courts have been expressly forbidden, in every act creating or imposing taxes or imposts enacted by the legislative body of the .hilippines since the merican occupation, to entertain any suit assailing the validity of any tax or impost thus imposed until the tax shall have been paid under protest. The only taxes (hich have not been brought (ithin the express inhibition (ere those included in that part of the old 4panish system (hich completely disappeared on or before %anuary 1, 1$09, and possibly the old customs duties (hich disappeared in Eebruary, 1$0". 4ection 92 of the <rganic ct (!o. 1#2), effective %une 12, 1$01, provides that 3*ourts of Eirst +nstance shall have original jurisdictionD

". +n all civil actions (hich involve the ... legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, . . . .

:. 4aid courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have po(er to issue (rits of injunction, mandamus,certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the *ode of *ivil .rocedure. The provisions of the *ode of *ivil .rocedure ( ct !o. 1$0), effective <ctober 1, 1$01, (hich deals (ith the subject of injunctions, are sections 12" to 1:", inclusive. +njunctions, as here defined, are of t(o /inds' preliminary and final. The former may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before final judgment, and the latter at the termination of the trial as the relief or part of the relief prayed for (sec. 12"). ny judge of the 4upreme *ourt may grant a preliminary injunction in any action pending in that court or in any *ourt of Eirst +nstance. preliminary injunction may also be granted by a judge of the *ourt of Eirst +nstance in actions pending in his district in (hich he has original jurisdiction (sec. 12#). ?ut such injunctions may be granted only (hen the complaint sho(s facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded (sec. 122), and before a final or permanent injunction can be granted, it must appear upon the trial of the action that the plaintiff is entitled to have commission or continuance of the acts complained of perpetually restrained (sec. 1:1). These provisions authori0e the institution in *ourts of Eirst +nstance of (hat are /no(n as 3injunction suits,3 the sole object of (hich is to obtain the issuance of a final injunction. They also authori0e the granting of injunctions as aiders in ordinary civil actions. 1e have defined in Bavesa vs. rbes (1# .hil. ,ep., ":#), an injunction to be 3 3special remedy3 adopted in that code ( ct 1$0) from merican practice, and originally borro(ed from Fnglish legal procedure, (hich (as there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of e)uity, and limited, as in other cases (here e)uitable relief is sought, to those cases (here there is no 3plain, ade)uate, and complete remedy at la(,3(hich (ill not be granted (hile the rights bet(een the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases (here material and irreparable injury (ill be done,3(hich cannot be compensated in damages . . . ?y paragraph " of section 92 of ct !o. 1#2, supra, and the provisions of the various subse)uent cts heretofore mentioned, the +nsular -overnment has consented to litigate (ith aggrieved persons the validity of any original tax or impost imposed by it on condition that this be done in ordinary civil actions after the taxes or exactions shall have been paid. ?ut it is said that paragraph " confers original jurisdiction upon *ourts of Eirst +nstance to hear and determine 3all civil actions3 (hich involve the validity of any tax, impost or assessment, and that if the all-inclusive (ords 3all3 and 3any3 be given their natural and unrestricted meaning, no action (herein that )uestion is involved can arise over (hich such courts do not have jurisdiction. (?arrameda vs. 5oir, "9 .hil. ,ep., &&.) This is true. ?ut the term 3civil actions3 had its (ell defined meaning at the time the paragraph (as enacted.

The same legislative body (hich enacted paragraph " on %une 12, 1$01, had, just a fe( months prior to that time, defined the only /ind of action in (hich the legality of any tax imposed by it might be assailed. (4ec. 7&, ct 7", enacted %anuary #1, 1$01, and sec. 1:, ct !o. 7#, enacted Eebruary 2, 1$01.) That /ind of action being payment of the tax under protest and an ordinary suit to recover and no other, there can be no doubt that *ourts of Eirst +nstance have jurisdiction over all such actions. The subse)uent legislation on the same subject sho(s clearly that the *ommission, in enacting paragraph ", supra, did not intend to change or modify in any (ay section 7& of ct !o. 7" and section 1: of ct !o. 7#, but, on the contrary, it (as intended that 3civil actions,3 mentioned in said paragraph, should be understood to mean, in so far as testing the legality of taxes (ere concerned, only those of the /ind and character provided for in the t(o sections above mentioned. +t is also urged that the po(er to restrain by injunction the collection of taxes or imposts is conferred upon *ourts of Eirst +nstance by paragraph : of section 92, supra. This paragraph does empo(er those courts to grant injunctions, both preliminary and final, in any civil action pending in their districts, provided al(ays, that the complaint sho(s facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded. +njunction suits, such as the one at bar, are 3civil actions,3 but of a special or extraordinary character. +t cannot be said that the *ommission intended to give a broader or different meaning to the (ord 3action,3 used in *hapter $ of the *ode of *ivil .rocedure in connection (ith injunctions, than it gave to the same (ord found in paragraph " of section 92 of the <rganic ct. The +nsular -overnment, in exercising the po(er conferred upon it by the *ongress of the 6nited 4tates, has declared that the citi0ens and residents of this country shall pay certain specified taxes and imposts. The po(er to tax necessarily carries (ith it the po(er to collect the taxes. This being true, the (eight of authority supports the proposition that the -overnment may fix the conditions upon (hich it (ill consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes. (Tennessee vs. 4need, $2 6.4., 2$.) 1e must, therefore, conclude that paragraph " and : of section 92 of ct !o. 1#2, construed in the light of the prior and subse)uent legislation to (hich (e have referred, and the legislative and judicial history of the same subject in the 6nited 4tates (ith (hich the *ommission (as familiar, do not empo(er *ourts of firs +nstance to interfere by injunction (ith the collection of the taxes in )uestion in this case.
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+f (e are in error as to the scope of paragraph " and :, supra, and the *ommission did intend to confer the po(er upon the courts to restrain the collection of taxes, it does not necessarily follo( that this po(er or jurisdiction has been ta/en a(ay by section 1#$ of ct !o. "##$, for the reason that all agree that an injunction (ill not issue in any case if there is an ade)uate remedy at la(. The very nature of the (rit itself prevents its issuance under such circumstances. >egislation forbidding the issuing of injunctions in such cases is unnecessary. 4o the only )uestion to be here determined is (hether the remedy provided for in section 1&0 of ct !o. "##$ is ade)uate. +f it is, the (rits (hich form the basis of this appeal should not have been issued. +f this is the correct vie(, the authority to issue injunctions (ill not have been ta/en a(ay by section 1#$, but rendered inoperative only by reason of an ade)uate remedy having been made available. The legislative body of the .hilippine +slands has declared from the beginning ( ct !o. 7") that payment under protest and suit to recover is an ade)uate remedy to test the legality of any tax or impost, and that this remedy is exclusive. *an (e say that the remedy is not ade)uate or that it is not exclusive, or bothG The plaintiffs in the case at bar are the first, in so far as (e are a(are, to )uestion either the ade)uacy or exclusiveness of this remedy. 1e (ill refer to a fe( cases in the 6nited 4tates (here statutes similar to sections 1#$ and 1&0 have been construed and applied. +n 5ay, 17:&, one ?loomstein presented a petition to the circuit court sitting in !ashville, Tennessee, stating that his real and personal property had been assessed for state taxes in the year 17:" to the amount of H1#".20' that he tendered to the collector this amount in 3funds receivable by la( for such purposes'3 and that the collector refused to receive the same. 8e prayed for an alternative (rit

of mandamus to compel the collector to receive the bills in payment for such taxes, or to sho( cause to the contrary. To this petition the collector, in his ans(er, set up the defense that the petitioner@s suit (as expressly prohibited by the ct of the -eneral ssembly of the 4tate of Tennessee, passed in 17:#. The petition (as dismissed and the relief prayed for refused. n appeal to the supreme court of the 4tate resulted in the affirmance of the judgment of the lo(er court. The case (as then carried to the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates (Tennessee vs. 4need, $2 6. 4., 2$), (here the judgment (as again affirmed. The t(o sections of the ct of A5arch "1,C 17:#, dra(n in )uestion in that cases, read as follo(sD 1. That in all cases in (hich an officer, charged by la( (ith the collection of revenue due the 4tate, shall institute any proceeding, or ta/e any steps for the collection of the same, alleged or claimed to be due by said officer from any citi0en, the party against (hom the proceeding or step is ta/en shall, if he conceives the same to be unjust or illegal, or against any statute or clause of the *onstitution of the 4tate, pay the same under protest' and, upon his ma/ing said payment, the officer or collector shall pay such revenue into the 4tate Treasury, giving notice at the time of payment to the *omptroller that the same (as paid under protest' and the party paying said revenue may, at any time (ithin thirty days after ma/ing said payment, and not longer thereafter, sue the said officer having collected said sum, for the recovery thereof. nd the same may be tried in any court having the jurisdiction of the amount and parties' and, if it be determined that the same (as (rongfully collected, as not being due from said party to the 4tate, for any reason going to the merits of the same, then the court trying the case may certify of record that the same (as (rongfully paid and ought to be refunded' and thereupon the *omptroller shall issue his (arrant for the same, (hich shall be paid in preference to other claims on the Treasury. ". That there shall be no other remedy, in any case of the collection of revenue, or attempt to collect revenue illegally, or attempt to collect revenue in funds only receivable by said officer under the la(, the same being other or different funds than such as the tax payer may tender, or claim the right to pay, than that above provided' and no (rit for the prevention of the collection of any revenue claimed, or to hinder or delay the collection of the same, shall in any(ise issue, either injunction, supersedeas, prohibition, or any other (rit or process (hatever' but in all cases in (hich, for any reason, any person shall claim that the tax so collected (as (rongfully or illegally collected, the remedy for said party shall be as above provided, and in no other manner.3 +n discussing the ade)uacy of the remedy provided by the Tennessee >egislature, as above set forth, the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates, in the case just cited, saidD 3This remedy is simple and effective. suit at la( to recover money unla(fully exacted is as speedy, as easily tried, and less complicated than a proceeding by mandamus. ... +n revenue cases, (hether arising upon its (6nited 4tates) +nternal ,evenue >a(s or those providing for the collection of duties upon foreign imports, it (6nited 4tates) adopts the rule prescribed by the 4tate of Tennessee. +t re)uires the contestant to pay the amount as fixed by the -overnment, and gives him po(er to sue the collector, and in such suit to test the legality of the tax. There is nothing illegal or even harsh in this. +t is a (ise and reasonable precaution for the security of the -overnment.3 Thomas *. .latt commenced an action in the *ircuit *ourt of the 6nited 4tates for the Fastern Bistrict of Tennessee to restrain the collection of a license tax from the company (hich he represented. The defense (as that sections 1 and " of the ct of 17:#, supra, prohibited the bringing of that suit. This case also reached the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates. (4helton vs. .latt, 1#$ 6. 9$1.) +n spea/ing of the inhibitory provisions of sections 1 and " of the ct of 17:#, the court saidD 3This ct has been sanctioned and applied by the *ourts of Tennessee.

(!ashville vs. 4mith, 72 Tenn., "1#' >ouisville = !. ,. *o. vs. 4tate, 7 8eis/., 22#, 70&.) +t is, as counsel observe, similar to the ct of *ongress forbidding suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes under the +nternal ,evenue >a(s, in respect to (hich this court held that the remedy by suit to recover bac/ the tax after payment, provided for by the 4tatute, (as exclusive. (4nyder vs. 5ar/s, of this character has been called for by the embarrassments resulting from the improvident employment of the (rit of injunction in arresting the collection of the public revenue' and, even in its absence, the strong arm of the court of chancery ought not to be interposed in that direction except (here resort to that court is grounded upon the settled principles (hich govern its jurisdiction.3 +n >ouisville = !.,. *o. vs. 4tate (7 8eis/. A2& Tenn.C, 22#, 70&), cited by the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates in 4helton vs. .latt, supra, the court saidD 3+t (as urged that this statute (sections 1 and " of the ct of 17:#,supra) is unconstitutional and void, as it deprives the citi0en of the remedy by certiorari, guaranteed by the organic la(.3 ?y the 10th section of the sixth article of the *onstitution, ATennesseeC it is provided thatD 3The judges or justices of inferior courts of la( and e)uity shall have po(er in all civil cases to issue (rits of certiorari, to remove any cause, or the transcript of the record thereof, from any inferior jurisdiction into such court of la(, on sufficient cause, supported by oath or affirmation.3 The court held the act valid as not being in conflict (ith these provisions of the 4tate constitution. +n Fddy vs. The To(nship of >ee (:# 5ich., 1"#), the complainants sought to enjoin the collection of certain taxes for the year 1772. The defendants, in support of their demurrer, insisted that the remedy by injunction had been ta/en a(ay by section 10: of the ct of 1779, (hich section reads as follo(sD 3!o injunction shall issue to stay proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes under this ct.3 +t (as claimed by the complainants that the above )uoted provisions of the ct of 1779 (ere unconstitutional and void as being in conflict (ith article 2, sec. 7, of the *onstitution, (hich provides thatD 3The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted in this *onstitution, and not prohibited by la(. ... They shall also have po(er to issue (rits of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other (rits necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.3 5r. %ustice *hamplin, spea/ing for the court, saidD 3+ have no doubt that the >egislature has the constitutional authority, (here it has provided a plain, ade)uate, and complete remedy at la( to recover bac/ taxes illegally assessed and collected, to ta/e a(ay the remedy by injunction to restrain their collection.3 4ection $ of the .hilippine ?ill reads in part as follo(sD 3That the 4upreme *ourt and the *ourts of Eirst +nstance of the .hilippine +slands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the -overnment of said +slands, subject to the po(er of said -overnment to change the practice and method of procedure.3 +t (ill be seen that this section has not ta/en a(ay from the .hilippine -overnment the po(er to change the practice and method of procedure. +f sections 1#$ and 1&0, considered together, and this must al(ays be done, are nothing more than a mode of procedure, then it (ould seem that the >egislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting them. *onceding for the moment that the duly authori0ed procedure for the determination of the validity of any tax, impost, or assessment (as by injunction suits and that this method (as available to aggrieved taxpayers prior to the passage of ct !o. "##$, may the >egislature change this method of procedureG That the

>egislature has the po(er to do this, there can be no doubt, provided some other ade)uate remedy is substituted in lieu thereof. +n spea/ing of the modes of enforcing rights created by contracts, the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates, in Tennessee vs. 4need, supra, saidD 3The rule seems to be that in modes of proceedings and of forms to enforce the contract the >egislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it (ith conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right.3 +n that case the petitioner urged that the cts of 17:# (ere la(s impairing the obligation of the contract contained in the charter of the ?an/ of Tennessee, (hich contract (as entered into (ith the 4tate in 17#7. +t (as claimed that this (as done by placing such impediments and obstructions in the (ay of its enforcement, thereby so impairing the remedies as practically to render the obligation of no value. +n disposing of this contention, the court saidD 3+f (e assume that prior to 17:# the relator had authority to prosecute his claim against the 4tate by mandamus, and that by the statutes of that year the further use of that form (as prohibited to him, the )uestion remains. (hether an effectual remedy (as left to him or provided for him. 1e thin/ the regulation of the statute gave him an abundant means of enforcing such right as he possessed. +t provided that he might pay his claim to the collector under protest, giving notice thereof to the *omptroller of the Treasury' that at any time (ithin thirty days thereafter he might sue the officer ma/ing the collection' that the case should be tried by any court having jurisdiction and, if found in favor of the plaintiff on the merits, the court should certify that the same (as (rongfully paid and ought to be refunded and the *omptroller should thereupon issue his (arrant therefor, (hich should be paid in preference to other claim on the Treasury.3 ?ut great stress is laid upon the fact that the plaintiffs in the case under consideration are unable to pay the taxes assessed against them and that if the la( is enforced, they (ill be compelled to suspend business. This point may be best ans(ered by )uoting from the case of Ioungblood vs. 4exton (#" 5ich., &02), (herein %udge *ooley, spea/ing for the court, saidD 3?ut if this consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of la( to a court of e)uity, then every controversy (here money is demanded may be made the subject of e)uitable cogni0ance. To enforce against a dealer a promissory note may in some cases as effectually brea/ up his business as to collect from him a tax of e)ual amount. This is not (hat is /no(n to the la( as irreparable injury. The courts have never recogni0ed the conse)uences of the mere enforcement of a money demand as falling (ithin that category.3 *ertain specified sections of ct !o. "##$ (ere amended by ct !o. "&#", enacted Becember "#, 1$1&, effective %anuary 1, 1$19, by imposing increased and additional taxes. ct !o. "&#" (as amended, (ere ratified by the *ongress of the 6nited 4tates on 5arch &, 1$19. The opposition manifested against the taxes imposed by cts !os. "##$ and "&#" is a matter of local history. great many business men thought the taxes thus imposed (ere too high. +f the collection of the ne( taxes on signs, signboards, and billboards may be restrained, (e see no (ell-founded reason (hy injunctions cannot be granted restraining the collection of all or at least a number of the other increased taxes. The fact that this may be done, sho(s the (isdom of the >egislature in denying the use of the (rit of injunction to restrain the collection of any tax imposed by the cts. 1hen this (as done, an e)uitable remedy (as made available to all dissatisfied taxpayers. The )uestion no( arises (hether, the case being one of (hich the court belo( had no jurisdiction, this court, on appeal, shall proceed to express an opinion upon the validity of provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of ct !o. "##$, imposing the taxes complained of. s a general rule, an opinion on the merits of a controversy ought to be declined (hen the court is po(erless to give the relief demanded. ?ut it is claimed that this case is, in many particulars, exceptional. +t is true that it has been argued on the merits, and there is no reason for any suggestion or suspicion that it is not a bona fide controversy. The legal points involved in the merits have been presented (ith force,

clearness, and great ability by the learned counsel of both sides. +f the la( assailed (ere still in force, (e (ould feel that an opinion on its validity (ould be justifiable, but, as the amendment became effective on %anuary 1, 1$19, (e thin/ it advisable to proceed no further (ith this branch of the case. The next )uestion arises in connection (ith the supplementary complaint, the object of (hich is to enjoin the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue from removing certain billboards, the property of the plaintiffs located upon private lands in the .rovince of ,i0al. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in )uestion 3in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general (elfare of the community, or of any persons.3 The defendant denies these allegations in his ans(er and claims that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the ?ritish and -erman *onsuls, he 3decided that the billboard complained of (as and still is offensive to the sight, and is other(ise a nuisance.3 The plaintiffs proved by 5r. *hurchill that the 3billboards (ere )uite a distance from the road and that they (ere strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter (hich is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community.3 The defendant presented no testimony upon this point. +n the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs 3admit that the billboards mentioned (ere and still are offensive to the sight.3 The pertinent provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of ct !o. "##$ readD 3+f after due investigation the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue shall decide that any sign, signboard, or billboard displayed or exposed to public vie( is offensive to the sight or is other(ise a nuisance, he may by summary order direct the removal of such sign, signboard, or billboard, and if same is not removed (ithin ten days after he has issued such order he may himself cause its removal, and the sign, signboard, or billboard shall thereupon be forfeited to the -overnment, and the o(ner thereof charged (ith the expenses of the removal so effected. 1hen the sign, signboard, or billboard ordered to be removed as herein provided shall not comply (ith the provisions of the general regulations of the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue, no rebate or refund shall be allo(ed for any portion of a year for (hich the tax may have been paid. <ther(ise, the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue may in his discretion ma/e a proportionate refund of the tax for the portion of the year remaining for (hich the taxes (ere paid. n appeal may be had from the order of the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue to the 4ecretary of Einance and %ustice (hose decision thereon shall be final.3 The ttorney--eneral, on behalf of the defendant, saysD 3The )uestion (hich the case presents under this head for determination, resolves itself into this in)uiryD +s the suppression of advertising signs displayed or exposed to public vie(, (hich are admittedly offensive to the sight, conducive to the public interestG3 nd counsel for the plaintiffs states the )uestion thusD 31e contend that that portion of section 100 of ct !o. "##$, empo(ering the *ollector of +nternal ,evenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the sight, is unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law.3 Erom the position ta/en by counsel for both sides, it is clear that our in)uiry is limited to the )uestion (hether the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs (as a legitimate exercise of the police po(er of the -overnment' for all property is held subject to that po(er. s a conse)uence of the foregoing, all discussion and authorities cited, (hich go to the po(er of the state to authori0e administrative officers to find, as a fact, that legitimate trades, callings, and businesses are, under certain circumstances, statutory nuisances, and (hether the procedure prescribed for this purpose is due process of la(, are foreign to the issue here presented.

There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police po(er of the .hilippine -overnment belongs to the >egislature and that this po(er is limited only by the cts of *ongress and those fundamentals principles (hich lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. n ct of the >egislature (hich is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police po(er and interferes (ith the ordinary enjoyment of property (ould, (ithout doubt, be held to be invalid. ?ut (here the ct is reasonably (ithin a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their o(n vie(s for (hat is proper in the premises for those of the >egislature. +n 5unn vs. +llinois ($& 6.4., 11#), the 6nited 4tates 4upreme *ourt states the rule thusD 3+f no state of circumstances could exist to justify such statute, then (e may declare this one void because in excess of the legislative po(er of this state' but if it could, (e must presume it did. <f the propriety of legislative interference, (ithin the scope of the legislative po(er, a legislature is the exclusive judge.3 This rule very fully discussed and declared in .o(ell vs. .ennsylvania (1": 6.4., 2:7) J 3oleomargarine3 case. (4ee also *ro(ley vs. *hristensen, 1#: 6.4., 72, 7:' *amfield vs. 6.4., 12: 6.4., 917.) 1hile the state may interfere (herever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only (hat the interest of the public re)uire, but (hat measures are necessary for the protection of such interests' yet, its determination in these matters is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. (>a(ton vs. 4teele, 19" 6.4., 1##.) *an it be said judicially that signs, signboards, and billboards, (hich are admittedly offensive to the sight, are not (ith the category of things (hich interfere (ith the public safety, (elfare, and comfort, and therefore beyond the reach of the police po(er of the .hilippine -overnmentG The numerous attempts (hich have been made to limit by definition the scope of the police po(er are only interesting as illustrating its rapid extension (ithin comparatively recent years to points heretofore deemed entirely (ithin the field of private liberty and property rights. ?lac/stone@s definition of the police po(er (as as follo(sD 3The due regulation and domestic order of the /ingdom, (hereby the individuals of the state, li/e members of a (ell governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neigborhood, and good manners, to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.3 (*ommentaries, vol. &, p. 12".) *hanceller ;ent considered the police po(er the authority of the state 3to regulate un(holesome trades, slaughter houses, operations offensive to the senses.3 *hief %ustice 4ha( of 5assachusetts defined it as follo(sD 3The po(er vested in the legislature by the constitution to ma/e, ordain, and establish all manner of (holesome and reasonable la(s, statutes, and ordinances, either (ith penalties or (ithout, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and (elfare of the common(ealth, and of the subjects of the same.3 (*om. vs. lger, : *ush., 9#.) +n the case of ?utchers@ 6nion 4laughter-house, etc. *o. vs. *rescent *ity >ive 4toc/ >anding, etc. *o. (111 6.4., :&2), it (as suggested that the public health and public morals are matters of legislative concern of (hich the legislature cannot divest itself. (4ee 4tate vs. 5ountain Timber *o. A1$1#C, :9 1ash., 971, (here these definitions are collated.) +n *hamper vs. -reencastle (1#7 +nd., ##$), it (as saidD 3The police po(er of the 4tate, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. +t may be said, ho(ever, to be the right of the 4tate, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, (hich do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic la(.3 (Kuoted (ith approval in 8op/ins vs. ,ichmond ALa., 1$19C, 72 4.F., 1#$.) +n *om. vs. .lymouth *oal *o. (A1$11C "#" .a., 1&1), it (as saidD 3The police po(er of the state is difficult of definition, but it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the

good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, (hich does not encroach on a li/e po(er vested in congress or state legislatures by the federal constitution, or does not violate the provisions of the organic la(' and it has been expressly held that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution (as not designed to interfere (ith the exercise of that po(er by the state.3 +n .eople vs. ?ra0ee (A5ich., 1$1&C, 1&$ !.1., 109#), it (as saidD 3+t Athe police po(erC has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively (ith a vie( to bring about 3he greatest good of the greatest number.3*ourts have consistently and (isely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this po(er. +t is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction.3 +n 7 *yc., 72#, it is saidD 3.olice po(er is the name given to that inherent sovereignty (hich it is the right and duty of the government or its agents to exercise (henever public policy, in a broad sense, demands, for the benefit of society at large, regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order or to insure in any respect such economic conditions as an advancing civili0ation of a high complex character re)uires.3 ( s )uoted (ith approval in 4tettler vs. <@8ara A1$1&C, 2$ <re, 91$.) Einally, the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates has said in !oble 4tate ?an/ vs. 8as/ell ("1$ 6.4. A1$11C, 9:9D 3+t may be said in a general (ay that the police po(er extends to all the great public needs. +t may be put forth in aid of (hat is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public (elfare.3 This statement, recent as it is, has been )uoted (ith approval by several courts. (*unningham vs. !orth(estern +mp. *o. A1$11C, && 5ont., 170' 4tate vs. 5ountain Timber *o. A1$1#C, :9 1ash., 971' 5cBavid vs. ?an/ of ?ay 5inette A la., 1$19C, 2$ 4ou., &9"' 8op/ins vs. *ity of ,ichmond ALa., 1$19C, 72 4.F., 1#$' 4tate vs. .hilipps A5iss. 1$19C, 2: 4ou., 291.) +t (as said in *om. vs. lger (: *ush., 9#, 79), per 4ha(, *.%., thatD 3+t is much easier to perceive and reali0e the existence and sources of this police po(er than to mar/ its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise.3 +n 4tone vs. 5ississippi (101 6.4., 71&), it (as saidD 35any attempts have been made in this court and else(here to define the police po(er, but never (ith entire success. +t is al(ays easier to determine (hether a particular case comes (ithin the general scope of the po(er, than to give an abstract definition of the po(er itself, (hich (ill be in all respects accurate.3 <ther courts have held the same vo( of efforts to evolve a satisfactory definition of the police po(er. 5anifestly, definitions (hich fail to anticipate cases properly (ithin the scope of the police po(er are deficient. +t is necessary, therefore, to confine our discussion to the principle involved and determine (hether the cases as they come up are (ithin that principle. The basic idea of civil polity in the 6nited 4tates is that government should interfere (ith individual effort only to the extent necessary to preserve a healthy social and economic condition of the country. 4tate interference (ith the use of private property may be exercised in three (ays. Eirst, through the po(er of taxation, second, through the po(er of eminent domain, and third, through the police po(er. ?uy the first method it is assumed that the individual receives the e)uivalent of the tax in the form of protection and benefit he receives from the government as such. ?y the second method he receives the mar/et value of the property ta/en from him. ?ut under the third method the benefits he derived are only such as may arise from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and is often referred to as damnum absque in uria. (*om. vs. .lymouth *oal *o. "#" .a., 1&1' ?emis vs. -uirl Brainage *o., 17" +nd., #2.) There (as a time (hen state interference (ith the use of private property under the guise of the police po(er (as practically confined to the suppression of common nuisances. t

the present day, ho(ever, industry is organi0ed along lines (hich ma/e it possible for large combinations of capital to profit at the expense of the socio-economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and dictating to industrial (or/ers (ages and conditions of labor. !ot only this but the universal use of mechanical contrivances by producers and common carriers has enormously increased the toll of human life and limb in the production and distribution of consumption goods. To the extent that these businesses affect not only the public health, safety, and morals, but also the general social and economic life of the nation, it has been and (ill continue to be necessary for the state to interfere by regulation. ?y so doing, it is true that the enjoyment of private property is interfered (ith in no small degree and in (ays that (ould have been considered entirely unnecessary in years gone by. The regulation of rates charged by common carriers, for instance, or the limitation of hours of (or/ in industrial establishments have only a very indirect bearing upon the public health, safety, and morals, but do bear directly upon social and economic conditions. To permit each individual unit of society to feel that his industry (ill bring a fair return' to see that his (or/ shall be done under conditions that (ill not either immediately or eventually ruin his health' to prevent the artificial inflation of prices of the things (hich are necessary for his physical (ell being are matters (hich the individual is no longer capable of attending to himself. +t is (ithin the province of the police po(er to render assistance to the people to the extent that may be necessary to safeguard these rights. 8ence, la(s providing for the regulation of (ages and hours of labor of coal miners (,ail = ,iver *oal *o. vs. Taylor, "#& 6.4., ""&)' re)uiring payment of employees of railroads and other industrial concerns in legal tender and re)uiring salaries to be paid semimonthly (Frie ,.,. *o. vs. 1illiams, "## 6.4., 279)' providing a maximum number of hours of labor for (omen (5iller vs. 1ilson, 6.4. 4up. *t. AEeb. "#, 1$19C, dv. <pns., p. #&")' prohibiting child labor (4turges = ?urn vs. ?eauchamp, "#1 6.4., #"0)' restricting the hours of labor in public laundries (+n re 1ong 1ing, 12: *al., 10$)' limiting hours of labor in industrial establishment generally (4tate vs.?unting, :1 <re., "9$)' 4unday *losing >a(s (4tate vs. !icholls A<re., 1$19C, 191 .ac., &:#' .eople vs. *. ;linc/ .ac/ing *o. A!.I., 1$19C, 107 !. F., ":7' 8iller vs. 4tate A5d., 1$1&C, $" tl., 7&"' 4tate vs. .enny, &" 5ont., 117' *ity of 4pringfield vs. ,ichter, "9: +ll., 9:7, 970' 4tate vs. 8ondros A4.*., 1$19C, 7& 4.F., :71)' have all been upheld as a valid exercise of the police po(er. gain, (or/men@s compensation la(s have been )uite generally upheld. These statutes discard the common la( theory that employers are not liable for industrial accidents and ma/e them responsible for all accidents resulting from trade ris/s, it being considered that such accidents are a legitimate charge against production and that the employer by controlling the prices of his product may shift the burden to the community. >a(s re)uiring state ban/s to join in establishing a depositors@ guarantee fund have also been upheld by the Eederal 4upreme *ourt in !oble 4tate ?an/ vs. 8as/ell ("1$ 6. 4., 10&), and ssaria 4tate ?an/ vs. Bolley ("1$ 6.4., 1"1). <ffensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible of suppression in thic/ly populated districts. ?arring livery stables from such locations (as approved of in ,einman vs. >ittle ,oc/ (6.4. 4up. *t. A pr. 9, 1$19C, 6.4. dv. <pns., p. 911). nd a municipal ordinance (as recently upheld (.eople vs. Fricsson, "2# +ll., #27), (hich prohibited the location of garages (ithin t(o hundred feet of any hospital, church, or school, or in any bloc/ used exclusively for residential purposes, unless the consent of the majority of the property o(ners be obtained. 4uch statutes as these are usually upheld on the theory of safeguarding the public health. ?ut (e apprehend that in point of fact they have little bearing upon the health of the normal person, but a great deal to do (ith his physical comfort and convenience and not a little to do (ith his peace of mind. 1ithout entering into the realm of psychology, (e thin/ it )uite demonstrable that sight is as valuable to a human being as any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense conduces as much to his contentment as the care besto(ed upon the senses of hearing or smell, and probably as much as both together. <bjects may be offensive to the eye as (ell as to the nose or ear. 5an@s esthetic feelings are constantly being appealed to through his sense of sight. >arge investments have been made in theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and spectacular displays, the success of (hich depends in great part upon the appeal made through the sense of sight. 5oving picture sho(s could not possible (ithout the sense of sight. -overnments

have spent millions on par/s and boulevards and other forms of civic beauty, the first aim of (hich is to appeal to the sense of sight. 1hy, then, should the -overnment not interpose to protect from annoyance this most valuable of man@s senses as readily as to protect him from offensive noises and smellsG The advertising industry is a legitimate one. +t is at the same time a cause and an effect of the great industrial age through (hich the (orld is no( passing. 5illions are spent each year in this manner to guide the consumer to the articles (hich he needs. The sense of sight is the primary essential to advertising success. ?illboard advertising, as it is no( conducted, is a comparatively recent form of advertising. +t is conducted out of doors and along the arteries of travel, and compels attention by the strategic locations of the boards, (hich obstruct the range of vision at points (here travelers are most li/ely to direct their eyes. ?eautiful landscapes are marred or may not be seen at all by the traveler because of the gaudy array of posters announcing a particular /ind of brea/fast food, or under(ear, the coming of a circus, an incomparable soap, nostrums or medicines for the curing of all the ills to (hich the flesh is heir, etc. +t is )uite natural for people to protest against this indiscriminate and (holesale use of the landscape by advertisers and the intrusion of tradesmen upon their hours of leisure and relaxation from (or/. <utdoor life must lose much of its charm and pleasure if this form of advertising is permitted to continue unhampered until it converts the streets and high(ays into veritable canyons through (hich the (orld must travel in going to (or/ or in search of outdoor pleasure. The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of private property as it does upon the use of the channels of travel used by the general public. 4uppose that the o(ner of private property, (ho so vigorously objects to the restriction of this form of advertising, should re)uire the advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards so that they (ould face the interior of the property instead of the exterior. ?illboard advertising (ould die a natural death if this (ere done, and its real dependency not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the public high(ays is at once apparent. <stensibly located on private property, the real and sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. 8ence, (e conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares. 1e (ould not be understood as saying that billboard advertising is not a legitimate business any more than (e (ould say that a livery stable or an automobile garage is not. Fven a billboard is more sightly than piles of rubbish or an open se(er. ?ut all these businesses are offensive to the senses under certain conditions. +t has been urged against ministering to the sense of sight that tastes are so diversified that there is no safe standard of legislation in this direction. 1e ans(er in the language of the 4upreme *ourt in !oble 4tate ?an/ vs.8as/ell ("1$ 6.4., 10&), and (hich has already been adopted by several state courts (see supra), that 3the prevailing morality or strong and preponderating opinion3 demands such legislation. The agitation against the unrestrained development of the billboard business has produced results in nearly all the countries of Furope. (Fncy. ?ritannica, vol. 1, pp. "#:-"&0.) 5any drastic ordinances and state la(s have been passed in the 6nited 4tates see/ing to ma/e the business amenable to regulation. ?ut their regulation in the 6nited states is hampered by (hat (e conceive an un(arranted restriction upon the scope of the police po(er by the courts. +f the police po(er may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included (ithin those subjects, everything (hich encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police po(er. source of annoyance and irritation to the public does not minister to the comfort and convenience of the public. nd (e are of the opinion that the prevailing sentiment is manifestly against the erection of billboards (hich are offensive to the sight.

1e do not consider that (e are in conflict (ith the decision in Fuban/ vs. ,ichmond (""2 6.4., 1#:), (here a municipal ordinance establishing a building line to (hich property o(ners must conform (as held unconstitutional. s (e have pointed out, billboard advertising is not so much a use of private property as it is a use of the public thoroughfares. +t derives its value to the po(er solely because the posters are exposed to the public ga0e. +t may (ell be that the state may not re)uire private property o(ners to conform to a building line, but may prescribe the conditions under (hich they shall ma/e use of the adjoining streets and high(ays. !or is the la( in )uestion to be held invalid as denying e)ual protection of the la(s. +n ;eo/ee *o/e *o. vs. Taylor ("#& 6.4., ""&), it (as saidD 3+t is more pressed that the act discriminates unconstitutionally against certain classes. ?ut (hile there are differences of opinion as to the degree and /ind of discrimination permitted by the Eourteenth mendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at (hat is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably (here experience sho(s it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thin/ing up and enumerating other instances to (hich it might have been applied e)ually (ell, so far as the court can see. That is for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear.3 ?ut (e have not overloo/ed the fact that (e are not in harmony (ith the highest courts of a number of the states in the merican 6nion upon this point. Those courts being of the opinion that statutes (hich are prompted and inspired by esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the promotion and gratification of the esthetic sense, and not the promotion or protection of the public safety, the public peace and good order of society, must be held invalid and contrary to constitutional provisions holding inviolate the rights of private property. <r, in other (ords, the police po(er cannot interfere (ith private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts, ta/ing this vie(, rest their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general (elfare and is, therefore, beyond the police po(er of the state. ?ut (e are of the opinion, as above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards (hich are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general (elfare of the public. This is not establishing a ne( principle, but carrying a (ell recogni0ed principle to further application. (Eruend on .olice .o(er, p. 122.) Eor the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the merits, (ith costs. 4o ordered. Arellano! ".#.! $orres! "arson! and Araullo! ##.! concur. BF*+4+<! <! T8F 5<T+<! E<, R!N , J.: *ounsel for the plaintiffs call our attention to the case of %& parte Ioung ("0$ 6.4., 1"#)' and say that they are of the opinion that this case 3is the absolutely determinative of the )uestion of jurisdiction in injunctions of this /ind.3 1e did not refer to this case in our former opinion because (e (ere satisfied that the reasoning of the case is not applicable to section 100 (b), 1#$ and 1&0 of ct !o. "##$. The principles announced in the Ioung case are stated as follo(sD 3+t may therefore be said that (hen the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the la( in terms prohibited the company from see/ing judicial construction of la(s (hich deeply affect its rights. +t is urged that there is no principle upon (hich to base the claim that a person is entitled to disobey a statute at least once, for the purpose of testing its validity (ithout subjecting himself to the penalties for disobedience provided by the statute in case it is valid. This is not an accurate statement of the case. <rdinarily a la( creating offenses in the nature of ,F8F ,+!-, % !6 ,I "&, 1$12.

misdemeanors or felonies relates to a subject over (hich the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event. +n these case, ho(ever, of the establishment of certain rates (ithout any hearing, the validity of such rates necessarily depends upon (hether they are high enough to permit at least some return upon the investment (ho( much it is not no( necessary to state), and an in)uiry as to that fact is a proper subject of judicial investigation. +f it turns out that the rates are too lo( for that purpose, then they are illegal. !o(, to impose upon a party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of such a )uestion (no prior hearing having ever been given) only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful, he must suffer imprisonment and pay fines as provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and thus prevent any hearing upon the )uestion (hether the rates as provided by the acts are not too lo(, and therefore invalid. The distinction is obvious bet(een a case (here the validity of the acts depends upon the existence of a fact (hich can be determined only after investigation of a very complicated and technical character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a subject re)uiring no such investigation and over (hich the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event. n examination of the sections of our +nternal ,evenue >a( and of the circumstances under (hich and the purposes for (hich they (ere enacted, (ill sho( that, unli/e the statutes under consideration in the above cited case, their enactment involved no attempt on the part of the >egislature to prevent dissatisfied taxpayers 3from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation'3 no effort to prevent any in)uiry as to their validity. 1hile section 1#$ does prevent the testing of the validity of subsection (b) of section 100 in injunction suits instituted for the purpose of restraining the collection of internal revenue taxes, section 1&0 provides a complete remedy for that purpose. nd furthermore, the validity of subsection (b) does not depend upon 3the existence of a fact (hich can be determined only after investigation of a very complicated and technical character,3 but the jurisdiction of the >egislature over the subject (ith (hich the subsection deals 3is complete in any event.3 The judgment of the court in the Ioung case rests upon the proposition that the aggrieved parties had no ade)uate remedy at la(. !either did (e overloo/ the case of -eneral <il *o. vs. *rain ("0$ 6.4., "11), decided the same day and citing %& parte Ioung, supra. +n that case the plaintiff (as a Tennessee corporation, (ith its principal place of business in 5emphis, Tennessee. +t (as engaged in the manufacture and sale of coal oil, etc. +ts (ells and plant (ere located in .ennsylvania and <hio. 5emphis (as not only its place of business, at (hich place it sold oil to the residents of Tennessee, but also a distributing point to (hich oils (ere shipped from .ennsylvania and <hio and unloaded into various tan/s for the purpose of being for(arded to the r/ansas, >ouisiana, and 5ississippi customers. !ot(ithstanding the fact that the company separated its oils, (hich (ere designated to meet the re)uirements of the orders from those 4tates, from the oils for sale in Tennessee, the defendant insisted that he had a right, under the ct of the Tennessee >egislature, approved pril "1, 17$$, to inspect all the oils unlocated in 5emphis, (hether for sale in that 4tate or not, and charge and collect for such inspection a regular fee of t(enty-five cents per barrel. The company, being advised that the defendant had no such right, instituted this action in the inferior 4tates court for the purpose of enjoining the defendant, upon the grounds stated in the bill, from inspecting or attempting to inspect its oils. 6pon trial, the preliminary injunction (hich had been granted at the commencement of the action, (as continued in force. 6pon appeal, the supreme court of the 4tate of Tennessee decided that the suit (as one against the 4tate and reversed the judgment of the *hancellor. +n the 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates, (here the case (as revie(ed upon a (rit of error, the contentions of the parties (ere stated by the court as follo(sD 3+t is contended by defendant in error that this court is (ithout jurisdiction because no matter sought to be litigated by plaintiff in error (as determined by the 4upreme *ourt of Tennessee. The court simply held, it is paid, that, under the la(s of the 4tate, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for any purpose. nd it is insisted 3hat this holding involved

no Eederal )uestion, but only the po(ers and jurisdiction of the courts of the 4tate of Tennessee, in respect to (hich the 4upreme *ourt of Tennessee is the final arbiter.3 <pposing these contentions, plaintiff in error urges that (hether a suit is one against a 4tate cannot depend upon the declaration of a statute, but depends upon the essential nature ofthe suit, and that the 4upreme *ourt recogni0ed that the statute 3aded nothing to the axiomatic principle that the 4tate, as a sovereign, is not subject to suit save by its o(n consent.3 nd it is hence insisted that the court by dismissing the bill gave effect to the la( (hich (as attac/ed. +t is further insisted that the bill undoubtedly present rights under the *onstitution of the 6nited 4tates and conditions (hich entitle plaintiff in error to an injunction for the protection of such rights, and that a statute of the 4tate (hich operates to deny such rights, or such relief, Mis itself in conflict (ith the *onstitution of the 6nited 4tates.3 That statute of Tennessee, (hich the supreme court of that 4tate construed and held to be prohibitory of the suit, (as an act passed Eebruary "7, 17:#, (hich providesD 3That no court in the 4tate of Tennessee has, nor shall hereafter have, any po(er, jurisdiction, or authority to entertain any suit against the 4tate, or any officer acting by the authority of the 4tate, (ith a vie( to reach the 4tate, its treasury, funds or property' and all such suits no( pending, or hereafter brought, shall be dismissed as to the 4tate, or such officer, on motion, plea or demurrer of the la( officer of the 4tate, or counsel employed by the 4tate.3 The 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates, after revie(ing many cases, saidD 3!ecessarily, to give ade)uate protection to constitutional rights a distinction must be made bet(een valid and invalid state la(s, as determining the character of the suit against state officers. nd the suit at bar illustrates the necessity. +f a suit against state officer is precluded in the national courts by the Fleventh mendment to the *onstitution, and may be forbidden by a 4tate to its courts, as it is contended in the case at bar that it may be, (ithout po(er of revie( by this court, it must be evident that an easy (ay is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the *onstitution' and the Eourteenth mendment, (hich is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its operation. ... +t being then the right of a party to be protected against a la( (hich violates a constitutional right, (hether by its terms or the manner of its enforcement, it is manifest that a decision (hich denies such protection gives effect to the la(, and the decision is revie(able by this court.3 The court then proceeded to consider (hether the la( of 17$$ (ould, if administered against the oils in )uestion, violate any constitutional right of the plaintiff and after finding and adjudging that the oils (ere not in movement through the 4tates, that they had reached the destination of their first shipment, and (ere held there, not in necessary delay at means of transportation but for the business purposes and profit of the company, and resting its judgment upon the taxing po(er of the 4tate, affirmed the decree of the supreme court of the 4tate of Tennessee. Erom the foregoing it (ill be seen that the 4upreme *ourt of Tennessee dismissed the case for (ant of jurisdiction because the suit (as one against the 4tate, (hich (as prohibited by the Tennessee >egislature. The 4upreme *ourt of the 6nited 4tates too/ jurisdiction of the controversy for the reasons above )uoted and sustained the ct of 17$$ as a revenue la(. The case of Tennessee vs. 4need ($2 6.4., 2$), and 4helton vs. .latt (1#$ 6.4., 9$1), relied upon in our former opinion, (ere not cited in -eneral <il *o. vs. *rain, supra, because the )uestions presented and the statutes under consideration (ere entirely different. The ct approved 5arch #1, 17:#, expressly prohibits the courts from restraining the collection of any tax, leaving the dissatisfied taxpayer to his exclusive remedy J payment under protest and suit to recover J (hile the ct approved Eebruary "7, 17:#, prohibits suits against the 4tate.

+n upholding the statute (hich authori0es the removal of signboards or billboards upon the sole ground that they are offensive to the sight, (e recogni0ed the fact that (e are not in harmony (ith various state courts in the merican 6nion. 1e have just examined the decision of the 4upreme *ourt of the 4tate of +llinois in the recent case (<ctober ABecemberC, 1$1&) of Thomas *usac/ *o. vs. *ity of *hicago ("2: +ll., #&&), (herein the court upheld the validity of a municipal ordinances, (hich reads as follo(sD 3:0:. 'ronta(e consents required. +t shall be unla(ful for any person, firm or corporation to erect or construct any bill-board or sign-board in any bloc/ on any public street in (hich one-half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes, (ithout first obtaining the consent, in (riting, of the o(ners or duly authori0ed agents of said o(ners o(ning a majority of the frontage of the property, on both sides of the street, in the bloc/ in (hich such bill-board or sign-board is to be erected, constructed or located. 4uch (ritten consent shall be filed (ith the commissioner of buildings before a permit shall be issued for the erection, construction or location of such bill-board or sign-board.3 The evidence (hich the +llinois court relied upon (as the danger of fires, the fact that billboards promote the commission of various immoral and filthy acts by disorderly persons, and the inade)uate police protection furnished to residential districts. The last objection has no virtue unless one or the other of the other objections are valid. +f the billboard industry does, in fact, promote such municipal evils to noticeable extent, it seems a curious inconsistency that a majority of the property o(ners on a given bloc/ may legali0e the business. 8o(ever, the decision is undoubtedly a considerable advance over the vie(s ta/en by other high courts in the 6nited 4tates and distinguishes several +llinois decisions. +t is an advance because it permits the suppression of billboards (here they are undesirable. The ordinance (hich the court approved (ill no doubt cause the virtual suppression of the business in the residential districts. 8ence, it is recogni0ed that under certain circumstances billboards may be suppressed as an unla(ful use of private property. >ogically, it (ould seem that the premise of fact relied upon is not very solid. <bjections to the billboard upon police, sanitary, and moral grounds have been, as pointed out by counsel for *hurchill and Tait, duly considered by numerous high courts in the 6nited 4tates, and, (ith one exception, have been rejected as (ithout foundation. The exception is the 4upreme *ourt of 5issouri, (hich advances practically the same line of reasoning as has the +llinois court in this recent case. (4t. >ouis -unning dvt. *o. vs. *ity of 4t. >ouis, 1#: 4. 1., $"$.) +n fact, the +llinois court, in 8aller 4ign 1or/s vs. .hysical *ulture Training 4chool ("&$ +ll., &#2), 3distinguished3 in the recent case, saidD 3There is nothing inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in structures that are properly erected for advertising purposes.3 +f a billboard is so constructed as to offer no room for objections on sanitary or moral grounds, it (ould seem that the ordinance above )uoted (ould have to be sustained upon the very grounds (hich (e have advanced in sustaining our o(n statute. +t might be (ell to note that billboard legislation in the 6nited 4tates is attempting to eradicate a business (hich has already been firmly established. This business (as allo(ed to expand unchec/ed until its very extent called attention to its objectionable features. +n the .hilippine +slands such legislation has almost anticipated the business, (hich is not yet of such proportions that it can be said to be fairly established. +t may be that the courts in the 6nited 4tates have committed themselves to a course of decisions (ith respect to billboard advertising, the full conse)uences of (hich (ere not perceived for the reason that the development of the business has been so recent that the objectionable features of it did not present themselves clearly to the courts nor to the people. 1e, in this country, have the benefit of the experience of the people of the 6nited 4tates and may ma/e our legislation preventive rather than corrective. There are in this country, moreover, on every hand in those districts (here 4panish civili0ation has held s(ay for so many centuries, examples of architecture no( belonging to a past age, and (hich are attractive not only to the residents of the country but to visitors. +f the billboard industry is permitted (ithout constraint or control to hide these

historic sites from the passerby, the country (ill be less attractive to the tourist and the people (ill suffer a district economic loss. The motion for a rehearing is therefore denied. Arellano! ".#.! $orres! and "arson! ##.! concur.

G.R. No. 111097 #*&+ 20, 199, $A%-R .A/L- .. $AG A#AS 0 H! CI % -F CAGA%AN D! -R-, petitioners, vs. .R%C! .R-.!R I!S C-R.-RA I-N, INC. 0 .HILI..IN! A$US!$!N AND GA$ING C-R.-RA I-N,respondents. Aquilino G. )imentel! #r. and Associates for petitioners. *.*. $orralba + Associates for private respondent.

CRU1, J.: There (as instant opposition (hen . -*<, announced the opening of a casino in *agayan de <ro *ity. *ivic organi0ations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the (omen@s groups and the youth. Bemonstrations (ere led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the (elfare of the city. The trouble arose (hen in 1$$", flush (ith its tremendous success in several cities, . -*<, decided to expand its operations to *agayan de <ro *ity. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to .ryce .roperties *orporation, +nc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and e)uipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the *hristmas season. The reaction of the 4angguniang .anlungsod of *agayan de <ro *ity (as s(ift and hostile. <n Becember :, 1$$", it enacted <rdinance !o. ##9# reading as follo(sD <,B+! !*F !<. ##9# ! <,B+! !*F .,<8+?+T+!- T8F +446 !*F <E ?64+!F44 .F,5+T !B * !*F>>+!- FN+4T+!- ?64+!F44 .F,5+T T< !I F4T ?>+485F!T E<, T8F 64+!- !B >><1+!- T< ?F 64FB +T4 .,F5+4F4 <, .<,T+<! T8F,F<E E<, T8F <.F, T+<! <E * 4+!<. ?F +T <,B +!FB by the 4angguniang .anlungsod of the *ity of *agayan de <ro, in session assembled thatD

4ec. 1. J That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino (ithin its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino (ithin the city limits. 4ec. ". J That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allo( the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities. 4ec. #. J .F! >T+F4. J ny violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the follo(ing penalties, to (itD a) 4uspension of the business permit for sixty (20) days for the first offense and a fine of .1,000.00Oday b) 4uspension of the business permit for 4ix (2) months for the second offense, and a fine of .#,000.00Oday c) .ermanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of <ne (1) year, for the third and subse)uent offenses. 4ec. &. J This <rdinance shall ta/e effect ten (10) days from publication thereof. !or (as this all. <n %anuary &, 1$$#, it adopted a sterner <rdinance !o. ##:9-$# reading as follo(sD <,B+! !*F !<. ##:9-$# ! <,B+! !*F .,<8+?+T+!- T8F <.F, T+<! <E * 4+!< !B .,<L+B+!.F! >TI E<, L+<> T+<! T8F,FE<,. 18F,F 4, the *ity *ouncil established a policy as early as 1$$0 against * 4+!< under its ,esolution !o. ""$9' 18F,F 4, on <ctober 1&, 1$$", the *ity *ouncil passed another ,esolution !o. "2:#, reiterating its policy against the establishment of * 4+!<' 18F,F 4, subse)uently, thereafter, it li/e(ise passed <rdinance !o. ##9#, prohibiting the issuance of ?usiness .ermit and to cancel existing ?usiness .ermit to any establishment for the using and allo(ing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of * 4+!<' 18F,F 4, under rt. #, section &97, !o. (&), sub paragraph L+ of the >ocal -overnment *ode of 1$$1 (,ep. ct :120) and under rt. $$, !o. (&), .aragraph L+ of the implementing rules of the >ocal -overnment *ode, the *ity *ouncil as the >egislative ?ody shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general (elfare of the people andOor regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral (elfare of the community' !<1 T8F,FE<,F,

?F +T <,B +!FB by the *ity *ouncil in session duly assembled thatD 4ec. 1. J The operation of gambling * 4+!< in the *ity of *agayan de <ro is hereby prohibited. 4ec. ". J ny violation of this <rdinance shall be subject to the follo(ing penaltiesD a) dministrative fine of .9,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation underta/ing the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling * 4+!< in the *ity and closure thereof' b) +mprisonment of not less than six (2) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of .9,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, andOor any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling * 4+!<. 4ec. #. J This <rdinance shall ta/e effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local ne(spaper of general circulation. .ryce assailed the ordinances before the *ourt of ppeals, (here it (as joined by . -*<, as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. <n 5arch #1, 1$$#, the *ourt of ppeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the (rit prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 ,econsideration of this decision (as denied on %uly 1#, 1$$#. 2 *agayan de <ro *ity and its mayor are no( before us in this petition for revie( under ,ule &9 of the ,ules of *ourt. 2 They aver that the respondent *ourt of ppeals erred in holding thatD 1. 6nder existing la(s, the 4angguniang .anlungsod of the *ity of *agayan de <ro does not have the po(er and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a . -*<, gambling casino (ithin the *ity@s territorial limits. ". The phrase 3gambling and other prohibited games of chance3 found in 4ec. &97, par. (a), sub-par. (1) J (v) of ,. . :120 could only mean 3illegal gambling.3 #. The )uestioned <rdinances in effect annul ..B. 172$ and are therefore invalid on that point. &. The )uestioned <rdinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to coc/fighting and are therefore invalid on that point. 9. The )uestioned <rdinances are not reasonable, not consonant (ith the general po(ers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent (ith the la(s or policy of the 4tate. 2. +t had no option but to follo( the ruling in the case of ,asco! et al. v. )AG"-*! -.,. !o. $12&$, 5ay 1&, 1$$1, 1$: 4*, 9# in disposing of the issues presented in this present case. . -*<, is a corporation created directly by ..B. 172$ to help centrali0e and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea (ithin the territorial jurisdiction of the .hilippines. +n ,asco v. )hilippine Amusements and Gamin( "orporation , , this *ourt sustained the

constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the ?+, and the ?ureau of *ustoms. *agayan de <ro *ity, li/e other local political subdivisions, is empo(ered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the >ocal -overnment *ode. +t is expressly vested (ith the police po(er under (hat is /no(n as the -eneral 1elfare *lause no( embodied in 4ection 12 as follo(sD 4ec. 12. J -eneral 1elfare. J Fvery local government unit shall exercise the po(ers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as (ell as po(ers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those (hich are essential to the promotion of the general (elfare. 1ithin their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. +n addition, 4ection &97 of the said *ode specifically declares thatD 4ec. &97. J .o(ers, Buties, Eunctions and *ompensation. J (a) The 4angguniang .anlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general (elfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to 4ection 12 of this *ode and in the proper exercise of the corporate po(ers of the city as provided for under 4ection "" of this *ode, and shallD (1) pprove ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shallD xxx xxx xxx (v) Fnact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drun/enness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute,(amblin( and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and (ays to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delin)uency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the (elfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city' This section also authori0es the local government units to regulate properties and businesses (ithin their territorial limits in the interest of the general (elfare. 5 The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the 4angguniang .anlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, (hich are detrimental to the people. -ambling is not allo(ed by general la( and even by the *onstitution itself. The legislative po(er conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all /inds of gambling and not only

over 3illegal gambling3 as the respondents erroneously argue. Fven if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under ..B. 172$, the government of *agayan de <ro *ity has the authority to prohibit them (ithin its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the >ocal -overnment *ode. +t is submitted that this interpretation is consonant (ith the policy of local autonomy as mandated in rticle ++, 4ection "9, and rticle N of the *onstitution, as (ell as various other provisions therein see/ing to strengthen the character of the nation. +n giving the local government units the po(er to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the >ocal -overnment *ode has recogni0ed the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general (elfare of their inhabitants in line (ith the policies of the 4tate. The petitioners also stress that (hen the *ode expressly authori0ed the local government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, li/e craps, baccarat, blac/jac/ and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling (ithout distinction. .bi le& non distin(uit! nec nos distin(uere debemos. 3 <ther(ise, it (ould have expressly excluded from the scope of their po(er casinos and other forms of gambling authori0ed by special la(, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all /inds of gambling (ithin their territories, including the operation of casinos. The adoption of the >ocal -overnment *ode, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the . -*<,. The *ode is not only a later enactment than ..B. 172$ and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies bet(een them. 5ore than this, the po(ers of the . -*<, under the decree are expressly discontinued by the *ode insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to .ar. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follo(sD (f) ll general and special la(s, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof (hich are inconsistent (ith any of the provisions of this *ode are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. +t is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the >ocal -overnment *ode on ..B. 172$, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance (ith the direction in the *ode calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local government units. 4ection 9 of the *ode specifically providesD 4ec. 9. ,ules of +nterpretation. J +n the interpretation of the provisions of this *ode, the follo(ing rules shall applyD (a) Any provision on a power of a local (overnment unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor! and in case of doubt! any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local (overnment unit . ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the po(er shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned' xxx xxx xxx (c) $he (eneral welfare provisions in this "ode shall be liberally interpreted to (ive more powers to local (overnment units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the )uality of life for the people in the community' . . . (Fmphasis supplied.)

Einally, the petitioners also attac/ gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the *onstitution and several decisions of this *ourt expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invo/e the 4tate policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of ..S. v. Salaveria, 7 (hich sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of pan(uin(ue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the (isdom of ..B. 172$ ((hich they describe as 3a martial la( instrument3) in creating . -*<, and authori0ing it to operate casinos 3on land and sea (ithin the territorial jurisdiction of the .hilippines.3 This is the opportune time to stress an important point. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. -ambling is not illegal per se. 1hile it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the *onstitution categorically proscribing or penali0ing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. +t is left to *ongress to deal (ith the activity as it sees fit. +n the exercise of its o(n discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allo( it (ithout limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allo( others for (hatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited ueten( and monte but permits lotteries, coc/fighting and horse-racing. +n ma/ing such choices, *ongress has consulted its o(n (isdom, (hich this *ourt has no authority to revie(, much less reverse. 1ell has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 4 That is the prerogative of the political departments. +t is settled that )uestions regarding the (isdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to (hich the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. 1hichever (ay these branches decide, they are ans(erable only to their o(n conscience and the constituents (ho (ill ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. The only )uestion (e can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of <rdinance !o. ##99 and <rdinance !o. ##:9-$# as enacted by the 4angguniang .anlungsod of *agayan de <ro *ity. nd (e shall do so only by the criteria laid do(n by la( and not by our o(n convictions on the propriety of gambling. The tests of a valid ordinance are (ell established. long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the follo(ing substantive re)uirementsD 1) +t must not contravene the constitution or any statute. ") +t must not be unfair or oppressive. #) +t must not be partial or discriminatory. &) +t must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 9) +t must be general and consistent (ith public policy. 2) +t must not be unreasonable. 1e begin by observing that under 4ec. &97 of the >ocal -overnment *ode, local government units are authori0ed to prevent or suppress, among others, 3gambling and other prohibited games of chance.3 <bviously, this provision excludes games of chance (hich are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by la(. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the *ode could have excluded such games of chance but did not. +n fact it does. The language of the section is clear and

unmista/able. 6nder the rule of noscitur a sociis, a (ord or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, (ords (ith (hich it is associated. ccordingly, (e conclude that since the (ord 3gambling3 is associated (ith 3and other prohibited games of chance,3 the (ord should be read as referring to only illegal gambling (hich, li/e the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. 1e could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem )uite conclusively. ?ut (e (ill not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of *agayan de <ro *ity, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this *ourt. The apparent fla( in the ordinances in )uestion is that they contravene ..B. 172$ and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent . -*<, from exercising the po(er conferred on it to operate a casino in *agayan de <ro *ity. The petitioners have an ingenious ans(er to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed ..B. 172$ for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the >ocal -overnment *ode itself, (hich (as also enacted by the national la(ma/ing authority. +n their vie(, the decree has been, not really repealed by the *ode, but merely 3modified pro tanto3 in the sense that . -*<, cannot no( operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of ..B. 172$ by the >ocal -overnment *ode is permissible because one la( can change or repeal another la(. +t seems to us that the petitioners are playing (ith (ords. 1hile insisting that the decree has only been 3modifiedpro tanto,3 they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the *ode has shorn . -*<, of all po(er to centrali0e and regulate casinos. 4trictly spea/ing, its operations may no( be not only prohibited by the local government unit' in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by 4ection &97 of the *ode if the (ord 3shall3 as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. >ocal government units have no( no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, (hich in the petitioners@ vie( includes both legal and illegal gambling. 6nder this construction, . -*<, (ill have no more games of chance to regulate or centrali0e as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the *ode. +n this situation, . -*<, cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a (hite elephant and (ill no longer be able to exercise its po(ers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos. +t is note(orthy that the petitioners have cited only .ar. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision (hich painsta/ingly mentions the specific la(s or the parts thereof (hich are repealed (or modified) by the *ode. 4ignificantly, ..B. 172$ is not one of them. reading of the entire repealing clause, (hich is reproduced belo(, (ill disclose the omissionD 4ec. 9#&. ,epealing *lause. J (a) ?atas .ambansa ?lg. ##:, other(ise /no(n as the 3>ocal -overnment *ode,3 Fxecutive <rder !o. 11" (1$7:), and Fxecutive <rder !o. #1$ (1$77) are hereby repealed. (b) .residential Becree !os. 27&, 11$1, 1907 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of 4ections ", #, and & of ,epublic ct !o. 1$#$ regarding hospital fund' 4ection #, a (#) and b (") of ,epublic ct. !o. 9&&: regarding the 4pecial Fducation Eund' .residential Becree !o. 1&& as amended by .residential Becree !os. 99$ and 1:&1' .residential Becree !o. "#1 as amended' .residential Becree !o. &#2 as amended by .residential Becree !o. 997' and .residential

Becree !os. #71, &#2, &2&, &::, 9"2, 2#", :9", and 11#2 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. (d) .residential Becree !o. 19$& is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locallyfunded projects. (e) The follo(ing provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent (ith the provisions of this *odeD 4ections ", 12, and "$ of .residential Becree !o. :0&' 4ections 1" of .residential Becree !o. 7:, as amended' 4ections 9", 9#, 22, 2:, 27, 2$, :0, :1, :", :#, and :& of .residential Becree !o. &2#, as amended' and 4ection 12 of .residential Becree !o. $:", as amended, and (f) ll general and special la(s, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof (hich are inconsistent (ith any of the provisions of this *ode are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Eurthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmista/able sho(ing of such intention. +n /ichauco + "o. v. Apostol, 10 this *ourt explainedD The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the la(ma/ing po(er to abrogate the prior la(, this intention must be given effect' but there must al(ays be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former la( (ill not be imputed to the >egislature (hen it appears that the t(o statutes, or provisions, (ith reference to (hich the )uestion arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of ..B. 172$. <n the contrary, as the private respondent points out, . -*<, is mentioned as the source of funding in t(o later enactments of *ongress, to (it, ,. . :#0$, creating a ?oard of *laims under the Bepartment of %ustice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and ,. . :2&7, providing for measures for the solution of the po(er crisis. . -*<, revenues are tapped by these t(o statutes. This (ould sho( that the . -*<, charter has not been repealed by the >ocal -overnment *ode but has in fact been improved as it (ere to ma/e the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government. +t is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both la(s deserve a becoming respect as the handi(or/ of a coordinate branch of the government. <n the assumption of a conflict bet(een ..B. 172$ and the *ode, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmoni0ing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the >ocal -overnment *ode, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all /inds of gambling (ithin their territories except only those allo(ed by statutes li/e ..B. 172$. The exception reserved in such la(s must be read into the *ode, to ma/e both the *ode and such la(s e)ually effective and mutually complementary. This approach (ould also affirm that there are indeed t(o /inds of gambling, to (it, the illegal and those authori0ed by la(. >egali0ed gambling is not a modern concept' it is probably as old as illegal

gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners@ suggestion that the *ode authori0es them to prohibit all /inds of gambling (ould erase the distinction bet(een these t(o forms of gambling (ithout a clear indication that this is the (ill of the legislature. .lausibly, follo(ing this theory, the *ity of 5anila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the .hilippine *harity 4(eepsta/es <ffice from conducting a lottery as authori0ed by ,. . 112$ and ?... &" or stop the races at the 4an >a0aro 8ippodrome as authori0ed by ,. . #0$ and ,. . $7#. +n light of all the above considerations, (e see no (ay of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in )uestion are valid. <n the contrary, (e find that the ordinances violate ..B. 172$, (hich has the character and force of a statute, as (ell as the public policy expressed in the decree allo(ing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. The rationale of the re)uirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. 5unicipal governments are only agents of the national government. >ocal councils exercise only delegated legislative po(ers conferred on them by *ongress as the national la(ma/ing body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise po(ers higher than those of the latter. +t is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of *ongress, from (hich they have derived their po(er in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
5unicipal corporations o(e their origin to, and derive their po(ers and rights (holly from the legislature. +t breathes into them the breath of life, (ithout (hich they cannot exist. s it creates, so it may destroy. s it may destroy, it may abridge and control. 6nless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if (e can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a (rong, s(eep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the 4tate, and the corporation could not prevent it. 1e /no( of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at (ill of the legislature. 11

This basic relationship bet(een the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the ne( provisions in the *onstitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. 1ithout meaning to detract from that policy, (e here confirm that *ongress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree no( than under our previous *onstitutions. The po(er to create still includes the po(er to destroy. The po(er to grant still includes the po(er to (ithhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the *onstitution, li/e the direct conferment on the local government units of the po(er to tax, 12(hich cannot no( be (ithdra(n by mere statute. ?y and large, ho(ever, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, (hich cannot defy its (ill or modify or violate it. The *ourt understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the (elfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the (elfare of *agayan de <ro *ity (ill be endangered by the opening of the casino. 1e share the vie( that 3the hope of large or easy gain, obtained (ithout special effort, turns the head of the (or/man312 and that 3habitual gambling is a cause of la0iness and ruin.3 1, +n )eople v. Gorosti0a , 15 (e declaredD 3The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The la(s against gambling must be enforced to the limit.3 -eorge 1ashington called gambling 3the child of avarice, the brother of ini)uity and the father of mischief.3 !evertheless, (e must recogni0e the po(er of the legislature to decide, in its o(n (isdom, to legali0e certain forms of gambling, as (as done in ..B. 172$ and impliedly affirmed in the >ocal -overnment *ode. That decision can be revo/ed by this *ourt only if it contravenes the *onstitution as the touchstone of all official acts. 1e do not find such contravention here. 1e hold that the po(er of . -*<, to centrali0e and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea (ithin the territorial jurisdiction of the .hilippines, remains unimpaired. ..B.

172$ has not been modified by the >ocal -overnment *ode, (hich empo(ers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by la(. *asino gambling is authori0ed by ..B. 172$. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. 8ence, it (as not competent for the 4angguniang .anlungsod of *agayan de <ro *ity to enact <rdinance !o. ##9# prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and <rdinance !o. ##:9-$# prohibiting the operation of casinos. Eor all their praise(orthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to ..B. 172$ and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. 18F,FE<,F, the petition is BF!+FB and the challenged decision of the respondent *ourt of ppeals is EE+,5FB, (ith costs against the petitioners. +t is so ordered. 1arvasa! ".#.! 'eliciano! ,idin! *e(alado! *omero! ,ellosillo! 2elo! 3uiason! )uno! 4itu(! 5apunan and 2endo0a! ##.! concur.

Se5ara'e -56n6on7

.ADILLA, J., concurringD + concur (ith the majority holding that the city ordinances in )uestion cannot modify much less repeal . -*<,@s general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos any(here in the .hilippines under .residential Becree !o. 172$. +n ,asco v. )hilippine Amusement and Gamin( "orporation 6)AG"-*7, 1$: 4*, 9", + stated in a separate opinion thatD . . . + agree (ith the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity /no(n as gambling properly pertain to 3state policy8. +t is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on (hat government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy.3 (Fmphasis supplied) 8o(ever, despite the le(ality of the opening and operation of a casino in *agayan de <ro *ity by respondent . -*<,, + (ish to reiterate my vie( that gambling in any form runs counter to the government@s o(n efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Eilipino moral character (hich is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. +t is in the light of this alarming perspective that + call upon government to carefully (eigh the advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country.

That the . -*<, contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this (ill not help improve, but (ill cause a further deterioration in the Eilipino moral character. +t is (orth remembering in this regard that, 1) (hat is legal is not al(ays moral and ") the ends do not al(ays justify the means. s in ,asco, + can easily visuali0e prostitution at par (ith (amblin(. nd yet, legali0ation of the former (ill not render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue for the government can be reali0ed from it. The same is true of gambling. +n the present case, it is my considered vie( that the national government (through . -*<,) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of imposin( the gambling casino on the residents of *agayan de <ro *ity' for it is abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the )uestion must be seriously deliberatedD (ill the prospects of revenue to be reali0ed from the casino out(eigh the further destruction of the Eilipino sense of valuesG

DA8ID!, #R., J., concurringD 1hile + concur in part (ith the majority, + (ish, ho(ever, to express my vie(s on certain aspects of this case. +. +t must at once be noted that private respondent .ryce .roperties *orporation (.,I*F) directly filed (ith the *ourt of ppeals its so-called petition for prohibition! thereby invo/ing the said court@s original jurisdiction to issue (rits of prohibition under 4ection $(1) of ?... ?lg. 1"$. s + see it, ho(ever, the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory reliefD to declare null and unconstitutional J for, inter alia, having been enacted (ithout or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent (ith public policy J the challenged ordinances enacted by the San((unian( )an(lun(sod of the *ity of *agayan de <ro. The intervention therein of public respondent .hilippine musement and -aming *orporation (. -*<,) further underscores the 3declaratory relief3 nature of the action. . -*<, assails the ordinances for being contrary to the non-impairment and e)ual protection clauses of the *onstitution, violative of the >ocal -overnment *ode, and against the 4tate@s national policy declared in ..B. !o. 172$. ccordingly, the *ourt of ppeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Fven assuming ar(uendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this *ourt@s established policy relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed (ith the ,egional Trial *ourt of *agayan de <ro *ity. + find no special or compelling reason (hy it (as not filed (ith the said court. + do not (ish to entertain the thought that .,I*F doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in (hich case the filing of the petition (ith the *ourt of ppeals may have been impelled by tactical considerations. dismissal of the petition by the *ourt of ppeals (ould have been in order pursuant to our decisions in )eople vs. "uaresma (1:" 4*, &19, A1$7$C) and Defensor-Santia(o vs. 4asque0 ("1: 4*, 2## A1$$#C). +n "uaresma, this *ourt statedD last (ord. This court@s original jurisdiction to issue (rits of certiorari (as (ell as prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. +t is shared by this *ourt (ith ,egional Trial *ourts (formerly *ourts of Eirst +nstance), (hich may issue the (rit, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. +t is also shared by this court, and by the ,egional Trial *ourt, (ith the *ourt

of ppeals (formerly, +ntermediate ppellate *ourt), although prior to the effectivity of,atas )ambansa ,ilan( 19: on ugust 1&, 1$71, the latter@s competence to issue the extraordinary (rits (as restricted by those 3in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.3 This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, ho(ever, to be ta/en as according to parties see/ing any of the (rits an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to (hich application therefor (ill be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the revenue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary (rits. becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary (rits against first level (3inferior3) courts should be filed (ith the ,egional Trial *ourt, and those against the latter, (ith the *ourt of ppeals. direct invocation of the 4upreme *ourt@s original jurisdiction to issue these (rits should be allo(ed only (hen there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. +t is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the *ourt@s time and attention (hich are better devoted to those matters (ithin its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-cro(ding of the *ourt@s doc/et. +ndeed, the removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the *ourt of ppeals in this regard, supra J resulting from the deletion of the )ualifying phrase, 3in aid of its appellate jurisdiction3 J (as evidently intended precisely to relieve this *ourt pro tanto of the burden of dealing (ith applications for extraordinary (rits (hich, but for the expansion of the ppellate *ourt@s corresponding jurisdiction, (ould have had to be filed (ith it. (citations omitted) nd in 4asque0, this *ourt saidD <ne final observation. 1e discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants (ho initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by see/ing relief directly from this *ourt despite the fact that the same is available in the lo(er courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by la( to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the previous time of this *ourt but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or other(ise, in the adjudication of the case (hich often has to be remanded or referred to the lo(er court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better e)uipped to resolve the issues since this *ourt is not a trier of facts. 1e, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this *ourt (ill not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or (here exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy (ithin and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. ++. The challenged ordinances are (a) <rdinance !o. ##9# entitled, 3 An -rdinance )rohibitin( the ;ssuance of ,usiness )ermit and "ancelin( %&istin( ,usiness )ermit $o Any %stablishment for the .sin( and Allowin( to be .sed ;ts )remises or )ortion $hereof for the -peration of "asino ,3 and (b) <rdinance !o. ##:9-$# entitled, 3An -rdinance )rohibitin( the -peration of "asino and )rovidin( )enalty for 4iolation $herefor.3 They (ere enacted to implement ,esolution !o. ""$9 entitled, 3*esolution Declarin( As a 2atter of )olicy to )rohibit and<or 1ot to Allow the %stablishment of the Gamblin( "asino in the "ity of "a(ayan de -ro,3 (hich (as promulgated on 1$ !ovember 1$$0 J nearly t(o years before .,I*F and . -*<, entered into a contract of lease under (hich the latter

leased a portion of the former@s .ryce .la0a 8otel for the operation of a gambling casino J (hich resolution (as vigorously reiterated in ,esolution !o. "2:# of 1$ <ctober 1$$". The challenged ordinances (ere enacted pursuant to the 4angguniang .anglungsod@s express po(ers conferred by 4ection &97, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (#)-(ii), and (&)-(i), (iv), and (vii), >ocal -overnment *ode, and pursuant to its implied po(er under 4ection 12 thereof (the general (elfare clause) (hich readsD 4ec. 12. General =elfare. J Fvery local government unit shall exercise the po(ers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as (ell as po(ers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those (hich are essential to the promotion of the general (elfare. 1ithin their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. The issue that necessarily arises is (hether in granting local governments (such as the *ity of *agayan de <ro) the above po(ers and functions, the >ocal -overnment *ode has, pro tanto, repealed ..B. !o. 172$ insofar as . -*<,@s general authority to establish and maintain gambling casinos any(here in the .hilippines is concerned. + join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot repeal ..B. !o. 172$. +++. The nullification by the *ourt of ppeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in contravention to ..B. !o. 172$ is un(arranted. contravention of a la( is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. +n any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as offending ..B. !o. 172$. They can be reconciled, (hich is not impossible to do. 4o reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not applying to . -*<,. +L. Erom the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of *agayan de <ro *ity are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city. -ambling, even if legali0ed, (ould be inimical to the general (elfare of the inhabitants of the *ity, or of any place for that matter. The . -*<,, as a government-o(ned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the people of the *ity of *agayan de <ro and should not impose its (ill upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.

9 Se5ara'e -56n6on7

G.R. No7. 49494-99 -c'ober 1, 1990 $UNICI.ALI % -F $A:A I, petitioner, vs. H! H-N-RA/L! C-UR -F A..!ALS, H-N. SAL8AD-R .. D! GU1$AN, #R., a7 #*d;e R C o( $a<a'6, /ranc= C>LII AD$IRAL FINANC! CR!DI -RS C-NS-R IU$, INC., and SH!RIFF SIL8IN- R. .AS RANA, respondents. Defante + %le(ado for petitioner. *oberto ,. /u(ue for private respondent Admiral 'inance "reditors> "onsortium! ;nc. R!S-LU I-N

C-R ?S, J.: The present petition for revie( is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by petitioner 5unicipality of 5a/ati against private respondent dmiral Einance *reditors *onsortium, +nc., 8ome ?uilding 4ystem = ,ealty *orporation and one rceli .. %o, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at 5ayapis 4t., 4an ntonio Lillage, 5a/ati and registered in the name of rceli .. %o under T*T !o. 4-9&$$. +t appears that the action for eminent domain (as filed on 5ay "0, 1$72, doc/eted as *ivil *ase !o. 1#2$$. ttached to petitioner@s complaint (as a certification that a ban/ account ( ccount !o. 4O "29-9#:19&-#) had been opened (ith the .!? ?uendia ?ranch under petitioner@s name containing the sum of .&1:,910.00, made pursuant to the provisions of .res. Becree !o. &". fter due hearing (here the parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the property, respondent ,T* judge rendered a decision on %une &, 1$7:, fixing the appraised value of the property at .9,"$1,222.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of .##7,120.00 (hich (as earlier released to private respondent. fter this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the issuance of a (rit of execution. This motion (as granted by respondent ,T* judge. fter issuance of the (rit of execution, a !otice of -arnishment dated %anuary 1&, 1$77 (as served by respondent sheriff 4ilvino ,. .astrana upon the manager of the .!? ?uendia ?ranch. 8o(ever, respondent sheriff (as informed that a 3hold code3 (as placed on the account of petitioner. s a result of this, private respondent filed a motion dated %anuary ":, 1$77 praying that an order be issued directing the ban/ to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount e)uivalent to the unpaid balance due under the ,T* decision dated %une &, 1$7:. .etitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments (hich the respondent ,T* judge failed to state in his decision. .rivate respondent filed its opposition to the motion. .ending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on %uly "0, 1$77 a 35anifestation3 informing the court that private respondent (as no longer the true and la(ful o(ner of the subject property because a ne( title over the property had been registered in the name of .hilippine 4avings ?an/,

+nc. (.4?) ,espondent ,T* judge issued an order re)uiring .4? to ma/e available the documents pertaining to its transactions over the subject property, and the .!? ?uendia ?ranch to reveal the amount in petitioner@s account (hich (as garnished by respondent sheriff. +n compliance (ith this order, .4? filed a manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its o(nership over the property as mortgageeOpurchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on pril "0, 1$7:. fter several conferences, .4? and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement (hereby they agreed to divide bet(een themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings. ,espondent trial judge subse)uently issued an order dated 4eptember 7, 1$77 (hichD (1) approved the compromise agreement' (") ordered .!? ?uendia ?ranch to immediately release to .4? the sum of .&,$9#,902.&9 (hich corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property under the ,T* decision dated %une &, 1$7:, from the garnished account of petitioner' and, (#) ordered .4? and private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the subject property in favor of petitioner. .etitioner@s motion to lift the garnishment (as denied. .etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, (hich (as duly opposed by private respondent. <n the other hand, for failure of the manager of the .!? ?uendia ?ranch to comply (ith the order dated 4eptember 7, 1$77, private respondent filed t(o succeeding motions to re)uire the ban/ manager to sho( cause (hy he should not be held in contempt of court. Buring the hearings conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the .!? ?uendia ?ranch, a 5r. ntonio ?autista, informed the court that he (as still (aiting for proper authori0ation from the .!? head office enabling him to ma/e a disbursement for the amount so ordered. Eor its part, petitioner contended that its funds at the .!? ?uendia ?ranch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so (ould result in the disbursement of public funds (ithout the proper appropriation re)uired under the la(, citing the case of *epublic of the )hilippines v. )alacio A-.,. !o. >-"0#"", 5ay "$, 1$27, "# 4*, 7$$C. ,espondent trial judge issued an order dated Becember "1, 1$77 denying petitioner@s motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated in *epublic v. )alacio did not apply to the case because petitioner@s .!? ccount !o. 4O "29-9#:19&-# (as an account specifically opened for the expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to .res. Becree !o. &". ,espondent ,T* judge li/e(ise declared 5r. ntonio ?autista guilty of contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated 4eptember 7, 1$77, and thus ordered his arrest and detention until his compliance (ith the said order. .etitioner and the ban/ manager of .!? ?uendia ?ranch then filed separate petitions for certiorari (ith the *ourt of ppeals, (hich (ere eventually consolidated. +n a decision promulgated on %une "7, 1$7$, the *ourt of ppeals dismissed both petitions for lac/ of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of respondent ,T* judge over the funds contained in petitioner@s .!? ccount !o. "29-9#:19&-#, and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds. +ts motion for reconsideration having been denied by the *ourt of ppeals, petitioner no( files the present petition for revie( (ith prayer for preliminary injunction. <n !ovember "0, 1$7$, the *ourt resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent ,T* judge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing andOor carrying out the ,T* order dated Becember "1, 1$77 and the (rit of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. .rivate respondent then filed its comment to the petition, (hile petitioner filed its reply. .etitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the *ourt of ppeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually t(o accounts (ith the .!? ?uendia ?ranch, to (itD

xxx xxx xxx (1) ccount !o. 4O "29-9#:19&-# J exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property, (ith an outstanding balance of .$$,:&#.$&. (") ccount !o. 4O "2#-9#0790-: J for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government, (ith a balance of .1:0,0$7,&"1.:", as of %uly 1", 1$7$. xxx xxx xxx A.etition, pp. 2-:' *ollo, pp. 11-1".C ?ecause the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this *ourt the existence of t(o ban/ accounts, it may fairly be as/ed (hether the second account (as opened only for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent ,T* judge and the decision of the *ourt of ppeals, and strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as enunciated in *epublic v. )alacioAsupra.C t any rate, the *ourt (ill give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues presented based on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner. dmitting that its .!? ccount !o. 4O "29-9#:19&-# (as specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to .$$,:&#.$&. 8o(ever, it is petitioner@s main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent ,T* judge involved the net amount of .&,$29,902.&9, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of .$$,:&#.$&, (hich are public funds earmar/ed for the municipal government@s other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution (ithout the proper appropriation re)uired under the la(. There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second .!? ccount !o. 4O "2#9#0790-: are public funds of the municipal government. +n this jurisdiction, (ell-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless other(ise provided for by statute A,epublic v. .alacio, supra.' The *ommissioner of .ublic 8igh(ays v. 4an Biego, -.,. !o. >-#00$7, Eebruary 17, 1$:0, #1 4*, 212C. 5ore particularly, the properties of a municipality, (hether real or personal, (hich are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. 5unicipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and mar/et fees, and (hich are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution A See Liuda Be Tan Toco v. The 5unicipal *ouncil of +loilo, &$ .hil. 9" (1$"2)D The 5unicipality of .aoay, +locos !orte v. 5anaois, 72 .hil. 2"$ (1$90)' 5unicipality of 4an 5iguel, ?ulacan v. Eernande0, -.,. !o. 21:&&, %une "9, 1$7&, 1#0 4*, 92C. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. bsent a sho(ing that the municipal council of 5a/ati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the ,T* decision dated %une &, 1$7:, less the sum of .$$,:&#.$& deposited in ccount !o. 4O "29-9#:19&-#, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in ccount !o. 4O "2#-9#0790-:. !evertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and .4? are left (ith no legal recourse. 1here a municipality fails or refuses, (ithout justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor ASeeLiuda Be Tan Toco v. The 5unicipal *ouncil of +loilo, supra' ?aldivia v. >ota, 10: .hil. 10$$ (1$20)' Iuviengco v. -on0ales, 107 .hil. "&: (1$20)C.

+n the case at bar, the validity of the ,T* decision dated %une &, 1$7: is not disputed by petitioner. !o appeal (as ta/en therefrom. Eor three years no(, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property not(ithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply (ith its legal obligation to pay just compensation. .etitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of 5a/ati 1est 8igh 4chool since the school year 1$72-1$7:. This *ourt (ill not condone petitioner@s blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. +t cannot be over-emphasi0ed that, (ithin the context of the 4tate@s inherent po(er of eminent domain, . . . AjCust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the o(ner of the land but also the payment of the land (ithin a reasonable time from its ta/ing. 1ithout prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 3just3 for the property o(ner is made to suffer the conse)uence of being immediately deprived of his land (hile being made to (ait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope (ith his loss A*osculluela v. The 8onorable *ourt of ppeals, -.,. !o. :::29, ugust 19, 1$77, 12& 4*, #$#, &00. See also .rovincial -overnment of 4orsogon v. Lda. de Lillaroya, -.,. !o. 2&0#:, ugust ":, 1$7:, 19# 4*, "$1C. The 4tate@s po(er of eminent domain should be exercised (ithin the bounds of fair play and justice. +n the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been ta/en, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utili0ing the property for public purpose, for three (#) years, the *ourt finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. 18F,FE<,F, the *ourt ,esolved to <,BF, petitioner 5unicipality of 5a/ati to immediately pay .hilippine 4avings ?an/, +nc. and private respondent the amount of .&,$9#,902.&9. .etitioner is hereby re)uired to submit to this *ourt a report of its compliance (ith the foregoing order (ithin a non-extendible period of 4+NTI (20) B I4 from the date of receipt of this resolution. The order of respondent ,T* judge dated Becember "1, 1$77, (hich (as rendered in *ivil *ase !o. 1#2$$, is 4FT 4+BF and the temporary restraining order issued by the *ourt on !ovember "0, 1$7$ is 5 BF .F,5 !F!T. 4< <,BF,FB. 'ernan! ".#.! Gutierre0! #r.! 'eliciano and ,idin! ##.! concur.