CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

[G.R. No. 176354. August 3, 2010. T!E "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. .ILS#N L#"E/, VICT#RIN# CRU/ 0 1#NG MADA2AG ')3 $ELI"E MAGLA2A, 4R., '55us,3+ '%%,&&')ts. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a (# !here is more than one circumstance" !he facts from which the inferences are derived are proven" and

(c !he com#ination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction #e$ond reasona#le dou#t. !o uphold a conviction #ased on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an un#ro%en chain which leads one to a fair and reasona#le conclusion pointin& to the accused, to the e'clusion of the others, as the &uilt$ person. !he test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances dul$ proved must #e consistent with each other and that each and ever$ circumstance must #e consistent with the accused(s &uilt and inconsistent with the accused(s innocence. )* !he circumstantial evidence must e'clude the possi#ilit$ that some other person has committed the offense. +ere, the appellate court considered the followin& circumstances to esta#lish an un#ro%en chain of events pointin& to the lo&ical conclusion that appellants %illed the victim:

[G.R. No. 146664. August 21, 2002. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. RAMIL SA4#LGA 2 #MERA, ,ndeed, a conviction #ased on circumstantial evidence is proper if the circumstances proven constitute an un#ro%en chain which lead to a fair and reasona#le conclusion pointin& to the accused, to the e'clusion of all others, as the &uilt$ person. )3 ,n this case, the totalit$ of circumstances warrants a findin& that private complainant was raped #$ accused-appellant while the former was unconscious. !he prosecution presented credi#le and su#stantial evidence showin& interloc%in& circumstances that accused-appellant se'uall$ a#used complainant. .s pointed out #$ the Solicitor-/eneral, these circumstances are:

[G.R. No. 177741. August 25, 2007. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. LIT# MACA1ARE 8 L#"E/, '55us,3+'%%,&&')t.

!o uphold a conviction #ased on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an un#ro%en chain which leads one to a fair and reasona#le conclusion pointin& to the accused, to the e'clusion of the others, as the &uilt$ person. Circumstantial evidence on record will #e sufficient to convict the accused if it shows a series of circumstances dul$ proved and consistent with each other. Each and ever$ circumstance must #e consistent with the accused(s &uilt and inconsistent with the accused(s innocence. 0 !he circumstances must #e proved, and not themselves presumed. 1*

[G.R. No. 144405. $,9:u':8 24, 2004. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, '%%,&&,,, -s. $ERDINAND MATIT# 8 T#RRES, '.;.'. <$REDDIE,< '%%,&&')t. Circumstantial Evidence Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that 1indirectl$ proves a fact in issue throu&h an inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence esta#lished. Resort thereto is essential when the lac% of direct testimon$ would result in settin& a felon free.1 12 ,t is not a wea%er form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. 13 Cases have reco&ni4ed that in its effect upon the courts, the former ma$ surpass the latter in wei&ht and pro#ative force. 15 !o warrant a conviction #ased on circumstantial evidence, the followin& re6uisites must concur: (1 there is more than one circumstance" () the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven" and (3 the com#ination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction #e$ond reasona#le dou#t. 10 !he totalit$ of the evidence must constitute an un#ro%en chain showin& the &uilt of the accused #e$ond reasona#le dou#t. 7n the stren&th of the circumstantial evidence proven in the current case, we hold that the court a 6uo did not err in convictin& appellant of the crime char&ed. !he com#ination of the circumstances comprisin& such evidence forms an un#ro%en chain that points to appellant, to the e'clusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.

!o=(5(3, G.R. No. 146034. A%:(& 7, 2003. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. LASTIDE A. SU1E, R#LAND# M. MEN/#N, DIN# G. A2ALA >At L':g,?, 1ENEDICT# A. ACALA >At L':g,? ')3 $ELI/ARD# #NT#G, '55us,3. !he essence of evident premeditation is that the e'ecution of the crime is preceded #$ cool thou&ht and reflection upon a resolution to carr$ out the criminal intent durin& a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm 8ud&ment. 22 ,n this case, the records are #ereft of an$ evidence of evident premeditation. !here is no proof of the time when accused-appellants decided to commit the crime. 9either is there an$ showin& of how accused-appellants planned the %illin&s, nor of how much time elapsed #efore the$ e'ecuted their plan. .#sent all these, evident premeditation cannot #e appreciated. +ence, the crime committed is onl$ homicide.

!he crime of homicide is punisha#le #$ reclusion temporal. !here #ein& no apprecia#le modif$in& circumstance, the penalt$ shall #e imposed in its medium period. .ppl$in& the ,ndeterminate Sentence :aw, the minimum term of the penalt$ shall #e ta%en from the penalt$ ne't lower in de&ree, prision ma$or, which has a ran&e of from si' (2 $ears and one da$ to twelve (1) $ears. +ence, accused-appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalt$ of imprisonment from ei&ht (5 $ears and one (1 da$ of prision ma$or, as minimum, to fourteen (14 $ears, ei&ht (5 months and one (1 da$ of reclusion temporal, as ma'imum.

A9us, o* Su%,:(o: St:,)gt@

[G.R. Nos. 75671+72. $,9:u':8 26, 2000. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. #SMUND# $UERTES 0 <Do3o<A AGUSTIN LU2#NG 0 <4'5;< ')3 <4'5;(, "')g'&')< >'t &':g,?A EDGAR GI1#NEA $RANCISC# SALVA 0 <1o5@o8<A ')3 R#LAND# TAN# 0 <1o8 N,g:o< ')3 <1:')3o<, '55us,3. !he a&&ravatin& circumstance of a#use of superior stren&th, althou&h alle&ed, is a#sor#ed in treacher$ and can no lon&er #e appreciated separatel$. ,n this connection, it #ears stressin& that when treacher$ 6ualifies the crime to murder, the &eneric a&&ravatin& circumstance of a#use of superior stren&th is necessaril$ included in the former. Stated differentl$, when treacher$ 6ualifies the crime to murder, it a#sor#s a#use of superior stren&th and the latter can not #e appreciated even as a &eneric a&&ravatin& circumstance

[G.R. No. 123102. $,9:u':8 27, 2000. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. MADEL# ES"INA 2 CABASARES, '55us,3+'%%,&&')t. .s to the crime committed, the ,nformation alle&ed three 6ualif$in& circumstances a#use of superior stren&th, evident premeditation, and treacher$. !he trial court appreciated a#use of superior stren&th and evident premeditation without specif$in& which one 6ualified the crime to murder. ;e find, however, that onl$ a#use of superior stren&th 6ualified the %illin& to murder. ,n several cases, 34 we have held that an attac% made #$ a man with a deadl$ weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of a#use of that superiorit$ which his se' and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was una#le to defend herself. !his is the e'act scenario in this case. cdphil Evident premeditation, however, was not sufficientl$ proven #$ the prosecution. !he followin& re6uisites must #e esta#lished #efore evident premeditation ma$ #e considered in imposin& the proper penalt$: (a the time when the accused determined to commit the crime" (# an act manifestl$ indicatin& that the accused clun& to his determination" and (c a sufficient lapse of time #etween such determination and e'ecution to allow him to reflect upon the conse6uences of his act. 3< /iven the attendant factual circumstances in this case, we find them insufficient to esta#lish evident premeditation.

!reacher$ li%ewise did not attend the commission of the crime. !he 6ualif$in& circumstance of treacher$ can not #e ta%en into consideration in the a#sence of evidence showin& the manner of attac% and what ensued inside the hut. 9o#od$ witnessed the actual %illin&, onl$ its immediate aftermath. ;here treacher$ is alle&ed, the manner of attac% must #e proven. 32 ,t cannot #e presumed or concluded merel$ on the #asis of the resultin& crime. 33 ;hen no particulars are %nown re&ardin& the manner in which the a&&ression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim #e&an and developed, it cannot #e esta#lished from mere supposition that the accused perpetrated the %illin& with treacher$. 35 !he trial court erred in appreciatin& ni&httime as a &eneric a&&ravatin& circumstance. 9i&httime onl$ #ecomes an a&&ravatin& circumstance when (1 it is especiall$ sou&ht #$ the offender" () it is ta%en advanta&e of #$ him" or (3 it facilitates the commission of the crime #$ ensurin& the offender(s immunit$ from capture. 30 +ere, other than the time of the crime, there is nothin& else to su&&est that appellant deli#eratel$ availed himself or too% advanta&e of the circumstances of ni&httime. =urther, when the place of the crime is illuminated #$ li&ht, as in this case, ni&httime is not a&&ravatin&. 4* ,n sum, we find the crime committed #$ appellant to #e murder #ecause %illin& was 6ualified #$ a#use of superior stren&th. [G.R. No. 107660. 4u&8 1, 1777. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. C R#ME# NELL '&('s <#=,)g,< DANN2 ANGELES '&('s <D'))8 $';,< ')3 4#!N D#E, '55us,3, R#ME# NELL '&('s <#=,)g,< '%%,&&')t. !reacher$ and a#use of superior stren&th were not discussed in the trial court(s >ecision. Since the$ were alle&ed in the ,nformation, the Court pored over the records to find an$ evidentiar$ support therefor. +owever, we are also una#le to appreciate treacher$ from the prosecution(s narration of events. ?en8amin was #rin&in& several containers of water into their house when the incident occurred. !hus, #ecause his attention was focused elsewhere prior to his #rother(s sta##in&, he was not in a position to sa$ that appellant attac%ed his #rother suddenl$ and without warnin&. +e did see, however, that appellant chased his #rother with a #laded weapon and that the$ stru&&led with each other first #efore appellant sta##ed his #rother. ,n effect, he admitted that when appellant attac%ed the victim, the latter was not without a chance to defend himself. !he prosecution failed to esta#lish that the appellant emplo$ed means, methods or forms which tended directl$ and speciall$ to insure the commission of the %illin& without ris% to himself arisin& from the defense which the offended part$ mi&ht ma%e. 3<

EVIDENT "REMEDITATI#N
[G.R. No. 126074. 4u&8 13, 1777. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. ISA A1DUL, MIN2A A1DUL, MALDIS A1DUL, INGGAT D#E, ')3 4#.EN A""ANG, '55us,3, MIN2A A1DUL, '55us,3+'%%,&&')t. E@,>E9! AREBE>,!.!,79" E:EBE9!S" 97! ES!.?:,S+E>. =or evident premeditation to #e appreciated, the followin& must #e proved: 1. the time when the accused determined to commit the crime" ). an act manifestl$ indicatin& that the accused has clun& to his determination" and 3. sufficient time #etween such determination and e'ecution to allow him to

reflect upon the conse6uences of his act. .#sent an$ of these re6uisites, evident premeditation cannot #e appreciated. ;e are not convinced that evident premeditation was sufficientl$ proven. !he prosecution(s evidence did not clearl$ esta#lish #e$ond reasona#le dou#t the first and third re6uisites of evident premeditation. .lthou&h there are #ad&es of premeditation here in the present case, we can onl$ speculate as to the time elements re6uired to appreciate evident premeditation. Evident premeditation must #e esta#lished #$ clear and positive evidence and cannot #e inferred nor presumed no matter how lo&ical and pro#a#le such inferences or presumptions mi&ht #e

[G.R. No. 173246. No-,=9,: 3, 2006. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. DANTE NUEVA 8 SAMAR#, '55us,3+'%%,&&')t. ;hile evident premeditation was alle&ed in the ,nformation, the court a 6uo correctl$ concluded that this circumstance was not proven. =or evident premeditation to #e appreciated, the followin& elements must #e esta#lished: (1 the time when the accused determined to commit the crime" () an overt act manifestl$ indicatin& that the accused has clun& to his determination" and (3 sufficient lapse of time #etween decision and e'ecution to allow the accused to reflect on the conse6uences of his act. 4< Si&nificantl$, the prosecution did not even attempt to prove the presence of these elements"

[G.R. No. 116737. 4u&8 31, 2000. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. RICARD# T#RT#SA 8 1ACLA#, '55us,3+'%%,&&')t. E@,>E9! AREBE>,!.!,79" C9.@.,:,9/ ,9 C.SE .! ?.R. !he investi&ation of the whole record produces moral certaint$ in an unpre8udiced mind of appellant(s culpa#ilit$. !he %illin& was attended #$ treacher$, which 6ualifies the %illin& to murder. 9evertheless, no factual #asis e'ists for the a&&ravatin& circumstance of evident premeditation. !he testimon$ of the #aran&a$ %a&awad that in the mornin& of that fateful da$ when appellant complained a&ainst the victim is not sufficient #asis for considerin& evident premeditation. Evident premeditation ma$ not #e appreciated a#sent an$ proof as to how and when the plan to %ill was hatched or what time elapsed #efore it was carried out. !he premeditation must #e evident and not merel$ suspected. ;hile appellant mi&ht have mused a &rud&e or resentment a&ainst the victim, that circumstance alone is not conclusive proof of evident premeditation. [G.R. No. 125675. 4u&8 4, 2002. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. ALED RIVERA ')3 R#GIT# RIVERA, '55us,3+'%%,&&')ts. !he circumstance of evident premeditation cannot #e appreciated. 9o less than direct evidence of the plannin& and preparation when the plan was conceived must #e esta#lished #$ prosecution. Evident premeditation cannot #e deduced from mere presumption or speculation. !he prosecution failed to clearl$ and directl$ esta#lish evident premeditation.

[G.R. No. 106454. M':5@ 13, 1777. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. TEDD2 EUINA#, R#LAND# SIDR# ')3 1ALTA/AR #RTI/, :,s%o)3,)t+'%%,&&')ts. =or evident premeditation to #e appreciated, it is necessar$ that the prosecution must prove the followin& elements: (1 the time when the accused decided to commit the crime" () an overt act showin& that the accused clun& to their determination to commit the crime" and (3 the lapse of a sufficient period of time #etween the decision and the e'ecution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the conse6uences of the act. 44 9one of these elements could #e &athered from the evidence on record. "ENALT2 MURDERFA9us, o* su%,:(o: st:,)gt@FA&(9(

D/.R. 9os. 133411-13. =e#ruar$ )5, )**3.E AE7A:E 7= !+E A+,:,AA,9ES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. S.BCE: :7RE!7, accusedappellant. Cnder .rticle )45 of the Revised Aenal Code, as amended #$ Repu#lic .ct 32<0, the penalt$ for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Cnder .rticle 23 of the Revised Aenal Code, the death penalt$ will #e imposed on the accused if an a&&ravatin& circumstance was attendant in the commission of the crime, a#sent an$ miti&atin& circumstances. .#sent an$ a&&ravatin& circumstance, the lesser penalt$ of reclusion perpetua should #e imposed on accused-appellant. ,n this case, aside from a#use of superior stren&th which 6ualified the crime to murder, no other modif$in& circumstances was attendant in the commission of the crime. +ence, accusedappellant should #e meted onl$ the penalt$ of reclusion perpetua. D!Ehe trial court imposed an indeterminate penalt$ on accused-appellant 1ran&in& from the minimum of nine (0 $ears of prision ma$or in its medium period of fifteen (1< $ears of reclusion temporal in its medium period. !he penalt$ meted on accused-appellant is imprecise. Cnder the ,ndeterminate Sentence :aw, the trial court is mandated to impose an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term and definite ma'imum term. !he trial court must specificall$ indicate which is the minimum of the indeterminate penalt$ and which is the ma'imum of the indeterminate penalt$. ,n this case, the penalt$ for homicide under .rticle )40 of the Revised Aenal Code is reclusion temporal in its full term. !he minimum of the indeterminate penalt$, a#sent an$ modif$in& circumstances, shall #e ta%en from the full ran&e of prision ma$or and the ma'imum of the indeterminate penalt$ shall #e ta%en from medium period of reclusion temporal. +ence, accused-appellant ma$ #e meted an indeterminate penalt$ of from nine (0 $ears of prision ma$or in its medium period as minimum to fifteen (1< $ears of reclusion temporal in its medium period as ma'imum.

.s to the crime of murder committed #$ appellant, the Supreme Court a&reed with the rulin& of the trial court that a#use of superior stren&th is a#sor#ed in treacher$, hence, a#use of superior stren&th is not a separate and distinct a&&ravatin& circumstance. +owever, the Court did not a&ree with the rulin& of the trial court that althou&h treacher$ a#sor#ed a#use of superior stren&th, it is a#use of superior stren&th and not treacher$ which 6ualified the crime. ;hat should 6ualif$ the crime is treacher$ as proved and not a#use of superior stren&th. ,f treacher$

was not proved #ut a#use of superior stren&th was proved #$ the prosecution, the crime is 6ualified #$ a#use of superior stren&th. !he Court further ruled that a#use of superior stren&th is determined #$ the e'cess of the a&&ressor(s natural stren&th over that of the victim, considerin& the position of #oth and the emplo$ment of means to wea%en the defense. ,n the case at #ar, appellant was armed with a %nife and used the same in repeatedl$ sta##in& :eah. !hus, appellant a#used his superior stren&th in sta##in& :eah. [G.R. No. 123617. No-,=9,: 14, 2001. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, .!ISEN!UNT, '55us,3+'%%,&&')t. %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. STE"!EN MARG

.?CSE 7= SCAER,7R S!RE9/!+" 97! ARESE9! ,9 C.SE .! ?.R. ;e do not a&ree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficientl$ proved the 6ualif$in& circumstance of a#use of superior stren&th. .#use of superiorit$ is present whenever there is ine6ualit$ of forces #etween the victim and the a&&ressor, assumin& a situation of superiorit$ of stren&th notoriousl$ advanta&eous for the a&&ressor and selected or ta%en advanta&e of #$ him in the commission of the crime. !he fact that the victim was a woman does not, #$ itself, esta#lish that accusedappellant committed the crime with a#use of superior stren&th. !here ou&ht to #e enou&h proof of the relative stren&th of the a&&ressor and the victim. .#use of superior stren&th must #e shown and clearl$ esta#lished as the crime itself. ,n this case, no#od$ witnessed the actual %illin&.

;hile it ma$ #e true that there was no e$ewitness to the death of Elsa, the confluence of the testimonial and ph$sical evidence a&ainst accused-appellant creates an un#ro%en chain of circumstantial evidence that naturall$ leads to the fair and reasona#le conclusion that accusedappellant was the author of the crime, to the e'clusion of all others. Circumstantial evidence ma$ #e resorted to in provin& the identit$ of the accused when direct evidence is not availa#le, otherwise felons would &o scot-free and the communit$ would #e denied proper protection. !he rules on evidence and 8urisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused throu&h circumstantial evidence when the followin& re6uisites concur: (1 there must #e more than one circumstance" () the inference must #e #ased on proven facts" and (3 the com#ination of all circumstances produces a conviction #e$ond dou#t of the &uilt of the accused. ,n the case at #ar, the followin& circumstances were successfull$ proven #$ the prosecution without a shadow of dou#t, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was #rou&ht to accused-appellant(s condominium unit on Septem#er )3, 1003" that on Septem#er )4, 1003, accused-appellant(s housemaid was loo%in& for her %itchen %nife and accused-appellant &ave it to her, sa$in& that it was in his #edroom" that on Septem#er )<, 1003, accused-appellant and >emetrio Ravelo collected the dismem#ered #od$ parts of Elsa from the #athroom inside accused-appellant(s #edroom" that accused-appellant disposed of the #od$ parts #$ a roadside somewhere in San Aedro, :a&una" that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsa(s personal #elon&in&s alon& the road &oin& to ?a&ac, ?ataan" that the mutilated #od$ parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found #$ the police and 9?, a&ents at the spot where >emetrio pointed" that hair specimens found inside accused-appellant(s

#athroom and #edroom showed similarities with hair ta%en from Elsa(s head" and that the #loodstains found on accused-appellant(s #edspread, covers and in the trun% of his car, all matched Elsa(s #lood t$pe.

[G.R. No. 140731. No-,=9,: 21, 2002. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. "A1LIT# IL# 8 ACA2EN 0 <!'g'H';,< '55us,3+'%%,&&')t. 9either did a#use of superior stren&th attend the %illin& of @ir&inia 7liva. .#use of superior stren&th attend the %illin& of @ir&inia 7liva. .#use of superior stren&th depends upon the a&e, si4e and stren&th of the parties. !o ta%e advanta&e of superior stren&th is to purposel$ use e'cessive force out of proportion to the means of defense availa#le to the person attac%ed. ,n this case, the assault #$ appellant of the victim was a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an ar&ument #etween them. +ence, appellant could not have deli#eratel$ and purposel$ used e'cessive force out of proportion to the means of defense availa#le to the victim.

ALI1I [G.R. No. 102576. D,5,=9,: 17, 1777. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. NICASI# EN#4A 0 <N(5;<, 4#SE EN#4A 0 <Mo:os<, ANT#NI# GALU"AR 0 <To)8<, R#NNIE EN#4A 0 <1u3+ o8<, ')3 2#LL2 ARMADA, '55us,3+'%%,&&')ts =or ali#i to prosper as a defense, the accused must show that he was so far awa$ that he could not have #een ph$sicall$ present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinit$ at the time of its commission and that his presence elsewhere renders it impossi#le for him to #e the &uilt$ part$. ,n this case, 9icasio admitted he was within the vicinit$ of the crime #ut presented the lame e'cuse that he was inside Salamanca(s rice mill at the time of the shootin&. +is son, .rnold, corro#orated this testimon$. ?ut it was put in dou#t #$ the testimon$ of Salamanca, who stated that no millin& of pala$ in his ricemill was &oin& on at the time of the shootin&. .li#i, especiall$ when it is corro#orated mainl$ #$ relatives and friends of the accused, is held #$ this Court with e'treme suspicion for ali#i is eas$ to fa#ricate and concoct. [G.R. Nos. 75671+72. $,9:u':8 26, 2000. "E#"LE #$ T!E "!ILI""INES, %&'()t(**+'%%,&&,,, -s. #SMUND# $UERTES 0 <Do3o<A AGUSTIN LU2#NG 0 <4'5;< ')3 <4'5;(, "')g'&')< >'t &':g,?A EDGAR GI1#NEA $RANCISC# SALVA 0 <1o5@o8<A ')3 R#LAND# TAN# 0 <1o8 N,g:o< ')3 <1:')3o<, '55us,3. !he a&&ravatin& circumstance of a#use of superior stren&th, althou&h alle&ed, is a#sor#ed in treacher$ and can no lon&er #e appreciated separatel$. ,n this connection, it #ears stressin& that when treacher$ 6ualifies the crime to murder, the &eneric a&&ravatin& circumstance of a#use of superior stren&th is necessaril$ included in the former. Stated differentl$, when treacher$ 6ualifies the crime to murder, it a#sor#s a#use of superior stren&th and the latter can not #e appreciated even as a &eneric a&&ravatin& circumstance. cS!+aE

3. ,>." ,>." E@,>E9! AREBE>,!.!,79" E:CC,>.!E>. Evident premeditation can #e presumed where, as in this case, conspirac$ is directl$ esta#lished. !he essence of evident premeditation is that the e'ecution of the criminal act is preceded #$ cool thou&ht and reflection upon the resolution to carr$ out the criminal intent durin& the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm 8ud&ment. ,ts re6uisites are: 1.E the time the accused determined to commit the crime" ).E an act manifestl$ indicatin& that the accused has clun& to his determination" 3.E a sufficient lapse of time #etween such determination and e'ecution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.