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CHAP'TER 18
-


Civilian Power Europe and American Leadership
Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
Introduction 432 Coordination in Brussels, but
Fr0111 European political cooperation
decisions in national capitals
ta comn1on foreign poliey 433 From Iraq to the European Securit)'
Strategy
End of thc cold war and launch
of CFSP 434 ESDP enters the real world
Conclusions Fr0111 CFSP to ESDP: Britain and
France as leaders
CFSP in the context of eastern
_cnlargelnclll. . ..
.
. 438
-FU RTH ERREAD I NG .'
.440
-
441
444
448
451
':Diplomacy and defence are part of the core of state sovereignty,around whiththeprac-, ' .. "
;titioners of functional integrationtiptoed in the formative yearsof.theEuropeanUnion .'.
o ...:.:.... ." _ ,
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432 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
---,---------------------------------
Introduction
Statcs have forcign international organizations coordinate national positions.
National defence. and the 11lobilization of national resources for defencc, require cen- ,
tralized conlmand and control' concepts of national securitv and national interest
1 A j
justify strong state authority. Hardly surprisinglYl even the most [ederalist .
proponents of European integration have found foreign and security policy pecu-
liarly difficult. Cooperation in this policy field has evolved gradually, often spurred
by externa} events which exposed inadequacies. The structures and underlying
assumptions of PolicY-lnaking in this field today are lllarked by past struggles over
the balan ce bet\veen national sovereignty and effective capabilities. National political
cultures differ significantly in aS5ulllptions abouL appropriate roles in international
politics) about the projection of power beyond national boundaries, and about the
use of force. Such political cuI tures change slovvly. VI/hile a Brussels-based set of insti-
tutiOllS and procedures has emerged, intergovernlnentalism remains the nonn in the
sense that the predonlinant actors are the member govemnlents. Thi5 in pan explains
why performante in (Ominon foreign and security poliey falls 50 far short of aspira-
tio11s. None the less the increasing intensity of policy developlnen tin this field and its
increased importance in the treaties suggest elements of the policy mode of 'intensive
transgovernmentalisll1' (see Chapter 4).
\iVest European integration began under US sponsorship, vlith the European Eco-
nomic ComlTIunity (EEC), as it vvas then, 'nested' \"vithin the broader franlevv'ork of
the North Atlantic Treaty. Consultations on foreign and security policy therefore
took place vvithin Nato, \vhich provided the integrated structure for thc defence of
\vestern Europe against the Soviet-led VlarsJ\v Pact. The Treaty of ROl1le gave the
EEC llnited cOlnpetences for extern al trade relations (see Chapter 16) and assist-
ing development in fonner colonial territories. French Gaullisrs insisted an a clear
distinction bet"veen 'high' and '10,,"" politics: the EEC \vas to be confined ta the lo\v
politics of comlnercial diplomacy, Ieaving the high politics of foreign palicy and
defence to sovereign states.
Issues of national security and foreign policy \vere1 of fundan1ental to the
developnlent of \vest European integration. The French governn1ent had launched
the SChU111an Plan for a European Coal and Steel Comn1unity (ECSC) in 1950 in
response ta ntense US pressurc, to contain the reconstruction of \tVest Gernlan
industry \vithin a supranational franlcwork. The outhreak of the Korean \/\/ar thcn led
\tVashington to press for Gernlan rearn1an1ent; the Plevcn Plan for a European
Defence C0l11111unity (EDC), iuto vibich GClman units 111ight be integrated, \vas the
reluctant French response. The European Defence Ireaty, signecl in Paris in i'v1ay
1952, C0111luiuecl its signatories to design the 'poHtlcal supcrstnlcture" needed to give
the EDC direction and legitilnacy. Thc resuhing draft treaty for a European Politica]
C0111111unilY \vould havc transfonned the six founding nlcrnocr statcs into a [ornl of
federation, with a European executjve accountable to a dircctly decred European
-- ..
: .. : '
Foreign and Security Polcy 433
Parliament (EP). The Korcan armisticc and the death of Stalin in 1953, hn'v',rever, made
so direct an attac1z on tbe core of national sovereignty less cOInpelling; thc French
National AssembJy rejected the treaty. An intergovernlnental compro111ise, prornoted
by the British, brought V"/est Cennany and ItaIy, with France and the Benelux (Belgiuln,
The Netherlands, and Luxenlbourg) states 1nto the\i\lestenl European Union (WEU),
a bociv \vhich at first serveci luainlv to 1110nitor German rearmaluent.
j J
Fjve years Iater, President de Gaulle chose foreign-policy cooperation as the ground
on vvhich ta make his double challenge to US hegelnony and to the supranational
anlbitions of the infant EEC. A 'conference of heads of state and governlnent and
foreign of the Six Inet, al French invitatioll, in Paris in February 1961 'to
discover suitable means of organizing closer political cooperation' as a basis for 'a
progressively developing union' (European Parliamenl 1964). This 'Fouchet Plan'
(nalned after the French diplonlat Christian Fouchet) was vigorously opposed by
the and found little support even v"ithin the German government. With Brit-
ain applying to join the EEC, and the Kennedy administra tion calling for a new
'Atlantic partnership') this vvas an evident challenge to US leadership and to Nato
as such. De Gaulle's 1963 veto an British accession negotiations sank the initia-
and the French later Ieft Nato's integrated structures (Cleveland 1966; Grosser
1980). This chapter captures the gradual developulent of foreign and security policy
cooperation anlong lllen1ber states by analysing the hesitant moves from European
political cooperation (EPC) to a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and
the emergence of European security and defence policy (ESDP) as a part of CFSP.
the underlying thenle of national sovereignty combined with EU-level
capadty is explored through a range of examples.
FroITI European political cooperation
to common foreign policy
Foreign-policy consultations among EU members separately frOUl those within
Nato v/ere agreed as a concession to the French in 19691 after de Gaulle's depar-
ture. <European political cooperation' (EPC) was an entirely intergovernlnental
process, outside thc treaties, steered by foreign ministers and lnanagecJ by dip-
lOlnats. Ihe COlll1nission \vas rigorously excluclecl in the earIy years. In sharp
contrast to the lcaky policy-nlaking processcs of thc EEC, EPe \vas lnanagecl
conf1dentially \vith infrequent reporting to national parliaments and httle cover-
age: in the press. The evolution of cooperation in foreign policy since then has
1110ved in cyeles: ar. first hesitant steps to strengthen the fran1evvork, followed by
periods of increasing frustration at the lneagre results achieved, culminating in
further reluctan t reinforcenlcnt of the rules and procedures in the face of external
events.
Bastian Giegerich andWilliamWallace
Relations witb the US have bec.n the 1110S1. ilnportant factor in these cyeles, the
Mic1dle East the 11105t frequent and diffieuh [oens [01' transatlantic dispute. The
French government, the n10st strategic actor in prollloting a 1110rc CllltOI1Cnnous
European foreign polle)', frequently canle up against Anlcrican opposition. Diver-
gent reactions ta the Arab-lsraeli War of ()ct.ober 1973, for exanlple, cscalated into
a bitter Franco-US confrontation, with other west European governments caught
in between. European dis111ay at the dlift ofUS policy in 1979-81, over the coup in
Poland and over the revolution in lra11, as well as at their o\vn failure ta concert their
response ta the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led to rene\ved efforts ta promote
this time led by the British.
Vvestern Europe)s self-image as a 'civilian power) in the 19705 and 19805 partIy
reflected the exclusion of security and defence issues, reinforced by the unresolved
Gaullist challenge to US security leadership. The concept a150 inlplied a clailn to nor-
mative authority, portraying \vestern Europe as a nlode1 of peaceful dip10macy oper-
ating through economic instruments a self-image \\rith a particular appeal v/ithin
Germany, \vhose recent history had led ta a rejection of 'pov'ler politics' in its don1es-
tic culture (Bull 1982; Sjursen 2007). It a1so appealed ta the Comn1ission1 \vhich
had international capacities in the civilian dimensions of trade and developmenL
but was exeluded froln the 'harder' instruments of foreign policy. Foreign ll1inistries
developed extensive for consultation an such harder issues through
but with little policy output and almost no national ar European accountability.
The revolutions in central and eastern Europe in the course of 1989, and the rapid
lnoves towards Gennan unification \vhich followed in 1990, nevertheless forced
foreign and security policy up the EU's agenda. Ihe cnd of the cold \var brought
Germany back ta the centre of a potentially reunited continent, and reopcned under-
lying questions about the delicate balance between France and Gennany and about
American security leadership through Nato. \l\lest European governlnents adjusted
slowly and hesitantly ta this radical transforu1ation of their strategic environlnent.
End of the cold war and launch of CFSP
The Freneh and German governments jointly proposed, in April 1990, that the
planned intergovernmental conference (lGC) should formulate a C01111110n foreign
and security poliey (CFSP) as a cen traI feature of the EU l alongside econon1ic
and nl0netary union (EMlJ; see Chapter 7). The t"\\'o governlnents, hovvever, had
vvidely different concepts of CFSP, vvith the French govcrnnlent [ocuscd on capa-
bilities and thc Gernlan on institution-builcling. Lengthy negotiatiollS f0110WTcl,
\vith several dividing lines: bctween defenders of AUlerican leadcrship through
Nato (thc British) the Dutch anel Portllguese, and to sonlC exre.nt the Gcn11ans)
and supporters of grcater European autonolny France, and and
to S0111e extent Spain); between defcnde.rs of national sovereignty (Britain, Den-
lllark, anel France) and proponents of transfer of forcign polie)' into the C01l1111U-
nit:y franlcwork (Belgiuln, Gennany, ItaIy, and LUXC1nbol1Tg); bCPNe.en states vlith
, . .
Foreign and Security Policy 435
thc capacity and d0111CStic support for active foreign and defence policies above
alI Britain and France and those 1ike Germany for \vhich international strategy,
above a11 ll1ilitary deploynlcnt beyoncl national borders, \vas surrounc\ccl by politi-
cal inhibi tions (Cncsotto 1990). , ,
The US \vas an active player throughout thi5 lG C, detern1ined ta 1naintaill the
primacy of Nato (and thU5 of US leadership) in post-cold-war Europe. Successful
agreement an the conclusions of the post-cold-war Alliance Strategic Review,
launched in April 1990, \vas a precondition for successful agreel11ent an10ng the
then tvvelve n1cmber states (i'vlenon et al. 1992). External developments distracted
the negotiators horn their institutional designs. New regin1es to the EU's east were
pressing for the pro111ise of n1embership (see Chapter 1 7). Iraq invaded Kuwait in
August 1990; Britain and France contributed significant ground forces to the US-
led coalitiol1: "\\'ith son1e dozen ar other European countries in supporting roles.
Ihe break-up of Yugoslavia begaD- in the summer of 1991, and the Luxelnbourg
president of the Council unwisely declared as civili an ElJ monitors were deployed
in Bosnia that is the hour of Europe' (Nevv Yorh Tinles, 29 June 1991).
There vvas also an attenlpted putsch in in August 1990. The subsequent
disintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen separate states accon1panied the final
stages of the lGC.
The confident opening statelnent of Artiele J of the Maastricht Ireaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU) 'A e0111ffiOn foreign and security policy is hereby established'-
therefore papered over unresolved differenees. CFSP and justice and home affairs
UHA.; see Chapter 19) \vere to remain as the second and third 'pillars' of the EU out-
side the integrated, C0111111issioll-led first piUar. Policy initiative, representation, and
ilnplelTIentation \vere explicitly reserved ta the Couneil 'assisted if need
be by the pre'vious and next ll1ember states to hald the Presidency' in \vhat becan1e
knov/TI as the 'troika.' The COlun1ission was ta be 'fuUy with discussions
in this intergovernll1ental pillar, and 'the vie\\TS of the European Parlia1uent ... duly
taken into consideration'. Ambiguous language allowed for Joint action5' in pursuit
of agreed C0I111IlOn ail115 , and referred to 'the eventual frm.ning of a COlTIlnOn defence
\vhich might in tin1e lead to a common defence.
i\1uch of the CFSP negotiation during the IGC leading to the IEU amounted to
shaclo"\\'-boxing behind the security cover which the US provided, while monetary
union and social poliey preoccupied heads of governulent. There 'Nas little discus-
sion of the strategic in1plications of the transformation of European order, or of the
balance benvecl1 civilian and 1nilitary instrunlcnlS required for an effcctive COD1D1on
policy in this l1e\\r context (Nihlett and vVallace 2001). lt \vas only aher thc IGC
\vas concluded that the secretariat, aher negotiations \Vth Nato, persuadcd
European govenl1nents ta agrc.c, in the :PeteTsberg Deelaration' (Box 18.1), 10 dehne
a rangc of sharcd tas Izs in pcacekeeping and peaceJnaking operations. Most unrc-
solvecl issues, such as the exlent of qua1ified lnajority voting in CFSP ar hO'w to
detinc rhe overall institutionallink bet\veen thc \".1 EU and thc EU, however, werc put
off to a further IGC, ta be convened in 1996.
436 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
, . The Petersberg tasks
Petersberg Declaration, June 1992, Section II, On Strengthening WELJ's Operational
Ro/e, para 4:
'Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance \'vith Article 5 of the \j\I'ash-
ington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, miiitary uni:s of
WEU member states, aeting under the authority of WEU, coulo be employed for:
humanitaflan and reseue tasks;
peacekeeping tasks;
tasks of combat forees in crisls management, including peacemakirg:
(Western European Unon Council of Ministers, Bon:!. 19 June 1992, available 2t:
http://www.weu.int).
The Treaty of Amsterdam's substantial revisions of the Treaty on European Union's provi-
sions n Ttle V (TEU) on CFSP incorporated this list, as Article (eTEU:I. Tne Euro-
pean Securty Strategy (ESS) expanded this task spectrum and the TI"eaty of Lisbo1 (TcLL
which entered into force in Oecember 2009 following ratification bV 'aii member s:ates,
offered a further revised defintion of what the ESDP \A/as to cover. The ToL stipulates
that the EU should use both civilian and mlitary means ta conduet humanitar:an, rescue,
and dsarmament operations, provide military advice and assistanee to eountries,
and undertake conflict prevention and peacekeeping. tt furthe: specifies that the Un:on
should be able to apply combat forces ta crisis-management tasks inc!uding peacemak-
,ing and post-conflict stabilization. The Treaty observes tha: ali these tasks could also oe
,appled to the fight against terrorism, and that the EU could use ESDP to sup-
'port third countries combating terrorist activity in their territories. VVhether ar no'C the ToL
entersinto foree, it is likely that this expanded definition of tne task specuum \Nili guide
'ESOPin the future.
"
External events nevertheless drove European governn1ents to cooperate more
closely during the course of the 1990s. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force
(Unprofor), the initial peacekeeping force in Bosnia: \vas under French commancl.
The French and the British provided the largest numbers on the the Span-
i5h and Dutch also contributed substantial contingents. Other European COUll-
tries with troops in Bosnia or Croatia in early 1995 inel uded the Czech
Repuhlic, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukrainc, as \vcl1 as thc Danes, f'inns, and S\vedcs
with Nonvegians in a joint Nordic battalion. French attitudcs botb to Nata and
to Britain shifted further under thc experiencc of cooperation \\711.11 British forces
in thc field, ancl closeT appreciation of the ulility of Nato D1ilitary asscts. Anothel'
field of closer cooperatiol1 arosc fronl pressure exerted by thc EU's sourhcrn n1enl-
hers [ar Mecliterrancan progran1n1es, orientecl particularIy to\varels the Maghre.lj,
to parallel thc eastern-oriented Pharc progranl111e (Pologrle, Nongrie: assistance a la
restructuraiiml des t:cononlies) and Tec:hnical Assistance to the COl1llnc)1nvealth of
Independent States progranl1llc (TAC1S), and \v1th a cCJlllparable share of thc EU
, '"
" ...
. : .--
Foreign and Security Policy 437
budget. The Spanish presidency convened a Euro-Ivlediterranean Conferencc in
Barcelona in Noven1ber 1995, \vhich con1n1itted Lhe EU in principlc to a generous
long-term progran1n1e (Sarbe 1998). -
Nevertheless, the US continued to dominate Nato and overshad()\ved SOlne of
the cffcets of European governn1ents \-vorking closer together. For the
CS) \vhich had insisted in 1991 that Yugoslavia was no"v a European responsibiliry,
nevertheless intervened to supply and to train Croatian forces, and dominated the
negotiations \-vhich led to the Dayton Agreen1ent in December 1995 (Neville-Jones
1997). Silnilarly the l"5 through Nato continued to define East-'0/est political strat-
egy, although \vest European governments collectively and individually provided by
far the largest proportion of economic asslstance to the former socialist states includ-
1
ing Russia. An1erican officials promoted a parallel Nato dialogue \vith the Maghrebi
states. At the Nato summit in Brussels in january 1994 the Clinton adnlinistration
proposed to enlarge the alliance to Poland, and the Republic, ahead
of their projected accession to the ElL The accession to the EU in 1995 of three more
non-aligned states (Austria, Finland) and Sweden), to join neutral lreland, further
cOlnplicated the relationship between the EU and Nato.
Britain) France, and Gennany were the key players in moves towards a more effec-
tive CFSP. Painful reasseSS111ent of post-cold-war German responsiblities was lead-
ing to a gradual 'normalization) of German foreign and defence policy. Nevertheless,
continuing suppon for the principle of a conscript 'citizen army' and deep cuts in
defence spending Ieft its anned forces poorly structured and ill-equipped. Attitudes
in the British ancl French governments \vere) ho\vever, converging. The French gov-
ernnlent had explicitly lnodelled its post-Gulf-War defence review on the British
anned forces, ending conscription to focus an a s111aller, better-equipped, and more
deployable military force. Cooperation on the ground in Bosnia built n1utual respect
betvveen the French and British military. At the poliLicallevel the British and French
shared similar frustrations over the reassertion of US leadership in the Balkans and
the ilnposition of the Dayton Agreen1ent. AlI this eontributed to a convergence of
attitudes bet\veen London and Paris, though the strength of Euroscepticisln within
the British Conservative part)' and within the British press meant that its iUlplica-
tions clid not becolne evident until well after the election of a Labour government
in M.av 1997.
,
\\7ith ratification of the conlpleted only in 1993, there was little enthusiaSlTI
for the (nlajor reviev/ of CFSP in the JGC which \vas convenecl in 1996 and stretched
through lLali:J.l1, Irish, and Duteh Counci1 presidencies ovcr eighteen 1110nths. Pro-
posals [reHn 111elnber goven1l11cnts for thi5 IGC rcvivecl the debate frorn five years
earlier. As in 1990-1, intra-European negotiations on security policy and c1efence
n10ved in parallel \vith developnlents \vithin Nato.
1hc concept of a European security and defence identity (ESD [)J agreed at the J3rus-
scls Nato SU111111it in ]anuary 1994, signalled lIS wilhngness to accolIllllodate French
sensitivities, as \ve11 as US insjstence that the European allies should play a larger
rolc in n1aintaining the security of thcir own rcgion. In Decen1ber 1995 the French
438 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
govcrnlnent announced a formal return to some parts of the Nata structure, although
President Chirac Inac1e c1ear that France expected a genuinc of the
alliance in returil. His public den1and that a french ofGcer should take over Nato's
southern cOlnlnand and Washington's prcdictable refusaL dashcd hopes that
French re-entry intoNato's integratcd lnilitary structure wcould pern1it the en1ergence
of a stronger European piUar wit.hin the alliance, c10sely integrateel \vith thc EU.
From CFSP to ESDP: Britain and France as leaders
Given the reluctance of most meluber governments to clarify the strategic objectives
that CFSP should serve, innovations in this field have carne 1110fe from responses
to externa1 erises than from IGCs. The crisis in Kosovo, a Serbian province \vith an
Albanian luajority, in 1998 sent another surge of refugees through neighbouring
countries into EU member states. The US administration led a bombing ealnpaign
against Serbian targets; the British and French were willing in addition to deplo)'
substantial ground forces. Tony Blair, the neV\7 British prime 11linister, \vas shocked
to discover how feV\T troops other European governments eoulci depIo)' beyond their
borders. Over 1;000 German troops were nevertheless posted to the neighbouring
former Yugoslav Republie of Macedonia (FYROM), and German troops. participated
in the later peacekeeping force in Kosovo, after ]oschka Fischer, the Green Pan)' For-
eign Minister, had passionate1y argued the case for a change in Germany's attitude to
humanitarian crises beyond its borders.
Partly in response to Kosovo and partly to demonstrate the ne"v governlnent's
COilllnitn1ent ta closer European cooperatioll, the British no\v 1110ved fron1 Iaggard
to Ieader in prolnoting European defence integration. In the defence realIn Britain
and :=;rance stand apart horn the other EU mel11ber states. By 2008, bet\veen thelD,
they accounted for 45 per cent of defence expenditure in the EU, and 60 per cent
of spending an defence equipment; Gern1any and ltaly accounted for a further 15
per cent and 13 per cent of defence spending respectively though their equiplnent
budgets are luuch s111aller. At a bilateral Franco-British sUlnmit in Deceu1ber 1998,
Blair and Chirac issued the St Malo Declaration, robustly stating that 'thc union
lnust have the capacity for autonomous aetion, backed up by crediblc militar)'
forccs', with 111Clnber governnlcn ts operating 'Vv'ithin rhe insti tu tional frarnc\vod,
of thc European Unjon', inc1uding 'Ineetings of defencc luinislcrs'. Intensive Fran-
co-British consultations bctween political directors anei senior clcfencc officials
cxpanded bilaterally to olher kcy EU governillents, and 1.hen to thc- US; t11e N orvVf-
gians; and the Turks (as Nato menlbers). \Vithin the EU the Gern1ans and Dutch
were 1110st close1y in. Thc Social Dell1ocrat-Green c03111.10n govern111ent in
Berlin i'ound it hard t.o fornlulatc a cohcrcnt responsc: the concept of Europe as a
power for peacc, renouncing lnilitary anlbitions, rctaincd strong suppon anlong
the Gerlllan Ieft.
."0-
-
-
Foreign and Security Policy 439
Tnitial rcactions in Vv'ashington "vcre 111ixed. The North Atlantic Counei! vvhich
111el in \iVashington in April 1999 ta celebrate the fiftieth anniversarv o[ the Atlantic
-'
Alliance and ta \\iT1conle three ne"v rnc.lnbers the Czech Republic, I--Iungary,
and Po1and declarcd in its careful1y balanced cOffilDuniquc thal \ve reaffirm our
COlnnlitIDcnt to preserve the transatlantic link', but a1so 'welcolTle the new inlpetus
given to the strengthening of a C01TIlTIOn European policy in security and defence'
(Nato 1999).
The Franco-British partnership, with the support of the German Council presi-
dency in the first six months of 1999, pushed through some significant innova-
tions. The strategy "vas to focus on EU n1ilitary eapabilities n10re than institutional
change. They challenged their European partners ta reshape their armed forees, in
order to enable European states to manage peacekeeping operations outside their
region \vithout depending an the US for crucial equipment and reinforcement.
Their intention, ou tlined in the 1999 Cologne was to gain stronger
c01111nitn1ents from their partners ta build dep10yable European forces, and then
to 111erge \\7EU into the EU in the further IGC planned in 2000. They achieved
the first of these aims at the December 1999 European Council , which adopted
the 'Helsinki headline goa1s', pledging EU governments collectively ta constitute a
European Rapid Reaction Force of up ta fifteen brigades (60,000 troops), 'militarily
self-sustaining \vith the necessary command, control and intelligenee capabilities,
logistics: other c0111bat support services and as appropriate, air and
naval eleluents on operations beyond their and ta achieve this aim 'by
2003) (Council of the European Union 1999c).
A follo\v-up Capabilities Comn1itment Conference, in Noven1ber 2000, identified
the lnajor shortcomings in \veapons and transport systems, and dre'w up a list of
pledges and priorities. The \vorking nlethod was similar ta that af the Lisbon eco-
n0111ic-refornl process: intended to spread 'best practice' from the most advanced ta
the laggards; and to shame the most deficient govemn1ents into improving their per-
formances. Nineteen \vorlzing groups "vere set up to consider each target and shortfall
in 1110re detail. As sa often before, the US was sponsoring a parallei process through
1\0.1.0, the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Neither process, however, made much
impact 011 lnost governlnents. Meetings of EU defence lninisters received ahnost no
attention in parlialnents ar press. Competing pressures an national budgets blocked
any reversal in the recluction of defence spending. The Gennan government, after the
effon required ta persuacle the Bundestag to depIoy troops to diseouraged
cliscussion of \vhcther the Rapid Reactiol1 Forcc l11ight be sent beyond Europe to
Africa ar the Middlc East. In south-eastern Europe, ho\vever
1
the succession of crises
had IeEt behincl a rTIuch higher 1evel of European political and 11lilitary engagc.n1ent.
i\S the Pentagon \vithcJIT\V l.J5 troops frOTII deployrnents in Bosnia and Kosovo, the
nUDlber of contributing European countries rase.
Only the British and Frcnch governnlents vvere yet prepared ta project lnilitary
forces beyond Europe for luore than lJN peacekecping operations. A slnall British
forcc re-estabhshed order in Sierra Leonc in 2001, after a UN force of over 17,000
440 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
had [ailed to contain civil conflict. French forces intervened in Cote d'lvoire in 2002.
In a gesture o[ shared COlll111itnlent to the stability of a continent \vhere. Franco-
Bri tish rivah-y haei persisted into the 1990s, the British and French foreign 1ninisters
travelled round Africa together the same yeaL Nordic governments, the Irish and
Austrians had long contributed La UN peacckeeping operations in Africa and the
1viiddle East. While EU 111en1ber states have for decades contributed to U-N peace-
keeping missions) the number of troops deployed rose significantly in the context of
the Balkan crises. Ioday, EU member-state governments sustain bet\veen 60,000 and
70\000 troops an international crisis-management operations. \Vhile deploYlnents
are conducted through many frameworks, including the UN and since 2003 the EU's
Nato remains dominant.
CFSP in the context of eastern enlargement
The implications of the EU's forthcoming eastern enlargement for the European
region preoccupied European governments much more directly. lf enlargement is
seen as a part of the EU's foreign policy (see Chapter 17), the ext,ension of security,
prosperity, and democracy within a strong international frame\vork across eastern
Europe must be counted as a lnajor achievement. The Helsinki European Council
of December 1999 a150 sa\v reluctant heads of state and governlnent accept Iur-
key as a forn1al candidate, under intense US pressure based on Iurke;/s strategic
importance to western interests across the Middle East. Negotiations \vith Russia,
with which the EU now shared a common bordel' jointly lnanaged in un\vieldy
fashion by representatives of the COll11nission, the High and the
rotating Council Presidency ranged from relations \vith Belarus to energy secu-
rity (see Chapter 15) to the future of Kaliningrad (the Russian region surrounded
bv EU lnen1ber states), ta cross-border crilninal netvlarks. Nato enlargement

which passed another milestone \vith the Prague SUlnnlit of \vas relatively
straightforward in institutional tenns. ElT enlargement necessitatecl delicate
adjustlnents of COlnmon policies, financial flo\vs, institutional and
voting weights.
Postponelnent of decision on these issues in the Ireat)' of An1sterdan1 (IoA) required
a further IGC, ending \virh President Chirac)s mislnanaged late-night c0111promises
at Nice in Decen1ber 2000. This failure, in turn, sparkecl the propo5al for a broader
Convention on the Future of Europe, \vhich n1et fron1 lnid-2002 to Jul-y 2003, \vith
representativesofthirteen candidate states ROlnania, and Turkey)
as participating observcrs. Meanwhile the European C0I111nission v/as atternptlng to
focus the attcntion of 111elllber governments on the ilnplications of enJargClncnt for
the wider European periphery, east and south. 1n carIy 200.3 it floated proposals for
a broader European neighbourhood policy (ENP), ain1cd al providing a franlf\Vork
for economic cooperation and political consultation for the states araund thc EU's
eastern and southern borders: con1n1on foreign policy in effecL) but cleGned and
managed through civilian instrUi11ents (sec Chapter 17).

.. :,..... , ,. .
.. 1. ;yr .
- : ': . .
Foreign and Securty Policy 441
Coordination in Brussels, but decisions
-
in national capitals
The CFSP pillarren1ains largely in the hands of the member governments, although
it i5 110\V supplemented by a cluster of Brussels-based institutions. Intensive
. transgovernn1entalism thus has becolne the dOlllinant policy mode (see Chapter 4),
and its character is changing) in particular as a result of the structures created n the
v.rake of the decision to launch ESDP Heads of state and governlnent remain ultimately
responsible for CFSP and its overall direction through the European Council. The
General Affairs and External Relatons Council (GAERC, up to 2002 called the
General- Affairs Council), \vhich brings together melnber states' foreign lninisters in
monthly 111eetings, is the main decision-making body in practice. To manage better
the ever-gro\ving agendaj GAERC is divided into two sessions. The first, prepared by
the COlnlnittee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), deals with internal paliey
coordination alnong governlnents and the second, prepared by the Political and
Securitv COlnn1ittee also knovvnafterits Frenchacronym COPS) in coordination
.,
\vith Coreper, addre5ses the external din1ension. \A/hile there i5 stiU no formal
Council of Defence Ministers, they have met in informal sessions under G.l.L\.ERC
1.0 discuss military-capability questions since 2002. Furthermore) EU melnber-state
defence lninisters serve as the steering board of the European Defence Agency CEDA),
\vhich \vas created in 2004. The European Council and the GAERC are supported by
the Council Secretariat: which has acquired a substantial nUlnber of foreign affairs
officials as "ve11 as a militarv staff.
.1
The Conncil 1S forn1ally empo"vered to appoint 'special repre5entatives' forparticular
policy issues generalizing the experiment adopted (vvith Lord Carrington, David
OVlen, and CarI Bildt) [ar the Yugoslav wars. In autumn 2009, the EU had eleven
special representativcs (ElTSRs) in different regions of the world which pron10te EU
policies and seek to contribute ta their overa11 coherence and effectiveness by acting
as the :face' of the Union: Afghanistan and Pakistan, the African Great Lakes Region,
the African Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia and Georgia, Kosovo, the
formeI' Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)1 the Middle East, Moldova, the .
South Caucasus, and Sudan.
The PSC. created 011 an interim basis in 2000, was formalized in 2001 and is the
,
:,uccessor to the Political Con1111ittee ofEPe. Unlikc its its D1cmbers are
alI based in pennanent national representatives with ambassadorial rank
\<\7ho 111eet at lea:,t t\ATiee a \veelz. lts meetings are a150 attended hy representatives
[roln the COl1llnission's Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) and
Council Secretariat's Directorate-General E for External and Political-Military Affairs
and iLs Policv Unit. The PSC 1s taskcd with monitoring international afTairs, drafting
.1
poliey options for the Louneil, and overseeing the ilnplen1entation of adopted po11-
cies, thus loeated at the centre of CFSP/ESDP's day-to-day business.
,
442 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
The creation of the PSC in iLS current fann elearly refJccts reeognition on the pan
of Inember-state governments that coordination al. the centre had ta be strengthencd.
However, thc PSC is a1so a good example of the efforts governn1cnts undcrtake to
illaintain tight control of the Brussels-based 'institutions that thcy created in thc fidel of
foreign and security policy. Governlnents had rather diverging vie.v,Ts an ho\v senior
their representatives in the PSC should be, with son1e reasoning that more junior an1-
bassadors would be easier to control from capitals. Ivlore subsrantively, the divergent
views relating to the 2003 invasion of lraq illustrate that national governments \vill not
be shy ta put the brakes an if the stakes are perceived to be high. Several PSC alubassa-
dors were issued rigid and unequivocal instructions from their respective ll1inistries of
foreign affairs to resist discussion in the EU on the issue of lraq (Hoviorth 2007).
An important institutional innovation under the IoA \vas the ereation of the post
ofHigh Representative for CFSP\vhich was merged with the post ofSecretaY)T General of
the Council (HRlSG). lts holder is part of the troika, consisting since the ToA also
of the Council presidency and the COlumissioner for external relations, and is assisted
bya small Policy Unit to develop poliey and assess relevant events. The job description
for the High Representative was imprecise, beyond 4assisting: the Council. Ho\vever,
the first High Representative, former Nato Seeretary General: ]avier Solana, has lnade
himself the external face of CFSp, tirelessly travelling, in and ou t of Belgrade, Mosco\v,
and across the Middle East, while carefully avoiding too open a challenge
to luember-state autholity.As in the debate about the seniority of PSC representatives)
luember governments clicl not see eye ta eye when discussing the desirability ofhaving
a political and diplon1atic heavyweight like Salana in the HR/SG position. The UK in
particular favoured a more junior appointment whereas more integrationist-minded
governn1ents aud the Comn1ission had argued that the post should be located inside
the COlTIIUission rather than the Council.
The limited roles played by the European the Ep, and the European
Court ofjustice (EC]) further underline the dominance of the 111ember governments
through intergoven1mental structures. The Commission has only a non-exclusive
right of initiative for CFSP and despite involvement through the COllUl1issioner for
external relations in the reforn1cd troiha, it is in a difficult position to exert influence.
However, given the multi-faceted nature of mast foreign- and security-policy issues,
the Cammission, in its rale of running external economic relations1 is sOluetin1es
able to exploit crass-pillar linkages to make its voice heard. In response ta the crea-
tion of CFSP and ESDP it has furthe.r adapted its structures, for example through
the crcation of a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management UniL (CPCMU) anc1 a
further increase of the nUlnber of units directorates-general responsible. for
aspects of extenlal relations. The EP retnains linlitecl to provic1ing running C0111-
1l1cntary ou CFSP The treaty rules stipulate that the parhanlent.'s vie\vs on al] CFSP
lnatters have ta he taken into account, but in practice 111uch depends on the Council
providing a steady of infonnation and an M.EPs, especial1y in relevant spccial-
ized comluittees, developing the necessary expertisc to strengthcn the Parhame.nt's
vaice. The Ee] rC1TIains exc1uded from the CFSP pillar.
" . . 1 ..
.. .. . -.
. . .. , ...
Foreign and Security Policy 443
Political resistancc to the encroachnlent of the COD1Illission and the EP into thc
second pillar has lcssened throughsuccessive IGCs. Duplication ofIunctions between
the Con1mission and the noVvC substantial externa1 DG E of the Council Secretariat
\vas contained by easy personaj relatioI1s between So1ana and Chrislophcr Patten,
thc then COTI11Uissioncr for External Relations. Burcaucratic rivalrv is nevcrtheless

a constant problen1, in particular horn those within the Comn1ission who vicw the
expansion of the Couneil Secretariat as a threat to its powers and privileges. There
\\Tre turf battles: too, over funding CFSP activities: the Commission and the EP
\\Tere seeking to use the 1 per cent of external aetion expenditure (60 million)
alloeated to the CFSP ta introduce Community procedures and oversight, while
governments \vere torn bet\:veen seeking additional COlnUl0n funding and defending
the intergovernn1ental approach. Adlninistrative expenditure for the second pillar
and non-lnilitary operational expenditure can now be charged ta the EU budget,
leaving 'operations having military or defence implications; ta be funded by those
states \vhich have not exereised their right of constructive abstentiol1 in each case.
ESDP triggered a further raft of institutional engineering in Brussels. The EU Mili-
tary Comlnittee (EUTvIe): the Union's highest military body, was created in 2001
(ad in[eriln from 2000) and brings together member states' ehiefs of defence
(CHODs). The Ellj\1C usually meets in the form of the CHODs' military representa-
tives, \vho are often 'double-hatted' with their nation's representatives at Nato. The
EUi\1C provides unanimous advice and recommendations an military nlatters of
ESDP ta the Council, channelled through the PSC. For example, it evaluates differ-
ent options for ESDP missions, oversees the development of an operations plan, and
monitors the conduct of ESDP operations.
The Ee N1ilitary Stafe no\v l1lore than 200 strong, \\Tas set up at the salne tinle.
It ,vork5 under the political direction of the European Council through the PSC
, ,
ancl under the militarv direction of the EUMC. It eonstitutes the pernlanent
J
Brussels-based luilitary expertise that the EU can draw on for early warning
purposes, situation asseSSlnent (and intelligence cooperation), and strategic
planning tasks. It i5 organized like a directorate-general within the Counci1
Secretariat. It houses a civil-tnilitary planning ceU and, since January 2007,
the nucleus of an operations centre vvhich can, if reinforced through national
run autonomous ESDP ll1isslons of up to about 2,000 personnel. '
1Ylirroring these lnilitary bodies on the civilian side are: the Committee for Civilian
Aspects of Crisis l'vlanageluent (CIVCOM) and the Civilia11 Planning and Conduct
Capability (CPCC). CIVCOlvl adviscs and drafts recommendations for the PSC on
civihan aspects of cri5is Inanagclnent. The cpec has a luanclate to plan and concluct
civilian ESDP opcrations ancl in general assist thc Council with regarcl to civilian
1111ss10ns. Thc ercc Director serves as EU Civilian Operations COffiTnandcr.
severa1 agencies play ilnportant enabling rales. The l:DA is warking an
de[ence capabilitics clevclopll1ent, armaments cooperatiop., the European defencc
technological and industrial base and defencc equipn1cnt lllarket, and research and
tcchnolog)'. Thc \vork of theFDA docs not seek 1.0 replace national defencc-planning
444 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
or eapabilities-developn1ent proccsses with a European-level equivalent but rather
operates as a facilita tor and ta some degree coordinator of such processes. The EDA
suffers from divergent British and French viey\ls of itspril11ary objective: v/hethcr
1.0 foeus an raising the effectiveness of national forces and their equiplnenL or
to prolllote defence procurelnent frorn European manufacturers. The agency has
atten1pted to co11ect comprehensive data on defence l)rOa ralun1es undenvav and
o j
defence-spending trends across member states, although some governments have
resisted publication of their data (Witney 2008). Its steering board consists of
national defence ministers, chaired by the HRJSG: it thus remains firmly in the hands
of the member governments. Furthern10re, the EU incorporated the \\7ElTs Insti-
tute for Security Studies in 2001 and the satellite centre in Iorrejon, \vhich
produces and analyses space-based imagery in support of CFSP To provide training
in the field of ESDP, the Council set up the European Security and Defence Col-
lege (ESDC) in July 2005. The ESDC is a virtual institution organized as a net\vork
between national colleges, and academies.
The institutional set-up clearly sho\vs a grovving trend tovvards more coordination
at the EU level in CFSP and ESDP and thus represents a marginal shift frolll the origi-
nal and whol1y intergovemmental 1110del of EPe toward5 closer association v.ith the
established Brussels institutions and thus ""ith intensive transgovernn1entalism (see
Chapter 4). The resuIt is a ren1arkably complex machinery \\lhich is intended ta make
the EU a more effective actor in the seculit:y realm through coordinatiol1 of national
polices. However, it is clear that govemments are careful not to relinquish control.
From Iraq to the European Security Strategy
The policies pursued by President George Vl Bush provided an external shock to
the EU's 1005e1y coordinated structures for foreign polie)". President Bushs flrst
visit to Europe, for an Ell-US sunlnlit in Gothenburg inJune 2001, \vas a disaster)
when fifteen heads of governnlent repeated criticisn1S of US policy on climate
having failed ta agree what messages to convey ta their most important
external partner.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 follo\ved three lTIonths later. European govern-
ments expressed their solidarity vvith the US by invoking for the first tinlf ever
Nato)s collective defence clause, Article 5. In gathering support for its planned
intervention jn Afghanistan the US ncvertheless ignored both Nato and thc Ee as
consllltative fOrU111S, \vorking bilat.erally 'w1th the lnajor European states. Under
lJS cOlnmand, French" German, and Spanish ships patrolled the Indian C)ccanj
British air 1.an kers refucllcd US planes , aud special. [orces fr01TI several European
countries, includ ing Dennl(uk and GermanYl operated inside Afghanistan-
lnarking a furthcr point of transition in thc gradual adjusnnent of European gov-
ernn1ents to glo ba1 CO111 nli
ln moving rapidly on honl Afghanistan to Iraq, US policy-makers luade even
less efron to carry thcir European allies \vith thC111. The flilnSy st.ructures of CFSP
.,
.. .. , -0""
..
.. .
Foreign and Security Policy 445
vveakened furthcr bv the Jeterioration in Dcrsonal relations between British ancl
j ,
French lcaders ancl by the domestic poHtics of a Genllan election campaign, buckled
under the. strain. Thc British offered full public suppare in the hopc of influencing the
direction of 1]5 policy, anel Britisb troops entered ]raq with the US. Thc French
refused 5Upport for an invasion \vithout lJS conce5sions , and resisted thc British-US
effarts to gain authorization [rolu the UN Securitv Council for militarv action. The
. j
Franco-Gennan clain1 Lo represent 'European) opposition to the invasion provoked
competing statenlents by other groups of governn1ents. In April 2003 the Belgian
government vvorsened divisions by eonvening a sU111mit ta discuss an independent
European defenee headquarters. \vhich only the French, German, and Luxembourg
heads of government attended. Washington policy-nlakers eelebrated the divi-
sion bet\veen 'old Europe) and Europe), as Donald RUlnsfeld, US Secretary of
Defence) dubbed it
1
playing on transatlantic loyalties of the ten east European coun-
tries about to join the EU. Disintegration of a COlnnlon European foreign policy
over the invasion of Iraq) in the winter of 2002-3, revealed the wide gap between a
'colnnlon
1
policy, created out of political negotiations among heads of government
and foreign ministries, and a 'single) policy built 011 integrated institu tions and ex-
penditure and an a Europe-\vide public debate.
The intervention in Iraq constituted the sharpest crisis in transatlantic rela-
tions since 1973-4. The underlying issue for CFSP remained how far European
governments should converge to\vards an autonon10US international role
l
as
opposed to one roated \vithin the Atlantic frame\vork and under US leadership.
Bitter \vords among Europe's political leaders, and across the Atlantic, did not,
ho\vever
1
prevent a rapid return to cooperation among EU governments. Here,
as after previous crises
1
the European response ta failure \vas to re-establish col-
laboration\ on a firn1er base vI/here possible, following the path set by established
ins titu tion5.
In]une 2003 Secretariat produced a draft European Security Strategy (ESS),
A Secure Europe in a Better \:V'orld, partly as a response to the Bush adlninistration's 2002
National Security Strategy, but also as a ll1eans of stimulating an EU-wide debate. A
revised version \vas adopted by heads of government at the Decelnber 2003 European
Council (Couneil of the European Union 2003b). Te llingly) the 2003 ESS received
scarcelyanymentioninnationalmedia,andlittleornoattentioninnationalparliaments.
National governments, in spite of approving the dOCU111ent
1
had not \vanted to
encourage an open debatc. lts prol11inent place in the Brusscls-bascc1 cliscourse on
securi ty affairs thus sCr"v'ed to \vidcn the gap between Brussels anel national capitals)
\vhcre prior assuI11ptions and connnitnlents continued to drive defence polie)'. The
British and French governn1enls were pushing the ESDP agenda fOT"\\Tard together
only 1110nths aher thc invasion of Iraq (Menon 2004). Frustrated at the [ailure of
other governn1cnts in 1.he 111u1tilateral capabilities-pledging process to achieve the
Helsinki goals, thcy declared in February 2004 that they vvould advance in defcncc
through 'cnhanced coopcration'; they announced that they would provide 'battle-
groups' in rcsponse to international crises, and invited thosc othcr lnelubers (or
44.-6 Bastian Giegerich andWilliamWallace
-
groLlps of lllcmbers) which could delllonstratc a c0111parable capability to join thenl,
The Gennan governlnent announced its COlll111itlnent tojoin thenl the follo\ving
, L_
- day (Ins1.1 tutc- for Security Studies 2004) _ The battlegroups concept \vas adoptecl at
in J\1ay 2004 within the of the 111iliw.ry J-Iead1ine Goal 2010 (sec
Box 18_2)_
Under the pressures of US demands for 'burden-sharing' inhibitions over
long-range military deployment were giving way. Every EU member govern-
ment (except those of Cyprus and Malta) has contributed troops ta Afghanistan
sincc the enel of 2001. Recognizing their shared interest in a stable ou tcarne
in lraq, despite the divisions caused by the 2003 invasion: no fe\ver than fif-
teen governments fro111 the post-2004 EU25 contribu ted troops to post-conflict
,
reconstructlon.
. , .
. ' "-B"()X'1:8 -'2 ,.-
.. .. ;' ... ::.. ..... .. .
: .. : . .. . . .. .. . . . :. .
. .:;.: : .. ' ....
.... .. . .
'.. . . ' ..
. .
The Couneil of Ministers declared in May 2004 that the 'abilityfor the EU to deploy force'
I packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as
part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases, is a key element of the 2010 Head-
line Goal_ These mininlum force packages must be military effeetive, credible and coher-
ent and should be broad\y based an the battlegroups concept' (piess reiease, 2,582nd
Couneil Mee1ing, General Affairs and External Relationsr 17 2004). Batt!egroups
can be provided by individual member states or as a rnultinational force package. High
readiness is rotated an six monthly schedules. Since the EU aims ta have the capabil-
ity to conduct two rapid response operations at onC8, four siots neeo te be filied each
yeaL An EU battlegroup, a particular military rapid reaction element has the follovving
characte ristics:
its generic composit!on is capable of stand-alone operations across ali crisis man-
agement tasks included in ESDP's remit;
it is based on a combined-arms battalion-sized foree reinforced v'I'ith comba: sup-
port and combat service support units leading ta a gelleric of about 1,500
troops;
it can be initially sustained in theatre for 30 days, a period that can be ex:ellded ta
120 it the battlegroup is resupplied appropriately; and
it is deployable vvithin 5-10 days of a decision to launch an operation.
At a Military Commitments Conference in November 2004 EU member states agl-eed
ta set up the first thirteen battlegroups, with initial operationai capability hom January
2005 and full operational capability from January 2007. Since 2007 the EU has hcd a
minimunl of two battlegroups on standby caii at ali times, Although the target strength o'f
a battlegroup is set at 1,500 troops, the tata! involved can exceed 3,000 vI/hen aii support
and enabling capabilities are taken into account.
'---------,,------------ --_ .. __._--------,,-,,------
--______ 1
.. -: :... . .. .
. - ....... .
. . <. .
. . . ,. ,
,."-- ... -. -. - .' . . ... . . .. , ' . , . . , '
. - ,. - - . . . . ' ..
-- : "TA'B'LE - . :E$DP"ri'li'ssions . -' '"," .. ' .
.... ",-_.. ." ....... - ,.- .. _ .... '.-
- , - - , .. '. . ,... ;", " :' ' .... . . . . - , ',' .
Mission
Africa
Operar/on Arremis
EUSEC P.D Congo
EUPOL K:nshasa
Mission to supocrt
AMIS li (African
Jrion mlssion)
EUFOR RD Conac

RD Conao
'-'
EU FO PI Chad/CD,P.
EU SSR
EU NAVFOR (A ta/a n ta)
Asia
ArvlM
EUPOL

'""
Balkans
Euprvl
Concordia
EUPOL PROXlfvlA
EUFOR/Ooeration
Althea
EU PAT
r' 'BAr--
c L.J Ivi
,
EULEX Kosovo
Caucasus
EUJUSTTHEMIS
EU rVHv1 Georgia
Middle East
. EU BAM Rafah
EUJUST LEX
EUPOL COPPS
Location
DRC
nRf'
l...I v

Sudan
DRC
DRC
Chad and Central
African Republic
G u i nea-B issa u
Somali coast
Aceh/I ndonesia
Afgnanistan
Bcsn ia-Herzegovina
FYROM
FYROM
B os n i a-H e rzegovi n a
FYROM
U k ra i ne/M 01 dova
Kosovo
Georgia
Georgia
D; -
,
I raq/B russels
Palestine
Source: updmed from Glegerich (2008: 9)
Foreign and Security Policy 447
. . -
., .. .
. . . . . , .
., .. ,.
Duration
2003
2006-
2005-7
2005-6
2006
2007-
2008-9
2008-
2008 (Dec.)-
2005-6
2007-
2003-
2003
2004-5
2004-
2006
2006-
2008-
2004-5
. .. ,.
, , .
2008 (Oct.)-2009
Since 2005
Since 2005
Since 2006
.71
" ' , , . . ',i
" , .. , ..
, .
, .,..
No.of
personnel
1,800
40
30
50
2,400
39
3,700
39
1,200
225
230
182
400
200
2,500
(i n itia lIy
7,000)
30
69
1,900
10
300
27
25
31
"
, .. ,
.'- .,. ."
, .
----------------_ .. _- .. __ ..- ._--------
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448 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
ESDP enters the real world
ESDP becan1e operational in 2003, when the formally toah. over COlnmand of the
lTIodest civil and 111ilitary operations in FYROM. It took over n1ilitary responsibility
Erom Nato for the much larger mission in Bosnia in December 2004. By the end of
2008 no fe\ver than t\venty-three missions) ahnost all small and most of thenl civil-
ian in nature) had been launched (Table 18.1). The overall deploYlnent of European
troops an operations outside the boundaries of the EU and Nato rose froIn 40-50.000 ,
in the late 1990s ta over 70,000 from 2003 an thU5 surpassing the target of the
Headline Goals even as they missed their formal deadline. The pereentage of these
actually deployed through the EU nevertheless remained nlost vv'ere cOlnmitted
to Nato operations\ ar were part of UN peacekeeping missions (Giegerich and \Val-
lace 2004; IISS 2008). EU oJ2erations were limited to the lower end of the spectrum
of military tasks; even then, they relied on Nato assets (and of ten on Ukrainian air
transport) for logistical support, and were deficient in command-and-control and
operational-planning capabilities, as \vell as in tactical airlift.
The EU's decisions to deploy a military mission to the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) in 2003 and 2006 under the ESDP heading and the failure ta do so at
the end of 2008 serve as good illustrations that the EU is in some cases able to deliver
substantially, in particular if there is strong leadership from a major playeL \vhile
differences among capitals continue to throw up obstacles. On 11 May 2003, France
indicated that it was willing to deploy a force to Bunia in the DRC follovving a request
from the UN Secretary-General for a stopgap measure to reinforce the UN mission
already in country in the face of a deteriorating securit)' situatioll. Having secured
assurances for a UN Chapter VII mandate, with agreenlent [roln the relevant regional
players including on the lin1ited nature of the operation in tenns of time and scope,
the French governn1ent officially announced ils readiness to conduct the operation.
French planning for what \vas then dubbed 'Operation 1vlamba' \vas already \\.'ell
Under\\1ay v/hen then President Chirac re.cognized this as an opportunity to sho\v-
case ESDP 'on operations'. It was onl1' then that Operation Arten1is: the ESDP lnis-
"vas born in essence a Europe.anized French operation built on the French
desire ta demonstrate that ESDP could ODerate autonomouslv in Africa \vhich ena-
... /)
bled the Council's decision of 12] une 2003 to launch the operation.
When in 2006 the El] \vas again asked to reinforee temporarily the lJN:s pres-
ence in the DRC to help ensure security around the presiclcntial elections schcduled
for 30 July, the absence of such detennined leadership provecl problell1atic. France
lnadc clear that it v\louJd not lead again and was looking to Gernlany to fin this Tolc.
Pressure on Gennany rase further after the UK indicate.d it \vould not partjcipare in
any significant way owing to overstretch in its anned forces, then heavily engaged in
Afghanistan and lraq. Gcrmany, howevcr) found it difficuh to fon11 a coherent
with the Minister of Defence sencling confusing signals regarding \vhether
Gennany was \villing to lead. A lacl<. of available funding, the absence of Africa
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Foreign and Security Policy 449
experience of the Bundcs1vehr (indirectIy elTlphasizing the responsibilities of forn1cr
colonial pO'Ners and those \vith relnaining security and defcnce obligations in
,Africa) 1 and ovcrstretch \vere advanced as obstacles ultilnately reflecting the fragile
dODlcstic consensus that enables the deployment of Gennan forces abroad in gen-
eral. The Gennan lvlinister of Defence, Franz ]osefJung, indicated he cliel not think
Germany should play a leadership rolc and a leaked 111CmO froIn the policy planning
staff of the 1vlinistry of Defence argued that sgnificant Gern1an involvement would
be inappropriate because no vital German inte1'ests were at stake.
In the \vake of gro\ving EU pressure Germany shifted its stance, aL first setting out
conditions sinlilar to those France secured in 2003 while adding that if Germanv were
1 '.1
to lead an ESDP operation, it \'Vould need to be tnlly 111ultinational. Even while this shift
\vas undenvay) Germany refused officially to take on the role of framework nation as
long as other 11lember states clid not make unequivocal con1mitlnents. This reversal of
the process delayed planning efforts. Solana roade httle headway with other n1eluber
states and finally asked Gennany ta organize the force generation process, in response
ta \vhich Gern1any arranged for a farce contribution conference in late March. The
pressure that Solana exerted on the German government ta take on this leadership role,
\vhile also arguing for a nlore \vide-ranging operation than the Gennan government
\vas ready ta support; led to sharp exchanges between Jung and Solana. Some of the
German staff in the vicinity of the minister's phone reported a major shouting match.
vVhile EUFOR RD Congo, as the Gennan-led ESDP operation became kno\vn, was
eventually conducted successfully the episode nonetheless points to a clash between
the centre in the foml of Solana pushing ESDP into a prominent rale and national
capitals
l
efforts to control earefully how much they nlight want ta invest. As a result
it took the EL1 several nl0nths to organize a relatively linlited deployment of forces.
Furthernl0re, the successes \vhich the EU clailned in 2003 and 2006 did not have a
strategic effect on the c1'isi5 in the DRC incleed they could not have, even though the
lnilitary personnel deployed inlplemented with great professionalism and effective-
ness the limited nlandate given 10 them by their political masters (Giegerich 2008).
HovvevcL vvhen the security situation in east.ern DRC deteriorated rapidly in
autumn even a limited deployment proved to be unattainable. While then
French Foreign lvlinister, Bernard Kouchner, insisted the EU 'has to act\ including
through the provision of his British counterpart, David Miliband, pointed
out that responsibility lay ,vith the UN (Xinhua News AgencYl 4 Novenlber 2008).
In Decenl beL the Ul'\ Secretary-General explicitly called on the EU to senc1 troops as
a stopgap 111easure so that UI\ reinforcenlent eould he arrangecl and dcploycd, not
unlike in 2003. The European Council conclusions froln its meetlng a few days latel'
in Decel11ber 2008 \\'el'e noeable [01' their unwillingness to C01l1111it thc El]. Concerns
thai haeI been loonling in thc 1ninds of national PolicY-lnakers harked back to mili-
tary oversLrctch and the thought tha1: it would be casier to reinforcc thc UN lniss'ioTI,
J'vlol1uC (United Nations \-1i5s10n in thc Denlocratic Republic of the Congo), than to
set up a ne\v ESDP lnissioll. In the event, the lTN Securit)' Council authorized an
incrcase of SOlIle t1'oops for Monue and exrencled the mandate of the mission
452 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace
defection [ron1 the princip1e of solidarity (Box] 8.3). 1 t i5 hard ta disagrce \vith the
bitter conclusion of the first head of the EDA, that (nlen1ber states anei Brussels
institutions have ignored the need [or cohere11t strategies, i111prcrvised inlportant
operations, and taken refuge in process as an easier option than delivering real-
\vor1e! change
l
(Wi tney 2008: 8).
From 1969 ol1\\lards, F fench governments have driven CFSP forvvard. Their Bel-
gian, and Italian counterpart5 have supported institution-building) though
preferring a lnore supranational framework. They have not, ho\vever, shared French
strategic objectives, or France's willingness to invest in military instruments to fulfi1
thClll. In ternlS of defence1 Britain and France constitute the dominant p1ayers;
agreement bet\veen them launched ESDP. The cooling of the British Labour goven1-
TIlent tovvards the project} and the major conlmitments of British forces to lraq and
Afghanistan, have contributed to the 510\\1 pace of progress in the ten years since
St MaIa. The grea test obstacle has, been the reluctance of other govern-
11lents ta invest in the equipment needed, or ta reshape their anned forces to be able
to operate effectiveIy outside the EU ta the shared frustration of the British and
French governnlents. ESDP has created the as-yet unfulfilled promise of compre-
hensive (civil and milital)') crisis 11lanagelnent, which adds a crucial building block
to CFSP While ESDP operations so far have been nl0derately successfu1 \vithin
the limitations defined by their parall1eters an the ground) they in the end are yet
another reminder of the difficulties EU menlber governnlents face as they try ta align
their cOlllmonly agreed aspirations \vith actual policy outpUL
\Vest European integration was built an a revulsion against lvlachtpoIitik. Exten-
sion of the EU across southern, central, and eastern Europe has created \vhat the
head of Solana's CFSP Secretariat called a 'postmodern) state systenl, fron1 \vhich
force has been excluded and across which human rights and civil liberties are
enforced (Cooper 2003). lv1any intellectuals and politicians \vithin European COUll-
tries \\lould 1ike to extend this 'civilizing process' to the rest of the \vorld, through
civilian instrlunents and moral example thus justifying the lO\\T level of lnilitary
spending by lnany vvest European governments (Linklater 2005; 1\1anners 2008).
The EU is nO\\1 a civilian pO\\Ter in a lin1ited nUlnber of \vhich is lllaking
some progress to\vards shared civi]-1l1ilitary capabilities. A rising proportion (no\v
approaching 10 per cent) of its COffilllon budget is spent an externa1 relations,
including nation-building in south-east Europe; further development of neighbour-
haod Dolicv would increase this further.

Thc El] punches belo\.v its \veight in international diplornacy including in the
international institutions through \vhich civihan po\ver 11light best be cxcrcised.
Dependence an the US for hard security and for leadership in 111anaging extra-European
security threats betrays idealist daillls to clistinctively civilian po"\vcr. Thc absencc of
a European public space of a shared public debate, cOlllnlunicating through sharecl
. nlcdia, think tanks, poliricat responding to and critlcizing 3uthoritative
policy-nlakers lcaves issues of global strategy ancl externa} threats ta Sl11a11 groups
of professianals. A transnationa1 expert C01l1111unity has gradl1ally developed across
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Foreign and Security Policy 453
.: !
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. llDX.18.3
.. '. Treaty ofLisbonprovisions forCFSP.
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for-eign policy irstitutional arrangements in the Treaty of Lisbon:
Tile ne\'v EU High Representative (EUHR), taking over the functions of Presidency,
High Representative, and Commissioner for External Relatons and apPonted by the
European Couneii and Parliament for up to two five-year terms, will be responsible to
the Couneil Tor the ieadershio, management. and implementation of the EU's foreign
and seeurity policy.
-he EU H R wi'l at the same time be Vice President of the Commsson, responsible
for aii of the Commissi01'S activities in the external relatons field, either directly, or
in a eoordinating role where other Commssoners have the lead (e.g. enlargemen(
development, trade, energy, climate change).
The EU H R. will be assisted for the purpose of externa I representation by an Externa!
Action Service (EAS), dravl/ing together officials from the Couneil Secretariat and
Commission engaged in external affairs and diplomats seconded from the diplo-
matic services 0
7
the member states.
ihe EU will have a solidarity clause (Art. 222) and a mutual assistance clause (Art. 42.7).
The assistance clause ealls on EU member states ta aid each other n case of 'armed
aggressior' on a rf1,ember's territory and to do sa with 'aii means in their power'. The
solidarity clause eommits EU member states to support each other in the event of
lerrorist attaeks or natural and man-made disasters. While the clause refers ta mili-
tarv assets, it \!y'!I! be left ta member states to decide what kind of assistance they
would provide,
"The Pe"Lersberg Tasks arc be redefined. Lsbon lists these as 'joint disarmament
operations, numar:itarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks,
conflict prevention arid peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, inciuding peace-making and post-conflict stabilization ... aII these tasks
may contribute to tlle flght against terrorism, includ ing by supporting third cauntries
in combating terrorism in their territories'.
A 'start up fund' is envisaged through which member states could agree to fund
some activitles outside the EU budget.
. Further innovations are the provisions regarding permanent structured cooperation
. (Art. 42.6 and Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation) which allo\;vs those
member states 'whose military capabi!ities fulfi! higher criteria and whieh have made
more binding commitments ta ane another in this area with a view ta the most
demanding operations' to set up a leadership group seeking closer cooperation but
within the overail rramewol-k of the EU.
Afull-time president of tile European Counci!, with a twa-Elnd-a-half year mandate,
renewable onee, is at that level ta 'ensure the external representation of the union
on ssues concern-Ing its cornmon foreign and security policy'.
,---------- -------_._------ -----_ .. _._- . - - ._--------------'
thc EL, COlll111unicating tlltough specialist journals and think tanks
1
such as the EU
Institute for Security Studies\ but it has developcd only \\7cak links \\7ith nationa]
political debates.
454 Bastian Giegerich and Williarn Wallace
European coopcration in foreign policy has gOlle bcyond thc [r,llllev\/ork or- sov-
creign state cliplo111acy, bUl stiU rcrnains far short of an iIltegratecl singlc pobe)', \vith
in1.cgratcd clip]onlatic, flnancial, ancl u1ilitary in5lTU111cnts. Thc dCH111nant lnodc of po1-
iCY-lllaking (sec Chaptcr 4) i5 predolllinantly intensivc traDsgovernnlen tahsnl dlllong
foreign lninistrics \vithin the EU ancl an10ng cJnbassics in third countrles. \t\Tithin its
resu-ieted fields of CODTpetcnce for external rclations thc European COlllnlission pur--
sucs the COlTIlnunity 111Cthod
1
v"ith national rcpresentatives IDoniloring its anlbitiollS
to extend its authority. Variable geometry i5 a frequent characteristic, both in closeT
cooperarion bet\veen Britain and France, of ten also vvith Gennany in an inforn1allead-
ership group of states with active international interests, and also across the EU's ex-
ternal boundaries, \vith Turkey Norw-ay, and even Switzcrland contributing to extern al
actions. ToL proposals for enhanced cooperation might rcinforcc thi5 tfend,
There relnain evident tensions between national autonolny and con1111on polie)';
and (particularly for the smaller meluber states) bet\veen national passivity anc1 the
acceptance of the 'global ... responsibilities
l
which the European Security Strategy
spelled out. Acceptance of shared responsibilities and institutions since 1970 had
been driven as much by a succession of external de111ands and crises, hOTIl across
the Atlantic and froln the USSR (later Russia) and the :\1iddle East, as by compet-
ing Gaullist and federalist grand designs. It seelned likely that further deve1op-
lllent would sin1ilarly be driven by external pressures, but \vith the significant path
dependence of established structures and procedures through \vhich to respond.
FURTHER READING
There is a substantial and growing literature an the various aspects of European foreigr:
and defence policy as well as on the broader field of EU externalmlations. F o ~ a -::holougn
intmduction to the field see Hill and Smith (2005). K. E. Smith (2003) and rvi. E. Smith
(2004) examine the gradual development of foreign poiicy cooperation. HO\tvorth (2007)
and Jones (2007) trace the developnlent of ESDP. Ca:isnaes et al. (2004:
,
oner a more
theoretical approach. The series of Chaillot Papers from the EU Institute fOi Securit\, Stud-
ies provide case studies of CFSP and ESDp, as well as compilations of primarv source
material, fllost recently Gliere (2008). Journals such as Surviva/ and the Eurooean Fore.rgn
Affairs Review are Llseful on recent developn1811ts.
Carlsnaes, W., Sjursen, H., and White, B. (2004) (eds.), Conternporary European F"oreign
Policv(London: Sage).
Gliere, C. (2008), EU Security and Oefence: Core Oocurnerns 2007 VoI. VI/I, Olaillot Paper
No. 112 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies).
Hill, c., and Snlith, M. (2005) (eds.), International He/ations and the European Union (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
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Foreign anei Security Policy 455

Ho\."'/orth, J. (2007), Securit}! anei Oefenco PolicV In tlie European Union (B8sinqstoke:
j-Jalgrave Vi2cmiilem).
Jones, S. G. (2007), n"Je Rise of Europeaft Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge
U niversit'y' Press).
Srnith, K. E. (2003), European Union F"oreign PolicV in a Changing lIVorld (Canlbridge: Po!ilyl.
SITlith, rv1. E, (2004), Curope's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Coopera-
tion ,CslTbridge: Cambridge University Press).
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