Patriotism is Like Racism Author(s): Paul Gomberg Reviewed work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Oct.

, 1990), pp. 144-150 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381896 . Accessed: 01/08/2012 15:06
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DISCUSSION

Patriotism Is like Racism Paul Gomberg

Stephen Nathanson's "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism"' tries to show that there is a moderate patriotism that does not collapse into an unpatriotic universal morality or become an immoderate patriotism that no universalist could endorse.' It fails. I will argue this much in the first part of this note. In the second I will draw some more constructive lessons, arguing that, on the most plausible assumptions about our world, patriotism is no better than racism. NATHANSON'S MODERATE PATRIOTISM AND ITS PROBLEMS Nathanson defines moderate patriotism as preference (presumably, in action) for one's nation, its traditions and institutions, and one's fellow nationals, but within the limits of morality, that is, provided one does not violate the "legitimate needs and interests of other nations" and their nationals (p. 538). He argues that there is a moderate patriotism that is compatible both with the imperatives of commonsense morality and with moral universalism. I will not dispute compatibility with commonsense morality. Since I will question compatibility with moral universalism, it is important to characterize it. Let us say that moral universalism implies that actions are to be governed by principles that give equal consideration to all people who might be affected by an action. Moral universalism is often thought to be uncontroversial and coextensive with commonsense morality, but I believe it is neither. Christian universalism is often based on an interpretation of the parable of the. good Samaritan: Jesus is explicating the principle, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," by answering the question, "Who is my neighbor?" The point of the parable is that the Samaritan helped a Jew, thus transcending the narrow loyalty of nationality. Jesus concludes his discussion by saying, "Go, and do thou likewise." His purpose is to take what is already an exacting morality love your neighbor as yourself-and to make it more exacting by adding that nationality is irrelevant to this commandment. This is one kind of moral universalism, and it is pretty clear that this is not identical with commonsense morality, either of that time or ours.

1. Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism,"' Ethics 99 (1989): 535-52. Page references to Nathanson are in the text. Ethics 101 (October 1990): 144-150 C 1.990 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/91/0101-0007$01.00

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Of course, a moral universalism that commands us to love our neighbor as ourselves is not the only possible one, but part of moral universalism is that moral regard is universal-all count equally and positively in deciding what to do. And, at first glance, this does seem incompatible with a preference for one's fellow nationals or for one's own traditions and institutions over those of others. Nathanson tries to show that universalism and national preference are compatible in his discussion of examples of two sorts conflict, examples that are raised by Alasdair MacIntyre.2 MacIntyre's argument is that in conflicts between nationalities the moral universalist will not be patriotic. Nathanson's reply is that in conflicts between nationalities the moderate patriot will act differently from both the unpatriotic moral universalist and the nonuniversalist patriot. The first example is of conflict between nations over resources, typically land and its products and often population. In the extreme case, the way of life of a national community might be at stake (although claims that the U.S. national way of life depend this is so are often hyperbole-does on imported oil?). MacIntyre claims that the patriot will fight for the national community while the moral universalist will not. Nathanson replies that moderate patriots will follow a third course, seeking a just compromise between nations, but supporting their nations when and only when such compromise is impossible or conflict is unavoidable (he puts his condition in both ways) (pp. 541-42). The two formulations are significantly different, and in the difference lies the problem of establishing that there is a genuine third alternative between chauvinistic patriotism and unpatriotic universalism. On the first formulation of the condition-that compromise is impossible-the moderate patriot must be reasonably assured that there is no possible just compromise. This is a huge burden that moderate patriots may be unable to fulfill, and it may, in practice, lead to a neutrality that precludes patriotism. Are the conflicts between Jews and Arabs on the West Bank impossible to compromise in a just way? the conflict between the United States and Japan over trade? In considering real cases, whether contemporary or historical, it seems hard to find a clear case of conflicts of national interest where just accommodation is or was impossible. If so, then Nathanson has not shown that the moderate patriot will be different from the unpatriotic moral universalist. conflict is unavoidableBut Nathanson's other condition-that seems to imply that the moderate patriot will support the national community once conflict has started, when "either/or choices must be made." Would the moderate patriot have supported the U.S. war effort against Mexico in 1846? the war effort in Southeast Asia? The second condition fails to distinguish the moderate patriot from the chauvinist patriot.
2. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" Lindley Lecture (University of Kansas Philosophy Department, Lawrence, 1984).

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The second sort of conflict is over competing conceptions of the good life-MacIntyre gives the example of peoples for whom the good life involves raids on their neighbors. Here Nathanson strongly endorses the moral universalist conclusion that such a conception of the good must be abandoned because it fails to respect the humanity of others. Then his task is to show how the moderate patriot is different from the moral universalist-what the moderate patriot would do that the moral universalist would not. His answer is that "moderate patriots would realize the genuine value of... the goods associated with that way of life. Unlike outsiders, they might work to foster the development of other practices that preserve some of the community's traditional values. They would not be indifferent to the community's losses" (pp. 543-44). But this fails to distinguish the moderate patriot from the moral universalist. The moral universalist can hardly be "indifferent to the community's losses." And, like anthropologists and others who know of and cherish the traditional way of life that was practiced by Khoisan (bushmen) of the northwest Kalahari Desert, the moral universalist might well "work to foster the development of other practices that preserve some of the community's traditional values." Would the moderate patriot be more committed to the preservation of the institutions and traditions of his or her own nationality than to those of other nationalities? If the answer is yes, this can be construed in two ways. On the one hand, it might be a division of moral labor, where universal duties must be divided among us and where the equally valuable traditions of all nationalities are best preserved if members of each nationality take care of their own traditions. In that case, the devotion to the traditions of one's own nation is contingent and dependent on this claim about ends and means. It is a consequence of this view that if, for some reason, some national traditions cannot be preserved by their own peoples, we are equally duty bound to uphold those. On the other hand, this greater commitment to our own nation might not be contingent in this way and might represent assigning greater value to one's own national traditions than to those of other nationalities. But this looks a lot like racism, at least in the broad sense in which I will use that word here, where it includes ethnic and national chauvinism. PATRIOTISM AND MORAL THEORY Consider two ways to define the relationship between universal morality and moderate patriotism. Moderate patriotism might be allowed by universal morality, but not required by it. Alternatively, the duty to be moderately patriotic might be a consequence of a universal morality and facts about an individual's particular situation. In the first case, where moderate patriotism is allowed but not required by universal morality, it would have to be the case that universal morality does not render judgments about all acts. For if it did, it would either command or forbid patriotic acts. Universal morality would have to contain

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a significant zone of discretion, where acts are neither required nor forbidden. This zone may be occupied either by acts that are indifferent or supererogatory or by acts that are required by special moralities, such as patriotism or moralities of kinship. It is not hard to imagine moralities that meet this condition, and commonsense morality may indeed have this logical structure. Suppose universal morality requires only respect for minimal rights of all others, for example, the right not to be killed without cause, these rights specified by an objective list of injunctions and prohibitions. Special moralities may specify duties to others with special relations to the agent, such as kin or fellow nationals. While universal morality would prohibit killing, deceiving, and exploiting others, it would leave a large area where one may (or must, by the injunctions of a special morality) pursue one's own interests or those of one's family, community, or nation with relative indifference to others. Surely, a moderate patriotism, including preference for fellow nationals, is consistent with universal morality so conceived. In this sense, one might also speak of a "moderate racism" that would be compatible with universal morality, for surely someone could discriminate against black or Hispanic people or against immigrants or noncitizens in hiring and promotion without violating their fundamental rights-unless we say that their fundamental rights include being treated impartially without regard to race, nationality, or citizenship. But if we say this is a fundamental right, then doesn't this preclude favoring others of one's own nationality? In order to appreciate the difficulty of finding a significant distinction between racism and patriotism, we must consider an example in some detail. In our society money earned is considered our own, so that it is permissible and even obligatory to spend a significant portion of our earnings in providing for our families.3 Whatever is required by universal morality, most think that this practice does not violate those requirements. And if one owns a small business, a travel agency, let us say, there is nothing wrong with hiring a teenage daughter part-time to do paperwork for pay. (In contrast, a public employee who hires a family member violates a public trust because the money spent is not her own.) As long as the business is your own, you may hire your family if you wish. Now suppose you need more employees, more than your family can provide. Is it morally permissible to hire old school chums and people from the neighborhood? Given the degree of residential and school segregation in most big cities in the United States, it would not be surprising if these were of a single ethnic group, and it would be quite likely that if they were either white or Hispanic, they would not include any or
3. The reader should not assume that the author believes that family-centered morality, the money economy, and the wage system are compatible with promoting a better world for all. For a communist critique of these, see "Road to Revolution IV-a Communist Manifesto (1982)," PL: A Journal of CommunistTheoryand Practice (1989), pp. 9-14.

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many black people, and if black, not many white or Hispanic. Now, in these circumstances is it morally permissible to hire employees from one's "natural"circle of friends and acquaintances, which happens to be severely limited in ethnic composition? Or suppose that one has benefited by being raised in an ethnic community and trained in one's vocation by one's co-nationals. Is it now permissible to show gratitude by favoring one's nationality in hiring and promotion? I imagine that seventy or eighty years ago most people saw nothing wrong with these practices. How was it argued that they were wrong? I think the crucial argument is that, given residential and school segregation and given the greater initial disadvantage of most black people in access to capital and business opportunities generally, the practice will tend to maintain or exacerbate poverty in intensely impoverished inner-city black ghettos.4 In a society where all ethnic groups had roughly equal economic resources, a practice of favoring one's own nationality or ethnic group might not be unjust. We-or at least I-believe it is racism, undermining human equality. The belief that favoring one's own nationality is wrong is based on the estimation that the practice contributes to segregation and subordination of black people. It is at least plausible that considerations parallel to these apply in the case of favoring compatriots (citizens of the same state). Consider the practice of a U.S. citizen's favoring compatriots in employment. The considerations that were convincing regarding racism against black people can be applied internationally. People from other countries immigrate to the United States because of international inequality. International income gaps are vastly greater than domestic racial inequality. So favoritism toward a more prosperous nationality or discrimination against nationals from poor nations contributes to a morally objectionable inequality. Large percentages of the populations of many countries, particularly in the southern parts of the world, fail to get enough calories to lead a normal, active life, making for short life expectancy. Moral universalism must regard this as very bad. If, as seems plausible, favoritism by nationals of more prosperous countries for hungry compatriots over others who are hungry would contribute to this situation, then such favoritism is, from a universalist viewpoint, no better than racism. The question, "How are patriotism and moral universalism related?" is primarily a question about the effects of patriotism. There seem to be plausible, but not conclusive, arguments that the effects are bad and that favoritism toward one's compatriots is as objectionable as ethnic favoritism.5
4. William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 60, cites the absence of social networks linking ajobless individual to others who have jobs to explain joblessness, especially in inner-city black ghettos. On widening black-white disparities, see U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstractof the United States: 1988, 108th ed. (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 427. 5. It has been common in left-wing circles to distinguish between the nationalism of more prosperous nations and that of oppressed nations or oppressed nationalities in mul-

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A different argument can be made against patriotism that is not directed against oppressed nationalities. Consider the imperative, "Buy American!" which is certainly presented as a patriotic duty. Now, if directed against Philippine, Brazilian, or Chinese imports, the earlier argument applies. But suppose it is directed against Japanese imports. Here the Japanese are regarded as both privileged and unfair (although the main consideration offered in favor of this imperative is common national interest). This imperative, however, may contribute toward a climate of war, as did similar movements toward national autarky in the 1930s. Anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States has already been reciprocated in Japan. The effect of the imperative, "Buy American!" is likely to be increased national antagonism. Once again, this is not a conclusive argument against the imperative but a substantive question which would strongly affect whether a moderate patriotism can be distinguished from a harmful national chauvinism. We have been investigating the possibility of a moderate patriotism within the framework of a limited universal morality of basic rights specified by an objective list. If we try to allow patriotism and forbid racism on the basis of a universal morality that makes racial discrimination a violation of a fundamental right but makes discrimination based on national citizenship permissible, the universal morality with this structure looks implausible and arbitrary. We want to know by what criterion we decide what is on the list and what is not. Philosophical moral theory, in either a Kantian or a utilitarian vein, has attempted to provide a single principle or a closely related set of principles from which a morality might be derived. Can either a universalist utilitarianism or a universalist Kantianism show why (some) patriotism is good and racism is bad? The task for the universalist utilitarian is easy to describe: it must be shown that we achieve the overall best results, everyone's interests counting equally, if we (or some of us) are patriotic, but that we do not achieve the best results if people practice racism. Such an argument requires an estimate of the effects of patriotism and racism in human societies. Some of the arguments endorsing patriotism are familiar enough. It was common in the nineteenth century for British intellectuals to argue that the spread of British imperalism had a civilizing and uplifting effect on non-European peoples. We are familiar with U.S politicians who identify U.S. interests with the interests of all the world's peoples in human rights and democracy. Or one might argue, as Sidgwick does with respect to devotion to family and associates, that limitations on power, knowledge, and affection make it best overall that people concentrate other-regarding concerns on members of their community.6
tiethnic nations and to regard the nationalism of the oppressed as good. The above argument should not be understood as endorsing that position. The experience of black nationalism in the United States seems to indicate that the nationalism of oppressed peoples does little or nothing to alleviate oppression. But that is another argument. 6. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), pp. 433-34.

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These arguments are about the effect of patriotism or a particular patriotism; needless to say, there is much room for argument. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many believed that particular nationalisms, especially U.S. and French, represented universal human interests and progress.7 We are now more skeptical about the effects of nationalism. Earlier in the century communists believed that national liberation struggles were part of universal human progress. But the outcomes in Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere leave much room for doubt. So it is hard to accept utilitarian arguments that some limited patriotism will lead to the best results universally. The most plausible strategy for defending patriotism is to argue for an indirect universalism, either utilitarian or Kantian: in order to realize universal principles (promoting well-being and respect for human rights) we need social norms that bind people together, and those norms create special relationships, with corresponding special duties. Hence universal principles can be realized only through relationships that require preferential treatment.8 I have no quarrel with this general conclusion. But are nation-states and patriotic culture-a culture of preference for one's the institutions that in fact realize compatriots and country-among universal principles? I have argued that there are substantial reasons to doubt this. The problematic relationship between patriotism and moral universalism derives from our history. Universalism arose fairly recently in human societies, perhaps first in the philosophies and religions of hellenistic society.9 The parable of the good Samaritan is a typical expression of the rejection of nationalism that characterized Christian universalism. This remained the dominant ethical ideal in Europe until the rise of the nation-state and, later, of conscious nationalism in the eighteenth century. There were various efforts to reconcile nationalism and patriotism with the tradition of universalism. Efforts at reconciliation are essentially conceptions of human history that say that patriotism helps to realize universal well-being or human rights. This positive estimate of patriotism can be derived either from an optimistic view that patriotism is a stage in our progress toward a more universal moral regard or from a pessimistic view that widespread patriotism is the closest most of us can get to consciously practicing universal moral ideals. I am suggesting that neither the pessimism nor that particular optimism is warranted: a genuine universalism is possible, but only as a result of a struggle against patriotism and nationalism.
7. Hans Kohn made this point in different places. See, e.g., The Age of Nationalism (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 3-4. 8. This argument is made convincingly, from a human rights perspective, by Alan Gewirth, "Ethical Universalism and Particularism," Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 283302. 9. See, e.g., Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan, 1944), chap. 2.