Bax 1 James Bax Dunch 290 Term Paper 20 April 2012 The Impact of Euthyphros Dilemma on a Divine Command

Theory of Ethics Instead of commanding thou shalt not kill, what if God decreed take the life of whoever you like? Or rather than thou shalt not steal, mankind was instructed to take what thou wilt? In asking these questions another more important enquiry reveals itself: should the actions that God commands be obligatory assuming they are morally right, or should such actions be obligatory because they are intrinsically moral and right? This question drives at the heart of the debate surrounding the idea of a divine command theory of ethics (DCT). According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy the divine command theory holds that what God wills is relevant to determining the moral status of some set of entities such as character or actions. In Platos Euthyphro Socrates ignites the debate with the young and seemingly pious Euthryphro who is unwittingly forced into this very same quandary. The question that Socrates poses to Euthyphro is whether or not actions may be considered moral for no other reason than God commanded we perform them. Having read Platos text and the work of many scholars who both advocate for and oppose such a theory, I have come to seriously question the teachings of religion and its implications on what should be considered religious truth. The context in which the dialogue begins is important because it illustrates just how high the stakes are for finding the answer to Euthyphros dilemma. Socrates and Euthyphro meet outside on the Porch of the King of Archon where they each explain why they are appearing in court. Socrates explains how a young man, Meletus, is bringing forth a case of youth corruption

Bax 2 and impiety. Socrates tells how he is being charged with creating new Gods and may face death (76). When the conversation shifts to Euthyphro, he responds that he is bringing suit against his father for murder (77). Euthyphro explains how on his familys farm a quarrel between a drunken farm hand and slave. The slave was murdered and Euthyphros father apprehended the killer, constraining him and leaving him in a ditch while he went to Athens to seek guidance from religious authorities. While waiting for a reply, Euthyphros father neglected the murderer who ended up dying (78). Ironically, Socrates exclaims how pious and wise Euthyphro must be to bring such a case against his own father (77). Socrates reasons that he may be able to save his own life if he can follow and learn from the pious Euthyphro (78). With the lives of two men at stake, Socrates implores Euthyphro to explain to him the nature of piety so that he may begin to form a defense against his prosecutors. Euthyphros first response is that piety is prosecuting a wrongdoer regardless of personal affiliation (79). Euthyphro cites the example of Zeus killing his father for his wicked deeds believing that this is the example he should follow. Socrates reminds Euthyphro that this is merely an example and cannot be a definition. Euthyphro makes another attempt and states piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods and impiety is that which is not dear to them (80). Socrates defeats this definition as well pointing out that although men and Gods alike love what they deem to be honorable and moral, what constitutes such things cannot be agreed upon (82). Socrates relates this notion to Euthyphros suit against his father citing the particulars, or value, of Euthyphros case as causing the Gods to deadlock (83). Naturally, Euthyphro protests this conclusion citing the universal condemnation of acts like murder. For the sake of argument, Socrates agrees and even proposes a small fix to Euthyphros current definition. Euthyphro accepts the modification without realizing what Socrates has in store.

Bax 3 This reformulation avoids the issue of Gods disagreeing but lands Euthyphro in an even deeper conundrum. The new definition is what all the Gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy leading Socrates to endeavor further into the nature of piety. Specifically whether things that are pious are adorned by the Gods because they are pious, or things are pious because the Gods adorn them (85). This is Euthyphros dilemma. Euthyphro and Socrates agree that for something to be divinely accepted of by the Gods it must first be intrinsically holy. Once the Gods all agree that the thing is intrinsically holy and approve of it, it becomes divinely accepted and is pious. The difference between Euthyphros first conception of the dilemma is that holy and pious are supposed equals while Socrates advocates for a difference in meaning. Something being holy is distinctly different and should be considered different in nature than the state of something that is pious. In other words, even if we suppose everything that is holy is accepted by the Gods, something that is holy and something that is accepted by the Gods are not equivalents. Euthyphro is ultimately unable to respond Socrates questioning without reverting to DCT. It is important to note that both Euthyphro and Socrates are operating under the assumption of plurality. In monotheism, there is no need for the Gods to form consensus because there is only one God. Additionally, one may suppose that Gods unquestioned state of perfection would allow Him to identify holy objects perfectly. From this, it seems that Euthyphros dilemma could easily be resolved. Yet, there is an analogous argument in monotheism that looks at evil in the same way Euthyphro and Socrates examined piety. Should one abstain from certain actions because God says so or because certain actions are inherently evil? This reformulation is at the heart of a DCT of ethics and is advocated for using three main arguments: a scriptural argument based on Christian-Judeo and Islamic texts, a metaphysical argument, and a meta-ethical argument.

Bax 4 The scripturally based argument aims to establish a DCT of ethics by showing Gods sovereign power in Scripture. One of the most pervasive themes in the Bible and Quran is Gods sovereignty as creator of life and the universe. In both texts, there are instances that show Gods incomprehensible power and control over mankind and the earth. For many believers, this alone is a good enough reason to believe in a DCT of ethics. The rational being that since God is all powerful, He must surely set the precedence for what is morally right. Another rendering of this argument is that God, in all his power, has compelled mankind into a state of morality out of sheer force. However, this belief easily falls prey to the fact that God in both the Bible and Quran appears manipulative, commanding seemingly immoral acts. The most well-known instance featured in the two Scriptures is when God commands Abraham to bind and kill his son Isaac in clear violation of the 6th commandment. Although this was a test and Abraham did not kill Isaac, Gods intent was nonetheless to deceive. Another example in the bible is in Exodus when God commands the Israelites to plunder the wealth of the Egyptians (3:21-2). This example violates the 8th commandment. An example in the Quran describes a manipulative God who guides whom he wishes and misguides whom he wishes (14:4). In both instances, God disregards his own commandments. If the best man can do is follow the teachings of God and emulate Him to the extent it is possible to, would it not follow that like God, we are not obliged to follow any moral compass? In spite of this perception, many scholars have argued that this reason in itself is sufficient to warrant a belief in the DCT of ethics. One of these scholars is Philip Quinn. Quinn bases his argument on the irrefutability of Scriptures coupled with a consistent reading leading to a belief in the DCT. In The Primacy of Gods Will in Christian Ethics Quinn writes because of divine conflicting prohibitions, the only way to preserve consistency of the Scriptures, and

Bax 5 retain the commonly held divine attributes is to hold that God is the source of morality, and fully endorses the DCT of ethics (500). The problem with this argument, and all scripturally based arguments for that matter, is that they all rely on theories, assumptions, and allegorical interpretations. Any argument based on scripture cannot escape the fact that it is conversely based on the interpreters theories and assumptions regarding the text. The bible itself provides no hints on how it should be read which leaves the reader in charge of this task. Any meaning we ascertain from the text will inevitably be theory-laden and based on preconceived notions and assumptions. This fact makes it impossible to objectively argue in favor of the DCT based solely on Scripture. In Divine Command Theory and the Passage of Time, Simin Rahimi outlines the basis for a metaphysical argument which begins by considering the nature of God, his attributes, and relation to the rest of the world in order to demonstrate that a correct philosophical understanding of the divine nature and Gods relation to the created world leads to the divine command theory of ethics (320). Rene Descartes illustrates Gods relation and influence on this world in his seminal work Discourse on Method and Meditation on First Philosophy. Descartes argues for a DCT after he reasons that his ability to conceive of an idea more perfect than him must indicate that that one instance of perfection must have been placed in him by a being that is perfect, i.e., God (19). To prove mans dependence on God Descartes uses a syllogism: man is composed of two natures, corporeal and intelligent. Composition signifies dependence, ergo mankind is dependent on God because God is perfect and composition is indicative of imperfection (20). The implication of Descartes reasoning is that everything in the world is contingent on Gods will. Truth, including ethical truth, must also be dependent on God. However, this argument is no more useful in arguing for the DCT than the Scriptural argument.

Bax 6 The problem with this argument is Gods limitless power. Like a dictator, God has free reign and absolute power to decree whatever He pleases. Like a dictator there is also the potential to create what may seem to us as an arbitrary law. It is a distinct possibility that Gods will transcends any level of rationality mankind may ever be able to comprehend. Is it not possible that God could in fact create an opposing world where inflicting pain on others is morally right? By the DCT and Descartes reasoning God can command whatever He likes. He is all powerful. Whether it be perceived by man as good or bad is irrelevant. We have already considered examples in Exodus and Genesis where this is the case. The problem appears to be that the metaphysical issue with the DCT is that it primarily focuses on divine command instead of the subject at hand, ethics. Simin Rahimi echoes a similar truth in A Resolution to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Here Rahimi states that since any possible world is logically consistent with an absolute divine will, from the postulation of an absolute divine will no conclusion about ethics can be drawn (754-5). To avoid this problem, Robert Adams advocates for a meta-ethical argument that avoids both the arbitrary argument as well the instances in scripture of God commanding immoral acts. What exactly is meant by meta-ethical must first be examined. For Socrates and Euthyphro to come to a conclusive definition for the word piety, requires a framework of judgment that aims to guide them to the nature of morality and the ability to solve moral conflicts. Any enquiries or arguments regarding such a theory would apply only to the criterion that makes such an argument ethically plausible and not ethics or morals themselves (Rahimi 323). A meta-ethical argument for DTC will then aim to do a better job of satisfying such a basic moral criteria compared to any other ethics related theory. The meta-ethical argument will unfold in two stages. The first stage aims to establish the points of morality at which an ethical

Bax 7 theory must answer for it to be successful. The second stage is a comparative stage where the ethical theory is compared to other similar theories. Robert Adams Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again first proposes that DTC accounts for the basics of morality, and second, that it is currently the best theory of ethics. Adams begins by establishing two sets of moral values, ethical and non-ethical. Ethical values, such as fairness, depend on God, while non-ethical values, including love, do not (Adams 101). Adams sets forth a lengthy criterion as prescribed by the first stage of the meta-ethical argument. Adams suggests that identifying ethical wrongness with the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God accounts for this criteria (139). In the second stage Adams supposes that God commands out of love. Gods goodness can then be analyzed in nonmoral terms. This seems to be more line with believers who ascribe positive characteristics to God (Adams 104). Adams argues that this detail allows his argument to circumvent the arbitrary argument because his argument is bound by non-moral values such as kindness, and God always acts out of kindness (100). However, there appears to be a disconnect between what is loved and what is morally right. Adams argument opens itself to all forms of deconstruction on numerous grounds. If the lovingness of an object comes to signify morality, then there is no need for God to decree what is morally right. Gods commandments then seem to be redundant because Adams equates love to morality. After having researched the topic of DCT, which plays a central role in most religious teachings, I have begun to seriously question the validity of what I once took as truth. One problem is that if we compare God to a supreme monarch who can decree whatever law He likes, whatever is decreed has the potential of being arbitrary. Or if God truly does possess infinite power and creative ability, what is to stop Him from creating a world that is morally opposite of

Bax 8 ours? More importantly, what purpose will there be for religion if moral truth can be realized in another way? The fact that there is no conclusive answer to the validity of the DCT of ethics tells me one thing: mankinds moral and ethical judgments cannot be justified by divine command alone. Moreover, defenders of the DCT have neglected possibly the most important facet of a DCT: why people should subscribe to it. If God is powerful enough to lay claim to mankinds will why not force obedience? Perhaps it is the act of assenting to God that He values over simple subjugation. Perhaps God has willed a moral intuitive into man that is an aspect of a DCT. The inability of the DCT defenders to come to solid conclusion has caused me to critically doubt morality based on Gods command alone. Platos Euthyphro and the accompanying authors have caused a significant shift in my beliefs regarding divine command. I have since come to a better, more critical understanding of my Christian foundation realizing that even what is decreed by God should not be exempt from evaluation.

Bax 9 Bibliography Adams, Robert M. Divine Command Theory Modified Again. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Web. Descartes, Ren , Donald A. Cress. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1998. Print. Murphy, Mark. Theological Voluntarism. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2008. Web. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-theological/>. Quinn, Philip L. "The Primacy of God's Will in Christian Ethics. Philosophical Perspectives. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company., 1992. Print. Rahimi, Simin. Divine Command Theory in the Passage of History. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal of Philosophy. Philosopher's Index. 2009. Web. Rahimi, Simin. A Resolution to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Heythrop Journal. Religion and Philosophy Collection. 2009. Web.