UNCLASSIFIED I COMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Dr. Ruth David
Type of event: Interview
Date: June 10, 2003
Special Access Issues: none
Prepared by: Gordon Lederman
Team Number: 2
Location: ANSER headquarters, Shirlington, VA
Participants - Non-Commission: Dr. Ruth David, President and CEO, ANSER
Participants - Commission: Bruce Berkowitz (lead), Gordon Lederman.jnotetaker)
UNCLASSIFIED: She was DDS&T from Sept. 1995 through Sept. 1998. When John
Deutch became DCI, he decided to look. outside the CIA for a DDS&T because he thought that
DS&T had lost touch with the technological state of the art. David was at Sandia National
Laboratories and was hired as DDS&T. She was an IPA fortwo years and then stayed on for a
third year. She had no background in intelligence but had a lot of experience in information
technology (IT) and other technology. DCI Deutch did not give her any specific instructions, but
in general Deutch was concerned about the depth of talent in the CIA regarding technology and
that the CIA needed to focus on technology. Deutch was there for only 1 year of her term as
DDS&T.

UNCLASSIFIED: She developed the idea of the Agile Intelligence Enterprise (AlE),
which she characterized as a "vision" rather than as a concrete proposal. AlE was a multimedia
package designed to illustrate what technology could offer to intelligence, namely via IT
networking. AlE was a complete end-to-end system, linking all parts of the intelligence cycle
from collection to dissemination. It was controversial in that it would allow consumers to access
more information than just what the intelligence community would give them directly. She
( characterized AlE as including some state of the art IT but also "speculative" IT. David noted
the importance of engaging non-technologists in devising plans for employing technology; as she
said, technology does no good if it is never used. AlE was a means to reach out to non-
technologists to engage them in dialogue concerning the potential offeredby IT for intelligence.

UNCLASSIFIED: David started to think about AlE in early 1996. The term "agile"
came from her involvement in Lehigh University'S "Agile Manufacturing Enterprise Forum"
while at Sandia. The AlE idea matured in 1996-7. She gave approximately 100 speeches across
the IC and DOD concerning AlE in 1.5 years.

UNCLASSIFIED I COMMISSION SENSITIVE 1

 UNCLASSIFIED I COMMISSION SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED: However, she did not control any of the resources necessary to
translate AlE into reality. Also, AlE was intended to be implemented 011 an IC-wide rather than
a CIA basis. Moreover, implementation rested in the "CIO-controlled" environment, and the
CIO were evidently concerned about desktop security. David said that rp.~ AlE concept was built
on some sort of CMS idea that previously existed, but the CMS CIO had-Iittle clout to implement
the idea. The CIA appointed a CIO midway through her tenure as DDS~T, but the CIO focused
on desktop upgrades. .'

UNCLASSIFIED: The most controversial part of AlE was how to deal with security.
AlE included a proposal for a biometric key that would know the holder's tickets and thus allow
access as appropriate. David said that "everything" about AlE was controversial from a security
perspective. She said that, as DDS&T, she held tickets with other agencies but could not access
that information directly from her desktop. She said that access-security barriers to AlE were to
a large extent cultural in nature and that 80% of AlE could have been achieved if cultural
barriers regarding security were overcome. She said that strong advocacy by the DCI of AlE
could have overcome cultural barriers. Deutch embraced technology, while Tenet was not
comfortable with technology and was "not able to see technology as anything other than a
threat." It was difficult to convince Tenet that the benefits of technology outweighed the risks.
David was attuned to the security concerns of AlE, and she built security audits into AlE to catch
individuals using AlE who were trolling for information that they did not have tickets to receive.
However, she said that the people in charge of security and counterintelligence were averse to
using technology because they viewed it as a tremendous vulnerability.

UNCLASSIFIED: With respect to recommendations, she said ili~'~:thefirst thing that

must be done is to sort out the security environment. Each agency has~aifferent way of holding
data. Yet analysts must have access to all information relevant to their subject regardless of how
it is collected. She thought that "metadata tags" and encryption can be used to protect sources
and methods while still allowing access. She said that analysts too often develop opinions based
on limited data; for example, NSA and CIA will each develop opinions, yet such opinions will be
based on that agency's information rather than both agencies' information. Moreover, each
agency decides what information should be reported to analysts, but data that might not seem
important at first glance still might prove to be important concerning "emerging threats" when
viewed from a broader perspective. She said that there needs to be a review of raw data from a
larger perspective to determine relevance to emerging threats.

UNCLASSIFIED: Also regarding analysts, she said that advanced IT tools are needed for
dealing with the high volumes of data collected by the IC. She also said that there need to be
community standards for "metadata tagging" to allow searching. She said that analysts should
have the ability to access a wide range of databases (there is no need to compile all information
into a single database). She said that there should be a system for alerting analysts as to new
information regarding their issues; if such new information is in a compartment that an analyst
cannot access, then someone such as a supervisor should be notified by the system. She cited the
examples of ballistic missile tests and the IndiaIPakistan nuclear tests, in-:/whichafter-action
dt~·
UNCLASSIFIED I COMMISSION SENSITIVE 2
 ;.:~v

UNCLASSIFIED / COMMISSION SENSITIVE

reports indicated that analysts would have been able to predict such tests if they had access to all
the relevant information.

UNCLASSIFIED: She said that the issue of information access will become even more
acute in the homeland security context. For example: (1) the bridge between foreign and
domestic intelligence information is problematic, and (2) geographic divisions within the
analytical bureaucracy can hinder analysis (i.~., the transnational analysis office was weak as
compared to regional analytical bureaus).

UNCLASSIFIED: She thinks that everyone in the IC should have access to the Internet.
When she came to CIA, she did not have access to the Internet, although DCI Deutch fixed that
quickly. However, getting Internet access for analysts was very difficult She said that the
reason for the lack of Internet access was basically that the high cost of,~vilding a separate
unclassified network. The reaction among CIA management was, "TheYtechies might require
access to the Internet, but they could not understand why a case officer would require access to
the Internet." As late as 1998, "I heard of analyst going home to use their personal Internet
accounts" to get access. David was concerned that the analysts, lacking access to the Internet
"were operating in a world that wasn't the same as the one inwhich their adversaries 11.~.,AI
Qaeda] were operating."

UNCLASSIFIED: Regarding organizational changes, she said that (1) the DCI should be
separated from the CIA, and (2) the DCI should have a cadre of all-source analysts. The DCI
should focus on strategic intelligence. The DI should become part of the DCl's analytical cadre.
CIA has become seen as too HUMINT oriented, presumably hurting the Drs ability to conduct
all-source analysis.

UNCLASSIFIED: She criticized the ORCON system. She said that we need to figure out
how to separate data from its sources/methods information. She criticized collectors as
collecting information regardless of its usefulness.

UNCLASSIFIED: In general, she said that there was no methodology in the IC for
weighing security against other values such as efficiency and cost. Shesaid that decisions
regarding security were very personality-driven, and collectors have g~€~f.!.latitudein what they
do (presumably, controlling who sees collected information). She said'that DS&T had
developed objectives for classification, namely protecting (1) technology, (2) ongoing
operations, and (3) data collected. However, others in the IC did not have such objectives or
discipline. She said that the DO should have latitude regarding classification because it knows
local conditions; however, she noted that there is no oversight of how the DO does security. She
summed up the security issue as follows: "If we are investing to collect it, we need to be able to
use it." She said that technology has not been exploited to overcome security challenges.

UNCLASSIFIED: With respect to IC management, she said that 80% was failure of will.
She said that "the community was not managed" while she was there. She said that issues of

UNCLASSIFIED I COMMISSION SENSITIVE 3

 MORl DoclD: 1454125

UNCLASSIFIED / CO:MMISSION SENSITIVE

budgetary authority were not as important as some observers made it see~. She said that, in
general, "the DCI has more authority than he routinely exercised." Jt~"
t.y:~:t~...
UNCLASSIFIED: She said that, due to the post-Cold War peacedividend, the IC
downsized and sought to do so by attritiontj.e., by not hiring new people). However, the 1990s
were the decade of the IT revolution, and the IC's failure to bring in new people meant that the
Ie's employees were out of touch with IT advances. As she, said, "By the mid-90s we had a
technologically obsolete workforce; In the 1990s, there was a severe shortage of IT workers
II

across the economy; in order toattracttalent"sheproposed,"pay-branding," which meant paying

IT engineersaccording to market rates for their specific Skills.. However, the ICresisted this
idea,as the IC found it "unacceptable" that engineers should be paid more and wasreluctanrto
admit that engineers are, paidmore in the privatesectorShesaid that she would be surprise-to-
find that there.ispay-branding.now. ':;';,; ;,!: ' '."

liNc~t\~~IFrnD:She recommends that the DCI be a former CEO from industiywhb, ,'
hassignificant experience in management and .reorganization/restructuring, The DCI's deputy ..'"
should be someone' who knows the Jc:, well. The DCI needs to be a leader who has vision and
can break: China and go mano-a-mario with bureaucrats protecting turf. The DCI should be
someone from outside the beltway and who hasmanagedlargecorporations. RecentDCIs have
lacked those qualifications.

UNCLASSIFIED: Regarding the tension between DOD and nO~!>OD intelligence

assets,she said that there is a tension between strategic intelligence and':'supporting warfighters,
DIA should be beefed-up to support the warfighter, while the DI should focus on strategic
analysis. Collection will need to be balanced between strategic intelligence and supporting
warfighting. She said that, in her experience, the IC focuses too much on tactical intelligence
and support for warfighters. She attended daily meetings, and the focus of such meetings was
invariably on tactical matters. She said that the Ie's focus on tactical issues is detrimental for
technology, as technology that cannot deliver immediate benefits is treated as a lower priority.

UNCLASSIFIED: She said that the DS&T spent abouDf its budget operating
exp~~s~ and maintenanceDon development [planned op s1, anD on strategic
positioning.

UNCLASSIFffiD: With respect to terrorism, she said it was not discussed very much
separately but rather was viewed as part of transnational threats - narnel counte roliferation.'
She said that the embassy bombings were strategic warning because
the attacks were two near-simultaneous events in prevl,..".o=u=y::--r=o=w=-"'-r=ls-=:-r.,,-ar=e..,.,as=-.-------'
'--r1"I'Tlo,...,wl'TFe....,vro=rel..-,"TIII~o~6ne
thought that there would be an attack against the U.S.':'" there was a reluctance
to think of the U.S. 'homeland as a target, and the foreign/domestic divide was critical. Finally,
factors such as the ease of international travel, IT networking, and otherjechnology helped
individuals coordinate across long distances and thus allowed terrorists;.~d:'operate globally -

•
while the Ie was failing to exploit technology. '

UNCLASSIFIED I COMMISSION SENSITIVE 4

CIA 0095
 UNCLASSIFIED / COMMISSION SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED: Although David left the CIA after the Africa embassy bombings and
was DDS&T, she does not remember seeing the DCI's declaration of war on terrorism - but she
may have seen it in a daily briefing.

UNCLASSIFIED I COMMISSION SENSITIVE 5