Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature Aristotles account of motion can be found in the Physics.

By motion, Aristotle (384 3!! B"#$ understands any %ind of chan&e. 'e defines motion as the actuality of a (otentiality. )nitially, Aristotles definition seems to in*ol*e a contradiction. 'o+e*er, commentators on the +or%s of Aristotle, such as ,t. -homas A.uinas, maintain that this is the only +ay to define motion. )n order to ade.uately understand Aristotles definition of motion it is necessary to understand +hat he means by actuality and (otentiality. Aristotle uses the +ords energeia and entelechia interchan&eably to describe a %ind of action. A lin&uistic analysis sho+s that, by actuality, Aristotle means both energeia, +hich means bein& at +or%, and entelechia, +hich means bein& at an end. -hese t+o +ords, althou&h they ha*e different meanin&s, function as synonyms in Aristotles scheme. /or Aristotle, to be a thin& in the +orld is to be at +or%, to belon& to a (articular s(ecies, to act for an end and to form material into endurin& or&ani0ed +holes. Actuality, for Aristotle, is therefore close in meanin& to +hat it is to be ali*e, e1ce(t it does not carry the im(lication of mortality. /rom the Middle A&es to modern times, commentators disa&reed on the inter(retation of Aristotles account of motion. An accurate renderin& of Aristotles definition must include a((arently inconsistent (ro(ositions: (a$ that motion is rest, and (b$ that a (otentiality, +hich must be, if anythin&, a (ri*ation of actuality, is at the same time that actuality of +hich it is the lac%. ,t. -homas A.uinas +as (re(ared to ta%e these (ro(ositions seriously. ,t. -homas obser*es that to say that somethin& is in motion is 2ust to say that it is both +hat it is already and somethin& else that it is not yet. Accordin&ly, motion is the mode in +hich the future belon&s to the (resent, it is the (resent absence of 2ust those (articular absent thin&s +hich are about to be. ,t. -homas thus resol*es the a((arent contradiction bet+een (otentiality and actuality in Aristotles definition of motion by ar&uin& that in e*ery motion actuality and (otentiality are mi1ed or blended. ,t. -homas inter(retation of Aristotles definition of motion, ho+e*er, is not free of difficulties. 'is inter(retation seems to tri*iali0e the meanin& of entelechia. 3ne im(lication of this inter(retation is that +hate*er ha((ens to be the case ri&ht no+ is an entelechia, as thou&h somethin& +hich is intrinsically unstable as the instantaneous (osition of an arro+ in fli&ht deser*ed to be described by the +ord +hich Aristotle e*ery+here else reser*es for com(le1 or&ani0ed states +hich (ersist, +hich hold out in bein& a&ainst internal and e1ternal causes tendin& to destroy them. )n the Metaphysics, ho+e*er, Aristotle dra+s a distinction bet+een t+o %inds of (otentiality. 3n the one hand, there are latent or inacti*e (otentialities. 3n the other hand, there are acti*e or at +or% (otentialities. Accordin&ly, e*ery motion is a com(le1 +hole, an endurin& unity +hich or&ani0es distinct (arts. -hin&s ha*e bein& to the e1tent that they are or are (art of determinate +holes, so that to be means to be somethin&, and chan&e has bein& because it al+ays is or is (art of some determinate (otentiality, at +or% and manifest in the +orld as chan&e. -able of "ontents )ntroduction Energeia and Entelechia -he ,tandard Account of Aristotles 4ie+ of Motion -homas Account of Aristotles 4ie+ of Motion -he 5imits of -homas Account /acin& the "ontradictions of Aristotles Account of Motion

6hat Motion )s 7enos Parado1es and Aristotles 8efinition of Motion 9eferences and /urther 9eadin& :. )ntroduction Aristotle defines motion, by +hich he means chan&e of any %ind, as the actuality of a (otentiality as such (or as mo*able, or as a (otentiality ; Physics !<:a :< ::, != !>, b 4 ?$. -he definition is a con2unction of t+o terms +hich normally contradict each other, alon& +ith, in @ree%, a .ualifyin& clause +hich seems to ma%e the contradiction inesca(able. Aet ,t. -homas A.uinas called it the only (ossible +ay to define motion by +hat is (rior to and better %no+n than motion. At the o((osite e1treme is the youn& 8escartes, +ho in the first boo% he +rote announced that +hile e*eryone %no+s +hat motion is, no one understands Aristotles definition of it. Accordin& to 8escartes, Bmotion . . . is nothin& more than the action by +hich any body (asses from one (lace to anotherC (Princi(les )), !4$. -he use of the +ord B(assesC ma%es this definition an ob*ious circleD 8escartes mi&ht 2ust as +ell ha*e called motion the action by +hich a thin& mo*es. But the im(ortant (art of 8escartes definition is the +ords Bnothin& more than,C by +hich he asserts that motion is susce(tible of no definition +hich is not circular, as one mi&ht say Bthe color red is 2ust the color red,C to mean that the term is not reducible to some modification of a +a*e, or analy0able in any other +ay. -here must be ultimate terms of discourse, or there +ould be no definitions, and indeed no thou&ht. -he (oint is not that one cannot construct a non circular definition of such a term, one claimed to be (ro(erly irreducible, but that one ou&ht not to do so. -he true atoms of discourse are those thin&s +hich can be e1(lained only by means of thin&s less %no+n than themsel*es. )f motion is such an ultimate term, then to define it by means of anythin& but synonyms is +illfully to choose to d+ell in a realm of dar%ness, at the sacrifice of the understandin& +hich is naturally ours in the form of B&ood senseC or ordinary common sense. 8escartes treatment of motion is e1(licitly anti Aristotelian and his definition of motion is deliberately circular. -he "artesian (hysics is rooted in a disa&reement +ith Aristotle about +hat the best %no+n thin&s are, and about +here thou&ht should ta%e its be&innin&s. -here is, ho+e*er, a lon& tradition of inter(retation and translation of Aristotles definition of motion, be&innin& at least fi*e hundred years before 8escartes and dominatin& discussions of Aristotle today, +hich see%s to ha*e thin&s both +ays. An unusually clear instance of this attitude is found in the follo+in& sentence from a medie*al Arabic commentary: BMotion is a first entelechy of that +hich is in (otentiality, insofar as it is in (otentiality, and if you (refer you may say that it is a transition from (otentiality to actuality.C Aou +ill reco&ni0e the first of these t+o statements (resented as e.ui*alent as a translation of Aristotles definition, and the second as a circular definition of the same ty(e as that of 8escartes. Motion is an entelechyD motion is a transition. -he stran&eness of the +ord BentelechyC mas%s the contradiction bet+een these t+o claims. 6e must achie*e an understandin& of Aristotles +ord entelechia, the heart of his definition of motion, in order to see that +hat it says cannot be said 2ust as +ell by such a +ord as Btransition.C !. #ner&eia and #ntelechia -he +ord entelecheia +as in*ented by Aristotle, but ne*er defined by him. )t is at the heart not only of his definition of motion, but of all his thou&ht. )ts meanin& is the most %no+able in itself of all (ossible ob2ects of the intellect. -here is no startin& (oint from +hich +e can descend to (ut to&ether the cements of its meanin&. 6e can come to an understandin& of entelecheia only by an ascent from +hat is intrinsically

less %no+able than it, indeed %no+able only throu&h it, but more %no+n because more familiar to us. 6e ha*e a number of resources by +hich to be&in such an ascent, dra+in& u(on the lin&uistic elements out of +hich Aristotle constructed the +ord, and u(on the fact that he uses the +ord energeia as a synonym, or all but a synonym, for entelecheia. -he root of energeia is ergon deed, +or%, or act from +hich comes the ad2ecti*e energon used in ordinary s(eech to mean acti*e, busy, or at +or%. Energeia is formed by the addition of a noun endin& to the ad2ecti*e energonD +e mi&ht construct the +ord is at +or% ness from An&lo ,a1on roots to translate energeia into #n&lish, or use the more eu(honious (eri(hrastic e1(ression, bein& at +or%. )f +e are careful to remember ho+ +e &ot there, +e could alternati*ely use 5atin roots to ma%e the +ord BactualityC to translate energeia. -he (roblem +ith this alternati*e is that the +ord BactualityC already belon&s to the #n&lish lan&ua&e, and has a life of its o+n +hich seems to be at *ariance +ith the sim(le sense of bein& acti*e. By the actuality of a thin&, +e mean not its bein& in action but its bein& +hat it is. /or e1am(le, there is a fish +ith an effecti*e means of camoufla&e: it loo%s li%e a roc% but it is actually a fish. 6hen an actuality is attributed to that fish, com(letely at rest at the bottom of the ocean, +e dont seem to be tal%in& about any acti*ity. But accordin& to Aristotle, to be somethin& al+ays means to be at +or% in a certain +ay. )n the case of the fish at rest, its actuality is the acti*ity of metabolism, the +or% by +hich it is constantly transformin& material from its en*ironment into (arts of itself and losin& material from itself into its en*ironment, the acti*ity by +hich the fish maintains itself as a fish and as 2ust the fish it is, and +hich ceases only +hen the fish ceases to be. Any static state +hich has any determinate character can only e1ist as the outcome of a continuous e1(enditure of effort, maintainin& the state as it is. -hus e*en the roc%, at rest ne1t to the fish, is in acti*ity: to be a roc% is to strain to be at the center of the uni*erse, and thus to be in motion unless constrained other+ise, as the roc% in our e1am(le is constrained by the lar&e .uantity of earth already &athered around the center of the uni*erse. A roc% at rest at the center is at +or% maintainin& its (lace, a&ainst the counter tendency of all the earth to dis(lace it. -he center of the uni*erse is determined only by the common innate acti*ity of roc%s and other %inds of earth. Nothin& is +hich is not someho+ in action, maintainin& itself either as the +hole it is, or as a (art of some +hole. A roc% is inor&anic only +hen re&arded in isolation from the uni*erse as a +hole +hich is an or&ani0ed +hole 2ust as blood considered by itself could not be called ali*e yet is only blood insofar as it contributes to the maintenance of some or&ani0ed body. No e1istin& roc% can fail to contribute to the hierarchical or&ani0ation of the uni*erseD +e can therefore call any e1istin& roc% an actual roc%. Energeia, then, al+ays means the bein& at +or% of some definite, s(ecific somethin&D the roc% cannot under&o metabolism, and once the fish does no more than fall to earth and remain there it is no lon&er a fish. -he material and or&ani0ation of a thin& determine a s(ecific ca(acity or (otentiality for acti*ity +ith res(ect to +hich the corres(ondin& acti*ity has the character of an end (telos$. Aristotle says Bthe act is an end and the bein& at +or% is the act and since energeia is named from the ergon it also e1tends to the bein& at an end (entelecheia$C (Metaphysics :<?<a !: !3$. -he +ord entelecheia has a structure (arallel to that of energeia. /rom the root +ord telos, meanin& end, comes the ad2ecti*e enteles, used in ordinary s(eech to mean com(lete, (erfect, or full &ro+n. But +hile energeia, bein& at +or%, is made from the ad2ecti*e meanin& at +or% and a noun endin&, entelecheia is made from the ad2ecti*e meanin& com(lete and the *erb exein. -hus if +e translate entelecheia as Bcom(letenessC or B(erfection,C the contribution the meanin& of exein ma%es to the term is not e*ident.

Aristotle (robably uses exein for t+o reasons +hich lead to the same conclusion: /irst, one of the common meanin&s of exein is Bto beC in the sense of to remain, to stay, or to %ee( in some condition s(ecified by a (recedin& ad*erb as in the idiomskalos exei, Bthin&s are &oin& +ell,C or kakos exei, Bthin&s are &oin& badly.C )t means Bto beC in the sense of to continue to be. -his is only one of se*eral (ossible meanin&s of exein, but there is a second fact +hich ma%es it li%ely that it is the meanin& +hich +ould stri%e the ear of a @ree% s(ea%in& (erson of Aristotles time. -here +as then in ordinary use the +ord endelecheia, differin& from Aristotles +ordentelecheia only by a delta in (lace of the tau. Endelecheia means continuity or (ersistence. As one +ould e1(ect, there +as a &ood deal of confusion in ancient times bet+een the in*ented and undefined term entelecheia and the familiar +ord endelecheia. -he use of the (un for the serious (hiloso(hic (ur(ose of sayin& at once t+o thin&s for +hose union the lan&ua&e has no +ord +as a fre.uent literary de*ice of Aristotles teacher Plato. )n this stri%in& instance, Aristotle seems to ha*e imitated the (layful style of his teacher in constructin& the most im(ortant term in his technical *ocabulary. -he addition ofexein to enteles, throu&h the 2oint action of the meanin& of the suffi1 and the sound of the +hole, su(erim(oses u(on the sense of Bcom(letenessC that of continuity. Entelecheia means continuin& in a state of com(leteness, or bein& at an end +hich is of such a nature that it is only (ossible to be there by means of the continual e1(enditure of the effort re.uired to stay there. Eust as energeia e1tends toentelecheia because it is the acti*ity +hich ma%es a thin& +hat it is, entelecheia e1tends to energeiabecause it is the end or (erfection +hich has bein& only in, throu&h, and durin& acti*ity. /or the remainder of this entry, the +ord BactualityC translates both energeia and entelecheia, and BactualityC means 2ust that area of o*erla( bet+een bein& at +or% and bein& at an end +hich e1(resses +hat it means to be somethin& determinate. -he +ords energeia and entelecheia ha*e *ery different meanin&s, but function as synonyms because the +orld is such that thin&s ha*e identities, belon& to s(ecies, act for ends, and form material into endurin& or&ani0ed +holes. -he +ord actuality as thus used is *ery close in meanin& to the +ord life, +ith the e1ce(tion that it is broader in meanin&, carryin& no necessary im(lication of mortality. Fosman G:>H>I inter(rets the definition in substantially the same +ay as it is inter(reted abo*e, utili0in& e1am(les of %inds of entelecheia &i*en by Aristotle in On the Soul, and thus he succeeds in by(assin& the inade.uate translations of the +ord. -he ,achs :>>? translation of Aristotles Physics translatesentelecheia as bein& at +or% stayin& itself. 3. -he ,tandard Account of Aristotles 4ie+ of Motion 6e embar%ed on this .uest for the meanin& of entelecheia in order to decide +hether the (hrase Btransition to actualityC could e*er (ro(erly render it. -he ans+er is no+ ob*iously Bno.C An actuality is somethin& on&oin&, but only the on&oin& acti*ity of maintainin& a state of com(leteness or (erfection already reachedD the transition into such a state al+ays lac%s and (ro&ressi*ely a((roaches the (erfected character +hich an actuality al+ays has. A do& is not a (u((y: the one is, amon& other thin&s, ca(able of &eneratin& (u((ies and &i*in& (rotection, +hile the other is inca(able of &eneration and in need of (rotection. 6e mi&ht ha*e trouble decidin& e1actly +hen the (u((y has ceased to be a (u((y and become a do& at the a&e of one year, for e1am(le, it +ill (robably be fully &ro+n and ca(able of re(roducin&, but still a+%+ard in its mo*ements and (u((yish in its attitudes, but in any res(ect in +hich it has become a do& it has ceased to be a (u((y. But our concern +as to understand +hat motion is, and it is ob*iously the (u((y

+hich is in motion, since it is &ro+in& to+ard maturity, +hile the do& is not in motion in that res(ect, since its acti*ity has ceased to (roduce chan&e and become +holly directed to+ard self maintenance. )f the same thin& cannot be in the same res(ect both an actuality and a transition to actuality, it is clearly the transition that motion is, and the actuality that it isnt. )t seems that 8escartes is ri&ht and Aristotle is +ron&. 3f course it is (ossible that Aristotle meant +hat 8escartes said, but sim(ly used the +ron& +ord, that he called motion an entelecheia three times, at the be&innin&, middle, and end of his e1(lanation of +hat motion is, +hen he really meant not entelecheia but the transition or (assa&e to entelecheia. No+, this su&&estion +ould be lau&hable if it +ere not +hat almost e*eryone +ho addresses the .uestion today belie*es. ,ir 8a*id 9oss, certainly the most massi*ely .ualified authority on Aristotle of those +ho ha*e li*ed in our century and +ritten in our lan&ua&e, the man +ho su(er*ised the 31ford Jni*ersity Presss forty fi*e year (ro2ect of translatin& all the +or%s of Aristotle into #n&lish, in a commentary, on Aristotles definition of motion, +rites: Bentelecheia must here mean Kactuali0ation, not KactualityD it is the (assa&e to actuality that iskinesisC (Physics, text with commentary, 5ondon, :>3H, (. 3?>$. )n another boo%, his commentary on the Metaphysics, 9oss ma%es it clear that he re&ards the meanin& entelecheia has in e*ery use Aristotle ma%es of it e*ery+here but in the definition of motion as bein& not only other than but incom(atible +ith the meanin& Bactuali0ation.C )n *ie+ of that fact, 9oss decision that B entelecheia must here mean Kactuali0ationC is a des(erate one, indicatin& a des(air of understandin& Aristotle out of his o+n mouth. )t is not translation or inter(retation but (lastic sur&ery. 9oss full account of motion as actuali0ation ( Aristotle, Ne+ Aor%, :>HH, ((. 8: 8!$ cites no (assa&es from Aristotle, and no authorities, but (atiently e1(lains that motion is motion and cannot, therefore, be an actuality. -here are authorities he could ha*e cited, includin& Moses Maimonides, the t+elfth century Ee+ish (hiloso(her +ho sou&ht to reconcile Aristotles (hiloso(hy +ith the 3ld -estament and -almud, and +ho defined motion as Bthe transition from (otentiality to actuality,C and the most famous Aristotelian commentator of all time, A*erroes, the t+elfth century ,(anish Muslim thin%er, +ho called motion a (assa&e from non bein& to actuality and com(lete reality. )n each case the circular definition is chosen in (reference to the one +hich seems laden +ith contradictions. A circular statement, to the e1tent that it is circular, is at least not false, and can as a +hole ha*e some content: 8escartes definition amounts to sayin& B+hate*er motion is, it is (ossible only +ith res(ect to (lace,C and that of A*erroes, Maimonides, and 9oss amounts to sayin& B+hate*er motion is, it results al+ays in an actuality.C An accurate renderin& of Aristotles definition +ould amount to sayin& (a$ that motion is rest, and (b$ that a (otentiality, +hich must be, at a minimum, a (ri*ation of actuality, is at the same time that actuality of +hich it is the lac%. -here has been one ma2or commentator on Aristotle +ho +as (re(ared to ta%e seriously and to ma%e sense of both these claims. 4. -homas Account of Aristotles 4ie+ of Motion ,t. -homas A.uinas, in his inter(retation of Aristotles definition of motion, (Commentary on Aristotles Physics, 5ondon, :>H3, ((. :3H :3=$, obser*es t+o (rinci(les: (:$ that Aristotle meant +hat he +rote, and (!$ that +hat Aristotle +rote is +orth the effort of understandin&. 6ritin& a century after Maimonides and A*erroes, -homas dis(oses of their a((roach to definin& motion +ith fe+ +ords: it is not Aristotles definition and it is an error. A (assa&e, a transition, an actuali0ation, an actuali0in&, or any of the more com(le1 substanti*es to +hich translators ha*e resorted +hich incor(orate in some more or less dis&uised form some (ro&ressi*e

sense united to the meanin& of actuality, all ha*e in common that they denote a %ind of motion. )f motion can be defined, then to rest content +ith e1(lainin& motion as a %ind of motion is certainly to errD e*en if one is to re2ect Aristotles definition on fundamental (hiloso(hical &rounds, as 8escartes +as to do, the first ste( must be to see +hat it means. And -homas e1(lains clearly and sim(ly a sense in +hich Aristotles definition is both free of contradiction and &enuinely a definition of motion. 3ne must sim(ly see that the &ro+in& (u((y is a do&, that the half formed lum( of bron0e on +hich the scul(tor is +or%in& is a statue of 'ermes, that the te(id +ater on the fire is hotD +hat it means to say that the (u((y is &ro+in&, the bron0e is bein& +or%ed, or the +ater is bein& heated, is that each is not 2ust the com(le1 of characteristics it (ossesses ri&ht no+D in each case, somethin& that the thin& is not yet, already belon&s to it as that to+ard +hich it is, ri&ht no+, ordered. -o say that somethin& is in motion is 2ust to say that it is oth +hat it is already and somethin& else that it isnt yet. 6hat else do +e mean by sayin& that the (u((y is &ro+in&, rather than remainin& +hat it is, that the bron0e under the scul(tors hand is in a different condition from the identically sha(ed lum( of bron0e he has discarded, or that the +ater is not 2ust te(id but bein& heatedL Motion is the mode in +hich the future belon&s to the (resent, is the (resent absence of 2ust those (articular absent thin&s +hich are about to be. -homas discusses in detail the e1am(le of the +ater bein& heated. Assume it to ha*e started cold, and to ha*e been heated so far to room tem(erature. -he heat it no+ has, +hich has re(laced the (otentiality it (re*iously had to be 2ust that hot, belon&s to it in actuality. -he ca(acity it has to be still hotter belon&s to it in (otentiality. -o the e1tent that it is actually hot it has been mo*edD to the e1tent that it is not yet as hot as it is &oin& to be, it is not yet mo*ed. -he motion is 2ust the !oint presence o" potentiality and actuality with respect to same thing, in this case heat. )n -homas *ersion of Aristotles definition one can see the alternati*e to 8escartes a((roach to (hysics. ,ince 8escartes re&ards motion as ultimate and &i*en, his (hysics +ill &i*e no account of motion itself, but describe the transient static confi&urations throu&h +hich the mo*in& thin&s (ass. By -homas account, motion is not ultimate but is a conse.uence of the +ay in +hich (resent states of thin&s are ordered to+ard other actualities +hich do not belon& to them. 3ne could build on such an account a (hysics of forces, that is, of those directed (otentialities +hich cause a thin& to mo*e, to (ass o*er from the actuality it (ossesses to another +hich it lac%s but to +hich it is ordered. Motion +ill thus not ha*e to be understood as the mysterious de(arture of thin&s from rest, +hich alone can be described, but as the outcome of the action u(on one another of di*er&ent and conflictin& innate tendencies of thin&s. 9est +ill be the anomaly, since thin&s +ill be understood as so constituted by nature as to (ass o*er of themsel*es into certain states of acti*ity, but states of rest +ill be e1(lainable as dynamic states of balance amon& thin&s +ith o((osed tendencies. 5eibni0, +ho critici0ed 8escartes (hysics and in*ented a science of dynamics, e1(licitly ac%no+led&ed his debt to Aristotle (see, e.&., Specimen #ynamicum$, +hose doctrine of entelecheia he re&arded himself as restorin& in a modified form. /rom 5eibni0 +e deri*e our current notions of (otential and %inetic ener&y, +hose *ery names, (ointin& to the actuality +hich is (otential and the actuality +hich is motion, (reser*e the -homistic resolutions of the t+o (arado1es in Aristotles definition of motion. ?. -he 5imits of -homas Account But thou&h the modern science of dynamics can be seen in &erm in ,t. -homas discussion of motion, it can be seen also to re*eal difficulties in -homas conclusions.

Accordin& to -homas, actuality and (otentiality do not e1clude one another but co e1ist as motion. -o the e1tent that an actuality is also a (otentiality it is a motion, and to the e1tent that an actuality is a motion it is a (otentiality. -he t+o seemin& contradictions cancel each other in the dynamic actuality of the (resent state +hich is determined by its o+n future. But are not (otential and %inetic ener&y t+o different thin&sL A roc% held si1 feet abo*e the &round has been actually mo*ed identically to the roc% thro+n si1 feet abo*e the &round, and at that distance each strains identically to fall to earthD but the one is fallin& and the other isnt. 'o+ can the descri(tion +hich is common to both, +hen one is mo*in& and the other is at rest, be an account of +hat motion isL )t seems that e*erythin& +hich -homas says about the te(id +ater +hich is bein& heated can be said also of the te(id +ater +hich has been remo*ed from the fire. #ach is a coincidence of a certain actuality of heat +ith a further (otentiality to the same heat. 6hat does it mean to say that the +ater on the fire has, ri&ht no+, an order to further heat +hich the +ater off the fire lac%sL )f +e say that the fire is actin& on the one and not on the other in such a +ay as to disturb its (resent state, +e ha*e be&&ed the .uestion and returned to the (osition of (resu((osin& motion to e1(lain motion. -homas account of Aristotles definition of motion, thou&h immeasurably su(erior to that of ,ir 8a*id 9oss as inter(retation, and far more so(histicated as an a((roach to and s(ecification of the conditions an account of motion +ould ha*e to meet, seems ultimately sub2ect to the same circularity. Maimonides, A*erroes, and 9oss fail to say ho+ motion differs from rest. -homas fails to say ho+ any &i*en motion differs from a corres(ondin& state of balanced tension, or of strain and constraint. -he stren&th of -homas inter(retation of the definition of motion comes from his ta%in& e*ery +ord seriously. 6hen 9oss discusses Aristotles definition, he &i*es no indication of +hy the he toiouton, or Binsofar as it is such,C clause should ha*e been included. By -homas account, motion is the actuality of any (otentiality +hich is ne*ertheless still a (otentiality. )t is the actuality +hich has not canceled its corres(ondin& (otentiality but e1ists alon& +ith it. Motion then is the actuality of any (otentiality insofar as it is still a (otentiality. -his is the formula +hich a((lies e.ually +ell to the dynamic state of rest and the dynamic state of motion. 6e shall try to ad*ance our understandin& by bein& still more careful about the meanin& of the (ronoun he. -homas account of the meanin& of Aristotles definition forces him to construe the &rammar of the definition in such a +ay that the clause introduced by the dati*e sin&ular feminine relati*e (ronoun he has as its antecedent, in t+o cases, the neuter (artici(le tou ontos, and in the third, the neuter substanti*e ad2ecti*e tou dunatou. )t is true that this (articular feminine relati*e (ronoun often had an ad*erbial sense to +hich its &ender +as irrele*ant, but in the three statements of the definition of motion there is no *erb but estin. )f the clause is understood ad*erbially, then, the sentence must mean somethin& li%e: if motion is a (otentiality, it is the actuality of a (otentiality. 6hate*er that mi&ht mean, it could at any rate not be a definition of motion. -hus the clause must be understood ad2ecti*ally, and -homas must ma%e the relati*e (ronoun de(endent u(on a +ord +ith +hich it does not a&ree in &ender. 'e ma%es the sentence say that motion is the actuality of the (otentiality in +hich there is yet (otentiality. 9eadin& the (ronoun as de(endent u(on the feminine noun entelecheia +ith +hich it does a&ree, +e find the sentence sayin& that motion is the actuality as which it is a (otentiality of the (otentiality, or the actuality as a (otentiality of the (otentiality. H. /acin& the "ontradictions of Aristotles Account of Motion

-his readin& of the definition im(lies that (otentialities e1ist in t+o +ays, that it is (ossible to e a (otentiality, yet not be an actual (otentiality. -he be&innin& of this entry says that Aristotles definition of motion +as made by (uttin& to&ether t+o terms, actuality and (otentiality, +hich normally contradict each other. -homas resol*ed the contradiction by ar&uin& that in e*ery motion actuality and (otentiality are mi1ed or blended, that the condition of becomin& hot of the +ater is 2ust the simultaneous (resence in the same +ater of some actuality of heat and some remainin& (otentiality of heat. #arlier it +as stated that there +as a .ualifyin& clause in Aristotles definition +hich seemed to intensify, rather than relie*e, the contradiction. -his refers to the he toiouton, or he kineton, or he dunaton, +hich a((ears in each *ersion of the definition, and +hich, bein& &rammatically de(endent on entelecheia, si&nifies somethin& the *ery actuality of +hich is (otentiality. -he -homistic blend of actuality and (otentiality has the characteristic that, to the e1tent that it is actual it is not (otential and to the e1tent that it is (otential it is not actualD the hotter the +ater is, the less is it (otentially hot, and the cooler it is, the less is it actually, the more (otentially, hot. -he most serious defect in ,aint -homas inter(retation of Aristotles definition is that, li%e 9oss inter(retation, it broadens, dilutes, chea(ens, and tri*iali0es the meanin& of the +ord entelecheia. An immediate im(lication of the inter(retations of both -homas and 9oss is that +hate*er ha((ens to be the case ri&ht no+ is an entelecheia, as thou&h bein& at =< de&rees /ahrenheit +ere an end determined by the nature of +ater, or as thou&h somethin& +hich is intrinsically so unstable as the instantaneous (osition of an arro+ in fli&ht deser*ed to be described by the +ord +hich Aristotle e*ery+here else reser*es for com(le1 or&ani0ed states +hich (ersist, +hich hold out in bein& a&ainst internal and e1ternal causes tendin& to destroy them. Aristotles definition of motion a((lies to any and e*ery motion: the (encil fallin& to the floor, the +hite (a&es in the boo% turnin& yello+, the &lue in the bindin& of the boo% bein& eaten by insects. Maimonides, A*erroes, and 9oss, +ho say that motion is al+ays a transition or (assa&e from (otentiality to actuality, must call the bein& on the floor of the (encil, the bein& yello+ of the (a&es, and the crumbled condition of the bindin& of the boo% actualities. -homas, +ho says that motion is constituted at any moment by the 2oint (resence of actuality and (otentiality, is in a still +orse (osition: he must call e*ery (osition of the (encil on the +ay to the floor, e*ery color of the (a&es on the +ay to bein& yello+, and e*ery loss of a crumb from the bindin& an actuality. )f these are actualities, then it is no +onder that (hiloso(hers such as 8escartes re2ected Aristotles account of motion as a useless redundancy, sayin& no more than that +hate*er chan&es, chan&es into that into +hich it chan&es. 6e %no+ ho+e*er that the thin&s Aristotle called actualities are limited in number, and constitute the +orld in its ordered finitude rather than in its random (articularity. -he actuality of the adult horse is one, althou&h horses are many and all different from each other. Boo%s and (encils are not actualities at all, e*en thou&h they are or&ani0ed +holes, since their or&ani0ations are (roducts of human art, and they maintain themsel*es not as boo%s and (encils but only as earth. #*en the or&ani0ed content of a boo%, such as that of the first three cha(ters of Boo% -hree of Aristotles Physics, does not e1ist as an actuality, since it is only the ne+ labor of each ne+ reader that &i*es bein& to that content, in this case a *ery difficult labor. By this strict test, the only actualities in the +orld, that is, the only thin&s +hich, by their o+n innate tendencies, maintain themsel*es in bein& as or&ani0ed +holes, seem to be the animals and (lants, the e*er the same orbits of the e*er mo*in& (lanets, and the uni*erse as a +hole. But Aristotle has said that e*ery motion is an entelecheiaD if +e

choose not to tri*iali0e the meanin& of entelecheia to ma%e it a((licable to motion, +e must dee(en our understandin& of motion to ma%e it a((licable to the meanin& of entelecheia. =. 6hat Motion )s )n the Metaphysics, Aristotle ar&ues that if there is a distinction bet+een (otentiality and actuality at all, there must be a distinction bet+een t+o %inds of (otentiality. -he man +ith si&ht, but +ith his eyes closed, differs from the blind man, althou&h neither is seein&. -he first man has the ca(acity to see, +hich the second man lac%s. -here are then (otentialities as +ell as actualities in the +orld. But +hen the first man o(ens his eyes, has he lost the ca(acity to seeL 3b*iously notD +hile he is seein&, his ca(acity to see is no lon&er merely a (otentiality, but is a (otentiality +hich has been (ut to +or%. -he (otentiality to see e1ists sometimes as acti*e or at +or%, and sometimes as inacti*e or latent. But this e1am(le seems to &et us no closer to understandin& motion, since seein& is 2ust one of those acti*ities +hich is not a motion. 5et us consider, then, a mans ca(acity to +al% across the room. 6hen he is sittin& or standin& or lyin& still, his ca(acity to +al% is latent, li%e the si&ht of the man +ith his eyes closedD that ca(acity ne*ertheless has real bein&, distin&uishin& the man in .uestion from a man +ho is cri((led to the e1tent of ha*in& lost all (otentiality to +al%. 6hen the man is +al%in& across the room, his ca(acity to +al% has been (ut to +or%. But +hile he is +al%in&, +hat has ha((ened to his ca(acity to e at the other side of the room, +hich +as also latent before he be&an to +al%L )t too is a (otentiality +hich has been (ut to +or% by the act of +al%in&. 3nce he has reached the other side of the room, his (otentiality to be there has been actuali0ed in 9oss sense of the term, but +hile he is +al%in&, his (otentiality to be on the other side of the room is not merely latent, and is not yet canceled by, an actuality in the +ea% sense, the so called actuality of bein& on that other side of the roomD while he is walking his potentiality to e on the other side o" the room is actual !ust as a potentiality . -he actuality of the (otentiality to be on the other side of the room, as 2ust that (otentiality, is neither more nor less than the +al%in& across the room. A similar analysis +ill a((ly to any motion +hate*er. -he &ro+th of the (u((y is not the actuali0ation of its (otentiality to be a do&, but the actuality of that (otentiality as a (otentiality. -he fallin& of the (encil is the actuality of its (otentiality to be on the floor, in actuality as 2ust that: as a potentiality to be on the floor. )n each case the motion is 2ust the (otentiality $ua actual and the actuality $ua (otential. And the sense +e thus &i*e to the +ord entelecheia is not at odds +ith its other uses: a motion is li%e an animal in that it remains com(letely and e1actly +hat it is throu&h time. My +al%in& across the room is no more a motion as the last ste( is bein& ta%en than at any earlier (oint. #*ery motion is a com(le1 +hole, an endurin& unity +hich or&ani0es distinct (arts, such as the *arious (ositions throu&h +hich the fallin& (encil (asses. As (arts of the motion of the (encil, these (ositions, thou&h distinct, function identically in the ordered continuity determined by the (otentiality of the (encil to be on the floor. -hin&s ha*e bein& to the e1tent that they are or are (art of determinate +holes, so that to be means to be somethin&, and chan&e has bein& because it al+ays is or is (art of some determinate (otentiality, at +or% and manifest in the +orld as chan&e. 8. 7enos Parado1es and Aristotles 8efinition of Motion "onsider the a((lication of Aristotles account of motion to t+o (arado1es famous in anti.uity. 7eno ar&ued in *arious +ays that there is no motion. Accordin& to one of his ar&uments, the arro+ in fli&ht is al+ays in some one (lace, therefore al+ays at rest, and therefore ne*er in motion. 6e can deduce from Aristotles definition that 7eno has made the same error, technically called the fallacy of com(osition, as one

+ho +ould ar&ue that no animal is ali*e since its head, +hen cut off, is not ali*e, its blood, +hen dra+n out, is not ali*e, its bones, +hen remo*ed are not ali*e, and so on +ith each (art in turn. -he second (arado1 is one attributed to 'eraclitus, and ta%en as (ro*in& that there is nothin& but motion, that is, no identity, in the +orld. -he sayin& &oes that one cannot ste( into the same ri*er t+ice. )f the ri*er flo+s, ho+ can it continue to be itselfL But the flu1 of the ri*er, li%e the fli&ht of the arro+, is an actuality of 2ust the %ind Aristotle formulates in his definition of motion. -he ri*er is al+ays the same, as a ri%er, (recisely because it is ne*er the same as +ater. -o be a ri*er is to be the al+ays identical actuality of the (otentiality of +ater to be in the sea. /or more discussion of Aristotles solution to 7enos (arado1es, see B7eno: Aristotles -reatment of 7enos Parado1es.C >. 9eferences and /urther 9eadin& Aristotle, Metaphysics, Eoe ,achs (trans.$, @reen 5ion Press, :>>>. Aristotle, &icomachean Ethics, Eoe ,achs (trans.$, /ocus Philoso(hical 5ibrary, Pullins Press, !<<!. Aristotle, On the Soul, Eoe ,achs (trans.$, @reen 5ion Press, !<<:. Aristotle, Poetics, Eoe ,achs (trans.$, /ocus Philoso(hical 5ibrary, Pullins Press, !<<H. Aristotle, Physics, Eoe ,achs (trans.$, 9ut&ers J. P., :>>?. Fosman, 5. A. BAristotles 8efinition of Motion,C Phronesis, :>H>. Author )nformation Eoe ,achs#mail: 2 sachsMs2ca.edu,t. Eohns "olle&eJ. ,. A.