DA. DE BORROMEO v.

POGOY- Forcible entry and unlawful detainer Special Civil Actions; Forcible entry and unlawful detainer prescribes in one year counted from demand to vacate the premises FACTS: Petitioner seeks to stop respondent Judge Pogoy from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation. Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the building which was leased to herein petitioner Petra Vda. De Borromeo for P500 per month payable within the first five days of the month. On August 28, 1982, Atty Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overde rentals corresponding to the period from March to September (1982), and thereafter vacate the premises. Petitioner failed to do so, thus the respondent instituted an ejectment case against the former. Petitioner moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. She points out that the parties are from the same cities and as such they must refer the dispute to the barangay Court or Lupon before going through the judicial courts. Respondents defense was that it was danger of prescribing under the statute of limitations. The motion was dismissed thus this case. ISSUES: Whether or not it was indeed in danger of prescribing? Whether or not going through Lupon was necessary? RULING: NO to both. The defense of Atty Reyes regarding the statute of limitations is unacceptable because the case was filed on September 16, 1982, less than a month before the letter of demand was served. Forcible entry and detainer prescribes in one year counted from demand to vacate the premises and the law only required 60 days upon which the parties should try to reconcile in Lupon; Respondent had more than 9 months left even if reconciliation failed. However, PD No. 1508, wherein it is required to go through Lupon first before going to courts only applies to individuals. In this case, Ricardo reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo thus it is inapplicable to them. G.R. No. L-60367 September 30, 1982

HON. ROSARIO R. VELOSO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch III of the City Court of Manila, and JULIETA CAPATI, respondents. PLANA, J.: Venustiano T. Tavora, a resident of Marikina, Metro Manila, owns an apartment in Quiapo, Manila which he has leased to Julieta Capati, a resident of Quiapo. On account of alleged violations of the lease agreement by the lessee (unauthorized subleasing and failure to pay rent), the lessor filed on January 12, 1981 an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 060828) in the City Court of Manila. The defendant filed a motion t/ dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiff to bring the dispute first to the barangay court for possible amicable settlement under PD 1508. Parenthetically, there is no question that there has been no attempt to amicably settle the dispute between Tavora and Capati at the barangay level. After denying the motion to dismiss as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration, the municipal court reversed itself and dismissed the ejectment case. Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, petitioner Tavora has come to this Court on certiorari and mandamus praying that the order of dismissal be set aside and that respondent judge be ordered to hear and decide the case. The sole issue raised is one of law: Under the given facts, is the respondent judge barred from taking cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to Sec-6 of PD 1508 establishing a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level? The section reads: SECTION 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated ... (Emphasis supplied.) For the above provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the relevant provisions of PD 1508 are: SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

ATTY. VENUSTIANO T. TAVORA, petitioner, vs.

(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; (2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; (4) party; Offenses where there is no private offended It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:

However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such. The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary. The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except something from the enacting clause; to limit, restrict, or qualify the statute in whole or in part; or to exclude from the scope of the statute that which otherwise would be within its terms. (73 Am Jur 2d 467.) Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus: Although venue is generally determined by the residence of the parties, disputes involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated, notwithstanding that the parties reside elsewhere within the same city/municipality. In the instant case, the plaintiff in the ejectment case (petitioner herein) is a resident of Marikina, while the defendant (private respondent) is a resident of Quiapo. No Lupon therefore is authorized to take cognizance of their dispute. Finding the petition to be meritorious, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 060828 (ejectment) by the respondent Judge being predicated upon a misconstruction of PD 1508, the same should be granted. (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672.) Accordingly, the assailed order of dismissal dated February 22, 1982 as well as the order dated March 23, 1982 denying reconsideration thereof, are hereby set aside; and the respondent Judge is directed to hear and decide the aforesaid ejectment case on its merits. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. Fernando CJ., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine, upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government. SECTION 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes: (1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and (2) involving real property located in different municipalities. (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different barangays within the same city or municipality unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other. Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other,

Relova, J., took no part. LUCITA Q. GARCES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION, respondents. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.: Questioned in this petition for review is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA), as well as its resolution, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court[3] (RTC) of Zamboanga del Norte in dismissing a petition for mandamus against a Provincial Election Supervisor and an incumbent Election Registrar. The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.[4] Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service Commission,[5] both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it.[6] Garces, on the other hand, was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post.[7] But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not vacant.[8] On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by the same Office of Assistant Director to defer her assumption of the Gutalac post. On April 15, 1987, she received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.[9] Meanwhile, since respondent Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.[10] On February 26, 1988, Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado[11] and Concepcion, among others. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac,[12] and ordered that the appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled.[13] In view thereof, respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art.

IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. The RTC, thereafter, dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy,[14] and (2) that the cases or matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections. On appeal, respondent CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition. The issues raised are purely legal. First, is petitioners action for mandamus proper? And, second, is this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court? On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post which was deemed vacated at the time of her appointment and qualification. Garces insists that the vacancy was created by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution.[15] On the contrary, Concepcion posits that he did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did not accept the transfer to Liloy. Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution provides: All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. (Italics supplied) The above organic provision did not require any cause for removal of an appointive official under the 1973 Constitution.[16] The transition period from the old to the new Constitution envisioned an automatic vacancy;*17+ hence the government is not hard put to prove anything plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.[18] Mere appointment and qualification of the successor removes an incumbent from his post. Nevertheless, the government in an act of auto-limitation and to prevent indiscriminate dismissal of government personnel issued on May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17. This executive order, which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the issuance of Concepcions transfer order, enumerates five grounds for separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit: 1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law; 2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned; 3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;

4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; 5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service. Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner when respondent Concepcion was transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion was transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior appointment.[19] If the transfer was made without the consent of the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal without valid cause[20] contrary to the fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for cause.*21+ Concepcions transfer thus becomes legally infirm and without effect for he was not validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete because he did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, is indispensable to complete an appointment.*22+ Corollarily, Concepcions post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic precept in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant.[23] There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated before one could be validly installed to succeed him. Further, Garces appointment was ordered to be deferred by the COMELEC. The deferment order, we note, was not unequivocably lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac was even cancelled by the COMELEC en banc. These factors negate Garces claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to the Gutalac post. On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly doubtful and highly questionable. As correctly ruled by respondent court, mandamus, which petitioner filed below, will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.[24] It will not issue to give him something to which he is not clearly and conclusively entitled.[25] Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position and exercises the corresponding functions therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo warranto and not mandamus.*26+ Quo warranto tests the title to ones office claimed by another and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles.[27] Garces heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie*28+ case is misplaced for material and different factual considerations. Unlike in this case, the disputed office of Assistant Provincial Agriculturist in the case of Tulawie is clearly vacant and petitioner Tulawies appointment was confirmed by the higher authorities making his claim to the disputed position clear and certain. Tulawies petition for mandamus, moreover, was against the Provincial Agriculturist who never claimed title to the contested

office. In this case, there was no vacancy in the Gutalac post and petitioners appointment to which she could base her claim was revoked making her claim uncertain. Coming now to the second issue. The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado[29+ contending that this is a case or matter cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IXA of the 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election Registrar of Gutalac, he argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A. The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides: Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this Controversy. The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers*30+ involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.*31+ In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency.[32] The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.*33+ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED without prejudice to the filing of the proper action with the appropriate body.

SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 90643 Davide, Jr., Melo, and

committed against the latter by the accused at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of that day. Following this, the accused was forthwith apprehended. Thereupon, on 5 December 1983, Agripino Gine filed on behalf of Merelyn a complaint 2 for rape against the accused before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in Matnog, Sorsogon. 3 The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows: That on or about 11:00 in the morning of November 26, 1983, at Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with deliberate intent and without the consent of the victim MERELYN GINE, and by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) armed with a bolo threatened (sic) and dragged (sic) the victim MERELYN GINE, and there the said accused committed the acts of rape inside the nipa hut owned by Leovegildo (sic) Garra, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned offended party. Act contrary to law. 4 Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminary examination was conducted, the MCTC issued on 9 December 1983 an order for the arrest of the accused. 5 The bond for the latter's temporary liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but was later reduced to P25,000.00 6 upon motion of the accused. The latter then put up the required bond; upon its approval, the court ordered his release on 15 December 1983. 7 When the case was finally called for preliminary investigation on 5 December 1984, the accused, through his counsel de oficio, informed the court that he was waiving his right thereto. The court then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. 8 On 25 January 1985, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel C. Genova, filed with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a complaint for rape against the accused, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about, the 26th day of November, 1983, in the Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation and with lewd design (sic), and armed with a bolo and (sic) threatened her with harm and dragged to a hut the victim and there have (sic) carnal knowledge with one Merelyn Gine against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. 9

June 25, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN FORTES Y GARRA, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 91155

June 25, 1993.

AGUSTIN G. FORTES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE EUGENIO C. GUAN,. JR. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Irosin, Sorsogon, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Gavino L. Barlin for accused-appellant. DAVIDE, JR., J.: The conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra for the rape of a young girl described by the trial court as "a guileless lass of only 13, [a] sixth grade pupil, bred in a barangay of rural atmosphere," and the denial by the trial court of his application for bail pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction are questioned in these consolidated cases. In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Irosin, Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 219. The court a quo, in its Decision dated 18 November 1988 but promulgated on 25 January 1989, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00 to answer for damages and costs. 1 In G.R. No. 91155, the accused seeks to annul and set aside two (2) related orders of the said trial court denying his application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure his provisional liberty pending the resolution of his appeal. The records disclose these antecedents: On 26 November 1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 219. Accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on 28 February 1985. 10 The protracted trial began on 26 June 1985 and ended nearly three (3) years later when the case was finally submitted for decision on 22 February 1988. 11 The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Merelyn Gine, her father Agripino and Dr. Eddie Dorotan. The witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, were the accused himself, Leovegildo Garra and Celso Gardon, the Barangay Captain of Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon. On 25 January 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the accused of the crime charged. 12 The dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Merelyn Gine the sum of P20,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs. The accused is ordered committed to the Sorsogon Provincial Jail through the Provincial Warden or through any of his provincial guards and eventually committed to the National Penitentiary in accordance with law. SO ORDERED. 13 On the same day, the accused filed his notice of appeal 14 wherein he requested that the amount of the appeal bond be fixed by the trial court. The following day, 26 January 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal 15 but did not resolve the request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April 1989, the accused filed an "Application for Bail on Appeal" 16 reiterating his earlier request that the bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal be set. This was subsequently denied by the trial court in its Order of 19 June 1989 on the ground that ". . . the accused has already been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal from the decision already approved by the Court . . . ." 17 Thereupon, on 19 August 1989, the trial court issued a Commitment of Final Sentence turning over the person of the accused to the Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. 18 On 9 December 1989, the accused filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court denying his application for bail and his motion to reconsider the said denial. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 91155. In the Resolution of 20 December 1989, 21 this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. Then, on 18 June 1990, the said case was ordered consolidated with G.R. No. 90643. 22 The records of G.R. No. 91155 do not disclose if the respondents had actually filed the required comment.

G.R. No. 91155

We shall first resolve G.R. No. 91155. Accused assails the trial court's refusal to grant his application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. He contends that before his conviction by final judgment, he enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence, and is therefore entitled to bail as a matter of right.

There is no merit in the said petition.

It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution 23 and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, 24 that:

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.

On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying his application for bail pending appeal, 19 but the same was denied in the Order of 6 September 1989. 20

xxx

xxx

xxx

In the meantime, the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to this Court the records of criminal Case No. 219. We received the same on 16 November 1989 and docketed the appeal as G.R. No. 90643.

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . . 25

xxx The clear implication, therefore is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, 26 ruled that:

xxx

xxx

(3) The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of 26 November 1983, Merelyn Gine accompanied her father Agripino Gine to Barangay Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon, where he was going to work in the farm of Patrolman Nonito Galeria. Her father left her in the nipa hut of one Leovegildo Garra so she can cook his meal for lunch. She was alone in the hut.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

(4) While she was preparing to cook the meal, accused appeared from nowhere and inserted his T-shirt inside her mouth. Accused also held her hands and tore her pedal pant (sic). She tried to kick him but to no avail. After he was able to remove her pedal, she was threatened with a bolo and was warned that he will kill her if she shouted. The bolo which was presented in evidence as Exhibit C (sic) was 23 inches long including the handle. The sharp end of the bolo was pointed by the accused to her throat. Accused laid her down and it was in this position when (sic) the accused had sexually abused her by inserting his penis through her (sic) panty she was wearing which was torn and stained with her (Exhibits B, B1 and B2). She suffered extreme pain and her vagina started bleeding. She cried and wished that her father were around so that she could ask him to kill the accused.

In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal.

G.R. No. 90643

(5) Just as the accused consummated the rape, her father returned from the farm to inquire whether his meal was cooked already. He called for his daughter but she did not answer during the first call and on the second call he heard her answer "po" (meaning yes). Suddenly, the accused jumped out of the window with his short pants on but leaving behind in his hurry to escape, the T-shirt which he inserted inside the mouth of the victim and the bolo he used to threaten her. Her father gave chase but was not able to catch up with the accused.

We now turn to the accused's appeal from the judgment of conviction.

(6) When her father went gave inside the hut, he found her in a state of shock and (sic) was trying to get up but was swaying for she could hardly stand. It was at this instance when his daughter narrated to him the dastardly act perpetrated upon her by the accused.

The inculpatory facts, proven by the prosecution and upon which the trial court based its judgment of conviction, are summarized by the trial court in its decision. Finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence adduced, We hereby adopt the said summary as follows:

(7) On the same day, she and her father reported the incident to the police authorities in Matnog, Sorsogon, and an investigation was made. On that same day, the accused was apprehended.

(8) From the police, went to the Irosin District Hospital for medical examination. Thereat, she was subjected to a medical examination by a certain Dr. Tito Garrido but he did not issue her a medical certificate. So she had another medical examination by Dr. Eddie Dorotan of the same hospital who issued her a medical certificate which was introduced in evidence as E and E1.

At this juncture, Agripino (sic) arrived from the ricefield at about 11:00 in the morning and called his daughter, Merelyn, to inquire if lunch was ready. Merelyn answered in the negative. Agripino got angry and scolded his daughter, Merelyn for failing to cook the lunch on time.

(9) At the time she was sexually abused, Merelyn Gine was only 13 years old (Exhibit D). She demonstrated to the Court the position in which she was raped by the accused. She felt so ashamed after the rape and underwent so much suffering and pain like her father, which could not be compensated with money alone and wants justice done. 27

In the meantime, accused-appellant returned to the ricefield to pick-up his bottle of drinking water. He returned back to the Nipa Hut at about 12:00 noon and he saw inside the nipa hut, the following people: Agripino Gine, Joel, Mondoy, sons of Agripino and Dick Galeria son the owner of the riceland being cultivated, by Agripino Gine eating their lunch. 28

To bolster his defense, the accused presented two (2) other witnesses, namely Leovegildo Garra, his grandfather, and Celso Gardon, the Barangay Captain of Naburacan, Matnog.

On the other hand, the accused capsulated his version of the incident in this manner: The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the prosecution's version; it was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Merelyn fell victim to a sexual assault on the morning of 26 November 1983 which was perpetrated through force and intimidation. On that same day, both she and her father immediately reported the incident to the police authorities. She then submitted to a medical examination.

On November 26, 1983 at about 8:30 in the morning, accused Fortes on his way to the Nipa Hut which he used as a rest house met Agripino Gine, father of Complainant Merelyn Gine in the ricefield at Bgy. Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon where they both work and cultivate their respective ricelands. In that meeting Agripino asked permission from accused if her (sic) daughter, Merelyn, could cook their lunch at the Nipa Hut, ("Payag" in local dialect), owned by the grandfather of accused Leovegeldo (sic) Garra. Accused who is a neighbor and family friend of Agripino (sic) in Bgy. Camachilis where they both reside gave his permission. Accused proceeded to the Nipa Hut owned by his grandfather for the purpose of preparing his own lunch. When accused arrived in the Nipa Hut, he saw Merelyn preparing their lunch.

There seems to be no logical reason for her or her father to concoct the charge of rape against the accused. During her testimony, Merelyn "showed an unmistakable determination to exact justice, from the man who had forcibly violated her and caused her early loss of virginity." She "has no motive other than to bring to justice the culprit who had grievously wronged her." 29

Accused waited for his turn while Merelyn was preparing their lunch. Accused spent his waiting time in repairing the plow (araro) which he used in the cultivation of the riceland. At this point in time his grandfather Leovegeldo (sic) Garra arrived. Merelyn Gine and accused who are known to each other being neighbors and family friends exchanged pleasanties (sic) and jokes. In the process, accused accidentally dropped the fish which he was about to cook for lunch outside the window. Accused passed through the window which is about half () meter from the ground to pick-up the fish.

In his Brief, the accused, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, urges this Court to reverse his conviction and acquit him on the ground that the trial court erred in:

I . . . GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT.

TO THE PRIVATE

II . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE SHOWING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT SEXUALLY ABUSED ON NOVEMBER 26, 1983.

III . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE BGY. CAPTAIN WHERE THE ALLEGED CRIME WAS COMMITTED.

she was purportedly raped and that her panty and pants were torn by the appellant. Moreover, it is averred that Agripino did not even describe to the court his daughter's attire when he found her in the nipa hut. Appellant then faults the trial court for concluding that he had presented the defense of alibi when the records reveals that no such defense was offered by him.

IV . . . NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 30

Appellant's last assigned error is but a summation of the previous three (3) errors; he concludes that the totality of the prosecution's evidence creates sufficient doubt as to his guilt. Hence, he concludes that he is entitled to an acquittal.

For his first assigned error, the appellant contends that the rape for which he was charged and subsequently convicted was not established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. He claims that the complainant's statement that she had her panty on while she was being raped is incredible, as "[E]xperience will show that it is physically [I]mpossible to perform and execute the act of sexual intercourse to woman with her panty on." 31

Our careful review of the records and painstaking evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties yield nothing to support the assigned errors, and lead Us to the inevitable conclusion that the culpability of the appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. This appeal must therefore be dismissed for palpable lack of merit.

In support of the second assigned error, he asserts that the medical examination conducted by Eddie Dorotan, a government physician assigned to the Irosin District Hospital, which revealed that "there was no bleeding" and "no spermatozoa" 32 present, conclusively proved that the accused did not commit the crime of rape. The latter further contends that the trial court erred in believing the complainant's declaration that her panty was stained with her blood because, as he points out, there was no "corroborated (sic) evidence to prove that indeed the alleged blood stain is indeed the blood coming from the vagina of complainant." 33

The victim narrated her ordeal in a simple, yet candid and straightforward manner as evidenced by the transcripts of her testimony, the pertinent portions of which read:

FISCAL GENOVA

What happened while you were getting the kettle preparatory to cooking your meal?

A Suddenly, this Agustin Fortes appeared from nowhere and tried to embrace me. As to his third ascribed error, the appellant faults the trial court for not giving due weight to the testimony of the Barangay Captain of the locality wherein the rape was committed. He further contends that since Barangay Captain Celso Gardon testified that he (Gordon) passed by the nipa hut and saw the complainant and her father Agripino together with other persons at around lunch time the time of the commission of the alleged rape Agripino should have immediately reported the sexual assault to him as he is the barangay captain.

In what part of your body?

He tried to insert his T-shirt in my mouth.

xxx The appellant additionally assails the credibility of Agripino Gine, claiming that the latter failed to corroborate his daughter's story that there was blood on the spot where

xxx

xxx

Q What happened after you were held and a piece of T-shirt put (sic) inside your mouth? A No, sir.

He had sexual intercourse with me. Q see? What is this dark stain here . . . which you could

Q Before he had sexual intercourse with you, what did he do? A That is a blood.

He torn (sic) my panty and my pedal. Q Whose blood?

Q Do you mean to tell this Court that you were dressed during that time?

Mine.

Yes, sir.

How was this torn? The pedal . . . no the panty?

Q And how did Agustin Fortes tried (sic) to torn (sic) your pedal and panty?

He was the one who torn (sic) my panty.

A When he was trying to hold my hands, he was pulling my panty at the same time tearing my pedal and I was kicking him.

Q body?

And in the process this was removed from your

A Q I am showing to you clothes from the Police Station labeled "Criminal Case No. 3226" which I presumed is the criminal case number . . . a panty with dark stain and a pedal. I am showing to you these in connection to what you just stated. This is from the Police Station of Matnog.

Yes sir.

Q What happened now after this pedal also was removed?

This is the pedal I was wearing at the time.

A I was able to shout but he warned me that he is going to kill me.

Q torn?

When you were wearing this, was it already

Q When he stated that he was going to kill you, what was in his possession?

Not yet.

A bolo.

Q How about this panty of yours, is this already in this kind (sic)?

Q I am showing to you a bolo wrapped in a coupon bond, 23 inches labelled "People of the Philippines

versus Agustin Fortes November 26, 1983." What is the relation of this bolo to the bolo that was used? Q When you said "ikiti" (sexual intercourse), my question is, did the penis of the accused penetrate your vagina? A This is the bolo that was used.

A xxx xxx xxx

Yes sir.

Q body?

Now, how was this bolo being used in your

Q And while he was on that act of sexual intercourse with his penis inside your vagina, what happened then?

He was trying to thrust it below my neck.

I felt pain. And my vagina started bleeding.

With what hand was the accused using this?

And what happened next?

Left.

A And then I cried and I remembered that if only my father is there I will ask him to kill the accused.

Q When you say it was being poked in your body, which part of the bolo?

Did your father arrive?

The sharp end.

A Yes sir and Agustin Fortes jumped out of the window. 34

On what part of your body was it being poked? The jumping of the appellant out of the window was witnessed by Merelyn's father whose testimony thereon was further bolstered during cross-examination:

On my neck.

xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. ZULUETA:

Q Now, you said you were sexually abused by Agustin fortes, how was this sexual abuse made in (sic) your body?

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q When you returned to the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what happened? A By holding my hands and laying me down on the floor and he lied (sic) down on top of me . . . and then he performed the sexual intercourse.

A When I was about in a distance of (sic) three meters from the house of Leovegildo (sic) Garra, I called

for my daughter. My first call, there was no answer, and on my second call, there was an answer "po", then, suddenly, somebody jumped out of the window in the person of Agustin Fortes.

show how the rape was committed. Merelyn then demonstrated how the appellant gripped her hands and pointed the bolo to her neck. 38

Q When you saw the alleged accused in this case jumped (sic) out of the window of the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what did you do?

A Instead of trying to run after Agustin Fortes, I felt apprehensive, and so, I went to the succor of my daughter which (sic) was speechless. ATTY ZULUETA: xxx xxx xxx xxx Q After you went to the house of Leovegildo Garra, what happened there? xxx xxx

As to the alleged impossibility of the commission of the sexual act because of the fact that Merelyn's panty was not actually removed, the appellant seems to have forgotten that it was he, through the cross-examination of his lawyer, who elicited from Merelyn the declaration that his penis was inserted through a hold in the said panty. Thus:

Q You have said that the accused had forcefully made sexual intercourse with you. How come that (sic) the penis penetrated your vagina?

That (sic) my daughter was raped. A When his right hand was holding my hands he unzipped his pants and put out his penis and inserted his penis to (sic) my vagina.

Q How come that you knew that your daughter was raped?

Because my daughter herself told me. 35

Q When the accused conducted sexual intercourse with you, do (sic) you have your panty?

Agripino's daughter was in a sitting position and could hardly stand when he saw her. 36 He thus decided to report the incident to the police authorities immediately. Thus, both he and Merelyn proceeded to the police station where they were consequently interrogated. Thereafter, the appellant was apprehended. 37

A Yes sir. There is a hole in my panty where he inserted his penis to (sic) my vagina.

Q While the accused was having sexual intercourse with you, what happened next?

From Merelyn's testimony, it is evident that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her through force and intimidation. He gagged her first with a t-shirt and then forced her into the sexual act by threatening to kill her with his bolo. Her testimony on this point was even further strengthened and enhanced when, during cross-examination, counsel for the appellant gambled on the fate of the latter by asking Merelyn to

A My vagina was bleeding because it was very painful. 39

Neither may the medical certificate (Exhibit "E") issued by Dr. Eddie Dorotan be of any help to the appellant. The said certificate does not, contrary to the latter's claim, prove that Merelyn did not have sexual intercourse because of

the findings therein reported that there was no bleeding, the vagina admitted two (2) fingers and the vaginal fluid contained no spermatozoa. Again, the appellant conveniently forgot that Dr. Dorotan examined Merelyn only on 28 November 1983 at 9:45 o'clock in the morning, 40 or two (2) days after the incident. By that time, the bleeding, which had taken place earlier, may no longer have been noticeable and the spermatozoa may no longer have been present. It is settled that the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape. The important consideration is not the emission of semen, but the penetration by the male organ. 41 It must likewise be emphasized that Dr. Tito Garrido of the District Hospital of Irosin, the physician who examined Merelyn in the afternoon of 26 November 1983, did not issue a medical certificate, although he promised to deliver one in Matnog. It has been shown that Dr. Garrido reneged on this pledge. Furthermore, during trial, complainant's father claimed that he had later learned that Dr. Garrido is related to the appellant. 42 This assertion was not even rebutted by the defense. Moving on, this Court is not persuaded by the appellant's contention that if Merelyn had in fact been raped, then either she or her father should have first informed the barangay captain about the incident. Suffice it to say, reporting the commission of a crime to a barangay captain is not a prerequisite for the formal institution of criminal charges. Even under P.D. No. 1508, the governing law then, rapes was not among the crimes which required referral to the Barangay Lupon for the purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a matter of fact, it was among those excepted from such a referral considering that the penalty imposable is more than thirty (30) days imprisonment. 43 If the complainant and her father seemed to have "by-passed" the barangay captain and instead reported the incident directly to the police, it is quite obvious that they wanted immediate action to ensure the appellant's arrest and forestall any possible escape on his part. Finally, the appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously characterized his defense as one of alibi, is without any basis. The trial court actually characterized the appellant's defense as one of "alibi and absolute denial." 44 Besides, the "alibi" aspect thereof is not entirely inaccurate for in fact, as shown by his own story, the appellant went back to the ricefield to retrieve his bottle of drinking water before returning to the nipa hut at around 12:00 o'clock noon. In effect, he suggested that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time the sexual assault was committed. All told, We have in this case a 13-year old barrio lass who: immediately revealed the commission of the heinous crime to her father just as the appellant consummated the act and jumped out of the window to escape, forthwith reported it to the police authorities who, after having heard her

story, apprehended the appellant; thereafter, in the afternoon of the same day, voluntarily submitted to a medical examination of her private parts; submitted again to a second medical examination on her private parts on 28 November 1983; underwent the ordeal of a public trial; and, upon demand by the appellant's counsel, even demonstrated as part of the cross-examination how she was raped. We need no further evidence to convince Us that indeed, the complainant was raped by the appellant. We have repeatedly held that when a woman admits that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape had been committed. A complainant would make public the offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the gory details if she had not in fact been raped, for no decent Filipina would publicly admit that she has been raped unless it is the truth. 45 Moreover, the appellant has not shown that the complainant and her father were actuated by any ulterior motives which could have induced them to falsely implicate him in the commission of the crime. It is settled that when there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 46 Indeed, if an accused had really nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith that the prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former. 47 We thus affirm the decision appealed from except as to the matter of the indemnity, which is hereby increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 pursuant to the current policy of the Court.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1) In G.R. No. 90643, AFFIRMING the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No. 219 of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, at Irosin, Sorsogon, with the modification of the indemnity which is increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00; and 2) In G.R. No. 91155, DENYING, for lack of merit, the petition. Costs against appellant Agustin Fortes y Garra in both cases. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

VALENCIDES VERCIDE, complainant, vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, respondent. francis DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint filed against Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez of the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, charging her with grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for her dismissal of a case which complainant Valencides Vercide and his wife had filed against Daria Lagas Galleros for recovery of possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same municipality, while complainant and his wife are residents of Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00); (d) Offenses where there is no private offended party; (e) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. marie The court in which the non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement. SEC. 409. Venue. - (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay. (b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city of municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. (c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated. (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding. They argued that under 408(f), in relation to 409(c), where the parties to a dispute involving real property or any interest therein are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of adjoining barangays, prior resort to barangay conciliation is not required. However, respondent denied the motion. In her order dated September 9, 1997, respondent stated:

However, this matter was raised by defendant in her answer as an affirmative defense, and respondent, in her order of July 15, 1997, ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to the prosecution of the counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in her answer. In support of her order, respondent cited P.D. No. 1508, 3 of which provides: Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. (Emphasis added) Complainant and his wife moved for a reconsideration, citing the following provisions of R.A. 7160, "The Local Government Code of 1991": SEC. 408. Subject matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: (a) Where one party is the government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

The Court after taking into consideration the Motion for Reconsideration and the ground relied upon by the counsel finds that counsel for the plaintiffs failed to correlate Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 and to consider Rule VIII, paragraph (a) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, the rules and regulations [of] which were promulgated to implement Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One Book III and Section 515, Book IV of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, to wit: "RULE VIII - PRE-CONDITION FOR FORMAL ADJUDICATION Conciliation, pre-condition for filing of complaint in court or government office. novero (a) No individual may go directly to court or to any government office for adjudication of his dispute with another individual upon any matter falling within the authority of the Punong Barangay or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo to settle under these Rules, unless, after personal confrontation of the parties before them earnest efforts to conciliate have failed to result in a settlement or such settlement has been effectively repudiated." and also Rule VI, Section 3 paragraph (c) of the same Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which provides: "Rule VI - Amicable Settlement of Disputes Section 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules: .... (c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the Barangay where the real property or larger portion thereof is situated. From the provisions of the above-cited Rules it was very clear that parties whose disputes involved real property should first br[ing] the said dispute before the barangay where the property was located, and that [because of] failure to bring the dispute before the Barangay for conciliation no action may be filed in court for final adjudication of the said dispute. That parties should first comply with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law before the Court can acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. That noncompliance of the plaintiff to the requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law was admitted by her in paragraph 3 of the complaint. Her allegation of noncompliance with the mandatory requirement of Lupon Conciliation before the filing of the complaint, in a way divest[s] the Court of its jurisdiction over the case. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (j) provides:

"That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with" WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied. Complainant alleges that in dismissing Civil Case No. 295, respondent judge committed "(a) Grave abuse of authority by knowingly rendering an unjust and unlawful order; (b) Ignorance of the law in its highest order, she being a judge; (c) Grave disobedience to the jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the matter of exemption of lupon conciliation of contending parties who are not residen[ts] of the same city or municipality." He states that respondent "practically threw several decisions of the Supreme Court on the matter out of the window and obviously followed hook, line and sinker the arguments of the [defendant] Daria Galleros." In answer, respondent judge claims that she merely followed the law in dismissing the case. She prays that the complaint against her be dismissed and that complainant be ordered to stop harassing her just because he had not been able to obtain the relief he wanted in Civil Case No. 295. nigel In its memorandum dated February 29, 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends the dismissal of this case on the ground that the "issue [raised] is purely judicial and is best resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction" and that, even if respondent had erred, she should not be held administratively liable since there is no allegation that she acted in bad faith or knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. In Tavora v. Veloso,[1] this Court already ruled that where parties do not reside in the same city or municipality or in adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute involving real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. As explained in that case: The sole issue raised is one of law: Under the given facts, is the respondent judge barred from taking cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1508 establishing a system of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level? The section reads: "SECTION. 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. - No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . ." (Italics supplied)

For the above provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the relevant provisions of PD 1508 are: "SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: (1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; (2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; (4) Offenses were there is no private offended party; (5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine, upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government. ella "SECTION 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. "The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes: (1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and (2) involving real property municipalities." (Italics supplied) located in different

"involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other. Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.

It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds: "However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated." Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such. marinella The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.[2] To be sure, the Court was interpreting in that case the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 which, except for some modifications, are applicable to the case before respondent judge because they are now found in 408409 of R.A. No. 7160 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The ruling in Tavora v. Veloso, reiterated in other cases,[3] should be familiar to the bench and the bar. As we have held in Espiritu v. Jovellanos,[4] the phrase "Ignorance of the law excuses no one" has a special application to judges who, under the injunction of Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence." In Bacar v. De Guzman,[5] it was held that when the law violated is basic, the failure to observe it constitutes gross ignorance. Reiterating this ruling, it was emphasized in Almeron v. Sardido[6] that the disregard of an established rule of law amounts to gross ignorance of the law and makes the judge subject to disciplinary action. In the case at bar, respondent showed patent ignorance if not disregard of this Courts rulings on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapamayapa by her erroneous quotations of the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing R.A. No. 7160. While a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders, his error may be so gross or patent that he should be administratively disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence. In this case, respondent at first cited P.D. No. 1508, 3 as basis of her action. When her attention was called to the

The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different barangays within the same city or municipality" unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes

fact that this had been repealed by 409(c) of R.A. No. 7160, respondent, who obviously was more intent in justifying her previous order than correcting her error, quoted out of context the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay provisions of R.A. No. 7160. She thus violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear of criticism." Contrary to respondents interpretation, it is clear even from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. Rule VI of the same states in pertinent part: SECTION 2. Subject matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of proceedings for amicable settlement under these rules except the following enumerated cases: (a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; alonzo (b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; (c) Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00); (d) Offenses where there is no private offended party; (e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto to agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The foregoing exceptions notwithstanding, the court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under these Katarungang Pambarangay Law and Rules are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

SECTION 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules: (a) Where the parties reside in the same barangay, the dispute shall be brought for settlement in said barangay; (b) Where the parties reside in different barangays in the same city or municipality, the dispute shall be settled in the barangay where the respondent or any one of the respondents actually resides, at the choice of the complainant; (c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the barangay where the real property or larger portion thereof is situated; (d) Disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located; (e) Any objection relating to venue shall be raised before the Punong Barangay during the mediation proceedings before him. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver of such objection; (f) Any legal question which may confront the Punong Barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. brando (Emphasis added) Indeed, these provisions, which are also found in P.D. No. 1508, have already been authoritatively interpreted by this Court, and the duty of respondent judge was to follow the rulings of this Court. Her insistence on her own interpretation of the law can only be due either to an ignorance of this Courts ruling or to an utter disregard thereof. We choose to believe that her failure to apply our rulings to the case before her was simply due to gross ignorance which, nevertheless, is inexcusable. In accordance with the ruling in Ting v. Atal,[7] in which a judge who was similarly found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was fined P2,000.00, respondent judge should likewise be fined the same amount. WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. micks