CONSTITUTIONAL LAW A.

THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE Police Power

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Definition of Police Power: 1) Power vested in the legislature 2) By the Constitution 3) To make, ordain, and establish 4) All manner o wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinan!es ") #ither with $enalties or without %) &ot re$ugnant to the !onstitution ') As they shall (udge to be or the good and wel are o the !ommonwealth and o the sub(e!ts o the same)
1. Define Police Power and clarify its scope.

Held: 1. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same . The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the ational !egislature . It cannot be e"ercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power . The ational !egislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units . #nce delegated, the agents can e"ercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body . (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air illa!e Association, "nc., #$% &'(A %#), %*#-%**, March $+, $,,,, -st Div. ./uno01 $. The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if e"ercised for a regulatory and not revenue%raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. &"" 'T(he issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the e"ercise of the police power of the )tate within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the !ocal *overnment Code. (Acebedo 2ptical 'ompany, "nc. v. 'ourt of Appeals, #$3 &'(A #-*, March #-, $,,,, 4n Banc ./urisima01 2. Does Article 263(g) of the Labor Code ( esting !pon the "ecretary of Labor the discretion to deter#ine what ind!stries are indispensable to the national interest and thereafter$ ass!#e %!risdiction o er disp!tes in said ind!stries) iolate the wor&ers' constit!tional right to stri&e(

Held: )aid article does not interfere with the workers+ right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the e"ercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not e"ercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and the employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference.

The !abor Code vests upon the )ecretary of !abor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the )ecretary of !abor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The )ecretary of !abor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers+ right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. (/hiltread 5or6ers 7nion ./8570 v. 'onfesor, $)3 &'(A #3#, March -$, -33+1 3. )ay solicitation for religio!s p!rposes be s!b%ect to proper reg!lation by the "tate in the e*ercise of police power(

Held: The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. #n the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. ,reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organi-ation or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. #n the other hand, it safeguards the free e"ercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the Constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so e"ercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom. .hence, even the e"ercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the )tate may protect its citi-ens from injury. .ithout doubt, a )tate may protect its citi-ens from fraudulent solicitation by re/uiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The )tate is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guarantees of the free e"ercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated . It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the 0free e"ercise1 of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion . Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. )uch regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free e"ercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its e"ercise . 2ven with numerous regulative laws in e"istence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on by persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public. It is in fact ama-ing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate them. The )tate has authority under the e"ercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed . )ome regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest . To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the )tate in the e"ercise of police power. ('enteno v. illalon-/ornillos, $#) &'(A -3+, &ept. -, -33* .(e!alado01 The Power of Eminent om!in

Power of Eminent Domain Section 9. /rivate property shall not be ta6en for public use without 9ust
compensation. Who can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1) The national government a) Congress b) #*e!utive, $ursuant to legislation ena!ted by Congress 2) +o!al government units, $ursuant to an ordinan!e ena!ted by their res$e!tive legislative bodies ,under +-C)

3) Publi! utilities, as may be delegated by law)

When is the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessary?

It is only necessary when the owner does not want or opposes the sale of his property. Thus, i a valid !ontra!t e*ists between the government and the owner, the government !annot e*er!ise the $ower o eminent domain as a substitute to the en or!ement o the !ontra!t)
Elements of the power of eminent domain

1) There is a TA./&- o $rivate $ro$erty 2) Taking is or P0B+/C 01# 3) Payment o 201T C34P#&1AT/3& "TAKING" A) Elements: CODE: E P PO

1) The e*$ro$riator enters the $ro$erty 2) The entran!e must not be or a momentary $eriod, i)e), it must be permanent 3) #ntry is made under warrant or !olor o legal authority 4) Pro$erty is devoted to $ubli! use ") 0tili5ation o the $ro$erty must be in su!h a way as to oust the owner and de$rive him o the bene i!ial en(oyment o his $ro$erty) B) Compensable taking does not need to involve all the property interests which form part of the right of ownership) 6hen one or more o the $ro$erty rights are a$$ro$riated and a$$lied to a $ubli! $ur$ose, there is already a !om$ensable taking, even i bare title still remains with the owner) "PUBLIC USE" 1) Publi! use, or $ur$oses o e*$ro$riation, is synonymous with $ubli! wel are as the latter term is used in the !on!e$t o $oli!e $ower) 2) #*am$les o $ubli! use in!lude land re orm and so!iali5ed housing) "JUST COMPENSATION" 1) Compensation is just if the owner receives a sum e uivalent to the market value of his property ) 4arket value is generally de ined as the air value o the $ro$erty as between one who desires to $ur!hase and one who desires to sell) 2) !he point of reference used in determining fair value is the value at the time the property was taken) Thus, uture $otential use o the land is not !onsidered in !om$uting (ust !om$ensation) !"dicial re#iew of the exercise of the power of eminent domain 1) To determine the ade7ua!y o the !om$ensation 2) To determine the ne!essity o the taking 3) To determine the 8$ubli! use8 !hara!ter o the taking) "owever# if the expropriation is pursuant to a specific law passed by Congress# the courts cannot uestion the public use character of the taking.

When m"nicipal propert$ is ta%en &$ the State: Compensation is re uired if the property is a patrimonial property , that is, $ro$erty a!7uired by the muni!i$ality with its $rivate unds in its !or$orate or $rivate !a$a!ity) "owever, i it is any other $ro$erty su!h a $ubli! buildings or legua !omunal held by the muni!i$ality or the 1tate in trust or the inhabitants, the 1tate is ree to dis$ose o it at will) Point of reference for #al"atin' a piece of propert$: (eneral r"le: The value must be that as o the time o the iling o the !om$laint or e*$ro$riation) Exception: 6hen the iling o the !ase !omes later than the time o taking and meanwhile the value o the $ro$erty has in!reased be!ause o the use to whi!h the e*$ro$riator has $ut it, the value is that o the time o the earlier taking) B0T i the value in!reased inde$endently o what the e*$ro$riator did, then the value is that o the latter iling o the !ase)
+. ,hat is -#inent Do#ain(

Held: 1. 2minent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty3 a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare . Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition . The provisions found in modern constitutions of civili-ed countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that 0'p(rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.1 (Art. ...$ "ec. /). ,urthermore, the due process and e/ual protection clauses (1/01 Constit!tion$ Art. ...$ "ec. 1) act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary e"ercise of this governmental power. )ince the e"ercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual+s right to private property, a constitutionally% protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty$ the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasi-ed. In City of )anila . Chinese Co##!nity of )anila we said (+2 Phil. 3+/ 31/1/)4 The e"ercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the )tate, or by its authori-ed agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. o species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the Constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. .hen the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of ah individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt'ful( interpretation. (4ensley . )o!ntainla&e ,ater Co.$ 13 Cal.$ 326 and cases cited 313 A#. Dec.$ 5166) The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate e"ercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citi-ens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the e"ercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse " " ". The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be e"ercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. (:eirs of Alberto &u!uitan v. 'ity of Mandaluyon!, #$% &'(A -#+, -**--*), March -*, $,,,, #rd Div. .;on<a!a-(eyes01 $. 2minent domain is a fundamental )tate power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government+s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the )tate, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. ,or the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public purpose and there must be just compensation. (Moday v. 'ourt of Appeals, $)% &'(A =%), >ebruary $,, -33+1 5. "tate so#e li#itations on the e*ercise of the power of -#inent Do#ain.

Held: The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The )upreme Court, taking cogni-ance of such issues as the ade/uacy of compensation,

necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of e"ercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. *overnment may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. (Moday v. 'ourt of Appeals, $)% &'(A =%), >ebruary $,, -33+1 6. Disc!ss the e*panded notion of p!blic !se in e#inent do#ain proceedings.

Held: The City of 5anila, acting through its legislative branch, has the e"press power to ac/uire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low%salaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the e"propriation of the property does not diminish its public character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Corollary to the e"panded notion of public use, e"propriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be e"propriated in this case is less than half a hectare only. Through the years, the public use re/uirement in eminent domain has evolved into a fle"ible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing. (>ilstream "nternational "ncorporated v. 'A, $%* &'(A +-), ?an. $#, -33% .>rancisco01 1. 7he constit!tionality of "ec. /2 of 4.P. 4lg. 001 (re8!iring radio and tele ision station owners and operators to gi e to the Co#elec radio and tele ision ti#e free of charge) was challenged on the gro!nd$ a#ong others$ that it iolated the d!e process cla!se and the e#inent do#ain pro ision of the Constit!tion by ta&ing airti#e fro# radio and tele ision broadcasting stations witho!t pay#ent of %!st co#pensation. Petitioners clai# that the pri#ary so!rce of re en!e of radio and tele ision stations is the sale of airti#e to ad ertisers and that to re8!ire these stations to pro ide free airti#e is to a!thori9e a ta&ing which is not :a de #ini#is te#porary li#itation or restraint !pon the !se of pri ate property.; ,ill yo! s!stain the challenge(

Held: 6ll broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. 6irwave fre/uencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre/uencies to assign. 6 franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that 0any such franchise or right granted " " " shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so re/uires.1 (Art. <..$ "ec. 11) Indeed, provisions for Comelec Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and such provisions have not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. 6rt. &II, )ec. 11 of the Constitution authori-es the amendment of franchises for 0the common good.1 .hat better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free airtime for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election7 0'I(t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.1 or indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the re/uirement that broadcast stations give free airtime. 2ven in the 8nited )tates, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free e"pression. ,or this purpose, broadcast stations may be re/uired to give free airtime to candidates in an election. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and fre/uencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. )ince a franchise is a mere privilege, the e"ercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the )tate spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it cannot even re/uire the licensees to render public service by giving free airtime. The claim that petitioner would be losing P9$,:;<,<<<.<< in unreali-ed revenue from advertising is based on the assumption that airtime is 0finished product1 which, it is said, become the property of the company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural resources after undergoing a process for their production. 6s held in =ed Lion 4roadcasting Co. . >.C.C. (3/5 ?.". at 3/+$ 23 L. -d. 2d at 3/1$ 8!oting +1 ?.".C. "ec. 321)$ which upheld the right of a party personally attacked to reply, 0licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated fre/uencies, but only the temporary privilege of using them.1 Conse/uently, 0a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopoli-e a radio fre/uency to the e"clusion of his fellow citi-ens. There is nothing in the ,irst 6mendment which prevents the government from re/uiring a licensee to share his fre/uency with others and to conduct himself as a pro"y or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.1 6s radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property

is taken by the re/uirement that they provide airtime to the Comelec. (84@4BA/, "nc. v. '2M4@4', $%3 &'(A ##+, April $-, -33% .Mendo<a01 0. )ay e#inent do#ain be barred by @res %!dicata@ or @law of the case@(

Held: The principle of res %!dicata$ which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the )tate or its agents to e"propriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the )tate, dictates that the right to e"ercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res %!dicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can 0reach every form of property which the )tate might need for public use.1 6ll separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. otwithstanding the grant to individuals, the e#inent do#ain$ the highest and most e"act idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity3 and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest re/uires it.1 Thus, the )tate or its authori-ed agent cannot be forever barred from e"ercising said right by reason alone of previous non%compliance with any legal re/uirement. .hile the principle of res %!dicata does not denigrate the right of the )tate to e"ercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. ,or e"ample, a final judgment dismissing an e"propriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue3 it cannot, however, bar the )tate or its agent from thereafter complying with this re/uirement, as prescribed by law, and subse/uently e"ercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. (Municipality of /aranaque v. .M. (ealty 'orporation, $3$ &'(A )+%, ?uly $,, -33% ./an!aniban01 /. Disc!ss how e*propriation #ay be initiated$ and the two stages in e*propriation.

Held: 2"propriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation . In both instances, just compensation is determined by the courts (-PAA . D!lay$ 1+/ "C=A 325 31/016). The e"propriation of lands consists of two stages. 6s e"plained in )!nicipality of 4inan . Barcia (102 "C=A 516$ 503C 50+ 31/0/6$ reiterated in Dational Power Corp. . Eocson$ 226 "C=A 522 31//26)F The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to e"ercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its e"ercise in the conte"t of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, =of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint= " " ". The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of =the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.= This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three >:? commissioners " " ". It is only upon the completion of these two stages that e"propriation is said to have been completed. 5oreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government . Therefore, until the action for e"propriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being e"propriated remains with the registered owner. Conse/uently, the latter can e"ercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the )tate ultimately to ac/uire it through e"propriation. ((epublic v. &alem "nvestment 'orporation, et. al., ;.(. No. -#+=)3, ?une $#, $,,,, $nd Div. .Mendo<a01 12. Does the two (2) stages in e*propriation apply only to %!dicial$ and not to legislati e$ e*propriation( Held: The @e la Aamas are mistaken in arguing that the two stages of e"propriation " " " only apply to judicial, and not to legislative, e"propriation. 6lthough Congress has the power to determine what land to take, it can not do so arbitrarily. Budicial determination of the propriety of the e"ercise of the power, for instance, in view of allegations of partiality and prejudice by those adversely affected$ and the just compensation for the subject property is provided in our constitutional system. .e see no point in distinguishing between judicial and legislative e"propriation as far as the two stages mentioned above are concerned. Coth involve these stages and in both the process is not completed until payment of just compensation is made. The Court of 6ppeals was correct in saying that C.P. Clg. :D< did not effectively e"propriate the land of the @e la Aamas. 6s a matter of fact, it merely commenced the e"propriation of the subject property. &"" The @e la Aamas make much of the fact that ownership of the land was transferred to the government because the e/uitable and the beneficial title was already ac/uired by it in 1E;:, leaving them with only the naked title. Fowever, as this Court held in Association of "#all Landowners in the Phil.$ .nc. . "ecretary of Agrarian =efor# (115 "C=A 3+3$ 30/ 31/0/6)F

The recogni-ed rule, indeed, is that title to the property e"propriated shall pass from the owner to the e"propriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Burisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. & " " ((epublic v. &alem "nvestment 'orporation, et. al., ;.(. No. -#+=)3, ?une $#, $,,,, $nd Div. .Mendo<a0 11. .s prior !ns!ccessf!l negotiation a condition precedent for the e*ercise of e#inent do#ain( Held: Citing .ron and "teel A!thority . Co!rt of Appeals (2+/ "C=A 530$ Gctober 25$ 1//5)$ petitioner insists that before eminent domain may be e"ercised by the state, there must be a showing of prior unsuccessful negotiation with the owner of the property to be e"propriated. This contention is not correct. 6s pointed out by the )olicitor *eneral the current effective law on delegated authority to e"ercise the power of eminent domain is found in )ection 1$, Cook III of the Aevised 6dministrative Code, which provides4 0)2C. 1$. Power of -#inent Do#ain G The President shall determine when it is necessary or advantageous to e"ercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the ational *overnment, and direct the )olicitor *eneral, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute e"propriation proceedings in the proper court.1 The foregoing provision does not re/uire prior unsuccessful negotiation as a condition precedent for the e"ercise of eminent domain. In .ron and "teel A!thority . Co!rt of Appeals$ the President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional re/uirement instead. In the instant case, however, no such voluntary restriction was imposed. (&M" Development 'orporation v. (epublic, #$# &'(A %)$, ?an. $%, $,,,, #rd Div. ./an!aniban01 The Power of T!"!tion

Section )*. POWE+ ,O , .imitations: 1) The rule o ta*ation should be 0&/93:4 2) /t should be #;0/TAB+# 3) Congress should evolve a P:3-:#11/<# system o ta*ation) 4) The $ower to ta* must be e*er!ised or a $ubli! $ur$ose be!ause the $ower e*ists or the general wel are ") The due $ro!ess and e7ual $rote!tion !lauses o the Constitution should be observed) Dele'ation of power to fix rates $% Congress may, BY LAW, au !or"#e !e Pres"$en o %"& !e %o''o("ng) a) Tari rates b) /m$ort and #*$ort ;uotas !) Tonnage and whar age dues d) 3ther duties and im$osts Within the framework of the national development program of the &overnment '% !he exercise of such power by the (resident shall be within the specified limits fixed by Congress and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose. Constit"tional tax exemptions: $% T!e %o''o("ng *ro*er "es are e&em* %rom +EAL P+OPE+TY a&es /CODE: Cha Ch" 01 C 2

a) Charitable institutions b) Chur!hes, and $arsonages or !onvents a$$urtenant thereto !) 4os7ues d) &on=$ro it !emeteries> and e) All lands, buildings and im$rovements a!tually, dire!tly and e*!lusively used or religious, !haritable, or edu!ational $ur$oses) 2) )ll revenues and assets of *+*,-!+C. *+*,(/+0I! E12C)!I+*)3 institutions are exempt from taxes and duties (/+4I1E1 that such revenues and assets are actually# directly and exclusively used for educational purposes) ,Art) ?/< 1e! 4 ,3)) 3) &rants# endowments# donations or contributions used actually# directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. !his is subject to conditions prescribed by law ) ,Art) ?/<) 1e! 4 ,4))

12. Can ta*es be s!b%ect to offCsetting or co#pensation( Held: Ta"es cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the ta"payer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a ta" and debt. @ebts are due to the *overnment in its corporate capacity, while ta"es are due to the *overnment in its sovereign capacity . It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a ta" is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain. Fence, a ta" does not depend upon the consent of the ta"payer. If any ta"payer can defer the payment of ta"es by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. 6 ta"payer cannot refuse to pay his ta"es when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of a ta" is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government. (/hileA Minin! 'orporation v. 'ommissioner of "nternal (evenue, $3* &'(A )%+, Au!. $%, -33% .(omero01 13. ?nder Article H.$ "ection 20$ paragraph 3 of the 1/01 Constit!tion$ @3C6haritable instit!tions$ ch!rches and parsonages or con ents app!rtenant thereto$ #os8!es$ nonCprofit ce#eteries$ and all lands$ b!ildings$ and i#pro e#ents$ act!ally$ directly and e*cl!si ely !sed for religio!s$ charitable or ed!cational p!rposes shall be e*e#pt fro# ta*ation.@ I)CA clai#s that the inco#e earned by its b!ilding leased to pri ate entities and that of its par&ing space is li&ewise co ered by said e*e#ption. =esol e. Held: The debates, interpellations and e"pressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent that which, in turn, may have guided the people in ratifying the Charter. )uch intent must be effectuated. 6ccordingly, Bustice Filario *. @avide, Br., a former constitutional commissioner, who is now a member of this Court, stressed during the Concom debates that =" " " what is e"empted is not the institution itself " " "3 those e"empted from real estate ta"es are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and e"clusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. ,ather Boa/uin *. Cernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the e"emption created by said provision pertained only to property ta"es. In his treatise on ta"ation, 5r. Bustice Bose C. Hitug concurs, stating that ='t(he ta" e"emption covers property ta"es only.= ('ommissioner of "nternal (evenue v. 'A, $3% &'(A %#, 2ct. -*, -33% ./an!aniban01 1+. ?nder Article <.H$ "ection +$ paragraph 3 of the 1/01 Constit!tion$ @3A6ll re en!es and assets of nonCstoc&$ nonCprofit ed!cational instit!tions !sed act!ally$ directly$ and e*cl!si ely for ed!cational p!rposes shall be e*e#pt fro# ta*es and d!ties.@ I)CA alleged that it @is a nonCprofit ed!cational instit!tion whose re en!es and assets are !sed act!ally$ directly and e*cl!si ely for ed!cational p!rposes so it is e*e#pt fro# ta*es on its properties and inco#e.@ Held: .e reiterate that private respondent is e"empt from the payment of property ta", but not income ta" on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non%stock, non%profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its e"emption from the payment of income ta". '!(aws allowing ta" e"emption are construed strictissi#i %!ris. Fence, for the I5C6 to be granted the e"emption it claims under the abovecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that >1? it falls under the classification nonCstoc&$ nonCprofit ed!cational instit!tionJ and >$? the income it seeks to be e"empted from ta"ation is !sed act!ally$ directly$ and

e*cl!si ely for ed!cational p!rposes. Fowever, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to prove that it met the said re/uisites. ('ommissioner of "nternal (evenue v. 'A, $3% &'(A %#, 2ct. -*, -33% ./an!aniban01 15. .s the I)CA an ed!cational instit!tion within the p!r iew of Article <.H$ "ection +$ par. 3 of the Constit!tion( Held: .e rule that it is not. The term =educational institution= or =institution of learning= has ac/uired a well%known technical meaning, of which the members of the Constitutional Commission are deemed cogni-ant . 8nder the 2ducation 6ct of 1E;$, such term refers to schools. The school system is synonymous with formal education, which =refers to the hierarchically structured and chronologically graded learnings organi-ed and provided by the formal school system and for which certification is re/uired in order for the learner to progress through the grades or move to the higher levels.= The Court has e"amined the =6mended 6rticles of Incorporation= and =Cy%!aws= of the I5C6, but found nothing in them that even hints that it is a school or an educational institution. ,urthermore, under the 2ducation 6ct of 1E;$, even non%formal education is understood to be school%based and =private auspices such as foundations and civic%spirited organi-ations= are ruled out. It is settled that the term =educational institution,= when used in laws granting ta" e"emptions, refers to a =" " " school seminary, college or educational establishment " " ".= (0+ CE" 566) Therefore, the private respondent cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the constitutional provision under consideration. ('ommissioner of "nternal (evenue v. 'A, $3% &'(A %#, 2ct. -*, -33% ./an!aniban01 16. )ay the PCBB alidly co##it to e*e#pt fro# all for#s of ta*es the properties to be retained by the )arcos heirs in a Co#pro#ise Agree#ent between the for#er and the latter( Held: The power to ta" and to grant e"emptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain e"tent, in the local legislative bodies. )ection $;>D?, 6rticle HI of the Constitution, specifically provides4 0 o law granting any ta" e"emption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.1 The PC** has absolutely no power to grant ta" e"emptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill%gotten wealth cases. 2ven granting that Congress enacts a law e"empting the 5arcoses from paying ta"es on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the e/ual protection clause under the Cill of Aights. 6ny special grant of ta" e"emption in favor only of the 5arcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that 0ta"ation shall be uniform and e/uitable.B ('have< v. /';;, $33 &'(A +**, Dec. 3, -33% ./an!aniban01 11. Disc!ss the p!rpose of ta* treaties( Held: The AP%8) Ta" Treaty is just one of a number of bilateral treaties which the Philippines has entered into for the avoidance of double ta"ation. The purpose of these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties in order to help the ta"payer avoid simultaneous ta"ation in two different jurisdictions . 5ore precisely, the ta" conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation " " ". ('ommissioner of "nternal (evenue v. &.'. ?ohnson and &on, "nc., #,3 &'(A %+, -,---,$, ?une $=, -333, #rd Div. .;on<a!a-(eyes01 10. ,hat is @international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation@( Held: It is defined as the imposition of comparable ta"es in two or more states on the same ta"payer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods. ('ommissioner of "nternal (evenue v. &.'. ?ohnson and &on, "nc., #,3 &'(A %+, -,$, ?une $=, -3331 1/. ,hat is the rationale for doing away with international %!ridical do!ble ta*ation( ,hat are the #ethods resorted to by ta* treaties to eli#inate do!ble ta*ation( Held: The apparent rationale for doing away with double ta"ation is to encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and persons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies. ,oreign investments will only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable international investment climate and the protection against double ta"ation is crucial in creating such a climate. @ouble ta"ation usually takes place when a person is resident of a contracting state and derives income from, or owns capital in, the other contracting state and both states impose ta" on that income or capital. In order to eliminate double ta"ation, a ta" treaty resorts to several methods. ,irst, it sets out the respective rights to ta" of the state of source or situs and of the state of residence with regard to certain classes of income or capital. In some cases, an e"clusive right to ta" is conferred on one of the contracting states3 however, for other items of income or capital, both states are given the right to ta", although the amount of ta" that may be imposed by the state of source is limited. The second method for the elimination of double ta"ation applies whenever the state of source is given a full or limited right to ta" together with the state of residence. In this case, the treaties make it incumbent upon the state of residence to allow relief in order to avoid double ta"ation. There are two methods of relief % the e"emption method and the credit method. In the

e"emption method, the income or capital which is ta"able in the state of source or situs is e"empted in the state of residence, although in some instances it may be taken into account in determining the rate of ta" applicable to the ta"payerJs remaining income or capital. #n the other hand, in the credit method, although the income or capital which is ta"ed in the state of source is still ta"able in the state of residence, the ta" paid in the former is credited against the ta" levied in the latter. The basic difference between the two methods is that in the e"emption method, the focus is on the income or capital itself, whereas the credit method focuses upon the ta". ('ommissioner of "nternal (evenue v. &.'. ?ohnson and &on, "nc., #,3 &'(A %+, -,$--,#, ?une $=, -3331 22. ,hat is the rationale for red!cing the ta* rate in negotiating ta* treaties( Held: In negotiating ta" treaties, the underlying rationale for reducing the ta" rate is that the Philippines will give up a part of the ta" in the e"pectation that the ta" given up for this particular investment is not ta"ed by the other country. ('ommissioner of "nternal (evenue v. &.'. ?ohnson and &on, "nc., #,3 &'(A %+, -,#, ?une $=, -3331 #. THE #ILL OF RI$HTS The %e Proce&& Cl!%&e

A&'ect& of ( %e Proce&&): 1. Proced!ral d!e process G refers to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow in the enforcement and application of laws. $. "!bstanti e d!e process G prohibition against arbitrary laws. Note: PA#C2@8A6! @82 PA#C2))4 1. 6 law which hears before it condemns. $. @ue process of law contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one+s person or property >!ope- v. @ir. of !ands? :. @ue process depends on circumstances3 it varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. Re*%i&ite& of PROCE URAL d%e 'roce&&:
0or 521ICI)3 proceedings6 C+1E6 C 5 * + "

1. 6 court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. $. +urisdiction must be lawfully ac/uired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings. :. The defendant must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. D. Budgment must be rendered upon a lawful hearing. 9or A@4/&/1T:AT/<# $ro!eedingsA C3@#A B # @ 1 B / P 1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one+s case and submit evidence in support thereof. $. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented. :. The decision must have something to support itself. D. 2vidence supporting the conclusion must be &ubstantial. 9. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. K. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. L. The board or body should, in all controversial /uestions, render its decision in such a manner that the 'arties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered. Note:

1. .hat is re/uired is not actual hearing, but a real opportunity to be heard. $. The re/uirement of due process can be satisfied by subse/uent due hearing. :. Hiolation of due process4 when same person reviews his own decision on appeal. D. otice and hearing are re/uired in judicial and /uasi%judicial proceedings, but not in the promulgation of general rule. 9or 1CB33+ @/1C/P+/&A:C $ro!eedingsA C3@#A 6 A /n A @ P 1. The student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. $. The student shall have the right to !nswer the charges against him, with the assistance of counsel if desired. :. The student has the right to be informed of the evidence against him. D. The student has the right to !dduce evidence in his own behalf. 9. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. K. The penalty imposed must be 'roportionate to the offense. Note: 1. The school has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course a student has enrolled for. $. 2"ceptions4 :. )erious breach of discipline3 or D. ,ailure to maintain the re/uired academic standard. 9. Proceedings in student disciplinary cases may be summary3 cross%e"amination is not essential In&t!nce& when he!rin,& !re NOT nece&&!r-: 1. $. :. D. 9. K. L. ;. E. .hen administrative agencies are e"ercising their 8!asiClegislati e functions. 6batement of n!isance per se. *ranting by courts of pro isional re#edies. Cases of pre enti e s!spension. =e#o al of temporary employees in the government service. Issuance of warrants of distraint andKor le y by the 4.= Co##issioner. Cancellation of the passport of a person charged with a crime. Issuance of se8!estration orders >considered a provisional remedy?. Budicial order which prevents an accused from tra elling abroad in order to maintain the effectivity of the court+s jurisdiction. 1<. "!spension of a ban&'s operations by the 5onetary Coard upon a prima facie finding of li/uidity problems in such bank. Note: 1. The right to counsel is a very basic re/uirement of substantive due process and has to be observed even in administrative and /uasi%judicial bodies. $. The right to appeal is a &t!t%tor- 'ri.ile,e that may be e"ercised only in the manner in accordance with law.

Ae/uisites of )8C)T6 TIH2 due process4 C#@24 I 5

1. The .D7-=-"7" of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re/uires the interference by the government and $. The )-AD" employed are necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Ae/uirements of a valid ordinance4 1. 5ust not contravene the Constitution or any statute $. 5ust not be unfair or oppressive :. 5ust not be partial or discriminatory

D. 5ust not prohibit, but may regulate trade 9. 5ust be general and consistent with public policy K. 5ust not be unreasonable
When is a law 4)&2E?

1. .hen it lacks C#5PA2F2 )IC!2 )T6 @6A@) $. That men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily *82)) as to its meaning :. 6nd differ as to its application
21. Disc!ss the D!e Process Cla!se. Disting!ish s!bstanti e d!e process fro# proced!ral d!e process. Held: )ection 1 of the Cill of Aights lays down what is known as the =due process clause= of the Constitution. In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. .hen one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process =refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,= while substantive due process =re/uires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.= ('orona v. 7nited :arbor /ilots Association of the /hils., $%# &'(A #-, Dec. -$, -33+ .(omero01 22. =espondents ?nited Larbor Pilots Association of the Philippines arg!e that d!e process was not obser ed in the adoption of PPACAG Do. 2+C/2 which pro ides thatF :(a)ll e*isting reg!lar appoint#ents which ha e been pre io!sly iss!ed by the 4!rea! of C!sto#s or the PPA shall re#ain alid !p to 31 Dece#ber 1//2 only$; and :(a)ll appoint#ents to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall$ henceforth$ be only for a ter# of one (1) year fro# date of effecti ity s!b%ect to renewal or cancellation by the Philippine Ports A!thority after cond!ct of a rigid e al!ation of perfor#ance$; allegedly beca!se no hearing was cond!cted whereby :rele ant go ern#ent agencies; and the harbor pilots the#sel es co!ld entilate their iews. 7hey also contended that the sole and e*cl!si e right to the e*ercise of harbor pilotage by pilots has beco#e ested and can only be :withdrawn or shortened; by obser ing the constit!tional #andate of d!e process of law. Held: They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. ,ortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of L!#i8!ed . Lon. -*e ea (B.=. Do. 111565$ Do e#ber 10$ 1//1)$ where it declared that 0>a?s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 5oreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.1 In the case at bar, respondents /uestioned PP6%6# o. <D%E$ no less than four times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, failed to persuade. & " " either does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. 6s a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental re/uirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body e"ercises its /uasi%judicial function. In the performance of its e"ecutive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the re/uirements of notice and hearing. 8pon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and e"clusive right to the e"ercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Aespondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be 0withdrawn or shortened1 by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PP6%6# o. <D%E$ fails to meet the condition set by the organic law. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. !icensure is 0the granting of license especially to practice a profession.1 It is also 0the system of granting licenses >as for professional practice? in accordance with established standards.1 6 license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. Cefore harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but fi e e"aminations, each followed by actual training and practice. & " " Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of L< years. This is a vested right. 8nder the terms of PP6%6# o. <D%E$, 0'a(ll e"isting regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Cureau of Customs or the PP6 shall remain valid up to :1 @ecember 1EE$ only,1 and 0>a?ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one >1? year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the 6uthority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.1

It is readily apparent that PP6%6# o. <D%E$ unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five e"aminations and undergoing years of on%the%job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PP6 for mental or physical unfitness. 8nder the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Heteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one%year terms which ipso facto e"pire at the end of that period. Aenewal of their license is now dependent on a 0rigid evaluation of performance1 which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Fence, the use of the term 0renewal.1 It is this pre%evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PP6%6# o. <D%E$ unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. ('orona v. 7nited :arbor /ilots Association of the /hils., $%# &'(A #-, December -$, -33+ .(omero01 23. Does the d!e process cla!se enco#pass the right to be assisted by co!nsel d!ring an ad#inistrati e in8!iry( Held: The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative in/uiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an acc!sed in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. !umi/ued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee " " " was for the sole purpose of determining if he could be held ad#inistrati ely liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. " " " 6s such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. & " " .hile investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under e"isting laws, a party in an administrative in/uiry #ay or #ay not be assisted by co!nsel$ irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondentJs capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding " " " a respondent " " " has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. " " " Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such in/uiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless re/uired by the Constitution or the law. & " ". (@umiqued v. 4Aevea, $%$ &'(A -$=, Nov. -%, -33+ .(omero01 2+. Does an e*traditee ha e the right to notice and hearing d!ring the e al!ation stage of an e*tradition proceeding( Held: Considering that in the case at bar, the e"tradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner )ecretary of Bustice. & " " .n tilting the balance in fa or of the interests of the "tate$ the Co!rt stresses that it is not r!ling that the pri ate respondent has no right to d!e process at all thro!gho!t the length and breadth of the e*tradition proceedings. Procedural due process re/uires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. )tated otherwise, a prior deter#ination sho!ld be #ade as to whether proced!ral protections are at all d!e and when they are d!e$ which in t!rn depends on the e*tent to which an indi id!al will be @conde#ned to s!ffer grie o!s loss.@ .e have e"plained why an e"traditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the e"tradition process. 6s aforesaid, P.@. o. 1<KE which implements the AP%8) 2"tradition Treaty affords an e"traditee s!fficient opport!nity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in co!rt. The ti#e for the e"traditee to know the basis of the re/uest for his e"tradition is #erely #o ed to the filing in court of the formal petition for e"tradition. The e"traditeeJs right to know is #o#entarily withheld d!ring the e al!ation stage of the e"tradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the )tate to prevent escape of potential e"traditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the re/uest for his e"tradition. o less compelling at that stage of the e"tradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co%e/ual branch of the government, the 2"ecutive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. eedless to state, this balance of interests is not a static b!t a #o ing balance which can be adjusted as the e"tradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the e"ecution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the te#porary hold on private respondentJs privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of f!nda#ental fairness should he decide to resist the re/uest for his e"tradition to the 8nited )tates. 7here is no denial of d!e process as long as f!nda#ental fairness is ass!red a party. (&ecretary of ?ustice v. :on. (alph '. @antion, ;.(. No. -#3*)=, 2ct. -+, $,,,, 4n Banc ./uno01 The E*%!l Protection Cl!%&e

E*%!l Protection of the l!w

The e*%!lit- th!t it ,%!r!ntee& i& le,!l e*%!lit- or the e*%!lit- of !ll 'er&on& /efore the l!w. It doe& not dem!nd !/&ol%te e*%!lit-. It merel- re*%ire& th!t !ll 'er&on& &h!ll /e tre!ted !li0e1 %nder li0e circ%m&t!nce& !nd condition& /oth !& to 'ri.ile,e& conferred !nd li!/ilitie& enforced.
/e uisites for valid classification for purposes of the e ual protection clause

The cl!&&ific!tion m%&t:

CO E: S$EE

1. Aest on S8C)T6 TI6! @I)TI CTI# ) $. Ce $2A56 2 to the purposes of the law :. #T !I5IT2@ T# E&I)TI * C# @ITI# ) only D. 6PP!I EM86!!I to all members of the )652 C!6)).
25. -*plain and disc!ss the e8!al protection of the law cla!se. Held: 1. The e/ual protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the re/uirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in 6rticle III, )ec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. 6rbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. Cut if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the e/ual protection clause. 6ccording to a long line of decisions, e/ual protection simply re/uires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed . )imilar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The e/ual protection clause does not re/uire the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in une/ual protection, as where, for e"ample, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. .hat the clause re/uires is e/uality among e/uals as determined according to a valid classification. Cy classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars . (/hilippine ?ud!es Association v. /rado, $$+ &'(A +,#, +---+-$, Nov. --, -33#, 4n Banc .'ru<01 $. The e/ual protection clause e"ists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on ine/uality. Aecogni-ing the e"istence of real difference among men, the e/ual protection clause does not demand absolute e/uality. It merely re/uires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced . Thus, the e/ual protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications " " ". If the classification is based on real and substantial differences3 is germane to the purpose of the law3 applies to all members of the same class3 and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the ConstitutionJs e/ual protection guarantee. 6 distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose " " " is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded. (:ima!an v. /eople, $#+ &'(A =#%, 2ct. +, -33*, 4n Banc .Capunan01 26. Congress enacted =.A. Do. 010/ which pro ides$ in "ection ++ thereof$ that @Do -lection Gfficer shall hold office in a partic!lar city or #!nicipality for #ore than fo!r (+) years. Any election officer who$ either at the ti#e of the appro al of this Act or s!bse8!ent thereto$ has ser ed for at least fo!r (+) years in a partic!lar city or #!nicipality shall a!to#atically be reassigned by the Co##ission to a new station o!tside the original congressional district.@ Petitioners$ who are City and )!nicipal -lection Gfficers$ theori9e that "ection ++ of =A 010/ is iolati e of the @e8!al protection cla!se@ of the 1/01 Constit!tion beca!se it singles o!t the City and )!nicipal -lection Gfficers of the CG)-L-C as prohibited fro# holding office in the sa#e city or #!nicipality for #ore than fo!r (+) years. 7hey #aintain that there is no s!bstantial distinction between the# and other CG)-L-C officials$ and therefore$ there is no alid classification to %!stify the ob%ecti e of the pro ision of law !nder attac&. =esol e. Held: The Court is not persuaded by petitionersJ arguments. The =e/ual protection clause= of the 1E;L Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions4 1? $? :? D? The classification must rest on substantial distinction3 The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law3 The classification must not be limited to e"isting conditions only3 and The classification must apply e/ually to all members of the same class.

6fter a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under )ection DD of A6 ;1;E satisfies the aforestated re/uirements.

The singling out of election officers in order to =ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment= does not violate the e/ual protection clause of the Constitution. In L!t9 . Araneta (/0 Phil. 1+0$ 153 31/556)$ it was held that =the legislature is not re/uired by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of Jall or noneJ=. This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all other officers of C#52!2C referred to by petitioners are e"posed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. Fowever, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Herily, under )ection :>n? of A6 ;1;E, election officers are the highest officials or authori-ed representatives of the C#52!2C in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large%scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. (A!ripino A. De ;u<man, ?r., et al. v. '2M4@4' (;.(. No. -$3--%, ?uly -3, $,,,, en Banc ./urisima01 21. Are there s!bstantial distinctions between print #edia and broadcast #edia to %!stify the re8!ire#ent for the latter to gi e free airti#e to be !sed by the Co#elec to infor# the p!blic of 8!alifications and progra# of go ern#ent of candidates and political parties d!ring the ca#paign period( Disc!ss. Held: There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. Cecause of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast fre/uencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media. In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that the government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of print media. To re/uire radio and television broadcast industry to provide free airtime for the Comelec Time is a fair e"change for what the industry gets. ,rom another point of view, the )C has also held that because of the uni/ue and pervasive influence of the broadcast media, 0'n(ecessarily " " " the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.1 (84@4BA/, "nc. v. '2M4@4', $%3 &'(A ##+, April $-, -33% .Mendo<a01 20. Does the death penalty law (=.A. Do. 165/) iolate the e8!al protection cla!se considering that$ in effect$ it p!nishes only people who are poor$ !ned!cated$ and %obless( Held: A.6. o. LK9E specifically provides that 0'T(he death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed " " " when the victim is a religious or a child below seven >L? years old.1 6pparently, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and to all classes of persons G rich or poor, educated or uneducated, religious or non%religious. o particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty shall be e"clusively imposed. The law punishes with death a person who shall commit rape against a child below seven years of age. Thus, the perpetration of rape against a 9%year old girl does not absolve or e"empt an accused from the imposition of the death penalty by the fact that he is poor, uneducated, jobless, and lacks catechetical instruction. To hold otherwise will not eliminate but promote ine/ualities. In Cecille ille =ealty and "er ice Corporation . CA$ 210 "C=A 01/ 31//16)$ the )C clarified that compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. (/eople v. ?immy Mi9ano y 8amora, ;.(. No. -$3--$, ?uly $#, -333, 4n Banc ./er 'uriam01 2/. 7he .nternational "chool Alliance of -d!cators (."A-) 8!estioned the pointCofChire classification e#ployed by .nternational "chool$ .nc. to %!stify distinction in salary rates between foreignChires and localChires$ i.e.$ salary rates of foreignChires are higher by 25M than their local co!nterparts$ as discri#inatory and$ therefore$ iolates the e8!al protection cla!se. 7he .nternational "chool contended that this is necessary in order to entice foreignChires to lea e their do#icile and wor& here. =esol e. Held: That public policy abhors ine/uality and discrimination is beyond contention. #ur Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. & " " International law, which springs from general principles of law $ likewise proscribes discrimination " " ". The 8niversal @eclaration of Fuman Aights, the International Covenant on 2conomic, )ocial and Cultural Aights, the International Convention on the 2limination of 6ll ,orms of Aacial @iscrimination, the Convention against @iscrimination in 2ducation, the Convention > o. 111? Concerning @iscrimination in Aespect of 2mployment and #ccupation % all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. 'I(t would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the )tate, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure e/ual employment opportunities, closes its eyes to une/ual and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment " " ".

@iscrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the !abor Code. 6rticle 1:9, for e"ample, prohibits and penali-es the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of e/ual value. 6rticle $D; declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-ation. & " " The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionali-e in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of =2/ual pay for e/ual work.= Persons who work with substantially e/ual /ualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the )chool >International )chool, Inc.?, its =international character= notwithstanding. The )chool contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local%hires perform work e/ual to that of foreign% hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform e/ual work. This presumption is borne by logic and human e"perience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to e"plain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee3 it is for the employer to e"plain why the employee is treated unfairly. The employer in this case failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign%hires perform $9N more efficiently or effectively than the local%hires. Coth groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The )chool cannot invoke the need to entice foreign%hires to leave their domicile to rationali-e the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of e/ual work for e/ual pay. &"" .hile we recogni-e the need of the )chool to attract foreign%hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local%hires. The local%hires perform the same services as foreign%hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. ,or the same reason, the =dislocation factor= and the foreign%hiresJ limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign%hires are ade/uately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local%hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, ta"es and home leave travel allowances. The Constitution enjoins the )tate to =protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare=, =to afford labor full protection.= The )tate, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital . These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good . )hould such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point%of%hire classification employed by respondent )chool to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign%hires and local%hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign%hires and local%hires. The practice of the )chool of according higher salaries to foreign%hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court. ("nternational &chool Alliance of 4ducators ("&A41 v. :on. @eonardo A. Duisumbin!, ;.(. No. -$%%*=, ?une -, $,,,, -st Div. .Capunan01 32. Acc!sedCappellant =o#eo B. Ealos%os filed a #otion before the Co!rt as&ing that he be allowed to f!lly discharge the d!ties of a Congress#an$ incl!ding attendance at legislati e sessions and co##ittee #eetings despite his ha ing been con icted in the first instance of a nonCbailable offense. Does being an electi e official res!lt in a s!bstantial distinction that allows different treat#ent( .s being a Congress#an a s!bstantial differentiation which re#o es the acc!sedCappellant as a prisoner fro# the sa#e class as all persons alidly confined !nder law( Held: In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a /uestion of constitutional e/ual protection. &"" The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an e"cuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the 0mandate of the people1 are multifarious. The accused%appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused%appellant is only one of $9< members of the Fouse of Aepresentatives, not to mention the $D members of the )enate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. @epending on the e"igency of *overnment that has to be addressed, the President or the )upreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its e"ercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. 6 doctor with uni/ue skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. 6n elective governor has to

serve provincial constituents. 6 police officer must maintain peace and order. ever had the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. 6 strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. The Court cannot validate badges of ine/uality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify e"ercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded . .e, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. !awful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. &"" It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual+s status in society . Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially e"plosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepare inmates for re%entry into the social mainstream. ecessarily, both these demands re/uire the curtailment and elimination of certain rights. Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused%appellant+s claim that re%election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the )tate. (/eople v. ?alos9os, #$* &'(A )%3, >eb. #, $,,,, 4n Banc .Enares-&antia!o01 The Ri,ht !,!in&t Unre!&on!/le Se!rche& !nd Sei2%re&

)ection $. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-ures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e"cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after e"amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be sei-ed. *eneral Aule4 Se!rch !nd &ei2%re& !re %nre!&on!/le UNLESS !%thori2ed /- ! .!lidl- i&&%ed &e!rch w!rr!nt or w!rr!nt of !rre&t

Ae/uisites for a valid warrant4

1. $. :. D.

C#@24

P B 2 @

It must be issued upon PA#C6C!2 C68)2. The e"istence of probable cause is determined personally by the +U $E. The judge must E&65I 2 8 @2A #6TF the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The warrant must P6ATIC8!6A!I 2)CAIC2 the place to be searched and person or things to be sei-ed.

1efinition of 7(/+8)83E C)2-E9

>or the iss!ance of a warrant of arrestF

Pro/!/le c!%&e refer& to &%ch f!ct& !nd circ%m&t!nce& which wo%ld le!d ! re!&on!/ldi&creet !nd 'r%dent m!n to /elie.e th!t !n offen&e h!& /een committed /- the 'er&on &o%,ht to /e !rre&ted.
>or the iss!ance of a search warrantF Probable cause would mean such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.

Note: Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant does #T re/uire that the probable guilt of a specific offender be established, unlike in the case of a warrant of arrest.
Existence of probable cause 71E!E/:I*E1 (E/-+*)33; 8; !"E 521&E9

The judge is #T re/uired to personally e"amine the complainant and his witnesses. .hat the Constitution underscores is the e"clusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the e"istence of probable cause >"oli en . )a&asiar, 1KL )CA6 :ED?. To be sure, the Budge must go beyond the prosecutor+s certification and investigation report whenever necessary >!im v. ,eli"?. Proced%re: 1. The judge personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the e"istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest or $. If on the basis thereof, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal+s report and re/uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to the e"istence of probable cause. E"!min!tion (UN ER OATH OR AFFIR3ATION OF THE CO3PLAINANT AN WITNESSES) 1. The oath re/uired must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the complainant or his witnesses because the purpose is to convince the judge of the e"istence of probable cause >6lvare- v. C,I, KD Phil. ::?. $. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant the issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for the damages caused >6lvarev. C,I?. PARTICULARIT4 OF ESCRIPTION 5SEARCH WARRANT6 1. 6 search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be sei-ed when the de&cri'tion therein i& !& &'ecific !& the circ%m&t!nce& will ordin!ril- !llow or $. .hen the de&cri'tion e"'re&&e& ! concl%&ion of f!ct G not of law G by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and sei-ure or :. .hen the thin,& de&cri/ed !re limited to tho&e which /e!r ! direct rel!tion to the offen&e for which the warrant is being issued >4ache and Co. . =!i9, :L )CA6 ;$:?. +OHN OE WARRANT 6 0Bohn @oe1 warrant can satisfy the re/uirement of particularity of description if it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused > People . Heloso, D; Phil. 19E? $ENERAL WARRANT 6 general warrant is one that does not allege any specific acts or omissions constituting the offense charged in the application for the issuance of the warrant. It contravenes the e"plicit demand of the Cill of Aights that the things to be sei-ed be particularly described. 7ALI WARRANTLESS SEARCH 1. )earch made as an incident to lawful arrest 6. 6n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested4 i. 6ny money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the offense or ii. .as the fruit thereof or iii. .hich might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping or iv. .hich may be used in evidence in the trial of the case

C. The search must be made simultaneously with the arrest and it may only be made in the area within the reach of the person arrested $. )earch of moving vehicles 6. This e"ception is based on e"igency. Thus, if there is time to obtain a warrant in order to search the vehicle, a warrant must first be obtained. C. The search of a moving vehicle must be based on probable cause. :. )ei-ure of goods concealed to avoid customs dutiesOauthori-ed under the Tariffs and Customs Code 6. The Tariffs and Customs Code authori-es persons having police authority under the Code to effect search and sei-ures without a search warrant to enforce customs laws. C. 2"ception4 6 search warrant is re/uired for the search of a dwelling house. C. )earches under this e"ception include searches at borders and ports of entry. )earches in these areas do not re/uire the e"istence of probable cause

D. )ei-ure of evidence in plain view 6. To be a valid warrantless search, the articles must be open to the eye and hand. C. The peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 9. .aiver of right 6. Ae/uisites of a valid waiver4 i. ii. iii. The right e"ists. The person had actual or constructive knowledge of the e"istence of such right. There is an actual intention to relin/uish such right.

C. The right against unreasonable searches and sei-ures is a personal right. Thus, only the person being searched can waive the same. C. .aiver re/uires a positive act from the person. 5ere absence of opposition is not a waiver. @. The search made pursuant to the waiver must be made within the scope of the waiver. Note: 1. Checkpoints4 as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search P valid search > Hal#onte H. De Hilla? $. Carroll rule4 warrantless search of a vehicle that can be /uickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction :. The 1E;L Constitution has returned to the 1E:9 rule that warrants may be issued only by judges, but the Commissioner of Immigration may order the arrest of an alien in order to carry out a ,I 6! deportation order.

H6!I@ .6AA6 T!2)) 6AA2)T)

1. .hen the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. $. .hen an offense has in fact just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. :. .hen the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. D. .aiver of an invalid arrest4 .hen a person who is detained applies for bail, he is deemed to have waived any irregularity which may have occurred in relation to his arrest. 9. Fot pursuit 6. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous from the time of the commission of the offense to the time of the arrest. C. There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the chase.

K. )top and frisk .hen a policeman observes suspicious activity which leads him to believe that a crime is about to be committed, he can investigate the suspicious looking person and may frisk him for weapons as a measure of self%protection. )hould he find, however, a weapon on the suspect which is unlicensed, he can arrest such person then and there for having committed an offense in the officer+s presence.
31. Disc!ss the constit!tional re8!ire#ent that a %!dge$ in iss!ing a warrant of arrest$ #!st deter#ine probable ca!se :personally.; Disting!ish deter#ination of probable ca!se by the prosec!tor and deter#ination of probable ca!se by the %!dge. Held: It must be stressed that the 1E;L Constitution re/uires the judge to determine probable cause 0personally,1 a re/uirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions . In "oli en . )a&asiar$ this Court pronounced4 0.hat the Constitution underscores is the e"clusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the e"istence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the e"istence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not re/uired to personally e"amine the complainant and his witnesses. ,ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall4 >1? personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the e"istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest3 or >$? if in the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal+s report and re/uire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the e"istence of probable cause.1 Lo . People (.bid.) summari-es e"isting jurisprudence on the matter as follows4 0!est we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasi-e three vital matters once more4 >irst$ as held in .nting$ the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. .hether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e.$ whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives. "econd$ since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. #bviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor+s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial. Fowever, the judge must decide independently. Fence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor+s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the e"istence >or none"istence? of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the e"istence or none"istence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the Fis Fonor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. Lastly$ it is not re/uired that the co#plete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and e"amined by the judge. .e do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to e"amine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. .hat is re/uired, rather, is that the judge must have s!fficient supporting documents >such as the complaint, affidavits, counter%affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any? upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the e"istence of probable cause. The point is4 he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor+s recommendation, as Aespondent Court did in this case. 6lthough the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.1 (Citations o#itted) In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the /uestioned warrant as there was 0no reason for >him? to doubt the validity of the certification made by the 6ssistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to e"ist as against those charged in the information filed.1 The statement is an admission that respondent relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause e"ists as against those charged in the information

and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor+s findings and recommendations. Fe adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the e"istence of probable cause as his own. (Abdula v. ;uiani, #$) &'(A -, >eb. -%, $,,,, #rd Div. .;on<a!a-(eyes01 32. .n an application for search warrant$ the application was acco#panied by a s&etch of the co#po!nd at 516 "an Eose de la )ontana "t.$ )abolo$ Ceb! City$ indicating the 2Cstorey residential ho!se of pri ate respondent with a large :<; enclosed in a s8!are. ,ithin the sa#e co#po!nd are residences of other people$ wor&shops$ offices$ factories and wareho!se. 7he search warrant iss!ed$ howe er$ #erely indicated the address of the co#po!nd which is 516 "an Eose de la )ontana "t.$ )abolo$ Ceb! City. Did this satisfy the constit!tional re8!ire#ent !nder "ection 2$ Article ... that the place to be searched #!st be partic!larly described( Held: This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be sei-ed, where er and whene er it is feasible. In the present case, it must be noted that the application for a search warrant was accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 91K )an Bose de la 5ontana )t., 5abolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the $%storey residential house of private respondent with a large =&= enclosed in a s/uare. .ithin the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. .ith this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with s!fficient partic!larity so as to segregate it fro# the other b!ildings or str!ct!res inside the sa#e co#po!nd. Cut the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 91K )an Bose de la 5ontana )t., 5abolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inade/uacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characteri-ed the /uestioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional re/uirement. (/eople v. 4strada, $3) &'(A #%#, *,,, .Martine<01 33. Can the place to be searched$ as set o!t in the warrant$ be a#plified or #odified by the officers' own personal &nowledge of the pre#ises$ or the e idence they add!ce in s!pport of their application for the warrant( Held: )uch a change is proscribed by the Constitution which re/uires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be sei-ed. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers e"ecuting a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particulari-ation of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Budge, and only in the warrant itself3 it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched G although not that specified in the warrant G is e"actly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. .hat is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. (/eople v. 'ourt of Appeals, $3- &'(A *,,, ?une $), -33% .Narvasa01 3+. ,hat is :search incidental to a lawf!l arrest;( Disc!ss. Held: .hile a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may e"tend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is /uestioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a prete"t for conducting a search. In this instance, the law re/uires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made G the process cannot be reversed. ()alacat . Co!rt of Appeals$ 203 "C=A 15/$ 115 31//16) (/eople v. 'hua :o &an, #,% &'(A *#$, ?une -+, -333, 4n Banc .Davide, ?r., '.?.01 35. ,hat is the :plain iew; doctrine( ,hat are its re8!isites( Disc!ss. Held: 1. #bjects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to sei-ure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence . The 0plain view1 doctrine applies when the following re/uisites concur4 >a? the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area3 >b? the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent3 >c? it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to sei-ure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly e"posed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. .here the object sei-ed was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and

therefore cannot be sei-ed without a warrant. Fowever, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be sei-ed . In other words, if the package is such that an e"perienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to sei-ure. (/eople v. Doria, #,- &'(A ))%, ?an. $$, -333, 4n Banc ./uno, ?.01 $. ,or the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present4 a? a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties3 b? the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are3 and c? the evidence must be immediately apparent3 and d? plain view justified mere sei-ure of evidence without further search. In the instant case, recall that P#$ Calut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Fence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant+s premises. ote further that the police team was dispatched to appellant+s &aingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The sei-ure of evidence in 0plain view1 applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. .e also note the testimony of )P#$ Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to 0look around the area1 before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the sei-ed marijuana plants were not 0immediately apparent1 and 0further search1 was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in /uestion were not in 0plain view1 or 0open to eye and hand.1 The 0plain view1 doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply. or can we sustain the trial court+s conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the )tate. The right against unreasonable searches and sei-ures is the immunity of one+s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to 0the right of personal security1 of the individual. & " ", what is sought to be protected against the )tate+s unlawful intrusion are persons, not places . To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and sei-ures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Cill of Aights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom. (/eople v. Abe alde<, ;.(. No. -$3$3), &ept. $=, $,,,, 4n Banc .Duisumbin!01 :. Considering its factual milieu, this case falls s/uarely under the plain iew doctrine. & " ". .hen )pencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of P#$ *aviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The members of the buy%bust team were justified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. #nce inside the house, the police officers cornered )pencer and recovered the buy% bust money from him. They also caught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view on top of a table. & " ". Fence, appellant+s subse/uent arrest was likewise lawful, coming as it is within the purview of )ection 9>a? of Aule 11: of the 1E;9 Aules on Criminal Procedure " " ". )ection 9>a? is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests. Fere two elements must concur4 >1? the person to be arrested must e"ecute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime3 and >$? such overt act is done in the presence or within the iew of the arresting officer. Thus, when appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers were not only authori-ed but also duty%bound to arrest him even without a warrant. (/eople v. 4lamparo, #$3 &'(A *,*, *-*-*-=, March #-, $,,,, $nd Div. .Duisumbin!01 36. ,hat is a :stopCandCfris&; search( Held: 1. In the landmark case of 7erry . Ghio (22 L -d 2d 00/J 00 " Ct 1060$ 3/2 ?" 1$ /22$ E!ne 12$ 1/60)$ a stop% and%frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citi-en on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon>s?4 0" " " >.?here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his e"perience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and make reasonable in/uiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others+ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. )uch a search is a reasonable search under the ,ourth 6mendment, and any weapon sei-ed may properly be introduced in

evidence against the person from whom they were taken.1 (Lerrera$ A Landboo& on Arrest$ "earch and "ei9!re and C!stodial .n estigation$ 1//5 ed.$ p. 105J and 7erry . Ghio$ s!pra$ p. /11) In allowing such a search, the 8nited )tates )upreme Court held that the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. In admitting in evidence two guns sei-ed during the stop%and%frisk, the 8) )upreme Court held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could une"pectedly and fatally be used against him. It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and sei-ures through the warrant procedure, e"cused only by e"igent circumstances. (Manalili v. 'A, $%, &'(A *,,, 2ct. 3, -33+ ./an!aniban01 $. .e now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a 0stop%and%frisk1 as a 0limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,1 as laid down in 7erry$ thus4 .e merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his e"perience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable in/uiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others+ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. )uch a search is a reasonable search under the ,ourth 6mendment (7erry$ at /11. .n fact$ the Co!rt noted that the Nsole %!stification' for a stopCandCfris& was the Nprotection of the police officer and others nearby'J while the scope of the search cond!cted in the case was li#ited to patting down the o!ter clothing of petitioner and his co#panions$ the police officer did not place his hands in their poc&ets nor !nder the o!ter s!rface of their gar#ents !ntil he had felt weapons$ and then he #erely reached for and re#o ed the g!ns. 7his did not constit!te a general e*ploratory search$ .d.) #ther notable points of 7erry are that while probable cause is not re/uired to conduct a 0stop%and%frisk,1 it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a 0stop%and%frisk.1 6 genuine reason must e"ist, in light of the police officer+s e"perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him . ,inally, a 0stop%and%frisk1 serves a two%fold interest4 >1? the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause3 and >$? the more pressing interest of safety and self%preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could une"pectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. (Malacat v. 'ourt of Appeals, $%# &'(A -=3, Dec. -$, -33+ .Davide01 31. Are searches at chec&points alid( Disc!ss. Held: 6ccused%appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in /uestion was conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the 5akati Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. .e take judicial notice of the e"istence of the C#52!2C resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to )ection 9$>c? in relation to )ection $K>/? of the #mnibus 2lection Code >Catas Pambansa Clg. ;;1?. The national and local elections in 1EE9 were held on ; 5ay, the second 5onday of the month. The incident, which happened on 9 6pril 1EE9, was well within the election period. This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the e"igencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed . ,or, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain e"tent, on motorists+ right to 0free passage without interruption,1 but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle+s occupants are re/uired to answer a brief /uestion or two. ,or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual+s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fi"ed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the C#52!2C. The C#52!2C would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputi-ed agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and sei-ure. P#: )uba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. 6t best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car+s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. .e see no need for checkpoints to be announced " " ". ot only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. 2ven so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fi"ed location and the regulari-ed manner in which they are operated. (/eople v. 7sana, #$# &'(A +=*, ?an. $%, $,,,, -st Div. .Davide, '?01 30. Do the ordinary rights against !nreasonable searches and sei9!res apply to searches cond!cted at the airport p!rs!ant to ro!tine airport sec!rity proced!res( Held: Persons may lose the protection of the search and sei-ure clause by e"posure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective e"pectation of privacy, which e"pectation society is prepared to recogni-e as reasonable. )uch recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. .ith increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation+s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors3 their carry%on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to "%ray scans. )hould these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little /uestion that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy e"pectations associated with airline travel . Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to sei-ure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and sei-ures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused%appellant herein. Corollarily, her subse/uent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of 0shabu1 in her person in flagrante delicto. (/eople v. @eila ?ohnson, ;.(. No. -#%%%-, Dec. -%, $,,,, $nd Div. .Mendo<a01 3/. )ay the constit!tional protection against !nreasonable searches and sei9!res be e*tended to acts co##itted by pri ate indi id!als( Held: 6s held in People . )arti (1/3 "C=A 51 31//16)$ the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and sei-ures refers to the immunity of oneJs person from interference by government and it cannot be e"tended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion. (/eople v. Mendo<a, #,- &'(A )), ?an. -%, -333, -st Div. .Melo01 +2. "ho!ld the sei9ed dr!gs which are phar#ace!tically correct b!t not properly doc!#ented s!b%ect of an illegal search beca!se the applicant :failed to allege in the application for search warrant that the s!b%ect dr!gs for which she was applying for search warrant were either fa&e$ #isbranded$ ad!lterated$ or !nregistered$; be ret!rned to the owner( Held: .ith the )tateJs obligation to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them (Article ..$ "ection 15$ 1/01 Constit!tion)$ in order to develop a healthy and alert citi-enry (Article <.H$ "ection 1/316)$ it became mandatory for the government to supervise and control the proliferation of drugs in the market. The constitutional mandate that =the )tate shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost= (Article <...$ "ection 11) cannot be neglected. This is why =the )tate shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system.= (Article <...$ "ection 12) The C,6@ is the government agency vested by law to make a mandatory and authoritative determination of the true therapeutic effect of drugs because it involves technical skill which is within its special competence. The health of the citi-enry should never be compromised. To the layman, medicine is a cure that may lead to better health. If the sei-ed 9$ bo"es of drugs are pharmaceutically correct but not properly documented, they should be promptly disposed of in the manner provided by law in order to ensure that the same do not fall into the wrong hands who might use the drugs underground. Private respondent cannot rely on the statement of the trial court that the applicant =failed to allege in the application for search warrant that the subject drugs for which she was applying for search warrant were either fake, misbranded, adulterated, or unregistered= in order to obtain the return of the drugs. The policy of the law enunciated in A.6. o. ;$<: is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed businessmen. ,oremost among these consumers is the government itself which procures medicines and distributes them to the local communities through direct assistance to the local health centers or through outreach and charity programs. #nly with the proper government sanctions can medicines and drugs circulate the market. .e cannot afford to take any risk, for the life and health of the citi-enry are as precious as the e"istence of the )tate. (/eople v. ?ud!e 4strella 8. 4strada, ;.( No. -$**)-, ?une $), $,,,, &pcl. $nd Div. .Enares-&antia!o01 +1. Do =egional 7rial Co!rts ha e co#petence to pass !pon the alidity or reg!larity of sei9!re and forfeit!re proceedings cond!cted by the 4!rea! of C!sto#s and to en%oin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings(

Held: In Eao . Co!rt of Appeals (2+/ "C=A 35$ +2C+3 31//56)$ this Court, reiterating its rulings " " " said4 There is no /uestion that Aegional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of sei-ure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Cureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in sei-ure and forfeiture proceedings has e*cl!si e %!risdiction to hear and determine all /uestions touching on the sei-ure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The Aegional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cogni-ance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. It is likewise well%settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and that of Aepublic 6ct o. 11$9, as amended, otherwise known as 06n 6ct Creating the Court of Ta" 6ppeals,1 specify the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the e"clusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Ta" 6ppeals and from there to the Court of 6ppeals. The rule that Aegional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government+s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and e"port duties due the )tate, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform. 2ven if the sei-ure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, " " " we have said that such act does not deprive the Cureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. Aespondents cite the statement of the Court of 6ppeals that regular courts still retain jurisdiction 0where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs jurisdiction through sei-ureOforfeiture proceedings.1 They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the /uestion of whether probable cause e"ists for the sei-ure of the subject sacks of rice is not for the Aegional Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before they may e"ercise the power to effect customs+ searches, sei-ures, or arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative hearings. 6s the Court held in Ponce -nrile . Hin!ya (31 "C=A 301$ 300C30/ 31/116$ reiterated in Eao . Co!rt of Appeals$ s!pra and )ison . Dati idad$ 213 "C=A 13+ 31//26)4 The governmental agency concerned, the Cureau of Customs, is vested with e"clusive authority. 2ven if it be assumed that in the e"ercise of such e"clusive competence a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final. 6n appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of Ta" 6ppeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate petition for review. 7he proper entilation of the legal iss!es raised is th!s indicated. Certainly a co!rt of first instance is not therein incl!ded. .t is de oid of %!risdiction. (Bureau of 'ustoms v. 2!ario, #$3 &'(A $%3, $3)-$3%, March #,, $,,,, $nd Div. .Mendo<a01 The Pri.!c- of Comm%nic!tion& !nd Corre&'ondence +2. Pri ate respondent =afael ". Grtane9 filed with the =egional 7rial Co!rt of O!e9on City a co#plaint for ann!l#ent of #arriage with da#ages against petitioner 7eresita "alcedoCGrtane9$ on gro!nds of lac& of #arriage license andKor psychological incapacity of the petitioner. A#ong the e*hibits offered by pri ate respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone con ersations between petitioner and !nidentified persons. 7he trial co!rt iss!ed the assailed order ad#itting all of the e idence offered by pri ate respondent$ incl!ding tape recordings of telephone con ersations of petitioner with !nidentified persons. 7hese tape recordings were #ade and obtained when pri ate respondent allowed his friends fro# the #ilitary to wire tap his ho#e telephone. Did the trial co!rt act properly when it ad#itted in e idence said tape recordings( Held: Aepublic 6ct o. D$<< entitled =6n 6ct to Prohibit and Penali-e .ire Tapping and #ther Aelated Hiolations of the Privacy of Communication, and ,or #ther Purposes= e"pressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. " " ". Clearly, respondent trial court and Court of 6ppeals failed to consider the afore%/uoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in /uestion. 6bsent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Aep. 6ct o. D$<<. 6dditionally, it should be mentioned that the above%mentioned Aepublic 6ct in )ection $ thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than si" >K? months and up to si" >K? years for violation of said 6ct. (&alcedo-2rtane< v. 'ourt of Appeals, $#= &'(A ---, Au!. *, -33* ./adilla01

The Ri,ht to Pri.!c-

)ection :. >1? The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable e"cept upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order re/uires otherwise as prescribed by law. 586 An- e.idence o/t!ined in .iol!tion of thi& or the 'recedin, &ection &h!ll /e in!dmi&&i/le for !n- '%r'o&e in !n- 'roceedin,&. A.6. D$<< >6nti%.iretapping 6ct? 1. The law does not distinguish between a party to the private communication or a third person. Fence, both a party and a third person could be held liable under A.6. D$<< if they commit any of the prohibited acts under A.6. D$<< >Aamire- v. Ca? $. The use of a telephone e"tension to overhear a private conversation is not a violation of A.6. D$<< because it is not similar to any of the prohibited devices under the law. 6lso, a telephone e"tension is not purposely installed for the purpose of secretly intercepting or recording private communication. >*aanan v. I6C, 1D9 )CA6 11$? T-'e& of comm%nic!tion 'rotected: !etters, messages, telephone calls, telegrams and the like. E"cl%&ion!r- r%le: 6ny evidence obtained shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Fowever, in the absence of governmental interference, the protection against unreasonable search and sei-ure cannot be e"tended to acts committed by private individuals. >People . )artin?
+3. .s there a constit!tional right to pri acy( Held: The essence of privacy is the 0right to be let alone.1 In the 1EK9 case of Briswold . Connectic!t (301 ?.". +1/$ 1+ l. ed. 2D 512 31/656)$ the 8nited )tates )upreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of the ,irst, Third, ,ourth, ,ifth and inth 6mendments. In the 1EK; case of )orfe . )!t!c (22 "C=A +2+$ +++C++5)$ we adopted the Briswold ruling that there is a constit!tional right to pri acy. The )C clarified that the right of privacy is recogni-ed and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is e"pressly recogni-ed in )ection :>1? of the Cill of Aights. #ther facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Cill of Aights, i.e.$ )ecs. 1, $, K, ;, and 1L. (2ple v. 8orres, ;.(. No. -$+)%=, ?uly $#, -33% ./uno01 ++. .dentify the 9ones of pri acy recogni9ed and protected in o!r laws. Held: The Ci il Code provides that 0'e(very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons1 and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recogni-es the privacy of letters and other private communications. The =e ised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the 6nti%.iretapping !aw >A.6. D$<<?, the )ecrecy of Cank @eposits >A.6. 1D<9? and the Intellectual Property Code >A.6. ;$E:?. The =!les of Co!rt on privileged communication likewise recogni-e the privacy of certain information ("ection 2+$ =!le 1323c6$ =e ised =!les on - idence). (2ple v. 8orres, ;.(. No. -$+)%=, ?uly $#, -33% ./uno01 +5. Disc!ss why Ad#inistrati e Grder Do. 320 (iss!ed by the President prescribing for a Dational .D syste# for all citi9ens to facilitate b!siness transactions with go ern#ent agencies engaged in the deli ery of basic ser ices and social sec!rity pro isions) sho!ld be declared !nconstit!tional. Held: .e prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that 6.#. o. :<; is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. 6.#. o. :<; is predicated on two considerations4 >1? the need to provide our citi-ens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and >$? the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of 6.#. o. :<;. 4!t what is not

arg!able is the broadness$ the ag!eness$ the o erbreadth of A.G. Do. 320 which if i#ple#ented will p!t o!r people's right to pri acy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.G. Do. 320 lies in its )ection D which provides for a Population Aeference umber >PA ? as a 0common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies1 through the use of 0Ciometrics Technology1 and 0computer application designs.1 .t is noteworthy that A.G. Do. 320 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what partic!lar bio#etrics technology shall be !sed to identify people who will see& its co erage. Considering the ban8!et of options a ailable to the i#ple#entors of A.G. Do. 320$ the fear that it threatens the right to pri acy of o!r people is not gro!ndless. A.G. Do. 320 sho!ld also raise o!r antennas for a f!rther loo& will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is li#ited to biological infor#ation alone for identification p!rposes. < * *. Clearly$ the indefiniteness of A.G. Do. 320 can gi e the go ern#ent the ro ing a!thority to store and retrie e infor#ation for a p!rpose other than the identification of the indi id!al thro!gh his P=D. 7he potential for #is!se of the data to be gathered !nder A.G. Do. 320 cannot be !nderplayed * * *. 7he #ore fre8!ent the !se of the P=D$ the better the chance of b!ilding a h!ge and for#idable infor#ation base thro!gh the electronic lin&age of the files. 7he data #ay be gathered for gainf!l and !sef!l go ern#ent p!rposesJ b!t the e*istence of this ast reser oir of personal infor#ation constit!tes a co ert in itation to #is!se$ a te#ptation that #ay be too great for so#e of o!r a!thorities to resist. It is plain and we hold that 6.#. o. :<; falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for une/uivocally specified p!rposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of 6.#. o. :<; may interfere with the individual+s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement3 it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self%incrimination3 it may pave the way for 0fishing e"peditions1 by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and sei-ures. 7he possibilities of ab!se and #is!se of the P=D$ bio#etrics and co#p!ter technology are accent!ated when we consider that the indi id!al lac&s control o er what can be read or placed on his .D$ #!ch less erify the correctness of the data encoded. 7hey threaten the ery ab!ses that the 4ill of =ights see&s to pre ent. The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradleCtoCgra e dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. & " ". Aetrieval of stored data is simple. .hen information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be e"tracted together with other data on the subject. #nce e"tracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins. 'T(he Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people+s liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them. 3A6nd we now hold that when the integrity of a f!nda#ental right is at sta&e$ this Co!rt will gi e the challenged law$ ad#inistrati e order$ r!le or reg!lation a stricter scr!tiny. .t will not do for the a!thorities to in o&e the pres!#ption of reg!larity in the perfor#ance of official d!ties. Dor is it eno!gh for the a!thorities to pro e that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be di#inished$ if not defeated$ e en when the go ern#ent does not act irrationally. 7hey #!st satisfactorily show the presence of co#pelling state interest and that the law$ r!le$ or reg!lation is narrowly drawn to precl!de ab!ses. This approach is demanded by the 1E;L Constitution whose entire matri" is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitution. 7he right to pri acy is one of the #ost threatened rights of #an li ing in a #ass society. The threats emanate from various sources G governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the e"ecutive branch of government which by issuing 6.#. o. :<; pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the prete"t that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Bi en the recordC&eeping power of the co#p!ter$ only the indifferent will fail to percei e the danger that A.G. Do. 320 gi es the go ern#ent the power to co#pile a de astating dossier against !ns!specting citi9ens. & " " '.(e close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery. (2ple v. 8orres, ;.(. No. -$+)%=, ?uly $#, -33% ./uno01 +6. "ho!ld in ca#era inspection of ban& acco!nts be allowed( .f in the affir#ati e$ !nder what circ!#stances sho!ld it be allowed( Held: The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents re/uested by the #mbudsman. 6nd whether the order of the #mbudsman to have an in ca#era inspection of the /uestioned account is allowed as an e"ception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits >A.6. o. 1D<9?.

6n e"amination of the secrecy of bank deposits law >A.6. o. 1D<9? would reveal the following e"ceptions4 1? $? :? D? 9? .here the depositor consents in writing3 Impeachment cases3 Cy court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials3 @eposit is subject of litigation3 )ec. ;, A.6. o. :<1E, in cases of une"plained wealth as held in the case of PD4 . Bancayco (122 Phil. 523$ 520 31/656).

The order of the #mbudsman to produce for in ca#era inspection the subject accounts with the 8nion Cank of the Philippines, Bulia Hargas Cranch, is based on a pending investigation at the #ffice of the #mbudsman against 6mado !agdameo, et. al. for violation of A.6. o. :<1E, )ec. : >e? and >g? relative to the Boint Henture 6greement between the Public 2states 6uthority and 656AI. .e rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. ,urther, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. In ?nion 4an& of the Philippines . Co!rt of Appeals , we held that 0)ection $ of the !aw on )ecrecy of Cank @eposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be Qabsolutely confidential+ e"cept4 1? In an e"amination made in the course of a special or general e"amination of a bank that is specifically authori-ed by the 5onetary Coard after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity, $? In an e"amination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the e"amination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the e"clusive use of the bank, :? 8pon written permission of the depositor, D? In cases of impeachment, 9? 8pon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or K? In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation1. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. .hat is e"isting is an investigation by the #ffice of the #mbudsman. In short, what the #ffice of the #mbudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge 6mado !agdameo, et. al.$ with the )andiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection. Rones of privacy are recogni-ed and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that 0'e(very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons1 and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recogni-es the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Aevised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the anti%.iretapping !aw $ the "ecrecy of 4an& Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code . (@ourdes 8. Marque< v. :on. Aniano A. Desierto, ;.(. No. -#=%%$, ?une $+, $,,-, 4n Banc ./ardo01 Freedom of E"'re&&ion

Section 9. No l!w &h!ll /e '!&&ed !/rid,in, the freedom of &'eech1 of e"'re&&ion1 or of the 're&&1 or of the ri,ht of the 'eo'le 'e!ce!/l- to !&&em/le !nd 'etition the ,o.ernment for redre&& of ,rie.!nce&. Wh!t !re con&idered 'rotected &'eech: Protected speech includes every form of e"pression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorded. It includes motion pictures as well as what is known as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an armband as a symbol of protest. Peaceful picketing has also been included within the meaning of speech.
(rohibitions under -ection <

1. Prohibition against PAI#A A2)TA6I T $. Prohibition against )8C)2M82 T P8 I)F52 T

(rohibition against prior restraint

1. Prior restraint means official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of e"pression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. $. 2"amplesOforms of prior restraint a. movie censorship b. judicial prior restraint P injunction against publication c. license ta"es based on gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in the business of advertising in any newspaper d. flat license fees for the privilege of selling religious books
When prohibition does not apply

a. @uring a war. 2". *overnment can prevent publication about the numberOlocations of its troops > ear v. 5innesota, $:; 8) KEL? b. #bscene publications.
-tandards for allowable subse uent punishment

T2)T -. Dan!erous 8endency 8est $. Clear and Present @anger Test

CAIT2AI# 8here should be a (A8"2NA@ '2NN4'8"2N between the speech and the evil apprehended. There should be a clear and present danger that the words when used under such circumstances are of such a nature as to create a C!26A 6 @ PA2)2 T @6 *2A that they will bring about the substantive evils that the )tate has a right to prevent. The courts should C6!6 C2 the P8C!IC I T2A2)T served by legislation on one hand and the ,A22@#5 #, )P22CF >or any other constitutional right? on the other. The courts will then decide where the greater weight should be placed. 3reedom of Speech

:. Calancing of Interests Test

The do!trine on reedom o s$ee!h was ormulated $rimarily or the $rote!tion o D!oreE s$ee!h, i)e) s$ee!h whi!h !ommuni!ates $oliti!al, so!ial or religious ideas) These en(oy the same degree o $rote!tion) Commer!ial s$ee!h, however, does not) Commerci!l S'eech 1. 6 communication which no more than proposes a commercial transaction. $. To enjoy protection4 a. It must not be false or misleading3 and b. It should not propose an illegal transaction. :. 2ven truthful and lawful commercial speech may be regulated if4 a. *overnment has a substantial interest to protect3 b. The regulation directly advances that interest3 and c. It is not more e"tensive than is necessary to protect that interest. > Central L!dson Bas and -lectric Corp. . P!blic "er ice Co##ission of DI$ DDL 8) 99L? 4nprotected Speech :. LI#EL

6. >A.= CG))-D7 (?.". =!le). These are statements of #PI I# , not of fact, and are not considered actionable, even if the words used are neither mild nor temperate. .hat is important is that the opinion is the true and honest opinion of the person. The statements are not used to attack personalities but to give one+s opinion on decisions and actions. C. GP.D.GD". .ith respect to public personalities >politicians, actors, anyone with a connection to a newsworthy event?, opinions can be aired regarding their public actuations. Comment on their private lives, if not germane to their public personae, are not protected. 8. O#SCENIT4 6. 7est for obscenity >5iller v. California? i. .hether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. ii. .hether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, se"ual conduct, specifically defined by law. iii. .hether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 4. Proced!re for sei9!re of allegedly obscene p!blications i. 6uthorities must apply for issuance of search warrant. ii. Court must be convinced that the materials are obscene. 6pply clear and present danger test. iii. Budge will determine whether they are in fact 0obscene1. iv. Budge will issue a search warrant. v. Proper action should be filed under 6rt. $<1 of the APC. vi. Conviction is subject to appeal. +i'ht of ssem&l$ and Petition

:. The &t!nd!rd& for !llow!/le im'!irment of &'eech !nd 're&& !l&o !''l- to the ri,ht of !&&em/l!nd 'etition.
$. Aules on assembly in public places4 i. ii. 6pplicant should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when the assembly will take place. The application should be filed ahead of time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there are valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant, but in another public place. The grant or refusal should be based on the application of the Clear and Present @anger Test. If the public authority is of the view that there is an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. The decision of the public authority, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to the applicants at the earliest opportunity so that they may, if they so desire, have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

iii. iv.

:. Aules on assembly in private properties4 #nly the consent of the owner of the property or person entitled to possession thereof is re/uired.
+1. Disting!ish :contentCbased restrictions; on free speech fro# :contentCne!tral restrictions$; and gi e e*a#ple of each. Held: ContentCbased restrictions are imposed because of the content of the speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear%and%present danger test. ,or e"ample, a rule such as that involved in "anidad . Co#elec (101 "C=A 52/ 31//26)$ prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.

ContentCne!tral restrictions, on the other hand, like )ec. 11>b? of A.6. o. KKDK, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates during the campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. 6 deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear%and%present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws, like )ec. 11>b? of A.6. o. KKDK, which are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear%and%present danger test to such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed. The test for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content%based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. o such reasons underlie content%neutral regulations, like regulation of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under C.P. Clg. ;;<, the Public 6ssembly 6ct of 1E;9. (2smena v. '2M4@4', $%% &'(A **+, March #-, -33% .Mendo<a01 +0. Does the cond!ct of e*it poll by A4" C4D present a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process as it has the tendency to sow conf!sion considering the rando#ness of selecting inter iewees$ which f!rther #a&es the e*it poll highly !nreliable$ to %!stify the pro#!lgation of a Co#elec resol!tion prohibiting the sa#e( Held: )uch arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. >irst$ by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. "econd$ the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. >inally$ not at stake are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are e"ercises that are separate and independent from the e"it polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of e"it polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other. The C#52!2C+s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of e"it polls G disorder and confusion in the voting centers G does not justify a total ban on them. 8ndoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Aesolution is too broad, since its application is without /ualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. There is no showing, however, that e"it polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. either has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of e"it poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. 5oreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of e"it poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters+ answers to the survey /uestions will forever remain unknown and une"plored. 8nless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election%day and other factors on voters+ choices. The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through e"it polling. #n the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or minimi-ing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by e"it surveys. .ith foregoing premises, it is concluded that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Muite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, e"it polls G properly conducted and publici-ed G can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections3 and for the elimination of election%fi"ing, fraud and other electoral ills. (AB&-'BN Broadcastin! 'orporation v. '2M4@4', ;.(. No. -##*%), ?an. $%, $,,,, 4n Banc ./an!aniban01 +/. "ection 5.+ of =.A. Do. /226 (>air -lection Act) which pro idesF :"!r eys affecting national candidates shall not be p!blished fifteen (15) days before an election and s!r eys affecting local candidates shall not be p!blished se en (1) days before an election.; 7he "ocial ,eather "tations$ .nc. (",")$ a pri ate nonCstoc&$ nonCprofit social research instit!tion cond!cting s!r eys in ario!s fieldsJ and Pa#ahalan P!blishing Corporation$ p!blisher of the )anila "tandard$ a newspaper of general circ!lation$ which feat!res newsworthy ite#s of infor#ation incl!ding election s!r eys$ challenged the constit!tionality of aforesaid pro ision as it constit!tes a prior restraint on the e*ercise of freedo# of speech witho!t any clear and present danger to %!stify s!ch restraint. "ho!ld the challenge be s!stained( Held: ,or reason hereunder given, we hold that )ection 9.D of A.6. o. E<<K constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, e"pression, and the press. To be sure, )ection 9.D lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, e"pression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen >19? days immediately preceding a national election and seven >L? days before a local election. Cecause of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, e"pression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity . Indeed, 0any

system of prior restraints of e"pression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity " " ". The *overnment Qthus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.+1 There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation. or may it be argued that because of 6rt. I&%C, )ec. D of the Constitution, which gives the Comelec supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utili-ation of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like )ec. 9.D. ,or as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the Comelec under 6rt. I&%C, )ec. D is limited to ensuring 0e/ual opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply1 as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for 0public information campaigns and forums among candidates.1 &"" or can the ban on election surveys be justified on the ground that there are other countries " " " which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of election surveys. 6t best this survey is inconclusive. It is noteworthy that in the 8nited )tates no restriction on the publication of election survey results e"ists. It cannot be argued that this is because the 8nited )tates is a mature democracy. either are there laws imposing an embargo on survey results, even for a limited period, in other countries. & " ". .hat test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of )ection 9.D7 The 8nited )tates )upreme Court " " " held in ?nited "tates . G' 4rienF '6( government regulation is sufficiently justified >1? if it is within the constitutional power of the government3 >$? if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest3 >:? if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free e"pression3 and >D? if the incidental restriction on alleged ,irst 6mendment freedoms >of speech, e"pression and press? is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest (3/1 ?.". 361$ 22 L. -d. 2d 6/2$ 602 31/606 3brac&eted n!#bers added6). This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content%based from content%neutral regulations and is said to have 0become canonical in the review of such laws.1 It is noteworthy that the G' 4rien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases (Adiong . Co#elec$ 221 "C=A 112 31//26J Gs#ena . Co#elec$ s!pra.). 8nder this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is 0not unrelated to the suppression of free e"pression.1 5oreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of e"pression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in /uestion. #ur in/uiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to )ec. 9.D. >irst. )ec. 9.D fails to meet criterion >:? of the G' 4rien test because the causal connection of e"pression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest 0not unrelated to the suppression of free e"pression.1 Cy prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, )ec. 9.D actually suppresses a whole class of e"pression, while allowing the e"pression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TH commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect, )ec. 9.D shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of e"pression means that 0the government has no power to restrict e"pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its contents.1 The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the e"pression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplins&y . Dew La#pshire (315 ?.". 560$ 511C512$ 06 L. -d. 1231$ 1235 31/+26)$ thus4 There are certain well%defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or Qfighting+ words G those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. ')(uch utterances are no essential part of any e"position of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. or is there justification for the prior restraint which )ec. 9.D lays on protected speech. In Dear . )innesota (203 ?.". 6/1$ 115C116$ 15 l. -d. 1351$ 1361 31/316)$ it was held4 'T(he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. Cut the limitation has been recogni-ed only in e"ceptional cases " " ". o one would /uestion but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops. #n similar grounds, the primary re/uirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government " " ".

Thus, " " " the prohibition imposed by )ec. 9.D cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of e"pression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen >19? days immediately before a national election and seven >L? days immediately before a local election. This sufficiently distinguishes )ec. 9.D from A.6. o. KKDK, )ec. 11>b?, which this Court found to be valid in Dational Press Cl!b . Co#elec (s!pra.)$ and Gs#ena . Co#elec (s!pra.). ,or the ban imposed by A.6. o. KKDK, )ec. 11>b? is not only authori-ed by a specific constitutional provision (Art. .<CC$ "ec. +)$ but it also provided an alternative so that, as this Court pointed out in Gs#ena$ there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media advertisements by the Comelec space, and Comelec hour. "econd. 2ven if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free e"pression is only incidental, )ec. 9.D nonetheless fails to meet criterion >D? of the G' 4rien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. 6s already stated, )ec. 9.D. aims at the prevention of last%minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, 0junking1 of weak or 0losing1 candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called 0dagdag%bawas.1 Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of e"pression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts$ rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. Thus, under the 6dministrative Code of 1E;L (4&. H$ 7it. .$ "!btit. C$ Ch 1$ "ec. 3316)$ the Comelec is given the power4 To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any !nlawf!l$ libelous, #isleading or false election propaganda$ after due notice and hearing. This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in )ec. 9.D. Pursuant to this power of the Comelec, it can confiscate bogus survey results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted. o right of reply can be invoked by others. o principle of e/uality is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate brings his ideas. 6s for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the *overnment can deal with this natural% enough tendency of some voters. )ome voters want to be identified with the 0winners.1 )ome are susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of survey results which are a form of e"pression7 It has been held that 0'mere( legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the e"ercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.1 To summari-e then, we hold that )ec. 9.D. is invalid because >1? it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of e"pression, >$? it is a direct and total suppression of a category of e"pression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and >:? the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of e"pression. (&ocial 5eather &tations, "nc., v. '2M4@4', ;.(. No. -*+=+-, May =, $,,-, 4n Banc .Mendo<a01 52. Disc!ss the @doctrine of fair co##ent@ as a alid defense in an action for libel or slander. Held: ,air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an e"pression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. (Bor9al v. 'A, #,&'(A -, ?an. -*, -333, $nd Div. .Bellosillo01 51. ,hat is the :raison d'etre; for the Dew Ior& 7i#es . "!lli an (316 ?" 25+) holding that honest criticis#s on the cond!ct of p!blic officials and p!blic fig!res are ins!lated fro# libel %!dg#ents( Held: The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e.$ with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The raison d'etre for the Dew Ior& 7i#es doctrine was that to re/uire critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self%censorship, since would%be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the e"pense of having to prove it. (Bor9al v. 'A, #,- &'(A -, ?an. -*, -333, $nd Div. .Bellosillo01 52. ,ho is a :p!blic fig!re$; and therefore s!b%ect to p!blic co##ent(

Held: '.(e deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the Dew Ior& 7i#es ruling. 6t any rate, we have also defined 0public figure1 in Ayers Prod!ction Pty.$ Ltd. . Cap!long (B.=. Dos. 02302 and 023/0$ 2/ April 1/00$ 162 "C=A 061) as G & " " a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a Qpublic personage.+ Fe is, in other words, a celebrity. #bviously, to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and e"plorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the *reat 2"alted Auler of the lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person. The , C!T >,irst ational Conference on !and Transportation? was an undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the government and the private sector, and organi-ed by top government officials and prominent businessmen. ,or this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. 6s its 2"ecutive @irector and spokesman, private respondent conse/uently assumed the status of a public figure. Cut even assuming e*Cgratia arg!#enti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the , C!T, would not /ualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public+s primary interest is in the event3 the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant+s prior anonymity or notoriety. (Bor9al v. 'A, #,- &'(A -, ?an. -*, -333, $nd Div. .Bellosillo01 53. 7he Gffice of the )ayor of Las Pinas ref!sed to iss!e per#it to petitioners to hold rally a rally in front of the E!stice Lall of Las Pinas on the gro!nd that it was prohibited !nder "!pre#e Co!rt -n 4anc =esol!tion dated E!ly 1$1//0 in A.). Do. /0C 1C22C"C$ entitled$ @=eF B!idelines on the Cond!ct of De#onstrations$ Pic&ets$ =allies and Gther "i#ilar Batherings in the Hicinity of the "!pre#e Co!rt and All Gther Co!rts.@ Petitioners th!s initiated the instant proceedings. 7hey s!b#it that the "!pre#e Co!rt gra ely ab!sed its discretion andKor acted witho!t or in e*cess of %!risdiction in pro#!lgating those g!idelines. Held: .e shall first dwell on the critical argument made by petitioners that the rules constitute an abridgment of the peopleJs aggregate rights of free speech, free e"pression, peaceful assembly and petitioning government for redress of grievances citing )ec. D, 6rticle III of the 1E;L Constitution that =no law shall be passed abridging= them. It is true that the safeguarding of the peopleJs freedom of e"pression to the end that individuals may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods may be e"posed through the processes of education and discussion, is essential to free government. Cut freedom of speech and e"pression despite its indispensability has its limitations. It has never been understood as the absolute right to speak whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, for the manner, place, and time of public discussion can be constitutionally controlled. 'T(he better policy is not liberty untamed but liberty regulated by law where every freedom is e"ercised in accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others . Conventional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a comple" society preclude an absolutist interpretation of freedom of e"pression where it does not involve pure speech but speech plus physical actions like picketing. There are other significant societal values that must be accommodated and when they clash, they must all be weighed with the promotion of the general welfare of the people as the ultimate objective. In balancing these values, this Court has accorded freedom of e"pression a preferred position in light of its more comparative importance. Fence, our rulings now musty in years hold that only the narrowest time, place and manner regulations that are specifically tailored to serve an important governmental interest may justify the application of the balancing of interests test in derogation of the peopleJs right of free speech and e"pression . .here said regulations do not aim particularly at the evils within the allowable areas of state control but, on the contrary, sweep within their ambit other activities as to operate as an overhanging threat to free discussion, or where upon their face they are so vague, indefinite, or ine"act as to permit punishment of the fair use of the right of free speech, such regulations are void. Prescinding from this premise, the Court reiterates that judicial independence and the fair and orderly administration of justice constitute paramount governmental interests that can justify the regulation of the publicJs right of free speech and peaceful assembly in the vicinity of courthouses. In the case of .n =eF -#il P. E!rado, the Court pronounced in no uncertain terms that4 =" " " freedom of e"pression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the re/uirements of e/ually important public interests. #ne of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free e"pression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. ,or the protection and maintenance of freedom of e"pression itself can be secured only within the conte"t of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the conte"t, in other words, of viable

independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. " " "= (.n =eF -#il P. E!rado$ 2+3 "C=A 2//$ 323C32+ 31//56) It is sadly observed that judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice have been threatened not only by contemptuous acts inside, but also by irascible demonstrations outside, the courthouses. They wittingly or unwittingly, spoil the ideal of sober, non%partisan proceedings before a cold and neutral judge. 2ven in the 8nited )tates, a prohibition against picketing and demonstrating in or near courthouses, has been ruled as valid and constitutional notwithstanding its limiting effect on the e"ercise by the public of their liberties. & " " The administration of justice must not only be fair but must also appear to be fair and it is the duty of this Court to eliminate everything that will diminish if not destroy this judicial desideratum. To be sure, there will be grievances against our justice system for there can be no perfect system of justice but these grievances must be ventilated through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings. )uch a mode is in keeping with the respect due to the courts as vessels of justice and is necessary if judges are to dispose their business in a fair fashion. It is the traditional conviction of every civili-ed society that courts must be insulated from every e"traneous influence in their decisions . The facts of a case should be determined upon evidence produced in court, and should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. ("n (eF /etition to Annul 4n Banc (esolution A.M. 3%-+,$-&' - (icardo '. almonte and 7nion of @awyers and Advocates for 8ransparency in ;overnment .7@A80, ;.(. No. -#*)$-, &ept. $3, -33%1 5+. Did the "!pre#e Co!rt co##it an act of %!dicial legislation in pro#!lgating -n 4anc =esol!tion A.). /0C1C22C"C$ entitled$ @=eF B!idelines on the Cond!ct of De#onstrations$ Pic&ets$ =allies and Gther "i#ilar Batherings in the Hicinity of the "!pre#e Co!rt and All Gther Co!rts(@ Held: Petitioners also claim that this Court committed an act of judicial legislation in promulgating the assailed resolution. They charge that this Court amended provisions of Catas Pambansa >C.P.? Clg. ;;<, otherwise known as =the Public 6ssembly 6ct,= by converting the sidewalks and streets within a radius of two hundred >$<<? meters from every courthouse from a public forum place into a =no rally= -one. Thus, they accuse this Court of " " " violating the principle of separation of powers. .e reject these low watts arguments. Public places historically associated with the free e"ercise of e"pressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, witho!t #ore, to be public fora. In other words, it is not any law that can imbue such places with the public nature inherent in them. Cut even in such public fora, it is settled jurisprudence that the government may restrict speech plus activities and enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are content%neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Contrary therefore to petitioners+ impression, C.P. Clg. ;;< did not establish streets and sidewalks, among other places, as public fora. 6 close look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Thus, it re/uires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places subject, even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or sound system and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly. The e"istence of C.P. Clg. ;;<, however, does not preclude this Court from promulgating rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution. To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from public hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions within a $<<%meter radius from every courthouse. In fine, C.P. Clg. ;;< imposes general restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions. #n the other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory measures. )imply put, C.P. Clg. ;;< and the assailed resolution complement each other. .e so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an apparent conflict between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmoni-ed and both should be given effect if possible . ("n (eF /etition to Annul 4n Banc (esolution A.M. 3%-+-,$-&' - (icardo '. almonte and 7nion of @awyers and Advocates for 8ransparency in ;overnment .7@A80, ;.(. No. -#*)$-, &ept. $3, -33%1 55. "ho!ld li e #edia co erage of co!rt proceedings be allowed( Held: The propriety of granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings involves weighing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of justice. Collaterally, it also raises issues on the nature of the media, particularly television and its role in society, and of the impact of new technologies on law. The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom. )imilarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the /uestion s/uarely.

.hile we take notice of the )eptember 1EE< report of the 8nited )tates Budicial Conference 6d Foc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the ,ederal Courts of the 8nited )tates prohibits the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Aule 9: of the ,ederal Aules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. 6 trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious /uest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom . In -stes . 7e*as (301 ?.". 532)$ the 8nited )tates )upreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of a criminal defendant. Hoting 9%D, the Court through 5r. Bustice Clark, identified four >D? areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated4 =2"perience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. .itnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to e"traordinary out%of%court influences which might affect their testimony. 6lso, telecasting not only increases the trial judgeJs responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant3 it may as well affect his own performance. Budges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. ,or the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to e"cessive public e"posure and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense. =The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public.= Aepresentatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporterJs constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. 5assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the re/uirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom. Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendantJs right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Hideo footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. o video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper. (&upreme 'ourt 4n Banc (esolution (eF @ive 8 and (adio 'overa!e of the :earin! of /resident 'ora<on '. AquinoGs @ibel 'ase, dated 2ct. $$, -33-1 56. "ho!ld the Co!rt allow li e #edia co erage of the anticipated trial of the pl!nder and other cri#inal cases filed against for#er President Eoseph -. -strada before the "andiganbayan in order :to ass!re the p!blic of f!ll transparency in the proceedings of an !nprecedented case in o!r history; as re8!ested by the Papisanan ng #ga 4rod&aster ng Pilipinas( Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. .hen these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. .ith the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. @ue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public+s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. .itnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that 0television can work profound changes in the

behavior of the people it focuses on.1 2ven while it may be difficult to /uantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create . The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far%fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now. 6n accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. 6 public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. 6 public trial is not synonymous with publici-ed trial3 it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. The courts recogni-e the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media+s e"alted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in ac/uainting the public with the judicial process in action3 nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Bustice Clark thusly pronounced, 0while a ma"imum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its e"ercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absol!te fairness in the judicial process.1 &"" The Integrated Car of the Philippines " " " e"pressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of 5r. 2strada3 to paraphrase4 !ive television and radio coverage can negate the rule on e"clusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial3 at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the 0hooting throng1 to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular3 and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. &"" 8nlike other government offices, courts do not e"press the popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. 6 trial is not a free trade of ideas. or is a competing market of thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom. ((eF (equest (adio-8 covera!e of the 8rial in the &andi!anbayan of the /lunder 'ases a!ainst the former /resident ?oseph 4. 4strada, A.M. No. ,--*-,#-&', ?une $3, $,,-, 4n Banc . itu!01

The Ri,ht of the Peo'le to Inform!tion on 3!tter& of P%/lic Concern 51. Disc!ss the scope of the right to infor#ation on #atters of p!blic concern. Held: In Hal#onte . 4el#onte$ Er.$ the Court emphasi-ed that the information sought must be 0matters of public concern,1 access to which may be limited by law. )imilarly, the state policy of full public disclosure e"tends only to 0transactions involving public interest1 and may also be 0subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.1 6s to the meanings of the terms 0public interest1 and 0public concern,1 the Court, in Legaspi . Ci il "er ice Co##ission$ elucidated4 0In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. QPublic concern+ like Qpublic interest+ is a term that eludes e"act definition. Coth terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citi-en. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to

determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.1 Considered a public concern in the above%mentioned case was the 0legitimate concern of citi-ens to ensure that government positions re/uiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.1 )o was the need to give the general public ade/uate notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citi-ens, as held in 7anada. !ikewise did the 0public nature of the loanable funds of the *)I) and the public office held by the alleged borrowers >members of the defunct Catasang Pambansa?1 /ualify the information sought in Hal#onte as matters of public interest and concern. In A8!inoC"ar#iento . )orato (223 "C=A 515$ 522C23$ Do e#ber 13$ 1//1)$ the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions are public in character3 hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to p!blic records. 8nder Aepublic 6ct o. KL1:, public officials and employees are mandated to 0provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, 'and( ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearing whenever appropriate " " ",1 e"cept when 0otherwise provided by law or when re/uired by the public interest.1 In particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of government and government%owned or controlled corporations3 and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees. In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants . 8ndeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free% flow of thought3 but thoughts and ideas must be well%informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to critici-e as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited e"change of ideas among a well%informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people . ('have< v. /';;, $33 &'(A +**, Dec. 3, -33%, ./an!aniban01 50. ,hat are so#e of the recogni9ed restrictions to the right of the people to infor#ation on #atters of p!blic concern( Held: ational security matters and intelligence information. This jurisdiction recogni-es the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. !ikewise, information on inter%government e"changes prior to the conclusion of treaties and e"ecutive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest3 $? Trade or industrial secrets >pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 'A.6. o. ;$E:, approved on Bune K, 1EEL( and other related laws? and banking transactions >pursuant to the )ecrecy of Cank @eposits 6ct 'A.6. o. 1D<9, as amended(?3 :? Criminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not in/uire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution3 D? #ther confidential information. The 2thical )tandards 6ct >A.6. o. KL1:, enacted on ,ebruary $<, 1E;E? further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging 0confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public.1 >)ec. L'c(, ibid.? #ther acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and e"ecutive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the )upreme Court. ('have< v. /';;, $33 &'(A +**, Dec. 3, -33% ./an!aniban01 5/. .s the alleged illCgotten wealth of the )arcoses a #atter of p!blic concern s!b%ect to this right( Held: .ith such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the 5arcosesJ alleged ill%gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest . .e may also add that 0ill%gotten wealth1 refers to assets and properties purportedly ac/uired, directly or indirectly, by former President 5arcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties3 or their having taken undue advantage of their public office3 or their use of powers, influences or relationships, 0resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the ,ilipino people and the Aepublic of the Philippines.1 Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. 6s such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. 6nother declared overriding consideration for the e"peditious recovery of ill%gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery. 1?

.e believe the foregoing dis/uisition settles the /uestion of whether petitioner has a right to respondentsJ disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the 5arcoses+ purported ill%gotten wealth. ('have< v. /';;, $33 &'(A +**, Dec. 3, -33% ./an!aniban01 Freedom of A&&oci!tion 62. Does the right of ci il ser ants to organi9e incl!de their right to stri&e( Clarify. Held: )pecifically, the right of civil servants to organi-e themselves was positively recogni-ed in Association of Co!rt of Appeals -#ployees (ACA-) . >errerCCalle%a (223 "C=A 5/6$ Do e#ber 15$ 1//1). Cut, as in the e"ercise of the rights of free e"pression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purposes of the association $ the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions (People . >errer$ +0 "C=A 302$ Dece#ber 21$ 1/12$ per Castro$ E.$ where the Co!rt$ while !pholding the alidity of the AntiC"!b ersion Act which o!tlawed the Co##!nist Party of the Philippines and other @s!b ersi e@ organi9ations$ clarified$ @,hate er interest in freedo# of speech and freedo# of association is infringed by the prohibition against &nowing #e#bership in the Co##!nist Party of the Philippines$ is so indirect and so ins!bstantial as to be clearly and hea ily o!tweighed by the o erriding considerations of national sec!rity and the preser ation of de#ocratic instit!tions in this co!ntry.@ .t ca!tioned$ tho!gh$ that @the need for pr!dence and circ!#spection 3cannot be o ere#phasi9ed6 in 3the lawQs6 enforce#ent$ operating as it does in the sensiti e area of freedo# of e*pression and belief.@) 6s regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself /ualifies its e"ercise with the proviso =in accordance with law.= This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. 2"ecutive #rder o. 1;< (.ss!ed by for#er President Cora9on C. A8!ino on E!ne 1$ 1/01) which provides guidelines for the e"ercise of the right of government workers to organi-e, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier C)C circular which =enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service= (C"C )e#orand!# Circ!lar Do. 6$ s. 1/01$ dated April 21$ 1/01) by stating that the Civil )ervice law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed. It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike. Alliance of Concerned Bo ern#ent ,or&ers . )inister of Labor and -#ploy#ent (12+ "C=A 1$ A!g!st 3$ 1/03$ also per B!tierre9$ Er.$ E.) rationali-ed the proscription thus4 =The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the Jterms and conditions of employment in the *overnment, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law.J & " ". )ince the terms and conditions of government employment are fi*ed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Aelations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. )ubject to the minimum re/uirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unioni-ed private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fi" the terms and conditions of employment. 6nd this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.= (.bid.$ p. 13) 6fter delving into the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the Court affirmed the above rule in "ocial "ec!rity "yste# -#ployees Association ("""-A) . Co!rt of Appeals (115 "C=A 606$ E!ly 20$ 1/0/) and e"plained4 =*overnment employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fi"ed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public )ector !abor%5anagement Council for appropriate action. Cut employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the *overnment to accede to their demands. 6s now provided under )ec. D, Aule III of the Aules and Aegulations to *overn the 2"ercise of the Aight of *overnment 2mployees to )elf%#rgani-ation, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, J't(he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government%owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes 'thereto(.JJ (.bid.$ p. 6/0) (?acinto v. 'ourt of Appeals, $%- &'(A )=+, Nov. -*, -33+, 4n Banc ./an!aniban01 61. Petitioners p!blic school teachers wal&ed o!t of their classes and engaged in #ass actions d!ring certain dates in "epte#ber 1//2 protesting the alleged !nlawf!l withholding of their salaries and other econo#ic benefits. 7hey also raised national iss!es$ s!ch as the re#o al of ?" bases and the rep!diation of foreign debts$ in their #ass actions. 7hey ref!sed to ret!rn to wor& despite orders to do so and s!bse8!ently were fo!nd g!ilty of cond!ct pre%!dicial to the best interests of the ser ice for

ha ing absented the#sel es witho!t proper a!thority$ fro# their schools d!ring reg!lar school days$ and penali9ed. 7hey denied that they engaged in :stri&e; b!t clai#ed that they #erely e*ercised a constit!tionally g!aranteed right R the right to peaceably asse#ble and petition the go ern#ent for redress of grie ances C and$ therefore$ sho!ld not ha e been penali9ed. "ho!ld their contention be !pheld( Held: Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees, do not seek to establish that they have a right to strike. Aather, they tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in )eptember 1EE< were a valid e"ercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their gathering was not a strike, therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense. )P"7A . Lag!io ("!pra$ per Dar asa$ E.$ now CE.) and AC7 . Carino (.bid.), in which this Court declared that =these Jmass actionsJ were to all intents and purposes a strike3 they constituted a concerted and unauthori-ed stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachersJ duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons,= should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical. "tri&e, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work done by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 6 labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment3 or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fi"ing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the pro"imate relation of employers and employees . .ith these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition. It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non%holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities % essentially, their =employers= % to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially " " ". 6nd probably to clothe their action with permissible character (.n %!stifying their #ass actions$ petitioners li&en their acti ity to the proCbases rally led by for#er President Cora9on C. A8!ino on "epte#ber 12$ 1//1$ participated in$ as well$ by p!blic school teachers who conse8!ently absented the#sel es fro# their classes. Do ad#inistrati e charges were allegedly instit!ted against any of the participants.) , they also raised national issues such as the removal of the 8.). bases and the repudiation of foreign debt. In 4alingasan . Co!rt of Appeals (B.=. Do. 12+610$ E!ly 31$ 1//1$ per =egalado$ E.), however, this Court said that the fact that the conventional term =strike= was not used by the participants to describe their common course of action was insignificant, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, was deemed controlling. )oreo er$ the petitioners here * * * were not penali9ed for the e*ercise of their right to asse#ble peacef!lly and to petition the go ern#ent for a redress of grie ances. =ather$ the Ci il "er ice Co##ission fo!nd the# g!ilty of cond!ct pre%!dicial to the best interest of the ser ice for ha ing absented the#sel es witho!t proper a!thority$ fro# their schools d!ring reg!lar school days$ in order to participate in the #ass protest$ their absence inel!ctably res!lting in the nonCholding of classes and in the depri ation of st!dents of ed!cation$ for which they were responsible. Lad petitioners a ailed the#sel es of their free ti#e C recess$ after classes$ wee&ends or holidays C to dra#ati9e their grie ances and to dialog!e with the proper a!thorities within the bo!nds of law$ no one C not the D-C"$ the C"C or e en this Co!rt C co!ld ha e held the# liable for the alid e*ercise of their constit!tionally g!aranteed rights. As it was$ the te#porary stoppage of classes res!lting fro# their acti ity necessarily disr!pted p!blic ser ices$ the ery e il so!ght to be forestalled by the prohibition against stri&es by go ern#ent wor&ers. 7heir act by their nat!re was en%oined by the Ci il "er ice law$ r!les and reg!lations$ for which they #!st$ therefore$ be #ade answerable. (?acinto v. 'A, $%- &'(A )=+, Nov. -*, -33+, 4n Banc ./an!aniban01 The Non;Im'!irment Cl!%&e 62. .s the constit!tional prohibition against i#pairing contract!al obligations absol!te( Held: 1. Cill of Aights. or is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the

The e"ecutive order creating the P#26 was enacted to further implement the social justice provisions of the 1EL: Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and e"panded in the 1E;L Constitution by placing them under a separate 6rticle (Article <...). The 6rticle on )ocial Bustice was aptly described as the =heart of the new Charter= by the President of the 1E;K Constitutional Commission, retired Bustice Cecilia 5uno- Palma . )ocial justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and re/uires the e"tensive use of such power. & " ". The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal e"actness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice3 it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the )tate and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper e"ercise by the )tate of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the )tate to regulate and control them.

Herily, the freedom to contract is not absolute3 all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the )tate and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the )tate, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well%being of the community may re/uire, or as the circumstances may change, or as e"perience may demonstrate the necessity. 6nd under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are e"plicitly subject to the police power of the )tate because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. 6rticle 1L<< thereof e"pressly provides4 6rt. 1L<<. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of 2.#. o. LEL >Creating the P#26?, which was enacted under the police power of the )tate, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long%established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause. (8he 'onference of Maritime Mannin! A!encies, "nc. v. /24A, $*# &'(A ))), April $-, -33= .Davide, ?r.01 $. Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred, because private respondents have voluntarily e"ecuted /uitclaims and releases and received their separation pay. Petitioners claim that the present suit is a =grave derogation of the fundamental principle that obligations arising from a valid contract have the force of law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith.= The Court disagrees. Burisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of non%impairment of contract is subject to the police power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting health, morals, safety and welfare. ot all /uitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, e"cept >1? where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or >$? where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. In these cases, the law will step in to annul the /uestionable transactions . )uch /uitclaim and release agreements are regarded as ineffective to bar the workers from claiming the full measure of their legal rights. In the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the /uitclaim and release in consideration of their separation pay. )ince they were dismissed allegedly for business losses, they are entitled to separation pay under 6rticle $;: of the !abor Code. 6nd since there was thus no e"tra consideration for the private respondents to give up their employment, such undertakings cannot be allowed to bar the action for illegal dismissal. (Bo!o-Medellin &u!arcane /lanters Association, "nc. v. N@(', $3) &'(A -,%, -$*, ./an!aniban01 :. #nly slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CA2C6 that the imposition of the H6T on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that = o law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.= It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the e"ercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the e"ercise of the ta"ing power of the )tate. ,or not only are e"isting laws read into contracts in order to fi" obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains ade/uate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the e"ercise of the )tateJs power of ta"ation save only where a ta" e"emption has been granted for a valid consideration . & " ". (8olentino v. &ecretary of >inance, $#= &'(A )#,, )%=-)%), Au!. $=, -33*, 4n Banc .Mendo<a01 D. )ince timber licenses are not contracts, the non%impairment clause " " " cannot be invoked. & " ", even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an e"ecutive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of e"isting timber licenses. Fence, the non%impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. evertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmati-ed as a violation of the non%impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the e"ercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing their general welfare. & " ". In short, the non%impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. ,inally, it is difficult to imagine " " " how the non%impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent )ecretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as yet e"isted in the other instances. 5oreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. (2posa v. >actoran, ?r., $$* &'(A +3$ .-33#01

9. 6nent petitionersJ contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that ='n(ot all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non%suability3 distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. The acts involved in this case are governmental. Cesides, the Court is in agreement with the )olicitor *eneral that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation. (Blaquera v. Alcala, $3= &'(A #)), **), &ept. --, -33%, 4n Banc ./urisima01 The In;C%&todi!l In.e&ti,!tion Ri,ht& of !n Acc%&ed Per&on 63. "tate the proced!re$ g!idelines and d!ties which the arresting$ detaining$ in iting$ or in estigating officer or his co#panions #!st do and obser e at the ti#e of #a&ing an arrest and again at and d!ring the ti#e of the c!stodial interrogation. Held: !astly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as g!ardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Aepublic 6ct o. LD:; (An Act Defining Certain =ights of Person Arrested$ Detained or ?nder C!stodial .n estigation as well as the D!ties of the Arresting$ Detaining$ and .n estigating Gfficers and Pro iding Penalties for Hiolations 7hereof). It is high% time to educate our law%enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so%called 5iranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments4 The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. 2very other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person3 $? Fe must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him3 :? Fe must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice3 D? Fe must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him3 and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting on his behalf3 9? That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted e"cept in the presence of his counsel of after a valid waiver has been made3 K? The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most e"pedient means % telephone, radio, letter or messenger % with his lawyer >either retained or appointed?, any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited byOconfer with duly accredited national or international non%government organi-ation. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished3 L? Fe must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same3 ;? In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak3 E? That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be /uestioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already begun3 1<? The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some /uestions or volunteered some statements3 11? Fe must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or e"culpatory, in whole or in part, shall be admissible in evidence. (/eople v. Mahinay, #,$ &'(A *==, >eb. -, -333, 4n Banc ./er 'uriam01 6+. -*plain the &ind of infor#ation that is re8!ired to be gi en by law enforce#ent officers to s!spect d!ring c!stodial in estigation. Held: 'I(t is settled that one+s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is not enough for the interrogator to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of )ection 1$, 6rticle III of the 1E;L Constitution3 the former must also e"plain the effects of such provision in practical terms G e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do G and in a language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to e"plain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject+s understanding of what is conveyed. )ince it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of e"planation re/uired will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of 1?

the person undergoing investigation. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right3 he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he could ask for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his re/uest. If he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel, who, under prevailing jurisprudence, must be a lawyer. (/eople v. 'anoy, #$% &'(A #%=, March -+, $,,,, -st Div. .Davide, '?01 65. ,hat is the #eaning of :co#petent co!nsel; !nder "ection 12 of the 4ill of =ights( Held: The meaning of 0competent counsel1 was e"plained in People . Deniega (251 "C=A 626$ 631) as follows4 0" " " 'T(he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing /uestioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused+s behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e.$ that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual+s rights. In People . 4asay (21/ "C=A +2+$ +10)$ this Court stressed that an accused+s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel Qcontemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.+ 0Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation >if the latter could not afford one? Qshould be engaged by the accused >himself?, or by the latter+s relative or person authori-ed by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authori-ed by the accused to file such petition.+ !awyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. 0" " " The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e.$ at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.1 (/eople v. 4spiritu, #,$ &'(A =##, >eb. $, -333, #rd Div. ./an!aniban01 66. Can a PAG lawyer be considered an independent co!nsel within the conte#plation of "ection 12$ Article ...$ 1/01 Constit!tion( Held: In People . Gracoy$ 22+ "C=A 15/ 31//36J People . 4and!la$ 232 "C=A 566 31//+6$ the )C has held that a P6# lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused%appellant. Thus, the assistance of a P6# lawyer satisfies the constitutional re/uirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused. (/eople v. Bacor, #,) &'(A =$$, April #,, -333, $nd Div. .Mendo<a01 61. .s the confession of an acc!sed gi en spontaneo!sly$ freely and ol!ntarily to the )ayor ad#issible in e idence$ considering that the )ayor has :operational s!per ision and control; o er the local police and #ay arg!ably be dee#ed a law enforce#ent officer( Held: .hile it is true that a municipal mayor has 0operational supervision and control1 over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying )ection 1$>1? and >:? of 6rticle III of the Constitution, however, appellant+s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not /uestion the appellant at all. o police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. ,hen appellant tal&ed with the #ayor as a confidant and not as a law enforce#ent officer$ his !nco!nselled confession to hi# did not iolate his constit!tional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through /uestioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. .hat the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under )ection 1$ are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the )tate as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (/eople v. Andan, $)3 &'(A 3=, March #, -33+1 60. Are confessions #ade in response to 8!estions by news reporters ad#issible in e idence( An&wer: Ies. Confessions made in response to /uestions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer, are admissible. In People . Hi9carra$ 115 "C=A 1+3$ 152 31/026$ where the accused, under custody, gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview by several press reporters in the office of the chief of the CI), it was held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In /eople v. Andan, $)3 &'(A 3=, March #, -33+ $ it was held that appellant+s confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they

interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. The )upreme Court further ruled that appellant+s verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by )ection 1$>1? and >:? of 6rticle III of the Constitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence. 6/. Disc!ss the two &inds of in ol!ntary or coerced confessions !nder "ection 12$ Article ... of the 1/01 Constit!tion. .ll!strate how the Co!rt sho!ld appreciate said in ol!ntary or coerced confessions. Held: There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision4 >1? those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph $ of )ection 1$, and >$? those which are given without the benefit of 5iranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same )ection 1$. 6ccused%appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. 6side from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. Fe did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical e"amination. Fis allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it. &"" .e discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily e"ecuted from the fact that it was signed by accused%appellant five times. &"" 2"trajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant+s consent in e"ecuting the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained. 5oreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. & " ". It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. .hen the details narrated in an e"trajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the e"traction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence e"ists showing that the statement was voluntarily e"ecuted, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence ali!nde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession. Cut what renders the confession of accused%appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused%appellant was not given the 5iranda warnings effectively. 8nder the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the 8nited )tates from which 6rticle III, )ection 1$>1? was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. )wept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. ow, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is re/uired that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings4 >1? he must be informed of his right to remain silent3 >$? he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him3 and >:? he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. &"" There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the 5iranda rights to accused%appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inade/uate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. 2specially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused%appellant was specifically asked these /uestions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. & " " 5oreover, 6rticle III, )ection 1$>1? re/uires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Fere, accused%appellant was assisted by 6tty. @e los Aeyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an 0independent counsel1 as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the .P@ at the time he assisted accused%appellant. & " ". This is error. 6s observed in People . 4and!la (232 "C=A 566 31//+6)$ the independent counsel re/uired by 6rticle III, )ection 1$>1? cannot be special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, 6tty. @e los Aeyes, as PC Captain and )tation Commander of the .P@, was part of the police force who could not be e"pected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused%appellant in

the investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation. (/eople v. 2brero, ##$ &'(A -3,, $$, H $,%, May -+, $,,,, $nd Div. .Mendo<a01 12. ,hat are the re8!ire#ents for an e*traC%!dicial confession of an acc!sed to be ad#issible in e idence( Held: 1. In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given4 1? ,reely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery3 $? Snowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights3 and :? Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its conse/uences. #nce admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal e"perience of mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability. 6 confession meeting all the foregoing re/uisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. .hen all these re/uirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused. (/eople v. >abro, $++ &'(A -3, Au!. --, -33+ ./an!aniban01 $. umerous decisions of this Court rule that for an e"trajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be4 1? voluntary3 $? made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel3 :? e"press3 and D? in writing. The mantle of protection afforded by the above%/uoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody . The e"clusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. Fowever, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue . (/eople v. Base, #$3 &'(A -=%, -)3--+-, March #,, $,,,, -st Div. .Enares-&antia!o01 11. .s the choice of a lawyer by a person !nder c!stodial in estigation who cannot afford the ser ices of a co!nsel e*cl!si e as to precl!de other e8!ally co#petent and independent attorneys fro# handling his defense( Held: It must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. Indeed G The phrase 0competent and independent1 and 0preferably of his own choice1 were e"plicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers in the 1E;K Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore beholden to the military. (Citing . =ecord of the Constit!tional Co##ission 131C13+J . 4ernas$ 7he Constit!tion of the =ep!blic of the Philippines$ 1/01 1st ed.$ p. 3+1) &"" """ """

.ithal, the word 0preferably1 under )ection 1$>1?, 6rticle : of the 1E;L Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is e"clusive as to preclude other e/ually competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter. .hile the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. 6 lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former+s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Herily, to be an effective counsel 0'a( lawyer need not challenge all the /uestions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false (People .

Lay!so$ 115 "C=A +1 31/0/6). The counsel, however, sho!ld ne er pre ent an acc!sed fro# freely and ol!ntarily telling the tr!th.; (/eople v. Base, #$3 &'(A -=%, -)3--+-, March #,, $,,,, -st Div. .Enares-&antia!o01 12. "ho!ld co!rts be allowed to disting!ish between preli#inary 8!estioning and c!stodial in estigation proper when applying the e*cl!sionary r!le( Held: The e"clusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue . !aw enforcement agencies are re/uired to effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. 6ny measure short of this re/uirement is considered a denial of such right . Courts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminary /uestioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the e"clusionary rule. 6ny information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the e"clusionary rule. The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written e"tra%judicial confession3 the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an 0informal talk1 at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of " " ". The arresting policeman testified that the appellant admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of Banuary 1$, 1EED, the probable time of the commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drunk to remember what subse/uently happened. The arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. .e note that the alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the company of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed. The e"clusionary rule applies. The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of " " " and any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman+s apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made during an 0informal talk1 prior to custodial investigation prior is not tenable. The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general in/uiry for any possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. 6t the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing of " " ". The e"clusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. )upportive of such presumption is the absence of a written e"tra%judicial confession to that effect and the appellant+s denial in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as inadmissible. (/eople v. Bravo, #-% &'(A %-$, Nov. $$, -333, 4n Banc .;on<a!a-(eyes01 13. -*plain the proced!re for o!tCofCco!rt identification of s!spects and the test to deter#ine the ad#issibility of s!ch identification. Held: 1. In People . 7eehan&ee$ Er. (2+/ "C=A 5+$ Gctober 6$ 1//5)$ the Court " " " e"plained the procedure for out% of%court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification. It listed the following ways of identifying the suspects during custodial investigation4 show%up, mug shots and line%ups. The Court there ruled4 0" " ". #ut%of%court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru showC!ps where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru #!g shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line !ps where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. )ince corruption of o!tCofCco!rt identification contaminates the integrity of in co!rt identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the re/uirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out%of% court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circ!#stances test where they consider the following factors, i9F >1? the witness+ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime3 >$? the witness+ degree of attention at that time3 >:? the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness3 >D? the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification3 >9? the length of time between the crime and the identification3 and >K? the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.1 (.bid.$ p. /5) (/eople v. 8imon, $%- &'(A =++, Nov. -$, -33+ ./an!aniban01 $. " " ". The totality test has been fashioned precisely to assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional re/uirements of due process in regard to out%of%court identification. These cited factors must be considered to prevent contamination of the integrity of in%court identifications better. (/eople v. ;amer, #$) &'(A )),, >eb. $3, $,,,, $ nd Div. .Duisumbin!01 1+. Does the prohibition for c!stodial in estigation cond!cted witho!t the assistance of co!nsel e*tend to a person in a police lineC!p( Conse8!ently$ is the identification by pri ate co#plainant of acc!sed who was not assisted by co!nsel d!ring police lineC!p ad#issible in e idence(

Held: The prohibition " " " does not e"tend to a person in a police line%up because that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. It has been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask /uestions on the suspect+s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission . The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line%up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general in/uiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line%up does not preclude the admissibility of an in%court identification . The identification made by the private complainant in the police line%up pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused%appellant was not assisted by counsel. & " " (/eople v. /avillare, #$3 &'(A )%*, )3*-)3=, April =, $,,,, 4n Banc ./er 'uriam01 15. Petitioner in a case :* * * posits the theory that since he had no co!nsel d!ring the c!stodial in estigation when his !rine sa#ple was ta&en and che#ically e*a#ined$ -*hibits :L; and :)$; * * * are also inad#issible in e idence since his !rine sa#ple was deri ed in effect fro# an !nco!nselled e*traC%!dicial confession. Petitioner clai#s that the ta&ing of his !rine sa#ple allegedly iolates Article ...$ "ection 2 of the Constit!tion * * *.; "ho!ld his contentions be !pheld( Held: .e are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e.$ when the investigating officer starts to ask /uestions to elicit information andOor confession or admissions from the accused. )uch right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived e"cept in writing and in the presence of counsel. Fowever, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to e"tort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion . The situation in the case at bar falls within the e"emption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be e"amined came from the body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co%accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were re/uested to undergo a drug test. (;utan! v. /eople, ##= &'(A *+3, ?uly --, $,,,, $nd Div. .De @eon01 The Ri,ht to #!il 16. .n bail application where the acc!sed is charged with a capital offense$ will it be proper for the %!dge to grant bail witho!t cond!cting hearing if the prosec!tor interposes no ob%ection to s!ch application( ,hy( Held: Burisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the re/uired hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. =)aid reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of e"ercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Budicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to e"ercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.= Imposed in 4aylon . "ison (2+3 "C=A 20+$ April 6$ 1//5) was this mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite the prosecutionJs refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fi" bail. (?oselito . Narciso v. >lor Marie &ta. (omana-'ru<, ;.(. No. -#*=,*, March -+, $,,,, #rd Div. ./an!aniban01 11. ,hat are the d!ties of the %!dge in cases of bail applications where the acc!sed is charged with capital offense( Held: 4asco . =apatalo (26/ "C=A 222$ )arch 5$ 1//1) enunciated the following duties of the trial judge in such petition for bail4 1? otify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or re/uire him to submit his recommendation3 $? Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to e"ercise its sound discretion3 :? @ecide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution3 D? If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. #therwise, petition should be denied. The Court added4 =The above%enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. )o basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.= 6dditionally, the courtJs grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judgeJs own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the

accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense3 its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail. (?oselito . Narciso v. >lor Marie &ta. (omana-'ru<, ;.(. No. -#*=,*, March -+, $,,,, #rd Div. ./an!aniban01 10. "ho!ld the acc!sed who re#ained at large after their con iction be allowed pro isional liberty( Can the bail bond that the acc!sed pre io!sly posted be !sed d!ring the entire period of appeal( Held: @espite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of 6ppeals, petitioners had remained at large. It is a"iomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise, deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one+s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free . Petitioners+ Compliance and 5otion " " " came short of an unconditional submission to respondent court+s lawful order and to its jurisdiction. The trial court correctly denied petitioners+ motion that they be allowed provisional liberty after their conviction, !nder their respecti e bail bonds. 6part from the fact that they were at large, )ection 9, Aule 11D of the Aules of Court, as amended by )upreme Court 6dministrative Circular 1$%ED, provides that4 &"" The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 19%day period to appeal >Aule 1$$? and not during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with )ection $>a? of Aule 11D which provides that the bail 0shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled, !ntil the pro#!lgation of the %!dg#ent of the =egional 7rial Co!rt$ irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it.1 This amendment, introduced by )C 6dministrative Circular 1$%ED is a departure from the old rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even during the period of appeal. 5oreover, under the present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessary. ,rom the record, it appears that the bondsman " " " filed a motion in the trial court " " " for the cancellation of petitioners+ bail bond for the latter+s failure to renew the same upon its e"piration. #btaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed. (Ma!uddatu v. 'ourt of Appeals, #$) &'(A #)$, >eb. $#, $,,,, -st Div. .Capunan01 1/. .s a condition in an application for bail that acc!sed be first arraigned before he co!ld be granted bail alid( Held: In re/uiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases. Fence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner+s bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. 6fter that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of the hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under 6rt. III, )ec. 1D>$? of the Constitution, trial in absencia is authori-ed. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its " " " order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment. This theory is mistaken. In the first place " " " in cases where it is authori-ed, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to /uash. ,or if the information is /uashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. 8nder Aule 11D, )ec. $>b? of the Aules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that 0the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so re/uired by the court or these Aules,1 while under Aule 11K, )ec. 1>b? the presence of the accused at the arraignment is re/uired. #n the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between >1? filing a motion to /uash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to /uash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and >$? foregoing the filing of a motion to /uash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused+s constitutional right not to be put on trial e"cept upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. (@avides v. 'A, #$* &'(A #$-, >eb. -, $,,,, $nd Div. .Mendo<a01 The Ri,ht to /e Informed of the N!t%re !nd C!%&e of Acc%&!tion !,!in&t the Acc%&ed 02. ,hat are the ob%ecti es of the right to be infor#ed of the nat!re and ca!se of acc!sations against the acc!sed( Held: Instructive in this regard is )ection K, Aule 11< of the Aules of Court " " ".

The purpose of the above%/uoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land (Article ...$ "ection 1+326$ 1/01 Constit!tion). 2laborating on the defendant+s right to be informed, the Court held in Pecho . People (262 "C=A 510) that the objectives of this right are4 1? To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense3 $? To avail himself of his conviction or ac/uittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause3 and :? To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be complete G to the end that the accused may suitably prepare for his defense. Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused. &"" In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the #inority of the icti# " " " although the same was proven during the trial " " ". The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. Fe has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or Information on which he is tried would constitute unauthori-ed denial of that right. (/eople v. Bayya, #$+ &'(A ++-, March -,, $,,,, 4n Banc ./urisima01 The Ri,ht to ! F!ir Tri!l 01. ,hat is the p!rpose of the r!le barring trial or sentence of an insane person( ,hat are the reasons !nderlying it( Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public . It has been held that it is inhuman to re/uire an accused disabled by *od to make a just defense for his life or liberty . To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial3 and this has several reasons underlying it. ,or one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. 5oreover, he is not in a position to e"ercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g.$ the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. "econd$ the fairness of the proceedings may be /uestioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is e"pected to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. 7hird$ the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. 2ven if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. 6 criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and becomes and invective against an insensible object. >o!rth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. 6n incompetent defendant may not reali-e the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionali-ed retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its significance . (/eople v. 4strada, ### &'(A )33, +-%-+-3, ?une -3, $,,,, 4n Banc ./uno01 The Ri,ht to !n Im'!rti!l Tri!l 02. ,hat are the two principal legal and philosophical schools of tho!ght on how to deal with the rain of !nrestrained p!blicity d!ring the in estigation and trial of high profile cases( Held: There are two >$? principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases . The 4ritish approach the problem with the pres!#ption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, 2nglish courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The A#erican approach is different. 8) courts assume a s&eptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. (4strada v. Desierto, ;.(. Nos. -*)+-,--=, March $, $,,-, 4n Banc ./uno01 03. "ho!ld the G#b!ds#an be stopped fro# cond!cting the in estigation of the cases filed against petitioner (for#er President) -strada d!e to the barrage of pre%!dicial p!blicity on his g!ilt(

Held: Petitioner " " " contends that the respondent #mbudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. Fe submits that the respondent #mbudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process. &"" This is not the first ti#e the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases. In People . 7eehan&ee$ Er. (2+/ "C=A 5+ 31//56), later reiterated in the case of Larranaga . Co!rt of Appeals$ et al. (201 "C=A 501 at pp. 5/6C5/1 31//06), we laid down the doctrine that4 0.e cannot sustain appellant+s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. 7hen and now$ we r!le that the right of an acc!sed to a fair trial is not inco#patible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused+s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field " " ". The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to e"tensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day%to%day, gavel%to%gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. ,or one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre%trial and other off%court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. ,or another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. .e have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. " " ". #ur judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off%court evidence and on%camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere e"posure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. 6t best, appellant can only conjure possibility of pre%!dice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characteri-ed the investigation and trial of the case. In )artelino$ et al. . Ale%andro$ et al.$ we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of act!al pre%!dice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed act!al bias against appellant as a conse/uence of the e"tensive media coverage of the pre%trial and trial of his case. The totality of circ!#stances of the case does not prove that the trial judge ac/uired a fi*ed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. 6ppellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.1 .e e"pounded further on this doctrine in the subse/uent case of ,ebb . Lon. =a!l de Leon$ etc. (2+1 "C=A 652 31//56) and its companion cases, i9.F 06gain, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. .e find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty whole undergoing a preliminary investigation. &"" The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its e"cessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. ,or sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. #ur daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case G the CI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathi-ers G have participated in this media blit-. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of =ich#ond Dewspapers$ .nc. . Hirginia$ it was wisely held4 Q" " " >a? The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in 6nglo%6merican justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this ation+s organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in 2ngland had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recogni-ed4 when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the

open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society+s criminal process Qsatisfy the appearance of justice,+ #ffutt v. 8nited )tates, :D; 8) 11, 1D, EE ! 2d 11, L9 ) Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. ,rom this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this ation+s system of justice, Cf., e.g., !evine v. 8nited )tates, :K$ 8) K1<, D ! 2d $d E;E, ;< ) Ct 1<:;. >b? The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, e"pressly guaranteed by the ,irst 6mendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the ,irst 6mendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those e"plicit guarantees3 the ,irst 6mendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the conte"t of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the ,irst 6mendment was adopted. 5oreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free e"ercise of the other ,irst 6mendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. 6 trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally G and representatives of the media G have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and /uality of what takes place. >c? 2ven though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not e"pressly guaranteed, have been recogni-ed as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the ,irst 6mendment4 without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have e"ercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.+ Ce that as it may, we recogni-e that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in )artelino$ et al. . Ale%andro$ et al.$ we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the @#B Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the @#B Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the @#B Panel is composed of an 6ssistant Chief )tate Prosecutor and )enior )tate Prosecutors. Their long e"perience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their $K%page Aesolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any e"tra%record evidence e"cept evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite it summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. 6t no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the dis/ualification of any member of the @#B Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.1 6pplying the above ruling, we hold that there is not eno!gh e idence to warrant this Co!rt to en%oin the preli#inary in estigation of the petitioner by the respondent G#b!ds#an. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. Fe needs to show more than weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias%free decision. .ell to note, the cases against the petitioner are still !ndergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent #mbudsman. o allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner. (4strada v. Desierto, ;.(. Nos. -*)+-,--=, March $, $,,-, 4n Banc ./uno01 The Ri,ht !,!in&t Self;Incrimin!tion 0+. Disc!ss the types of i##!nity stat!tes. ,hich has broader scope of protection( Held: #ur immunity statutes are of 6merican origin. In the 8nited )tates, there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the transactional immunity and the use%and%derivative%use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. Cy its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction . In contrast, by the grant of use%and%derivative%use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subse/uent prosecution. (Mapa, ?r. v. &andi!anbayan, $#- &'(A +%#, +3+-+3%, April $), -33*, 4n Banc ./uno01

05. .s the grant of i##!nity to an acc!sed willing to testify for the go ern#ent a special pri ilege and therefore #!st be strictly constr!ed against the acc!sed( Held: '.(e reject respondent court+s ruling that the grant of section 9 immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners. It simplistically characteri-ed the grant as a special privilege, as if it was gifted by the government, e* gratia. In taking this posture, it misread the raison d' etre and the long pedigree of the right against self%incrimination isCSC is immunity statutes. The days of in/uisition brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights. ot the least of these abuses is the e"pert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self%incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civili-ed countries. #ver the years, however, came the need to assist government in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a necessary matri" of public welfare. To accommodate the need, the right against self%incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testify despite his plea of the right against self%incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be known as transactional or a use%derivative%use immunity " " ". Muite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonan-a from government. Those given the privilege of immunity paid a high price for it G the surrender of their precious right to be silent. #ur hierarchy of values demands that the right against self%incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection. !aws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightly. (Mapa, ?r. v. &andi!anbayan, $#- &'(A +%#, %,=-%,), April $), -33*, 4n Banc ./uno01 The Ri,ht !,!in&t o%/le +eo'!rd06. Disc!ss the two &inds of do!ble %eopardy. Held: #ur Cill of Aights deals with two >$? kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of Clause $<, )ection 1, 6rticle III of the Constitution ordains that 0no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.1 The second sentence of said clause provides that 0if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or ac/uittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.1 Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. 8nder the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offense charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or ac/uittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or ac/uittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment or the same offense. )o long as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor ac/uittal in either case. 2lsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penali-ed either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important in/uiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to e"ist between the earlier and the subse/uent offenses charged. The /uestion of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by e"amining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. (/eople v. Dui9ada, $=3 &'(A -3-, ?uly $*, -33)1 01. ,hat #!st be pro ed to s!bstantiate a clai# of do!ble %eopardy( ,hen #ay legal %eopardy attach( Held: To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven4 >1? 6 first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second3 >$? the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated3 >:? the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. !egal jeopardy attaches only4 >1? upon a valid indictment3 >b? before a competent court3 >c? after arraignment3 >d? when a valid plea has been entered3 and >e? the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e"press consent of the accused. ('uison v. 'A, $%3 &'(A -=3, April -=, -33% ./an!aniban01 00. .n its decision in a cri#inal case$ the E!dge pro#!lgated only the ci il aspect of the case$ b!t not the cri#inal. ,ill the pro#!lgation of the cri#inal aspect later constit!te do!ble %eopardy(

Held: Petitioner contends that =the promulgation by Budge Aamos on 6pril D, 1EE9 of the Aespondent CourtJs decision of Bune :<, 1EE1 by reading its dispositive portion has effecti ely ter#inated the cri#inal cases against the petitioner * * *.@ In other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point. The Court is not persuaded. 6s a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Fence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Fere, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. 'T(he promulgation of the C6 @ecision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete3 it was also void. In e"cess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on 6pril D, 1EE9, and he repeated his mistake in his 6pril 1$, 1EEK #rder. .e emphasi-e that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. )ince the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Fence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. .e must stress that Aespondent CourtJs /uestioned @ecision did not modify or amend its Buly :<, 1EE1 @ecision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full e"ecution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. ('uison v. 'A, $%3 &'(A -=3, April -=, -33% ./an!aniban01 The Ri,ht !,!in&t E" Po&t F!cto L!w& !nd #ill& of Att!inder 0/. ,hat is a bill of attainder( .s P.D. 1066 a bill of attainder( Held: 'T(he Court, in People . >errer (B.=. Dos. LC32613C1+$ Dece#ber 21$ 1/12$ +0 "C=A 302)$ defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. 2ssential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential . P.@. o. 1;KK does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. owhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. .hat the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the /ualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the /ualifying circumstances attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents re/uire. (Misolas v. /an!a, -%- &'(A )*%, )=3-)),, ?an. #,, -33,, 4n Banc .'ortes01 /2. ,hat is an e* post facto law( .s =.A. Do. 02+/ an e* post facto law( Held: -* post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. A.6. ;$DE is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the !egislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations3 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. A.6. LEL9, which amended P.@. 1K<K as regards the )andiganbayan+s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.$ one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. ot being a penal law, the retroactive application of A.6. ;$DE cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. Petitioner+s and intervenors+ contention that their right to a two%tiered appeal which they ac/uired under A.6. LEL9 has been diluted by the enactment of A.6. ;$DE, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a nat!ral right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against e* post facto laws. A.6. ;$DE pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an e* post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 5oreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 6t any rate, A.6. ;$DE has preserved the accused+s right to appeal to the )upreme Court to review /uestions of law. #n the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the )upreme Court still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome. (/anfilo M. @acson v. 8he 4Aecutive &ecretary, et. al., ;.(. No. -$%,3), ?an. $,, -333 .Martine<01 A 3INISTRATI7E LAW /1. Describe the Ad#inistrati e Code of 1/01

Held: The Code is a general law and 0incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance (7hird ,hereas Cla!se$ Ad#inistrati e Code of 1/01) and 0embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people.1 (>o!rth ,hereas Cla!se$ Ad#inistrati e Code of 1/01) The Code is divided into seven >L? books. These books contain provisions on the organi-ation, powers and general administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the e"ecutive branch, the organi-ation and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the e"ercise by administrative agencies of /uasi%legislative and /uasi%judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration, i.e.$ internal organi-ation, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. (2ple v. 8orres, ;.(. No. -$+)%=, ?uly $#, -33% ./uno01 /2. ,hat is ad#inistrati e power( Held: Ad#inistrati e power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fi" a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. (2ple v. 8orres, ;.(. No. -$+)%=, ?uly $#, -33% ./uno01 /3. ,hat is an ad#inistrati e order( Held: 6n ad#inistrati e order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. (2ple v. 8orres, ;.(. No. -$+)%=, ?uly $#, -33% ./uno01 /+. ,hat is the Bo ern#ent of the =ep!blic of the Philippines( An&wer: The Bo ern#ent of the =ep!blic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of the government are e"ercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the conte"t, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. (&ec. $.-0, "ntroductory /rovisions, 4Aecutive 2rder No. $3$1 /5. ,hat is a go ern#ent instr!#entality( ,hat are incl!ded in the ter# go ern#ent instr!#entality( An&wer: 6 go ern#ent instr!#entality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. The term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government%owned or controlled corporations. (&ec. $.-,0, "ntroductory /rovisions, 4Aecutive 2rder No. $3$1 /6. ,hat is a reg!latory agency( An&wer: 6 reg!latory agency refers to any agency e"pressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the principal powers of which are e"ercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or council. (&ec. $.--0, "ntroductory /rovisions, 4Aecutive 2rder No. $3$1 /1. ,hat is a chartered instit!tion( An&wer: 6 chartered instit!tion refers to any agency organi-ed or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the )tate. (&ection $.-$0, "ntroductory /rovisions, 4Aecutive 2rder No. $3$1 /0. ,hen is a go ern#entCowned or controlled corporation dee#ed to be perfor#ing proprietary f!nction( ,hen is it dee#ed to be perfor#ing go ern#ental f!nction( Held: *overnment%owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as 0proprietary1 are those intended for private advantage and benefit. (Blaquera v. Alcala, $3= &'(A #)), *$=, &ept. --, -33%, 4n Banc ./urisima01 //. Does the petition for ann!l#ent of procla#ation of a candidate #erely in ol e the e*ercise by the CG)-L-C of its ad#inistrati e power to re iew$ re ise and re erse the actions of the board of can assers and$ therefore$ %!stifies nonC obser ance of proced!ral d!e process$ or does it in ol e the e*ercise of the CG)-L-CQs 8!asiC%!dicial f!nction(

Held: Taking cogni-ance of private respondentJs petitions for annulment of petitionerJs proclamation, C#52!2C was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the C#52!2C include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputi-e law enforcement agencies and governmental instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organi-ations or coalition, accredit citi-enJs arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputi-ed for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. Fowever, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the e"istence of a manifest error in the /uestioned certificate of canvass re/uires the C#52!2C to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Fence, the resolution of this issue calls for the e"ercise by the C#52!2C of its /uasi%judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the e"ercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed /uasi%judicial. The C#52!2C therefore, acting as /uasi%judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the re/uirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent. (>ederico &. &andoval v. '2M4@4', ;.(. No. -##%*$, ?an. $), $,,, ./uno01 122.Disc!ss the Doctrine of Pri#ary E!risdiction (or Prior =esort). Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a /uestion which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the /uestion demands the e"ercise of sound administrative discretion re/uiring the special knowledge, e"perience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the /uestion involved is also judicial in character. It applies 0where a claim is originally cogni-able in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim re/uires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body3 in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.1 In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. ( illaflor v. 'A, $%, &'(A $%+1 121.Disc!ss the Doctrine of -*ha!stion of Ad#inistrati e =e#edies. -n!#erate e*ceptions thereto. Held: 1. Cefore a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre%condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Fence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be e"hausted first before the court+s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court+s jurisdiction is fatal to one+s cause of action. 6ccordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of e"haustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser e"penses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. This doctrine is disregarded4 when there is a violation of due process3 when the issue involved is purely a legal /uestion3 when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or e"cess of jurisdiction3 when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned3 when there is irreparable injury3 when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter3 L? when to re/uire e"haustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable3 ;? when it would amount to a nullification of a claim3 E? when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding3 1<? when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and ade/uate remedy, and 11? when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. (/aat v. 'A, $)) &'(A -)+ .-33+01 $. on%e"haustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature, i.e.$ claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. ('arale v. Abarintos, $)3 &'(A -#$1 1? $? :? D? 9? K?

Citi2en&hi' 122.7o what citi9enship principle does the Philippines adhere to( -*plain$ and gi e ill!strati e case. Held: The Philippine law on citi-enship adheres to the principle of %!s sang!inis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citi-enship of the parents regardless of the place of hisOher birth, as opposed to the doctrine of %!s soli which determines nationality or citi-enship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent Aosalind Ibasco !ope- was born on 5ay 1K, 1E:D in apier Terrace, Croome, .estern 6ustralia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ibasco, a ,ilipino citi-en and native of @aet, Camarines orte, and Theresa 5ar/ue-, an 6ustralian. Fistorically, this was a year before the 1E:9 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the 8nited )tates governed the country. These were the Philippine Cill of Buly 1, 1E<$ and the Philippine 6utonomy 6ct of 6ugust $E, 1E1K, also known as the Bones !aw. 6mong others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citi-ens of the Philippine Islands. " " " 8nder both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were )panish subjects on 6pril 11, 1;EE and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citi-ens. Private respondent+s father, Telesforo Ibasco, was born on Banuary 9, 1;LE in @aet, Camarines orte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Aegistry of Cirths. Thus, under the Philippine Cill of 1E<$ and the Bones !aw, Telesforo Ibasco was deemed to be a Philippine citi-en. Cy virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo+s daughter, herein private respondent Aosalind Ibasco !ope-, is likewise a citi-en of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1E:9 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of %!s sang!inis as basis for the ac/uisition of Philippine citi-enship " " ". )o also, the principle of %!s sang!inis$ which confers citi-enship by virtue of blood relationship, was subse/uently retained under the 1EL: and 1E;L Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Aosalind Ibasco !ope-, is a ,ilipino citi-en, having been born to a ,ilipino father. The fact of her being born in 6ustralia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citi-enship. If 6ustralia follows the principle of %!s soli$ then at most, private respondent can also claim 6ustralian citi-enship resulting to her possession of dual citi-enship. ( alles v. '2M4@4', ##+ &'(A =*#, Au!. 3, $,,,, 4n Banc ./urisima01 123.,hat are the ways of ac8!iring citi9enship( Disc!ss. Held: There are two ways of ac/uiring citi-enship4 >1? by birth, and >$? by naturali-ation. These ways of ac/uiring citi-enship correspond to the two kinds of citi-ens4 the natural%born citi-en, and the naturali-ed citi-en. 6 person who at the time of his birth is a citi-en of a particular country, is a natural%born citi-en thereof. 6s defined in the " " " Constitution, natural%born citi-ens 0are those citi-ens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac/uire or perfect his Philippine citi-enship.1 #n the other hand, naturali-ed citi-ens are those who have become ,ilipino citi-ens through naturali-ation, generally under Commonwealth 6ct o. DL:, otherwise known as the Aevised aturali-ation !aw, which repealed the former aturali-ation !aw >6ct o. $E$L?, and by Aepublic 6ct o. 9:<. (Antonio Ben!son """ v. :(48, ;.(. No. -*$%*,, May +, $,,-, 4n Banc .Capunan01 12+.7o be nat!rali9ed$ what #!st an applicant pro e( ,hen and what are the conditions before the decision granting Philippine citi9enship beco#es e*ec!tory( Held: To be naturali-ed, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the /ualifications and none of the dis/ualifications provided by law to become a ,ilipino citi-en. The decision granting Philippine citi-enship becomes e"ecutory only after two >$? years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has >1? not left the Philippines3 >$? has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession3 >:? has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules3 or >D? committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies ("ection 1$ =.A. 532). (Antonio Ben!son """ v. :(48, ;.(. No. -*$%*,, May +, $,,-, 4n Banc .Capunan01 125.,hat 8!alifications #!st be possessed by an applicant for nat!rali9ation( Held: )ection $, 6ct DL: provides the following /ualifications4 >a? Fe must be not less than $1 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition3 >b? Fe must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years3

>c? Fe must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living3 >d? Fe must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation3 >e? Fe must be able to speak and write 2nglish or )panish and any of the principal languages3 and >f? Fe must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recogni-ed by the Cureau of Private )chools of the Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines re/uired of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturali-ation as Philippine citi-en. (Antonio Ben!son """ v. :(48, ;.(. No. -*$%*,, May +, $,,-, 4n Banc .Capunan01 126.,hat are the dis8!alifications !nder "ection +$ Act +13$ in an application for nat!rali9ation( Held: )ection D, 6ct DL:, provides the following dis/ualifications4 >a? Fe must not be opposed to organi-ed government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organi-ed governments3 >b? Fe must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas3 >c? Fe must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy3 >d? Fe must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude3 >e? Fe must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases3 >f? Fe must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines >or not less than si" months before filing his application?, mingled socially with the ,ilipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the ,ilipinos3 >g? Fe must not be a citi-en or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war3 >h? Fe must not be a citi-en or subject of a foreign country whose laws do not grant ,ilipinos the right to become naturali-ed citi-ens or subjects thereof. (Antonio Ben!son """ v. :(48, ;.(. No. -*$%*,, May +, $,,-, 4n Banc .Capunan01 121.Can a legiti#ate child born !nder the 1/35 Constit!tion of a >ilipino #other and an alien father alidly elect Philippine citi9enship fo!rteen (1+) years after he has reached the age of #a%ority( Held: 8nder 6rticle IH, )ection 1>:? of the 1E:9 Constitution, the citi-enship of a legitimate child born of a ,ilipino mother and an alien father followed the citi-enship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citi-enship. C.6. o. K$9 which was enacted pursuant to )ection 1>:?, 6rticle IH of the 1E:9 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citi-enship. Fowever, the 1E:9 Constitution and C.6. o. K$9 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citi-enship should be made. The 1E:9 Charter only provides that the election should be made 0upon reaching the age of majority.1 The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty%one >$1? years. In the opinions of the )ecretary of Bustice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citi-enship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1E:9 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citi-enship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the @epartment of )tate of the 8nited )tates *overnment to the effect that the election should be made within a 0reasonable time1 after attaining the age of majority. The phrase 0reasonable time1 has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three >:? years from reaching the age of majority. The span of fourteen >1D? years that lapsed from the time that person reached the age of majority until he finally e"pressed his intention to elect Philippine citi-enship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the re/uirement of electing 0upon reaching the age of majority.1 Philippine citi-enship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. #ne who is privileged to elect Philippine citi-enship has only an inchoate right to such citi-enship. 6s such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. ((eF Application for Admission to the /hilippine Bar, icente D. 'hin!, Bar Matter No. 3-*, 2ct. -, -333, 4n Banc .Capunan01 120.Low #ay Philippine citi9enship be reno!nced( .s the application for an alien certificate of registration$ and the possession of foreign passport$ tanta#o!nt to acts of ren!nciation of Philippine citi9enship( Held: Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a ,ilipino citi-en, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citi-enship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent+s application for an alien Certificate of Aegistration >6CA? and Immigrant Certificate of Aesidence >ICA?, on )eptember 1E, 1E;;, and the issuance to her of an 6ustralian passport on 5arch :, 1E;;. &""

In order that citi-enship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be e"press. Petitioner+s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her 6ustralian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of A9nar . CG)-L-C (105 "C=A 123 31//26) and in the more recent case of )ercado . )an9ano and CG)-L-C (B.=. Do. 135203$ 321 "C=A 632$ )ay 26$ 1///). In the case of 6-nar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that he is an 6merican did not mean that he is no longer a ,ilipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citi-enship. 6nd, in )ercado . )an9ano and CG)-L-C$ it was held that the fact that respondent 5an-ano was registered as an 6merican citi-en in the Cureau of Immigration and @eportation and was holding an 6merican passport on 6pril $$, 1EEL, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice%mayor of 5akati, were just assertions of his 6merican nationality before the termination of his 6merican citi-enship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Aosalind Ibasco !ope- was a holder of an 6ustralian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citi-enship and do not militate against her claim of ,ilipino citi-enship. ,or renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citi-enship, the same must be e"press. 6s held by this Court in the aforecited case of A9nar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an e"press renunciation or repudiation of one+s citi-enship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an 6ustralian passport, as in the case of )ercado . )an9ano$ were mere acts of assertion of her 6ustralian citi-enship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citi-enship G she was an 6ustralian and a ,ilipino, as well. 5oreover, under Commonwealth 6ct K:, the fact that a child of ,ilipino parentOs was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one+s Philippine citi-enship. )ince private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citi-enship, petitioner+s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. ( alles v. '2M4@4', ##+ &'(A =*#, Au!. 3, $,,,, 4n Banc ./urisima01 12/.Low #ay >ilipino citi9ens who lost their citi9enship reac8!ire the sa#e( An&wer: ,ilipino citi-ens who have lost their citi-enship may " " " reac/uire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth 6ct o. K: enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citi-enship may be reac/uired by a former citi-en4 >1? by naturali-ation, >$? by repatriation, and >:? by direct act of Congress . (>rivaldo v. '2M4@4', $=+ &'(A +$+, ?une $%, -33), 4n Banc ./an!aniban0I Antonio Ben!son """ v. :(48, ;.(. No. -*$%*,, May +, $,,-, 4n Banc .Capunan01 112.Disting!ish nat!rali9ation fro# repatriation. Held: aturali-ation is a mode for both ac/uisition and reac/uisition of Philippine citi-enship. 6s a mode of initially ac/uiring Philippine citi-enship, naturali-ation is governed by Commonwealth 6ct o. DL:, as amended. #n the other hand, naturali-ation as a mode for reac/uiring Philippine citi-enship is governed by Commonwealth 6ct o. K: (An Act Pro iding for the ,ays in ,hich Philippine Citi9enship )ay 4e Lost or =eac8!ired 31/366). 8nder this law, a former ,ilipino citi-en who wishes to reac/uire Philippine citi-enship must possess certain /ualifications and none of the dis/ualifications mentioned in )ection D of C.6. DL:. Aepatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citi-enship due to4 >1? desertion of the armed forces ("ection +$ C.A. Do. 63)J >$? service in the armed forces of the allied forces in .orld .ar II ("ection 1$ =ep!blic Act Do. /65 31/536)J >:? service in the 6rmed ,orces of the 8nited )tates at any other time ("ec. 1$ =ep!blic Act Do. 2632 31/626)J >D? marriage of a ,ilipino woman to an alien ("ec. 1$ =ep!blic Act Do. 0111 31//56)J and >9? political and economic necessity (.bid). 6s distinguished from the lengthy process of naturali-ation, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Aepublic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the !ocal Civil Aegistry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. In Angat . =ep!blic (31+ "C=A +30 31///6)$ we held4 'P(arenthetically, under these statutes >referring to A6 os. EK9 and $K:<?, the person desiring to reac/uire Philippine citi-enship would not even be re/uired to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Aepublic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. 5oreover, repatriation results in the reco ery of the original nationality. This means that a naturali-ed ,ilipino who lost his citi-enship will be restored to his prior status as a naturali-ed ,ilipino citi-en. #n the other hand, if he was originally a

natural%born citi-en before he lost his Philippine citi-enship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural%born ,ilipino. (Antonio Ben!son """ v. :(48, ;.(. No. -*$%*,, May +, $,,-, 4n Banc .Capunan01 111.,ho #ay alidly a ail of repatriation !nder =.A. Do. 0111( Held: A.6. o. ;1L1, which has lapsed into law on #ctober $:, 1EE9, is an act providing for the repatriation >a? of ,ilipino women who have lost their Philippine citi-enship by marriage to aliens and >b? of natural%born ,ilipinos who have lost their Philippine citi-enship on account of political or economic necessity. (;erardo An!at v. (epublic, ;.(. No. -#$$**, &ept. -*, -333 . itu!01 112.4efore what agency sho!ld application for repatriation !nder =.A 0111 be filed( Held: 8nder )ection 1 of P.@. o. L$9, dated Bune 9, 1EL9, amending C.6. o. K:, an application for repatriation could be filed with the "pecial Co##ittee on Dat!rali9ation chaired by the )olicitor *eneral with the 8ndersecretary of ,oreign 6ffairs and the @irector of the ational Intelligence Coordinating 6gency as the other members. 6lthough the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Cora-on C. 6/uino+s 5emorandum of 5arch $L, 1E;L, it was not, however, abrogated. The Committee was reactivated on Bune ;, 1EE9. Fence, the application should be filed with said 6gency, not with the Aegional Trial Court. (;erardo An!at v. (epublic, ;.(. No. -#$$**, &ept. -*, -333 . itu!01 113.)ay a nat!ralCborn >ilipino who beca#e an A#erican citi9en still be considered a nat!ralCborn >ilipino !pon his reac8!isition of Philippine citi9enship and$ therefore$ 8!alified to r!n for Congress#an( Held: Aepatriation results in the reco ery of the original nationality. This means that a naturali-ed ,ilipino who lost his citi-enship will be restored to his prior status as a naturali-ed ,ilipino citi-en. #n the other hand, if he was originally a natural% born citi-en before he lost his Philippine citi-enship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural%born ,ilipino. In respondent Cru-+s case, he lost his ,ilipino citi-enship when he rendered service in the 6rmed ,orces of the 8nited )tates. Fowever, he subse/uently reac/uired Philippine citi-enship under A.6. o. $K:<, which provides4 )ection 1. 6ny person who had lost his Philippine citi-enship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the 6rmed ,orces of the 8nited )tates, or after separation from the 6rmed ,orces of the 8nited )tates, ac/uired 8nited )tates citi-enship, may reac/uire Philippine citi-enship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Aepublic of the Philippines and registering the same with !ocal Civil Aegistry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citi-enship. Faving thus taken the re/uired oath of allegiance to the Aepublic and having registered the same in the Civil Aegistry of 5angatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cru- is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural%born citi-en, a status which he ac/uired at birth as the son of a ,ilipino father . It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to reco er$ or ret!rn to$ his original stat!s before he lost his Philippine citi9enship. Petitioner+s contention that respondent Cru- is no longer a natural%born citi-en since he had to perform an act to regain his citi-enship is untenable. 'T(he term 0natural%born citi-en1 was first defined in 6rticle III, )ection D of the 1EL: Constitution as follows4 )ection D. 6 natural%born citi-en is one who is a citi-en of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac/uire or perfect his Philippine citi-enship. Two re/uisites must concur for a person to be considered as such4 >1? a person must be a ,ilipino citi-en from birth and >$? he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citi-enship. 8nder the 1EL: Constitution definition, there were two categories of ,ilipino citi-ens which were not considered natural% born4 >1? those who were naturali-ed and >$? those born before Banuary 1L, 1EL: (the date of effecti ity of the 1/13 Constit!tion) , of ,ilipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citi-enship. Those 0naturali-ed citi-ens1 were not considered natural%born obviously because they were not ,ilipinos at birth and had to perform an act to ac/uire Philippine citi-enship. Those born of ,ilipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1EL: Constitution were likewise not considered natural% born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citi-enship. The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of ,ilipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1EL: Constitution and who elected Philippine citi-enship upon reaching the majority age as natural%born. 6fter defining who are natural%born citi-ens, )ection $ of 6rticle IH adds a sentence4 0Those who elect Philippine citi-enship in accordance with paragraph >:?, )ection 1 hereof shall be deemed natural%born citi-ens.1 Conse/uently, only naturali-ed ,ilipinos are considered not natural%born citi-ens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citi-ens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citi-ens4 >1? those who are natural%born and >$? those who are naturali-ed in accordance with law. 6 citi-en who is not a naturali-ed ,ilipino, i.e.$ did not have to undergo the process of naturali-ation to obtain Philippine citi-enship, necessarily is a natural%born ,ilipino. oteworthy is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,

after losing Philippine citi-enship, subse/uently reac/uire it. The reason therefore is clear4 as to such persons, they would either be natural%born or naturali-ed depending on the reasons for the loss of their citi-enship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reac/uisition thereof. 6s respondent Cru- was not re/uired by law to go through naturali-ation proceedings in order to reac/uire his citi-enship, he is perforce a natural%born ,ilipino. 6s such, he possessed all the necessary /ualifications to be elected as member of the Fouse of Aepresentatives. (Antonio Ben!son """ v. :(48, ;.(. No. -*$%*,, May +, $,,-, 4n Banc .Capunan01 11+.Disting!ish d!al citi9enship fro# d!al allegiance. Held: @ual citi-enship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. ,or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citi-ens of a state which adheres to the principle of %!s sang!inis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of %!s soli. )uch a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citi-en of both states. @ual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. .hile dual citi-enship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual+s volition. (Mercado v. Man<ano, #,+ &'(A )#,, May $), -333, 4n Banc .Mendo<a01 115.,hat is the #ain concern of "ection 5$ Article .H$ 1/01 Constit!tion$ on citi9enship( Conse8!ently$ are persons with #ere d!al citi9enship dis8!alified to r!n for electi e local positions !nder "ection +2(d) of the Local Bo ern#ent Code( Held: In including )ection 9 in 6rticle IH on citi-enship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citi-ens per se but with naturali-ed citi-ens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturali-ation. Fence, the phrase 0dual citi-enship1 in A.6. o. L1K<, )ection D<>d? >!ocal *overnment Code? must be understood as referring to 0dual allegiance.1 Conse/uently, persons with mere dual citi-enship do not fall under this dis/ualification. 8nlike those with dual allegiance, who must, " " ", be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citi-enship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citi-enship to terminate their status as persons with dual citi-enship considering that their condition is the unavoidable conse/uence of conflicting laws of different states. Cy electing Philippine citi-enship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citi-ens and thereby terminate their status as dual citi-ens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citi-enship. That is of no moment. (Mercado v. Man<ano, ;.(. No. -#=,%#, #,+ &'(A )#,, May $), -333 .Mendo<a01 116.Cite instances when a citi9en of the Philippines #ay possess d!al citi9enship considering the citi9enship cla!se (Article .H) of the Constit!tion. Held: 1? Those born of ,ilipino fathers andOor mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of %!s soli3 $? Those born in the Philippines of ,ilipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father+s country such children are citi-ens of that country3 :? Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter+s country the former are considered citi-ens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citi-enship. (Mercado v. Man<ano, ;.(. No. -#=,%#, #,+ &'(A )#,, May $), -333 .Mendo<a01 111.Does res %!dicata apply in cases hinging on the iss!e of citi9enship( Held: Petitioner maintains further that when citi-enship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subse/uent proceeding challenging the same3 citing the case of )oy Ia Li# Iao . Co##issioner of .##igration (+1 "C=A 2/2 31/116). Fe insists that the same issue of citi-enship may be threshed out anew. Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e.$ the principle of res %!dicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citi-enship. Fowever, in the case of 4!rca . =ep!blic (51 "C=A 2+0 31/136)$ an e"ception to this general rule was recogni-ed. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res %!dicata may be applied in cases of citi-enship, the following must be present4 1? a person+s citi-enship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party3 $? the )olicitor *eneral or his authori-ed representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and :? the finding on citi-enship is affirmed by this Court.

6lthough the general rule was set forth in the case of )oy Ia Li# Iao$ the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citi-enship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. ( alles v. '2M4@4', ##+ &'(A =*#, Au!. 3, $,,,, 4n Banc ./urisima01