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08 January 2014
David Keeble
Global Head of Interest Rates Strategy
david.keeble@ca-cib.com +1 212 261 3274
Luca Jellinek
Head of European Interest Rates Strategy
luca.jellinek@ca-cib.com +44 20 7214 6244
Peter Chatwell
Senior Interest Rates Strategist
peter.chatwell@ca-cib.com +44 207 214 5289
Frances Cheung
Head of Asian Rates Strategy
frances.cheung@ca-cib.com +852 2826 1520
Orlando Green
Senior Interest Rates Strategist
orlando.green@ca-cib.com +44 20 7214 7467
Jean-Franois Perrin
Inflation Strategist
jean-francois.perrin@ca-cib.com +33 1 41 89 94 22
Jonathan Rick
IRD Strategist
jonathan.rick@ca-cib.com +1 212 261 4096
https://catalystresearch.ca-cib.com
Crdit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank is authorised by the Autorit de Contrle Prudentiel et de Rsolution (ACPR) and supervised by the ACPR and the Autorit des Marchs Financiers (AMF) in France and subject to limited regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from us on request.
US Directional View
What the US environment will be at the end of 2014
What will the world look like at the end of 2014? Our economists forecasts expect each of the main global economic blocs to grow at the same pace or faster this year than in 2013. In the US, we cannot see any good reason to expect a significant slowdown in the pace of jobs growth assuming that GDP growth (at around 2.7%) will be around 100bp faster in the coming year than it was in 2013 and US corporates are rudely profitable. By the end of the year, there should be evidence of supply constraints and there are already sporadic hints of issues in some industries. By end-2014, the whole nature of monetary policy will have changed in the US. If the Feds own forecasts are approximately correct, Taylor rules would be arguing for higher rates by the end of 2014, so if the Fed is sticking with its zero interest rate policy, the zero percent Fed Funds rate flips from being too restrictive to being stimulative by itself and without the assistance of QE or forward guidance. Then there is the financial repression itself. By the end of this year, the Feds asset purchases will likely have concluded and forward guidance will no longer appear so forward. Remember that the Fed sweetened the start of the taper by saying that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal. By the end of 2014, the unemployment rate will be around 6.5% and the projected PCE deflator from the Feds summary of economic projections for 2015 and 2016 will be close to 2%. If the economy develops approximately as the Fed expects, then forward guidance will be close to its sell-by date at end2014. Structural impediments to growth have eased: the household sector has improved its balance sheet, the fiscal drag lessens this year and Europe looks much, much better. There may be other less familiar drags upon growth in the coming year: problems in emerging markets, higher US mortgage rates and the debt-ceiling problem doesnt seem to want to die. However, growth should be pretty decent. Overall, stronger global growth, disappearing financial repression and growing evidence that the copious spare capacity is disappearing create a good environment for somewhat higher Treasury yields and we see the 10Y UST at around 3% by year-end. Fig 1. UST yield increases since October 2013
bp 60 50 40 30 20 10
0 -10 Oct-13
2013
2014
Australia
Latam
US
UK
Japan
Asia
EZ
Nov-13
Nov-13
Dec-13
Dec-13
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
08 January 2014
EM Europe
Africa/ME
150 100
50
0
-50 Dec-90
5Y Jan-99
Dec-94
Dec-98
Dec-02
Dec-06
Dec-10
Source: Bloomberg
Source: Bloomberg
david.keeble@ca-cib.com
08 January 2014
The first factor is the most basic: as we move towards a more normal rate cycle, the front end of the curve should be more susceptible to variance between Fed policy and market expectations. Each additional step in tapering as well as a virtuous cycle in the economy brings markets one step closer to an exit from ZIRP. Furthermore, as Fed officials have noted in recent comments, the Fed is capable of raising interest rates without first removing excess liquidity. As the potential for bear flattening increases in the market, conditional bear flatteners provide less and less attractive terms. Specifically in the current market, to strike a 3M->2s10s conditional bear flattener at zero-cost, and if you strike the 3M2Y payer at at-the-money forward (ATMF), the 3M10Y payer would be struck at ATMF+22bp. Leaving everything else constant and shifting vols to levels just prior to the FOMC, the 3M10Y payer could be struck at ATMF+35bp for a zero-cost trade previously attractive terms are disappearing. Fig 5. Both FX and equity vols rose towards the end of the year
10
EURUSD 3m Vol VIX (RHS)
9.5
9 8.5 8 7.5 7 6.5 % %
110
100 90
18 16 14 12
30 20
3M2Y 3M10Y (RHS)
80 70
60
6 1-Sep
10
1-Oct 1-Nov 1-Dec 1-Jan
10 1-Jan
1-Mar
1-May
1-Jul
1-Sep
1-Nov
50 1-Jan
08 January 2014
The first factor is obviously only part of the story in rates, and the second factor also helps explain the recent underperformance of gamma (ie, short expiry options) of longer tails (ie, maturities). The second driver is that, with the 10Y Treasury bouncing around 3.00% and the long bond very near 4.00%, long-dated interest rates no longer look that expensive, as the ten-year average for the two is 3.49% and 4.22%, respectively. For comparison purposes, the 2Y note has a mean of 2.00% over the same period. Volatility markets seem to have taken this into consideration, as noted by the recent and significant decline in volatility skew shown in Figure 7. With longer-term rates moving to a more neutral rate, the expected probability of rates moving higher vs rates moving lower becomes more symmetric, which helps explain why the difference in level of implied volatility of a 3M10Y ATMF+25 option and ATMF-25 the skew has decreased. Furthermore, we have decomposed the volatility surface via principal component analysis (PCA), to highlight the three main analytical drivers of the shape of the surface. This is similar to performing PCA on the yield curve to decompose the yield curve into shift (level), twist (curve), and bow (convexity), with similar interpretations. Obviously, with PCA there are as many principal components as there are time series used, but traditionally the first three provide a significant amount of the explanatory power.1 When comparing the first principal component (PC) to the level of 3M10Y implied volatility we notice that, in the past month or so, the two have diverged as the gamma of tails 5Y and longer have generally underperformed the rest of the surface.2 In other words, 3M10Y vol is not moving so precisely with the global move in vol there is more independence. Fig 7. Vol spread for 3M10Y +/-25 risk reversal
13.5 13 ABPV Spread
89
79 69 59 8-Jan
3m10y PC1 (RHS)
8-Apr
8-Jul
8-Oct
The final factor that is likely to drive volatility as we look to escape from a world of quantitative easing is a fundamental change in the volatility surface towards normalisation. The current shape of the volatility surface is far from a normal one. At the moment, the peak of the volatility surface is at the 5Y1Y point as the belly of the curve has been the most volatile. However, with the Fed in play in the coming year or two, one would not expect a one-year strip of rates five years out to be the one most conditioned upon Fed policy. Instead, we typically would see implied vols around the 2Y2Y point of the surface to be at the peak of the hump. There is a two-fold reason for this: although markets have a decent idea of what the Fed will do over the next two years, thanks in part to the Feds Summary of Economic Projections, the pace at which it proceeds beyond that point as well as the economic conditions that may arise between now and then are far less certain. jonathan.rick@ca-cib.com
When performing PCA on the level of volatility the first three principal components explain 98% of cumulative variance on the past one year of data with the first PC explaining 90% on its own. 2 Using the first three PCs shows a similar divergence, and can be seen in our daily USD Interest Rates Derivatives Report.
08 January 2014
+200 bp
6 5
4 3 2 %
+45 bp
0
-1 Jan-97 Jan-02 Jan-07 Jan-12
The standard explanation for the historically high difference between US and Eurozone medium-term rates is that the US has been growing and should continue to grow more rapidly the latest YoY real GDP figures being, respectively, +2.0% and -0.4%. However, the key consideration going forward is that Eurozone growth has been gradually accelerating and should continue to do so. The Eurozone PMI points upward and has been catching up to the US ISM. The Eurozone as a whole continues to post current account surpluses, despite a firm exchange rate, suggesting that accelerating growth elsewhere in the Atlantic rim will generate further growth in the Eurozone. Signs of renewed growth potential are also evident in the pick-up in gross fixed capital formation, which in Q3 marked the first set of two consecutive positive figures since 2008. Lastly, the overall level of intra-EMU dispersion in economic sentiment has decreased significantly, despite ongoing differences between countries.
08 January 2014
10
8
% GDP
forecast 0.5
0.0 -0.5
4
2 0
0.0%
-0.5% -1.0% -1.5%
QoQ
-1.0
points
Mar-02 Mar-05 Mar-08 Mar-11 Mar-14
-2
-2.0% Mar-99
-4
-1.5 Mar-03
Mar-06
Mar-09
Mar-12
Another factor that suggests that EUR rates will rise more steadily in 2014 is that the safe-haven premium associated with core EGBs should shrink more markedly (we discuss the reasons for this view in our Eurozone Relative Value section). In the second half of last year, the core-peripheral yield spread compression decelerated clearly as domestic periphery investors booked profits and core institutions postponed some periphery buying until after the 2013 yearend. This was mirrored just as clearly in the lack of reduction in Target 2 balances at national central banks, an indicator of banking system fragmentation. Spreads have recently resumed their convergence process, and we think that a combination of improving fundamentals and ECB policy measures will also foster a degree of normalisation in EMU banks and, as a consequence, core EUR rates. Another way to conceptualise the steeper/higher core EUR curve (in absolute terms and relative to the US) is to consider that, in the moderate but positive growth scenario we have for the Eurozone economy, ECB policy support this year is likely to be targeted firmly at maintaining and improving interbank liquidity, reversing the negative corporate credit growth rate and reducing banking system fragmentation along national lines. We do not expect any of the measures linked to this effort to be announced in January, but there should definitely be significant progress in H1. Between now and year-end, we expect further, significant rises in core EUR rates, especially beyond the 2-3Y maturity. luca.jellinek@ca-cib.com
08 January 2014
2012
2013
400 300
200 100 Jul-11 10Y Spain 10Y Italy Jan-12 Jul-12 Jan-13 Jul-13 Jan-14
-3.0%
-4.0% -5.0% -6.0%
-7.0%
-8.0%
% GDP
Source: Nation finance ministries, Crdit Agricole CIB. * = Italian data adjusted for funding flows referring to previous FY.
The strong convergence price action more recently needs to be confirmed in a more normal environment of flow volumes, but it does suggest we were correct in thinking that, come the New Year, both domestic and international institutions would be minded to allocate more risk budget to the periphery trade4. That is not to deny that there are always significant domestic and EU political risks to the convergence process, ranging from the variable willingness of German authorities to support more mutualistic solutions to the stability of various periphery governments and their commitment to austerity. At the same time,
3 4
See for instance: Fundamentals and EGB valuations still converging, Nov. 2013. With specific reference to banks, see: Will periphery banks still support their govvies in 2014?, Dec. 2013.
08 January 2014
however, investor sentiment regarding sovereign risk in the Eurozone has been understandably buoyed by the broad improvement in economic sentiment and external sector balances, confirmed most recently by strong manufacturing and service sector PMI data. The early part of the fiscal year sees the publication of final deficit figures for the preceding year and adjusted forecasts for the current one. Since 2010, that newsflow has had a significant impact on spread trends. The indications we can glean from the 2013 data available at this point is that the broad thrust from the periphery will, again, be positive. This, too, should provide a seasonal fillip to the convergence process. Turning to individual sovereign issuers within the periphery: Italys expected central government (CG) supply looks rather different depending on whether one looks at net or gross measures. Gross supply will remain quite high at over 15% of GDP but, in net terms, the figure is a relatively slim 3.5% of GDP and a major drop from last years 6.5%5. At any rate, supply is due to fall slightly even in gross terms and we expect this most liquid periphery issuer to attract demand despite still so-so growth. Spain has recently put in some strong macro figures, especially in terms of forward-looking indicators. Having exited the bank recap support programme, it seems reasonable to believe that there will be no shocking surprises from the AQR, a view confirmed by the Spanish debt agency itself. If that is so, we expect the still-substantial net supply requirement (above 5% of GDP, in 2014) to be cut too. Ireland and Portugal are perceived by rating agencies and the market quite differently, but they are both scheduled to return more decisively to the market this year. In both cases, the amount they need to raise on bond markets is unlikely to be above EUR10bn and therefore should be straightforward to achieve. The Irish are already funded through this year and therefore their new 10Y issue amounts to further pre-funding.
In positioning terms, we continue to like: The absolute valuation of Portugal, with 10Y yields still above 5.5% and 3Y yields above 3%, Periphery-Core relative flatteners (periphery term structures are much steeper than in the core) The strategic recommendation to switch duration risk into sovereign credit risk for a similar running yield (the Aug-2023 Bund yield not more than the Jul-2017 Obligacin, for instance). Fig 16. Return of switching duration into credit
6% 5% bp 4%
3%
2% trade started
1% 0%
20 10 0 Sep-13
Oct-13 Nov-13 Dec-13 Jan-14
-1%
-2% Jun-13
Aug-13
Oct-13
Dec-13
Source: EFFAS, Crdit Agricole CIB. Total return difference between EFFA index maturity buckets.
luca.jellinek@ca-cib.com
The large difference between Italys financing need and Eurostat deficit in 2013 was due principally to the payment of pre-existing debt, which had, correctly, already been accounted for in previous years.
08 January 2014
130
120 110 100 90 80 150 200 250 300 350 400
IT 5s10s (bp)
15
10 5 0
-5
-10 ITDE10 (bp) -15 -20 Jan-13 Mar-13 May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13
One could look at Figure 17 above and think that the 5s10s flattener is a bearish trade. We think not it is a trade which has optionality within it due to the inflection we expect to see in periphery 5s10s slope directionality. Figure 19 puts the 5s10s slopes in context with other core and semi-core EGB paper (the dataset is the past year) and we have fitted a quadratic function through the data. Our point is simple as periphery spreads continue to tighten, the 5s10s slopes should enter a bull-flattening regime, but on the other hand the 5s10s flatteners should perform well if any serious stress materialises in periphery markets. The Italian or Spanish 5s10s flattener is thus not only cheap compared to the spread to Germany but we also expect it to be far less directional.
08 January 2014
10
140
120 100 80 60
5s10s (bp)
40
200 300 400
peter.chatwell@ca-cib.com
%
1.6 1.5
% 1.0 0.8
80
70 60 50 40 0.6
EUR bn
2012
2013
2014
1.4
30
20 10 0
79 68 65
72 71 70 58 45 35 30 15 14
20 6 5
15 15 15
BNG*
9 17 ESM
Apr-13
Jul-13
Oct-13
0.2 Jan-14
KfW
EIB
Source: Crdit Agricole CIB, Bloomberg. * KfW, CADES and BNG versus their core sovereign issuers
6
Source: Issuer websites, Crdit Agricole CIB * Crdit Agricole CIB forecast
We classify high-quality liquid issuers here as KfW, CADES and BNG alongside panEuropean issuers like EIB, EFSF, ESM and EU/EFSM.
08 January 2014
11
The few risks going into this year are likely to be specific to a minimal number of issuers. For instance, the ESM is lender/investor of last resort for the banks, which could be triggered if banks find raising capital difficult following the AQR and stress tests later this year. This could see the ESMs modest EUR17bn issuance target increase. Broadly speaking, the markets supply volume should be roughly similar to last year (Fig. 21), though this has hardly been a point of concern for some time. Another potentially vulnerable issuer is CADES due to pressure from French economic concerns. However, we do not see a decoupling of French sovereign bonds relative to their core counterparts in the months ahead even if there could be some pressure in the near term. When looking intra-market (Fig. 22 and 23) we still see potential for CADES bonds to underperform neighbouring EFSF bonds, especially the 3-7Y area of the curve. Despite the bank recapitalisation risk, we think ESM looks decent value against EFSF given its guarantee structure and creditor status. Among the more expensive issuers, KfW bonds that trade cheaper than EU bonds are attractive, such as KfW 4.375% Jul-18 at a 7bp pick-up against EU 3.25% Apr18. Meanwhile, there could be an argument for stronger-performing EIB bonds beyond the 5Y relative to their richer peers helped by its guarantee structure and diverse and historically sound loan portfolio. Fig 22. Agency/supra ASW term structures
40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 1 bp
Cheapening vs swap
Q4
CADES EU
-2 -4 -6 Richening vs swap
KfW
CADES
BNG
EIB
EU
EFSF
orlando.green@ca-cib.com
08 January 2014
12
2Y
5Y
10Y
INR
CNY
THB
HKD SGD
INR
08 January 2014
13
Individual markets
Front-end HKD IRS can continue to rise relative to USD IRS, with HKD liquidity potentially tightening. It is worth monitoring the HKD bank loan situation the percentage of HKD loans for use outside Hong Kong keeps increasing. We also notice there have been carry trades receiving 2Y and 3Y HKD IRS we would be looking to pay these rates beyond Q114. EFBNs have become bearish alongside USTs, but we see EFBNs outperform USTs, as EFBNs have a more favourable demand/supply dynamics. When asset swap trades are not viable in most Asian markets, bond investors will go for local currency bonds with a relatively stable FX outlook KRW is one of the obvious choices. Structural flows from the foreign public sector are key for KTB outperformance compared with regional peers. That said, KTB yields have to adjust higher to become attractive to more foreign investors. In this process of upward adjustments in yields, we expect the KTB curve to steepen, as foreign investors will likely choose not to leave the KRW bond market entirely but rather to shorten their portfolio duration. The KRW IRS curve should follow. In Thailand, while net LB supply in FY13/14 is scheduled to be less than in FY12/13, there is a risk that fiscal policy will become even more expansionary over the course of the year after disbursement gets back on track, with needs for stimulus and for extra money allocated to the rice pledging scheme. Asset swap trades in LBs from a USD-funded investors perspective are not appealing either. LB yields would be under upward pressure. The LB curve, however, is already very steep so we see scope for a flattening move in 2014. The THB IRS is steep as well, but it may maintain its steepness relative to the LB curve, as increased demand for overseas investment will push down 6M THBFIX an FX swap implied rate, and front-end THB IRS. In the offshore RMB market, we see further upside to CNH cross-currency swap (CCS) and offshore CGB yields across the curves. First, offshore rates have to catch up with the recent, marked upward moves in onshore CNY rates. Secondly, there would be a lack of receiving flows in CNH CCS, with the current levels still not attractive for opportunistic dim sum bond issuers to issue CNH bonds and swap the CNH proceeds back into USD. Thirdly, we suspect that a large bulk of the HKD loans for use outside of Hong Kong have been extended to mainland entities, which could result in paying flows at CNH CCS if they decide to swap the HKD loans into RMB. We expect more offshore RMB bonds to be issued in Taiwan in 2014. With the withholding tax in place, RMB bonds in Taiwan may not be particularly attractive to foreign investors. Still, there would be interest from local investors, especially if RMB bonds issued in Taiwan are to be exempt from the overseas investment limit (nothing is confirmed yet). Fig 26. Curve slope dynamics have varied
180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 bp 2/5 IRS slope USD Average of HKD, SGD, MYR, THB Average of CNY, KRW, TWD
11
12
13
14
HKD
MYR
INR
KRW
THB
CNH
SGD
frances.cheung@ca-cib.com
08 January 2014
14
Inflation-Linked Strategy
Dealing with very weak EUR inflation until Q3
Overall, 2013 was a painful year for European linkers, with falling realised inflation and increasing real yields, which resulted in large negative total returns and declining interest from investors. As an illustration, in the 10Y area, German, French and Italian breakevens all declined by about 30bp (Fig. 28). Even Italian breakevens, which had recovered in 2012 thanks to improving sentiment regarding the periphery, disappointed in 2013. Among the different factors driving breakevens, realised inflation will not help before late 2014 (Fig. 29). Indeed, we expect that Eurozone HICP inflation will remain stuck in a 0.6-1.0% corridor until end-Q314, meaning nine more months of very subdued yearly inflation. To be more precise, our hypotheses are relatively consensus-like regarding both oil prices and EUR/USD (which we see declining towards USD102/bl and 1.28 by end-2014, respectively). Only later in 2014, a declining EUR and slightly better macro conditions forecast by our economists suggest gradually rising headline inflation, to around 1.3% by end2014 and into a 1.3-1.5% range in 2015. Fig 28. Falling B/E in 2013
2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 Jan-12 DBRei 23 B/E All dow n about 30bp in 2013 Jan-13 BTPei 23 B/E Jan-14 OATei 22 B/E
Supply-wise, the issuance programmes look relatively benign in 2014. In Germany, the Finanzagentur announced an I/L issuance programme of EUR1014bn in 2014, similar to the EUR12.4bn seen in 2013. The 2014 programme will likely include new 5Y and 10Y Bundis. In France, 2014 OATi and OATei should make up about 10% of total AFT issuance, ie, about EUR17bn, which is a touch higher than 2013 total issuance (EUR15bn). The Italian issuance programme is more uncertain, given that the Italian Tesoro takes a more pragmatic approach, particularly with newer instruments such as the BTP Italia. The success of the BTP Italia 2017 issue last year (a record EUR22bn was issued in a day and a half) implies the Italian Treasury may supply more modest amounts of BTPei than in the past and tap some BTP Italia securities or attempt new maturities. With relatively stable I/L supply (France, Germany) and realised Euro inflation gyrating around 0.8% YoY in H113, the upside for core breakevens therefore looks limited for at least six months, but a further fall looks equally unlikely in our view. All in all, given our nominal yield scenario of higher core, the stabilisation in breakevens means that core real yields will rise again. A rise in 10Y German real yield of roughly 40bp by mid-June is plausible.
08 January 2014
15
Italian linkers look more attractive in relative terms. First, Italian HICPx-linked supply may be more limited than before, given a possible orientation towards BTP Italia. Secondly, Italian nominal yields should rise much more slowly than core yields (see Eurozone Relative Value section) in 2014, implying a limited rise in real yields assuming Italian breakevens stabilise. Already in 2013, Italian real yields stabilised, being the exception in the EUR I/L universe (Fig. 30). Lastly, there remains value in Italian HICPx-linked products, with real yields close to 2.6% in the 10Y area and a steep real yield curve slope. The main flipside of going long Italian I/L products is that in the past three weeks the BTPei 10Y real yield has fallen 30bp. Fig 30. Core and Italian real yield paths have diverged
1.4 1.0 0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0 Jan-12 Jan-13 DBRei 23 adj. YTM BTPei 23 adj. YTM (rs) Italy 3 2 Jan-14 OATei 22 adj. YTM Core 7 6 5 4
2019 OAT i
2024
2029 Germ i
2034
2039 BTP i
Source: Crdit Agricole CIB, Bloomberg. Real yields and breakevens are seasonally adjusted
jean-francois.perrin@ca-cib.com
08 January 2014
16
Trade recommendations
Trade Type 1 2 3 Switch old for current 7Y USD 2-5Y German ASW box Buy 10Y OATs vs DSLs & RAGBs Switch duration into sovereign credit risk 5Y KfW vs EU bonds 10Y UST vs 10Y Germany Spain-Italy 4-5-5Y fly Buy/ Receive Current 7Y (T 1.375% Jan 20) Schatz ASW spread Current 10Y OAT 1-3Y EFFAS Spanish index KFW 4.375 Jul-18 10Y UST (T 1.75% May-23) BTP Jun17 Sell/Pay Old 7Y (T 1.125% Dec 19) 5Y OBL ASW spread Current 10Y DSL & 10Y RAGB 7-10Y EFFAS German index EU 3.25 Apr18 10Y Bund (DBR 1.5% May-23) Bono Oct16 and Bono Jan18 US 7Y Swap Spread 3Y UST 0.875 Sep -16 UST 2 Feb-23 UST 1.375 09/18 -7.9 bp 94.9 bp Entry Level 2.2 bp -9.5 bp 18 bp Entry Date 04/02/13 03/04/13 20/05/13 Exit Date 08/01/14 08/01/14 open Target 2 bp -2 bp 10 bp Stop 3 bp -12 bp Latest 2.4 bp -2.2 bp 11.9 bp 1M Carry 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp P&L 0.2 bp 7.3 bp 6.1 bp
19/06/13
open
0 bp
5.25%
5 6
02/07/13 17/07/13
-12 bp 105bp
-12.8 bp 105.7 bp
0 bp 0 bp
-4.9 bp -10.8 bp
7 8
5bp
13.7 bp -4.4 bp
1 bp 0bp -3bp
38 bp -11 bp 6.8 bp
Buy 7Y Swap Spread Sell current 3Y UST 9 and buy current 2Y UST Buy Current UST 10 10Y vs 2nd UST 10Y 11 Sell 5Y UST vs 3Y UST & 7Y UST
2Y UST 0.25 Sep-15 UST 2.5 Aug23 UST 0.625 10/16 & UST 2 09/20 US 2Y swap spread UST 3.625 08/43 UST 0.25 10/15 & UST 1.25 10/18 BTPS 3.5 11/17 US 5Y Swap Spread ESM Oct 18
-50bp
-20bp
-34.8 bp
5.9 bp
16/10/13
open
4bp
6.8 bp
0bp
-0.9 bp
-8.8 bp 12 bp
17/10/13 05/11/13
0bp 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp
12 2Y Swap Spread 13 10Y - 30Y Flattener 14 2-3-5Y Fly sell belly 15 BTP 3-4Y flattener 16 5Y Swap Spread 17 Buy ESM Oct-18 against EFSF Jul-18
EFSF Jul 18
-0.9 bp
-10bp
2.1 bp
-1.7 bp
Receive 3M Eonia 18 and pay 9 x 12M Eonia Sell 5Y UST vs 7Y 19 UST 20 21 BTP-Bund 20232016 Box buy 2Y Schatz in ASW
3M Eonia UST 2 Nov-20 BTP 4.5 03/24 & OBL 1.25 10/16
9x12M Eonia UST 1.25 Nov18 DBR 1.5 05/23 & BTP 2.75 11/16 Schatz ASW spread UST 0.625 Nov-16 UST 1.25 Nov18 UST 2.75 Nov -23 UST 0.25 Nov15 UST 0.625 Dec-16 UST 2.5 Aug23
open open open open 08/01/14 open open open open open
0 bp 0 bp -2.5 bp 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp 0 bp
-0.5 bp 3.9 bp -4.4 bp 3.2 bp 7.9 bp 8.3 bp 9.9 bp 9.5 bp -0.2 bp 0.1 bp
22 US 2-3Y steepener 23 US 5-10Y flattener Buy 30Y UST vs 10Y Sell 2Y UST into 25 German 2Y Sell 3Y UST vs 10Y 26 UST Switch out of 10Y 27 1st old into 10Y Current 24
UST 0.25 Nov15 UST 2.75 Nov23 UST 3.75 Nov43 2Y Schatz Dec-15 UST 2.75 Nov23 UST 2.75 Nov23
08 January 2014
17
Trade 1: The 7Y current (Jan 2020) appears cheap compared to older 7Y securities. Analysis of the past two years shows that a new 7Y starts off poorly but then picks up steam. The pattern of performance suggests that the 7Y current will become more expensive to the spline curve in the coming weeks. Take Profit. Trade 2: The heightened perception of banking credit risk in recent weeks has benefited bonds in the 5Y area most against swaps. Our medium-term view for a simmering of fears should therefore see the OBL cheapen against swaps gradually. We recommend selling the OBL against swaps in a 2-5Y German swap spread box. Take Profit Trade 3: We plotted the z-spread of benchmark core-Eurozone 10Y bonds to the Euribor swap curve against both credit ratings and adjusted required-primary-balances. From a statistical standpoint, French OATs offer better value than Dutch and Austrian paper in the 10Y area, and we would overweight it until the spread shrinks. Hold. Trade 4: This trade involves swapping interest rate risk for credit risk while maintaining running yield in EGBs. Essentially, we sell longer-dated core paper and buy short-duration periphery paper with comparable yields. If economic recovery in the G10 bond markets does take place, then fiscal benefits to the periphery will be considerable. Hold. Trade 5: In the intra-market, relative moves have made the pricing order among issuers fuzzier than before (eg, KfW was the most expensively priced issuer, pre-LTRO). In some cases, EU bonds are trading more expensively than neighbouring KfW bonds. We think the KfW 4.375% Jul-18 looks decent value against the EU 3.25% Apr-18 at -8bp. Take Loss Trade 6: The spread between the two blocs is at its 89th percentile. If the US economy really begins to grow, a lot of the safe-haven premium for Bunds will go. Hold. Trade 7: Spain has outperformed Italy since mid-2012 with the trend accelerating post the Italian elections. Though we look upon the current economic position of Spain more favourably than that of Italy we see relative headline risks as more balanced than the current market suggests and note that sharp Italy-Spain spread swings have provided good trading opportunities in the past. Given current momentum in favour of Spain we would be very cautious about building a long Italy position. We enter the Spain Italy 3-4-5Y. Take Profit Trade 8: Swap spreads tend to widen on a seasonal basis leading into Q4. This widening bias should be reinforced by the current government shutdown/debt-ceiling concerns. Based on our models, existing swap spreads are due an adjustment. This trade looks particularly good at the 7Y tenor since the 7Y swap spread has cheapened of late. Buy 7Y swap spread. Take Loss. Trade 9: Following the unexpected Fed tapering delay, the 3Y yield has dropped to an important support level of 0.61 and, without further impetus, we dont see it dropping below this level so we consider this a good level to sell. However, selling the 3Y directly would generate roll and carry losses of about 14.5bp per 3 months. To offset this we recommend buying the 2Y, which in turn will reduce the losses to about 3bp. Hold. Trade 10: As the debt ceiling approached, off-the-run issues declined in liquidity; in the event of a default this effect would y be exacerbated, in which case we would expect some liquidity premium from holding the current 10Y, which would reduce some of the recent cheapening of the 10Y. However, if the debt-ceiling issue was resolved so the 5-10Y part of the curve should probably flatten as the belly unwinds its recent outperformance leading to some flattening of the current 10Y relative to the 2nd old. Buy current 10Y UST and sell 1st old 10Y UST. Hold. Trade 11: Carry and roll have recently moved inversely to yield movements strengthening the 5Y sector (due to improved carry). We believe that delayed Fed tapering and the appointment of Yellen are already priced into markets and that the following month will be data-heavy with added uncertainty on the impact of the shutdown. For this reason we sacrifice potential carry by selling the 5Y UST vs the 3Y and 7Y USTs. Take Loss. Trade 12: Since the 2Y swap spread is highly influenced by the date of the taper and also highly correlated to the MOVE volatility index, which has increased of late, we expect the spread to increase. Buy the 2Y swap spread. Hold. Trade 13: The 10-30Y spread is also a taper proxy since the lack of a taper reduces the attractiveness (in roll and carry terms) of the 10-30Y flattener, leading to the unwinding of such trades in the event of a taper. Whats more, this spread sits just below an important resistance of 110bp. Therefore, positive surprises from Fridays announcement have scope to impact the spread to the upside, with more limited potential to influence to the downside. We enter the 10-30Y flattener at about 110bp with a target of 100bp and a stop at 112bp. Hold. Trade 14: Whilst Yellen advocated the optimal control method for calculating interest rates recently suggested in two papers (which suggests very low rates for some time to come), she also noted that it suffers strong assumptions and advocated a Taylor rule, which produces much higher appropriate rate levels for end-2015 than implied by OIS forwards. We believe that the recent disjointedness in the curve is overdone and that the market is fully priced only at the front end of the curve. We sell the US 3Y in a 2-3-5Y Butterfly trade. Hold. Trade 15: Given ongoing spread convergence and ECB liquidity support we would expect the 2s4s spread to flatten in Spain and Italy to about 80bp (from about 110bp at present). However, that trade has a carry cost of about 6bp over the next six months. A less carry-expensive alternative is the BTP 3s4s flattener (currently about 50bp) with a 6-month carry cost of about 1bp. Hold. Trade 16: UST Swap spreads have not widened as much as anticipated recently. This can be attributed to a number of possible factors including curve steepening and an improved swap curve credit rating. However, the current situation of an
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Germ any
France
Italy
Spain
EUR sw aps
JPY JGBs
JPY sw aps
GBP
UK Gilts
GBP sw aps
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Kazuhiko Ogata
Chief Economist Japan +81 3 4580 5360 Yoshiro Sato Economist Japan +81 3 4580 5337 Frances Cheung Head of Asian Rates Strategy +852 2826 1520
Luca Jellinek Head of European Interest Rates Strategy +44 20 7214 6244 Peter Chatwell Senior Interest Rates Strategist +44 20 7214 5289 Orlando Green Senior Interest Rates Strategist +44 20 7214 7467 Jean-Franois Perrin Inflation Strategist +33 1 41 89 94 22 Sbastien Barb Head of EM Research and Strategy +33 1 41 89 15 97 Jakub Borowski Chief Economist - Crdit Agricole Bank Polska SA + 48 22 573 18 40 Alexander Pecherytsyn Chief Economist Crdit Agricole Bank Ukraine + 38 44 493-9014 Guillaume Tresca Senior Emerging Market Strategist +33 1 41 89 18 47 Adam Myers European Head of FX Strategy +44 20 7214 7468 Manuel Oliveri FX Strategist +44 20 7214 7469
David Keeble ** Global Head of Interest Rates Strategy +1 212 261 3274 Jonathan Rick ** IRD Strategist +1 212 261 4096
Frances Cheung Head of Asian Rates Strategy +852 2826 1520 Dariusz Kowalczyk Senior Economist/Strategist Asia ex-Japan +852 2826 1519
Certification
The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned analyst(s). In addition, the undersigned analyst(s) has not and will not receive any compensation for providing a specific recommendation or view in this report. David Keeble Luca Jellinek Peter Chatwell Orlando Green Jonathan Rick Frances Cheung Jean-Franois Perrin Important: Please note that in the United States, this fixed income research report is considered to be fixed income commentary and not fixed income research. Notwithstanding this, the Crdit Agricole CIB Research Disclaimer that can be found at the end of this report applies to this report in the United States as if references to research report were to fixed income commentary. Products and services are provided in the United States through Crdit Agricole Securities (USA), Inc.
This commentary has been produced by Credit Agricole Securities (USA) Inc.s (CAS -USA) Fixed Income FX Department and is not a fixed income research report prepared by a research analyst. These views may differ from those of the Research Department. The material contained in this commentary is intended solely for accredited, expert institutional investors and is provided for informational purpose only. This commentary is based on data obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, but is not guaranteed as to accuracy and does not purport to be complete. Any comments regarding the future direction of financial markets is illustrative and is not intended to predict actual results. It should not be construed as advice designed to meet the particular investment needs of any investor, nor as an offer or solicitation to buy or sell the securities or other products mentioned herein. Changes to assumptions may have a material impact on any returns detailed. Price and availability are subject to change without notice. No representation is made that any transaction can be effected at the values provided. The values provided are not necessarily the values carried on CAS-USAs books.
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