耶鲁博弈论24讲全笔记

24
:v 2.0Gabriel
By Apollo QQ:77981960
Gabriel QQ460323397
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Gabriel QQ460323397
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(
).Strategies_and_games-theory_and_practice(Dutta).pdf
2001
Ben
/ Ben
Ben George Bailey
13
Gabriel QQ460323397
James Stewart
Ben
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Gabriel
Gabriel
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Gabriel QQ460323397

Introduction: five first lessons
4

Thinking Strategically Ben
A C
B- B+
01-01
01-02
17
Gabriel QQ460323397
01-03
01-04
A 3
18
Gabriel QQ460323397
Evil gits

0 -1
3 1

1
115Inefficient
A B A B 5
1 2
2
Rational choices can lead to bad outcomes.
Indignant Angel
AC A C 3 4 = 1
-4
CA C A 1 2 = 3
19
Gabriel QQ460323397
-2
01-05
coordination problem
3
You can't get what you want , till you know what you want.
Evil gits VS.
Indignant Angel
20
01-06
me = Evil gits
Indignant Angel VS. Evil gits
01-07
me = Indignant Angel
21
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397
0 -3
1 -1
4
Yale students are evil.
0 -1
3 1

0 -3
5
Put yourself in other's shoes and try to figure out what they will do.
1 100
2/3
22
Gabriel QQ460323397

Putting yourselves into other people'sshoes
P85
players
strategies
S
= {1,2,3 100}
s s a strategy profile
payoffs 1 N
i
()
23
5
() =
02-01
12
S1 = { , }S2 = , ,
U1 = , = 11U2 = , = 3
24
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397
02-02
25
Gabriel QQ460323397
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
for all
for some
player
P38
# #
( , ) (# , )
( , ) > (# , )
common knowledge mutual knowledge

[ 68100 ] 100 100 2/366 2/3
[ 167 ] [ 4567 ]
26
Gabriel QQ460323397
[ 4567 ] [ 68100 ]
[ 68100 ]
[ 4567 ]
27
Gabriel QQ460323397

Iterative deletion and the median-votertheorem
10 10%
03-01
03-01 1 2 1
1 2 4 10
3 3
1 2
1(1,1) = 50% < 1 (2,1) = 90%
1 (1,1) 1
1 1
1 2
28
Gabriel QQ460323397
1 (1,2) = 10% < 1 (2,2) = 50%

1 (1,3) = 15% < 1 (2,3) = 20%
1 (1,4) = 20% < 1 (2,4) = 25%
2 1 2 5%
9 10
1 2 3
1 (2,1) = 90% < 1 (3,1) = 85%
1 10 3 2
2,310 2 3
2 93 84 7 5 6

P51-P52
10
Median Voter Theorem
M.Neil Brtuart Stuart

M.Keele
critical thinking
29
Gabriel QQ460323397
PDCA plandocheckaction
Best Response
03-02
U L BR
M R BR
30
Gabriel QQ460323397
LR 1/2,1/2
1
U 5 2 + 0 2 = 2
M 1 2 + 4 2 = 2
D 4 2 + 2 2 = 3
2/31/3
31
Gabriel QQ460323397
03-03
UMD
R
R X U
R Y M
XY D
XY
32
X=1/3
33
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397

Best responses in soccer and businesspartnerships
04-01
4
1 , = 4 40%
34
Gabriel QQ460323397
04-02
90% 10%
1/2 BR
BR
PS

35
Gabriel QQ460323397
04-03
833877
X
BR BR
( , ) ( , )
for all in
for all
36
Gabriel QQ460323397
si
si
si
solves
( , )
BR
p BR
P p
( , ) ( , )
solves
VNM
for all in
( , )
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern)

P21
37
Gabriel QQ460323397
1 (, ) = () 1 ( , ) + () 1 ( , )
50%
Si =[0,4]
0 4
b
1
4[s1 +s2 + s1 s2 ] b [0 , ]
4
U1 = s1 s2 =
1
[4 (s1 + s2 + bs1 s2 ] 12
2
50%12
1 2 S1 0
2(1 + 2 + 1 2 ) 12
2(1 + bs2 ) 21 = 0
02< 0
1 = 1 + bs2 = BRs2 s2
38
Gabriel QQ460323397
2 = 1 + 1 = 1
1
1 (2 ) = 1 + 2
4
s2 [0,4] 1 s2 BR
2 s1 BR
04-04
39
Gabriel QQ460323397
[01) U (24] 1
04-05
2 04-06
40
Gabriel QQ460323397
04-06
04-07
41
Gabriel QQ460323397
04-08
04-08
42
Gabriel QQ460323397
1 = 1 + 2
1
2 = 1 + 1 1 = 2 =
1
1 = 2
externality
43
Gabriel QQ460323397

Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bankruns
1 2
NENash Equilibrium
NE player
player
NE
player NE NE
self-fulfilling/self-enforcing
44
Gabriel QQ460323397
5-01
1 () = 2 () =
1 () = 2 () =
1 () = 2 () =
= 1 BR 2 BR
45
5-02
NE
NE = MC
46
Gabriel QQ460323397

NE
= =
10$ 0$
0$ 0$
10$
5$
90%
10$ 90%
47
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397
self-enforcing
NE
NE guess and check
NE
coordination game
a wonderful life
Jimmy Stewart NE
48
Gabriel QQ460323397

Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
Going to the movies
BThe Bourne Ultimatum
GThe Good Shepherd
SSnow White and the Seven Dwarfs
If you are doing that strategy, take it from a Brit, most princes are as dumb as toast, not
worth waiting for.
-B-G
-S
49
Gabriel QQ460323397
6-01
S
6-02
= =
Battle Of The Sexes

Cournot Duopoly
P69
1 2
c c
50
Gabriel QQ460323397
ab
p = a b (1 + 2 )
6-03
1 1 2 = 1 1
1 1 2 = 1 12 1 2 1
51
Gabriel QQ460323397
2 -2b
1 1 2
q1=0 Max q1
21 2 = 0
2
1 =
2
2
q1
a 2bq1 q2 c
2b < 0
B1 (2 ) = 1 =
1 2
2 (1 ) = 2 =
q2
2
2
2
2
2 0
1 (0) =
52
Gabriel QQ460323397
1 2 0
6-04
BR
d
v_2.0
53
Gabriel QQ460323397

PPT

6-04 MR 2 -2b
acd
= ta
= 2 =
54
Gabriel QQ460323397
6-05
2 1 1 = 2
2
=
2
2
2
1 =
2
2
1
= 2
3
1 =
100
55
Gabriel QQ460323397
6-06

1 2 A
56
Gabriel QQ460323397
6-07
2 1 C

57
Gabriel QQ460323397
> >
>2
>
3
2
< <
58
Gabriel QQ460323397
Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing andvoting on a line

Bertrand competition
1 c
1 1 2 2
s
0 1
() = 1 p
1
1 1 ( 1 < 2 )
0
( 1 > 2 )
1 =
1 1
( 1 = 2 )
2
1 1 1 = 1 ( 1 )
NE 1 BR 2
1 > 1 ( 2 < )
= 2 ( < 2 MO )
B1 ( 2 ) =
MO ( 2 MO )
( 2 = )
59
Gabriel QQ460323397
2 1 2
2 1
2 1
2 1
= ( 1 = 2 = )
Bertrand Paradox
Linear city model

01 y 1 y
2 1-y
7-01
60
Gabriel QQ460323397
y 1 1 + 2 1
2 2 1 + (1 )2
Candidate-Voter model
B C B>2C
X Y | |
Mr.x
Mr.x Mr.y Mr.x | |
Mr.x Mr.y Mr.x | |
= 2$ = 1$ 17
17
61
17
Gabriel QQ460323397
7-02
NE
Mr.x
NE
4 7 123 8
910
62
Gabriel QQ460323397
Nash equilibrium: location, segregationand randomization
1 NE
8-01
1/6 1/2 5/6 1/3
1/6 5/6
3
63
Gabriel QQ460323397
Location model
10
10
15 2/3
5
64
Gabriel QQ460323397
8-02
NE NE
Tipping Point
65
Gabriel QQ460323397
randomizationbussing
NE
Mixed strategies
8-03
pure NE
NE 1/3
66
Gabriel QQ460323397
Rock vs.
3
U1 RR + U1 RS + U1 RP = 3 0 + 3 1 + 3 (1) = 0
ScissorPaper
1/3
1
vs.
3
U1 =
1
1
1
+ + =0
3
3
3
1/3 1/3 BR NE
67
Gabriel QQ460323397
Mixed strategies in theory and tennis

( )

( )
= =
3
1
3
68
Gabriel QQ460323397
9-01
1
2
1 4
=( , )
5 5
1 1
=( , )
2 2
1
1
1 = 2 + 0 = 1
2
2
1
1 1
1 = 0 + 1 =
2
2 2
1
4
1 + 1
5
5
1
4 1 3
= 1+ =
5
5 2 5
1 =
BR BR
1 2 NE
i
BR
BR
Venus Williams and Serena Williams

Venus
69
Gabriel QQ460323397
9-02
1 ( ) Venus
Venus 80% 20%
Serena NE NE
9-03
70
Gabriel QQ460323397
Serena NE 1 Venus
Venus Serena (1 )
L50 + 80 (1 )
R90 + 20 (1 )
Venus NE L R
= 0.6 Serena NE
Venus Serena Venus
Venus
Venus
Serena NE 1 Serena
Serena
l50 + 10 (1 )
r20 + 80 (1 )
= 0.7
= [ 0.70.3 ( 0.60.4 ) ]
Serena 0.6 Venus BR

Serena 0.6 Venus BR
71
Gabriel QQ460323397
9-04
Serena

= 0.5
12
<
10
1:P101
2 P103
3P104
72
Gabriel QQ460323397

Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
= 0.7
= 0.6
BR
Venus Serena BR
10-01
Venus
Venus ( 0.60.4 )
L [ L 0.60.4 ] = 50 0.6 + 80 0.4 = 62

73
Gabriel QQ460323397
R R 0.60.4 = 90 0.6 + 20 0.4 = 62
Venus
1 0.60.4 = 0.7 62 + 0.3 62 = 62
Ben Polak
Venus
apple picking
Yale Rep and see play
74
Gabriel QQ460323397
10-02
NE APAP REPREP
NE Nina David
[ AP 1 ] = 2 + 0 (1 ) = 2
REP 1 = 0 + 1 (1 ) = 1
= 1 =
3
= 1 =
3
3
3
BR
75
2
Gabriel QQ460323397
2
NE
3
3
3
3
tax payer auditor

honestly cheat
10-03
4 4
0
2
76
Gabriel QQ460323397
-10 4
NE NE
A 1 = 2 + 4 (1 ) = 4 2
N 1 = 4 + 0 (1 ) = 4
=
2
3
2
7
NE
7
-10 -20
77
Gabriel QQ460323397
10-04
2
3
H 1 = 0 + 0 (1 ) = 0
C 1 = 20 + 4 (1 ) = 24 + 4
1
6
78
Gabriel QQ460323397
1
6
<7
1.
1 player ta
2 player
3
2.
1 player player
2 player player
player
3
79
Gabriel QQ460323397

Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
Evolution

DNA RNA
80
Gabriel QQ460323397
cooperate
defect
11-01
~(1 )~ 2 (1 ) + 0 = 2 2
81
Gabriel QQ460323397
D~(1 )~ 3 (1 ) + 1 = 3 2
> C D Evolutionarily Stable ES
ES
11-02
1
D~(1 )~ 3 + 1 (1 ) = 1 + 2
~(1 )~ 2 + 0 (1 ) = 2
> D C ES

ES
82
Gabriel QQ460323397
11-03
ES
~(1 )~(1 ) 0 + 1 =
~(1 )~(1 ) 1 + 0 = 1
b ES c ES
s s s NE S ES
s ES s s ES
83
Gabriel QQ460323397
11-04
NE
~0
~(1 ) 0 + 1 =
ES
s s NE s s BR s ES
1.Maynard Smith 1972
ES
(1 ) +
> (1 ) +
84
Gabriel QQ460323397
<
2.
ES
(a) NE for all
(b) NE = >
1 2
NE ES
() ( , ) , for all
()( , ) = , , ,
ES
85
Gabriel QQ460323397

Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
12-01
ES
NE aa
NE aa NE
a

ES
>
evolution of social convention
86
Gabriel QQ460323397
12-02
NE LL RR NE ES
RR LL
12-03
Battle Of The Sexes
a b
Chicken Game
P33
87
NE ba ab
Gabriel QQ460323397
NE
NE
2
3
3 3 3

Monomorphic
polymorphic
ES

(a)
(b)
NE
, NE
, > ,
( , ) = ,
2
3
3 3 3
a
NE
ES(b) ,
for all mixed mutations
> ,
88
Gabriel QQ460323397
ES
SLF sneaky little Ben
Hawk and Dove
12-04
> 0
> 0
D ESSEvolutionarily Stable Strategy
NE DD NE ESS
H ESS
NE HH
89
(1)
(2)
0 >
Gabriel QQ460323397
NE
= 0 (, ) = (, )
H ESS
H D ESS
=
2
>

NE
12-05
90
, =

+ ( 1 )
, = 0 + ( 1 )
=
Gabriel QQ460323397
NE 1
NE
, > ,
< ES
(a)

(b)
1 2

(c) identification
91
Gabriel QQ460323397
12-06
1<<2
scratch bite trample

ESS
1 1 1
( , , ) =
3 3 3
, > ,
=
, =
1+
3
(1 < < 2)
, = 1
>
92
Gabriel QQ460323397
ESS
93
Gabriel QQ460323397

Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
Cash in a hat
extensive
Sequential games
2 1 1
94
Gabriel QQ460323397
13-01
Ben
1) 2
2
2)
3)
4)
anticipation
BR
95
Gabriel QQ460323397
Thinking Strategically looking

forwardthinking backward
13-02
1. 2 2
1.5 1 3 2 2
2. 1 01
-3 1
BIbackward induction
96
Gabriel QQ460323397
moral hazard
3$ 3$ 321.93.1
incentive design
collateral
AD 1066
Norman
Saxon
Fighting Running Away
BurnNot Burn
97
Gabriel QQ460323397
13-03
F
commitment
Dr. Strangelove Stanley Kubrick
98
Gabriel QQ460323397
Node End Node edge path
13-04
5 4
4
3 4 2
2 3
1
99
Gabriel QQ460323397

Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
14-01
> 1
+ 2 >

>2
>
3
2
100
Gabriel QQ460323397

Stackelberg
2 1 2
14-02
1 BR 2 2
101
1
2
Gabriel QQ460323397
2 1
1 2
Strategic Substitutes
1 2 1 B2 1
1 2
1
1 > 1 2 < 2
1
1 + 2
2 1 1 1
102
Gabriel QQ460323397
14-03
1 22
1 1 1
tanC
103
Gabriel QQ460323397
14-04
y = x tan45y = x
tan135
Ben
(1 + 2 )
CSconsumer surplus
104
= (1 + 2 )
1 2
2 =
1 + 2 2 2
1 + 2 1 1
1
2
]1 =
1 =0
: 1 =
1
2
1
12
2
=0
2
2
105
Gabriel QQ460323397
NE
1

=
2
2 2
4
2 =
1 =
1 = 2 =
>
2
1 + 2 =
Gabriel QQ460323397
=
3
2 =
<
4
3( ) 2( )
>
= 1 + 2
4
3

sunk cost
P24
NIM
( ) 2 1 21
12
106
Gabriel QQ460323397
21 1
14-05
22 2
107
Gabriel QQ460323397
14-06
21
NIM
108
Gabriel QQ460323397

Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
Zermelo theorem
1 1 win 1 loss tie
1 2
1 2
2 1
NIM
by induction
N
15-01
109
Gabriel QQ460323397
N
pathN
N + 1
15-02
N=3
N+1 = 4
3 2
induction hypothesis 3
W 2 L
110
Gabriel QQ460323397
15-03
1
N N+1
Marienbad
N M
15-04
111
Gabriel QQ460323397
NM
games of perfect information
1
1
15-05
2 [ ]
[]
112
1
BI [ ]
Gabriel QQ460323397
[ ] [ ] [ ]
15-06
NE [ ] [ ]
NE BI NE
Ent Inc Inc Ent

113
15-07
15-08
NE
BI
iN ou
iN
ou
114
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397

Backward induction: reputation and duels
1%
the Chain
Store Paradox
Duel
() i d
115
Gabriel QQ460323397
16-01
chome http://graph.tk/ 1/2 1/3
Dominance Argument BI
A
116
B
Gabriel QQ460323397
() 1 ( 1) () + ( 1) 1
() + ( 1) = 1
i j
= 0 () = 1
Sometimes waiting is a good strategy.
117
Gabriel QQ460323397

Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
1 2
1 2 1
1 S
2 1 S
S1 S
2 SS 1 00
two period bargaining

1 1 2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 0,0
discounting < 1 = 0.9
100 10%
100 10 110
100 100 110
118
Gabriel QQ460323397
17-01
Gabriel
offerer player1receiver
player2
1-3 n
1 0 player 2 player 1 ta player 1
1,0 ta
2 2 player 1 ta 0,1
player 1 player 1 1 2,
1 , n
player 1 player 2
player 2 player 1
119
Gabriel QQ460323397
17-02
1 2 2
1 1
1 2 > 1 2
1 2 < 1 2
2 1
1 2
120
Gabriel QQ460323397
Ben
1 2
110 2 110
10% 100
alternate offer bargaining

10
1 + 2 3 + + 8 9 = 10
2 + 3 + 9 10 = 10
+ 1 10 = (1 + ) 10
10
1 10
=
1+
+ 10
(1 ) =
1+
10
2 1 2 2
3 2 2 1
2 2 1
1 (1 )
121
(1
Gabriel QQ460323397
1
1
=
=
1+
1+
=
=
1+
1+
1
1
1
= ;
=
1+ 2
1+ 2
1

1
1 = 2
2
122
Gabriel QQ460323397

Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
18-01
123
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-02
information set
2 2 1
124
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-03
2
18-04
1
perfect information
125
Gabriel QQ460323397
Ben player
perfect recall
imperfect information
18-05
126
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-06
pure strategies
127
18-07
128
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-08
129
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-09
18-10
1
2
130
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-11
NE
BI
131
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-12
132
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-13
NE
18-14
133
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-15
2 3
18-16
NE
sub-game
134
Gabriel QQ460323397
18-17
(1 2
) NE
SPEsub-game perfect equilibrium

NE
SPE NE
SPE
135
Gabriel QQ460323397

Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
don't screw up
19-01
136
19-02
NE
BI
sub-game perfect
137
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397
19-03
NE
NE ,
, ,
19-04
NE
138
Gabriel QQ460323397
19-05
NE ,
NE ,
19-06
NE
139
, ,
SPE
Matchmaker game
Dave Gaddis Cold War

Nina Spence China
19-07
140
Gabriel QQ460323397
, BI
Gabriel QQ460323397
19-08
NE , ,
SPE=
1 1
sen, , , ,
1 1 0
NE
2
NE 3 3 3 3
1 2 3
1
4
9
1 0
SPE= no sen, mi, mi
2
3
1 + (1) =
1
9
+ =
1
9
3 SPE NE
141
Gabriel QQ460323397
= 2 ( + ) = 1$/
3
21
1
3
=1
= 2 = = 1
3
= 2 ( + ) = 2 (1 + 1) = 1 $/
3
1
3
A A
A
0.7
0.5$/
1 Accountant
142
Gabriel QQ460323397
1 0.5$/1 50
70 70 >50
2 Economic
19-09
143
=
16
0.19
Gabriel QQ460323397
0.5 + 0.19 = 0.69 < 0.7
3 Game Theory
( , )
144
Gabriel QQ460323397
19-10
Strategic Substitutes
A
A B
31
145
Gabriel QQ460323397
0.69 + 0.31 = 1 > 0.7
19-11
70
strategic effect
RL'R
R'L' NE players
Ben
146
19-12
147
Gabriel QQ460323397
Gabriel QQ460323397

Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
FightQuit
= 1$
= 0.75$
0
war of attrition
bribery contests
all pay auction
148
Gabriel QQ460323397
20-01
B f2 q2
149
Gabriel QQ460323397
20-02
NE
[(2), (2)] = (, 0) [(2), (2)] = (0, )
20-03
150
Gabriel QQ460323397
20-04
{ [(1), (2)][(1), (2)] }
{ [(1), (2)][(1), (2)] }
151
Gabriel QQ460323397
20-05
NE
A Fight
A Quit
c + (1 )
0 + 0 (1 )
;1 =
v+
v+
NE
NE 0,0
v+
152
Gabriel QQ460323397
20-06
0 NE
SPE
0
NE
0
153
Gabriel QQ460323397

Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
Repeated Interaction
21-01
21-02
154
Gabriel QQ460323397
lame duck effect
21-03
AA NE
BBCC NE
AA
AA
AA A C B
155
Gabriel QQ460323397
AACC
BB
A (, ) = 4 + (, ) = 3 = 7
B (, ) = 5 + (, ) = 1 = 6
(, ) (, ) (, ) (, ) 5 4 3 1
NE
Bankruptcy
Bail Out
discussion of trading off ex-ante efficiency and ex-post
efficiency
156
Gabriel QQ460323397
21-04
75%
C D C D D
Grim Trigger Strategy
[ ]
157
Gabriel QQ460323397

Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
YYeTs
promise threat
NE
SPE NE
22-01
158
Gabriel QQ460323397

3 2 = 2 = 0
2 + 2 + 2 2 + +2 =
=
2
1
n 0
1 (1 )
=
1
Ben
p 1/1+r
p/1+r
P/1+r=delta
2
(0)
1
159
Gabriel QQ460323397
(1 ) 2
1
3
D C D
= 3 (1) +
2 (0) +
=3
1/3
SPE
1/3
one-period punishment

160
Gabriel QQ460323397
SPE
[ ]
3 2 [ = 2 = 2 ]
1[
2
2
]
1
1
2
[ 1 ]
1
1 2
1
2
SPE

Repeated Moral Hazard
161
Gabriel QQ460323397
22-02
Freedonia 0 1
WHonestCheat
1
1
4 1
3 ww
BIw = 1
w 2
= 2
Freedonia 1 2 100%
162
Gabriel QQ460323397

[ ]
The value of continuing the relationship minus the value of ending the relationship
2 [ 1 ]
1 1
(1 ) 2 (1 ) 1
(1 ) 2 + 1
= 0 = 2
= 1 = 1
= 1/2 = 1.5
50%
163
Gabriel QQ460323397

Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education

A B B
A
= +
B A A
B B A
164
Gabriel QQ460323397
23-01
A BR
A
A BR
165
Gabriel QQ460323397
Informational Unraveling
Costly Signaling
good workersG 5010%
bad workersB 3090%
5030
32B G
Mike Spence
MBA 5
10
MBA
G-worker MBA 50
3 5 5 35
MBA 30 < 35
166
Gabriel QQ460323397
B-worker MBA 30
MBA 50
3 10 10 20< 30
separating equilibrium
Ben
MBA 1 B-worker MBA 40

MBA 30
MBA 2
MBA
1
2
3
167
Gabriel QQ460323397

Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
Auction
common values
private values
[ ]
[ ]
winner's curse
-
0
= +
168
Gabriel QQ460323397
Initial Public Offerings IPO
= 150 <
A First-price Sealed-bid auction A=D

B Second-price Sealed-bid auction
Vickrey auction
C Ascending open auction
169
Gabriel QQ460323397
D Descending open auction

Dutch auction
=
B C
BC
170

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耶鲁博弈论24讲 全笔记

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24

v_2.0_Quickoffice Pro_5.0.164 .apk

G10 reader 10.1

G10 reader 10.1

Evil gits VS.

common knowledge mutual knowledge

1 (1,2) = 10% < 1 (2,2) = 50%

M.Neil Brtuart Stuart

(Von Neumann and Morgenstern)

Battle Of The Sexes

Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing andvoting on a line

Linear city model

Nash equilibrium: location, segregationand randomization

Mixed strategies in theory and tennis

Venus Williams and Serena Williams

Serena 0.6 Venus BR

L [ L 0.60.4 ] = 50 0.6 + 80 0.4 = 62

R R 0.60.4 = 90 0.6 + 20 0.4 = 62

1 0.60.4 = 0.7 62 + 0.3 62 = 62

tax payer auditor

> C D Evolutionarily Stable ES

(a) NE for all

evolution of social convention

for all mixed mutations

scratch bite trample

Thinking Strategically looking

Dr. Strangelove Stanley Kubrick

Node End Node edge path

1 1 win 1 loss tie

Ent Inc Inc Ent

Sometimes waiting is a good strategy.

two period bargaining

alternate offer bargaining

SPEsub-game perfect equilibrium

Dave Gaddis Cold War

SPE= no sen, mi, mi

0.5 + 0.19 = 0.69 < 0.7

0.69 + 0.31 = 1 > 0.7

[(2), (2)] = (, 0) [(2), (2)] = (0, )

{ [(1), (2)][(1), (2)] }

{ [(1), (2)][(1), (2)] }

lame duck effect

Repeated Moral Hazard

MBA 1 B-worker MBA 40

Initial Public Offerings IPO

A First-price Sealed-bid auction A=D

D Descending open auction

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耶鲁博弈论24讲全笔记

耶鲁博弈论24讲全笔记