Ancient Philosophy The Presocratics

Nicholaos Jones Autumn 2011

Lecture 1: Pre-Philosophical Background [Thales] is supposed to be the originator of philosophy, and from him the Ionian school gets its name. It became the longest tradition in philosophy. - pseudo-Plutarch, Placita 1.3.1 This is a course on ancient philosophy in Europe, starting from early in the 6th century .!.". #ith Thales of $iletus, and ending in the 3rd century .!.". #ith Pyrrho of "llis. The period of ancient "uropean philosophy e%tends further than this, to at least the &th century !.". #ith Proclus. ut #e do not ha'e the time to co'er this longer period. (or do #e ha'e time to co'er the !hinese tradition, #hich begins roughly in the 6th century .!.". #ith !onfucius) the Indian tradition, #hich begins #ith the Upanishads, composed bet#een *++ and ,++ .!.". Philosophy in "urope begins in Miletus, the most illustrious of the city-states along the eastern shore of the -egean .ea /in south#estern -sia $inor0. In its early days, $iletus #as an ally of Troy, and its people, the !arians, fought against the 1ree2s /the -cheans0 in the Tro3an 4ar /so says 5omer0. 1ree2 settlers e'entually too2 control of $iletus from the nati'e !arians, and by the 6th century .!.". $iletus #as part of a group of colonies along the eastern -egean .ea called Ionia. In those days, Ionia #as the center of a 1ree2 renaissance, combining the best of 1ree2, "gyptian, and abylonian ci'ili6ation. /"%ample7 The first prose boo2s--in "urope at least--#ere #ritten in the Ionian dialect, #ith the Ionian alphabet.0 $iletus #as an important trading to#n in Ionia. ut it is not for this reason alone that 5erodotus called $iletus the 83e#el of Ionia8 /Histories &.9*0. :or it is in $iletus that thin2ers emerge #ho shape the subse;uent course of "uropean philosophy. The first of these, Thales, is traditionally gi'en the title 8father of philosophy.8 (one of his #ritings sur'i'e, and #hat #e 2no# of his thought comes to us by #ay of fragments recorded by others /principally -ristotle0. 5e is famous for t#o ideas7 /10 #ater is the principle form of all matter) /90 all things are full of gods. Thales also belie'ed that magnets #ere animated) he studied the stars and allegedly founded geometry) he ga'e sage political ad'ice to the Ionians) and he #as famous for se'eral feats of engineering /the most famous of #hich is supposed to be his in'ention of the oli'e press0. ut #e ha'e no #ritten record from Thales himself of his thoughts, and the information #e do ha'e is not reliable enough to permit an understanding of his ideas. The first Ionian to lea'e a substantial #ritten record is Anaximander. -na%imander #as also from $iletus, and he probably #as a student of Thales. 4e can best understand #hat #as re'olutionary about -na%imander<s thought by contrasting his ideas #ith those of his predecessors. This also #ill gi'e us a handle on the grounds for saying that /"uropean0 philosophy begins #ith the Ionians.

-s a citi6en of a 1ree2 colony, -na%imander inherited a tradition of e%plaining the #orld in mythic terms. Hesiod, #riting around =++ .!."., recorded many of these e%planations in his Theogony. 5ere is 5esiod<s e%planation of the origin of the #orld7 5ail, children of >eus? 1i'e to me desirable song, and proclaim the holy race of immortals #ho e'er are, #ho #ere born from "arth and starry 5ea'en and @ar2 night, and #hom salty .ea nourished. Tell ho# first the gods and "arth came to be, and ri'ers and boundless sea, #ith raging s#ell, shining stars and #ide hea'en abo'e [and the gods that came from them, gi'ers of good things]) and ho# they distributed their #ealth and di'ided their honors, and ho# first they laid hold of many-folded Alympus. Tell me these things, $uses, #ho d#ell on Alympus, from the beginning) and say #ho #as first born of them. Indeed, first #as !haos born, but then broad-bosomed "arth, a steadfast seat al#ays of all [the immortals, #ho hold the pea2s of sno#y Alympus], and misty Tartarus in a recess of the #ide-#ayed earth, and "ros, #ho fairest among the immortal gods, looser of limbs, of all gods and all men, o'ercomes the thought in their breast and their #ise counsel. :rom !haos "rebus and blac2 (ight #ere born, -nd from (ight -ether and @ay #ere born, #hom she bore being #ith child after mingling in lo'e #ith "rebus. -nd "arth first bore e;ual to herself starry 5ea'en, that he might co'er her all around, that he might be a steadfast seat al#ays for the blessed gods. -nd she bore long 5ills, lo'ely haunts of the di'ine (ymphs, #ho d#ell on the #oody hills. -nd she bore the fruitless deep, #ith raging s#ell, .ea, #ithout desirable lo'e. ut then lying #ith 5ea'en she bore deep-s#irling Acean, !oeus, !rius, 5yperion, Iapetus, Theia, Bhea, Themis, $nemosyne, golden-cro#ned Phoebe and lo'ely Tethys. -fter them #as born the youngest, #ily !ronus, most terrible of her children. -nd he hated his flourishing sire. /1+,-3*0

5esiod<s gi'es his e%planation as part of an epic poem, #hich is probably an artifact of the poem ha'ing been transmitted orally through generations. /5esiod li'ed #hen alphabetic #riting #as ne#.0 4hat is important for us, ho#e'er is not so much the style of 5esiod<s e%planation as the substance. 5esiod offers a genealogical e%planation. The first beings are !haos /signifying a gap0, "arth, and Tartarus /the under#orld0. :rom !haos comes dar2 and light) from "arth, 5ea'en and hills and, in an incestuous union #ith 5ea'en, Acean and the Titans /#ho in turn beget the Alympian gods0. 5esiod<s e%planation is one in #hich cosmic beings beget other cosmic and di'ine beings, #ho e'entually beget human beings. This is not a scientific account) but there is an order to it, and the order pro'ides a systematic e%planation for #hat #e see around us7 - begets , #ho begets !) each being has its po#ers and its domain of rule) and these po#ers account for phenomena li2e the passing of the days, earth;ua2es /Poseidon sha2ing the earth belo# the sea0, storms />eus hurling thunderbolts0, and so on. The basic idea #ith 5esiod<s style of e%planation is to e%plain the current state of the #orld in terms of the #orld<s history. -nd 5esiod<s method for disco'ering this history is to call upon the $uses, the goddesses of poetry #ho inform him of the un2no#n. The authority for 5esiod<s story rests #ith these $uses7 their inspiration 'ouches for the truth of his e%planation. -s #e shall see, this is all ;uite different from the #ay in #hich the Ionian philosophers e%plain things. In The Physical World of the Greeks /Boutledge7 1C&60, .. .amburs2y notes three features of Ionian thought that distinguish it from its predecessors7 8the tracing bac2 of many phenomena to a fe# causes) the reduction of ;uality to ;uantity) D and the employment of mechanical models8 /160. These inno'ations #ere not fully appreciated or accepted at first. -s 5eraclitus notes, The teacher of the multitude is 5esiod) they belie'e he has the greatest 2no#ledge--#ho did not understand day and night7 for they are one. / &=0 ut, despite this, #e should 2eep an eye out for the #ay in #hich these inno'ations arri'e on the philosophical scene.

Lecture 1 Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 5o# does 5esiod e%plain the #orld he sees around himE 9. -re there elements of this e%planation that deser'e the label 8mythical8E 3. 4hat are some attracti'e features of the #ay 5esiod e%plains thingsE ,. 5o# does 5esiod<s style of e%planation differ from #hat #e #ould, today, call 8scientific8 e%planationE &. -re there remnants of 5esiod<s style of e%planation in the 2inds of e%planations people offer todayE

Lecture ": A #e$ Method -na%imander offers an account of the origins of the #orld that illustrates a ne# style of e%planation, a philosophical, and perhaps e'en scientific, style. -na%imander does not in'o2e interactions among di'ine beings, but rather restricts himself to interactions among natural processes. There is only part of the rele'ant fragment in your te%tboo2 /%&, p.30. 5ere is the e%tended fragment7 [-na%imander] says that that part of the e'erlasting #hich is generati'e of hot and cold separated off at the coming to be of the #orld-order and from this a sort of sphere of flame gre# around the air about the earth li2e bar2 around a tree. This subse;uently bro2e off and #as closed into indi'idual circles to form the sun, the moon, and the stars. 5e also says that in the beginning man #as generated from animals of a different species, inferring this from the fact that other animals ;uic2ly come to eat on their o#n, #hile man alone needs to be nursed for a long time. :or this reason man #ould ne'er ha'e sur'i'ed if he had originally had his present form. - pseudo-Plutarch, Miscellanies 9 /-1+0 -na%imander ta2es the original state of the #orld to be some e'erlasting stuff. /The 1ree2 term for this is to apeiron, 'ariously translated as 8the boundless8 or 8the indefinite.80 Fnli2e !haos, this stuff is not di'ine. It is, instead, a primordial stuff that gi'es rise to differentiated things such as hot and cold. /These things, unli2e the primordial stuff, are definite, bounded7 hot is distinct from cold, because each has a definite identity) but to apeiron has no definite identity.0 These differentiated things gi'e rise to a mass #ith an earthy nucleus surrounded by a layer of air, surrounded by a shell of fire. Fpon bursting, the mass produces a series of concentric rings of fire enclosed in air, all surrounding a cylindrical earth. The air ma2es the rings in'isible, but holes allo# the fire to be seen. The outermost ring is the sun) the middle, the moon) the inner set of rings, the stars. -na%imander e%plains the origin of the earth in another fragment /also not in your te%tboo207 .ome say the sea is #hat is left of the original moisture. :or the region about the earth #as first moist, and then part of the moisture #as e'aporated by the sun, and #inds arose from it and the turnings of the sun and moon, because their turnings are produced as a result of these 'apors and e%halations) and #here there is an abundance of moisture for the #inds, the turnings ta2e place. -nd #hat is left of the original moisture in the hollo# places of the earth is sea. -ccordingly it continually diminishes as it is dried out by the sun and finally some day it #ill be dry. - -le%ander of -phrodisias, On the Metereology 6=.3-19 /-9=0 5e also offers an e%planation for the origin of life, in yet another fragment not in your te%tboo27

-na%imander said the first animals #ere generated in moisture surrounded by a pric2ly bar2 or shell, and as they matured they mo'ed onto land and brea2ing out of their shell they sur'i'ed in a different form for a short #hile. - -etius &.1C., /-3+0 "lse#here, -na%imander says that the initial humans must ha'e been adults /see fragment -1+0, and reasons that they must ha'e been nourished inside fish until maturity, #hereupon the fish burst open and humans emerged to populate the land. 4e see, in these fragments, some remnants of Thales< focus on #ater. ut -na%imander ta2es to apeiron to be fundamental7 -na%imander #as the son of Pra%iades, of $iletus. 5e said the source and element #as the indefinite [to apeiron], not defining it as air or #ater or anything else. -nd the parts change, but the totality is changeless. - @iogenes Gaertes 9.1 -na%imander is 'ague about #hat to apeiron is7 it is something #hich has al#ays been and #hich is e'ery#here, a 2ind of indeterminate stuff that cannot be described or identified. Het, despite this 'agueness, #e can identify a pattern to -na%imander<s style of e%planation and compare it to 5esiod<s. I summari6e these comparisons in a chart7 Anaximander
There is a source from #hich e'erything arises, to apeiron, #hich defies description. There is a process by #hich the constituents of the #orld /contraries such as hotIcold, dryImoist) and then earth, air, fire0 arise out of this original stuff. These constituents are organi6ed into the material structure of the #orld7 a cylindrical earth made of fire, air, and earth, all surrounded by the rings of hea'en. These structures stabili6e into the present state of the #orld through natural processes /such as drying up0. Gi'ing things emerge from the basic constituents through natural processes. The structure itself e%plains 'arious phenomena. /".g., eclipses are due to sudden bloc2ing of the holes in the air.0

Hesiod
There is a source from #hich e'erything arises, !haos, a great ya#ning gap. There is a process by #hich the constituents of the #orld arise out of the original stuff7 ase%ual and se%ual reproduction) birth. These constituents are born as constituting the material structure of the #orld7 a flat, circular earth topped by a 'aulted hea'en and supported by a 'aulted under#orld. .truggles among deities #ithin these structures lead to a politicalIreligious order o'er #hich >eus rules. The human race is created in se'eral successi'e generations. The acti'ities of deities e%plain 'arious phenomena.

5esiod<s style is able to e%plain the same things that -na%imander<s can) and there is a sense in #hich -na%imander<s style continues 5esiod<s tradition. ut there important differences that mar2 5esiod<s style as mythical and -na%imander<s as scientific or philosophical. The fundamental difference bet#een -na%imander<s style of e%planation and 5esiod<s concerns method rather than content or scope.

1- The items that do e%plaining for -na%imander are natural e'ents or things) for 5esiod, they are di'ine persons. 9- -na%imander attempts to e%plain only natural e'ents or things) 5esiod attempts to e%plain both natural e'ents, mythological ones /such as the consignment of the Titans to the under#orld0, and religious practices /such as the #orship of the Alympian gods0. 3- -na%imander uses one pri'ileged set of natural phenomena to e%plain other natural phenomena and does not appeal to anything outside of or beyond the natural #orld) 5esiod appeals to supernatural beings. ,- -na%imander e%plains the #orld by sho#ing ho# some natural thingsIe'ents arise out of or are constructed out of other natural thingsIe'ents) 5esiod e%plains the #orld by sho#ing ho# it is generated by the acti'ity of di'ine persons. &- -na%imander de'elops his account in prose) 5esiod #rites poetry. 6- The ground for -na%imander<s claims is e%perience and reasoning) for 5esiod<s, di'ine inspiration /the $uses0. These si% features that distinguish -na%imander<s method from 5esiod<s are present in modern scientific practice /albeit perhaps to a more rigorous degree0. The main difference bet#een -na%imander<s method and modern scientific method concerns #hich e%periences count as e'idence7 -na%imander, and other Ionian philosophers, treat as e'idence our plain, e'eryday encounters #ith the #orld) in contrast, contemporary scientists treat as e'idence only those encounters #ith the #orld that occur in controlled en'ironments /e%periments0. 4e shall see, as #e study the de'elopment of philosophy in the ancient 1ree2 #orld, some of the reasons that the Ionian method became problematic. In any case, e'en if -na%imander<s method is scientific /or at least proto-scientific0, there is not a complete brea2 #ith religion in his thought. This comes out #ith fragment %" /p.90 in your te%tboo2, of #hich I here produce a more complete 'ersion7 :or that reason, as #e say, there is no source of the infinite, but this seems to be a source of e'erything and to contain all things and to steer all things, as e'eryone claims #ho does not posit some cause beyond the infinite, as for instance mind or li'e. -nd this is di'ine, for it is deathless and imperishable, as -na%imander says, and most of the natural philosophers. - -ristotle, Physics 9+3b1+-1& /-1&0 -na%imander declared the countless hea'ens to be gods. - -etius 1.=.19 /-1=0 4hile -na%imander describes di'ine attributes to to apeiron /original cause, eternal, imperishable, controlling e'erything, this di'inity is not of the 2ind that appears in 5esiod7 it is impersonal, based upon la#li2e cycles rather than arbitrary inter'entions.

Lecture " Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hat e'idence might -na%imander ha'e had in mind in claiming that the primordial stuff is to apeironE 4hat about e'idence for his e%planation of the origin of the #orldE -nd of peopleE 9. Joseph !ampbell, in The Power of Myth, says7 1ree2 and Gatin and biblical literature used to be part of e'eryone<s education. (o#, #hen these #ere dropped, a #hole tradition of Accidental mythological information #as lost. It used to be that these stories #ere in the minds of people. 4hen the story is in your mind, then you see its rele'ance to something happening in your o#n life. It gi'es you perspecti'e on #hat<s happening to you. 4ith the loss of that, #e<'e really lost something because #e don<t ha'e a comparable literature to ta2e its place. These bits of information from ancient times, #hich ha'e to do #ith the themes that ha'e supported human life, built ci'ili6ations, and informed religions o'er the millennia, ha'e to do #ith deep inner problems, inner mysteries, inner thresholds of passage, and if you don<t 2no# #hat the guide-signs are along the #ay, you ha'e to #or2 it out yourself. ut once this sub3ect catches you, there is such a feeling, from one or another of these traditions, of information of a deep, rich, life-'i'ifying sort that you don<t #ant to gi'e up. /90 5o# does -na%imander<s style of e%planation differ from 5esiod<sE 4hat are the strengths of -na%imander<s approach compared to 5esiod<sE The #ea2nessesE

Lecture ': Anaximander -na%imander<s method of e%plaining the #orld pro'ides a pattern for future e%planations, a model for ho# to account for natural phenomena in naturalistic /as opposed to mythic0 terms. 5is method sur'i'es, to at least some e%tent, #ith contemporary science. /:un -cti'ity7 !ompare the content of -na%imander<s accounts of the origins of the #orld and of life #ith our best contemporary accounts.0 4e are going to trace ho# this method plays out from -na%imander to Pyrrho7 ho# -na%imander<s successors challenge the content of his e%planations, de'elop competing theoretical paradigms, and e'en argue that his method is doomed to fail in pro'iding 2no#ledge of the #orld. The #ritings of the Ionian philosophers are fragmented to such an e%tent that proper understanding their meaning re;uires a great deal of interpreti'e #or2. :or that reason, #hile I #ant us to struggle #ith the te%ts and try to discern theses, arguments, and so on, I #ill, on occasion, present to you an interpretation of #hat the te%ts are saying. There are, in fact, many interpretations ad'ocated by scholars of ancient philosophy. There is e'en a standard interpretation, best presented in Jonathan arnes< The Presocratic Philosophers /Boutledge7 1C*90. /Hour te%tboo2 presents the standard interpretation in its summaries.0 @aniel 1raham gi'es a competing, re'isionary interpretation in Explaining the osmos! The "onian Tradition of #cientific Philosophy /Princeton FP7 9++60. /$uch of these lecture notes rely upon 1raham<s first chapter, #hich is freely a'ailable at Khttp7IIpress.princeton.eduIchaptersIs*3+3.pdfL.0 $y ad'ice to you is to concern yourself #ith the primary te%t itself, lea'ing aside secondary sources until you ha'e struggled to ma2e sense of the material. Part of the fun of philosophy is trying to figure out the reasoning behind the great philosophical theories. Get<s begin the fun #ith -na%imander<s notion of to apeiron. .implicius reports -na%imander<s basic idea /fragment %1 in your te%tboo2, p.907 Af those #ho declared that the first principal [source] is one, mo'ing, and indefinite [apeironIboundless], -na%imander, the son of Pra%iades, of $iletus, the successor and student of Thales, said that the indefinite #as the first principle and element of things that are, and he #as the first to introduce this name for the first principle [i.e., he #as the first to call it to apeiron]. 5e says that the first principle is neither #ater nor any other of the things called elements [earth, fire, air], but some other nature #hich is indefinite, out of #hich come to be all the hea'ens and the #orlds in them. The things that are perish into the things out of #hich they come to be, according to necessity, for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their in3ustice in accordance #ith the ordering of time, as he says in rather poetical language. - .implicius, ommentary on $ristotle%s Physics 9,.13-91 / 1 M -C0 There are three philosophical issues here7

1- 4hat does apeiron mean #hen -na%imander says itE 9- 4hy does -na%imander maintain that to apeiron is none of #ater, earth, air, fireE 3- 5o# does -na%imander use to apeiron to e%plain natural phenomenaE The Meaning of To Apeiron There are three terms contemporary scholars propose as a correct interpretation of apeiron7 boundless) indefiniteIindeterminate) infinite. $rgument for &oundless7 5omer sometimes refers to land and sea as apeiron, and 5omer seems to mean to say that these things are uncrossable. Gater generations come to understand apeiron as meaning 'ast e%tension or boundless, probably because the 'ast e%tension of land and sea is the reason #hy they are uncrossable. $rgument for "ndefinite7 .ince Thales proposes a determinate first principle /#ater0, and since -na%imenes, -na%imander<s successor, also proposes a determine first principle /air0, -na%imander<s failure to mention a definite principle is tantamount to his asserting that apeiron is indefinite. riticism7 8 oundless8 ne'er means 8indeterminate.8 .o #hile it might be correct that to apeiron is indefinite, this does not sho# that apeiron means 8indefinite.8 $gainst "nfinite7 This is too technical in -na%imander<s time. The idea is not around, #hich ma2es this interpretation anachronistic. The safest interpreti'e route stri2es me as translating 8to apeiron8 as 8the boundless8 and lea'ing it as a further ;uestion #hether the boundless has the property of being indefinite. Indeed, #ere #e to not do this, and translate 8to apeiron8 as 8indefinite,8 -na%imander #ould start to loo2 li2e he is contradicting himself. -fter all, he ascribes some pretty definite properties to to apeiron7 he says it is 8e'erlasting and ageless,8 that it is 8deathless and imperishable,8 that it 8surrounds all things8 and 8steers8 them 4hat sense does it ma2e to say that something is indefinitely deathless, or indefinitely agelessE 4hate'er is deathless is pretty definitely not mortal) #hate'er is ageless pretty definitely doesn<t ha'e an age. The principle of interpreti(e charit) says to not ascribe a contradiction to someone if there is some other #ay of interpreting their claims in a consistent #ay. The #ature of To Apeiron The fragments #e ha'e from -na%imander do not tell us #hy -na%imander did not identify to apeiron #ith one of the elements /earth, air, fire, #ater0. ut #e 2no# this7 to apeiron 8surrounds all things8 and 8steers8 them)

a part of to apeiron 8separates off8 after 8generating8 the contraries /hotIcold, #etIdry0.

1raham ta2es this to mean that to apeiron is the original stuff out of #hich the #orld and its constituents came to be, but that it is not itself the matter of the #orld. -ccording to 1raham, to apeiron is the matri% for the stuff of the #orld but not the stuff itself) it remains outside the #orld, surrounding and controlling it) but it is not in the #orld, and #e can 2no# about it only by studying its results -- to apeiron itself remains fore'er inaccessible to empirical in;uiry. -ristotle, in contrast, ta2es to apeiron to be the stuff of the #orld itself. -ristotle has in mind a biological analogy7 to apeiron generates the contraries by gestation, gi'ing birth to them through a 2ind of ase%ual reproduction. This birthing process lea'es to apeiron and produces the contraries, #hich are themsel'es made from to apeiron) these contraries then 8separate off8 by 'irtue of being definite stuffs, and they proceed to generate the other elements of the #orld by some 2ind of process /perhaps mi%ing7 thin2 of mi%ing cold and #et to produce ice, an earth-li2e solid0. -ccording to -ristotle, to apeiron is part of the #orld, and in fact is the fundamental stuff of the #orld. 4hich interpretation is more plausibleE -nd ho# does each suggest a reason to not identify to apeiron #ith, say, #aterE The Ph)sics of To Apeiron -na%imander does not say much about how the boundless generates the contraries, or e'en ho# the contraries generate natural thingsIe'ents. 5is #ords are, as .implicius notes, 8in rather poetical language.8 !harles Nahn gi'es the standard interpretation of -na%imander<s physics in $naximander and the Origins of Greek osmology /!olumbia FP7 1C6+07 The contraries /hotIcold, dryI#et0 come to be out of their opposites. .o, for e%ample, heat comes from cold /thin27 summer comes out of #inter0. ut each contrary has its proper domain, and #hen one contrary comes to dominate, this amounts to an 8in3ustice,8 8punishment8 for #hich in'ol'es the dominant contrary perishing /thin27 summer fades to autumn0. 4hen one contrary perishes, ho#e'er, the other comes to dominate /thin27 autumn progressing to spring, then into summer0, thus repeating the cycle. The periodic cycle of this order is 8the ordering of time,8 and it is necessary in the same #ay that the cycle of the seasons is necessary. If Nahn is correct, #hat argument might -na%imander gi'e in support of his claimE -nd e'en if Nahn<s interpretation is not correct, -na%imander<s physics lea'es us #ith a ;uestion7 #hat controls the cycle of change, ensures the regularity of 8penalty and retribution,8 enforces 3usticeE 4hat is the source of the necessity in -na%imander<s physicsE -na%imander e%presses faith in regularity, but he does not e%plain it. This is #here -na%imenes comes in.

Lecture ' Topics for lass !iscussion 1. There are three #ays contemporary scholars translate the term apeiron7 boundless, indefinite, infinite. 4hich one seems to be the most plausible, gi'en -na%imander<s fragmentsE 9. There are t#o main traditions of ho# to understand #hat -na%imander ta2es the nature of to apeiron to be7 it is the original stuff out of #hich the #orld and its constituents came to be, but that it is not itself the matter of the #orld) or it is itself the matter of the #orld. 4hich of these is more plausibleE -nd ho# does each suggest a reason to not identify to apeiron #ith, say, #aterE 3. If Nahn<s interpretation of the physics of to apeiron is correct, #hat argument might -na%imander gi'e in support of his claimE ,. Begardless of #hether Nahn<s interpretation of the physics of to apeiron is correct, #hat might the source of necessity be in -na%imander<s accountE Is this consistent #ith a nonmythological style of e%planationE

Lecture &: Anaximenes Gi2e Thales and -na%imander, -na%imenes is from $iletus. 5e continues -na%imander<s research program, de'eloping it by introducing a theory of change that in'ol'es impersonal mechanisms /rarefaction and condensation0 rather than a 'ague appeal to di'ine 3ustice. -na%imander, recall, offered a physics according to #hich the 8things that are perish into the things out of #hich they come to be, according to necessity, for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their in3ustice in accordance #ith the ordering of time8 / 1 M -C0. ut -na%imander does not e%plain #hat controls the cycle of change and ensures the regularity of 8penalty and retribution.8 @oing that re;uires t#o things7 first, a theory about #hat the elements are that undergo change) second, a theory about ho# these elements interact in a #ay allo#s cycles. -na%imenes offers an inno'ation that addresses these omissions /fragment %1 in your te%tboo207 -na%imenes, son of "urystratus, of $iletus, #as an associate of -na%imander, #ho says, li2e him, that the underlying nature is single and boundless, but not indeterminate as [-na%imander] says, but determinate, calling it air. It differs in essence in accordance #ith its rarity or density. 4hen it is thinned it becomes fire, #hile #hen it is condensed it becomes #ind, then cloud, #hen still more condensed it becomes #ater, then earth, then stones. "'erything else comes from these. -nd he too ma2es motion e'erlasting, as a result of #hich change occurs. - .implicius, ommentary on $ristotle%s Physics 9,.96-9&.1 /-&0 5ippolatus reports on some further details /these appear in fragment %' in your te%tboo207 eing condensed or thinned [air] changes its appearance7 #hen it is dispersed to become thinner, it becomes fire) #hen, on the other hand, air is condensed it becomes #inds, and from air cloud is produced by 8felting8) #hen it is condensed still more #ater, #hen condensed still more earth, and #hen it is condensed as much as possible stones. - 5ippolytus, 'efutation 1.=.3 /-=0 -na%imenes< theory has se'eral note#orthy features7 air is the source of e'erything /that from #hich e'erything else comes0 by 'irtue of being the 8underlying nature)8 there is a set of basic elements ordered by their relati'e density /fire---IB--#ind--cloud--#ater--earth--stone0) these elements arise from each other by being rarefied or condensed. -na%imenes li2ens the condensation process to felting. /:elting, in case you are unfamiliar #ith the term, is the process of ma2ing felt from #ool by sub3ecting the #ool to intense pressure. It #as a familiar piece of technology among the Ionians. -na%imenes seems to ha'e been ;uite ta2en #ith the felting analogy, apparently going so far as to imagine the hea'ens as a felt cap /pilion0. Plato, apparently, li2ed it too7 see his Timaeus ,Cb=-c=.0 -na%imenes< theory differs from -na%imander<s in at least four respects, #hich I summari6e in a table7

Anaximenes
The source from #hich e'erything arises is familiar, part of our e'eryday e%perience. There is a definite list of basic elements. There is a single principle, density, #hich imposes a structure upon the basic elements, ordering them from most rare to most dense. The process by #hich one element turns into another is completely mechanical.

Anaximander
The source from #hich e'erything arises is inscrutable, something-#e-2no#-not-#hat. The basic elements /8things that are80 are not specified. There is no clear structure among the basic elements.

(o mechanical processes of change are specified.

This first and differences are most important. y proposing air as the basic source, the #orld becomes entirely 2no#able, #ith nothing beyond our po#ers of in;uiry. y proposing rarefaction and condensation as the mechanism of change, -na%imenes offers something li2e a /non-mathematical0 scientific la#. :or, according to his theory, #hen certain conditions are met /e.g, air is sufficiently compressed0, a particular result ine'itably occurs /e.g., #ind arises0. The mechanism underlying changes lea'es no room for arbitrary or mysterious inter'entions by deities) nor does it appeal to 'ague analogies #ith anthropocentric concepts such as retribution and 3ustice. !hange, according to -na%imenes, is neither spontaneous nor capricious) instead, it is predictable and a matter of necessity. This is not to say, ho#e'er, that -na%imenes completely re3ects 5esiod<s manner of finding di'inity at #or2 in the natural #orld. Just as Thales said that all things are full of gods, -na%imenes says that air is a god /fragment %& in your te%tboo207 -na%imenes determined that air is a god and that it comes to be and is #ithout measure, infinite and al#ays in motion. - !icero, On the (ature of the Gods 1.1+.96 /-1+0 5e also ascribes di'ine ;ualities to air, such as the ability to control e'erything /fragment %& in your te%tboo207 -na%imenes, son of "urystratus, of $iletus, declared air to be the source of beings D. Just as our soul, #hich is air, holds us together and controls us, so do breath and air encompass the #hole #orld-order. - -etius 1.3., / 90 ut these religious features of -na%imenes theory seem to be accidental rather than essential. $ore interesting is the ontological status of air and its relation to the other basic elements. Is air present in these other elements as a component /in the #ay that #ater is present in ice0, or is air merely the starting point for change among the elements /in the #ay that parents are the starting point for their children0E -na%imenes only says that air is the source /arche0 of the basic elements, that the basic elements come to )e /gignesthai0 from air. ut all of this seems to be compatible #ith t#o competing interpretations.

The standard interpretation of -na%imenes, stretching bac2 to -ristotle, treats him as a material monist. Material Monism is a 2ind of metaphysical schema according to #hich7 $$1- "'erything arises from one source. $$9- "'erything is essentially identical to that source. $$3- That source is one substance, and e'erything else<s e%istence depends on this substance. $$,- -ll change is merely alteration of this substance. @ifferent 'ersions of $aterial $onism arise by postulating different stuff for the one source substance. :or e%ample, according to this 2ind of interpretation, Thales identifies the one substance #ith #ater) -na%imander, #ith the boundless) -na%imenes, #ith air. $aterial $onism allo#s for the e%istence of more than one thing, but only if the multiplicity of things depend for their e%istence upon the one source and differ from that source only in terms of accidental properties. .o, for e%ample, according to this interpretation, #ater and fire are air in different forms7 #ater is air #hen it is compressed) fire, air #hen it is rarefied) #ater and fire are not different substances, because there is only one substance) instead, they are different #ays that substance can be, different phases or modes of air /to use terminology from thermodynamics and .pino6a, respecti'ely0. There is, ho#e'er, a competing interpretation of -na%imenes /and other $ilesian philosophers0 #hich treats him as a generating substance theorist. *enerating +u,stance Theor) -*+T. is a metaphysical schema according to #hich7 1.T1- There are many basic substances that compose the #orld. 1.T9- -mong these substances, there is one original substance, one substance that e%isted at some time prior to all others. 1.T3- The original substance is also the one generating substance7 all other basic substances ultimately arise from it by 'irtue of transformations in #hich one substance perishes /goes out of e%istence0 and another comes to be. 1.T,- The #orld comes to be through the 'arious transformations of the generating substance. 1.T&- There is a mechanism that go'erns these transformations. The term 8substance8 in both $aterial $onism and 1.T is technical7 it refers, roughly, to something that is physical /as opposed to supernatural0, concrete /as opposed to abstract0, and independently e%isting. This meaning is important to 2eep in mind7 other#ise, there is a temptation to read 1.T as differing from 5esiod<s theory only by 'irtue of proposing a mechanism that go'erns the changes in the #orld. This is, to be sure, one #ay in #hich 1.Tstyle theories and 5esiod<s theory differ7 impersonal mechanism replaces di'ine #him. ut they also differ #ith respect to ontology7 for 5esiod, the basic elements of the #orld are the gods, #hich happen to be supernatural rather than physical. /"%ercise7 Beplace 8substance8 #ith 8deity8 in the 1.T schema to disco'er the e%tent to #hich 1.T mirrors 5esiod<s cosmogony.0

Lecture & Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hat is -na%imenes< theory of changeE 5o# does it sol'e open theoretical problems #ith -na%imander<s account of the #orldE 4hat e'idence might he ha'e in mind to support his theoryE 9. 4hy might -na%imenes identify air as the basic substance, rather than to apeironE 4hat argument might he ha'e had in mindE 3. 5o# does -na%imenes< style of e%planation differ from 5esiod<sE 4hat features does it share #ith -na%imander<sE

Lecture /: 0n ompeting Interpretations There is no scholarly consensus about #hether -na%imenes is a material monist or a generating substance theorist. Bather than try to resol'e the interpreti'e debate, I #ant to use the disagreement as an opportunity to discuss ho# to engage in scholarly con'ersation about interpretation. There are three criteria that an ideal interpretation of a theory from the history of philosophy should satisfy, and that you should 2eep in mind #hen trying to support or undermine an interpretation of a particular philosopher<s #ritings7 Historical $ppropriateness7 The interpretation should allo# the theory to ma2e sense to the people #ho #ere discussing it around the time #hen it #as proposed. Philosophical oherence7 The interpretation should not ma2e the theory full of contradictions or ob'iously false. *ialectical 'ele+ance7 The interpretation should situate the theory as part of an ongoing con'ersation #ith contiguous philosophical theories. Interpretations that fail the first often are guilty of being anachronistic, importing our #ays of understanding the #orld onto those #ho thought in less sophisticated fashion. Interpretations that fail the second 'iolate the principle of interpreti'e charity. -nd those that fail the third often forget that philosophies do not de'elop in isolation from broader communities. The primary argument for the material monist interpretation is an appeal to authority7 -ristotle said so. Af the first philosophers, the ma3ority thought the sources of all things #ere found only in the class of matter. :or that of #hich all e%isting things consist, and that from #hich they come to be first and into #hich they perish last--the substance continuing but changing its attributes--this, they say, is the element and this the source of e%isting things. -ccordingly they do not thin2 anything either comes to be or perishes, inasmuch as this nature is al#ays preser'ed D. :or a certain nature al#ays e%ists, either one or more than one, from #hich e'erything else comes to be #hile this is preser'ed. -ll, ho#e'er, do not agree on the number and character of this source, but Thales, the originator of this 2ind of theory, says it is #ater D -na%imenes and @iogenes [of -pollonia] posit air as the simply body prior to #ater that is most properly the source. - -ristotle, Metaphysics C*3b6-13, b1=-91, C*,a&-=0 arnes pro'ides an additional argument7

if , comes to be from O by 8thic2ening8 or 8thinning,8 by condensation or rarefaction, then surely , is made of -. If ice is condensed #ater, if it is made from #ater by a process of condensation, then it is made of #ater /1C*97 ,9, emphasis added0. arnes ascribes the follo#ing conditional to the $iletians7 if H comes from O, then H is made of O. -pplied to -na%imenes, this means that since all the elements come from air, they are all made of air. -nd this means that there is only one substance, air, from #hich e'erything comes. .o, if arnes< ascription is right, -na%imenes turns out to be a material monist. /Puestion to consider7 4ould the $ilesians ha'e understood arnes< #ater e%ample in the #ay that #e do, if they had not 2no#n that ice is condensed #ater by 'irtue of being 59+ and that different substances can e%ist in different phasesE0 1raham offers some te%tual e'idence to support the generating su,stance theor) -*+T. interpretation of -na%imenes /based upon a more faithful translation of part of fragment %' in your te%tboo207 -na%imenes D said the source #as boundless air, from #hich the things that are and #ere and #ill be, and gods and di'inities come to be /gignesthai0, the rest from the offspring /apogonoi0 of these. - 5ippolytus 1.=.1 /-=0 The term apogonoi has the connotation of one substance coming to be from a distinct substance /as child from parent0 rather than of one substance coming to be in a different phase /as #ater from ice0. 1raham also notes that the ancient 1ree2s tended to understand changes in substances as a 2ind of metabolic transformation7 thin2 of lamps that transform oli'e oil into flame, or more familiarly of #ood sto'es in #hich #ood comes to be fire and human bodies in #hich 'egetables become muscle. ut 1raham<s main argument for the 1.T interpretation depends upon big-picture details7 [T]he ma3or debates of the late si%th and early fifth centuries re'ol'e around the tensions inherent in 1.T, [but] they ha'e nothing to do #ith [$aterial $onism]. Indeed, #ere [$aterial $onism] the theory in force, there #ould be no reason for Parmenides to oppose coming to be, for generation #ould already in effect be e%cluded from scientific e%planation. Parmenides #ould be beating a dead horse, and his percei'ed contributions to the logic of e%planation #ould be completely specious. ut if 1.T, or something li2e it, pro'ides the dominant model of e%planation, generation and destruction are fundamental 2inds of change for cosmologists. There is at least a theoretical target for Parmenides to ta2e aim at, and the game is afoot /9++67 *90. The success of 1raham<s argument depends upon identifying problems #ith 1.T and being able to interpret subse;uent philosophers as attempting to sol'e those problems. 1raham identifies three such problems.

The Pro,lem of Primac)7 If - turns into , during one part of a meteorological cycle, and , turns into - in another, there seems to be no formal reason for preferring one substance as the generating substance rather than another. $oreo'er, there does not seem to be any empirical reason to 3ustify identifying one substance as the original substance /9++67 1+*0. The Pro,lem of 0rigination7 There does not seem to be any naturalistic e%planation for #hy the original substance generated other substances. Indeed, it seems that the original substance should ne'er change at all, since it #as initially completely uniform and there #as nothing else to cause it to change /9++67 1+C0. The Pro,lem of Being7 If - turns into , and , turns into ., and then, in the in'erse process of change, . changes into , and then into -, there does not seem to be anything that undergoes the changes by persisting through them. ut if there is a change, it seems that there must be some one entity that changes /9++67 11+-1110. 1raham states these problems as tensions for 1.T. ut similar problems arise for the $iletian theories under the material monist interpretation. :or e%ample, the Problem of Primacy becomes7 If the elements turn into each other, there seems to be neither formal reason nor empirical 3ustification for preferring one element as the uni;ue substance rather than another. -nd the Problem of Arigination becomes7 There does not seem to be any naturalistic e%planation for #hy the one substance is sub3ect to perpetual change rather than staying al#ays the same /see en3amin :araday, Greek #cience! "ts Meaning for Us, Qolume Ane7 Thales to -ristotle /Penguin7 1C,C07 3&0. 4e should 2eep these problems in mind as #e continue our study of the ancient "uropean philosophers, in order to discern the e%tent to #hich #e can interpret subse;uent philosophers are responding to problems #ith earlier philosophical theories.

Lecture / Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hich interpretation of -na%imenes< metaphysics is more plausible, $aterial $onism or 1enerating .ubstance TheoryE /Fse the criteria of 5istorical -ppropriateness, Philosophical !oherence, @ialectical Bele'ance.0 9. 5o# are the Problems of Primacy, Arigination, and eing difficulties for -na%imenes< accountE for -na%imander<sE

Lecture 1: Heraclitus and 2lux 5eraclitus is rumored to ha'e been gi'en the title 82ing of the Ionians,8 only to resign it to his brother. 5e li'ed in "phesus /near Nusadasi, Tur2ey0 under Persian rule. 4hile "phesus is close to $iletus, there is no e'idence that 5eraclitus had any contact #ith the $ilesian philosophers. 5eraclitus is best 2no#n for three doctrines7 1- "'erything is in flu%. 9- Apposites coincide /or are identical0. 3- :ire is the source /arche0 from #hich e'erything arises. There is, ho#e'er, scholarly disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of these doctrines. .ome maintain that 5eraclitus does not, in fact, hold that e'erything is in flu%. :or e%ample, according to 1... Nir2, Plato and all later ancient critics too2 the ri'er-analogy to apply to changes in e'ery indi'idual thing, and to illustrate the continuity of those changes) actually it illustrates the measure #hich must inhere in large-scale changes ta2en as a #hole. 5eraclitus did not belie'e, any more than any of his predecessors, that e'erything #as changing all the time, though many things are so changing and e'erything must e'entually change /Heraclitus! The osmic /ragments /1C&,07 3660. Athers maintain, in contrast, that 5eraclitus ad'ocates a doctrine of radical change. :or e%ample, according to 1regory Qlastos, 4hat is only occasional and intermittent, though recurrent, in -na%imander [namely, the transgression of the elements], becomes uni'ersal and in'ariant in 5eraclitus. 4hy this differenceE 4e cannot ans#er this ;uestion #ithout granting the ob'ious implication of the ri'er-fragments D, the uni'ersality of change /8An 5eraclitus,8 $merican 0ournal of Philology =6 /1C&&07 3&6-3&=0. There is, moreo'er, disagreement concerning #hether 5eraclitus< philosophy 'iolates the la# of contradiction. :or instance, according to 4.N.!. 1uthrie, 4e need not e%pect 5eraclitus< thought to be by our standards completely logical or selfconsistent. 5e ignores the la# of contradiction, he insists that opposites are identical /$ History of Greek Philosophy, Qolume 1 /1C6907 ,61, ,630. Ather scholars, ho#e'er, ta2e this attribution of inconsistency to 5eraclitus to 'iolate a 2ind of principle of charity, according to #hich #e ought not attribute contradictory claims to someone #hen interpreting them #hen other interpretations are a'ailable) and they argue that there are #ays to interpret 5eraclitus #ithout committing him to 3ointly inconsistent assertions. :inally,

there is disagreement about #hether 5eraclitus is a material monist or a generating substance theorist. Get<s briefly consider each of these debates in turn. The 2lux Thesis The main te%tual e'idence for interpreting 5eraclitus as holding that e'erything is in flu% is one for #hich there is e%cellent e'idence of its being a ;uotation from 5eraclitus rather than a paraphrase. An those stepping into ri'ers staying the same, other and other #aters flo#. [potamoisi toisin autoisin em)ainousin hetera kai hetera hudata epirrei] - -rius @idymus, fr. 3C.9 / 190 This fragment is ambiguous in the original 1ree2, because it is not clear #hether 8staying the same8 refers to ri'ers or those #ho step into ri'ers. That is, the fragment might say one of t#o things7 i- An those #ho step into the same ri'ers, different #aters flo#. ii- An the same persons #ho step into ri'ers, different #aters flo#. /The first disambiguation is fragment %"1 in your te%tboo2) it is the most popular disambiguation.0 The difference bet#een these disambiguations concerns the contrast bet#een #hat is the same and #hat is different. Get<s consider the first disambiguation. It says that the #hile the waters flo#ing o'er people are different, the ri+ers are the same. This is, in one respect, a mundane fact about ri'ers7 the #aters constantly change in the same ri'er. In fact, if the #aters #ere to not constantly change, the body #ould be something other than a ri'er--perhaps a la2e or a pond. .o there is a causal connection bet#een the #aters and the ri'er7 the #aters cause the body to be a ri'er /rather than a standing body of #ater0. ut, #hile the changing #aters cause the ri'er, the ri'er concentrates and conducts the changing #aters. If the ri'er is stable by 'irtue of persisting through the changes of the #ater, then Nir2<s interpretation is correct7 not e'erything changes, because the ri'er is constant through the change of the #aters--the ri'er does not flo# as the #aters flo# but, instead, perse'eres through changes in its matter. Af course, modern geology tells us that e'en ri'ers change. If this is correct, then the ri'er itself is not stable and, instead, changes less ;uic2ly than its #aters. .o, if e'en ri'ers change, Qlastos< interpretation is correct and change is uni'ersal. /@oes 5eraclitus maintain that the ri'er itself changesE There is no te%tual e'idence that he does) and it #ould be anachronistic to attribute our modern understanding of ri'ers to 5eraclitus.0 !onsider, ne%t, the second disambiguation of the fragment. It says that #hile the waters flo#ing o'er people are different, the people are the same. 4hether this supports the uni'ersality of change depends upon considerations that mirror those rele'ant to interpreting

the first disambiguation. ut there is a further issue. The ri'er is constituted as a ri'er by staying /relati'ely0 constant as the #aters change. .o, too, analogy suggests that people are constituted as people by staying /relati'ely0 the same as en'ironmental conditions change7 only by confronting a /relati'ely0 changing en'ironment do people become /relati'ely0 stable beings. They do not understand ho#, though at 'ariance #ith itself, it agrees #ith itself. It is a bac2#ards-turning attunement li2e that of the bo# and lyre. - 5ippolytus, 'efutation C.C.9 / &10 [fragment %1' in your te%tboo2] Just as the bo# and lyre #ould be nothing #ithout the tension of strings, 5eraclitus< fragment seems to suggest that #e #ould be nothing #ithout the tension /or changes0 of our en'ironment. The main fragment for interpreting 5eraclitus as denying that e'erything is in flu% is his statement on cosmology /fragment %"3 in your te%tboo207 This cosmos, the same of all, no god nor man did create, but it e'er #as and is and #ill be7 e'erli'ing fire, 2indling in measures and being ;uenched in measures. - !lement, Miscellanies &.1+3.6 / 3+0 This seems to suggest that, #hile the cosmos is fire that al#ays changes, the cosmos itself remains the same through the changes. Just as the ri'er #ould not e%ist #ere the #aters to cease flo#ing, the cosmos #ould cease to e%ist #ere the se;uences of changes in the cosmos to cease. If ri'ers and people are li2e the cosmos, not e'erything changes. There are, of course, changes) but there is also a higher-le'el ordering of those changes that remains stable and persists unchanged through the changes /bodies organi6ed as persons, #aters organi6ed as ri'ers, and so on0. If this interpretation is correct, it raises the ;uestion7 4hat are the elements of the cosmos that changeE Identit) of 0pposites oth interpretations of the ri'er fragment agree that, according to 5eraclitus, there are basic elements of the #orld that constantly change /see fragments %"1 in your te%tboo207 :ire li'es the death of earth, and air li'es the death of fire) #ater li'es the death of air, earth the death of #ater. - $a%imus of Tyre ,1., / =6a0 There are t#o things to notice about this fragment. :irst, there are four basic elements7 fire, #ater, earth, air. 5eraclitus seems to order them as follo#s7

earth fire air #ater earth fire

This mirrors -na%imenes< ordering but omits cloud and stone. .econd, these elements change into each other. 5eraclitus offers e'idence for this in :ragment 1967 !old things #arm up, #hat is hot cools do#n, #hat is #et dries out, #hat is dry gro#s moist. :ragment =6a describes changes among the basic elements biologically, in terms of death. "lse#here he mentions the corresponding process of birth, or coming to be /fragment %"& in your te%tboo207 :or souls it is death to become #ater, for #ater death to become earth) but from earth #ater is born, and from #ater soul. - !lement, Miscellanies 6.1=.9 / 360 /.oul seems to occupy the place of fire here.0 5eraclitus seems to maintain that change is regular and cyclical /see also 6+ and 1+3, fragments %"4 and "" in your te%tboo2, respecti'ely0. This mirrors -na%imenes< theory, insofar as the changes are regular. /5e refers to this regularity as logos) see 1, fragment %1 in your te%tboo2.0 5eraclitus departs from -na%imenes, ho#e'er, in allo#ing earth to change directly into fire) -na%imenes, in contrast, held that earth changes to fire 'ia se'eral intermediate stages are condensation. .o #hile both -na%imenes and 5eraclitus treat regular changes as cyclical, they conceptuali6e the cycle itself in slightly different #ays. 5eraclitus also seems to maintain that change is the essence of the #orld, necessary to the e%istence of the cosmos rather than an accidental feature. 5e suggests as much #ith his praise of #ar and strife, 2inds of change familiar in the political realm /see fragments %'" and '' in your te%tboo207 4ar is the father of all and 2ing of all, and some he sho#s as gods, others as men) some he ma2es sla'es, other free. - 5ippolytus, 'efutation C.C., / &30 It is necessary to 2no# that #ar is common and 3ustice is strife and that all things happen in accordance #ith strife and necessity. - Arigen, $gainst elsus 6.,9 / *+0 There is scholarly disagreement, ho#e'er, about #hether 5eraclitus concei'es of change in a consistent manner. .ome fragments suggest that he does not, by 'irtue of identifying opposites. The same thing is both li'ing and dead, #a2ing and sleeping, young and old) for these things are transformed, and those transformed bac2 again are these. - pseudo-Plutarch, onsolation to $pollonius 1+6e / **0 [fragment %"' in your te%tboo2]

If 5eraclitus is a material monist, then he maintains that there is only one substance, fire. /.ee the ne%t section.0 .ince he maintains that fire transforms into the other elements, and the other elements transform bac2 again into fire, an analogical inference from :ragments ** and 196 suggests that 5eraclitus maintains that the same thing /fire0 is both cold and #arm, #et and dry. ut this means that, according to 5eraclitus, opposites are identical. Ather fragments, ho#e'er, suggest that 5eraclitus has a consistent theory of change. The turnings [tropai] of fire7 first, sea) and of sea, half is earth and half fire-#ind [pr1st1r]. - !lement, Miscellanies &.1+,.3, & / 31a0 [fragment %"/ in your te%tboo2] /:ire-#ind is a fiery meterological e'ent associated #ith storms, probably a generic category for lightning, tornados, and sheet lightning.0 :ragment 31a characteri6es changes among the basic elements as 8turnings.8 This is a term that 5eraclitus also uses to characteri6e the solstices, or turning points of the sun. If the elements, li2e the solstices, 8turn8 into each other, then they must be distinct in the same #ay that the solstices are distinct. This suggests that 5eraclitus< references to the birth and death of the elements should be understood as referring to processes that transform one element into a distinct element, so that birth and death are a2in coming to be and perishing, respecti'ely. ut if this is so, then 5eraclitus seems not to be a material monist, since fire, in turning to air, ceases to be fire and fire, in being born from earth, comes into e%istence from something that is not fire.

Lecture 1 Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hat is some competing interpretations of 5eraclitus< claim that 8An those stepping into ri'ers staying the same, other and other #aters flo#8E 4hich is the bestE /Fse the criteria of 5istorical -ppropriateness, Philosophical !oherence, @ialectical Bele'ance.0 9. 4hy might 5eraclitus ha'e identified fire, rather than air, as the basic elementE 3. 4hat e'idence might 5eraclitus ha'e had in mind for supposing that the elements change into each otherE ,. @oes 5eraclitus identify opposites #ith each otherE /Fse the criteria of 5istorical -ppropriateness, Philosophical !oherence, @ialectical Bele'ance.0

Lecture 3: Heraclitus and 2ire There are se'eral fragments to support interpreting 5eraclitus as a material monist for #hom fire is the one substance upon #hich e'erything else depends for its e%istence. :ragments 31a and =6a, for e%ample, gi'e fire center-stage among the elements /fragments %"/ and "1 in your te%tboo2, respecti'ely0. Ather fragments, too, suggest that 5eraclitus maintains that there is only one basic substance /fragments %115 1' in your te%tboo20. Gistening not to me but to the logos it is #ise to agree that all things are one. - 5ippolytus, 'efutation C.C.1 / &+0 They do not understand ho#, though at 'ariance #ith itself, it agrees #ith itself. - 5ippolytus, 'efutation C.C.9 / &10 :inally, 5eraclitus seems to e%plicitly say that e'erything is fire /fragment %"3 in your te%tboo207 The cosmos, the same for all, none of the gods nor of humans has made, but it al#ays and is and shall e'er be7 an e'er-li'ing fire being 2indled in measures and being e%tinguished in measures. - !lement, Miscellanies &.1+3.6 / 3+0 There are, ho#e'er, alternati'e #ays to interpret these passages. :or e%ample, :ragments &+ and &1 might mean that, #hile the cosmos is one and agrees #ith itself #ith respect to being a #hole, it is many and at 'ariance #ith itself #ith respect to being composed of di'erse parts /the basic elements0. This same 2ind of alternati'e interpretation also relie'es 5eraclitus of stating e%plicit contradictions. !onsider /fragment %1" in your te%tboo207 Things ta2en together are #hole and not #hole, [something #hich is] being brought together and brought apart, in tune and out of tune) out of all things there comes a unity, and out of a unity all things. - -ristotle, On the World &.3C6b9+ / 1+0 "ither this passage asserts a series of contradictions, or else it ascribes contradictory properties to the same thing but in different respects. In the former case, 5eraclitus< metaphysics 'iolates the la# of contradiction) in the latter, it does not. $oreo'er, if 5eraclitus is a material monist, then his metaphysics is pretty clearly self-inconsistent, since it identifies elements that ha'e contrary properties. 1raham ad'ocates an interpretation of 5eraclitus according to #hich he is not a material monist and his metaphysics does not 'iolate the la# of contradiction. Instead, according to 1raham, 5eraclitus is a critic of the Ionian 1enerating .ubstance Theory /1.T0, re3ecting it in fa'or of a #orld in #hich there is no original or generating substance but, rather, e'er-changing processes united in a stable #hole.

To the Problem of Primacy, #hy one stuff should be prior to others, [5eraclitus] gi'es an ironic ans#er. :ire is the most fundamental substance because it is the least substantial7 it is al#ays changing, ne'er the same. This pro'ides the clue necessary for his radical ans#er to the Problem of eing7 #hat is real is not any one stuff, nor any set of stuffs, but the system of changes itself, the process from one stage in the system to another to another and bac2 again, in #hich the same order and ratio of transformation ta2e place. Beality is a la#li2e process, the only changeless reality, for all stuffs are but temporary stages in the scheme. .ince the #orld itself manifests this process, there is no need to see2 an origin of the #orld7 cosmogony is otiose, and the Problem of Arigination needs no ans#er /9++67 1,60. 1raham finds support for this interpretation in se'eral fragments /fragments %1/ and "6 in your te%tboo2, respecti'ely0. 4hat is opposed brings together) the finest harmony is composed of things at 'ariance, and e'erything comes to be in accordance #ith strife. - -ristotle, (icomachean Ethics *.9.11&&b, / *0 !hanging, it rests. - Plotinus, Enneads ,.*.1 / *,a0 "lse#here, 1raham elaborates upon his argument. ased upon interpretations of the ri'er fragment and the fragments that mention measures, he argues, first, that 5eraclitus ta2es 1.T to be committed to the thesis that changes among basic substances are la#-go'erned. 2awlike Material /lux7 Transformations bet#een basic substances occur in such a #ay that a portion of one substance that turns into another substance in the series is replaced by an e;ui'alent among of the second substance in a reciprocal transformation /9++67 13*0. (e%t, based upon interpretations of fragments about the identity of opposites, 1raham argues that 5eraclitus ta2es Ga#li2e $aterial :lu% to entail Transformational E3ui+alence, the thesis that that all of the basic substances can turn into each other. :inally, 1raham argues that 5eraclitus ta2es Transformational E3ui+alence to entail that 1.T is false. :or if any substance can be a generating substance because of the la#li2e nature of the cosmos, then there is no uni;ue generating substance) and if there is no uni;ue generating substance, there is no uni;ue original substance. 5ence, according to 1raham, #hile 5eraclitus might seem to assert contradictions, this is only because he is pro'iding a reductio ad a)surdum of Ionian metaphysics.

Lecture 3 Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hat are some competing interpretations of 5eraclitus< claim that 8They do not understand ho#, though at 'ariance #ith itself, it agrees #ith itself8E 4hich is the bestE /Fse the criteria of 5istorical -ppropriateness, Philosophical !oherence, @ialectical Bele'ance.0 9. 4hich interpretation of 5eraclitus< metaphysics is more plausible, $aterial $onism or 1enerating .ubstance TheoryE /Fse the criteria of 5istorical -ppropriateness, Philosophical !oherence, @ialectical Bele'ance) and 2eep in mind the Problems of Primacy, Arigination, and eing.0 3. 5o# does 5eraclitus< account of the #orld differ from 5esiod<sE @o any mythological elements remainE ,. @oes 5eraclitus ad'ocate a contradictory metaphysicsE

Lecture 6: Parmenides Parmenides is intriguing among the early 1ree2 philosophers by 'irtue of ha'ing #ritten in the poetic style of 5esiod rather than the prose style of -na%imander. 5is poem consists of three sections7 a 8proemium8 in #hich a goddess addresses a narrator #ith a di'ine re'elation about the nature of the #orld) a philosophical argument that elaborates upon and supports this re'elation) and a 8deceitful8 cosmology based upon 8mortal opinions.8 That the poem begins #ith mythology and ends #ith cosmology suggests that Parmenides< target audience includes both ad'ocates of 5esiod-style mythology and ad'ocates of Ionian-style cosmology. There is, moreo'er, reason to thin2 that these targets are not entirely dissimilar, since many features of Ionian cosmology appear as naturali6ed /or de-mythologi6ed0 elements of 5esiodic mythology. /:or e%ample, the Ionians seem to replace 5esiodic gods #ith naturalistic substances.0 +enses of Being Parmenides< poem introduces a fundamental contrast bet#een what4is and what4is4not /fragment %/ in your te%tboo20. It is right to say and to thin2 that #hat-is is, for being is, and nothing is not. These things I bid you consider. :rom this first #ay of in;uiry I #ithhold you, but then from this one, #hich mortals 2no#ing nothing #ander, t#o-headed. :or helplessness in their breasts guides a #andering mind) and they are borne both deaf and blind, da6ed, undiscerning tribes, by #hom to be and not to be are thought to be the same and not the same, and the path of all is bac2#ard-turning [palintropos]. - .implicius, ommentary on $ristotle%s Physics *6.9=-*) 11=.,-13 / 60 The ;uestion about this distinction that most pu66les interpreters is7 #hat sense of the 'erb 8to be8 is Parmenides usingE There are three main possibilities7 an e%istential sense, as in x exists) a predicati'e sense, as in x is /) and a 'eridical sense, as in it is the case that x. /There is a fourth possibility, namely, a sense that is ambiguous bet#een some of these unambiguous senses.0 There is a #ay to translate each of these senses into the other7 this : e%ists R % is : R it is the case that % is :. 5o#e'er, e'en though there is a #ay in #hich the different senses are e;ui'alent, ta2ing different senses as fundamental leads to different understandings of Parmenides< distinction. The e%istential sense pro'ides a straightfor#ard interpretation of the distinction bet#een #hatis and #hat-is-not7 Paremenides bars us from in;uiring about #hat-is-not, because #hat does not e%ist cannot be thought. /"'en fictions, #hich do not e%ist as reality, e%ist as ideas.0 The predicati'e sense, in contrast, suggests that Parmenides is critici6ing past philosophers for saying that, say, air is the fundamental substance) if this is incorrect, then air is not the

fundamental substance, and so the di'inity in Paremnides< poem is instructing the narrator that -na%imenes< cosmology is mista2en. There is some reason to prefer the e%istential sense of 8to be8 o'er the predicati'e sense. /The 'eridical sense is not a serious contender among modern interpreters of Parmenides.0 Parmenides e;uates #hat-is-not #ith nothing / *0, and this ma2es sense only on an e%istential reading of what4is4not. $oreo'er, Parmenides argues that #hat-is cannot come to be because it cannot come from #hat-is-not / *0. -ccording to the e%istential reading, Parmenides is arguing that something cannot come from nothing and hence something cannot come to be. This ma2es sense of the argument. -ccording to the predicati'e reading, in contrast, Parmenides is arguing that change is impossible, because something that does not ha'e a particular property cannot become something that does ha'e that property. This, too, ma2es sense of the argument) but if this interpretation is correct, Parmenides seems to be arguing in fa'or of a thesis that is ;uite ob'iously false. oth the e%istential and the predicati'e senses of 8to be8 situate Parmenides as opposed to Ionian cosmology. -ll of the Ionians, as #ell as 5eraclitus, maintain that change happens) but, if Parmenides has in mind a predicati'e sense of being, he denies this. $oreo'er, all of the Ionians, 5eraclitus included, maintain that some substances come to be) but, if Parmenides has in mind an e%istential sense of being, he denies this. The 2our +igns of Being Parmenides< disagreement #ith the Ionians is not based upon empirical or contingent refutations. Instead, Parmenides ta2es their cosmologies to be falsified apriori, by 'irtue of properties that what4is necessarily has. 5e ascribes four properties to what4is /fragment %3 in your te%tboo20. Anly one tale is left of the #ay7 that it is) and on this are posted 'ery many signs, that #hat-is is ungenerated and imperishable, a #hole of one 2ind, unsha2en, and complete. - .implicius, ommentary on $ristotle%s Physics 1,&.1-1,6.9&, 3C.1-C / *0 What4is, according to Parmenides, is eternal, indi'isible, motionless, and complete. 5e offers arguments in fa'or of each property, purporting to sho# that denying any one of these properties to #hat-is entails a contradiction. What4is is Eternal #hat birth #ould you see2 of itE 4here, #hence did it gro#E (ot from #hat-is-not #ill I allo# you to say or to thin2) for it is not sayable or thin2able that it is not. / *.6-C0

What4is is "ndi+isi)le (or is it di'isible, since it is all ali2e [homoion], nor is there any more here, #hich #ould 2eep it from holding together [sunechesthai] nor any less, but it is all full of #hat-is. Thus it is all continuous [xuneches], for #hat-is clea'es to #hat-is. / *.99-9&0 :or neither is it right for there to be anything more or anything less here or there) nor is there #hat-is-not, #hich might stop it from reaching its li2e) nor is there #hat-is in such a #ay that there #ould be of #hat-is here more and here less, since it is all in'iolate. / *.,,-,*0 What4is is Motionless :urther, motionless [akineton] in the limits of great bonds it is #ithout starting and stopping, since coming to be and perishing #andered 'ery far a#ay, and true faith banished them. The same in the same by itself it remains and thus it remains steadfast there) for mighty (ecessity holds it in the bonds of a limit, #hich confines it round about. / *.96-310 What4is is omplete 4herefore it is not right for #hat-is to be incomplete) for it is not needy) if it #ere it #ould lac2 e'erything. / *.39-330 ut since there is a final limit, it is complete, e'ery#here li2e to the mass of a #ell-rounded ball, e;ually balanced from the center in all directions. / *.,9-,,0

Lecture 6 Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hat sense of the 'erb 8to be8 does Parmenides use in his poemE Is he ambiguousE If so, #hat purpose might this ser'eE 9. Parmenides ascribes four properties to what4is7 eternal, indi'isible, motionless, complete. 4hat are each of these argumentsE -re they 'alidE soundE 3. 5o# does Parmednies< account of #hat e%ists differ from 5esiod<sE

Lecture 7: 8leatic Metatheor) The four signs, or four "leatic properties, are constraints that something must satisfy to count as a being. There are, ho#e'er, competing interpretations about #hat Parmenides ta2es these constraints to demonstrate. oth interpretations agree that, since the entities of Ionian cosmology fail to ha'e at least one of the "leatic properties, Parmenides is pro'iding a metacriti;ue of that cosmology. In its place, Parmenides demands that any intelligible cosmology must postulate only entities that ha'e a fi%ed nature, entities #ith determinate properties, entities that are themsel'es eternal, indi'isible, motionless, and complete. eyond this agreement, the interpretations di'erge. -ccording to a minimal or $eak interpretation, Parmenides only identifies properties that the elements of an acceptable cosmology must ha'e and does not, in addition, offer a competing ontology. This interpretation has Parmenides being silent about #hat the correct ontology is, #hether it contains one or many entities, and so on. -ccording to a ma%imal or strong interpretation, in contrast, Parmenides offers an ontology that competes #ith Ionian cosmology. The re3ection of coming to be and perishing /#ith the eternality property0 entails the elimination of differences bet#een past and future predications, and the elimination of differentiations /#ith the indi'isibility property0 entails that the only meaningful distinction is bet#een what4is and what4is4not) but since what4is4not does not e%ist, all that e%ists is )eing, a completely homogenous reality. The properties of motionless and completeness further preclude any transformation of this reality and the e%istence of anything other than this reality. 5ence, according to the strong interpretation, Parmenides< four signs entail that the #orld consists in nothing but pure being. -ristotle seems to ha'e attributed the strong interpretation to Parmenides, rebuffing him for being a bad philosopher by denying the plain e'idence of his senses7 (o# to claim that all things are at rest, and to defend this thesis disregarding sense perception is a case of intellectual failure--indeed it calls into ;uestion the #hole of e%perience rather than some part it, and not only in relation to the natural scientist, but in relation to 'irtually all the sciences and all 3udgments, since they all ma2e use of motion. - -ristotle, Physics 9&3a39-b9 -ristotle<s interpretation o'erloo2s the possibility that, rather than ta2ing motionless of being to imply that what4is ne'er changes in any #ay, motionless of being implies only that what4is ne'er changes in its o#n place. -ristotle attributes the former entailment to Parmenides) the latter, ho#e'er, a'oids -ristotle<s charge by allo#ing what4is to change location. Parmenides does not offer any e%plicit declaration to fa'or one interpretation o'er the other. Principles of 8leatic osmolog) Begardless of #hich interpretation is correct, Parmenides< arguments seem directed to#ard ans#er the Problem of eing7 if there is change, it seems that there must be some entity that

undergoes the change #ithout itself changing. This is a problem for the Ionians, because all of their basic elements undergo change. Parmenides< solution, it seems, is to deny that changeable elements can ;ualify as part of a foundational ontology that is also intelligible. ut if the basic elements cannot transform into each other, Ionian cosmology is false. $oreo'er, the second "leatic property, indi'isibility, rules out allo#ing one portion of #hat-is to be different from another, and thereby rules out e%plaining appearances #ith a mechanism li2e -na%imenes<, according to #hich elements differ from each other by 'irtue of ha'ing different densities. :inally, the fourth "leatic property, completeness, rules out any change of an original substance7 if being is complete, nothing could cause it to change. Parmenides offers a cosmological theory after defending his four signs. 5e characteri6es it as a 8deceitful ordering8 of #ords. This indicates that he does not place any great faith in its truth. -ccording to a strong interpretation of Parmenides<, this is because it cannot be true) according to a #ea2 interpretation, it is because he does not ha'e any particular arguments to offer in its fa'or. The cosmology itself is brief7 5ere I cease from faithful account and thought about truth) from this point on learn mortal opinions, hearing the decepti'e ordering of my #ords. :or they made up their minds to name t#o forms, of #hich it is not right to name one--this is #here they ha'e gone astray-and they distinguished contraries in body and set signs apart from each other7 to this form the ethereal fire of flame, being gentle, 'ery light, e'ery#here the same as itself, not the same as the other) but also that one by itself contrarily unintelligent night, a dense body and hea'y. I declare to you this ordering [diakosmos] to be completely li2ely, so that no 3udgment of mortals #ill e'er surpass you. / *.&+-610 Fnli2e Ionian theories, this cosmology is dualistic, postulating t#o forms /morphai0, Gight and (ight, #hich manifest opposite properties and are distinguished by their complete opposition. 4hile Ionian theories allo# basic substances to change into each other, none of them ma2e contrariety a fundamental and irreducible fact7 it is al#ays a temporary state of basic entities rather than their defining feature. $oreo'er, both entities in Parmenides< cosmology are selfidentical but contrary to the other in e'ery particular. This is unli2e Ionian theories, for #hich contrariety is not a defining feature of basic substances. :inally, these entities are themsel'es unchanging. This mar2s an especially star2 contrast #ith 5eraclitus, #ho seems to deny that there is any permanent substance at all, postulating instead an e'er-changing substance /fire0. Gight and (ight ha'e all four "leatic properties. They are ungenerated and imperishable) each is a #hole of a single 2ind) each is, in some sense, motionless /8all is full at once of light and dar2 night80) and neither is incomplete in any #ay. 4hile Parmenides indicates that he is not entirely confident that his cosmology is correct, the structure of his account suggests that he ta2es his

"leatic properties to place fi'e demands upon any acceptable cosmology. I<ll call these Principles of "leatic !osmology7 1- asic entities must ha'e permanent and unalterable natures. 9- asic entities must be ontologically distinct from and independent of one another. 3- There must be more than one basic entity. ,- The basic entities must be e;ual /neither more primary than the other0. &- The basic entities must be entirely opposite in character to each other. These principles re-appear in the cosmologies of the "leatic Pluralists.

Lecture 7 Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 5o#, if at all, does Parmenides sol'e the Problem of eingE of AriginationE of PrimacyE 9. 4hat are the principles of "leatic cosmologyE 5o#, if at all, do these follo# from the properties that Parmenides attributes to what4isE 3. 5o#, if at all, does 5esiod<s cosmogony 'iolate the principles of "leatic cosmologyE 5eraclitus<E -na%imander<sE ,. -re the principles of "leatic cosmology soundE

Lecture 14: 8leatic Pluralism -fter Parmenides, all cosmologies struggle to come to grips #ith his arguments. This is not an easy tas2. An the one hand, an acceptable cosmology must respect the apriori constraints, postulating only elements that satisfy the four "leatic properties7 eternal, indi'isible, motionless, and complete. An the other hand, an acceptable cosmology must also respect the e'idence of our senses, allo#ing for difference and change. >eno and $elissus re3ect this challenge, defending a strong interpretation of Parmenides< arguments. Athers, ho#e'er, attribute the #ea2 interpretation to Parmenides and thereby attempt to de'elop an acceptable cosmology. Prior to the time of .ocrates, there are fi'e significant cosmologists in this latter camp7 -na%agoras, "mpedocles, Geucippus, @emocritus, and @iogenes. The first four of these are 2no#n as pluralists, because they account for natural phenomena by appealing to a set of permanent substances that gi'e rise, through their interactions, to all phenomena . @iogenes, in contrast, is a monist, postulating a single permanent substance that gi'es rise, through changes of its state, to all phenomena. /-ll scholars agree that @iogenes is a material monist) those #ho prefer to interpret the Ionian cosmologists as generating substance theorists argue that the temptation to interpret them as material monists is due to conflating their style of cosmology #ith @iogenes<.0 .ince our te%tboo2 does not contain selections from @iogenes< #or2, #e #ill not discuss him. /The probable reason for this is that the te%tboo2<s editor accepts a material monist interpretation of the Ionian cosmologists, #hich means that @iogenes is merely attempting to re'i'e refuted theories rather than inno'ating an interesting response to Parmenidies.0 -mong the pluralists, scholars group -na%agoras together #ith "mpedocles and Geucippus together #ith @emocritus. The former, 2no#n as the "leatic Pluralists, largely accept Parmenides< theoretical frame#or2 and re3ect Ionian cosmology entirely. "mpedocles of -cragas, #ho #as born not long after -na%agoras, #as an enthusiast and a follo#er of Parmenides and e'en more of the Pythagoreans. - .implicius, Physics 9&.9C-91 The latter, 2no#n as the -tomists, re3ect some of the stronger elements of Parmenidean metatheory #hile preser'ing its spirit. The reason for this di'ergence is that, #hile the "leatic Pluralists enthusiastically follo# a #ea2 'ersion of Parmenides< program, the -tomists, coming later in time, are a#are of the problems faced by a strong 'ersion of that program /highlighted by >eno and $elissus0 and attempt to respond to them. Anaxagoras (s9 8mpedocles -na%agoras differs from "mpedocles primarily #ith respect to the status of phenomena relati'e to the underlying, foundational reality. -na%agoras theori6es that things reduce entirely to the basic entities) "mpedocles, that they emerge from these entities. That is, #hile "mpedocles allo#s things to ha'e properties and states that the basic entities lac2, -na%agoras does not.

There are other differences, too. :or e%ample, "mpedocles postulates only four basic elements #hile -na%agoras postulates indefinitely /and perhaps infinitely0 many) "mpedocles postulates that the elements combine only in #hole number ratios /as in modern chemistry0 #hile -na%agoras allo#s less determinate ratios of combination. "mpedocles< theory thus turns out to be more familiar to modern sensibilities than -na%agoras<. :or this reason, our discussion of the pluralists #ill focus on "mpedocles, turning to -na%imander only to supplement our understanding of pluralism. 8mpedocles: Theor) That "mpedocles sees himself as follo#ing in Parmenides< footsteps follo#s, in part, from "mpedocles< #riting7 he imitates Parmenides poetic style. It also follo#s from the fact that "mpedocles ma2es no significant attempt to refute any element of Parmenides< metatheory, nor does he register any disagreement /e%plicit or implicit0 #ith Parmenides. "mpedocles postulates four basic rhi5omata, 8roots8 or elements7 8earth and the sea #ith many #a'es and moist air and the Titan aither8 / 3*0. /$ither is fiery upper air. .o the four roots are7 earth, #ater, air, fire.0 5e further postulates t#o cosmic forces, personified as Go'e and .trife, representing the attraction of repulsion of unli2e bodies, respecti'ely. /The terms here borro# from political connotations7 strife occurs bet#een hostile social classes /e.g., rich and poor0, dri'ing them to#ard separation) lo'e, li2e#ise, occurs bet#een hostile social classes, dri'ing them to#ard harmony in a 'iable polity. (o special force is re;uired to unite mutually friendly classes /e.g., rich and po#erful0.0 The four elements and t#o forces are e'erlasting and unchanging. The forces unite or separate these elements, #ith different combinations gi'ing rise to the multitude of changing phenomena. In .trife they [the elements] are all separate and ha'e their o#n forms, but they come together in Go'e and yearn from one another. :rom these come all things that #ere and are and #ill be in the future. Trees ha'e sprouted and men and #omen, and beasts and birds and fishes and fishes nurtured in #ater, and long-li'ed gods highest in honors. :or there are 3ust these things, and running through one another they come to ha'e different appearances, for mi%ture changes them. - .implicius, ommentary on $ristotle%s Physics 1&C / 910 They [the four elements] dominate in turn as the cycle re'ol'es, and they decrease into one another and gro# in their turn, as destined. :or there are 3ust these things, and running through one another they come to be both humans and the tribes of other beasts at one time coming together into a single cosmos by Go'e and at another each being torn apart by the hatred of .trife,

until they gro# together into one, the #hole, and become subordinate. - .implicius, ommentary on $ristotle%s Physics 33.1C-3,.3 / 960 "mpedocles offers an e%tended simile for illustration7 -s #hen painters decorate offerings, men #ell trained by #isdom in their craft, #ho #hen they grasp colorful chemicals #ith their hands, missing them in combination, some more, some less, from them pro'ide forms li2e to all things, creating trees and men and #omen, beasts and birds and #ater-nourished fish, and longli'ed gods mightiest in honors. / 93.1-*0 Just as pigments combine together to produce many colors #ithout themsel'es changing, "mpedocles< four elements combine together to produce many things #ithout themsel'es changing. "ach element has its o#n characteristic properties and e%ists as a permanent feature of the #orld, and no element is reducible to something more basic. -nd 3ust as the artist<s mi%ing combines the pigments, the forces of Go'e and .trife respecti'ely combine and separate the elements. 8lemental +u,stance Theor) "mpedocles< paradigm differs from the Ionian one, in #hich the basic entities themsel'es change. This is because "mpedocles< basic elements are elements, changeless substances that can combine or mi% to 'arying degrees in order to produce different things. Ionian cosmology lac2s unchanging substances) but "mpedocles< substances are li2e the letters of our alphabet, persisting unchanged in themsel'es #hile yet forming different #ords. :or the Ionians, #ater can become fire and air can become earth, so that something can ha'e one property at one time and the contrary property at another time. :or "mpedocles, in contrast, #ater is al#ays and only #ater) fire is al#ays and only fire. !hange is not a matter of the substances themsel'es changing, but instead a matter of changes in the combinations of the substances. I #ill tell you another thing. There is coming to be not of a single one of all mortal things, nor is there any end of deadly death, but only mi%ture, and separation of #hat is mi%ed, and nature is the name gi'en to them by humans. - Plutarch, $gainst olotes 1111: / *0 .ince "mpedocles remo'es change from the basic substances, his cosmology re;uires some principle of change separate from those substances, something that acts upon the unchanging substances to induce alterations of their mi%tures. 5e calls these Go'e and .trife, the attracti'e and repulsi'e forces of the #orld. Presumably one force could not both unite and separate, lest it ha'e contrary properties.

The elements of "mpedocles< cosmology ha'e all four "leatic properties. -nd ho# could it [the totality of four elements] perish, since nothing is empty of theseE ut there are 3ust these 'ery things, and running through one another at different times they come to be different things are yet are al#ays and continuously the same. - .implicius, ommentary on $ristotle%s Physics 1&*.1-1&C., / 1=0 This passage indicates, first, that the elements are unchanging /ho# could they perishE0 and, second, that each is homogeneous or indi'isible, 8running through one another8 #ithout become each other. $oreo'er, the elements themsel'es are motionless) they are mo'ed by the forces of Go'e and .trife but do not mo'e themsel'es. :inally, there is at least some sense in #hich the elements are complete, namely, #hen they all come together in Go'e as a perfectly blended, homogeneous sphere7 ut e;ual Kto itselfL in e'ery direction and completely boundless, a rounded .phere re3oicing in circular solitude. - @iogenes Gaertius, 2i+es of the Philosophers *.= / 9*0 "mpedocles< cosmology thus instantiates a paradigm that competes #ith the Ionian one. 1raham /9++67 !hapter *0 labels it 8lemental +u,stance Theor) /8+T0. ".T1- There are se'eral basic substances, the elements. ".T9- These basic substances ha'e the "leatic properties7 they are eternal, indi'isible, motionless, and complete. ".T3- @eri'ati'e substances are a product of relations bet#een the basic substances. ".T,- There is a mechanism that controls these relations. ".T&- There are forces that go'ern this mechanism. ".T6- The #orld comes to be through the orderly application of these forces to the elements, and it continues to e%ist through a balance of these forces among the elements. /(ote7 ".T1 and ".T9 3ust are the conse;uences of a #ea2 interpretation of Parmenides< arguments.0 :or "mpedocles, the elements are earth, #ater, air, and fire. These elements combine in regular #ays, dri'en by the forces of Go'e and .trife. -nd the things around us are the product of the forces combining and separating these elements. ".T sol'es the Problem of Primacy by ta2ing all elements to be e;ual to each other, none more primary than another. It sol'es the Problem of eing by attributing the "leatic properties to the basic elements. /It is not clear ho# ".T sol'es the Problem of Arigination.0 The trade-off for these solutions, ho#e'er, is a lac2 of unity in ontology, since ".T, unli2e 1.T, postulates that there is more than one most fundamental substance.

Lecture 14 Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hat e'idence might ha'e led "mpedocles to postulate that the four basic elements are air, fire, #ater, earthE that there are forces /Go'e and .trife0E that these forces are opposed to each otherE 9. @oes "mpedocles< theory 'iolate any principles of "leatic cosmologyE 3. 4hat are the main differences bet#een "lemental .ubstance Theory and $aterial $onismE et#een "lemental .ubstance Theory and 1enerating .ubstance TheoryE ,. 5o#, if at all, does "mpedocles< theory sol'e the Problem of eingE of AriginationE of PrimacyE &. -re there arguments that fa'or "lemental .ubstance Theory o'er either $aterial $onism or 1enerating .ubstance TheoryE -re they 'alidE soundE 4hat about +ice +ersaE

Lecture 11: Parmenides: ;e(enge $elissus, a follo#er of Parmenides, offered arguments to bolster a strong interpretation of Parmenides< theory. $elissus argues, first, that what4is is all ali2e. (othing that has both a beginning and an end is either eternal or unlimited. -nd so #hate'er does not ha'e them is unlimited. If it [what4is] is not one, it #ill come to a limit against something else. :or if it is [unlimited], it #ill be one. :or if there #ere t#o, they could not be unlimited, but #ould ha'e limits against each other. Thus it is eternal and unlimited and one and all ali2e. / ,-*0 This argument generates the Pro,lem of Pluralit)7 if what4is is indi'isible, there are no distinctions #ithin what4is, #hich means that #hat e%ists is only one single thing. 5ence, pluralistic theories, theories #hich posit more than one being, are apriori false. $elissus also argues that what4is cannot change in any #ay. -nd [what4is] cannot perish, or become greater, or be rearranged, or feel pain or distress. :or if it e%perienced any of these, it #ould no longer be one. :or if it became different, it is necessary that #hat-is is not ali2e, but #hat pre'iously #as perishes, and #hat-is-not comes to be. D ut it is not possible for it to be rearranged, either. :or the arrangement that pre'iously #as is not destroyed and an arrangement that is not does not come to be. ut #hen nothing either comes to be in addition or is destroyed or becomes different, ho# could anything that is be rearrangedE :or it if became different at all, it #ould indeed already ha'e been rearranged. / =0 This argument generates the Pro,lem of hange7 the basic substances cannot change in themsel'es) nor can them change in relation to each other. 5ence, no 2ind of change at all is possible, and so cosmology itself, as the attempt to e%plain obser'ed changes in the #orld, is impossible. - third problem stems from the pluralist approach to cosmology. -ccording to the "leatic Pluralists, #hat #e obser'e are only appearances) the fundamental entities, the elements, #e 2no# only by inference. :or the senses pro'ide 2no#ledge only of that #hich changes) but the elements, by 'irtue of ha'ing "leatic properties, are unchanging. If one accepts this "leatic paradigm, then, as 1raham puts it, Philosophy dri'es a strong #edge bet#een e%perience and reality by putting the real things irretrie'ably beyond the reach of the senses. D (o longer is #hat #e see #hat #e get. There is no# an epistemological gap bet#een our e%perience and the #orld /9++67 9,=9,*0. This is the Pro,lem of <no$ledge.

Lecture 11 Topics for lass !iscussion

1. 4hat are the Problems of Plurality, !hange, and Nno#ledgeE 9. 5o# do these problems arise for "mpedocles< theoryE 3. @o they arise for Ionian theories, tooE

Lecture 1": Atomism -tomism is in many #ays the cro#n of 1ree2 philosophical achie'ement before Plato. - Nir2 and Ba'en, The Presocratic Philosophers /!ambridge Fni. Press7 1C&=0, ,96 !hronologically, the atomists come after the pluralists. -tomist cosmology, as a result, attempts to sol'e $elissus< arguments for a strong interpretation of Parmenides and the "leatic principles. Geucippus and @emocritus re3ect Parmenides< claim that what4is4not does not e%ist, arguing instead for a fundamental dualism bet#een what4is, concei'ed as atoms, and what4is4 not, concei'ed as the 'oid. They attempt to e%plain natural phenomena entirely in terms of natural elements and their motions, #ithout appeal to e%ternal agents /such as gods0 or internal po#ers /such as Go'e and .trife0. (ature, according to the atomists, is nothing but matter in motion, thoroughly demythologi6ed and mechanical. Geucippus and @emocritus represent a complete brea2 #ith 5esiod<s approach to understanding the natural #orld. Their approach, ho#e'er, raises some s2eptical issues that moti'ate the sophist mo'ement, a mo'ement to #hich .ocrates responds and #hich thereby gi'es rise to the t#o to#ering philosophers of the ancient "uropean #orld, Plato and -ristotle. Atom and =oid Geucippus and @emocritus postulate the e%istence of a plurality of atoms and the 'oid. The atoms are what4is, and they ha'e the "leatic properties7 eternal, all ali2e, unchanging /e%cept #ith respect to change of place0, and complete. The 'oid is what4is4not. @emocritus belie'es that the nature of the eternal things is small beings unlimited in multitude. -s a place for these he hypothesi6es something else, unlimited in si6e, and he calls the place by the names 8'oid,8 8nothing,8 and 8unlimited8 and he calls each of the substances 8hing8 [as opposed to not-hing, or nothing] and 8compact8 and 8#hat-is.8 - -ristotle, On *emocritus /-3=0 The atomists further postulate that the things of the #orld arise as a result of different shapes, arrangements, and positions of these atoms as they mo'e through the 'oid. 84hat-is8 is full and solid) D 8#hat-is-not8 is empty ['oid] and rare. D These are the material causes of e%isting things. D [T]he differences [among these] are the causes of the rest. $oreo'er, D the differences are three7 shape, arrangement, and position. D :or differs from ( in shape, -( from (- in arrangement, and > from ( in position. - -ristotle, Metaphysics 1.,.C*&b,-9+ /-60 !learly, then, the atomists deny the truth of $elissus< conclusions regarding plurality and change. Their arguments defending an atomist cosmology, ho#e'er, are opa;ue or lost. The best #e can do is offer reconstructions on their behalf. @emocritus< argument that the 'oid e%ists is pithy7

Thing /den0 is no more than not-thing /meden0. / 1&60 5e seems to be arguing that, since thing is no more than not-thing and yet thing e%ists, notthing e%ists too. 1raham helpfully e%plicates the main premise7 y isolating [not] as a morpheme he sho#s it as negating a noun /or noun substitute0, i.e., as negating a predicate. $oreo'er, the contrast sho#s that the negation is a 'ertain type of predicate, a predicate representing the sub3ect as a thing. 8(othing8 does not mean pure none%istence but the absence of substantiality. It is to be understood as 8not-/,8 or rather, gi'en a metaphysical 'ariable ranging o'er all substanti'e predicates, 8not-.8 .o the negati'e particle, properly understood, attaches not to the 'erb 8to be8 but to a substanti'e pronoun /9++67 96,0. -ccording to 1raham, the atomist insight is that #e 8can safely deny substantiality #ithout tal2ing nonsense8 because there is a sense of 8to be8 other than the e%istential sense, namely, a predicati'e sense. If @emocritus< argument successfully sho#s that what4is4not e%ists /that 'oid e%ists0, it transforms an argument of $elissus< against motion into an argument in fa'or of motion. $elissus argues that 'oid cannot e%ist because the 'oid is nothing, and #hat is nothing #ould not be. (or does it [what4is] mo'e, for it does not ha'e any#here to retire, since it is full. :or if there #ere 'oid, it [what4is] #ould retire into the 'oid. ut since there is no 'oid, it does not ha'e any place to retire. / =0 -ccording to $elissus, if there is 'oid, there is a place to mo'e, and if there is a place to mo'e there is motion) but since there is no 'oid, there is no place to mo'e and so no motion. /4hy suppose that if there is motion only if there is a place to mo'eE ecause the "leatic principles seems to dictate that the fundamental substances themsel'es cannot change) all change must be change in place of these substances.0 @emocritus< argument purports to sho# that #hat is nothing can be, because something can be #ithout being a /substantial0 thing, namely, thing #ithout substance, not-substantial thing, 'oid. ut if there is 'oid in addition to what4is, there can be motion. .o @emocritus< argument in fa'or of the 'oid<s e%istence sol'es the Problem of !hange. - solution to the Problem of Plurality follo#s directly. :or if there is 'oid, then there are distinctions among what4is, namely, separation by the 'oid. .o $elissus< argument against plurality collapses. #ature and on(ention These solutions, ho#e'er, seem to ma2e impossible a solution to the Problem of Nno#ledge. $elissus e%acts a se'ere re'enge) for he offers a separate argument against change #hich uses, as a premise, the supposition that the senses pro'ide access to reality.

If there #ere many things, then they #ould ha'e to be such as I say the one is. D If then these things e%ist, and #e see and hear rightly, each thing must be such as it first seemed to us, and must not change nor become different, but each thing must al#ays be such as it is. (o# #e do say #e see and hear and understand rightly. ut it seems to us that the hot becomes cold and the cold hot and the hard soft and the soft hard and the li'ing dies and is born from #hat is not li'ing, and all these things alter, and #hat #as and #hat no# is seem not to be ali2e at all, but iron #hich is hard seems to be #orn a#ay by contact #ith the finger, as #ell as gold and stone and #hate'er else seems to be completely solid. D (o# these things do not agree #ith each other. :or although #e say that there are many things #hich are eternal and ha'e characters and strength, all of them seem to us to alter and change from #hat they #ere seen to be on any occasion. / *0 1raham offers a useful paraphrase /9++67 9&,07 ecause what4is has the "leatic properties, what4is does not change. 5ence, if what4is is many, the many must not change. ut if #e see and hear and understand rightly, the many do change. 5ence, the many do not change. $elissus< clearly presupposes, if only for the sa2e of argument, that #e see and hear and understand rightly. ut if @emocritus is correct and the many change, #e must not see and hear and understand correctly. @emocritus himself seems to dra# this conclusion7 Af understanding [gnome] there are t#o 2inds, one legitimate, one bastard. Af the bastard 2ind there are these7 sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. -nd there is the legitimate 2ind, #hich is distinct from this. D 4hene'er the bastard 2ind is no longer able to see anything smaller or hear or smell or taste or percei'e by touch D [the legitimate 2ind ta2es o'er]. - .e%tus "mpiricus, $gainst the Professors =.13* / 110 -tomism, then, rescues the pro3ect of cosmology at the price of perception<s reliability. The result of this is that the atomists distinguish bet#een physis and nomos, nature and con'ention /fragment %"1 in your te%tboo20. y con'ention, s#eet) by con'ention, bitter) by con'ention, hot) by con'ention, cold) by con'ention, color) but in reality, atoms and 'oid. - .e%tus "mpiricus, $gainst the Professors =.13& / 19&0 Physis refers to the ultimate nature of reality) the -tomists ta2e this to be atoms and 'oid. (omos, in contrast, refers to the con'entions #e adopt in percei'ing nature. .ome call a food s#eet) others, bitter. .ome call an ob3ect cold, but to others the same ob3ect is hot. The properties to #hich #e ha'e reliable access #ith our senses are ones upon #hich #e tend to ha'e differing opinions. The properties that are present in nature, ho#e'er, independent of our sensory perceptions, are those of the atoms and the 'oid -- and these properties are inaccessible to our senses. Indeed, ha'ing obser'ed neither atoms nor 'oid, #e can only postulate their e%istence as unobser'able, theoretical entities. Aur senses are entirely unsuited to re'ealing to us the ultimate nature of the cosmos.

Lecture 1" Topics for lass !iscussion

1. 4hat is @emocritus< argument that 'oid e%istsE Is it 'alidE soundE

9. 4hy might @emocritus ha'e thought that atoms e%istE 3. @oes -tomism 'iolate any principles of "leatic cosmologyE ,. Is -tomism a 'ersion of "lemental .ubstance TheoryE &. 5o#, if at all, does -tomism sol'e the Problem of eingE of AriginationE of PrimacyE 6. 5o#, if at all, does it sol'e the Problem of PluralityE of !hangeE of Nno#ledgeE =. -re there arguments that fa'or -tomism o'er "mpedocles< theoryE 6ice +ersaE

Lecture 1': *orgias 1orgias mo'ed from Geontini to -thens in ,9= !", the year of Plato<s birth, as an ambassador of his nati'e .icily to a rising -thenian empire. .oon thereafter, he became the undisputed master of rhetoric and disputation among the -thenians. 5is arri'al coincided #ith that of Protagoras from -bdera, a man #ho flatly re3ected @emocritus< atomism and professed to teach people the art of political leadership rather than the speculations of cosmologists. 1orgias, too, re3ected cosmological theori6ing, maintaining that #e ought to focus entirely upon the persuasi'eness of opinions because any attempt to pro'e them true is bound to fail. 5is On (ature is an attac2 on Parmenides< presumption to be able to 2no# something about the ultimate nature of the cosmos. It is, in short, a defense of the priority of nomos o'er physis. Be3ecting Parmenides< 4ay of Truth as un2no#able, 1orgias, li2e Protagoras, aims to establish the priority and necessity of the 4ay of Apinion. 5e does this by purporting to pro'e three theses7 first, that eing cannot be said to e%ist) second, that if eing e%isted, it #ould be incomprehensible) and third, that if it e%isted and #ere comprehensible, it #ould be incommunicable. If 1orgias is correct, #e can ha'e no cosmological 2no#ledge) all that remains is opinion, because nothing can satisfy Parmenides< re;uirements for what4is. .o it is that 1orgias ad'ertised his ser'ices as a master rhetorician, one #ho could teach others, for around S1+++ per course, to ma2e their opinion persuasi'e despite being unpro'en /and unpro'able0. -long #ith Protagoras and 5ippias of "lli, 1orgias is the 'anguard of a ne# 2ind of philosopher in the ancient #orld, the sophist. #othing Is 1orgias first argues that nothing is. I<'e attempted to outline the argument. 1. If something is, it is either what4is or what4is4not or both. 9. What4is4not is not. a. .uppose that what4is4not is. b. Then what4is4not both is and is not. c. ut this is impossible. 3. What4is is not. a. .uppose that what4is is. b. Then what4is is either eternal or generated or both. c. ut what4is is not eternal. i. .uppose what4is is eternal. ii. Then what4is does not ha'e a beginning. iii. .o it is unlimited /because there is nothing else to enclose it0. i'. .o it is no#here /because if it #ere some#here, there #ould be some#here else #here it is not0. '. .o what4is is not. 'i. ut this contradicts the posit /see 3a0. d. -nd what4is is not generated.

i. .uppose what4is is generated. ii. Then what4is comes to be from either something that is or something that is not. iii. ut it cannot come to be from something that is. /4hence, then, this other thingE0 i'. (or can it come to be from something that is not. /.omething cannot come from nothing.0 '. .o what4is is not generated. e. What4is is not both eternal and generated /because these e%clude each other0. f. .o what4is is not. ,. 5ence, if something is, it is neither what4is nor what4is4not. &. -nd if it is neither, it is not both. 6. Therefore, it is not the case that something is7 nothing is. /(ote7 1orgias offers a second argument for the subthesis that what4is is not, in'ol'ing the claim that is can be neither one nor many.0 #othing Is <no$a,le 1orgias ne%t argues that, e'en if something is, it is incomprehensible. -gain, I<'e attempted to outline the argument. 1. .uppose that what4is is /contrary to the prior argument0. 9. If things that are thought of are not things-that-are, what4is is not thought of. a. .uppose that things that are thought of are not things-that-are. b. .uppose also that what4is is thought of. c. Then what4is is not things-that-are. d. ut this is absurd /see 10 e. .o what4is is not thought of. f. 5ence, if things that are thought of are not things-that-are, what4is is not thought of. 9. Things that are thought of are not things-that-are. a. .uppose things that are thought of are things-that-are. b. Then all things that are thought of are. c. ut this is false, because there are thoughts of things that are not. 3. 5ence, if what4is is, what4is is not thought of7 what4is is un2no#able because it is inconcei'able. /(ote7 1orgias offers t#o further arguments for this thesis.0 #othing Is 8xpressi,le :inally, 1orgias argues that, e'en if something is and is comprehensible, it is ine%pressible. 5is argument appeals to the notion of 2ogos, a term that means 8that #hich is said /from lego, 8to say80. Becall 5eraclitus< conception of 2ogos as 8the unseen but e'er-present structure of nature8 /1raham 9++67 139-1330. 1orgias is here re3ecting that conception as incomprehensible, proposing instead that #hat #e communicate to others is sayings rather

than beings /and, subse;uently, that #e can 2no# only #hat is said0. Ance again, I<'e attempted to outline the argument. 1. 9. 3. ,. &. What4is is e%ternal ob3ects. 4hat is communicable /re'ealed to others0 is #hat is said /2ogos0. 4hat is said is not e%ternal ob3ects. 5ence, e%ternal ob3ects are not communicable. Therefore, what4is is not communicable.

Lecture 1' Topics for lass !iscussion 1. 4hat is 1orgias< argument that nothing isE Is it 'alidE soundE 9. 4hat is 1orgias< argument that nothing is 2no#ableE Is it 'alidE soundE 3. 4hat is 1orgias< argument that nothing is communicableE Is it 'alidE soundE ,. -re 1orgias< theses compatible #ith the principles of "leatic cosmologyE &. -re 1orgias< theses compatible #ith the truth of Ionian cosmologiesE 6. -re 1orgias< theses compatible #ith the truth of 5esiod<s cosmogonyE

Lecture 1&: Interlude 0pen Pro,lems in Ancient *reek Philosoph) ,efore Plato 5a'ing traced the current of /"uropean0 philosophical thought from Thales to the sophists, it seems #ise and useful to pause before discussing the t#o ma3or philosophers of ancient 1reece, Plato and -ristotle, in order to ta2e stoc2 of #hat the Ionian tradition accomplished and #hat problems it failed to sol'e. This #ill be useful for situating oursel'es intellectually, in order to obtain some perspecti'e on #hat to loo2 for in the #ritings of Plato and -ristotle. @uring class, #e #ill identify Ionian accomplishments and Ionian failures. !ome prepared #ith a list. Taking +tock In Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato /!ambridge FP7 9+++0, Nathryn $organ #rites, The conceptual e%clusion of the mythological role of the poets ser'es as a po#erful form of philosophical self identification. - challenge to the pri'ileged relationship bet#een poet and $use goes hand in hand #ith re3ection of poets< lying tales. Thus D Parmenides replaces the $use #ith an anonymous goddess of uncertain status. .he too can tell both the truth, and false things li2e true things, but #e are left #ondering ho# <seriously< #e should ta2e her. D Bigorous analysis is to replace careless attributions to tradition /#hether that of pre'ious poets or of the $uses0. The philosophical re3ection of the poets, ho#e'er, goes beyond the reconfiguration of the $uses. Philosophers li2e [5eraclitus and Parmenides] construct their intellectual #orld as one opposed to the content and presentation of poetic tales. D The poets inhabited a different #orld from the philosophers, one that operated by different criteria. Their uncritical use of mythological material #as ta2en as a sign of that dangerous difference. The story the philosophers tell implies no common ground bet#een myth and philosophy, and stigmati6es myth as irrational. $yth becomes the <other<, and the opposition that #e 2no# as mythos 'ersus logos, or myth 'ersus science and rationality is born /9-30. The opposition bet#een myth and philosophy stretches bac2 to -na%imander. ut #e might #onder, ha'ing sur'eyed the Presocratic philosophers, to #hat e%tent the opposition is genuine /as opposed to being an artifact of tradition0. -ccording to Bichard $cNirahan, 8The philosophers of si%th-century $iletus manages to ta2e the decisi'e steps of abandoning mythological #ays of thought and re3ecting traditional #ays of loo2ing at the #orld8 /Philosophy &efore #ocrates7 1CC,, 1C0. 5o#e'er, as ".B. @odd notes in The Greeks and the "rrational /1C&10,

- ne# belief-pattern 'ery seldom effaces completely the pattern that #as there before7 either the old li'es on as an element in the ne#--sometimes an unconfessed and halfconscious element--or else the t#o persist side by side, logically incompatible, but contemporaneously accepted by different indi'iduals or e'en by the same indi'idual /1=C0. @o the Presocratic philosophers succeed in separating a ne# discipline, philosophy, from its mythological originsE $oreo'er, #e also might #onder #hether the attempt to separate philosophy from mythology is a good thing. In Myth and Philosophy! $ ontest of Truths /1CC+0, Ga#rence 5atab #rites, !ontemporary problems in philosophy and other disciplines stem, in part, from a misunderstanding of myth and an e%iling or demoting of mythical meaning. $odern 8crises8--alienation) intellectual, social, and personal rootlessness) threats from technology) #orries about 8regressi'e8 antirational de'elopments) and the conflict bet#een science and religiousImoralIaesthetic 'alues--are crises o#ing to a 8demythification8 of thought and an o'erconfidence in rationality and science. -ccordingly, any solution to such problems #ould include a restoration of myth or mythical meaning /%ii0. .etting aside the lager ;uestion of #hether 5atab<s diagnosis of contemporary ills is correct, are any of the crises 5atab identifies foreseeable as conse;uences of styles of e%planation de'eloped by the PresocraticsE