The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia Author(s): Chien-peng Chung Reviewed work(s): Source:

The China Quarterly, No. 180 (Dec., 2004), pp. 989-1009 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192414 . Accessed: 02/01/2013 01:18
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The Shanghai Co-operation Influence China's Changing Chien-peng Chung

Organization: in Central Asia

Abstract

China,

Russia

and

the Central

Asian

states

of Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, anti-terrorism in countering to China's

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan formed the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) in

2001. centre China's for for an SCO charter, secretariat and permanent backing to strengthen reflects its desire the SCO the past three years means that states China will worries be less that

United States influence in Central Asia. Diplomatically, China fears that the Ameri
can presence regional political American sions demands. petroleum Central Economically, accommodating the United States' efforts bases for support conces to wrest close to China's

from

will companies Asian governments.

compromise Security-wise,

Chinese with

western borders, Washington

in Central Asia, operating as a threat. The American Asia seem to have

can assist Beijing

pressure

in flushing out Xinjiang

on China, should

separatists

or put military and presence influence

put China's

Russian resurgent on in the region

it be perceived in Central involvement the defensive.

newest (SCO), the world's Organization Shanghai Co-operation of regional states and one primarily concerned with managing collective on 28 May 2003 in affairs in Central Asia, held its third annual meeting At the meeting, the presidents Moscow. of the organization's member states - Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan appointed China's Ambassador as the organization's to Russia, Zhang Deguang, first secretary general. of the the SCO secretariat edifice by 1 also mandated They completion so on were In their last meeting 2004. only building doing, they January held in Russia's St Petersburg on 7 June 2002, which agreed on a charter the structure, purpose and tasks of the organization, and the defining to co-ordinate establishment of a permanent secretariat in Beijing the activities of the organization. to participate in matters This article is about how China attempts to economics and of Central the Asia, politics, security directly pertaining and to secure the stability and prosperity of its own western frontier, by The Asian countries, through the institutional its the SCO and China linkages provided by conceptual underpinnings. has so far chosen to take part actively in the SCO, and its precursor, the in "Shanghai Five" forum, which may be read as a sign of its confidence in the regional affairs the ascendancy of its own weight and prominence engaging Russia in the region of Central Asia. However, given what has been happening events the rising influence of the United since the of 11 September 2001 States in Central Asia, the shifting, even opportunistic, pos diplomatic tures of regional states, and the increasingly pro-Western leanings of the - there is a need to assess whether China's roles and leadership of Russia so influence in Central Asia may be hitting roadblocks. This is especially ? The China Quarterly, 2004 and Central

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The China Quarterly since, as one analyst has observed, no point SCO, there is absolutely the SCO will continue minimum, in with Russia co-operate fighting American presence in Central Asia, the region's affairs. in the "without Beijing's participation in having the organization."1 At the to provide a platform for China to terrorism despite Russia's and accommodating the renewed activism in

The

"Shanghai

Five"

of "Shanghai Five" and its subsequent expansion and into the SCO, is a significant process in international relations, for it groups the countries of China, Russia and Central Asia co into a multilateral mechanism for regional security and economic operation for the first time in history. with Central Asia through the fabled the region were direct relations with China established initial contact 2,000 years ago, but severed after it became part of Union. From the dissolution of the Kyrgyzstan delineation These border Silk Road

The development institutionalization

Czarist Russia and then the Soviet in late 1991 up to 1995, Russia, Kazakhstan, Soviet Union and Tajikistan were engaged, as a group, in the negotiation,

of their common boundaries with China. and demarcation talks reflected the desire of Russia and the three Central Asian countries to forestall any attempt by an increasingly nationalistic and economically

to powerful China to take advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union in and Russian Far East territorial claims Central Asia the press dating a border still maintains back to the Czarist and Soviet eras. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had basically dispute with China, but Russia, Kazakhstan so that by 26 April 1996, the heads of state of these reached agreements, five countries were able to hold a meeting in Shanghai to put behind them boundary disputes involving China, and turn to other issues of mutual interest and concern. The state leaders to this first "Shanghai Five" meeting the explored to promote confidence need to create a mechanism and security in the military sphere, and reached an accord to notify one another of military exercises other undertaken within A four countries. border with the 1997 at the agreement, signed in Moscow, limited the deployment of troops to further in April 100 kilometres of China's

group's second summit a maximum 100 kilometres of China's of 130,400 personnel within In the and border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan at that the third "Shanghai Five" meeting followed Almaty Declaration states of the group pledged to the Kazakh capital in July 1998, member combat transnational security threats in the form of ethnic separatism, international terrorism, arms-smuggling, religious fundamentalism, drug trafficking and other cross-border crimes. This declaration would form an of the subsequent SCO, in referring important basis for the existence to the fight against what the Chinese termed the "three evils" specifically
1. Vasily Bubnov, "Shanghai Co-operation Organization: 7 June 2002, http://emglish.pravda.ru/main/2002/06/07/29950.html. what is it for?" Pravda On-line,

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The Shanghai

Co-operation

Organization

of separatism, fundamentalism and terrorism. In the context of Central sense this because the militant Muslim makes and ethnic Asia, linkage the exhibit all three in characteristics, insurgents region typically by engaging in violent acts to realize seditious ambitions behind the spiritual veil of Islam. Furthermore, 1998 was the year that the Islamic fundamen At the fourth its hold over Afghanistan. regime consolidated summit of "Shanghai Five" state leaders at the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek in August to set up a 1999, the group accepted Kyrgyzstan's suggestion centre to co-ordinate anti-terrorist measures taken by member-states.2 took place at Tajikistan's in July The fifth meeting capital of Dushanbe saw Uzbekistan status and observer for 2000, being granted It was at this meeting the gathering. that China's then President Jiang talist Taliban the "Shanghai Five" from a series of suggested transforming ad hoc meetings into a regular and institutionalized for mechanism The Five" multilateral became the "Shanghai officially co-operation.3 in the group's SCO on 15 June 2001 with the inclusion of Uzbekistan Zemin membership.

The

"Shanghai

Spirit/'

"New Regionalism/'

and

the Shanghai

Co

operation The

Organization

for a new world order of regional SCO was already a model on to Renmin ribao its the day of co-operation inauguration, according of the Chinese Communist (People's Daily), mouthpiece Party (CCP), and other Chinese of co-operation Thus, "the new model newspapers. is a partnership, represented by the 'Shanghai spirit' (Shanghai jingshen) not targeted at any third and not an alliance. It is an open mechanism party. In state-to-state relations, it demands that due respect be paid to the other side while pursuing one's own strategic interests. ... The 'Shanghai while reserving spirit' speaks for mutual respect and seeks commonalities summit a year later, Jiang extolled the differences."4 At the St Petersburg "Shanghai spirit" as an "important and useful reference" for mutual trust in seeking and co-operation of security, settling disputes by means consultation, respecting different civilizations, treating countries equally to the of size, and interacting with each other according regardless principle of reciprocal benefit and common prosperity.5 The "Shanghai spirit" has been summarized by a Chinese academic by means of five C's: and common "confidence, communication, coexistence, co-operation, interest."6 It has also been praised by another Chinese academic as a

2. Renmin ribao (People's Daily) (Beijing), 16 June 2001; XinhuaMonthly (Beijing), 31

December 2001. and Developing Quyu zhuyi yufazhanzhong Countries) guojia (Regionalism shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), p. 216. (Beijing: Zhongguo 4. Renmin 15 June 2001. Translation mine. ribao (Beijing), 5. Renmin 8 June 2002. Translation mine. ribao (Beijing), 6. Professor Lu Zhongwei, President of the China Institute of Contemporary International as quoted in Xu Tao, Relations in Beijing, "On the SCO under new situation," China, International No. 6 (June 2002), p. 23. Vol.12, Relations, Contemporary 3. Ma Ying,

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The China Quarterly powerful respects force that "confronts and 'hegemonism' 'power politics,' the right of states to develop their politics, and economics own or use in the the of human humanitarian way, opposes society right excuses to interfere in states' internal affairs, and supports the solidarity states in their struggle to build a new of SCO member 'multi-polar' international and economic order."7 Indeed, enthusiasts may political as even consider the "Shanghai the "spiritualization" of China's spirit" in the Chinese "new security concept," which made its first appearance defence white paper of 1998, stating that relations among countries on the basis of mutual should be established respect for territorial mutual integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual
co-existence.8

non-interference benefit; and peaceful

in

a "Shanghai were to manifesting spirit," the Chinese in the SCO to coin confident enough of their sway and opportunities their policy of political, economic and strategic opening towards Central to some Chinese Asia, "new regionalism" (xin quyu zhuyi). According In addition is an ideal example of China's pursuit of the of "new the co-ordination gains co-operative regionalism," through states to combat of member among security postures separatism, funda to and terrorism, and economic trade and mentalism promote policies in each other's countries.9 In their opinion, investment the theory and academics, the SCO is derived of classical of from the experience "regionalism" in and the decades the World Second War, unity following European nature of the economic rested not only on the complementary systems and political but also on the common of the values, understanding culture and civilization the countries and of among history, peoples on a "New the other is of Western hand, Europe. regionalism," product the post-Cold War era, built on the foundation of free or freer trade, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic (APEC) or the ASEAN + 3 Co-operation practice + China, of South-East Asian Nations (Association Japan and South as a or to embodied forum with deal Korea); security, co-operative in the regional environment, economics and changes like the ASEAN Forum (ARF) or the SCO. In this view, while Regional "regionalism" a retreat from state sovereignty with the movement demonstrates towards federation of the parts of the regional organization, "new regionalism" seeks to group together countries with different political systems and cultural and religious traditions chiefly for the purpose of promoting the

Ying, Regionalism 8. Cynics will note that "Five Principles of so-called at the Bandung Conference

7. Ma

and Developing Countries, pp. 224-25. this concept is really nothing of the new, but a refurbishment Peaceful Co-existence" enunciated by then Premier Zhou Enlai in April of Afro-Asian Nations 1955.

hezuo zuzhi yu xin diqu zhuyi," 9. Pang Zhongying, "Shanghai ("Shanghai Co-operation and new regionalism,") Luntan tongxun (China Reform Forum Newsletter), No. Organization " of 9 (2002), pp. 9-14; Liu Xiaolin, ("The new model Quyu hezuo zuzhi de xin moxing," Luntan tongxun, No. 9 (2002), pp. 15-22; and Zhang regional co-operative organizations,") Shengjun, Co-operation surrounding "Shanghai hezuo zuzhi yu 21 shiji woguo zhoubian anquan zhanl?e," ("Shanghai and the 21st of our country's century Organization strategic security Luntan tongxun, No. 9 (2002), pp. 22-26. regions,")

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The Shanghai

Co-operation

Organization

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interaction of global trade and capital in that region.10 In other words, to co "new regionalism" is open, functional, interest-based the Chinese, states that is clearly ascendant in Eurasia, as operation among contiguous exemplified by opposed to the traditional concept of ("old") regionalism, but is closed, identity-based, the European Union, which ideologically tressed by liberal democratic values, and presumably out-dated. Pursuing in Central Asia would also ideally group countries of "new regionalism" to undermine what the the SCO into a "pole" in a "multi-polar" world, to be American domination. Chinese perceive global Although Chinese writings have lauded the formation of the SCO as a in the search for a new model of state-to-state relations experiment "new regionalism," and comprehensive regional security and co-operation, more accurately which be nourishes and the "Shanghai it, may spirit" as an to China the traditional attempt by regarded uphold undertaking by states to respect each other as principal actors in the international arena while having domestic sovereignty within their own borders. By pushing these concepts, the Chinese hope to defend against agents of American useful and the inequitable aspects of economic democratization to threaten which subvert this order. China today perceives globalization others to perceive of state it, as both a defender itself, and wants sovereignty and a respected big power in the community of nations. Hence the two basic tenets of current Chinese foreign policy are: upholding the "hegemony," in states' domestic affairs; and strengthening principle of non-interference of the United Nations and its Security Council, the role and effectiveness a veto as a permanent member, in regulating where China enjoys for China to international affairs. The Chinese believes that, leadership become a powerful country with a strong military, itwill have to continue its economy, which requires conditions of external peace and developing some degree of domestic stability to prevail. As such, notwithstanding over like issues nuclear rebuilding Iraq, halting proliferation co-operation or fighting terrorism, China considers American attempts to establish, or strengthen as in Asia maintain countries strategic alliances with to China's and economic Amer potentially threatening military security. the virtues of individual rights icans' oft-expressed desire to proselytize and democracy also appears to the Chinese as a form of domestic political social stability and its process of the control of the CCP regime's through undermining development out Of it has often been that these Chinese course, country. pointed derive from a long-standing consternation sensitivities against self-inter ested great powers forcing their will upon weaker nations, a perturbation interference that may subvert China's recent history of being humiliated into signing "unequal" to treaties with the West and Japan. Whatever the case, Beijing wishes counter what it considers to be unilateralist and meddlesome American actions, and further its own interests at the same time, through promoting and retaining the principle of non-interference multilateral co-operation states in regional organizations such as the SCO. among like-minded rooted in China's
Palmer 10. Ma Ying, Regionalism and Kishore Mabhubani. and Developing Countries, pp. 31-32, quoting Ronald D.

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994

The China Quarterly The Shanghai Co-operation Organization

in 2001 transforming "Shanghai Five" into the SCO was, The meeting of the growing influence of the People's in a sense, a culmination over course the of the previous decade. in Asia Central of China Republic that joins together China became a founding member of an organization people and 60 per cent of the Eurasian landmass, and by and economic size. For the bulk of its population itself, of 50 its million form Central Asians population. only perspective, the Central Asian country most wary of a revival of Russian Uzbekistan, at this time. Russia, influence in the region, was admitted to membership on reducing the United States talks with had been pursuing which on went nevertheless nuclear missiles, warheads along with the Chinese some 1.5 billion constitutes to the scrapping of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles its opposition in expressing it could hardly be of concern to them, (ABM) treaty of 1972. Although lead in opposing any foreign (read: US) SCO states also took the Chinese of a in resolving the Taiwan involvement issue, or the US deployment Theatre Missile It was Taiwan. be allowed if requested a significant Defence (TMD) system in the western Pacific covering in future at that meeting that China might also discussed to send troops to Central Asia to combat terrorist threats there, If this comes about, it would be by regional governments.11

tenet of not current foreign policy departure from China's or in countries. bases troops foreign seeking military deploying the first time that the formation of the SCO marked Significantly, a member that is not of a formal regional grouping China became lead and an in took the and China economic orientation, exclusively Three active role in creating and shaping this multilateral organization. 2001, during the prime ministers' days after "9-11," on 14 September states it was China's Premier Zhu in SCO member of Almatay, meeting enactment charter and the establish of the SCO the who urged Rongji had hitherto centre at Bishkek.12 Kazakhstan ment of an anti-terrorism as the main focus of the SCO, and Russia stressed economic co-operation of Independent States (CIS) already had argued that the Commonwealth has an anti-terrorism co-ordinating body, but both were finally won over measures taken at the The institutionalization various China's stance.13 by to re-ener summit may be considered St Petersburg attempts by Beijing left somewhat dazed and numbed by the 11 the attacks, speed and quick success of the American September in Afghanistan. The charter's call to guard against "power intervention and the SCO's attempt to turn itself into a politics" and "unilateralism," are more permanent body, are strongly backed by China. Both moves gize the SCO, which was and linked to America's increasingly prominent post-11 September presence

21 July 2001. 11. Straits Times (Singapore), hezuo zuzhi: xia de Shanghai "Xin xingshi 12. Pan Guang, tiaozhan, jiyu he fazhan under a new situation: ("The Shanghai challenges, Organization Co-operation qianjing," and future developments,") Issues), Guoji wenti yanjiu (Studies of International opportunities No. 2 (2001), p. 38. 13. Ibid. p. 39.

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The Shanghai

Co-operation

Organization

in the countries of Central Asia, and China's desire not to let US dominance in regional and world affairs remained unchecked. China also the SCO into a multi-national hopes that strengthening compact will fuse its own desire to create a "multi-polar" world with Russian President Vladimir Putin's wish to prevent a "power vacuum" in Central Asia, caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's subsequent withdrawal from the region, from being filled by Islamic insurgents,14 or for that matter, the Americans. of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have for years been governments other for each armed terrorist forces aimed at decrying supporting own their While the accused its undermining authority. Tajik government Uzbek counterpart of harbouring elements of the United Tajik Opposition from 1992 to 1997, Uzbekistan dis during the civil war in Tajikistan to contain armed Islamist troops across the border with Tajikistan from Afghanistan into Uzbekistan insurgents moving through Tajikistan to topple its secular regime. Ethnic tension between the majority Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority in the south of the country people of Kyrgyzstan has become a factor affecting its stability. Still, witnessing the violent activities executed by the multi-national terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the Ferghana Valley where the borders of Uzbek patched and Tajikistan meet, istan, Kyrgyzstan out of erstwhile seeped Afghanistan's states were concerned to put enough centre at Bishkek terrorism. and the religious militancy that Taliban member SCO regime, an anti-terrorism into operation and share intelligence in the fight The

in 2001, to gather to national Threats to and challenges against sovereignty dominance also have the majority group ultimately prompted regimes in to and with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Russia, China co-operate Tajikistan and one another against These secessionism. had already aspirations enabled Russia and China to win endorsements from the Muslim Central Asian states not to assist their religious and ethnic brethren in conducting militant in Russia's Chechnya and China's Xinjiang. separatist activities In the context of the fight against the "three evils" of separatism, and terrorism, China hopes that the SCO will bolster the fundamentalism territorial integrity, economic revival and secular nature of the poverty authoritarian stricken, politically tral Asia that are struggling to Islamic extremism nationalism, China pays particular attention to Xinjiang and ethnically diverse regimes in Cen curb rising of Pan-Turkic sentiments and terrorist activities in the region. see the struggle for how Central Asians

Muslim Uighur independence by its dominant Turkic-speaking an Central to for Asia is host nationality, Uighur diaspora estimated at about half-a-million,15 with 300,000 of them in Kazakhstan and 50,000 in Kyrgyzstan.16 A peaceful and stable Central Asia would not only make
14. Sergei Blagov, for a new role," Eurasia Group, new Paper No. 499,

Insight, 30 April 2002.

15. B. Raman,

"Shanghai

Co-operation in Xinjiang," North-east

Organization

prepares

"US &

terrorism

24 July 2002.
Asialnt, 16. "Rejoining September the Silk Road: 2003, p. 1.

South Asia Analysis Asia

and Central

exploring

connections,"

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The China Quarterly China's funds and western borders more secure against men, weapons, in into aid of the materials separatists' crossing Xinjiang propaganda cause for an independent state of "Eastern Turkestan" or "Uighuristan,"17 It would also open doors for China's their preferred names for Xinjiang. domestic economic

(xibu da kaifa) strategy by "Open Up the West" between Central Asia and western China, investment trade and promoting billion into infrastructure where Beijing has pumped more than US$55 projects and education programmes,18 with US$12 ecological building, on to alone from 2001 to 2005.19 billion be spent railway construction two border national priorities These maintaining security and develop harmonize with the intent of the early 21st region ing the western of CCP rule by the legitimacy leadership to maintain stature, economic gains and social order. China's and strategic influence over the region economic diplomatic, burgeoning and semi-permanent through the SCO may be eroded by an intensifying in Central Asia. US military build-up century Chinese boosting China's global

Chinese
Reasons

Opposition

to the US Military

Presence

in Central

Asia:

Three

the military that it was pursuing the United States announced for the of Taliban harbouring government Afghanistan option against the 11 the Central Asian behind the attacks of masterminds September 2001, troubled by religious insurgencies states of the SCO, themselves member their support for the American for years, were quick to demonstrate cause. Uzbekistan allowed more than 3,000 American and Kyrgyzstan at to of Khanabad and Manas, the air bases be deployed and allied troops near Bishkek, in discussions January 2002 with following respectively, When General head of the US Central Command responsible a of State Donald visit from US for Afghanistan; Secretary to let the United States and Tajikistan Rumsfeld persuaded Kazakhstan use their airspace for military over-flight.20 Subsequently, in April 2002, use to three of its airports the Kazakh authorities allowed the US military Tommy Franks, while at Almaty, Chimkent the Ferghana Valley shifting the locus of their Taliban
17. According Information Office

and Jambyl. The IMU has reportedly regrouped in since 2002, where they were quite active before to Afghanistan in 1999 to be with their activities still allies,21 and another terrorist group, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
to a statement released by the People's on 21 January 2002, Uighur separatists of China State Council Republic were responsible for 200 terrorist

more than440 people injured. incidents in Xinjiang from 1990 to2001, causing 162 deaths and
18. Jason Leow, (Singapore), region," Straits Times "Beijing pumps $55b. into western 13 November 2002. Science Monitor, Christian 19. Shai Oster, "Rail link a mixed bag for China's Uighurs," 4 February 2001. 'extremisms' and "San ge 'jiduan zhuyi' yu zhongYa 20. Chen Lianbi, ("Three anquan," and Central Asian Central Asian (Eastern European zhongYa yanjiu security,") Dong'Ou Studies), No. 5 (2002). 22 August 21. Gao Qiufu, "Terrorist forces resurge in Central Asia," Beijing Review, 2002, p. 8.

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Co-operation

Organization

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an Islamic Caliphate harbours the vision of establishing in Central Asia. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Kyrgyzstan and the United States on 15 February 2002 could be seen as providing official cover for the American military presence in the country. Like the US-Uzbekistan declaration of 12 March wise, 2002, on a joint and Co-operation Framework" read, in part, that "Strategic Partnership the United States "affirms that it would regard with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial integrity of Uzbekistan."22 For access to Khanabad and logistical facilities at the Uzbek side of the border with Afghanistan, the United States provided annual aid of

US$160 million toUzbekistan,23with US$43 million inmilitary aid alone

in 2002.24 Washington also provided Tajikistan with US$125 million in on the other hand, furnished aid for 2002.25 The British government, to Kyrgyzstan in that year.26 US$20 million worth of assistance stance ardent China's in terror Considering fighting religion-inspired the ism, it could be assumed that the Chinese government would welcome US involvements in of its the territories SCO post-11 September military for being there neighbours. After all, the reason given by the Americans is to prevent the invidious forces of religious terrorism from seeping to from Afghanistan Central Asia and fuelling the militant through of the region. However, China has made known its dis insurgencies comfort with a direct American in Central Asia. It is widely presence that the principal purpose of the SCO for China is to skew the recognized of Central Asian governments towards friendship political preferences with China and reliance on Russia by means of economic development and security co-operation. for a country that shares a long Furthermore, border with three Central Asian that are in 3,300 kilometre republics and difficult to patrol, China's major concern many places mountainous for the region is to ensure its stability, so as better to guarantee the frontiers. As such, security and interests of its own troubled western China considers the American in Central Asia as an attempt to presence use the fight against terrorism to bolster its own influence in the region at the expense of China, Russia and Iran. The United States took practically no notice of the SCO in its bilateral negotiations with Central to enlist their co-operation in the war against Afghanistan. to Zemin's visit 2002 Iran, a country thatWashington During Jiang April considers part of an "axis of evil," the Chinese President openly opposed in Central Asia as a manifestation American of US troop deployment Asian states

"Bases of debate - America in Central Asia: being there," National Fairbanks, Summer Interest, 2002, p. 40. 23. Sally Buzbee, "United States expanded influence likely to remain in Central Asia, 12 March Associated 2002. Press, 22. Charles

"

24. Kaiser, "US cultivates allies in Central Asia." unlikely 25. Ahmed Rashid, "Trouble ahead," Far Eastern Economic 9 May 2002, p. 18. Review, 26. Yu Xuehui and Xu Tao, junshi "Meiguo liliang jinru zhongYa jiqi yingxiang," ("American military might entering Central Asia and its implications,") Dong'Ou zhongYa and Central Asian Studies), No. 3 (2002), p. 41. (Eastern European yanjiu

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998

The China Quarterly states to combat terrorism and calling on member hegemony.27 While other cross-border crimes, the SCO charter added that laws and principles to the fight against terrorism must not be used as excuses to pertaining the sovereignty of other states or interfere in their internal violate to the United States. affairs,28 in what can only be read as a warning its unhappiness because it has three major reasons for expressed or to at least minimize, American influence in Central exclude, wanting of China's geo-political, Asia, related to the preservation geo-economic Beijing and geo-strategic importance in the region, through the SCO.

Preservation of China's geo-political influence. First, the SCO was as a bulwark politico-security against the eastward expansion envisaged into Central Asia, of the North Atlantic (NATO) Treaty Organization aid to regional governments carried out chiefly through US military and training programmes with their armed forces, which China and Russia interests as great feared would have worked against their geo-political In the 1994, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, powers bordering region. Kyrgyzs pro and Kyrgyzstan formed the Central Asian Battalion Kazakhstan (Centrazbat), ostensibly for regional peace-keeping Since 1996, these three countries purposes. have also conducted annual military manoeuvres with American forces, a strong the US 82nd Airborne. With from elite including paratroopers ally in their midst, and Russia now a full NATO partner with the Putin government support for the providing unquestioning political status states to accommo Asian will Central have less need quo, regional date Chinese demands than before, or use China to balance Russia to gain a greater degree of independence. The authoritarian regimes of Central Asia might have had some concerns in the past when aid from the United States usually came with an earful of criticisms on their lack of human in American 11 and democracy, but changes since priorities rights to less for 2001 have led conditional these support September repressive in the cause of suppressing radical Islam and ensuring governments, American to the in the region. Against American and Western generosity two in the last years, however, China could only region's governments come up with a token 8 million RMB, or about US$970 000 of military in 2001.29 aid to Kyrgyzstan believe that the stationing of American troops on Uzbek Analysts stability of loans from the United territory and the approval of US$400 million to help Uzbekistan States and theWorld Bank inMarch 2002, ostensibly and drug trafficking, offer clear combat terrorism, nuclear proliferation indications that the US intends to support the country as its "anchor state" to serve American interests in Central Asia, even if it means playing to tan and Turkmenistan joined the NATO "Partnership in and under American 1995, gramme, aegis, Uzbekistan, for Peace"

in Central Asia," CNN.com, 22 April 27. Willy Wo-lap Lam, "China opposes US presence 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/22/china.iran/index.html. ribao (Beijing), 8 June 2001. 28. Renmin to combat Islamic radicals," Jane's Terrorism and Security 29. "Shanghai Five expands 1 July 2002. Monitor,

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The Shanghai Uzbekistan's hegemonic

Co-operation

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it seems that Uzbekistan pretensions.30 Already, is encouraged that it missed both an presence enough by the American in October 2001 to discuss the pending Ameri emergency SCO meeting can attack on Afghanistan, and a meeting in of SCO defence ministers

Moscow

inMay 2002 to discuss the possibility of holding joint anti-ter in the future. As a result, the meetings rorist operations failed to arrive at insist for military any concrete measures co-operation, despite Chinese ence. At the meeting in September 2003, of SCO heads of government even managed to have the organization's anti-terrorism centre Uzbekistan relocated Concerned to its own capital, Tashkent. from Kyrgyzstan's Bishkek about rising incidents of ethnic rioting, political assassina

and pipelines in arson, and sabotaging of oil-wells tions, bus bombings, Asian has been Central since the governments pressing Xinjiang, Beijing early 1990s to assist in efforts to identify groups and leaders of Uighur in their countries, and cut off separatists residing among the diaspora of the for them. Some and shelter small, dispersed but better funding known Uighur separatist groups operating in Central Asian states include the "Nozugum" Foundation, Kazakhstan Regional Uyghur Organization, Freedom As Kazakh Uyghur Unity (Ittipak) Association, Uyghuristan Youth and sociation, Uyghur Union, Uighurstan Liberation Organization, Front of Eastern Turkestan headed by Yusupbek United Revolutionary Mukhlisi, Unity based all based in Kazakhstan's and the Kyrgyz Uyghur Almatay; and Bishkek Human Rights Centre, both (Ittipak) Association to believe that all in Kyrgyzstan's Bishkek.31 It would be a mistake can only be accused of these groups pursue violence; indeed, most cassettes or videotapes and distributing writings, producing advocating

the Uighur cause. Only Mukhlisi's group has claimed credit for a series in 1997, and raids on the Chinese of bomb blasts in Urumqi and Beijing arms in under strong pressure from Still, military's depots Xinjiang.32 the of Kazakhstan and have shut down governments Beijing, Kyrgyzstan in and their countries. It is newspapers operating Uighur political parties in perhaps not surprising that, according to a nation-wide poll conducted a in cent 9.4 of Kazakhstan Russian 1998, newspaper per only by Kazakhs of good relations with China.33 supported the development

Co-operation

the United States and the Shanghai caught between Asia Caucasus Central 5 June 2002, Analyst, See http://www.cacianalyst.org/2002-06-05/20020522_UZBEKISTAN_US_SCO.htm. Jones Luong also Pauline and Erika Weinthal, "New friends, new fears in Central Asia," 30. Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Tashkent SAIS Organization,"

"The powers in Central Asia," Survival, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2, p. 70; Boris Rumer, and William D. Singleton Vol. 44, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 64-65; and John McConnell, " to terrorism: Asia "From Tamerlane the shifting basis of Uzbek Harvard foreign policy, ... a004.htm. Quarterly, http://www.fas.harvar /~asiatr/haq/200101/0101 31. Uyghur East Turkestan American Association, http://www.uyghuramerican.org/; and Michael Information Center, http://www.uygur.org/adres/uygur/organization.htm; Sheri 10 December 2000. dan, "China hides its Muslim (London) separatist war," The Times exiled Uighurs Radio 32. Jeremy Bransten, "Kazakhstan: step up fight against Beijing," 14 October Free Europe/Radio 1997, http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/10/ Liberty, F.RU.971014135113.html. 33. Deng Hao, "Zhongguo relations with Central Asian yu zhongYa guojia guanxi: countries: past and future,") huimou yu qianzhan," ("China's in Li Yu and Lu Ting'en (eds.),

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The China Quarterly to the desire of Central Asia's Notwithstanding political leadership ties with China, many people in the region have a maintain beneficial place in their hearts for the secessionist struggles of their ethnic and on Uighur militants kin in China's crackdown suppos Xinjiang. religious to Osama bin Laden's in the terrorist network linked AI-Qaeda edly aftermath of the 11 September attacks drew continuous criticism from the mass media in Kazakhstan.34 The Uighur service of Radio Free Asia, which has been funded by the American since its creation by government to in still from transmit broadcasts 1994, Washington regularly Xinjiang ters in Tajikistan Uighur dissidents treatment of and Kazakhstan, often criticizing China's in Xinjiang.35 One of the most organized and radical "Home East Turkestan the of also known as Youth," separatist groups, has 2,000 fighters operating reportedly "Xinjiang's Hamas," along the with borders of Xinjiang and Kazakhstan.36 Tajikistan Beijing has also over in concerned the apparent failure of the authorities expressed to act effectively against Uighur activists on Kyrgyz territory. Kyrgyzstan in Kyrgyzstan In 1998, Uighurs outside staged a protest demonstration

InMay 2002, thousands of demonstra the Chinese embassy in Bishkek. tors fought with police in the Jalal-Abad the only region and blocked highway between Bishkek and the major southern city of Osh to protest against the transfer of territory to China under an existing border agree ment. In June 2002, a Chinese diplomat was assassinated in the Kyrgyz capital, two years after two other visiting Chinese officials were similarly to the Kyrgyz killed. According Interior Ministry, the murders were movement of a Uighur linked to local members called the separatist Eastern Turkestan Liberation Front.37 one of the Preservation interests. Secondly, of China's geo-economic unstated purposes of the SCO was to function as a Sino-Russian condo to safeguard both Chinese minium and Russian economic interests in Central Asia, a region with abundant natural resources such as cotton, oil and natural gas. By exploring the gold and particularly for with Central Asian China is states, energy co-operation possibilities sources to its of crude oil from the seeking diversify imports away volatile Middle East, and thus reduce its reliance on American goodwill aluminium, Gulf and American guarantee of the security of the sea-lanes from the Persian to the Malacca Straits. In addition, Central Asia has the potential for

footnote continued hou de guojijushi yu zhoubianjiuyiyi Zhongguo International Situation) (Beijing: Zhongguo "China's Uighur 34. Mark Berniker, policy 29 in the post "9-11 (China and itsNeighbours shehui kexue chubanshe, 2002), pp. 235-36. draws critics in Kazakhstan," Eurasianet.org, people," 2003, "

2002, January http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav012902.shtml. the case of Xinjiang "China's minorities: and the Uyghur 35. Dru C. Gladney, "Uighurs flex their muscles," Asia Times (Taiwan),

paper. unpublished 36. Sean L. Yom,

23 January

http://www.atimes.com/china/DA23Ad01.html. trial focuses attention on possible Uighur Repression," 37. Nadia Usaeva,, "Kyrgyzstan: 31 August Radio Free Europe/Radio 2001, http://www.rferl.com/nca/features/2001/ Liberty,

08/31082001115924.asp.

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in its rapid economic need for energy resources to an of oil and and natural gas. According consumption development reserves in Kazakhstan alone of industrial survey 739 1999, possesses tons of crude oil and 1839.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas, million not an SCO member-state, has natural gas reserves of while Tukmenistan, a net importer of crude oil 2858.3 billion cubic metres.38 China became in 1993. In 2000, compared to China's production volume of 200 million crude oil import reached 60 million tons, and the tons,39 the country's to to tons in and 240 million is increase 120 2010 import figure expected tons in 2020.40 million In 1997, Beijing's state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation first (CNPC) rights to 60 per cent of acquired shares and development oil then outbid its American rival Kazakhstan's and field, Atyubinsk Amoco for the country's largest oil field at Uzen.41 CNPC reportedly won was attracted by its the Kazakh the Uzen bid because government attendant proposal to construct Kazakhstan, Xinjiang the Chinese coast.42 oil interests American a pipeline from the oil field across on and northern China to the port of Lianyungang is particularly China keen to keep an eye on

from Kazakhstan for concessions and bidding to sink wells or lay oil and gas pipelines other Central Asian governments from the region. Beijing wants to make sure CNPC retains its attraction at the in negotiating for Central Asian governments future concessions, well-connected American rivals, expense of its private but politically such as Chevron or Texaco, which had been remarkably successful in

In March 2001, Kazakh deals with Kazakhstan. concluding hydrocarbon to export his President Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed willingness a in under the oil future country's through proposed pipeline Caspian Sea to and across Azerbaijan, and the Turkish port of Georgia Turkey to which is be constructed with financing arranged by the US Ceyhan,43 a will American It be for boost economic influence government. powerful in Central Asia at the expense of the Russians if the US and the Chinese, is able to reroute Kazakh oil from its existing pipeline system ending at to Ceyhan, and persuade Kazakhstan not the Russian port of Novorossisk to participate any further in the pipeline project to China. Although trade
" ' 38. Zhang Zhenguo and Liao Qinian, '9-11 taishi shijian dui Mei-E zhengdou zhongYa de yingxiang" incident and the situation and influence of US-Russian '9-11' ("The rivalry in Central Asia") in Li and Lu, China and its Neighbours, p. 358. 39. Wang renshi ge jieduan Xinjiang "Quanmian Chuanqian, jingji fazhan de tezheng," the various stages of the characteristics of economic ("Completely development comprehend No. 4 (2002), p. 17. in Xinjiang") shehui kexue (Xinjiang Social Sciences), Xinjiang 40. Centre for Ethnic and Religious International Studies, China Institute of Contemporary xin anquan hezuo zuzhi Relations, guan yu xin jizhi (Shanghai Shanghai Co-operation New Security Concepts and New Mechanisms) Organization (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2001), p. 41. 41. Zhang Zhenguo, "Tan woguo dui zhongYa wu guo de waijiao zhengce," ("Discussing our country's towards the five Central Asian states,") in Li and Lu, China and foreign policy its Neighbours, p. 252. 42. Birgit Brauer, "China loses out in Central Asia," Transatlantic International Politik, Vol. 3 (2002), p. 83. in Turkey," Kazakh 43. BBC News, "World: Asia-Pacific 15 June 1998, president http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/l 12572.stm.

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The China Quarterly exceeded US$1.5 in 2001, the China and Kazakhstan billion a to construct from US$9.5 billion, 3,000-kilometre project pipeline to China is put on hold, as the Kazakh CNPC's Kazakh oilfields to guarantee an annual minimum volume government has been unwilling tons of crude for this long and costly pipeline.44 of 20 million as a potentially As early 1994, aware that Central Asia constitutes and other parts of important export market for products from Xinjiang the need to revive the China, then Chinese Premier Li Peng espoused ancient commercial "Silk Road" from running through Central Asia Europe to China.45 This was to be done through a proposed network of roads and railways, to rival a similar project backed by Western countries to link Central Asia with Europe called TRACECA (Transport Corridor border trade with Kaza Europe Caucasus Asia).46 In 2002, Xinjiang's amounted to US$1.57 billion or 57 per cent of its khstan and Kyrgyzstan total trade volume, and China became the third biggest trading partner for the economic benefits of trading with China both countries.47 However, seem to have so far accrued more favourably to China than to the Central Asian China's terms of trade between the differential considering consumer of electric durables, foodstuffs, fertilizers, export to machines the and of and its mineral, imports region, appliances and Kyrgyzstan agricultural and animal products from there. Kazakhstan of consumer goods have so far failed to prevent the illegal smuggling a from China, which have led to thriving black market across Central countries, between

authorities have offered little tangible help. The Asia, and the Chinese in world oil prices and their recovery since hitting a inherent volatility more low in 1998 have only made regional governments impatient to as well as additional attract more trade and investment from the West, loans and credits to develop their natural resources, especially energy. By the end of 1997, American and Western companies already had control of more than 30 major energy, gold and metallurgical works in Kazakhstan, 70 per cent of the country's national output.48 American comprising the largest provider of foreign investment companies are now collectively in Central Asia. Hence China has reason to worry that its efforts to in Central Asia will be greatly its own economic influence augment compromised by the renewed US interest in the region.

Preservation interests. Thirdly, a major pur of China's geo-strategic pose of the SCO was to ensure peace and stability on China's western to the domestic order of external disturbances frontiers, so as to minimize
44. W. Birgit Brauer, Lewis, "Beijing's "China loses out in Central Asia," p. 83. Amy Myers Jaffe and Steven oil diplomacy," 1 (Spring 2002), p. 125. Survival, Vol. 44, No.

45. Renmin ribao (Beijing), 20 April 1994.

and after before 46. Jyotsna Bakshi, (SCO) "Shanghai Co-operation Organization Vol. 26, No. 2 (April-June 11," Strategic Analysis, 2002), p. 270. September new connections," the Silk Road: North-east and Central Asia exploring 47. "Rejoining 2003, p. 6. Asialnt, September of "Mei-E zai zhongYa de xinjushi," 48. Deng Hao, ("The new situation zhengdou in Central Asia,") US-Russian (Studies of International Issues), Guoji wenti yanjiu rivalry No. 2 (2001).

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and flow of in the confidence Xinjiang which might have dampened a military presence on vestors and tourists to the region. By maintaining the China's western flank, even after the end of the war in Afghanistan, for any United States is putting itself in a very advantageous position on future strategic bargaining with China. Facing a severe crackdown in the last two years, many terrorist activities by the Chinese government arrest for in who organizing riots, bombings escaped Xinjiang separatists to continue have adopted non-violent means and political assassinations to join the al-Qaeda, their struggle,49 but some have fled to Afghanistan in Pakistan, or in schools Muslim (Madrassas) religious sought refuge to train with the extremist surfaced in Central Asia anti-government relations are kept on an groups there. Beijing knows that, if US-China can help the Chinese even keel, Washington government gather intelli gence United in Central Asia. The the Xinjiang separatist cells operating even cells for States may mop up these Beijing and extradite the as has been doing for a few the Kazakh government activists to China, the Chinese also realizes that, should the United States years. However, as a threat to its strategic interests, such as in mobilizing China perceive now for it will be much more for an attack on Taiwan, possible on

to put military pressure on Beijing from Central Asia. At the Washington of the governments US will have enough clout with the least, very them from cracking down on Uighur Central Asia to discourage sepa ratists seeking arms, training and sanctuary in the region before these Since the American elements slip back across the border into Xinjiang. in October 2001, and even with the collapse of invasion of Afghanistan its military forces along the the Taliban regime, China has not withdrawn or adjacent Tajikistan and Pakistan-held Kash border with Afghanistan,
mir.

A close reading of the Pentagon's "Quadrennial defense review report the 11 released after 2001," September events, and the "2002 annual just on of China," reveals the of the report People's Republic military power a long-term that the US military was devising strategy based on the to next the threat American that security interests global expectation and military modernization would be China, given its arms acquisition the troubles with Islamic terrorism and Iraq, there programme. Despite are still adherents to this view within the US administration and defence excellent relations with Iran, which establishment. Since China maintains an additional advantage to the United States of is no friend of America, in Central Asia is to break any possible future Iran-China having troops to if Iran, believed strategic axis running through the region, particularly be enriching weapons.50 likely to rise uranium American nuclear for reactor fuel, proceeds with developing is and Kyrgyzstan troop strength in Uzbekistan in the future. The United States is also expected to expand

at the China Institute Fellow of Professor Xu Tao, Research 49. Interview with 10 December 2002. International Relations, Beijing, Contemporary "The Asian nuclear arc," Los Angeles and Husain Haqqani, 50. Joseph Cirincione Times, was a beneficiary of Chinese assistance 28 September 2003. Iran's nuclear energy programme that aid had since been suspended under US pressure. See Robert in its early stages, although

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1004

The China Quarterly on a 20-year lease and only 320 air base in Kyrgyzstan, from the Chinese border, into a major base of support for air and the hub of a regional electronic network intelligence operations which covers western China.51 China's push for a nuclear weapons-free the Manas kilometres during the second SCO summit reflects its anxiety States, which has yet to endorse this vision, or some other into the region. power, may in future introduce tactical nuclear weapons to dismantle test site at is unwilling its nuclear weapons Hence, Beijing nor to be included in such would it allow Xinjiang Lop Nor, Xinjiang's a proposed zone. in Central Asia that the United zone

China's Since

Relations the end

with of

"Post 9-11" the Cold War China and

United and

States

and Russia

in NATO

relationship the Chinese Union, leadership has with Washington. of official basis co-operation long-term most that China's realized important state-to-state always

between

the United

the collapse of the strategic the Soviet States against been searching for a stable and Beijing has

is relationship sole superpower, and that, despite negative feelings on with the world's to support role in Central Asia, the American taking concrete measures 11 the terrorism after the United States' fight against global September events can be a means of drawing itself closer to Washington. Accord in late 2001 approved the establishment of ingly, the Chinese government a Federal Bureau of Investigation in Beijing and, at (FBI) Legal Attach? a search among banks in the request of the United States, conducted China and Hong Kong for possible funding for terrorist groups. The to assert direct control Chinese authorities also enacted new regulations and related technol and supervision over companies exporting missiles In return, the United States finally classified the ogy by the State Council. Islamic Movement East Turkestan (ETIM) as a terrorist organization, that earlier position effectively reversing President George W. Bush's China's counter-terrorism campaign should not be used "as an excuse to to Chinese rule in Xinjiang.52 Hence the persecute minorities" opposed on China's a concession part to quid pro quo may be considered American in exchange for Washington's power and priorities, implicit in of activities blessing of Beijing's separatist suppression Xinjiang. The basis of co-operation between China and the United States in the analysts post-11 September period has been described by some Chinese as resting on the three pillars of "anti-terrorism, and anti-proliferation

footnote continued S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait confrontation: International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), 51. New York Times, 9 January 2002. 52. Mike Allen and Phillip P. Pan, "China vows 19 October 2002. coercion, p. 99. to help credibility and the use of force,"

in terror fight," Washington

Post,

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The Shanghai

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In that case, if the US again disregards China's objec anti-recession."53 tion in attacking a sovereign country as it did with Iraq to oust Saddam in the sale of Hussein, or charges the Chinese government with conniving or accuses to enemies of the missile-related US, technology Beijing of on of the World Trade economic contravening provisions Organization or other issues, will these three pillars hold? Or is China liberalization to the once and future "strategic competitor" for the United remain likely as their bilateral States, relationship was characterized by the Bush in its early months? Although China has shared intelli on in Central Asia, with the United States terrorist gence organizations on its wars to the principal benefit of Chinese the United States support was stance in the in Afghanistan and Iraq China's sympathetic diplomatic administration and little more. Although Nations, fighting global terrorism is at present, in the final analysis, the war certainly a plank of co-operation on terror is a peripheral issue in Sino-American relations. China and the United States have somewhat different ideas on how to deal with Japan's future strategic role in Asia, the Taiwan issue, tensions on the Korean United of the TMD, China's growing presence peninsula, American deployment on the world stage, and concerns pertaining to the human rights situation in China. Chinese assent to the American-led campaign against terrorism diverts attention from bilateral disagreements, but does not solve them. states offered no public The Chinese will recall that Central Asian support or sympathy to China when its embassy in Belgrade was bombed in 1999 by the US during NATO's campaign against Yugoslavia.54 With American forces in Central Asia, China would be wise not to count on any automatic support from regional states in the event of a discord or conflict with the US, and may have to be reconciled to a more constrained role in the SCO. relations with Russia for the past decade have been stable Although and continue to be important, as Moscow remains the chief arms supplier to the Chinese People's Liberation Army, it is doubtful whether China to develop will be able to further its co-operation with Russia the SCO or "power politics." An older into a platform opposing "unilateralism" to be the of "Eurasianists" in Moscow who want Russia generation dominant country of Eurasia is giving way to a younger cohort of more and Western-oriented internationalist "Atlanticists," who are more envi ous of China's success and concerned economic about its potential for because valuable of Beijing's holding Russia's foreign policy hostage arms acquisitions from Moscow.55 China and Russia had forged what they described as a "strategic partnership" in 1996, under Putin's prede

were 53. These three supposed pillars of current Sino-American co-operation suggested to me by several scholars at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in and the Shanghai Institute of International Studies during my interviews with them Beijing

in July 2002.
54. Sun Zhuangzhi, xin geju yu diqu anquan ZhongYa and Regional shehui kexue Security) (Beijing: Zhongguo 55. Conversation with Dr Yevgeny Co-ordinator Volk, on 6 January 2003. Foundation, Heritage {Central Asia's New Chessboard chubanshe. 2001), p. 274. of the Moscow of the Office

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The China Quarterly formalized as the President, Boris Yeltsin, subsequently of and Good Treaty Friendship, Co-operation Neighbourly in July 2001. Since then, developments in Sino-Russian rela Relations, tions have not kept pace with those between Russia and the United States, and Beijing has been put on the defensive by Moscow's lean towards the West and acceptance of the American in Central Asia.56 This is presence Sino-Russian also perhaps because Russia has maintained 20,000 troops in Tajikistan; a 2,000-men formed anti-terrorist Collective Force Rapid Reaction (CRRF) in August 2001, under the aegis of the CIS Collective Security and Treaty, which groups Russia with Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and opened an airbase at Kant, only 20 kilometres east of Tajikistan; Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan, in October 2003. Unlike China, Russia does not need an SCO cover to deploy exercises troops in, or conduct military with, Central Asian affiliates of the CIS. the past two years, accords such as the US-Russia During Treaty on on a Reductions of Strategic Offensive Weapons, the Joint Declaration New Strategic Relationship between the US and Russia, Russia's partner Joint Council, and its ship status with NATO through the NATO-Russia to NATO expansion, have alerted the Chinese reconciliation to a new and the United States and Russia. In addition improved relationship between the United States is now discussing with its NATO partners, including Russia, further military engagement involving the alliance in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Thus, to retain a say in Central Asian affairs, China a formal bilateral dialogue with NATO at its enlargement requested in November to discuss shared 2002, meeting strategic perceptions, threats and NATO in Central Asia. This is the clearest activities security indication that Beijing has finally come to regard Russia's engagement with the Western military alliance as both durable and serious, and that it can no longer rely on Russia to act as a buffer against NATO. Although the leadership of China, and to a lesser extent Russia, will continue to use a multi-polar world order, they recognize the rhetoric of constructing that the Bush administration to shift American is unwilling foreign policy to a more multi-lateral over to what it considers to be platform, especially core US national interest. Bilateral relations between China and Russia are expected to remain peaceful and predictable, but for the foreseeable future, the two states will continue separately to view and pursue better and economic relations with the United States as their most political capital important foreign investment and strategy policy objective and technological transfer. for trade development, cessor as Russian

Future Asia

of the SCO and China's

Uncertain

Role

and Influence

in Central

So where is the SCO headed? Centrifugal to tendencies threatening break it apart will always be present, as there is no pooling of state
56. Vasily 7 June 2002, Bubnov, "Shanghai Co-operation Organization: http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/06/07/29950.html. what is it for?" Pravda On-line,

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or a common enemy threatening enough to thwart manifes sovereignties for the interests in the group. However, national tations of divergent to its coher retain is SCO the foreseeable future, likely organizational it now has a charter, a secretariat and a ence, not so much because state's best it is in a way every member secretary general, but because is of greatest interest to foreign policy position. The grouping as a its into Central Asia but to influence not extend vehicle China, only also to cope with the rising influence of the US in the region as best as with the if at all possible. Uzbekistan, it can, in tandem with Russia, states size of the rest of the Central Asian and population economic in the to Russia wants and China balance combined, through participating fallback The other aid and military presence. attracting American as a their membership Central Asian states perceive guarantee of protec tion from the aims and activities of Islamic radical groups, as well as the by involving China as an economic aspirations of Uzbekistan, hegemonic the SCO may and Russia as a security guarantor. Although locomotive SCO and influence in keeping American cease to have any useful role for Russia in the organization still out of Central Asia, its continuing membership serves to limit Chinese influence in the area, while nurturing a co-operat ive partnership with China, in case relations with the United States and turn for the worse. Of course, all members take an unexpected the West are keeping a watchful eye on the activities of groups of the organization in Central Asia and the adjacent parts of China and Russia seeking to which the main is and fundamentalism terrorism, separatism, promote now. at can least for all unreservedly agree to, agenda that they As an essentially Muslim region of Turkic and Persian speakers, with an overlay of Russian influence, the cultural attraction of China's Han Chinese majority will remain insignificant for the people of Central Asia. and Tajik Kyrgyzstan Although joint border patrols with Kazakhstan, istan to catch elements of the "three evils" are entirely conceivable, joint military exercises conducted by NATO or the Centrazbat states in Central to to welcome China. To add weight and significance Asia are unlikely a recon and the SCO, China might consider sponsoring Iran, Mongolia countries that are friendly to both China and Russia, structed Afghanistan, these countries may not be in the organization. However, for membership near term for their own reasons, just as prepared to join the club in the has so far declined membership the Central Asian state of Turkmenistan a neutral country. Inviting Pakistan and by citing its desire to remain into the into the SCO would import their dispute over Kashmir within also influence weaken China's would and India's entry grouping, If China intends to remain a prominent player in Central the organization. and deepening of its it will have to be through the broadening Asia, India linkages with the region. to For China to help Central Asian countries recover their economies the levels of before the Soviet collapse, and at the same time allay fears the best way may be that it intends to dominate the region economically, to offer more new loans and credits to regional governments, open more rates to Central Asian products and encourage at preferential markets economic

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The China Quarterly more in the region. Although Chinese investments trade between China and the five countries of Central Asia has quadrupled over the last ten to it is still less than US$2 billion,57 which, when years, compared billion a China's present overall turnover of trade of more than US$500 room for expansion. and leaves much year, is insignificant Arbitrary and levies, legal opaqueness inadequate infrastructure are the most per in the region.58 During sistent complains businessmen the by Chinese to June 2002 St Petersburg moved summit, Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev on a common hold consultations tariff policy for all SCO states,59 and called for the removal of trade barriers Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev Al trade policies and discriminatory the group's members.60 among too to it about is talk free-trade early though probably adopting policies as was suggested at the first meeting of the group's among members, economic push for in Shanghai inMay 2002,61 China can still and trade ministers the reduction of tariffs, harmonization of foreign investment of product export quality among SCO coun codes and standardization are already tries. Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan,

members

of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC), which has for reaching co-operative mechanism served as a co-ordinating agree ments on the sharing of riparian water resources, energy development, trade regulation and techniques of food production, cross-border among to the other issues. Areas where China can be of particular assistance states are the provision of much-needed infrastructure aid and CAEC technical development industries. for the construction of roads and railways, expertise, especially of telecommunications facilities, and the operation of light

a charter and a functioning to do much secretariat may Having as a vehicle to extend Chinese institutionalize the SCO. However, its western borders in Central Asia, the SCO and its influence beyond has encountered in roadblocks, supporting concept of "new regionalism" the form of an expanding American military presence and influence, and a possible resurgence in Russian security interest in the region. Fearing a and other Islamic terrorist rekindling of activities by the Hizb-ut-Tahrir states in the region have begun to rely on groups in the Ferghana Valley, forces to guarantee the security and stability of the presence of American their regimes. That China has been the dominant force in the SCO until to the absence of a direct American recently is due in no small measure in the member states, but this is no longer the case. As pointed presence out by a former US National Security Advisor, America fully expects to

"China-Central Asia-Russia relations and the role of SCO in the war on Pan Guang, Institute of International SUS (Shanghai Vol. 9, No. 2 (May Journal, Studies) 2002), p. 15. 58. Sun Zhuangzhi, Central Asia's New Chessboard, p. 228. Blua and Bruce Pannier, 59. Antoine "Russia: Shanghai group aims to increase economic 12 June 2002, http://www.rferl.org/nca/fea Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, co-operation," 57. terrorism,"

tures/2002/06/12062002134601.asp.
60. Pravda (Moscow), 7 June 2002.

61. China Daily (Beijing), 29 May 2002.

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Russian

the be the "ultimate arbiter" of Central Asian affairs in the future.62 With the air force back in Central Asia with and CRRF, together to use the SCO as a hedge less desire on the part of Moscow consequently reach in Central Asia, these roadblocks may prove against Washington's to be increasingly difficult for China to surmount. Even then, one should hesitate to write SCO. In October role and influence in Central Asia and the off China's 2002, units from China's Xinjiang Military District and conducted a two-day joint military exercise involving several

Kyrgyzstan hundred troops and dozens of armoured personnel carriers and helicopters terrorist activities.63 This was China's aimed at combating cross-border first military exercise with a Central Asian state and member of the SCO, and thus might be read as China's way of announcing return to centre-stage in the SCO and Central Asian could SCO

the first step in its affairs. This move

in the first only have been strengthened by China's participation at the exercise soldiers anti-terrorism military 1,000 involving border between Kazakhstan and China in August 2003.w At the June in cheap 2004 SCO summit in Tashkent, China extended US$900 million buyer's restore credit its weight to the SCO Central in the region. Asian states, in yet another step to

62. Zbgniew The Grand Chessboard: American and Its Geostrategic Brzezinski, Primacy (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 123-24. Imperatives 11 October 63. Xinhua News Agency, 2002. See also Jing Ban, "Zhongguo yu Jierjisi cross-border anti-terrorist ("China and Kyrgrzstan yanxi," jinmingtian kuajing fankong luntan {World Forum Military exercise Forum), today and tomorrow,") Shijie luntanjunshi 11 October and BBC News, "China 2002, http://216.40.227.4/wmf/posts/3603482.shtml; 11 October conduct exercises," 2002, http:// Kyrgyzstan joint anti-terrorist manoeuvring 216.40.227.4/wmf/posts/3603142.shtml. war games 64. "Foreign observers ribao for the first time," Renmin attend Chinese

(Beijing), 26 August 2003.

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