Sociocybernetics

Sociocybernetics
An actor-oriented social systems approach
Vol. 2
Edited by
R. Felix Geyer,
Netherlands Universities'
Joint Social Research Centre, Amsterdam
Johannes van der Zouwen
Free University, Amsterdam
tJAartinus8Vijhoff Social Sciences Division
CLeiden IGJJoston ICLondon 1978
ISBN-13: 978-90-207-0855-4
001: 10.1007/978-1-4613-4097-3
Sole Distributors for North America
Kluwer Boston, Inc.
160 Old Derby Street
Hingham, MA 02043 USA
e-ISBN-13: 978-1-4613-4097-3
Copyright 1978 by R. F. Geyer and J. van der Zouwen.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by print, photoprint, microfilm or any
other means, without written permission from the editors.
Preface
The fifteen papers comprising this book were chosen out of the sixty-one
contributions to the Symposium and Section on Social Systems held in the
context of the Fourth International Congress of Cybernetics and Systems
(Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 21-25 August, 1978). These papers, as-
sembled here on the basis of their topicality, depth and originality, cover a
wide range of problems, ranging from 'Societies and Turing machines' to
'Dialectics and catastrophe'. An interesting array of themes is considered
by authors from six countries. It is felt that these papers, some of them
thought-provoking and of great merit, will cast new light on social
problems. Though the contributions consider a wide variety of topics,
the underlying trend is apparent in many instances.
Of special value is the discussion of the relevance of cybernetics and
systems to a wide spectrum of social problems. I think the treatment and the
approach adopted by the contributors merit wide attention, since their
contributions constitute an appreciable advance in a fairly novel field.
1. ROSE
BLACKBURN (U.K.) May, 1978
Acknowledgements
First of all, we want to thank the authors for their contributions to these
volumes, often produced under severe time pressure.
We are particularly indebted to publisher Hans van der Sluijs and desk
editor Judy Marcure for their helpful cooperation in having both volumes
edited and published on schedule.
We also want to acknowledge the cooperation of the Netherlands Uni
versities' Joint Social Research Centre and the Free University, both in
Amsterdam, who granted us administrative assistance and the time to fulfil
our editorial duties.
Moreover, we have highly appreciated the feedback received from the
members of the Working Group on Social Systems of the Dutch Society for
General Systems Research.
Finally, we want to express our gratitude to Dr. J. Rose, the organizer of
the congress for which these contributions were written, for his stimulating
advice and his willingness to write the preface for this book.
The editors
Contents
Preface I v
Acknowledgements I VII
List of contributors I X
Introduction 11
R. F. Geyer and l. van der Zouwen
Control theory and social change: toward a synthesis of the system
and action approaches 115
l. R. Beniger
Cybernetic theorems on feedback in social processes / 29
M. Mazur
A. SIGGS information theoretic characterization of qualitative
knowing: cybernetic and SIGGS theory models I 41
M. L. Estep
Role playing in the interview: towards a theory of artifacts in the
survey-interview 159
W. Dijkstra and l. van der Zouwen
Alteration of information in channels: a cross-level analysis 185
B. l. Jones and l. G. Miller
Temporalization of complexity 195
N. Luhmann
Simulation of large-scale systems by aggregation / 113
H. A. Simon
Reality-simulation: a feedback loop /123
A. Rapoport
Disciplinary prestige and the accuracy of social predictions as a de-
viation-amplifying feedback /143
R. L. Henshel
List of contributors
PROFESSOR THOMASBAUMGARTNER,Economy and Society, Institute of Economic
Science, Catholic University of Louvain, Rue des Wallons 29, 1348 Louvain-Ia-
Neuve, Belgium.
PROFESSOR JAMES R. BENIGER, Department of Sociology, 2-N-2 Green Hall,
Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 08540, U.S.A.
DR. DON M. M. BOOKER, Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Systems
Analysis, Miami University, 118 East Chestnut Street, Oxford, Ohio 45056, U.S.A.
PROFESSOR TOM R. BURNS, Scandinavian Institutes of Administrative Research,
Lund, Sweden, and Institute of Sociology, University of Oslo, Blindern, Box 1096,
Oslo 3, Norway.
PROFESSOR PHILIPPE DEVILLE, Institute of Economic and Social Research, Cat h
olic University of Louvain, Rue des WaHons 29, 1348 Louvain-Ia-Neuve, Bel-
gium; Visiting Professor, Department of Economic Sciences, University of Mon-
treal, Canada.
WIL DUKSTRA, Psychologist, Department of Research Methods, Free University,
De Boelelaan 1115, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
PROFESSOR MYRNA L. ESTEP, College of Multidisciplinary Studies, Division of
Education, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, Texas 78285, U.S.A.
PROFESSOR RICHARD L. HENSHEL, Department of Sociology, University of Wes-
tern Ontario, London N6A 5C2, Ontario, Canada.
DR. BOBBIE J. JONES, Systems Science Center, University of Louisville, Louisville,
Kentucky 40208, U.S.A.
PROFESSOR NIKLAS LUHMANN, Fakultat fur Soziologie, Universitat Bielefeld, Uni-
versitatsstrasse, 4800 Bielefeld 1, F.R.G.
PROFESSOR MARIAN MAZUR, Institute of Political Science, Polish Academy of
Sciences, Nowy Swiat 47a m.4, 00-042 Warszawa, Poland.
PROFESSOR JAMES G. MILLER, President and Director of Systems Science Center,
University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky 40208, U.S.A.
PROFESSOR MARIA NOWAKOWSKA, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish
Academy of Sciences, Warszawa, Poland.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
PROFESSOR GORDON PASK, Department of Cybernetics, Brunei University, and
Institute of Educational Technology, Open University; Director, System Research
Ltd., Woodville House, 37 Sheen Road, Richmond, Surrey TW9 1AJ, England.
PROFESSOR ANATOL RAPOPORT, Department of Psychology, University of Toron
to, 11 Saint George Street, Toronto M5S 1A1, Ontario, Canada.
PROFESSOR HERBERT A. SIMON, Department of Psychology and Computer
Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
15213, U.S.A.
PROFESSOR JOHANNES V AN DER ZOUWEN, Department of Research Methods,
Free University, De Boelelaan 1115, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
PROFESSOR MARTIN ZWICK, Systems Science Ph.D. Program, Portland State Uni
versity, P.O. Box 751, Portland, Oregon 97207, U.S.A.
Introduction
R. Felix Geyer and Johannes van der Zouwen
Common themes
The papers brought together in these volumes represent a selection
from the more than fifty contributions presented in the symposium and
the section on social systems of the Fourth International Congress of
Cybernetics and Systems (Amsterdam, August 1978). They cover a
wide variety of apparently unrelated topics, and seem to be bound
together mainly by their use of the common conceptual framework of
sociocybernetics, or social systems theory: indeed, they were all selected
for their quality and originality rather than for their mutual fit or for
their illustration or observance of a common theme.
Even for the editors themselves, it was therefore surprising and inter-
esting that, on closer inspection, a number of mutually interlocking
common themes do emerge. These themes may be described as refuta-
tions of the frequently voiced objections against the applications of
systems theory to the social sciences (e.g. implicit conservatism, tech-
nocratic bias, and unwarranted reductionism). But they can also - and
more positively - be viewed as aspects of the emerging 'new cyberne-
tics'. This 'new cybernetics' and its application to social systems can be
characterized by the following developments (see also Briiten, 1978):
1. It stresses and gives an epistemological foundation for science as an
observer-dependent activity. The feedback and feedforward loops
characterizing the 'circular' form of systems thinking are not only
constructed between the objects observed but also between them and
the observer. The subjective character of knowledge is emphasized
by this approach: information is neither seen as inherently 'out there'
in the observer's environment, nor is it entirely viewed as a figment
of his own imagination or a resultant of his own inner cognitive pro-
cesses. Information is constructed - and continually reconstructed -
by the individual in open interaction with his environment. The pa-
pers by Pask and Estep illustrate this trend.
2 R. F. GEYER AND J. V AN DER ZOUWEN
2. Modern cybernetics makes it possible to bridge what one might call
the 'micro-macro gap' - the gap in social science thinking between
the individual and society, between freedom and determinism, be-
tween 'anascopic' explanations of society, departing from the activi-
ties of individuals conceived as goal-seeking, self-regulating systems,
and 'katascopic' explanations, which view society 'from the top down'
and see individuals as subservient to system-level criteria for system
stability. Baumgartner's actor-oriented systems analysis, Beniger's
synthesis of the system and action approaches, and Nowakowska's
theory of social change are good examples here.
3. The transition from classical to modern cybernetics is characterized
by a number of interrelated problem shifts:
a. One shift is from the system that is being controlled to the actively
steering system and consequently (1) to the nature and genesis of
the norms on which steering decisions are based, (2) to the infor-
mation-transformations, based on both observations and norms,
that are necessary to arrive at steering decisions, and (3) to the
learning processes behind repeated decision-making.
b. Especially when several systems try to steer each other, or an
outside system, attention is focused on the nature of, and the pos-
sibilities for, communication or dialogue between these systems; it
is no accident that studies of artificial intelligence devote so much
attention to this communication problem and that questions regard-
ing cooperation or conflict between steering systems become im-
portant.
c. When the behavior of a system has been explained in the classical
way, through environmental influences and systemic structure, the
problem is raised of the 'why' of this structure itself, qua origin
and development, and the 'why' of its autonomy with regard to the
environment. In systems terminology: the questions of
morphogenesis and autopoiesis.
4. These problem shifts in cybernetics involve a thorough reconceptual-
ization of many all too easily accepted and taken-for-granted concepts,
which yields new notions of stability, temporality, independence,
structure vs. behavior, and many other concepts.
Stability, for complex and therefore necessarily open systems, should be
conceived of as a dynamic, floating equilibrium, rather than as a static
one as the old notion of homeostatic equilibrium implies. Moreover,
INTRODUCTION 3
such systems are not only changed as a result of the interaction with
their environment but they also effectuate intra-systemic change them-
selves through a regular recoding of their experience, precisely in order
to safeguard the continuation of their autonomy.
Luhmann deals with the problem of temporality and shows how in
complex systems time and complexity reduction are closely interrelated.
Pask asserts that the system-cum-environment's a priori independence
in classical cybernetics was a definitional artifact, the result of assuming
an independent time coordinate - the observer's time - so that behav-
ioral interactions could be assumed not to influence the system's struc-
ture; in the new cybernetics, however, phenomena like autopoiesis and
organizational closure assume an extremely intricate interdependence
between system structure and system behavior.
The individual papers
Pask opens this collection of essays with his conversation-theoretic
approach to social systems, not only because his contribution is a good
example of a new theoretical development within the emerging frame-
work of the new cybernetics, but also and especially because he il-
lustrates in detail the major epistemological foundations that differen-
tiate the new cybernetics from the more classical approaches.
While stressing the advantages of classical cybernetics with its inter-
disciplinary and holistic perspective, he argues that non-classical cyber-
netics endows many traditional concepts with novel meaning. In clas-
sical cybernetics, as in classical science, the observer has a definitively
reserved external role, compared to the participants in his field of
study, while in the new cybernetics any of the participants may act con-
ditionally as an external observer - thus making the theory not only
relativistic, but also reflective.
In classical cybernetics structure is imputed from without by an ex-
ternal observer who draws the demarcation lines between the systems
studied and their environment and also provides them with an indepen-
dent time coordinate, so that the system's behavior, unless otherwise
specified, does not influence its own stucture. In modern cybernetics,
system stability is seen as a process termed 'organizational closure' or
'autopoiesis' which produces specific behaviors and reproduces itself as
well as the distinctions with the environment that are necessary for its
4 R. F. GEYER AND J. V AN DER ZOUWEN
continued operation. In modern cybernetics, behavior and structure are
viewed as mutually interdependent and hence not distinct.
Baumgartner, Burns and De Ville present another example of the new
cybernetics and develop a systems theoretic approach which they refer
to as actor-oriented systems analysis to indicate both the dialectical re-
lationship existing between social actors and systems and the duality of
the human situation: freedom vs. determinism. They try to integrate
theories where social actors are viewed as the essential force which
structures and restructures social systems and the conditions of human
activity, with the more classical social systems theories, based on sys-
tems engineering and influenced by the deterministic natural science
paradigm, where actors have to follow 'the iron rules of optimal choice
theory in a world of constraints over which they lack control'. Thus,
they construct linkages between actors and their strategic and decision-
making capabilities on the one hand, and social system dynamics and
stability on the other hand. They utilize game theory, viewing games as
open rather than as closed systems and study game transformation pro-
cesses where unsatisfactory games, through 'meta-operations', can in-
deed be restructured by the participants. Their research has focused on
the duality of social action - system-maintaining (reproductive) vs. sys-
tem-changing (transforming) processes. A multi-level hierarchical mod-
el of system stability and change is presented, in which structuring is
viewed as an operator on processes, functions and relationships gen-
erally, rather than on variables. Their conceptual model is then applied
to the structuring of conflict and cooperation and of power systems. It
stresses the potential of systems to change their own structure: complex
systems are rarely stable, and system stability must be explained in the
face of ever-present tendencies for structures to reform, change, or
evolve; existing institutional arrangements may be reproduced but can
also be transformed by often unintended spin-offs and spill-overs.
Baumgartner applies this actor-oriented systems model to an analysis
of industrial democracy measures. He uses elements of Marxist as well
as non-Marxist theoretical approaches to the analysis of capitalist pro-
duction processes and reconceptualizes these in terms of the above mod-
el, thus clearly demonstrating the existing linkages between the eco-
nomic, political, and socio-cultural spheres and demonstrating the in-
fluence of the educational system in perpetuating the existing arrange-
ments.
The crucial issue in industrial democracy reforms is to what extent
INTRODUCfION
5
they restructure control relationships within the capitalist enterprise and
to what extent increased control by workers over their labor and labor
process allows them to extend their control and power to other spheres
of social life. Baumgartner's assessment is rather pessimistic here: the
reproductive potential of the capitalist system is unlikely to be weak-
ened if power redistribution is limited to the process level, as opposed
to the redistribution of meta-power (i.e. the power to alter existing pow-
er relationships) at the structural level. Nevertheless, industrial dem-
ocracy measures, though basically to be considered as structure-
maintaining changes, may have important effects in different contexts:
e.g. by stimulating changes in cultural norms, educational arrangements,
etc.
Nowakowska, in her formal theory of social change, presents another
example of a theoretical approach that fits well within the domain of
the new cybernetics: it is also a non-mechanistic, non-reductionist mul-
ti-level approach, linking individual motivations and behavior to macro-
social processes in order to explain social change.
Social change is defined as a substantial change in one or more of the
seven 'variables' by which a society is defined, these being: S (the total
number of people involved), !fj (the social groups existing as subsets of
S), C (sets of certain goods),f (a particular distribution of goods), II (a
system of preference relations, per individual, over the class of all func-
tions j), R (the set of rules operating within particular groups and con-
straining their members' behavior), and 0 (a binary relation in S, es-
tablishing the communication links between members of S).
Pro-social or anti-social behavior of individuals, in a given situation
and with respect to a given group, is not viewed as a personality trait,
but as caused by a combination of situational, social and psychological
factors; as far as psychological factors are concerned, the combination
of high vs. low need for acceptance with high vs. low fear of rejection
yields four personality types that are linked with a high or low
probability of pro- or anti-social behavior.
A closer analysis of C (the sets of goods), in relation to the other
variables defining a society, leads to a distinction in infinitely divisible
and scarce goods. Infinitely divisible goods form the basis for a formal
theory of freedom, which employs the concepts of equality, preference
consistency, and admissibility. Especially scarce goods form a basic con-
cept for the construction of a formal theory of alienation, which deals
with the strategies of groups monopolizing the distribution of these
6
R. F. GEYER AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
scarce goods and also with the emergence of counter-monopolies which
attempt to block these strategies. Alienation is viewed as a primary
source of social change: first in the consciousness domain, and subse-
quently, when sufficiently strong counter-monopolies have been
formed, in the domain of the allocation of goods.
Finally, the theory is applied to communication networks where the
dissemination of innovations in a society is postulated to be dependent
on the size of the given group and the density of intra-group relations,
in such a way that essential qualitative changes in the dissemination of
innovations will occur when the density of these relations exceeds a
certain limit.
Booker rightly considers the decision-making process one of the most
important in social systems. When it involves a large number of deci-
sion-makers, who each develop their own preference of a series of al-
ternative choices and subscribe to democratic procedures, the prefer-
ence ordering of the majority of decision-makers will soon tum out to
be intransitive.
This problem, known among others as the Arrow praradox, is deno-
ted in Booker's contributions as the 'cyclical majority problem'. Booker
demonstrates that this problem generally cannot be solved, given a fi-
nite time for solution, although chances for a solution increase if the
preferences of the decision-makers converge; this problem is closely
related to Nowakowska's theory, worked out In the foregoing contribu-
tion. However, when value systems between or within groups are in-
compatible - one of the most important sources of social conflict - the
problem can only be solved in two ways: (1) by a reduction of the
number of decision makers and/or alternatives (e.g. through hierar-
chization of the decisional process); or (2) by acceptance, i.e. when a
cyclical decision process is considered acceptable, 'normal' behavior of
a social system. This vision evidently entails consequences for the mod-
elling of sodal systems. To the title of Booker's contribu-
tion: since societies are not Turing machines, they consequently cannot
be modelled as finite automata.
Zwick applies catastrophe theory, developed by Thom and Zeeman,
to a qualitative reconceptualization of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics.
His essay is a good example of. our thesis that developments within the
broad domain of general systems theory - even when they have not
come about in close interaction with social theorizing or fall
within the emerging paradigm of the new cybernetics which this inter-
INTRODUCfION
7
action has inspired - do not necessarily have a conservative bias when
applied to the social sciences but can, instead, be used to illustrate the
restructuring capabilities of systems. Also, the utilization of catastrophe
theory forms a good illustration of one of the basic advantages of the
general systems approach: the creative use of analogies - from different
disciplines, problem areas, or hierarchical levels of organization - to re-
conceptualize problems in another field, thus adding to their perspica-
city.
Especially the catastrophes known as the 'cusp' and the 'butterfly' are
used to model the three classical dialectical principles: (1) the transfor-
mation of quantity into quality; (2) the unity and struggle of opposites;
and (3) the negation of negation. As Zwick himself cautions: 'the cata-
strophe-theoretic interpretation does not add new content to the
Marxian analyses, but merely highlights their underlying coherence, via
a rich system of visual metaphor. That is, like dialectics, catastrophe
theory provides a language for modeling and a method of exposition'.
This, however, is no mean feat by itself; moreover, the possibility of a
more quantitative and rigorous use of the theory in the future cannot
be excluded. More generally speaking, catastrophe theory seems a
promising conceptual tool for modeling any relationship where con-
tinuous change in the independent variable results in discontinuous
'jumps' in the dependent one.
In volume 2, Beniger - in line with Pask, Baumgartner et al. and
Nowakowska - presents yet another theoretical approach which il-
lustrates the diversity of theoretical advances within the new cyberne-
tics. Like Baumgartner et al., he distinguishes two fundamentally dif-
ferent types of social theory: the autonomous system and the purposive
action approaches. These are different in their concept of control: in
action theories, actors control events to further self-interests; in system
theories, causal interactions are maintained by autonomous control re-
lationships. Beniger tries to develop a control theory that integrates
these two viewpoints and can be used for the explanation of social
change. His generalized concept of control rests on the imagery of
flows, both of socially-valued or processed commodities and of infor-
mation about them. He tries to bridge what we have called earlier the
micro-macro gap by answering the crucial question inherent in the sys-
tem and action approaches taken together: i.e. how do individual ac-
tions aggregate in the control patterns required of a social system and
8
R. F. GEYER AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
how do control systems communicate the requisite patterns of behavior
to individual actors.
Individual actors pursue commodities which constitute generalized
media of exchange, i.e. media that translate status and rewards across
organizational boundaries, which stimulates commodity flows on the
action level. On the other hand, the movement of commodities is also
regulated by system-wide norms (i.e. the prevailing rules at decision
nodes governing the flow of commodities); flows inappropriate to system
control will overburden or underutilize system capabilities, which causes
normative strain and results in change among actors supplying com-
modity flows.
Beniger applies his theory to a recent example of social change, the rapid
rise in illegal drug use, and analyzes the flows of commodities (referrals of
drug users) and information between the educational, legal, and medical
institutions concerned with the problem. Out of twelve possible flows
between these three types of institutions, four are predominant: user re-
ferrals from the educational to the medical and legal spheres, and drug-re-
lated information in the opposite directions. Referral flows are put in
motion, on the demand side, by specialists who seek media to translate
individual status and rewards across organizational boundaries and, on the
supply side, by non-specialists who seek competent assistance in a special-
ized area. A rapid rise in the number of drug users causes normative strain
and results in a liberalization of the customary definition of deviance.
Several hypotheses pertaining to normative strain are formulated.
Mazur, though not working within the framework of the new cybernetics,
presents an interesting illustration of how much can be done with only a
minimum of systems theoretical concepts, provided they are applied con-
sistently. With the aid of a simple two-system interaction model and a few
concise algebraic equations, he logically deducts a series of theorems
about the mutual interdependence of two interacting systems, building
one upon the next. Introducing the notion of reactivity (Le. the ratio of
output quantity to input quantity), he relates this notion to the behavior
of two interacting systems and to the concepts of (positively or nega-
tively) divergent, stable, and convergent feedback.
Estep exemplifies the work that has been done recently in the social
systems field to counter the criticisms against the systems approach as being
overly simple, reductionist and mechanistic. She distinguishes three epis-
temological categories of knowing: quantitative, performative, and quali-
tative, the latter being defined as consisting of the set of formal epistemo-
INTRODUCfION 9
logical conditions defining cognitive sensitive awareness (knowing) of uni-
que properties of persons, events, or objects. She then argues that classical
cybernetics cannot be considered sufficiently sophisticated to characterize
qualitative knowing, due to the information limitation of these models, and
develops a SIGGS information-theoretic characterization of qualitative
knowing which includes, as the acronym suggests, elements of Set theory,
Information theory, Graph theory, and General Systems theory. Estep
further distinguishes and describes three categories of qualitative knowing
-recognition,acquaintive qualitative knowing, and appreciative qualitative
knowing - and then goes on to describe the SIGGS-theoretic model which
contains - in addition to concepts like system, input, output, and feedback-
also concepts like feedin, toput, feedout, fromput, and feedthrough. The
model is then illustrated by applying it to empirical research among han-
dicapped learners in a classroom setting.
Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen apply systems methodology to the intrica-
cies of interviewer-respondent interaction in survey research and develop a
black box model of the interview process. They distinguish three possible
respondent roles: the faithful, the good, and the ingratiating respondents,
and argue that normally the respondent effectuates a role compromise
between these three basic orientations. This role compromise will be dif-
ferent in each concrete case and depends on, among other things, the
respondent's role conception, and on role inducement (defined by the
interview situation and, more specifically, by the way the respondent is
explicitly or implicitly cued by the interviewer). A weighted response
function is developed which reckons with the respondent's uncertainties
and incorporates weighted estimates of the contribution of each of the three
basic orientations to the respondent's answer. Eight propositions regarding
respondent behavior result in nine equations, formulated in an empirically
testable form. In a special section on the plausibility and applicability of the
model, results from two types of studies (accuracy studies and covariance
studies) are presented, which help to further refine the model presented.
Finally, prescriptions to reduce biasing effects in the interview situation are
derived from the model.
Jones and Miller, although operating within the framework of classical
cybernetics, show the usefulness of this approach in their cross-
level analysis of alteration of information in channels. Using insights more
fully developed in Miller's recent book, Living systems, they distinguish
seven hierarchical levels of living systems, characterized by increasing
complexity: cell, organ, organism, group, organization, society and supra-
10 R. F. GEYER AND 1. VAN DER ZOUWEN
national system. Each system, regardless of its level of complexity, has to
carry out 19 different processes if it is to survive (e.g. intake and storage of
information) .
The potential fertility and unifying power of the classical general systems
approach are demonstrated by its capacity to generate cross-
level hypotheses, making use of analogies in processes at different hierar-
chical levels of complexity. In this particular case, a hypothesis about
information degradation in channels is presented as a derivation of the
Second Law of Thermodynamics, and is described especially at the level of
the group and the level of society, with regard to the spread of rumors.
Three stages in the transmission of rumors are discerned: leveling, sharp-
ening, and assimilation. These are illustrated by presenting and reinterpret-
ing empirical data from several studies. _
Luhmann, after these demonstrations of the applicability of classical
general systems theory to the social sciences, can again be considered a
representative of the new cybernetics. He directs his analysis specifically to
the extreme complexity of social systems, a neglected element in classical
systems thinking, and links the problem of complexity to the need for a new
conceptualization oftime, system-bound rather than defined by an external
observer, and intimately related to the concepts of organizational closure
and self-referencing, recently developed within the systems paradigm.
Extremely complex systems can no longer relate all their elements, as
simpler systems still can. The structure of complex systems is precisely the
result of a selective process that results in a limited interdependence of
elements. In the theory of social systems, time has been dealt with mainly
from the viewpoint of stability and is measured by system-
external criteria (e.g. the observer's clocks). However, in a complex and
fluctuating environment, complex systems can only maintain themselves as
dynamic systems which can change their own structures in order to adapt to
changing environmental conditions: by being able to change the interrela-
tions between their elements over time, complex systems are not committed
to a simple pattern of interconnectivity, and thus can actualize more rela-
tions sequentially than would be possible simultaneously.
Time compensates for the disadvantages of size, and for the problem of
selection which increases overproportionally with size. Time-bound or
'temporalized' systems can only consist of time- bound elements, or events.
This goes especially for social systems, the ultimate elements of which are
specific events or actions: no action can be constituted without system and
no system is imaginable without actions. Events are defined by the actuality
INTRODUCTION
11
of change; the measurement of time, not required for their identification as
such, is nevertheless necessary to separate events from states - i.e. past
events, coded in memory.
Luhmann - like Baumgartner, Nowakowska and Beniger - bridges the
micro-macro gap between large-scale systems and the actors operating
within them by pointing to the linkage functions that can be ascribed to
actions: (1) depending on the intended or ascribed meaning of an action,
certain other actions become more or less probable; and (2) the meaning
that is attributed to series of interactions makes time individual-indepen-
dent through here-and-now communication. Communication allows one to
share the sequencing of events within one's own individual time horizon
with others, so that quasi-simultaneous events melt together and an inter-
subjectively shared time horizon emerges. Time thus becomes a culturally
interpretable dimension of the world: socialization serves the generaliza-
tion of time and therewith a further enlargement of relational possibilities.
Luhmann stresses the processual character of systems, and argues that
process should not be defined as a basic concept, but that the classical
notion of process should be reinterpreted as a combinatory effort of a
system that has to temporalize its elements and therefore has to attune the
relations between these elements to this purpose. Systemic processes are
not simply unrelated series of facts; they owe their unity, in spite of
temporal distance, to a combination of selectivities, where each event
within a process codetermines the selection of the following ones. The
author finally presents an analysis of the evolution of society since the 16th
century in the direction of greater internal complexity, temporalization of
time, and institutionalization of self-reflection.
Simon, from a different vantage point than Luhmann, also focuses on the
extreme complexity of large-scale social systems. He argues that very large
systems, whether natural or man-made, are almost universally hierarchical
in structure, since this considerably reduces the time required for their
evolution. Hence, they can be partially decomposed, by making subdiv-
isions of weakly interacting blocks of strongly interacting elements. When
complex systems are observed over a moderate time span and with some
maximum frequency of observation, genuine dynamic behavior can be
observed only at the intermediate hierarchical level. At the lowest level,
only the equilibrium distributions of the smallest components can be de-
tected, since they interact strongly at high frequency and thus move rapidly
toward internal equilibrium. At the highest level, the largest components
may appear to be stationary, since the time span of observation is too short
12
R. F. GEYER AND J. V AN DER ZOUWEN
to detect aggregate change in them. The simulation of such systems can be
greatly simplified by exploiting these properties: the dynamics of behavior
at each level can be studied independently by aggregating behavior at the
level below and by treating components at the level above as approximately
constant.
The emphasis on prediction in macro-social models is misplaced; predic-
tion is impossible due to lack of knowledge of the relevant socio-economic
mechanisms, and it is not needed for policy purposes. It is not necessary to
forecast the future but to understand the consequences of alternative
possible futures, and to understand which of these is associated with par-
ticular strategies or policy measures.
Rapoport also deals with the simulation of large-scale social systems.
Computer simulation, for the social sciences, is not only a substitute for
otherwise too complex mathematical deductions as in the natural sciences
but also a substitute for the lack of a real laboratory for large-scale systems.
However, there is a feedback between the research technology employed
(e.g. computer simulation) and the direction research takes, which should
be carefully monitored, because it implies a tendency for the researcher to
be fixated on concepts that are easy to operationalize for that particular
technology, while these concepts subsequently help to shape the re-
searcher's image of reality. The dangers inherent in this are illustrated by a
discussion of a mathematical model of arms control. If the assumptions that
go into a model are incorrect, this will not only result in unrealistic predic-
tions, but it will also tend to create reality, especially in the case of complex
models of large-scale systems. The power game model, for example, tends
to become self-fulfilling; the 'reality' of the power structure is entirely
generated in the minds of men and stems from its acceptance. Likewise,
however, a more positive feedback between model and reality might be
established, e.g. in simulations of the conditions for an improvement of the
quality of life.
Henshel, like Rapoport, deals with the relationship between science and
its environment - in this case not the interaction between the scientist's
models and reality, but the deviation-amplifying feedback between the
prestige of a discipline and the accuracy of its social predictions.
Henshel specifically investigates the effects of predictor prestige on
predictive accuracy. He considers it self-evident that the accuracy of
scientific predictions influences the prestige of the discipline which issues
them, and he devotes his essay to the opposite problem - i.e. to an analysis
of the different ways in which a discipline's prestige may influence its
INTRODUCTION 13
predictive power. He argues that in most 'prestige loops', which include
disciplinary prestige and predictive power as elements, the signs of the
relationships are all positive, so that deviation-amplifying mutual causal
feedback occurs: small changes may accumulate through several 'trips'
around a feedback loop.
One type of prestige loop occurs through dispersion of the disciplinary
perspective among the members of a society. A discipline with sufficient
prestige can eventually shape the institutional forms of its subject matter
and may so far permeate the thinking of the subject that many of its
postulates appear obvious a priori. Examples are given from economics,
IQ-testing and Freudian psychology.
Another type of prestige loop, especially in case of concrete predictions
about specific events, is characterized by 'negative feedback': it has built-in
mechanisms which inhibit the growth of prestige and accuracy.
Self-altering prophecies, both of the self-fulfilling and self-defeating
variety, are all the more interesting when they are issued by social science
itself. When prophecies are deemed credible, alterable, and important,
people may take individual or concerted action to level or improve its
chances, thus altering their accuracy and therewith the prestige of the
predictor. When social science prophecies are heeded and generally be-
come self-defeating, social science should decline in respect. Since pre-
dictions will no longer be listened to, their accuracy will consequently rise
again, leading in turn to a rise in social science prestige, whereupon the
cycle is repeated in a continuous process. However, when social science
prophecies become self-fulfilling (as they generally are when the predicted
state is desirable, and/or when selfish rather than concerted action is
predominant), a multiplier effect occurs as can be observed, for example, in
the field of election polling.
Henshel quotes Sjoberg and Nett as saying that the most effective fore-
caster might be the man who was right 60 or 70 percent of the
time, and he ends with the intriguing conclusion that the social sciences
can conceivably alter their own accuracy and prestige by a judicious selec-
tion or withholding of predictions.
Although we have not ventured into predictions, it is hoped that the
essays presented in these volumes will enhance the accuracy and prestige of
sociocybernetics.
14 R. F. GEYER AND 1. VAN DER ZOUWEN
Reference
Brllten, Stein, 'Systems research and social sciences,' in: G. 1. Klir (ed.), Applied general
systems research: recent developments and trends, New York, Plenum Press, 1978,655-685.
Control theory and social change:
toward a synthesis of the system
and action approaches*
James R. Beniger
1. Introduction
Social theories are of two basic types, involving either autonomous
systems or purposive action; each type has its own distinct notion of
'control'. In purposive action theories, individual actors are said to
control certain events in attempting to further their personal self-
interests. The early action theory of Parsons, symbolic interactionism,
theories of psychological and economic motivation, the exchange
theories of Homans and Blau - all are examples of the purposive action
approach to control. In theories involving systems, by contrast, causal
or power relations are maintained in equilibrium, either stable or dy-
namic, by some form of autonomous control relationships. System
approaches include demographic and ecological theories, the later work
of Parsons on social systems, Mertonian structural-functionalism, the
conflict theory of Simmel and Coser, and Levi-Strauss' functional
theory of social exchange.
Nowhere do the system and action approaches differ more sharply
than in explaining social change. Because action theorists view change
as a product of purposive behavior, they seek explanations in terms of
prior self-interests, power relations and control of events. Social change
is seen, from the action perspective, as a progression of individual and
joint actions and interactions, alliance formations and dissolutions, ex-
*This work was supported in part by a predoctoral fellowship from the National Institute
on Drug Abuse, DHEW, under faculty sponsorship of Neil Smelser, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. The author is indebted to Neil Smelser and Arthur Stinchcombe for
useful suggestions on earlier versions, and to faculty and students of eight sociology de-
partments - at Chicago, Cornell, Harvard, Indiana, North Carolina, Princeton, Wis-
consin and Yale - for helpful questions and criticisms on oral presentations. Data on
Baltimore and San Francisco were collected under Grant NO I-MH-I-0093 (ND) from
NIDA; the autor is grateful to Dr. Louise Richards, Chief, Psychosocial Branch, Division
of Research, for permission to use this study.
16 J. R. BENIGER
changes of assistance and favors, etc. System theorists, by contrast, view
society as a self-sustaining process, with an internal logic and dynamic
of its own. Social change is attributed, in the system approach, either to
prior changes exogenous to the system or to ultimately unexplained
changes within the system itself. Such changes alter the balance of
causal relationships within the system, and are controlled or contained
through restoration of an equilibrium among these relations (or else
result in total breakdown of control and revolutionary change equiva-
lent to morphogenesis of biological systems). Restoration of equilibrium
can result from an autonomous process (overcrowding, for example,
which may serve to 'control' increased birth rate in a demographic
model); it can also result from a purposively-designed cybernetic or
control process (such as a system for law enforcement, which might at-
tempt to 'control' an increase in the crime rate). In both types of sys-
tems, the control process is autonomous to the action level.
Neither the system nor action perspective affords a wholly adequate
framework for the explanation of social change, though both provide
elements for a synthesis built on common concepts of control. Action
theories do not attempt to explain the patterns of control required at
the system level, nor the control function of system-wide values and
norms. Such theories do explain individual attempts to control events,
however, as well as the aggregation of individual behavior in collective
interactions and alliances. System theories, by contrast, do not attempt
to account for personal motivations and behavior, nor to explain how
individual actions aggregate in the control behavior required of a social
system. Such theories do predict control relationships among system
variables, however, as well as control patterns among component sub-
systems.
What the system and action approaches do have in common is a well-
developed concept of control behavior, whether this is directed at other
actors and events, on the level of purposive action, or at changes in
exogenous variables and relationships at the system level; both con-
stitute environments to be controlled. A second common concept is that
of informational feedback from these environments, with the state of
control at time to determining control relations at time t l'
This paper introduces a new theoretical framework, based on a gen-
eralized concept of control, which serve:s to synthesize the autonomous
system and purposive action approaches to social change. Central to
this synthesis will be the imagery of flows, both of socially-valued or
CONTROL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
17
processed commodities (like money, citations, referrals or authority)
and of information about these commodity flows (feedback as defined
above). When the environment of any controlling unit (individual or
group, system or subsystem) is another such unit, flows become mu-
tually-controlled exchanges of both commodities and information. On
the action level, individuals will be seen to control commodity ex-
changes in pursuit of personal self-interests; these exchanges aggregate
in flows essential for the control of commodities at the system level.
Informational feedback, a requisite of system-level control, is also ex-
changed in furtherance of individual goals at the level of purposive ac-
tions.
The crucial question outstanding in the system and action perspectives,
taken together, is how indiviual actions aggregate in the control
patterns required of a social system or, conversely, how control systems
communicate the requisite patterns of behavior to individual actors.
The answer developed here combines normative strain and change, on
the system level, with the pursuit of generalized media of exchange on
the action level. Individual actors seek commodities because they con-
stitute generalized media, i.e. media that translate status and rewards
across organizational boundaries; this stimulates commodity flow on the
action level. The movement of commodities is also regulated by system-
wide norms, however, defined here as the prevailing rules at decision
nodes governing the flow of commodities (most applications of the term
'norm' can be modelled in this way). Flows inappropriate to system
control will overburden or under-utilize system capabilities; this, in
turn, will cause normative strain and change among actors supplying
commodity flows, with the result of tightening or loosening these flows.
In this way, the control theory synthesis expands the potential of either
autonomous system or purposive action theories to explain social change.
2. An illustrative application
To illustrate these claims for control theory with a specific application,
consider a recent example of social change: the rapid rise in illegal drug use
and abuse among American youth in the late 1960's. This national pheno-
menon brought a series of complex changes in the organizational systems of
local communities - in public health, law enforcement, court, social welfare
and school systems, to name just a few. These local systems are routinely
18
J. R. BENIGER
required to accommodate even acute national changes as, for example,
when a shift in migration patterns causes a school system to move from
college-preparatory to vocational education, when a Supreme Court deci-
sion forces a police department to alter its arrest and interrogation proce-
dures, or when changes in federal laws, enforcement or funding bring all of
the various systems to reexamine their hiring practices. Thus the appear-
ance of the 'drug problem' among youth represents a common type of social
change: exogenous to the complex of community systems, but causing a
series of organizational responses and change at that level.
The complex of community systems may be viewed in terms of purposive
action, in that it is staffed by professionals - police officials and judges,
school administrators and counselors, physicians and 'psychologists, social
workers and lawyers - who are attempting to increase salaries or fees,
further professional reputations, advance through organizational hierar-
chies, perhaps do good. The same community organizations may also be
seen as an autonomous system of social control, with authority for deviants
passing among subsystems devoted to identification, treatment, punish-
ment and rehabilitation. A generalized concept of control, based on flows
of user referrals and drug-related information, will serve to integrate both
the system and action perspectives in a single theoretical framework. The
individual pursuit of professional self-interests, to further standing in the
interorganizational 'drug abuse community' generated by such purposive
action, will be seen to coincide with system-level requisites for the control
of social deviance.
3. Control at the system level
Youth can be deviant with respect to drugs in two distinct ways: one
medical, the other legal. Medical deviance includes such problems as oc-
casional and chronic illness, psychological and physiological dependence
and addiction, psychological and physical injury, and other medical crises
demanding emergency treatment or rehabilitation. Legal deviance, with
respect to both formal law and unwritten police and probation procedures,
includes drug possession and use, trafficking, and non-commercial distri-
bution and sales. Youth who are not deviant (i.e. who do not require
restorative 'control'), with respect to drugs, are ordinarily part of the
educational system (including both public and private schools), which has
primary 'Organizational responsibility for preventing deviance through so-
CONTROL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 19
cialization. Thus the organizational system for the control of illegal drug use
and abuse by youth - on the community level - involves three major
spheres of activity: what might be called the educational, legal and medical
spheres.
Do these three spheres of organizational activity demarcate a cybernetic
or control system? Youths who are deviant - in the medical, legal or both
senses - obviously constitute the commodity to be controlled by such a
system (in the sense that heat, say, is the commodity controlled by a
thermostatic system). When youths are deviant in the legal sense, organiza-
tional responsibility for them partly shifts from the educational to the legal
sphere, the law enforcement and criminal justice system, which includes the
police courts, private legal practices, jails and prisons, and probation and
parole departments. When youths are deviant in the medical sense, res-
ponsibility for them transfers to the medical sphere, which includes the
public health administration, hospitals, clinics and research centers, private
group and individual medical practices and pharmacies, and other units and
programs specialized in medical problems. That this organizational system
approximates a cybernetic or control system can be tested empirically:
To constitute a control system, the three spheres of organized activity
must manifest two types of flows: (1) a controlled commodity flow, here the
flow of authority for deviant youths from the educational to the medical and
legal spheres, and (2) a feedback flow, here the flow of information about
the drug problem back to the educational sphere (hence the term 'feedback'
for this 'backward' flow of information). In other words, of the twelve
possible informational and referral flows among the three spheres of or-
ganizational activity, empirical investigation ought to find a predominance
of four flows: user referrals from the educational to the medical and legal
spheres, and informational feedback in the opposite directions; the four
reverse flows ought to be least prominent, with the four flows between the
medical and legal spheres of intermediate importance. (This model has
been verified by the author using patterns of information and referral
exhanges among professionals in both Baltimore and San Francisco during
1972-73)1
Thus control theory serves to explain the pattern of information and
referral flows, on the system level, among the educational, medical and
legal spheres of organizational activity. What such a system approach
cannot explain, however, because it does not account for individual motiv-
ations, special interests and goals, is how and why individuals come to
make the information and referral exchanges necessary for cybernetic
20 J. R. BENIGER
control of deviance to obtain at the system level. This question is particu-
larly problematical considering the organizational factors working against
the professional exchange of information and referrals. An extensive lit-
erature on formal organizations establishes that information tends to enter
organizational hierarchies at the top, while work with people (as customers,
students, patients, etc.) tends to concentrate near the bottom. In other
words, organizational information is positively correlated with hierarchical
standing, while people-commodities (as processed by the organization) are
negatively correlated with such standing. These status associations impede
both the flows of information downward and of commodity referrals up-
ward. For example, upward flow of referrals is minimized, not only because
such referrals imply incompetence of the sender, relative to the receiver,
but also because they represent extra, lower-status work for the receiver.
How, then, do school administrators and counselors learn of psycholo-
gists and physicians, or of probation officers and lawyers, with specialized
knowledge and interest in the drug problems of youth? Why do such
specialists accept referrals from the educational sphere, and reciprocate
with drug-related information? These information and referral exchanges,
essential for control of deviance at the system level, remain problematical at
the level of purposive action. It will therefore be necessary to extend control
theory to this level, to answer the motivational questions still outstanding.
4. Control at the action level
When any minor or at least contained social problem suddenly explodes on
the public consciousness, as illegal drug use and abuse did in America in the
late 1960's, there are a number of predictable consequences: governement
and private funds and resources shift to the new problem area; new agencies
and programs are institued from the federal to the neighborhood level;
specialists in the new problem area, suddenly in short supply, can command
higher positions and salaries; related specialties gain in prominence and
prestige in formal organizations working on the problem; the same special-
ties also gain in status and recruits, relative to other subfields, in a range of
disciplines and professions.
These resource shifts and related changes, on the system level, generate
new rewards - in terms of money, position, prestige, opportunity for
innovation and advancement, etc. - on the level of purposive action. To
obtain these rewards requires recognition as a specialist in the new problem
area, however, which often demands a return to the classroom for post-
CONTROL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
21
professional education or training (of the drug abuse specialists in Bal-
timore and San Francisco, for example, 72 percent report some post-degree
training on drugs - 63 percent more than ten academic hours or its equiva-
lent; 59 percent of the same group had no drug-related training while
earning professional degrees). Thus professionals often make a consider-
able personal investment - in time and tuition, lost salary and interrupted
career, etc. - in a particular social problem.
Returns on these investments are limited by two scarce commodities: the
number of high-status positions in the local drug abuse community, and the
number of actual drug users, control of whom is rewarded by the com-
munity positions. Even though the number of drug users fluctuates ac-
cording to the rate of identification activity, and through definitional and
normative changes, the supply of users is ultimately limited. Because users
are necessary for professionals seeking similarly limited rewards in the drug
abuse community, control theory predicts that the exchange of user re-
ferrals ( and drug-related information necessary for their control) will
approximate a model of economic competition for scarce resources. Data
from Baltimore and San Francisc0
2
confirm that a specialist's standing in
the local drug abuse communities is correlated with number of referrals
received, with number of contacts supplied information, and with centrality
in professional networks of information and referral exchange; this stand-
ing, in turn, is correlated with formal position, salary and prestige among
non-specialist professionals.
To maximize these returns on personal investments in the drug problem,
the strategy for specialists is to exchange drug-related information for user
referrals with as many non-specialists as possible. Such exchanges might be
seen as reciprocal control relations between non-specialist and specialist, or
between two specialists in different subject areas, with each party to the
exchange seeking to maximize its own self-interests. The non-specialist
needs to make referrals, and seeks to maximize the competence of the
specialist to whom they are sent; this typically is someone who has pre-
viously supplied the non-specialist with drug-related information. The
specialist, by contrast, needs to acquire referrals, to advance standing in the
local drug abuse community; hence specialists seek to maximize their
circles of non-specialist contacts by disseminating specialized information.
In exchanges between two specialists, information and referrals will pass in
both directions - for the same dual motives of acquiring referrals and
maximizing the competence of one's contacts - in double control rela-
tionships.
22
J. R. BENIGER
That specialists do in fact adopt these control theory strategies can be
verified empirically in two ways. First, reciprocal control relationships
imply that information and referral flows will tend to move in restricted
exchanges (Le. mutual reciprocities between two parties), rather than in the
univocal generalized exhanges more common under organizational norms.
This is confirmed by data from Baltimore and San Francisco, which indicate
that drug specialists in those cities tend to make user referrals to the same
professionals from whom they receive drug-related information. Second,
the individual self-interests of specialists vs. non-specialists (of courting
referral sources vs. sending referrals to specialists of known competence)
suggest that specialists will establish themselves as sources of drug-related
information before non-specialist recipients reciprocate with user referrals.
This is also confirm<:(d by the empirical evidence, which suggests that
network sources of information later become network sinks for referrals.
Contrary, therefore, to what might be expected on the system level, where
information flows appear as 'feedback' necessary to control commodity
flows, information channels in fact constitute a precondition of referral flow
on the level of purposive action. The system-level effect is the same, of
course, but the action-level analysis refines the causal imagery as well as
lending it a motivational explanation.
Control theory has thus answered, on the level of purposive action, the
questions of how and why individuals come to make the informational and
referral exchanges necessary for cybernetic control of deviance to obtain on
the system level. In the informal drug abuse community generated by the
specialists themselves, through their exchange behavior, information is
beneficial to give away, while referrals are beneficial to receive (just the
opposites of the incentives prevailing in formal organizations). Certain
formal positions (head of a police department's juvenile or narcotics bu-
reaus, the drug-treatment facility at a major hospital, etc.) will ordinarily
assure network centrality, and hence facilitate informal exchange behavior.
Extra-organizational maneuvering can also secure centrality in local drug
abuse networks, however, and these informal roles may serve as criteria for
later hiring in organizational positions. Specialists will therefore attempt to
establish themselves as information sources, whether formal or informal,
and hence authority for deviants will readily pass to the specialists in central
network positions. In this way, an interorganizational network of individ-
uals establishes both the referral flows - and the reciprocal feedback
channels - necessary for the control of social change at the system level.
CONTROL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
23
5. Generalized symbolic media
One aspect of the system and action explanations remains unclear, namely,
the attitudes of professionals toward providing information and accepting
referrals. Within organizations, according to the literature, such behavior is
resisted at the purposive action level. Outside of organizations, by contrast,
professionals actively seek to diffuse specialized information, and to accept
user referrals, to advance their own standing in informal local networks.
Both within and among organizations, however, information and referral
flows carry identical connotations: information flow connotes higher status
on the sender, relative to the receiver, while referral flow connotes just the
opposite. Why, then, are the attitudes toward such exchanges reversed
when organizational professionals participate in interorganizational com-
munities?
The answer is that formal organizations have highly institutionalized
symbols - formal positions and lines of authority, plus various perquisites
(title on the door, Bigelow on the floor, etc.) - that translate status and
rewards across all organizational contexts; hence providing information
and accepting referrals are not important requirements of individual status,
and carry few individual (Le. extra-organizational) connotations in any
case. Organizational symbols do not mediate well, however, across the
many organizational and professional boundaries of informal networks like
the drug abuse community. How is a school administrator to assess the
specialized drug training of scores of local psychologists, for example, or a
lawyer to choose among hundreds of local physicians for specialized
advice?
Unlike organizational symbols, information and referral flows do me-
diate across organizational and professional boundaries, in that they carry
connotations of relative expertise - much as citation networks map the
relative standing of scientific researchers. A social fact which sociologists of
science have developed into a formal methodology, namely that flows of
information and resources reveal relative standing, professionals in local
drug abuse communities employ somewhat less consciously - but to the
same end.
Information and referral flows serve as what Parsons calls 'generalized
symbolic media of interchange,' after the ideal-typical medium of money.
Like money, information and referrals have little intrinsic value (recall that
people-commodities are negatively correlated with organizational hierar-
chy), but they do have considerable value in exchange (i.e. providing
24 J. R. BENIGER
information and receiving referrals are positively correlated with standing
in the drug abuse community). Information and referrals meet Parsons'
other criteria for generalized media, including a fact that is problematic for
simple flow analysis - they are non-zero sum in character (a judge might
confer medical authority for a user upon some physician, for example,
without relinquishing his own legal authority over the same individual).
Given the various homologues among generalized symbolic media
(money, power, influence, etc.), it might be said that, for a specialist on drug
abuse or in any other subject-area (academic sociology, for example), to
have other professionals asking for information or sending referrals is like
money in the bank - in that such flows translate both status and material
rewards in the larger professional community. This explains a common
irony of organizational life: the same indivuals who cannot find time to
diffuse information and who shun referrals, within their own organizations,
may actively seek referrals, and devote time to establishing themselves as
informational sources, outside of their own organization - even at much
lower levels. The ranking methodologist in a sociology department, for
example, does not ordinarily seek problems to solve for faculty and stu-
dents, but will require a flow of queries from outside methodologists, and a
flow of manuscripts from major journals; to maintain comparable status in
methodology circles and the larger profession, where departmental reputa-
tions (for departmental work) do not mediate very well. In the same way,
the ranking expert on drugs in a social welfare agency does not need
internal referrals to maintain that status, but does need referrals from
outside professionals to claim similar status in the larger drug abuse com-
munity.
6. Norms in system-level control
The impetus for referral flow is assured, on the action level, at two cru-
cial decision-points: the receiving (demand) nodes and the sending
(supply) nodes. Demand for referrals is provided by specialists who
seek media to translate individual status and rewards across organiza-
tional boundaries; supply is provided by non-specialists who seek com-
petent assistance in a specialized area, or by specialists exchanging both
information and referrals across lines of differentiation in the larger
system.
Purposive demand and supply impulses, arising from the action level,
are also subject to control by system-level norms. These may concern
CONTROL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 25
the medical and legal definitions of deviance, or the conditions ap-
propriate to social control, and govern both the sending and receiving
nodes in the movement of system commodities. A rapid rise in the
number of drug users, for example, tends to 'liberalize' (i.e. make less
inclusive) the normative rules by which users are treated as deviant, in
three ways: On the demand side, capabilities to treat deviance (medical
personnel, jails, court schedules, etc.) are overburdened by the increase
in users; these new material conditions render excessively inclusive the
previous definitions of deviance. On the supply side, referrals sent to
organizations overburdened in capacity draw dampening - rather than
encouraging - feedback from non-specialists. On both the demand and
supply sides, norms governing social deviance, as this term applies to
increasing numbers of young people, will conflict with values and norms
in other areas (concerning justice, socialization, freedom, etc.).
All three of these normative strains and changes can be operational-
ized and tested. If such strains, and resulting changes in the direction of
more 'liberal' norms, are indeed experienced by professionals following
a rapid rise in illegal drug use and abuse, then three corresponding hy-
potheses ought to hold:
1. Strain and change will be greatest among norms governing a profes-
sional's own sphere of organizational activity, where overburdening
of material facilities is most directly experienced.
2. Normative strain and change will be greatest among professionals in
positions of responsibility for organizational integration, positions
where dampening feedback from other organizations is most directly
experienced.
3. Strain and change among norms governing referrals will be greatest
among professionals with the most 'liberal' norms in other areas,
given that such norms are most likely to move drug-related norms in
a liberal direction.
Normative strain can be operationalized as the variance in a set of
items related to the same norm (e.g. individual vs. government prero-
gatives in various areas of 'victimless' crime), or in a single item among
professionals in similar structural positions. Normative change can be
operationalized as the absolute difference in location of items on some
latent normative dimension (e.g. individual vs. societal responsibility for
deviant behavior). Data on Baltimore and San Francisco, from 1972-73
(the period of most rapid increase in drug abuse among local youth),
tend to confirm the three propositions
3
.
26 J. R. BENIGER
To generalize, social change can be defined, in a system conceived in
terms of flows, as a change in the rate (or in the rate of change) of
system flows. Norms can be analogously defined, in such a system, as
the rules at decision-nodes governing the movements of system flows. It
follows that social change may strain existing norms by rendering them
inappropriate (due to strains on facilities, or on other norms and
values) to new rates of flows, and that, conversely, norms may serve to
regulate social change by 'defining away' the changed rates of flow.
Exogenous changes that increase flows (and thus overburden existing
channels of information and commodity exchange) will cause normative
changes to choke off those flows (or to 'liberalize' them, in the sense
that fewer people of a given behavioral type are subjected to social
control). Conversely, changes that decrease flows (and leave existing
capabilities under-utilized) will change norms to loosen flows, thus mak-
ing norms more 'conservative' (in that more deviants are subjected to
social control). In this way, norms serve what Parsons has called -
speaking teleologically - a 'tension-management' function, working to
preserve basic structure against exogenous strains at the system level.
7. Summary
This paper has introduced a new theoretical framework, based on a gen-
eralized concept of control, to synthesize the system and action ap-
proaches to social change. Central to this synthesis has been the
imagery of flows, both of socially-processed commodities (like social
deviants) and of informational feedback about commodities. On the level
of purposive action, individuals seek to control commodity exchanges (as
academicians, for example, seek to be cited) as generalized symbolic media
which translate individual status and rewards across organizational
boundaries. These exchanges aggregate in flows essential to the control of
commodities, and to the maintenance of basic social structure, at the
autonomous system level.
The central theoretical problem has been to explain how control be-
havior on the action level, essentially a question of competition for
scarce resources, aggregates in the patterns required for control of a so-
cial system. Commodity exchanges, although stimulated at the action
level, are subject to control by system-level norms. These are strained
by exogenous changes in commodity flows, but can themselves adapt to
CONTROL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 27
'define away' such changes within material constraints. Commodity
flows are thus controlled by a balance of purposive action, in the pur-
suit of individual self-interests, and normative rules that are adaptive to
system requirements. Through this balance of autonomous and purposive
control, the system and action approaches combine to explain social
stability within social change.
Notes
1. Beniger, James R., 'Sampling Social Networks: the Subgroup Approach, ' Business
and Economic Statistics Section, Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, pp.
226-231, 1976.
Beniger, James R., Interorganizational Response to Social Change: Professional Control
of Drug Abuse by Youth in Two Cities, 1972-1973, Department of Sociology, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, 1978.
2. Beniger, 1978, op cit.
3. Beniger, 1978, op cit.
Cybernetic theorems on feedback
in social processes
Marian Mazur
The mathematical theory of feedback, so well worked out for technological
processes, did not find application in the analysis of social processes be-
cause of their irregularities, the great number of factors involved, inexact or
non-measurable data, etc.
However, owing to the fact that social processes, e.g. interpersonal
relations, are rather of a discrete than a continuous nature, and that their
general trends are more interesting than their details, a cybernetic approach
based on a simplified mathematization of them becomes possible.
Let us consider two systems X and Y, coupled in such a way that the
output of system X is the input of system Y, and vice versa (Figure 1).
x
y
Figure 1. Coupling of two systems.
Thus, the first action x 1 of system X will be followed by the first action y 1
of system Y, provoking the second action X2 of system X, which in its turn
will be followed by the second action Y2 of system Y, etc. (feedback).
The ratio of output quantity to input quantity will be called the reactivity
(r) of the system.
It is assumed that the respective reactivities rx and ry of systems X and Y
are constant.
With these assumptions several theorems on feedback can be formu-
lated.
Theorem 1
From the definition of reactivity it follows that:
30 M.MAZUR
and consequently:
(1)
(2)
(3)
These equations show that any action of one system is determined by the
reactivity of this system and by the antecedent action of another system.
This theorem emphasizes that there are always two causes of any action:
(1) internal properties of the acting system, and (2) external influences
exerted on this system by its environment.
Surprisingly enough, nobody seemed to be aware of it. The philosophers
are persuaded that one specific cause can provoke a determined result. In
psychology, the only cause of human behaviour was seen by the behav
iourists in external influences, and by the psychoanalysts in subcon
sciousness.
Similarly, when results of social relations are concerned people are in
clined to indicate only one cause: either reactivity or action (dependending
on the distinction between who to praise and who to blame).
For instance, if pupils (Y) are doing well (y I), their teacher (X) thinks that
this is the case thanks to his didactic work (x I). But if pupils are doing badly
(YI), the teacher thinks that this is so because they are lazy (ry).
If football players (Y) win (y I), they consider themselves to be brave (r y).
If they lose (YI), they complain of foul play (XI) by their adversaries (X).
In war, any agressor (Y) considers his own hostilities (YI) to be justified
by provocative actions (XI) of the enemy (X), and makes believe that
hostilities (X 2) ofthe enemy (X) stem from enemy aggressiveness (rx). Thus,
the assaulted country is to blame for the hostilities of both fighting
countries.
Theorem 2
From equations (1) and (2) it follows that:
(4)
CYBERNETIC THEOREMS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES 31
From equations (2) and (3) it follows that:
(5)
This means that any action of each system depends on the antecedent action
of this system.
Considering that an antecedent action in its turn may be preceded by
some earlier antecedent action, etc., this theorem emphasizes the im
portance of the 'first step', i.e. the first action starting a chain of subsequent
cycles of actions. That is how an apparently insignificant action can lead to a
great success or to a disaster. Many a war began with some small incident,
and ended with large scale devastation of the belligerents' countries.
In continuing conflicts both parties usually reproach each other for recent
mischiefs without remembering that they all began with some 'first step'
long ago.
On the other hand, persons applying for some desirable position want to
present themselves in the best light as early as at the first appointment with
the boss.
Theorem 3
Equations (4) and (5) can be transformed into:
(6)
and
(7)
Let the quotient of subsequent actions of any system be called the behav
iour.
Thus, equations (6) and (7) say that the behaviour of each system is
determined by the product of the reactivities of both coupled systems.
This theorem, when applied to interpersonal relations, shows that
changes in reactivity of one partner provoke changes in behaviour of both
partners.
The main difficulty in transforming bad relations into good ones is the
fact that each party, mostly for fear of appearing to be weak, is rather
32
M.MAZUR
inclined to force a change in the attitude of the other party than to modify
his own attitude towards this party. There are many examples of mutual
harassment in relations between ill-matched married people, litigating
neighbours, nations hating each other, etc.
Theorem 4
From equations (6) and (7) we derive:
X2 Y2
(8)
It means that the behaviour of both coupled systems is identical.
At first sight it may seem incredible that two coupled systems behave
alike even if their: reactivities are different. However, a simple numerical
example demonstrates the plausibility of the theorem. Suppose that system
X always doubles (rx = 2) actions of system Y, whereas system Y always
trebles (r y = 3) actions of system X. If the first action of system X is x, = 1,
the first action of system Y will be y, = r y x, = 3 . 1 = 3. The second action
of system X will be x 2 = r x y, = 2 . 3 = 6, and the second action of system Y
will be Y2=ry.x2=3.6=18. Further: x3=2.18=36, and
Y3 = 3 .36 = 108, etc. Subsequent actions of system X being 1, 6, 36, etc.,
and subsequent actions of system Y being 3,18, 108, etc., any action of each
system is six times greater than its antecedent action.
For instance, if a wolf runs faster in order to catch a hare, the hare runs
faster in order to escape, and so on. If aggressors besieging a fortress
increase their efforts, defenders increase their efforts too. Each of two
litigating parties increases its expenses in order to win its case.
Theorem 5
Equations (6) and (7) remain true if their right-hand sides are multiplied
and divided by any number k:
Y2 ry
-=krx -
y, k
(9)
(10)
CYBERNETIC THEOREMS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES 33
It means that the behaviour of each system remains unchanged even if the
reactivities of both coupled systems change, under the condition that the
product of reactivities remains unchanged.
This theorem applies, e.g. to situations in which, in spite of the decreasing
interest of one partner, an interpersonal relation is maintained owing to the
increasing interest of the other partner.
However, such a process, unlimited mathematically, is limited physically.
In order to explain it by means of a simple numerical illustration, let us
suppose that rx . ry = 1. In such a case, the actions of both systems repeat
unchanged: Xl =Xz =X3 ... =x, and Yl =Yz =Y3 =y.
Now, let us consider three situations:
rx = 1, ry = 1, X = 1, Y = 1
It can be stated that the smaller reactivity rn the feebler actions x, and the
greater reactivity ry, the stronger actions y. From the fact that strong actions
require much energy it follows that the process of decreasing reactivity rx
accompanied by increasing reactivity ry breaks off when system Y reaches
its upper capacity threshold to deliver more energy.
Practically, it means that if one partner wants to lessen a relation, another
partner is unable to counteract in the long run. For instance, if the emotions
of a lover cool down, the emotions of his mistress, anxious to maintain their
relation may warm up to the point of 'burning with love' - in vain, since it is
impossible to surpass the limit of endurance.
Let us return to the numerical illustration in order to state another
essential fact: the differences between actions y, related to the first sit-
uation' are much greater (2 - 1 = 1; 4 - 1 = 3) then the differences between
actionsx (1- 112 = 112; 1 - 1/4 = 3/4). It means that system Y requires much
more additional energy for its increasing actions in comparison to the
relatively small diminution of energy required for the decreasing actions of
system X.
Practically, this means that it is easy to become indifferent, but that the
struggle against somebody's indifference is a tiresome and exhausting job.
34 M.MAZUR
No wonder that indifference of a government provokes violent reactions
by its people (mutiny, revolution), and similarly, indifference ofthe people
provokes violent reactions by a government (repression, terror).
Theorem 6
If r y = 1, equation (4) is reduced to:
(11)
It means that the behaviour of one system is independent from another
system whose actions do not differ from the actions provoking them.
Any coupling to which equation (11) is applicable will be called self-
coupling. It can be:
1. Indirect self-coupling of a system coupled with some other system having
a reactivity equal to 1 (Figure 2a),
2. Direct self-coupling of a system coupled with itself so that its output
actions become its input actions (Figure 2b).
0)
x
x I
~
I
~
I
":.,
Iv
y=x
b)
Figure 2. Self-coupling: (a) indirect, (b) direct.
For instance, a man observing the text he is writing, a woman observing
the fingernails she is polishing, etc., are examples of direct self-coupling.
A girl asking her girlfriend 'how am I looking from the back?' is an
example of indirect self-coupling (under the condition that the girlfriend
tells the truth).
As another example of indirect self-coupling can be mentioned the
dictator who cannot endure any other advisors than 'yes men' always saying
just what they are supposed to say. In fact, this dictator is only coupled with
himself.
CYBERNETIC THEOREMS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES
Theorem 7
From equation (2) it follows that X2 =
ifrx=O,or
ifYl=O.
From equation (1) it follows that Y 1 =
if ry = 0, or
if Xl =0.
Thus, there is no action of system X:
1. if reactivity of system X equals zero, or
2. if reactivity of system Y equals zero, or
3. if there is no antecedent action of system X.
35
These three conditions pertain to the situations in which output ac
tions of one system are simultaneou' ly inputs of another system. Con
sidering situations in which actions of one system, owing to some ob
stacle, do not reach another system, there are two additional con
ditions:
4. if actions of system X do not reach system Y, or
5. if actions of system Y do not reach system X.
Thus, there is no coupling between two systems if one of them is in
sensitive to or does not act upon the other.
For the sake of emphasizing the practical application of these math
ematical considerations, they are illustrated by a simple example of a
person X offending another person Y. There will be no conflict be
tween them if:
1. X said nothing offensive,
2. X said something offensive, but Y did not hear it,
3. Y heard something offensive, but, being insensitive to it, he said nothing,
4. Y heard something offensive, and, being sensitive to it, he said something
offensive too, but X did not hear it,
5. X heard something offensive, but, being insensitive to it, he said nothing
more.
Thus, there are five ways of preventing or stopping any coupling.
No wonder that aristocrats:
1. avoided living in a luxury that would annoy the mob,
2. avoided, when living in luxury, displaying it to the mob,
3. tried to dampen the criticism of the mob,
4. avoided sight of any hardships of the mob,
5. tried to dampen their own sensitivity to the hardships of the mob.
36 M.MAZUR
Theorem 8
Considering dimension [X] of actions of system X and dimension [y] of
actions of system Y, the respective dimensions of their reactivities are:
Hence, the dimension of the product of their reactivities will be:
[x] . [y]
[rx.ry ]= =[1]
[y] . [x]
(12)
It means that the product of reactivities is a dimensionless number, even if the
actions of two coupled systems are of a different nature, under condition that
they are of the same nature for each system separately.
Taking in account that dimensionlessness of the product of reactivities
leads to dimensionlessness of behaviour (see Theorem 3), it can be said that
Theorem 8 emphasizes the interdisciplinary nature of cybernetics. In spite
of the progressing atomization of science, the cybernetic approach affords
application of the same formulae to analysis of any processes based on the
feedback principle.
The basic kinds of feedback are considered below, in Theorems 9 and 10.
Theorem 9
If actions x 1 and y 1 are considered to be positive, it follows from equation
(1) that reactivity ry is positive.
If action X2 is positive, it follows from equation (2) that reactivity rx is
positive. In such a case, the product of reactivities is positive. Actions of
systems X and Yare of the same sign (monotonic processes).
Instead, if actionx2is negative (the reverse of actionxl), it follows from
equation (2) that reactivity rx is negative. In such a case, the product of
reactivities is negative. Actions of system X and actions of system Y alter
nate their signs (oscillating processes).
It can be said that if the product of reactivities is greater than zero, actions
of each system change monotonically. This will be called positive feedback.
Instead, if the product of reactivities is smaller than zero, actions of each
system oscillate. This will be called negative feedback.
CYBERNETIC THEOREMS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES 37
Theorem 10
Let us consider the actions of each system and the product of their reactiv-
ities only from the viewpoint of their absolute values (Le. irrespective of
their signs). Then, it follows from equations (4) and (5) that:
1. x z is greater than x I> and y z is greater than y I> if r x r y is greater than 1;
2. Xz equals XI> and Yz equals Yb if rx ry equals 1;
3. X z is smaller than x I> and y z is smaller than Y I> if r x r y is smaller than 1.
Generally speaking:
1. If the absolute value of the product of reactivities is greater than 1, the
actions of each system increase. This will be called divergent feedback.
2. If the absolute value of the product of reactivities equals 1, the actions of
each system repeat. This will be called stable feedback.
3.1f the absolute value of the product of reactivities is smaller than 1, the
actions of each system decrease. This will be called convergent feedback.
Combining Theorems 9 and 10, there are six basic kinds of feedback:
1. positive divergent feedback (monotonic actions increase),
2. positive stable feedback (constant actions repeat),
3. positive convergent feedback (monotonic actions decrease),
4. negative divergent feedback (oscillating actions increase),
5. negative stable feedback (oscillating actions repeat).
6. negative convergent feedback (oscillating actions decrease).
Positive feedback is illustrated in Figure 3, negative feedback in
Figure 4.
Positive divergent feedback can be illustrated by examples of escala
tion: inflation, litigation, war, etc. Theoretically,such processes tend to
infinity. Practically, they come to an end when there is no more energy
to sustain them.
Positive stable feedback can be illustrated by examples of coopera-
tion, consisting in the repetition of interdependent manipulations (as it
is often the case in industry).
Positive convergent feedback can be illustrated by examples of extinction
(of hostilities, of correspondence, of love, of friendship, etc.).
If the product of reactivities is only slightly greater or smaller than 1,
initial differences between slow escalation and slow extinction may be
insignificant. Nevertheless, even slow escalation is a divergent process
tending to infinity, whereas slow extinction is a convergent process tending
to zero. Therefore, it is a reasonable policy to transform escalation of
hostilities into their extinction, even slow extinction, before it is too late, i.e.
before excalation goes too far. This justifies the so-called 'little steps tactics'.
38
M.MAZUR
Actions
Q
o ~ ________ = ~ ~ ~ ~ c __ c ~ ..
2 3 4
Figure 3. Positive feedback: (a) divergent, (b) stable, (c) convergent
Negative divergent feedback can be illustrated by the example of a
management in which repressions are followed by greater concessions
which in their turn are followed by even greater repressions, etc. According
to the nature of negative divergent feedback, such a policy of going from
one extreme to another comes inevitably to a disastrous end.
Negative stable feedback is typical of regulation. It can be illustrated by
the example of restoring equilibrium between supply and demand: an
increase in production provokes a decrease in prices, provoking a decrease
in production, which provokes an increase in prices, provoking again an
increase in production, etc.
Negative convergent feedback can be illustrated by the example of
demographic disturbance. After a war in which many people have perished,
there is a strong tendency to bear many children. The result appears to be
excessive so that a pronounced reduction in births follows which slightly
CYBERNETIC THEOREMS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES
39
Actions
Figure 4. Negative feedback: (a) divergent, (b) stable, (c) convergent.
diminishes in time, etc., until the original birth rate is re-established.
The initial assumption about the constancy of the reactivities does not
limit the application of the above theorems, as it might seem. Any change in
reactivity would only mean that a certain kind of behaviour is transformed
into some other, and a different kind of feedback must be appealed to.
A SIGGS information theoretic
characterization of qualitative knowing:
cybernetic and SIGGS theory models
Myrna L. Estep
Introduction
My purpose here is to develop a SIGGS information theoretic characteriza-
tion of qualitative knowing so as to render explicit the real and possible
limitations on what are generally categorized as cybernetic models in their
use for theorizing about epistemic states of affairs. I will argue that open
system theoretical models are necessary conditions to an adequate infor-
mation theoretic characterization of qualitative knowing. 'Qualitative
knowing' refers to the set of formal epistemological conditions possible to
obtain of a person or persons which define cognitive sensitive awareness of
unique properties of persons, events, or objects. The locution 'cognitive
sensitive awareness' can be explicated in terms of a disjunctive recursive
logical structure necessary to adequately describe sensitive human behavior
having cognitive significance.
A SIGGS characterization of qualitative knowing systems requires the
utilization of information theory, the characterization of occurrences at
categories of societal expressions. Explications of what constitutes oc-
currences at categories of societal expressions will be set forth, focusing
upon the theory of signs and indexicals. Such a characterization of oc-
currences necessitates the classification of those occurrences according to
categories, in particular epistemological categories of knowledge, knowing,
and belief. Recent epistemological inquiry supports the position that these
categories may be sorted as follows: (1) quantitative knowing, consisting of
generalizations and facts which may be further ordered according to
whether they are empirical or non-empirical, axiological or non-axiologi-
cal; (2) performative knowing, consisting of skills ordered according to the
number of paths leading to a terminus or termini in the execution of an act
or set of acts, and according to the number of termini possible to be
reached; (3) qualitative knowing, consisting of the set of formal epistemo-
42
M. L. ESTEP
logical conditions defining cognitive sensitive awareness (knowing) of
unique properties of persons, events, or objects.
It is with respect to category (3), qualitative knowing, that significant
questions can be raised regarding the adequacy of cybernetic models to
characterize epistemic systems. I will tend to support the position that
cybernetic or simple feedback schemes or models cannot be taken as
sufficient to characterize qualitative knowing because of the information
limitations on those models. These limitations will be thoroughly explicated
later; however, on the usual cybernetic interpretation, information avail
able to the system from the negasystem and how that relates to the input
remains unknown. Moreover, the information the negasystem gets and how
that relates to the output also remains unknown. It will be argued that the
addition of information measures provided by the SIGGS theory model, as
developed by E. Steiner and G. Maccia, permits the determination not only
of what the system takes in and what is available from the system but also
what the negasystem takes in and what is available from the negasystem.
1. On the nature of qualitative knowing
The history of epistemological inquiry reveals a fundamental classification
of kinds of knowledge into that knowledge which is in some sense deriva
tive, and that knowledge which has been variously referred to as 'basic' or
'direct'. An almost classical or orthodox interpretation of this distinction
between the two kinds of knowledge is found in Russell's philosophy where
he refers to the distinction as knowledge by description and knowledge by
acquaintance. Acquaintance, as defined by Russell', is the direct and infal
lible apprehension of some object. It is knowledge of something which is
distinguished from knowledge that. Each of these categories is further
distinguished according to its immediate or derived form. According to
Russell:
'The first thing that appears when we begin to analyze our common knowledge is that some
of it is derivative, while some is primitive; that is to say, there is some that we only believe
because of something else from which it has been inferred in some sense, though not neces
sarily in a strict logical sense, while other parts are believed on their own account, without the
support of any outside evidence.
2
He explains that the senses give knowledge of the latter kind (acquain
tance), that the immediate facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing do
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS 43
not need to be proved by argument but are completely self-evident. '1 say
that 1 am acquainted with an object when 1 have a direct cognitive relation
to the object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. '3
There are four general categories of kinds of facts or things with which we
may be acquainted: (1) those facts with which we are acquainted through
sensation, which Russell calls 'sense-data'. Examples of these are such
things as colors, sounds, smells, etc. (2) Those facts with which we are
acquainted through introspection, e.g. being aware that we are aware; (3)
those facts with which one is aware through memory; (4) those facts with
which one is aware through conceiving, i.e. concepts. For purposes here, the
meaning of qualitative knowing is limited in scope to the first and fourth
categories above, and is distinguished from knowledge by description or
knowledge-that in the way Russell has claimed, i.e. it is not derivative and
no other argument is necessary for it. There are some significant differ-
ences, however, between knowledge by acquaintance and qualitative
knowing: I am not claiming that knowledge by description is either
ultimately reducible to or 'rests upon' qualitative knowing in some
foundational sense; also, qualitative knowing is not solipsistic, i.e. limited to
the private sense data of individual persons; finally, qualitative knowing is
not claimed to be the infallible apprehension of some thing. In essence, the
position argued for here with respect to the epistemological status of
qualitative knowing is that such knowing may rightly be accounted for in
terms of what Lehrer
4
calls a 'corrected doxastic system.' A doxastic system
is a justificatory system consisting of a 'set of subjective statements'
articulating what one believes with which a given belief must cohere in
order to be completely justified. 5 Complete justification of any given belief,
thus, must meet the following formal conditions:
'S is completely justified in believing that p if and only if, within the corrected doxastic system
of S, p is believed to have a better chance of being true than the denial of p or any other
statement that competes with p.
6
A corrected doxastic system is simply one in which the beliefs are retained in
an impartial and disinterested search for truth. Drawing upon the distinc-
tions of Russell above, acquaintance by sensation in conjunction with
acquaintance by conceiving, the justification of perceptual beliefs which
constitute qualitative knowing can be shown to arise within a battery of
cohering beliefs. As Lehrer points out,
7
'It is not the simple belief that 1 see
something red, but that belief together with other beliefs about myself, my
abilities, and my circumstances, on which justification depends.' Thus, the
44 M. L. ESTEP
belief system as a whole is of crucial concern here, not isolated, atomistic
beliefs. Complete justification for beliefs about unique qualities of persons,
events and objects depends upon a myriad of other beliefs.
Elsewhere,
8
I have shown that concepts referring to kinds of sensitive
cognitive awareness can be- explicated in terms of three rules showing the
disjunctive recursive structure of such concepts. For example, terms refer-
ring to sense impressions, e.g. pain, may be analyzed in terms of an
ostensive rule, i.e. (R 1) pain is this, that, that, .... This rule by itself would
constitute the subconcept of pain (or any other sense impression), the
first-person subconcept one has of one's own pain or sense impression. The
basic layer of the concept is ostensive, hence one may use the word 'pain' for
different qualities constituting pain. (R2) pain is what exists (occurs) when
one makes the honest statement that one is in pain; (R3) pain is what exists
(occurs) as the cause of behavior of sort ... in circumstances ... when there is
no honest statement disrupting that course (or causal factor) as pain. The
(Rl) meaning of 'pain' (or some other sense impression) does not entail
either the (R2) or (R3) meanings and is knowledge of one's own pain that is
like observational knowledge. (R2) and (R3) constitute the propositions in
the scientific theory of sense impressions, e.g. pain, which extend the
meaning of those sense impressions given by (R 1).
As I have set forth a detailed explication of the nature of such a doxastic
system in its relation to qualitative knowing elsewhere, I will primarily focus
attention here upon formal conditions constituting descriptions of kinds of
qualitative knowing so as to illustrate a SIGGS information theoretic
characterization of them.
1.1. Classification of kinds of qualitative knowing
Elsewhere,
9
the categories of qualitative knowing have been set forth
stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for each kind. The classifica-
tion is rendered hierarchically, however, and necessitates a critical eval-
uation for the sake of later becoming clear on the limitations of cybernetic
models to characterize qualitative knowing systems.
Recognition is generally agreed upon as a first necessary condition to
cognition having epistemic significance, and hence has been taken by
Maccia and others
lO
to constitute the first category of qualitative knowing.
Recognition is held to be epistemically significant in that it demonstrates
the cognitive faculty of selection or discernment, i.e. the selection or dis-
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS 45
cernment of a figure from its background. Moreover, as Cherry\1 has
pointed out, there is no good reason to assume that the act of recognition
depends upon certain properties or attributes only, that under all transfor-
mations and distortions of the stimuli (object of recognition) certain invar-
iants remain. Indeed, this assumption would reduce this category of quali-
tative knowing to simply another kind of derived ('nonbasic') knowing, i.e.
an act of classification. In fact, recognition seems to depend more upon the
whole situation, including both the figure and whatever constitutes the
background, in which a given sign-event occurs. As has been pointed out by
Polanyi: 12
' ... whenever we are focusing our attention on a particular object, we are relying for doing so
on our awareness of many things to which we are not attending directly at the moment, but
which are yet functioning as compelling clues for the way the object of our attention will appear
to our senses.'
It is precisely the tacit power reflected by this awareness which Polanyi
holds is the element of judgment or 'motherwit' to which Kant surrendered
the application of rules. 13
On the basis of these considerations (among others), the following are
offered as necessary and sufficient conditions for qualitative knowing of the
recognitive kind:
X recognizes that unique Q if and only if:
(1) X believes that Q,
(2) X is completely justified in believing that Q,
(3) X selects (or can select) that Q from that which is not Q, and that which is not Q from Q,
( 4) Q is a unique state of affairs.
Condition (3) clearly requires a discernment of a figure, i.e. a discrimina-
tion of that figure and its ground. According to Polanyi: 14
'an object is seen as such by virtue of our seeing its surroundings as its background - and vice
versa .... we are performing one single mental act in jointly seeing an object against its
background, and this seeing may be right or illusory; indeed, that we are aware of the
background in terms of the object's appearance ... and that this view of the object may be true
or false.'
Polanyi's position on the corrigibility of such perceptual (qualitative) be-
liefs is, hence, in accord with the nature of qualitative knowing developed
here.
The second category of qualitative knowing is generally delineated by a
46
M. L. ESTEP
condition of first-hand acquaintance with some unique state of affairs and is
referred to as 'acquaintive qualitative knowing.' The formal conditions are:
X is acquainted with that unique Q if and only if:
(1) X recognizes that Q,
(2) X experienced that Q firsthand,
(3) X selects (or can select) elements Qi, ... Qj and relations Ri, ... Rj, peculiar to that Q,
( 4) Q is a unique state of affairs.
Examples of acquaintive qualitative knowing might include knowing an-
other, e.g. one's spouse, knowing Picasso's art, knowing one's own auto-
mobile. Knowing by acquaintance provides sensitivity, i.e. intimacy with
the most distinctive and innermost characteristics of entities, a cognitive
indwelling.
There are several problems with the distinction between recognitive and
acquaintive qualitative knowing as it has been left. At least two possible
categories of recognition may be distinguished in the following way: (1) one
recognizes ('knows') square objects as square objects only if one has the
concept 'squareness,' a universal which in itself is never seen, at least in any
ocular sense. Moreover, the universal 'squareness' is not a unique state of
affairs though particular individual representations of it may be. For
example, the individual representations of squareness in cubist paintings
are unique states of affairs. One may clearly ask how one recognizes
square ness, the universal, in the sense of recognition delineated above. Of
course, even without the universal, one may nevertheless recognize
individual representations of a plane figure bounded by four equal sides.
The question thus arises as to wether or not it is square ness which is being
recognized. (2) One may also be said to recognize the solution to a problem
which has never been solved before, e.g. a possible proof of Fermat's
famous 'last theorem.' Given that such a solution necessarily falls within the
domain of the structures of mathematics, one may justifiably ask in what
sense would such a solution be a unique state of affairs and in what sense it is
recognized. In sum, the scope of recognitive qualitative knowing and the
clarity of 'unique state of affairs' await further explanation.
The final category of qualitative knowing is referred to as 'appreciative
qualitative knowing,' constituted by the following formal conditions:
X appreciates that unique Q if and only if:
(1) X believes that Q,
(2) X is completely justified in believing that Q,
(3) X is acquainted with that Q,
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS
47
(4) X selects (or can select) elements Qi, ... Qj and relations Ri, ... Rj appropriate to that Q,
(5) Q is a unique state of affairs.
As Maccia explains, 15 appreciation provides the link between epistemic and
axiological significance. From the epistemic side, it refers to perspicacity
and acuteness in perception, in discerning the relatedness of parts in
wholes. From the axiological side, 'appreciation' names apprising. For
example, through appreciation one can know whether or not an object is
genuine or fake, i.e. it gives information for deciding value or merit.
Without appreciation, the authentic could not be discerned and there would
be no spice to life.
2. The SIGGS theory model and cybernetic theory model
Of paramount concern here is the adequacy of certain theory models to
characterize qualitative knowing systems. A cursory sketch of the SIGGS
theory model will be necessary in order to adequately compare SIGGS with
what are generally categorized as cybernetic models. As information
theoretic measures are obviously germane to the characterization of com
munication systems, they are also germane to the characterization of know
ing systems. Thus, I will tend to focus attention on information theoretic
measures of the SIGGS and cybernetic models as a basis for comparison
relative to the above classification of epistemological categories.
The SIGGS theory model is a configuration model, that is it permits
representations of organized complexity. Set theory permits quantification
of a complex organization as a whole; graph theory permits the quantifica
tion of structure; and information theory permits the quantification of
action, i.e. the greater precision to von Bertalanffy's definition of a system
as a 'complex of elements standing in interaction.'16 As the elements or
components in a set form a universe of discourse, the formal epistemic
properties constituting qualitative knowing possible to obtain of persons
are of interest here. The set theoretic notion of 'complement' is also used to
give greater precision to a system's surroundings or to what is not system,
i.e. the negasystem. What is taken as a component in one universe of
discourse can be taken as a system in another, e.g. the set of all epistemic
conditions obtaining of a person can be taken as a system rather than as a
component. One can then set forth the components within the set of all
epistemic conditions, e.g. necessary and sufficient conditions for
recognitive qualitative knowing.
48
M. L. ESTEP
The set theoretic definition of 'function' is utilized to interpret von
Bertalanffy's 'standing in interaction' as a mapping of the set into itself, and
hence as affect relations. Thus a function from one set into another is
constituted by an association of elements in one set with those in another,
e.g. the association between epistemic properties constituting qualitative
knowing in one person and those properties in another. That is, where
qualitative knowing properties of one person affect (influence) the epis-

IT]
FT
FI FO
TP IP FP OP
FB
:s
= system
IP = input
i
= negasystem
FO
=
fHdout
SP = storeput
FP = fromput
FT = feedthrough OP
=
output
F/
= f .. din FB = feedback
TP = toput
Figure 1. SIGGS theory model (extended cybernetic model).
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS
49
temic properties of another, i.e. where the epistemic properties of another
are a function of the qualitative knowing properties of someone.
The use of graph theory in the SIGGS theory model permits the charac
terization of such epistemic affect relations between persons. Persons can
be represented on directed graphs as (lettered) points and a communication
(epistemic) relation between any two persons as a directed line segment
(line segment and arrow) connecting the two persons. Where there is an
arrow or arrows between two points, there is a directed connection or
pairing. Where there is a line without an arrow, a directed connection is
assumed in one or the other or both directions. Thus, graph theory permits
interpretation of a complex of elements constituting a system as a set of
points, and 'standing in interaction' is interpreted as directed lines. These
added interpretations allow increased precision in the understanding of
certain properties of systems, e.g. connectedness.
The incorporation of information theory in the SIGGS theory model
permits the characterization of the transmission of epistemic components.
As information theory permits the characterization of occurrences at cate
gories, the concern here is the characterization of occurrences at epistem
ological categories of societal expressions. In particular, the focus of at
tention here is on categories of qualitative knowing categories of societal
expressions. Since human knowing systems and transmission networks are
not complete or 'all knowing,' there must be uncertainty of occurrences at
the categories where that uncertainty is explicated in terms of probability
distribution. The existence of alternatives for the occurrence of any epis
temic (qualitative knowing) component indicates the selective sense of in
formation. Measures of the transmission of information shared between
any two or more persons can be calculated as follows:
then
Where T = measure of shared information
PI, P2 = persons
H = basic information function
H (P I) = amount of information in one person's action
H (P2) = amount of information in another person's action
H (PI, P2) = amount of information in both persons' action
taken jointly
T(PI, P2) =H (PI) + H (P2) - H (Plo P2)
Figure 1 illustrates the SIGGS theory model and its properties necessary to
characterize the transmission flow of epistemological components both
50 M. L. ESTEP
Input

Output

Figure 2. The cybernetic model.
Key: Input is the information transmitted to the system.
Output is the information transmitted from the system.
Feedback is the information transmitted from the system through the
surroundings and back to the system.
from and to the system and its surroundings. Viewing a given person as the
system (S) and another given person as the negasystem ($), or as a given
person and a group respectively, the property of 'toputness,' TP, on the
model becomes interpreted as the formal qualitative knowing conditions
obtaining of the negasystem ($) which are available to the system (S) for
selection. Toputness is the environment of S. 'Fromputness,' FP, becomes
interpreted as the formal qualitative knowing conditions obtaining of a
system (S) which are available to the negasystem ($) for selection, i.e.
fromputness is the environment of $.
Figure 2 is an illustration of the usual cybernetic model, where input is the
information transmitted to the system, output is the information transmit
ted from the system, and feedback is the information transmitted from the
system through the surroundings and back to the system. A comparison of
the usual cybernetic model and SIGGS theory model reveals the information
limitations on cybernetic models to adequately characterize epistemic sys
tems, particularly with respect to the categories of qualitative knowing.
On the usual cybernetic model, input is what the system takes in, but
measures of what is available to the system from the negasystem and how
that relates to the input remains unknown. In addition, output on the
cybernetic model is what is available from the system, but what the nega
system gets and how that relates to the output remains unknown. Feedback
on the usual cybernetic model simply relates the output to the input. It is
with respect to the differences in the information measures between the two
models that the cybernetic model can be shown to be a closed, mechanical
model without the adaptive capabilities of an open, organismic model such
as SIGGS. The addition of information (H) measures provided by organismic
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS
51
models such as SIGGS permits the determination not only of what the system
takes in and what is available from the system, but also what the negasystem
takes in and what is available from the negasystem. SIGGS distinguishes the
following system properties descriptive of information transmission:
FI, feedin = transmission of information from the system's surroundings to the system
Fa, feedout = transmission of information from the system to its surroundings.
FT, feedthrough = transmission of information
FB, feedback = transmission of information from the system through its surroundings back to
the system.
The cybernetic model obviously provides only a perspective for homeo
stasis, whereas the SIGGS theory model provides a perspective for hetero
stasis. For example, on the cybernetic model, the transmission of infor
mation to and from the system is directed toward maintenance of specified
goals. The assumption on this model is that information fed back into the
system is both necessary and sufficient for the regulation of the system's
operations. Information directed toward the maintenance of the specified
goals is analyzed, while that information not in the system is excluded from
the analysis.
17
Through servomechanisms, information feedback corrects
error in the system operations relative to the system's goals; values re
presenting the desired state of the system are standards for controlling
system performances. Obviously, on the cybernetic model, there is a re
strictive use of information. Utilizing qualitative knowing systems as an
example, where a person, a group, and the behavioral tendencies of the
group provide a representation of a cybernetic system, and those behavioral
tendencies ( empirical norms) of the group are the goals, and variations in
qualitative knowing among persons (qualitative knowing influence rela
tions) are interpreted as information, the feedback loop provides the regu
lation on the growth of qualitative knowing exhibited by the person. What
ever happens outside the system, i.e. variations in qualitative knowing
influence among groups and persons outside the system are not incorpor
ated as part of the information feedback, hence whatever happens outside
the system has no effect on the qualitative knowing of the person.
The cybernetic model, thus, necessitates an extension relative to inform
ation theoretic measures which are provided by SIGGS. The extension
permits a perspective necessary for change, hierarchical differentiation,
evolution, i.e. a heterostatic perspective. Such an extension obviously per
mits a perspective for epistemic growth, in particular, qualitative knowing
growth.
52 M. L. ESTEP
Utilizing the previous sets, Sand $, to refer to the epistemic qualitative
knowing systems of person PI and P 2 respectively, figure 1 also illustrates
the use of SIGOS to give meaning to information transmission relative to the
qualitative knowing categories. Considering Sand $ as sets of messages, i.e.
S = {P
1Qh
P1Q2,,,,P1Qn} and $ = {P
2Qh
P2Q2,,,,P2Qn}
and their Cartesian product S x $. Where p (P lQi) refers to the probability
of selecting P lQi E Sand p (P 2Qj) refers to the probability of selecting
P 2Qj E $, and where p (P lQi' P 2Qj) refers to the probability of selecting
(P lQi' P 2Qj) E S x $, if P lQi is selected, then the information transmitted by
P 2Qj were it selected would be:
-logp (P 2Qj IP lQJ
(1)
The expected uncertainty of $ given that message P lQi is selected from S
would be:
n
- j;IP(P2Qj IP1Q;) logp(P2Qj IP1QJ
(2)
The basic uncertainty function is:
n 1
2l
og
p(Cj)
(3)
Referring to Figure 1, those negasystem qualitative knowing components
which are available to the system for selection are defined as 'system
environmentness.' Also, the system qualitative knowing components which
are available to the negasystem for selection are defined as 'negasystem
environmentness.' That is, toputness (TP) is the negasystem qualitative
knowing components available for the system's selection. Fromputness
(FP) is system qualitative knowing components available for the negasys-
tem's selection. Measures of the qualitative knowing influence of one
person, Phon another, P 2, are provided by the concept of 'feedinness' (FI)
which is, transmission of selective information from a negasy.stem to a
system (between toputness and inputness when toputness occurs at a time
just prior to inputness).
As SIGOS' organismic perspective permits measurement of what the
negasystem, P 2, takes in and what is available to the negasystem from the
system, Ph the concept of 'feedoutness' (FO) is included, that is transmis-
sion of selective information from a system, Ph to a negasystem (between
fromputness and outputness when fromputness occurs at a time just prior to
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS
53
outputness). The inclusion of time permits definitions of flow within and
across system boundaries.
By means of a joint classification of person, Ph toputness (TP) and
person, P
2
, inputness (IP), provided the epistemological classification of
qualitative knowing cited earlier is adequate, every occurrence of P 1 and P 2
qualitative knowing influence attempts and effects can be characterized by
one category of the classification. The relation between PI qualitative
knowing influence attempts and P 2 qualitative knowing influence effects is
indicated by feedinness, i.e. a measure of the shared information between
P 2 qualitative knowing conditions available to the system, Ph for selection
and the qualitative knowing conditions PI has selected. The uncertainty of
the epistemic qualitative knowing affect relation may be characterized by H
statistics.
In conclusion, the above arguments support my claim that cybernetic
models cannot be taken as sufficient to characterize qualitative knowing
systems due to the information limitations on those models. The usual
cybernetic model does not permit measures of the information available to
the system from the negasystem and how that relates to the input. Also, the
cybernetic model does not permit measures of the information the nega-
system gets and how that relates to the output. The addition of such
information measures provided by the SIGGS theory model does permit
such measures, hence also permitting adequate characterizations of quali-
tative knowing systems.
3. Addendum
As an addendum to the above arguments, I might point out that certain of
the same inadequacies of the usual cybernetic model have been recorded in
research in other fields. For example, the application of SIGGS to Project
Prime
18
which was concerned with the evaluation of main streaming han-
dicapped learners into regular classroom settings, revealed that the usual
cybernetic approach to such evaluation did not result in obtaining all the
information necessary to adequately diagnose teacher-learner influcence
relations within the mainstreaming context. Certain of the properties of
SIGGS, e.g. feedinness, were used to empirically calculate the teacher at-
tempts to influence the learner and the amount of influence actually affect-
ing the learner. The property of feedoutness was also used to calculate the
learner attempts to influence the teacher and the amount of influence
54 M. L. ESTEP
actually affecting the teacher. Both teacher and learner are viewed from a
SIGGS perspective as mutual agents of influence, whereas a cybernetic
model would view the teacher as the agent of influence.
In the Prime Project research, six influence categories were utilized,
drawn from research into the social bases of power by French and Raven, 19
such that every occurrence of a teacher attempting to influence a learner
was characterized by one and only one of the six categories. Moreover,
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories were utilized to charac
terize the effect of the influence attempt, i.e. moving toward, moving away,
moving against.
The SIGGS framing of the influence relations interpreted the regular
classroom as the universe of discourse, and the mainstreamed handicapped
learner as the system. The learner's negasystem included the teacher, peers,
books, etc. When the teacher attempted to influence the learner, this was
interpreted as learner toputness. That is, the teacher is interpreted as
information available to the learner for selection on the SIGGS model. When
subsequently taken in by the learner system, toputness affects inputness.
Learner inputness is the effect of the teacher influence on the learner
system. Such a relation is interpreted as feedinness. The uncertainty of the
feedinness relation is characterized by information statistics.
In Project Prime, the characterization of the feedinness relation between
learner toputness (which is teacher influence attempt) and learner input
ness (which is influence effect) was by means of a T statistic. T is comprised
of H statistics, i.e. the basic information or uncertainty statistic. H is used to
describe the average uncertainty of occurrences of categories in a classifi
cation, i.e. the categories of influence effect referred to above.
The characterization of the uncertainty of 1884 occurrences of learner
behavior in Project Prime showed the average uncertainty, H (1), to equal
1.335 (where I = inputness). The maximum uncertainty, Hmax, was also
calculated and found to equal 1.585. The H (1) = 1.335, is closer to Hmax
than to zero. The calculation of relative uncertainty rH showed a 15.8 %
reduction of uncertainty. Thus, it was shown that knowledge of the given
distribution of 1884 occurrences of learner behavior reduces (from
maximum) the uncertainty with which one could predict which inputness
category is occurring or might occur by approximately 16 percent.
Moreover, relative transmission was calculated, showing an 18 percent
reduction of uncertainty in learner inputness given knowledge of toputness.
It was concluded that there was little commonality between antecedent
teacher influence attempts and consequent learner influence effects.
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS 55
Although I have only utilized examples of the application of information
statistics to illustrate the differences between SIGGS and the usual cyber
netic model, there are other properties of SIGGS besides feedinness which
can be used to show how SIGGS can extend the cybernetic model. A few of
these will be touched upon here.
Again utilizing the application of SIGGS in Project Prime as an example,
the SIGGS property of Jeedoutness which is flow from fromputness to
outputness was calculated. That is, antecedent learner behavior was viewed
as an influence attempt by the learner and the consequent teacher behavior
was viewed as the effect of the learner influence on the teacher. Feed
outness, or transmission from the learner to the teacher, was found to be
.461, compared to the feedinness measure of .246. That is, the learner was
found to influence the teacher more than the teacher influenced the learner.
Feedthroughness, another property of SIGGS, reveals the flow in time
from the teacher (toputness) through the learner (inputness,fromputness)
and to the teacher (outputness). A calculation of feedthroughness neces
sitates the joint classification of toputness, TP, inputness, IP, fromputness,
FP, andoutputness, GP, where TP is att1,IP att2,FP att
3
, andGP att
4
; and
t1> t
2
, [3, t4 are successive moments in time.
Compatibleness is commonality of feedinness and feedoutness, and can
be estimated by a B function which is comprised of T's. This property
characterizes the relation between what is taken in by a system from its
environment, and what is subsequently taken in by the negasystem from the
system. If there is little compatibleness between a teacher and a
main streamed learner, for example, there may be an increase in the
'strainness' in the learner and/or 'stressness' in the teacher. Of course, if
strainness in the learner increases beyond a certain level, then the anxiety
level might increase leading to hostile or aggressive interactions with the
teacher and peers.
In conclusion, not all the properties of SIGGS have been utilized here to
demonstrate its extension of the usual cybernetic model. Adaptiveness, i.e.
'a difference in compatibleness under system environmental changeness', 20
for example, was not considered in the characterization of qualitative
knowing or in Project Prime. It should be clear, however, that SIGGS
permits more adequate theoretical and empirical characterizations than
does the usual cybernetic model, hence providing a more powerful and
fruitful heuristic for research.
56
M. L. ESTEP
Notes
1. Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
2. Russell, B., Our Knowledge of the External World, London: George Allen and Unwin,
Ltd., p. 75, 1922.
3. Russell, B., 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' in Mysticism
and Logic, London: Penguin Books, p. 197, 1918.
4. Lehrer, K., Knowledge, London: Oxford University Press, p. 199, 1974.
5. Lehrer, K., Knowledge, pp. 189ff (see Note 4).
6. Lehrer, K., Knowledge, p. 198 (see Note 4).
7. Lehrer, K., Knowledge, p. 199 (see Note 4).
8. Estep, M. L., 'On Perceptual Awareness and Understanding' an unpublished paper
presented at the Symposium on Epistemological Foundationalism, Perception, Con-
sciousnes and Psychological Inquiry, American Psychological Association, San Francisco,
California, August, 1977.
9. Maccia, G. S., 'Pedagogical Epistemology' in Proceedings of the 1973 Annual Meeting of
the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society, Terre Haute: Indiana State University,
57-69, 1974.
10. Maccia, G. S., 'Pedagogical Epistemology' (see Note 9).
11. Cherry, C., On Human Communication, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, p. 261, 1957.
12. Polanyi, M., 'The Unaccountable Element in Science' in Knowing and Being, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1969.
13. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason (N. K. Smith, trans.), Toronto: Macmillan, pp.
177ff., 1929.
14. Polanyi, M., 'The Unaccountable Element in Science,' in Knowing and Being, p. 111 (see
Note 12).
15. Maccia, G. S., 'Education for Humanity' an unpublished paper presented at the Sym-
posium on Philosophy of Education, Philosophical Society of the State University of New
York at Fredonia, New York, 1977.
16. Bertalanffy, L. von, General System Theory, New York: George Braziller, p. 33, 1968.
17. Maccia, E. and G. S. Maccia, 'Information Theoretic Extension of the Cybernetic Model'
an unpublished paper presented at the European Meeting of Cybernetics and Systems
Research, Vienna, 1972.
18. Frick, Ted, 'Application of SlOGS to Project Prime,' paper published by the Center for
Innovation in Teaching the Handicapped, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana,
April, 1976.
19. French, J. R. P.,Jr., and Raven, B. H., 'The Bases of Social Power,' inDo Cartwright (Ed.),
Studies in Social Power. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959.
20. Maccia, E. S. and Maccia, G. S., Development of Educational Theory Derivedfrom Three
Educational Theory Models. Final Report, Project No. 5-0638, United States Office of
Education, 1966.
CYBERNETIC AND SIGGS THEORY MODELS 57
References
Cherry, c., On Human Communication, Cambridge: The M.LT. Press, 1957.
Estep, M. L., 'On Perceptual Awareness and Understanding.' Unpublished paper presented at
the Symposium on Epistemological Foundationalism, Perception, Consciousness and Psy-
chological Inquiry, American Psychological Association, San Francisco, California, August,
1977.
Estep, M. L. 'Toward a SIGGS Characterization of Epistemic Properties of Educational Design'
pp. 917-936 in George Klir (ed.), Applied General Systems Research: Recent Developments
and Trends, New York and London: Plenum Press, 1978.
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason (N. K. Smith, trans.), Toronto: Macmillan, 1929.
Lehrer, K., Knowledge, London: Oxford University Press, 1974.
Maccia, E. S. and G. S. Maccia, 'System Theory and the SIGGS Theory Model.' Paper presented
at the Conference on the History and Perspectives of Development of Systems Approach
and General System Theory, International Congress of the History of Science, Moscow,
Soviet Union, August, 1971.
Maccia, E. S. and G. S. Maccia, 'Information Theoretic Extension of the Cybernetic Model.'
Paper presented at the European Meeting of Cybernetics and Systems Research, Vienna,
Austria, 1972.
Maccia, E. S. and G. S. Maccia, 'The Logic ofthe SIGGS Theory Model.' Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, Califor-
nia, April, 1976.
Maccia, G. S., 'Pedagogical Epistemology,' in Proceedings ofthe 1973 Annual Meeting ofthe
Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society, Terre Haute: Indiana State University,
57-69, 1974.
Polanyi, Michael, 'The Unaccountable Element in Science,' in Knowing and Being. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Russell, B., 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description' in Mysticism and
Logic, London: Penguin Books, 1918.
Russell, B., Our Knowledge of the External World, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
1922.
Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
Von Bertalanffy, L., General System Theory, New York: George Braziller, 1968.
Role playing in the interview: towards
a theory of artifacts in the
su rvey-i nterview*
Wil Dijkstra and Johannes van der Zouwen
1. Introduction
The method of data collection generally used in the social sciences is the
interview (e.g. Brown and Gilmartin, 1969): a procedure by means of
which a respondent is induced, through a series of questions presented by
an interviewer, to give verbal information about himself which is of interest
for a researcher (Scheuch, 1967).
It may be an unfortunate state of affairs if empirical knowledge depends
heavily on only one method, it is still worse if serious doubts exist about the
data gathered by this method (see Phillips, 1971, 1973). Much research has
been done with respect to the quality of the information obtained by
interviewing (see e.g. Sudman and Bradburn, 1974). Especially with
respect to the most common form of interviewing, the so-called structured
interview, in which every respondent answers the same questions by
choosing one of a fixed set of answer-categories. This type of interview is
primarily used in surveys; hence the term 'survey-interview'.
An analysis of the results of these investigations brought us to the
conclusion that the quality of the information is rather good if the questions
concern factual information which the respondent can give without much
difficulty; for example when he need not consult his memory, or if social
sanctions do not prevent him from being honest. However, if other types of
data are at issue, especially those concerning attitudes about disputable
affairs, the information may be strongly biased. This implies that precisely
in those cases in which the interview is most difficult to replace by some
other observation technique (namely, opinion and attitude research) the
probability is highest that wrong conclusions are inferred from interview
data (Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen, 1977).
Assuming the indispensability of the interview to social research, what is
* Part of this research was supported by a grant from The Netherlands Organization for the
Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.).
60 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
urgently needed is a model of the interview process from which one can
derive instructions and guidelines leading to a decrease of interview-bias. In
this paper a model of the interview process is presented. This model rests on
two main assumptions: (a) there exists an analogy between interviewing
and black box analysis as conducted in systems methodology (Section 2)
and (b) the interview process is a micro-social process that can fruitfully be
described in the terminology of so-called role theory, an approach in social
psychology (Section 3).
2. Interviewing and black box analysis
Many theoretical propositions in the social sciences contain concepts and
variables which cannot be made directly observable for a researcher, such
as opinions and attitudes. Such variables may be conceived as a state
variable (x) of a black box, while variables like educational level and voting
behaviour can be seen as input and output, respectively, of this black box.
The interview process, intended to produce estimates of unobservable
variables, may be conceived as a form of black box analysis (Van der
Zouwen, 1974).
By means of a specific (additional) input, namely the question posed (u
q
),
the interviewer receives an additional output in the form of the answer of
the respondent (y a). In analyzing these answers, the researcher assumes that
a certain relationship exists between the answer the respondent gives and
the state variable x referred to in question u
q
In other words the researcher
assumes that the respondent 'used' a specific output function in answering
u
q
, namely response function ra' With the help of an estimation of this
response function (fa) it is possible to make an estimation of the state
variable concerned (i) on the basis of the answer the respondent gives. See
Figure 1.
Question
u
q
Interview
characteristics
u*
State
variable
x
(opinion.
attitude)
Figure 1. Interviewing as a form of black box analysis.
;
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW 61
Now questions are not posed 'in a vacuum' but in the context of a specific
questionnaire, by a specific interviewer, etc., in short, in a specific interview
situation. The characteristics of this situation are described with variables
u"j, ... , etc., in short with vector u*. The (formulation of) question u
q
and
the characteristics of the interview situation u*, may effect the opinion, etc.,
of the respondent. Therefore, the researcher is obliged to make as-
sumptions concerning the relationships between question u
q
and interview
situation u* on the one hand, and the state variable under concern (x) on
the other hand. That is, the researcher has to assume a state transition
function Sq, relatingu
q
and u* withx. (Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen, 1977).
So we see that, in order to infer the opinion, etc., of the respondent from his
answer (in short: to infer x from Ya), the researcher is obliged to make
assumptions concerning two functions: the response function ra and the
state transition function Sq. If one or more of these assumptions are taken
for granted, but actually are violated, the inferences of the investigator are
said to be biased.
Types of bias related with the state transition function Sq are invalidity
and reactivity. These types of bias occur, respectively when the question u
q
concerns other state variables than the particular state variable the re-
searcher is interested in, and when the opinion or attitude being measured
alters because of the very posing of the question.
Inaccuracy is a type of bias related with the response function. This type
of bias occurs when the respondent, in answering the question, uses a
response function different from the one assumed by the researcher. In this
paper we will concentrate on the latter type of bias or artifact. Or stated
more positively, we will direct our attention mainly to those variables
effecting the 'choice' of functions by the respondents.
3. Role theoretical interpretations of the survey-interview
3.1. Interviewing, experimenting, and social psychology
As stated in Section 1, an interview is a kind of social interaction between
two persons, a respondent and an interviewer. Therefore social psychologi-
cal theories playa major part in the explanation and understanding of
artifacts in the survey-interview.
A review of the existent literature reveals two things. First, we found that
most authors use conceptions from role theory (e.g. Dexter, 1956; Back and
62 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. V AN DER ZOUWEN
Gergen, 1963; Henson, 1974; Henson, Cannell and Lawson, 1976; Sud-
man and Bradburn, 1974). Second, notwithstanding the apparent unani-
mity in orientation on role theory, a comprehensive interview theory is
clearly lacking.
The role-theoretical orientation of these authors may be stated as fol-
lows. Being interviewed is for the average respondent a rather unusual
experience. The interview situation is an ambiguous one for him, and so he
is unsure which mode of behaviour is appropriate to his position as res-
pondent. Otherwise stated, has he, as a respondent, selected the correct
role (cf. Sarbin and Allen, 1968)? And is his behaviour in accordance with
the selected role, assuming it is the correct one? To reduce the ambiguity of
the situation, and the uncertainty with respect to his behaviour, the res-
pondent attends to given cues. Not only does the interviewer as a person
constitute a powerful source of cues, but so do letters from the research
institute introducing the interviewer and verbal statements of the inter-
viewer elucidating the research purposes.
This orientation derived from the effects situational features had on the
response, and led in turn to a number of systematic investigations of the
effects of situational cues on response accuracy (see especially Cannell,
Marquis and Laurent, 1977 and Cannell, Oksenberg and Converse, 1977).
It is quite interesting to note that theorizing about artifacts in a related
data-gathering method, the psychological laboratory experiment, is equal-
ly, or even more, penetrated with role-theoretical notions (e.g. Weber and
Cook, 1972; Rosnow and Aiken, 1973; Shulman and Berman, 1975;
Silverman, 1977). Most notably, it is here the concept of subject roles that is
elaborated. It is assumed that subjects in psychological experiments adopt
one of a number of possible roles, as for example the role of the 'good
subject' who tries to give responses apparently confirming the researcher's
hypothesis.
Another role is that of the 'apprehensive' subject, who gives responses
such that he is likely to be more positively evaluated by the experimenter.
Although a comprehensive theory of the psychological experiment does not
exist, it seems worthwhile to apply the role theoretical approach of the
experiment to the problem of artifacts in the survey-interview. In the next
part of this section we will distinguish three respondent roles and we will
point to the respondent's problem of combining these roles in answering
questions.
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW
63
3.2. Respondent roles and role compromise
We distinguish three respondent roles on the basis of different role con-
ceptions:
1. The faithful respondent role is based on the conception that if one is asked
information, one is expected to give responses that are, to the best of
one's knowledge, in accordance with reality. This role parallels the
'faithful subject role' from the psychological experiment (cf. Weber and
Cook, 1972: 275) and is similar to Back and Gergen's (1963) 'infor-
mation-giving game'.
2. The good respondent role results from the conception that if one
cooperates in a scientific affair, o.ne is expected to deliver valuable
responses, to wit, to help the researcher to find support for his hypotheses
or expectations. This role is similar to the 'good subject role' (cf. Weber
and Cook, 1972: 275).
3. The ingratiating respondent role arise from the conception that if one is
engaged in a direct social encounter (e.g. an interview situation), one is
expected to ingratiate oneself with the other person; i.e. to consider his
feelings, and to portray oneself as a good (but perhaps not too good)
citizen. This role parallels partly the 'apprehensive subject role' from the
psychological experiment (cf. Weber and Cook, 1972: 275).
According to this conceptualization, the interview is an ambiguous
situation for the respondent in deciding which role is the correct one. In
addition, the respondent may be uncertain if his behaviour corresponds
with the selected role (after all, what are the investigator's hypotheses, or
which responses are likely to be most positively evaluated by the inter-
viewer?). Situational cues serve to reduce these ambiguities and uncertain-
ties, by providing information about which role is expected of the res-
pondent, and how to behave in accordance with a particular role.
However, it is quite implausible that the respondent's conceptions about
his role unambiguously point to one and only one role and that situational
cues informing him about which role is expected of him unequivocally
suggest the same role. Indeed, if this were so, it would contradict the
assumption stated above, that the interview is an ambiguous situation for
the respondent. Therefore, it is not to be expected that the respondent
simply adopts one of the above described roles, and acts accordingly.
Rather, the respondent arrives at a role compromise, signifying for example
that for the greater part he will act according to role 1, for a smaller part
according to role 2, and for a still smaller part according to role 3.
64 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
The antecedents of role compromise and how its effects on the response
will be taken into account, will be discussed in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
But first we face the problem of integrating these role theoretical notions in
the black box model of the interview process.
4. Role theory and black box model
The 'translation' of the three respondent roles in black box terminology
proves to be rather simple: The answer of the faithful respondent (Yal) is
only dependent on the state variable (opinion, etc.) the researcher is
interested in (here denoted with XI)' His response function (r
a
l) relates his
opinion with his answer.
(4.1)
The answer of an interviewee playing the role of the good respondent (Ya2) is
only dependent on his estimations of the researcher's evaluations of the
various values of the state variable under concern. These estimations are
denoted with the symbol X2. Therefore:
(4.2)
Interviewees playing the role of the ingratiating respondent will give an
answer (Ya3) that is only dependent on their estimations of interviewer's
evaluations of the values of X2 (denoted with X3)' Or:
(4.3)
As stated in the last section, it is rather unlikely that an interviewer will stick
only to one role; it is more likely that he will arrive at some sort of role
compromise, a weighted combination of different roles. That is, in answer-
ing a question, all three equations mentioned above are more or less
relevant. Therefore, one question may, in principle, lead to three (probably
different) answers: Yah Ya2 and Ya3
But in the structured interview the respondent is forced to give only one
answer (ya) to one question.
So our model of the interview process must contain a procedure that
combines information concerning the role compromise chosen by the res-
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW 65
pondent (indicated with the symbol q) and information concerning the
variables x h x 2 and x 3, in such a way that one, and only one, answer Ya is
produced.
We have called this procedure the weighted response function (raw) where
11 2: ntimations
01 rn.arch.rs
.valuations of
valunof 11,
q :rol.
compromi ..
11, : Itot. variabl.
(opinion,ltc.
of
113 : ntimations
of intMvi_'s
.valuations of
valunof 11,
fa :anl_oI
rnponlWnt
(4.4)
Figure 2. Role-theoretical extension of the black box model of the interview-process.
Figure 2 contains the just mentioned main components of the elaborated
black box model of the interview. This figure illustrates the fact that the
investigator who wants to infer a respondent's opinion (x 1) from the answer
he gives (Ya), needs estimations about the variables x 2 and x 3 and the role
compromise q 'chosen' by this respondent.
5. The antecedents of role compromise
5.1. Respondent role conception
In the interview, the respondent brings along a number of existent con-
66 W. DlJKSTRA AND J. V AN DER ZOUWEN
ceptions about what is expected of him, as described in 3.2. Specifically,
they could be conceived as the strength of the respondent's conviction that
he is expected to play the role of faithful, good, or ingratiating respondent,
or some combination of these.
In addition, the respondent may also be more or less motivated to play
one or the other role. This motivation should be conceived as a set of
particular respondent needs, likely to be satisfied by the interview. They
partly constitute the reason why the respondent has agreed to being inter-
viewed. It should be noted that conception and motivation need not coin-
cide. For example, the respondent may be convinced that he is expected to
play the faithful role, but his needs are more socially oriented, and he rather
wants just to talk to someone, and ingratiate himself with the other.
It is assumed that the effect of the interview conceptions of the res-
pondent on the role compromise depend on his needs. The effect of a
particular role compromise becomes greater to the degree the need to play
that particular role becomes greater. If there is no need at all to play a
particular role, the corresponding role conception does not contribute to
the role compromise. On the other hand, non-corresponding needs and
conceptions do not interact in this way.
Proposition 1
Corresponding respondent needs and respondent role conceptions multiply
with each other with respect to their contribution to the role compromise.
5.2. Role inducement
Apart from the respondent's own conceptions about the interview, the
situation itself may also impose particular expectations upon him. Imagine
for example that the respondent is informed that further grants for inves-
tigation depend on the result of the present research. Apparently this may
lead the respondent to believe that he is expected to play the. good res-
pondent role. Likewise, respondent instructions may stress the necessity to
respondent accurately. A less controlled, but quite important source of in-
ducement of role expectations, is the behaviour of the interviewer. From a
role-theoretical point of view, the interviewer serves as role sender for the
respondent. Role sender and role incumbent tend to occupy complemen-
tary roles. Therefore, the role conceptions and the consequent role behav-
iour of the interviewer may have a clear impact on the role the respondent
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW 67
will adopt. If the interviewer is convinced that gathering accurate infor-
mation is his sole mission, his behaviour will likely conform to the com-
plementary role of faithful respondent. Finally, the primary conception of
the interviewer about the interview may be that he is engaged in a kind of
social encounter; by acting accordingly, the respondent will be induced to
believe that the interviewer expects him to play the role of ingratiating
respondent.
It is assumed that role inducement, whether by means of instructions,
interviewer role behaviour, or otherwise, is mediated by the interviewer. It
is further assumed that the degree to which the respondent is willing to take
Balanc.d structures:
Imbalanced structures:
o
/\
o 0
I nduced role
expectation
Respondent
0----0
Intervi_ Induced role
expectation
Positive relation
----- Negative relation
o
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
I \
o 0
Interviewer Induced role
expectation
Respondent
I
I
I
I
0
Interviewer
0
I
I
\
0
Induced role
expectation
Figure 3. Balance theory and the relations between respondent, interviewer and induced role
expectation.
the induced role expectation into account will depend on his affective
relationship with the interviewer, i.e. whether he likes or dislikes him.
Application of balance theory (cf. Heider, 1946; Cartwright and Harary,
1956) provides some insight here. If 'interviewer', 'respondent' and 'in-
duced role expectations' are conceived as the elements of a triadic unit,
specific relations may exist between these elements. Between 'interviewer'
and 'respondent' a so-called like relation exists. In the present case this like
68
W. DIJKSTRA AND J. V AN DER ZOUWEN
relation may have the values 'positive' (liking), 'negative' (disliking), or
'zero' (absent). Between the elements 'interviewer' and 'induced role ex-
pectations' a so-called unit relation exists. Here it is assumed that this
relation only can take a positive value. That is, it is assumed that some role
expectation is always induced by the interviewer. Finally, a unit relation
exists between the elements 'respondent' and 'induced role expectation'.
This relation may have the values 'positive' (the respondent takes the
induced role expectation positively into account), 'negative' (the res-
pondent takes the induced role expectation negatively into account), or
'zero' (the respondent takes no induced role expectation into account).
According to balance theory, because the relation 'interviewer-induced
role expectation' is always positive, the structural unit is balanced if the
other two relations both are either positive or negative (see Figure 3); one
could also speak of a balanced structure if both these relations were zero (cf.
Cartwright and Harary, 1956).
Imbalanced structures tend toward balance by changing the values of
pertinent relations. Viewing the relation 'respondent-induced role ex-
pectation' as the dependent variable, this relation tends to take the same
value as the 'respondent-interviewer' relation. Applying this principle to
the present problem leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2
The more the interviewer is liked by the respondent, the more the induced
role behaviour will contribute positively to the role compromise; the more
the interviewer is disliked by the respondent, the more the induced role
behaviour will contribute negatively to the role compromise; if the inter-
viewer is neither liked nor disliked by the respondent, the induced role
behaviour will have no effect on the role compromise.
5.3. Role conception and role inducement combined
It is assumed that role conception and role inducement, conditioned by
respondent needs and the like relation between interviewer and res-
pondent, contribute additively to the role compromise. In addition they
may be provided with appropriate weights, signifying the relative contribu-
tion of role conceptions and role inducements. Figure 4 presents a picture of
the theory presented in this section thus far.
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW
Induc.cl rei

Lik. r.lation
R"pondMtl

Figure 4. Antecedents of the role compromise.
Proposition 3
RoI.
compromiM
69
The role compromise is an appropriately weighted linear combination of
role conceptions as conditioned by respondent needs, and role inducement
as conditioned by the liking relation between interviewer and respondent.
6. The weighted response function
6.1. External cues as guides for respondent role behaviour
In Section 4 we saw that the answer Ya is a function of the state variable
asked about (Xl)' and the apparent evaluations of the interviewer (X3) and
the researcher (X2) of the various values of this state variable. The res-
pondent bases the evaluations to be expected from interviewer or re-
searcher on available external cues; e.g. cues informing him about own
opinions of the interviewer, or prevalent expectations of the researcher
about research outcomes. In role theoretical terms these cues could be
conceived as role demands: cues informing the incumbent of a particular
role about the proper behaviour with respect to that role.
Thus the respondent infers from those cues how the various values on the
70 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
state variable are evaluated by the interviewer and the researcher. It is
further assumed that the respondent, in his inferences, only makes random
errors and no systematic errors.
Proposition 4
The respondent, cued by the interview situation, estimates - in an at least
not systematically biased way - respectively the interviewer's and the
researcher's evaluations of the values on the state variable.
6.2. The respondent's uncertainties
Cues informing the respondent about the evaluations of the values on
pertinent state variables by either researcher or interviewer, may be more
or less salient in the interview situation. As a consequence, the respondent
will be more or less certain about the estimate.
For example, if the respondent is questioned about racial attitudes and
the interviewer is black, the respondent will be quite certain which values
on the pertinent state variables are positively evaluated by the interviewer.
If the interviewer is white, the respondent will be somewhat more uncertain
in this respect.
Similarly, the respondent may be more or less certain about his own state.
For example, a respondent may be absolutely certain about his own age,
and rather uncertain about his opinion about the legalisation of abortion.
Proposition 5
The respondent's certainty about his estimates of the evaluations of the
values on the state variable questioned about, by the interviewer and the
researcher, depends on the saliency of the cues on which these estimates are
based. The respondent's certainty about his own state, depends on the
saliency of the state variable he is questioned about; e.g. whether or not the
respondent is highly involved with respect to the attitudes under concern;
or whether opinions concern recent (versus old) facts.
If the respondent is completely uncertain about the evaluations of the
interviewer, the ultimate response cannot be a function of the interviewer's
evaluation. Otherwise stated, the respondent cannot perform ingratiating
role behaviour, if he does not know what is ingratiating in a particular
situation. Neither can he perform good respondent role behaviour if he has
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW
71
no knowledge whatsoever about the researcher's purposes, hypotheses, or
expectations. Nor is a faithful answer possible if the respondent is com-
pletely uncertain about his own state. Of course, the respondent might say
'Don't Know', but this is not a value on the state variable but, indeed, an
indication for the complete uncertainty about any value.
Thus, the certainty or uncertainty about the values on the three variables
corresponding to the three respondent roles might have a definite impact on
the response. The greater the certainty about such a value, and thus, the
greater the certainty about the proper role behaviour with respect to that
role, the greater the ultimate impact of that role on the response will be.
Proposition 6
The contribution to the response of the variables x I> x 2 and x 3 is weighted
with the respondent's certainty about the values on those variables.
6.3. The weighted response function
As stated in Section 4, the role compromise could bring the respondent to
give three, possibly different, answer to only one question. Nevertheless,
he is urged to give only one answer. But the role compromise should also be
taken into account by the respondent. It is assumed that this is done by
weighting XI> X2 and X3 with the corresponding element of the role com-
promise. For example, if the role compromise is such that the respondent
will adopt for the greater part the faithful respondent role, for a smaller part
the ingratiating respondent role, and not at all the good respondent role, Xl
will obtain the greater weight, x 3 a smaller weight, andx 2 a weight of zero. In
addition it is assumed that the three x-values combine additively in deter-
mining a single response.
Proposition 7
The response is determined by a linear combination of the variables x I> x 2
and x 3, weighted with the corresponding elements of the role compromise.
Further, a random component will be added to the weighted response
function. In particular it is assumed that the magnitude of this random effect
is correlated with the respondent's uncertainty about the values on the
variables x I> x 2 and x 3
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ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW
73
Proposition 8
The response will be more determined by random fluctuations, the more
the respondent is uncertain about the values on the variablesxbxz andx3'
In principle, the response is fully determined by the propositions stated thus
far. However, the respondent may be provided with fixed answer alterna-
tives, and the response that results according to the above propositions
need not perfectly coincide with one such alternative. It is assumed that in
such a case the respondent selects the alternative that is nearest.
Figure 5 illustrates the theory as discussed in this section.
7. A mathematical formulation of the theory
Thus far the theory is stated somewhat loosely in verbal formulations. More
precision could be attained if mathematical formulations were used. In this
section such an attempt is made. However, it should be noted that, on the
basis of the verbally-stated propositions, other mathematical formulations
than the one presented here are also possible. The following formulation,
however, is very plausible in our opinion. It should be viewed as a platform
for subsequent refinements and extensions of the model and it could lead to
the deduction of empirical predictions by means of simulation.
Let:
q=(qh qz, q3), where
q j is the extent to which the respondent has adopted the faithful respondent
role either in a positive or negative sense;
qz is the extent to which the respondent has adopted the good respondent
role, either in a positive or negative sense;
q3 is the extent to which the respondent has adopted the ingratiating res-
pondent role, either in a positive or negative sense;
n = (nb nz, n3), where
nj is the strength of the respondent's need to play the role of the faithful
respondent;
nz is the strength of the respondent's need to play the role of the good
respondent;
n3 is the strength of the respondent's need to play the role of the ingratiating
respondent;
74 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
e = (el> e2, e3), where
el is the inducement of the faithful respondent role in the respondent;
e2 is the inducement of the good respondent role in the respondent;
e3 is the inducement of the ingratiating respondent role in the respondent;
(
CI 0 0)
C = 0 C2 0 , where
o 0 C3
C I is the strength of the respondent's conviction that he is expected to play
the' role of faithful respondent;
C2 is the strength of the respondent's conviction that he is expected to play
the role of good respondent;
C3 is the strength of the respondent's conviction that he is expected to play
the role of ingratiating respondent.
While further:
x I is the state of the respondent with respect to the state variable he is
questioned about;
X2 is the value n the state variable the respondent is questioned about, that
is most positively evaluated by the researcher;
X3 is'tire value on the state variable the respondent is questioned about, that
is rp.ost positively evaluated by the interviewer;
~ denotes the cues from which the respondent estimates X2;
~ denotes the cues from which the respondent estimates X3;
PI is the respondent's certainty about XI;
P2 is the respondent's certainty about Xz;
P3 is the respondent's certainty about X3;
pcj is the saliency of the state variable questioned about;
rz js. the saliency of cues from which the respondent estimates X2;
~ is the saliency of cues from which the respondent estimates X3;
a signifies the like relation between respondent and interviewer;
WI and W2 indicate appropriate weights for the respondent's role con-
ceptions and the induced role expectations, respectively;
1> 2, refer to respective error terms;
II> 12, ... denote different monotonically increasing functions;
i = 1, 2, 3;
-1<a<+1;
O<Pi<+ 1; and
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW
O<P*i<+ 1.
Then, according to proposition 1:
According to proposition 2,
According to proposition 3,
According to proposition 4:
X2 + E4}.
'
According to proposition 5:
According to proposition 6:
-f (PI *XI P2*X2 P3*X3) .
Ya- 3 --,--,-- ,
3 3 3
Pi Pi Pi
i=1 i=1 i=1
According to proposition 7:
75
(7.1.)
(7.2.)
(7.3)
(7.4)
(7.5.)
(7.6.)
(7.7.)
76
W. DIJKSTRA AND 1. VAN DER ZOUWEN
According to proposition 8:
(7.8.)
combining propositions 6, 7 and 8, one could arrive at:
3
QiPi{Xi+(1-Pi) E;}
i= 1
Ya=------------------
3
/qiIPi
(7.9.)
i = 1
8. The plausibility and the applicability of the model
In this section the results of a number of empirical investigations on the
quality of interview-data will be confronted with the model. It is not our
intention to discuss these researches exhaustively. Rather they serve as
illustrations of the plausibility of the model, since a direct test of the model
requires properly designed experiments. Hence, especially existent sum-
maries of research results, or studies where further references can be found
about similar studies, will be cited here.
Two types of studies are distinguished. In the first type, the so-called
accuracy studies, an estimation of the state the respondent is questioned
about, is obtained independent of the answer he gives; e.g. by means of
external records giving information about the respondent. This is only
possible to the extent that observable correlates of the state variable under
concern are available. Usually one speaks about factual or behavioral data.
These data are compared with the answer of the respondent.
Second, so-called covariance studies investigate the covariance between
variables constituting the interview-situation, and the response-variable.
The presence of such covariances implies the violation of one or more of the
basic assumptions on which the survey interview rests (ct. Di jkstra and Van
der Zouwen, 1977).
8.1. Accuracy studies
Results of accuracy studies have yielded three conclusions that are firmly
established in a great many investigations:
1. The longer the time between an event and the reporting of that event, the
less reliable and the less accurate that event will be reported. (ct. Dijkstra
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW 77
and Van der Zouwen, 1977; see also Cannell, Oksenberg and Converse,
1977: 8).
Assuming that time lowers the saliency of the state variable the res-
pondent is questioned about (that is, lowers p1), it could be deduced from
propositions 5 and 8 (equations 7.5. and 7.8.) that time and reliability are
negatively related. If it is further assumed that ((q2 ~ 0) /\ (P2 =1= 0)/\
(x 1 =1= x 2 V((q3 =1= 0) /\(p 3 =1= 0)/\ (x 1 =l=X3, then it follows from propositions
5,6 and 7 (equations 7.5., 7.6. and 7.7.) that events in the more distant past
are reported less accurately. More specifically, if x 1 is greater thanx2 andx3,
events tend to be more underreported if they occurred longer ago, whereas
if x 1 is smaller than x 2 and x 3, events tend to be more overreported the
longer ago they occurred.
2. The more salient or important an event is for the respondent, the more
reliable and the more accurate such events tend to be reported. (e.g.
Cannell, Oksenberg and Converse, 1977).
This statement could be deduced directly from propositions 5, 6 and 8
(equations 7.5., 7.6. an 7.8.) in the same way as statement 1.
3. The reporting of events tends to be biased in a socially desirable direction.
(e.g. Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen, 1977; Weiss, 1975).
Giving socially desirable answers is clearly a manner to ingratiate oneself
with another, and thus constitutes a part of the ingratiating respondent role
behaviour. Assuming that the respondent is inclined to adopt the ingrati-
ating role at least to some extent (that is, q3 =1= 0), that interviewers are
generally more liked than disliked (that is, a > 0), and that socially desirable
answers are indeed possible (that is, ~ =1= O), this conclusion follows from
propositions 4,5,6 and 7 (equations 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7.).
8.2. Covariance studies
The research results of the second type of study are somewhat more difficult
to summarize, especially because dependent and independent variables are
often hard to compare among different studies. Therefore, some degree of
subjective interpretation is hard to avoid. Nevertheless, the following
statements cover the results of a number of pertinent studies reasonably
well. It should be noted that these studies concern factual data (as in Section
8.1.) as well as so-called attitudinal data; that is, responses on questions
concerning state variables that are strictly unobservable, like feelings,
opinions, or attitudes.
78 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
4. Reinforcement by the interviewer of the respondent's answers, causes the
respondent to give answers in such a way that the probability of positive
reactions to these answer is increased (e.g. Insko and Cialdini, 1969).
It is assumed that reinforcement: (1) informs the respondent about X3,
thus enlarging (2) stresses the social conversational character of the
interview, thus inducing the ingratiating role in the respondent and en-
larging variable e3; (3) tends to affect the like relation between respondent
and interviewer in a positive way, thus causing variable a to be positive. It
follows from propositions 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (equations 7.2., 7.4., 7.5., 7.6. and
7.7.) that the likelihood that the respondent actually plays the ingratiating
role strongly enhanced by interviewer reinforcement, which in turn
increases the likelihood that he obtains positive reactions from the inter-
viewer.
5. If race- related state variables are concerned, the respondent tends to give
answers that are biased in the direction of the race of the interviewer, such
that they are more likely to be positively evaluated. (e.g. Hatchett and
Schuman, 1975).
The race of the interviewer is a clear cue for ingratiating respondent role
behaviour, and thus affects if race-related questions are concerned.
Assuming that q 3> 0, the statement is easily deduced from propositions 4,
5,6 and 7 (equations 7.4., 7.5., 7.6. and 7.7.).
6. A personnally oriented interviewer style tends to produce less accurate
responses than a task oriented interviewer style. (e.g. Goudy and Potter,
1975; Henson, Cannell and Lawson, 1976).
The above statement is induced with some reserve from available empir-
ical studies. First, results are sometimes contradictory, but in addition, the
independent variable is often very poorly conceptualized. Usually, one
speaks in survey-research about 'rapport', a concept referring to a sup-
portive atmosphere where the respondent is willing to talk about various
matters, and the interviewer behaves in a friendly, personally-oriented way.
The model presented here will prove useful in clarifying the concept, and
making understandable why contradictory results are sometimes obtained.
In different studies on effects of rapport or interviewer style on the
interviewee's response, several variables from the model presented here
may be involved; to wit, role inducement and the like relation between
respondent and interviewer. Rapport may be conceived as inducing the
ingratiating respondent role on the interviewee. Assuming =F and
a> 0, it will be clear from propositions 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 that rapport, or a
personal interviewer style, yields less accurate responses. Rapport, how-
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW 79
ever, may also be conceived as affecting the like relation between res-
pondent and interviewer in a positive way, and quite independent of the
inducement of ingratiating respondent role behaviour. From propositions 2
and 7 it could be deduced that this has the consequence that the effect of any
role inducement will be enhanced, given that the correspondingp*-value is
not zero. Therefore, responses may become more accurate as well as less
accurate because of this conception of rapport or interviewer style.
7. Different interviewers obtain different responses, or response distribu
tions. (e.g. Freeman and Butler, 1976).
According to the model it would hardly be understandable if the above
statement were not empirically supported. Assuming: (1) that interviewers
differ in their own role conceptions and therefore are also likely to differ in
the role they induce in the respondent; (2) that interviewers differ in the
extent they are liked by the respondents; (3) that interviewers differ in the
degree they give cues about their evaluations, then there are as many
possibilities to influence the response of the interviewee, according to the
model presented here.
8.3. Conditioning terms
In this section some conditions will be discussed, under which the tenability
of the above statements appears to be different. It has been proven in a
great many studies that especially the respondent's educational status and
the type ofthe question involved (i.e. factual versus attitudinal data) appear
to interact with situational variables. Two additional propositions, about
educational status and type of data respectively, enable us to infer more
specific predictions about the effects of these variables, and to confront
these predictions with the results of empirical investigations.
Proposition 8.1.
Respondents of high educational status are more certain about their own state
on the state variable concerned than are respondents of low educational
status.
The proposition itself is indirectly supported by the fact that respondents of
low educational status systematically give more 'Don't Know' or 'No
Opinion' responses than better-educated respondents (e.g. Converse,
1976).
80 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. VAN DER ZOUWEN
Proposition 8.1. means that p I is smaller for respondents with little
education, than for highly educated respondents. It follows that the relative
impact of situational cues aboutx2 andx3 on the response will be greater for
lower-educated respondents than for better-educated respondents; pro-
vided thatp2 andp3 are the same for both status groups. For, according to
proposition 6, the lower Ph the less x I will contribute to the response, and
consequently, the more X2 and X3'
In accordance with this prediction, it is found that respondents of lower
educational status conform more to apparent opinions of the interviewer
than respondents of higher status (Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen, 1977). In
addition, it could be deduced that respondents of lower educational status
generally will respond less accurately than respondents of higher status.
This indeed tends to be the case (Dijkstra and Van der Zouwen, 1977).
Finally, according to equation 7.9., the variables PI and ql combine mul-
tiplicatively in determining the response. It is expected therefore that
variations in q I (i.e. because of role inducement) are conditioned by the
respondent's educational status. More specifically, effects of inducing the
faithful respondent role, e.g. by instructing the respondent to behave so,
should be greater for respondents of higher educational status. Data
gathered tend to confirm this (cf. Cannell, Oksenberg and Converse, 1977,
Ch.3 and 6). Better educated respondents are, in other words, better able
to turn such inducements into action.
Proposition 8.2.
Respondents are generally more certain about their own state on the state
variable they are questioned about, if factual data are concerned, than if
attitudinal data are concerned.
Similar deductions could be made from this proposition as in the case of
respondent status, just by interchanging respondent status and type of data
as independent variables. However, much less pertinent empirical results
are known. The main conclusion is that, in the case of attitudinal data,
respondents react more to cues informing them about the interviewer's
evaluations, than in the case of factual data (cf. Dijkstra and Van der
Zouwen, 1977).
8.4. Interview prescriptions
The usefulness of the model presented here is determined not only by its
ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW
81
plausibility, but also by its applicability in doing away with biasing effects.
Two general strategies are possible. First one could make an unbiased
estimate of the respondent's state by entering in the inverse of the estimated
response function all relevant factors like the respondent's role con-
ceptions, interviewer behaviour, and so on. This may prove to be a rather
laborious undertaking if one is obliged to pose questions to the respondent;
for example to gain information about the respondent's needs, one meets
the same difficulties that caused us to set up this very interview model.
Second, one could specify conditions, under which biasing factors are
assumed to be zero. If one indeed is able to structure the interview situation
in such a way as to satisfy these conditions, i.e. if p 2 and p 3 or q 2 and q 3 are
zero, responses are not systematically biased. Surely, this will not be pos-
sible in all cases. One should aim therefore at a combination of both
strategies: measuring variables if the respondent himself can be excluded
from the measurement process, and fixing disturbing variables on zero-
value if this is not possible.
It cannot be discussed here in detail how both strategies can be carried
out. It should be clear, however, that interview-prescriptions about how to
fix particular variables on zero-values are easily inferred from the model.
For example:
- cues informing the respondent about x 2 and x 3 should be withheld from
him,
- the respondent should be carefully instructed that he is expected to play
the faithful respondent role,
- the interviewer should conduct a task-oriented interview style,
- the interviewer should maintain either a neutral (like) relation with the
respondent, or a positive (like) relation, if he is sure that the prominent
role inducement is that of the faithful respondent,
9. Perspective
A formal model of the interview process was developed, instigated by the
apparent fallacies of the usual interview-practice as a method of data-
gathering in the social sciences, and on the basis of an analogy between
interviewing and black box analysis from systems methodology, and con-
ceptualizations from social psychological role theory.
This model clearly has a tentative character, and should be further
refined and extended. Such a refinement might be effected by simulation
82 W. DIJKSTRA AND J. V AN DER ZOUWEN
techniques, secondary data-analysis, and field experiments.
A quite interesting extension of the model is the possibility of feedback
loops between the respondent's uncertainty and his reception of available
cues aboutxz andx3 (i.e. x ~ a n d x ~ . Specifically, uncertainty about Xz and
X3, that is, low pz and low P3, may stimulate the respondent to attend to
available cues, thus increasing the probability that these cues will be detec-
ted (assumed they are present) and consequently increasingpz andp3.
Further, the model presented here requires that responses are given at
interval or ratio level. If nominal data are involved, the weighted response
function (equation 7.9.) does not make sense; rather, the role compromise
has the character of a role conflict. The respondent faces a dilemma. It is
suggested that this situation resembles the selective learning paradigm from
psychological learning theory, where the organism has to choose between
two or more incompatible responses. Such an analogy could yield further
valuable insights.
Limited space prevents us from elaborating such speculations any
further.
References
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ROLE-PLAYING IN THE INTERVIEW 83
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Insko, C. A. and R B. Cialdini, 'A test of three interpretations of attitudinal verbal re-
inforcement.' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 12,333-341, 1969.
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Rand McNally, 1971.
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Alteration of information in channels: a
cross-level analysis
Bobbie J. Jones and James Grier Miller
In Living Systems, 1 Miller has presented a general theory which views the
increasing complexities of living systems as existing at seven discrete levels,
namely, the cell, organ, organism, group, organization, society, and supra-
national system. For every system, regardless of its level of complexity,
nineteen critical processes must be carried out or it will not survive.
Examples of these nineteen critical subsystems include the ingestor, which
transports matter-energy into the system, and the memory, which stores
information in the system. General living systems theory has suggested that
system structure and process at these various levels are similar in many
respects. That is, given comparable variable definitions across the various
levels, interrelationships among these variables can be shown to have
formal identities across levels. Various 'cross-level hypotheses' of this sort
have been proposed.
2
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we present and discuss one
such hypothesis in an abstract context for appropriate interpretation at
various levels. Second, the interpretations of the variables involved and
their interrelationship at each level are analyzed. Third, support is given to
the hypothesis by presenting empirical studies at two selected levels which
demonstrate the existence of the hypothesized interrelationships at each of
these levels. These supporting empirical results have been taken from
published and on-going researches carried out by investigators trained in
their respective scientific disciplines which study phenomena at each level.
Each of these studies was apparently undertaken without any awareness of
the existence of other comparable studies carried out at other levels. The
data relevant to this cross-level hypothesis provide one example of the
potential unifying power of general living systems theory.
Table 1 shows how the cross-level hypothesis, a proposition about infor-
mation degradation in channels, applies at each of the seven levels of living
systems.
In a channel there is always a progressive degradation of information and
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ALTERATION OF INFORMATION IN CHANNELS 87
decrease in negative entropy or increase in noise or entropy. The infor-
mation output per unit time is always less then it was at the input. This
information-processing hypothesis is a consequent, fundamentally, of the
Second Law of Thermodynamics.
This law deals with the efficiency of conversion and involves the concept
of entropy. Entropy, named by the German physicist Rudolph Clausius in
1865, is the measure of the quantity of energy not capable of conversion
into work. Similarly, with the hypothesis under study, information loss,
noise, error, or distortion (see Table 1) is considered equivalent to the
measure of entropy as dealt with in the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
Our primary concern is in the form of the output although causal factors are
also considered. Even though distortion may occur through motivated
reconstruction, the output is still reduced.
Information theory was developed in response to the need to measure the
performance of communication channels. The mathematical theory of
communication, originated by Shannon, deals primarily with channels such
as radio and telegraph wires rendered inefficient by noise. In his work
Shannon considers three entities: (1) a source of signals, (2) a channel, and
(3) a receiver. A noisy channel, in his definition, is one which fails by reason
of its intrinsic properties or of interference from outside to maintain a
perfectly consistent one-to-one correspondence between its input and
output ignals. As a result the output information is less than the input
information to the extent that noise interferes with transmission. The effect
of this information is that the receiver, on the average, gains less infor-
mation when an output signal arrives than is required to specify with
certainty which input signal was sent. In this paper the word 'noise' is used
in a more general sense, to include distortion, errors, leveling, sharpening,
and assimilation of messages.
At both the cell and organ levels, distortion or noise in channels occurs.
For example, on the cell level, neural signals are progressively altered by
random noise as they cross synapses and are transmitted through neurons.
Increasing noise in such transmissions can be demonstrated in electrical
recordings of input and output neural pulse sequences.
3
However, for this
paper we confine our study to only two levels - those of the group and
society.
88
B. J. JONES AND J. G. MILLER
1. Information degradation at the level of the group
Research related to noise in channels in groups is abundant.
4
A large
portion of this work is often referred to as the 'rumor spread' studies. Note
that when we refer to rumor spread, we are interested in the process of
information transmission only. Whether or not this information represents
fact or fiction is of no consequence in this study. The classic experimental
work is that of Gordon Allport and Leo Postman: beginning in 1945, they
first published an article entitled 'The basic psychology of rumor,' following
this up two years later with a book on the same subject which reported an
extensive series of experimental approaches to the subject. Other work
with similar findings has continued to the present.
Research has shown that there are several stages in the transmission of
rumor. Three behavior patterns are found in the rumor process as follows:
(1) leveling, (2) sharpening, and (3) assimilation. During the leveling
process, the rumor becomes more concise, grows shorter, and is more easily
grasped as it circulates. In successive versions fewer words are used and
fewer details are mentioned. During the sharpening process, the items of
the story that remain become more pronounced and take on greater im
portance. During the assimilation process a variety of additional things
occur. The details of the rumor are altered, arranged, and selected to suit
the emotional and intellectual needs of the listener. All three of these
categories involve information distortion.
Most of Allport and Postman's work on rumor spread and subsequent
work employs the serial transmission paradigm. This is the procedure by
which a chain of people transfer the story from one person to the next as in
the old game of 'telephone'. One subject is appointed as the starter and is
presented with a complex story of ideas, often reinforced with a drawing,
photograph or motion pictures. It is his task to relate what he has seen and
heard to the next subject who has not previously been exposed to the
material. This subject in turn passes the information on to the next and so
forth. The version of the story at each stage is recorded and studied for
content changes. Substantial agreement has emerged concerning the pat
tern of change through wich the content of the message is followed as it
moves from person to person through these artificially constructed networks.
From one such study Table 2 illustrates that on the basis of proper names
mentioned the message tends to grow shorter. Figure 1 shows the percen
tage of details initially retained in each successive reproduction. The num
ber of items enumerated in the description is considered to be 100 percent
ALTERATION OF INFORMATION IN CHANNELS
89
and all subsequent percentages are calculated from that base. The curve,
based on eleven experiments, shows that about 70 percent of the details are
eliminated in the course of five or six mouth-to-mouth transmissions even
when virtually no time lapse intervenes.
5
Table 2. Percentage of proper names mentioned in successive descriptions.*
Reproduction Percent Percent Percent
number correctly incorrectly leveled
given given out
Original description 92 8 0
1 .......................... 51 18 31
2 .......................... 43 16 41
3 .......................... 30 17 53
4 .......................... 23 13 64
5 .......................... 18 5 77
* The total number of proper names contained in the original descriptions constitutes the
lOO-percent level. The entries in the table are percentages computed to that base.
70
65
60
'0
55

50
45
.!!!
'0 40

35
'0
i:
..
30
u

25
20
15
10
05
00
Figure 1.
Indl'x of ll'vl'ling
4 5
Percentage of details originally given which are retained in each successive re-
production.
90 B. J. JONES AND J. G. MILLER
In the rumor spread experiments leveling never totally obliterated the
input message. The stabilization of the last part of the curve is a finding of
some consequence. It indicates that a short concise statement is likely to be
faithfully reproduced. In such a message the possibilities of further distor-
tion are few. Whenever verbal material is transmitted in groups of people as
either rumor, legend, or history, change in the message will be in the
direction of greater brevity and conciseness. Leveling is not a random
phenomenon.
Research data do not support the popular notion that rumors 'snowball',
that is, tend to expand and become overelaborate and verbose. The rumor
spread process begins at the moment an ambiguous situation is perceived.
The longer the time that elapses after the input is perceived, the greater are
the three-fold changes of leveling, sharpening, and assimilation. Also, the
more people that are involved in a serial report the greater the change is
likely to be.
Similar results are reported from experimental studies of a rumor in a
community setting. Even with short six-word slogans, shortening occurs.
Below is a summary of some of the findings at the group level which
results from the hypothesis under study:
a. Information inputs can overload groups.
b. Channel capacities of groups appear to be slower than those of human
organisms of the order of 0.2 to 1.5 bits per second in the researches
surveyed.
c. As in other behaving systems, the error and filtering adjustment proces-
ses seem to be used increasingly as information input rates increase.
There is no evidence concerning other adjustment processes.
d. More attention appears to have been devoted at this level to intrasystem
variables than at the lower levels, possibly because it has been technically
easier to observe these at this level. Special emphasis has been put on
communication nets. In general it appears that information transmission
is more effective the fewer the number of links there are in such channels,
the more directly members of the group can receive information and ask
questions of others, and perhaps the more they volunteer information
rather than solicit it. Interestingly, there is evidence that communication
in groups does not diminish at slower information input rates, but rather
that free time is devoted to communication, although the length of the
messages they send does not decrease.
ALTERATION OF INFORMATION IN CHANNELS 91
e. If the rumor spread and community diffusion experiments can be in
terpreted as reasonable approximations of the transmission of infor
mation through interpersonal networks which occurs when mass media
messages are brought to the attention of their audiencesithen the follow
ing conclusions follow: (1) Those people who are informed by others as
opposed to those who receive direct exposure from the media are likely
to be more poorly informed. (2) The person who has direct contact with
the originating source receives the more accurate information. (3) As a
communicated message passes through additional nodes in a communi
cation network, the individual who then receives this message is likely to
receive a shorter version, selectively edited and distorted in accord with
prevailing stereotype, habits and cultural themes. (4) In communication
situations which depend heavily upon word of mouth diffusion to extend
the range of contact, a low degree of fidelity to the original content is
likely to prevail.
f. Whenever verbal material is transmitted among groups of people,
whether as rumor, legend, or history, change will be in the direction of
greater brevity and conciseness.
g. The longer the time that elapses after an input is perceived or a rumor
begins, the greater is the distortion.
h. The more individuals involved in a serial report or community diffusion
experiment, the greater the distortion is likely to be.
2. Information degradation at the level of society
At the level of the society, information distortion occurred in one instance of
communication concerning the possible establishment of a colony in
Australia. In one study by Cameron the effect of attitudes in the British
press on Australian colonization was examined.
6
His observation was li
mited to the period between 1818 and 1831. He also examined the role
of different dissemination agencies, different information feedback, and
outlined a model which emphasized the close relationship between infor
mation and colonial migration. All information about Swan River colony
was derived from the assessment of the area made by Captain James Stirling
and the botanist Charles Frazier. During their first visit many problems
arose, but when they returned to England they reported that Swan River
was a suitable place for colonization. Their findings were distorted from
their original diary entries and contained ambiguities which could not be
92
B. J. JONES AND J. G. MILLER
immediately resolved because of the distance of Swan River from Britain
and the alien nature of its environment. Further, Stirling's report was made
available to the public only through an edited short version written by John
Barer of the Admiralty. Although the colonial offices had copies of the
original description, these were not circulated. Further, since it was printed
in the Quarterly Review, considered a semi-official publication, and since
Barer was an acknowledged expert on the Southern hemisphere, his state-
ment carried considerable authority. The information Barer supplied was
used by a number of dissemination agencies including a host of colonial
boosters like shipowners and their agents, land speculators, and prospective
employers. All of these modified his material to suit their particular inten-
tions. The major causes of distortion related to the formulating of an official
report in terms comprehensible by a wide public. The writer's prime con-
cern was to make the descriptions readable, comprehensible, and above all
interesting. Most strove for a degree of objectivety, but all were caught up
with the general enthusiasm for the formation of the colony and found it
difficult to exclude an element of excitement from their writing. So the
evaluation of the potential of an area for colonization became in essence a
publicity brochure, a colonization manifesto. Distortion clearly occurred.
In addition to the above cause of distortion, restrictions on the length of the
statement gave rise to distortions. The description in the Quarterly Review
was 20 percent longer than the 1827 report. Its restatement in the 1829
issue of the new monthly magazine was only one-third as long, and that of
the Westminster Review (January 1830) was reduced to one-tenth. This
reduction was accomplished by compression and deletion (or abstracting)
which completely removed some elements from the original description
and highlighted others, chiefly those which had most caught the public's
imagination. The report on the formation of the Swan River colony
generated large-scale information distortion, and as this message passed
through each successive network node in the society, Swan River, which
really was not a very good place to have a colony, became reported as
increasingly attractive.
One question in conclusion: Why do we study the seven hierarchical levels
of living systems and analyze similarities across levels? Because we hope
that such research will provide a means by which a proposition that explains
process at one level can be applied to other levels. We hope that this will
extend the explanatory power of the proposition and build a unified body of
scientific theory.
ALTERATION OF INFORMATION IN CHANNELS
93
Notes
1. Miller, J. G., Living Systems, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.
2. Miller, J. G. 'Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences.' Am. PsychollO, 513-
531, 1955.
3. Nicolis, J. M. and M. Benrubi, 'A Model of the Role of Noise at the Neuronal and the
Cognitive Levels.' The Journal of Theoretical Biology 59, 77-96, 1976.
4. Allport, G. W. and L. J. Postman, Psychology of Rumor. New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1947; DeFleur, M. L., 'Mass Communication and the Study of Rumors.'
Sociological1nquiry, 51-70, 1963.; Dodd, S. C. 'A Test of Message Diffusion by Name
Tags.' American Journal of Sociology, 425-432, 1956.
Ojha, B., 'Rumor Research: An Overview.' Journal of the Indian Academy of
Applied Psychology, 10 (2-3): 56-65, 1973.
5. Ibid., Allport, p. 96.
6. Cameron, J. M. R. 'Information Distortion in Colonial Promotion: The Case of Swan River
Colony.' Australian Geographical Studies 12,57-76,1974.
Temporalization of complexity
Niklas Luhmann
In the theory of social systems, problems of time have been dealt with up till
now mainly from the viewpoint of stability. Time is thereby understood as a
duration, measurable by clocks, in which the maintenance of the system can
become a problem. Maintenance is only possible, in a complex and fluctu-
ating environment, when the system itself becomes dynamic. It should
facilitate its own processes, which lead to different outcomes depending on
the environmental situation, and it should also be able to change its own
structures to some exWnt in order to adapt to changing environmental
conditions. In this respect, flexibility of structures can be functionally
equivalent to change, i.e. it may make change unnecessary to some degree.
This theoretical point of departure leads to the recognition that one
should distinguish the conceptual dichotomies of stability and change, and
of structure and process. I The formation of a difference between structure
and process can then, in turn, be understood as an internal construction of
the system that solves problems of time. It enables the system to keep itself
constant and change at the same time. In relation to the environment this
means that the system refrains from relying on point-to-point correlations.
Its structures are not borne by analogous environmental constructions, and
though its processes make point-to-point contact with the environment
possible (they take in information, for example), they also need time, in
their internal systemic processing, during which they are screened off
against environmental influences. In other words: they do not premise
exactly parallel processes in the environment.
2
Therefore, the system can
change the environmental situations on which it leans, and can thus be more
stable than many structures in its environment.
Herewith a distinct advance is reached compared to older, polemical
ways of contrasting static and dynamic systems (theories), or closed and
open systems. Nevertheless, as a theory of social systems, this conceptual-
96
N. LUHMANN
ization remains unsatisfactory in many respects:
1. The social theory which departs from the problem of 'double contingen-
cy'3 is being developed independent of this concept of stability, and
therefore needs its own theory of stabilization through norms or values.
In contract theory, for example, the normative legitimation of the bind-
ing effect of the contract is seen as the main problem, in concordance
with Durkheim.
4
No attention is paid to the advantages of time-sequenc-
ing, which result from defining interests and intentions by turns in
contractual negotiations. It could very well be, however, that the social
function of the contract rests precisely on the transformation of double,
and therewith open, contingency into a temporal sequence of com-
mitments. In any case, George H. Mead's5 insights on the mutually
reinforcing relationship between sociality and temporality in the present
situation of actors have not yet been taken up in an adequate way.
2. Time theory is put on too small a basis. It is considered only with respect
to the concept of duration or the mere sequence of events. No attention is
paid to the difference between past and future, which is essential for all
temporality. Therewith, the specific internal problematic of time - i.e.
the constitution of the present through the difference between two time
horizons, past and future - remains unnoticed.
6
Whatever time has to
offer, in every present, as a space for orientation and arrangement for the
constitution of social relations, thus disappears from view.
3. Possibly, this narrow definition of the concept of system stabilization is
responsible for the fact that basic concepts like stability, change, struc-
ture, process, do not gain any conceptual in-depth clarity in theory, but
are employed as if already known. At these points, systems theory bases
itself on common sense, perhaps all too quickly. Of course, this can only
be changed when one is prepared to commit oneself to a considerably
more complex theory of social systems.
II
In order to progress, given the present state of theory, one may return to the
concept of complexity.7 This concept is more general than the concept of
system, to the extent that it can also be applied to the world, and to the
environment of systems; nevertheless, it presupposes system formation,
because the contents of world, resp. environment, remain indeterminate
without recourse to systems.
8
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY
97
Systems can be designated as complex when they are so large that they
cannot anymore link every element with every other one. According to
mathematical laws, the arithmetic increase in the number of elements
results in a geometric increase of the number of possible relations between
them. Complex systems are characterized by the fact that they cannot
realize the mathematically possible. On whatever level of emergent order
elements are combined, their capacity to link up with other elements is
limited.
9
Consequently, complex systems must constrain themselves to
using only a fraction of mathematically possible relations. Regarding the
establishing of interrelations between their elements, they have to proceed
selectively. They have to select those relational patterns that are, directly or
indirectly, the most important for their relation with their environment.
And they must try to avoid disturbances that would occur purely internally
through overloading of their elements.
This is in accord with the generally accepted insight that complex systems
are not characterized by full interdependence of all their elements, but that
precisely the non-effectuated interrelationships indicate their real ordering
activities.
10
Similar consequences should be drawn for the concepts of
structure and process. It is not merely the establishment of a relation
between elements that defines a structure or a process, but only the selec-
tivity of the relationing effort. This is why structure- and process-qualities
can also change, almost imperceptibly, when the space for selection is
enlarged and more possibilities become optional, even when the habitual
pattern is kept and continued. (These are, by the way, systemic changes that
can hardly be incorporated in a theory of system stability in the above-
sketched sense, but often have a 'pre-revolutionary' meaning).
Entropic possibilities increase with increasing system size, since under
the above conditions every element can actualize only a very small number
of relations to other elements. But entropy can be avoided, if the system
succeeds in taking time into account in order to actualize more relations
sequentially than would be possible simultaneously. An element can then
change its relations and can be sequentially embedded in different con-
stellations. The system is then not committed to a single pattern of inter-
connectivity, but can meet its environment in changing combinations of its
elements. At the same time, this increases the number of environmental
situations the system can be compatible with.
In this sense one can say: time is extension of choice. Time compensates
for the disadvantages of size. Time partially evens out the problem of
selection, which increases over-proportionally with size. However, this
98 N.LUHMANN
does not hold under all circumstances. Rather, a system that wants to
constitute and utilize time for an increase of its relational possibilities,
should fulfill some special preconditions. The temporalization of com-
plexity, in tum, necessitates constraints of form. It cannot be actualized at
will in systems that are capable of self-maintenance. The increase of the
relational potential through temporalization of complexity limits, through
additional conditions, the system formations which are then still possible.
III
The theory of complex systems has dealt with the relationship between time
and complexity from two different viewpoints, in certain parallels to the
problematic static-dynamic. On the one hand, time is conceptualized as one
of the dimensions within a multidimensional concept of complexity. Com-
plexity is then greater when a system can sequentially manifest more and
more different states. 11 What is expected to compensate size is thus dealt
with as multiplication of size - and therewith rendered unproblematical. On
the other hand, the input-output model is taken as a point of departure,
which reckons with different times for input and output. The dynamic
system which transforms inputs into outputs can then be dealt with as
complex in the sense of non-transparant, and the problem would then be
whether one could find, through model considerations or simulation, func-
tional equivalents for an analysis of real-life events, i.e. a kind of conceptual
parallel-machine. In both these approaches, the genuine temporal structure
of the processes and the function of the utilization of time would not be
considered, apart from the pure linearity of the order of events and states in
time. If one presupposes, however, that complex systems constitute time in
order to enlarge their potential for establishing interrelations, quite dif-
ferent starting points for theory-building would follow. 12 One then has to
inquire into the conditions and consequences of temporalization of com-
plexity.
The most essential consequence is a greater depth of the level on which a
system constitutes its elements. Temporalized systems can only consist of
temporalized elements, i.e. events. Events can only be identified with the
aid of specific points in time. Consequently, they are ever bound to their
present (in the sense of specious present), with which they originate and
disintegrate. They are limited timewise by the activation of a relational
pattern that is different before them and after them. They are defined by the
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY 99
actuality of change and they define, in turn, the boundaries of the present by
the actuality of change. A measurement of time is not required for the
identification of events, but it is only this measurement which makes a clear
separation of events and states possible.
13
First and foremost, however,
events always have their own past and their own future, which is defined for
them and for them alone. Formulated otherwise: only when viewed from a
single event, a clearcut difference between past and future can be said to
exist; for lasting aggregations of meaning mix future and past within them-
selves, since they retain as past what once was future. 14
By themselves, events again are static connective points for relations, in
which the redistribution of relational structures in the nearby horizons for
past and future is already foreshadowed. Every analysis that takes apart
events in order to reach a greater in-depth clarity, always in turn leads to
smaller-sized events, until the relational pattern is lost which characterizes
a certain level of emergence. Therefore, a continuing breakdown of events
never ends with a new, virtually timeless kind of elements.
Systems that temporalize their ultimate elements therefore have to tune
in the totality of their internal combinations to time. The nervous system is a
typical case, systems of action form another one. Thus, there cannot exist a
single state for which the past and the future would be irrelevant; in
accordance with this, such a system controls itself by self-reference in each
of its states. Every change of states, every change of an ever actualized
relational pattern, presupposes self-contact, and such a system reacts only
to its environment when it changes the kinds and ways of reacting to itself.
By no means everything has therewith been surrendered to constant
fluctuation. Rather, the change of relations is precisely possible only then,
when in the time horizons of events the next-lying one is outlined suf-
ficiently fast and with none too many possibilities for choice. Therefore,
since it would not be possible otherwise, typical series and combinations of
events are engraving themselves, which can then be read by the system as
processes, while possible relational patterns (schemes for experiencing,
programs for action) are abstracted and stored for repeated usage. IS All this
presupposes specific ways of organizing environmental contacts, which
increase the conspicuousness of all that differentiates by change in the
course of time, and decrease the sensibility for random events, while
increasing the sensibility for specific ones (learning).
The way of functioning of a system temporalized in this manner is
insufficiently understood if one merely considers the functions to be ful-
filled and their bearers (structures, partial systems), thus trying to gain
100 N. LUHMANN
insight only in the permanent arrangements of such a system. On a more
fundamental conceptual level, there is the decomposition in elements and
relations, and only this decomposition makes clear which reality lies at the
base of a functional scheme, and why stability becomes a problem for a
system.
IV
Social systems are, in every case, systems with temporalized complexity.
Their ultimate elements are actions. Actions, however, are events that find
their unity in selecting a specific relational pattern with other actions - in
contradistinction to what is or would be actualized previously, without
them, or afterwards.
This way of affairs cannot be comprehended by contrasting the theory of
action with systems theory. 16 Within the object field of sociology, no action
can be constituted without system, and no system without action. The
contrasting effort utilizes, referring to Max Weber, either the goals-means
relation, or the subjectively motivated intentionality of action, or both, in
order to lift action out of the social system, which then only still figures as a
framework of external coercions. However, both rational form and inten-
tionality always are by themselves already connective forms of actions, in
other words nothing outside of systems. 17 Therefore, a specific methodolo-
gy of motivational explanation cannot be played off against systems
theory. IS In any case, the problem which first has to be solved is: how
conglomerations of actions can constitute themselves as systems, while they
combine actions as time-bound events, though time is passing. The specific
character of action, in other words, does not lie in its subjectivity (because
the subject, after all, is always considered as (having) duration), but in its
temporality. The 'intended meaning' and the envisioned goal of action
themselves are already means for relating, are efforts to transcend the
temporal boundaries of the event, and this alone leads without fail to the
formation of a system.
The meaning of the event action, therefore, has a linkage function and is
constituted for this function. Whether intended by the actor himself, or
merely ascribed to him 19; meaning always functions as a unit of referral to
other possibilities and thus offers the foundation for a time-bound coordi-
nation of action-linkages.
2o
Through the meaning of the event action, past
and future - and sometimes the expectation of simultaneous actions of
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY 101
others as well - become tangible. The specific way in which action incor-
porates other action and makes it relevant, lies in the presupposition that it
does make a difference whether action is undertaken or not. Through this
premise, selective relevancies are linked which then, fed back to the action
itself, make it appear as contingent and subject to decision.
21
Not every-
thing becomes different when one acts, but something does; and especially,
with any action, the possibilities for further action become different.
Meaning provides action not merely with the dimension of time. To the
extent that experiences and actions of other persons are also taken into
consideration, the social dimension likewise enters. Just as the time dimen-
sion functions as an extension of the possibilities for choosing, the social
dimension functions as an extension and objectivation of time. The pasts
and futures of others - or, more precisely: the action events of other persons
- can be made present to an actor by here-and-now communication. 22
Since individuals stimulate each other mutually to (engage in) actions, the
time horizons of simultaneous or quasi-simultaneous events melt together.
Thus, the time horizons of action events are relieved of the sequencing
within one single continuous consciousness. Only in this way, they gain the
form of a horizon one may suppose to be intersubjectively shared. Time can
now be cut loose from the events in whose meaning it manifests itself, and
gains the form of a (culturally interpretable) dimension of the world.
Making time individual-independent through sociality is a precondition for
all time measurement, but also for all correlations between societal devel-
opment and the semantics of temporal structures.23
Social communication consequently serves the generalization of time,
and therewith a further enlargement of relational possibilities. Whoever
acts within social systems is thus not dependent on the sequence of his own
remembered and anticipated actions, but can gain entry to other time
sequences through repeated here-and-now communication. He can there-
fore learn more quickly (vicarious learning) and can construct more far-
reaching constellations of actions. And he can risk to engage in those
actions which only fulfill their meaning when very special and highly selec-
tive preconditions are satisfied through complementary actions of others.
v
The main thesis of the previous considerations is: that systems constitute
those elements that are available to them for relational purposes as simple
102
N.LUHMANN
units on the basis of a complex infrastructure they are confronted with on
other levels of system formation. The constitution of elementary units is a
reduction of the complexity of lower levels. In whatever way actions are
made possible by a substructure, and however they can be analyzed psy-
chically, neurophysiologically, chemically, or otherwise: in social systems,
actions function as not further decomposable units, which gain their iden-
tity only through attribution to an actor. 24
Because a system temporalizes its elements, it is also forced to tempora-
lize the relations between these elements, i.e. to constitute itself in the form
of a process. This does not mean that social systems are nothing more than a
sum of processes; it does mean, however, that everything present in social
systems also has a processual aspect.
Stressing of processual aspects, periodically returning in the social
sciences, has been typically a manifestation of a protest attitude which
rejects either the normative premises or the analytical categories of prevail-
ing theoretical paradigms. 25 It has not lead to a sufficient clarification of
the concept of process. 26 The theoretical approach offered here suggests
that the concept of process should not be defined as a basic concept, but that
processes should be viewed as combinatory efforts that should be brought
together in systems which have to temporalize elements and have to attune
their relations to this purpose. The unity of this process is anyhow an
already highly aggregated unity, a form of contracted and selective infor-
mation processing which is chosen only when the system has reasons to
orient itself towards such units, that are time-transcending and take time
into account. In those cases, there are clearly preffered and non-preferred
perspectives. Thus, it will be easy to understand the walking about of a lady
through the business district of an inner city, from showroom window to
showroom window, as a process. It is less customary to understand a fur
coat in a showroom window as a process, to the extent that it attracts
different ladies one after another, and causes them to stop. In this case, the
'fur process' might be more interesting and exceptional than the 'lady
process' for specific purposes within the system. Probably, the fur process
reduces complexity more sharply than the lady process, so that fur proces-
ses can therefore be compared in a more meaningful way than lady proces-
ses.
If one follows the difference between both these imaginary constructions
any further, one hits upon an essential characteristic that might be of
conclusive importance for the understanding of processes. In the lady
process, one can easily deduct from the spatial structure of movement how
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY
103
the single events determine each other, or at least lie closely together.
Choosing one street makes the choice of other streets improbable. The
impression of having to do with a process becomes even stronger when also
the choice of one showroom window makes the choice of others more, resp.
less, probable. The process is easier to recognize to the extent that one may
presuppose specific intentions or specific search interests; it then becomes
'understandable'. But one may also be able to discover such principles of
interpretation as a unit out of the mere sequence, provided it reduces a
sufficient amount of complexity. The fur process, to the contrary, has too
little complexity to be able to produce such safeguarding of tendencies and
amplification of selectivity. Or it has not enough density in time, is too
sparsely occupied by events than that they would be able to influence each
other. It would be a process in a real sense only when one woman's stopping
would influence whether other women would stop or pass by.
Consequently, processes are not simply series of facts. One should only
speak of process when the selection of one event co determines the selection
of another one. One need not think here of effectuating causally. It is
sufficient when, as the result of an event, the array of possibilities for
subsequent events is shrunk so considerably, that relevance becomes de-
terminable. 27 This may mean a narrowing down of possibilities in the
course of the process, 28 but also a buildup and enlargement of possibilities
(saving, for example), and under some conditions both at the same time. It
is hence typical that the selectivity of events itself conducts the process.
'Whoever has said A, should say B as well' - and he must do so because the
beginning was contingent: because he did not have to say A, but had limited
himself voluntarily.
A process consequently originates when events follow one another and
refer to one another in their selectivity. Unity in spite of temporal distance
can therefore only be reached through combination of selectivities, and
thus also demands a reckoning with what does not happen. Process for-
mation presupposes system formation in more than one respect:
1. for the maintenance of complexity, which is forced to a selective
relationing of its elements;
2. for the temporalization of elements and the relational gains connected
therewith; and
3. for the constitution of processes, i.e. for the sufficient condensation of
the correlation between selective events in time.
Only the last viewpoint is partially a matter of subjective interpretation;
because there may be different criteria, interests or knowledge acquisition
104 N. LUHMANN
techniques with the aid of which process tendencies can be made visible and
convincing.
VI
This conceptualization of process already makes clear: temporalization of
complexity cannot be accomplished simply by considering a change of
presently actualized relations to be possible. In other words, it is not already
the time horizon itself which temporalizes complexity. Additionally, limi-
tations of the possible are mandatory before meaningful connections can
become visible at all. This distinguishes chaotic systems, in which every-
thing may become different at any moment, and the road of none of the
elements from one place to another is visible, from those with ordered
temporal complexity. 29 The choice of relations an element enters into, for
example, can be made dependent upon the relations another element will
actualize only under conditions of ordered temporal complexity. Only such
a system can build up an order that has the property of being determined by
the representation of its future.
Therefore, the buildup of specific complexity first of all demands a
reduction of unspecific complexity, i.e. a narrowing down of a random
change of relationing patterns. However, this does not yet indicate which
restrictions will prove to be effective. One of the most important
viewpoints, both for evolution theory and for learning theory, is: to limit the
order of events in such a way that thereby capacity is accumulated. The
limitation of the possible is then chosen from the viewpoint of the extension
of the possible, complexity is reduced for the sake of enlargement. Famous
examples are: refraining from carrying through natural law by force, in
order to attain an immense increase of contractual, positive, artificial law.
Or: refraining from direct consumption for the sake of capital accumula-
tion. Both demands time and, additionally, social mechanisms which are
generated already in the present by a sufficient enchaining of the future to
the present. The pedagogy of the second half of the eighteenth century
follows this pattern, and develops traits that are consonant with it:
1. Open expectations of increase with respect to the future of man (per-
fectibility);
2. Problematization and criticism of present-day conditions as status quo,
from which one has to depart, but which one cannot rest content with;
and
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY 105
3. Methodical self-discipline as the road to the future.
To the extent that modern society designs such an increase of chances,
and limitations in order to actualize them, mechanisms of increase are
brought to bear upon the status quo, the historical present, and therewith
upon man. The ordering of time in ontological and religious cosmologies is
abolished, and religion, at best, keeps the function to guarantee that the end
of the chain on which everything hangs remains invisible. 30 The correlation
of restriction and augmentation of the possible can only be experienced and
effectuated as a temporary one, but then the historical process carries itself
- apart from ultimate reasons.
VII
Within the general theory of social systems, the theory of societal systems is
a special case, although a case which at the same time can claim a special
relevance for all social systems. The correlations between complexity and
time, sketched first of all in a general way, should also and especially be
demonstrable for societal systems. The hypothesis could be formulated,
and should be verifiable, that societies which are becoming more complex
temporalize their complexity and correspondingly widen their time hori-
zons, even have to change their conceptualization of time, since it becomes
increasingly inevitable to order complexity sequentially. Admittedly, all
social systems are built on actions, create sequences of actions, and in that
respect utilize temporalized complexity. But they think of this primarily as
movement in an unmoved world around them, and conceptualize time to
that extent as a measure of movement relative to a before and an after. Only
very complex systems seem to be forced to recognize temporalized com-
plexity as a form of their structure as such, and to base all limitations of the
possible on time.
Indeed, at least since the second half ofthe sixteenth century, there have
been tendencies in Europe to transform experiences with the unrest and
turbulence of societal life in a new conceptual framework. Since wars,
religious struggle, economic catastrophes, upward and downward mobility,
uncertainty regarding status and success, also existed previously, one may
admittedly see in them motivational starting points, but not the real evolu-
tionary conditions for the change of temporal structures.
Montaigne, for example, reaches back to ancient philosophical tradition
with the thesis that everything is in flux, including the basis for one's own
106
N.LUHMANN
judgment, and that everything changes from moment to moment. 31 It may
be due to the experiences of his contemporaries that precisely this selection
from the trough of wisdom convinces him and others. But the way out is
new: to fixate self-reflection in writing, and even have it printed. While the
old ratio looks in vain for the permanent, a new orientation already heralds
itself, which finds its security in the fact that it portrays itself and is
continually occupied with this.
If one follows the abovesketched theory of a correlation between com-
plexity and time, then it is easy to understand which conceptual transfor-
mations cause profound consequences and why. The present is punctua-
lized, is concentrated on the moment, which alone is lived with irreducible
certainty. 32 But therewith, time seems not to hold anymore a guarantee for
moment-to-moment continuity. Time horizons offer no certainty anymore;
this at best is provided by momentary obedience to God, without reference
to past and future. 33 In the theory of action, likewise, the concept of a
natural (although corruptible) teleology is given up. Purely physicalistic
theories of action (Hobbes) show that it is most important to doubt any
natural continuity in order to be able to reconceptualize law and morality as
commitment. On the one hand, this leads to a theoretical stress on the
importance of steadfastness, persistence, conservatio sui as a dynamic prin-
ciple 34; on the other hand, to the possibility to reconnect the time horizons
of past and future with the present in a novel way, from the vantage point of
a here-and-now, which is initially understood individually and punctually,
then increasingly and historically. History becomes a process - a process
which leads from a past, that has been selected as relevant by the individual,
to an open future. Reflection, as a category of consciousness not identical
with self-maintenance as such,35 becomes transplanted in history itself;
history gains its identity as a making possible of its own reflection, and
Hegel writes its biography.
One may narrate histories of ideas of this kind, one can follow them along
words and concepts, and one may use problems or theoretical complexes as
leading principles. But one does not transcend, in this way, a mere history of
concepts, or at best problems.
36
The conception of complexity and the
notion of self-induced selectivity of complex systems try to offer a theoreti-
cal departure point for the interpretation of this history of semantic
changes. The transition to modern society is thus understood as a change in
the form of differentiation.
37
Society is rebuilt from a primarily stratified
into a primarily functionally differentiated social system, and thus gains a
considerably higher complexity. This makes it necessary to be able to order
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY 107
relational patterns also sequentially, i.e. changeably. The time dimension
comes under the pressure of order. It has to relate the function of the
elementary units to points in time, and must regenerate order from there
onward. Hence, it comes to: (1) punctualization of the present; (2) giving
up the entelechy of action; (3) rendering problematic of the conservatio;
and (4) reconstruction of correlations, structures and large-scale realities
through self-referential processes. The historization of time itself, and its
opening up for higher complexity, for more and more pluriform events, for
open possibilities and increased speed of development, is a consequence of
this transformation. It asserts itself only in the second half of the eighteenth
century.
It is not argued in the above that complexity functions as a latent motive
for semantic discoveries or transformations. Changes in layers of this depth
can hardly be explained through analogy with motives or intentions. It
rather seems a fertile approach to work with evolution-theoretical con-
cepts, and to distinguish between variation, selection, and retention. That
concepts for coping with reality are varied, may have very different causes,
which do not anyhow promise success. The fact that time becomes a
problem and is not anymore reproduced exclusively in theological con-
ceptualizations, might be caused by the increasing commercialization of the
economy since the Middle Ages,38 or by the political effects of religious
controversies. The selection of such innovations is effectuated through
socially successful communication. The conditions for success of selection,
in turn, change with societal evolution. When the evolution of the overall
system society creates new situations, a variation on the pool of ideas also
has altered chances to be accepted, and to at least appeal to the problem
consciousness of an epoch, if not to convince as insight. Admittedly, the
evolution of the social structures of the societal system is not identical with
the evolution of the ideational heritage; otherwise, one could not speak of
correlations between social and semantic developments. But it is - as
prevailing structural change, producing facts and problems - the selective
factor which offers altered chances of success to a more or less constantly
changing, more or less imprecisely reproduced conglomeration of ideas.
While variation reacts to an overload of accidental stimuli, and retention or
stabilization is effectuated through dogmatization or paradigmatical
theories, the selection of the ideational heritage might have its basis in the
evolution of the societal system as a whole - at least as long as no system of
science has been differentiated that can decide on truth or falsity itself.
Among the effects of societal change, which produce alterations of social
108 N. LUHMANN
semantics, of ways to define problems, and of themes and concepts, in-
crease of complexity is certainly not the only one; but it is the most
profound, because it refers to the ultimately possible elements and rela-
tions. More than any other reconceptualizations of semantic traditions, the
change of time consciousness residing here is called upon to aid modern
society (on its way)to self-determination. Consequently, an adequate
theory of modern society cannot neglect the temporalization of complexity.
Notes
1. See Talcott Parsons, 'Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change.' Rural
Sociology 26, 219-239, 1961.
2. See Talcott Parsons, 'Some Problems of a General Theory in Sociology.' pp. 27-68 (29 ff.)
in Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments (John C. McKinney and Edward
A. Tiryakian (eds.)), New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970.
3. Compare the 'General Statement', pp. 3-29 (16) in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils
Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1951.
4. Emile Durkheim, De la Division du Travail Social (reprint ofthe 2nd edition), pp. 177ff.;
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1973.
5. The Philosophy of the Present, Chicago/London: Open Court, 1932.
6. Compare J. Ellis McTaggart, 'The Unreality of Time.' Mind 17 (1908), reprinted (pp.
457-474) in his Philosophical Studies, London, 1934; and also, of course, countless
social-scientific and humanistic defense reactions against this merely chronometrical con-
ception of time.
7. Compare Niklas Luhmann, 'Komplexitat.' pp. 204-220 in his Saziolagische Aufkliirung
Vol. 2, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975.
8. See also, in this respect, pp. 147ft. and 292ff. in Jiirgen Habermas/Niklas Luhmann:
Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Was leistet die Systemforschung? Frank-
furt: Suhrkamp, 1971.
9. This problem has now and then been taken up also in social-scientific contexts, but it has
never been considered sufficiently in its theoretical relevance. Compare V. A. Graicunas,
'Relationship in Organization.' pp. 181-187 in Luther Gulick/Lyndall Urwick, (eds.)
Papers on the Science of Administration, New York: Institute of Public Administration,
1937. And also: James H. S. Bossard, 'The law of Family Interaction.' American Journal
of Sociology 50, 292-294, 1945; William M. Kephart, 'A Quantitative Analysis of Intra-
group Relationships.' American Journal of Sociology 55, 544-549, 1950; Fremont
A. Shull, Jr./ Andre L. Delbecq/L. L. Cummings, Organizational Decision Making,
New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 145ff., 1970.
10. Compare W. Ross Ashby, Design for a Brain (2nd edition), London: Chapman and Hall,
1954.
11. Compare, for example, J. W. S. Pringle, 'On the Parallel between Learning and Evolution.'
Behaviour 3, 174-215 (184ff.) 1951; Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in
Pluralist Systems, Stanford, Cal.: Stanford U.P., p. 16; 1969. Compare further, for the
concept of sequential complexity, J. E. Hopcroft, 'An Overview of the Theory of Com-
putational Complexity.' Journal of the Computing Machinery 18,444-475,
1971; Hannu Nurmi, 'On the Concept of Complexity and its Relationship to the Metho-
dology of Policy-oriented Research.' Social Science Information 13, 55-80, 1974.
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY 109
12. One ofthe points of difference, that will not be gone into any further here, seems to be that
a theory of complexity with overly simplistic premises switches prematurely to epistemo-
logical, cognitive, simulation-technical problems. Object structures are then dealt with as
difficulties in knowledge acquisition or as simulation problems. The complexity of the
object then does not anymore become a problem with what it meansfor itself, it merely still
appears as a hindrance for the investigation of the object.
13. Compare the reference of H. Hubert, 'Etude Sommaire de la Representation du Temps
dans la Religion et la Magie.' pp. 189-229 (202ff.) in H. Hubert/M. Mauss, Melanges
d'Histoire des Religions, Paris, 1909, to the effect that societies without time measurement
tend to identify time periods with those events which they introduce or conclude.
14. To that extent one may say, with Koselleck, that structures presuppose a different time
than events, since they are not identifiable with respect to a clearcut before and after, but
only with respect to the fact that something changes in the course of their duration.
Compare Reinhart Koselleck, 'Darstellung, Ereignis und Struktur.' pp. 307-317 in Ger-
hard Schulz (ed.) Geschichte Heute: Positionen, Tendenzen, Probleme, Gottingen: Van-
denhoeck, 1973.
15. Compare, for example, Robert Axelrod, 'Schema Theory: An Information Processing
Model of Perception and Cognition.' American Political Science Review 67, 1248-1266,
1973.
16. Compare Friedrich Jonas, 'Zur Aufgabenstellung der modernen Soziologie.' Archiv fur
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 52, 349-375, 1966; Alan Dawe, 'The Two Sociologies.'
British Journal of Sociology 21, 207-218,1970. In the meantime a customary component
of 'theoretical comparisons.'
17. This is the fundamental insight of the Parsonian theory of the general system of action,
from which then admittedly different conclusions are drawn than in the following.
18. This, however, is done by Klaus Grimm: Niklas Luhmann's 'Soziologische Aufkliirung'
oder das Elend der aprioristischen Soziologie, Hamburg: Haffmann und Campe, 1974.
19. It is generally accepted that only the actor can constitute the unity of an action. See, for
example, Werner Langenheder, Theorie menschlicher Entscheidungshandlungen, Stutt-
gart: Enke, pp. 42ff., 1975.
20. This pronouncement, that meaning finds its unity in making different possibilities of
experiencing and action accessible, could also be confirmed, referring to Husserl, by
phenomenological analyses. See Niklas Luhmann, 'Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie.'
pp. 25-100, in Habermas/Luhmann, op cit.
21. To that extent I follow Alfred Schutz in the thesis that actions can only be represented as
finished actions, and future actions only as 'pre-remembered', only modo futuri exacti.
Compare pp. 55ff. in his Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die
verstehende Sociologie, Vienna: Springer, 1932. Action can only be represented as fin-
ished, but then has to be represented as contingent, because one identifies it with regard
to temporal horizons of change.
22. See esp. George H. Mead, op. cit.
23. See Niklas Luhmann, 'Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte.' in his Soziologische Aufkliirung,
Vol. 2, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975, pp. 103-133; 'The Future Cannot Begin:
Temporal Structures in Modern Society.' Social Research 43, 130-152, 1976; Otthein
Rammstedt, 'Alltagsbewusztsein von Zeit.' Kainer Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und So-
zialpsychologie 27,47-63, 1975
24. Compare Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, New York: McGraw Hill, pp.
43ff., 1937.
25. Compare, e.g. the proceedings: Social Process: Papers presented at the 26th Annual
Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Washington, Dec. 28-31, 1932; Chica-
go, 1933. See also Alvin Boskoff, 'Process-Orientation in Sociological Theory and Re-
110 N.LUHMANN
search: Untasted Old Wine in Slightly Used Bottles.' Social Forces 50, 1-12, 1971; and
Evon Z. Vogt, 'On the Principles of Structure and Process in Cultural Anthropology.
American Anthropologist 62, 18-33, 1960.
26. Compare, however, remarkable exhortations by Paul Ridder, 'Bewegung sozialer Sys-
teme: Uber die endogene Erzeugung von Verlinderungen.' Kainer Zeitschrift fur Soziolo
gie und Sozialpsychologie 26,1-28,1974; id., 'Messung sozialer Prozesse.' Soziale Welt 27,
144-161, 1976.
27. Consequently, within processes events have a similar function for each other as structures
have for processes: limitation of the possible, giving purpose, lightening decisional bur-
dens.
28. Compare, e.g. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, New York: Free Press, 1963.
29. See J. W. S. Pringle, op. cit., p. 184.
30. Compare Jacques Necker, De ['Importance des Opinions Religieuses. London/Lyon, 1788,
cited from: Oevres Completes, Paris, 1821, reprint Vol. 12, pp. 55ff.
31. Compare, e.g. Essais II, XII (Pleiade edition, Paris, 1951, pp. 679ff.): 'Finalement, iI n'y a
aucune constante existence, ny de nostre estre, ny de celuy des objects. Et nous, et nostre
jugement, et toutes choses mortelles, vont coulant et roulant sans cesse. Ainsi iI ne se peut
establir rien de certain de run a I'autre, et Ie jugeant et Ie juge estans en continuelle
mutation et branle .... Ainsin estant toutes choses subjectes a passer d'un changement en
autre, la raison, y cherchant une reele subsistence, se trouve ne puvant rien
apprehender de subsistant et permanent, par ce que tout ou vient en estre et n'est pas
encore du tout, ou commence a mourir avant qu'i1 soit nay'.
32. Compare Georges Poulet, Etudes sur Ie Temps Humaine. Paris, Pion., 1950; id., 'Fenelon
et Ie Temps.' La Nouvelle Revue pp. 624-644, 1954.
33. 'Que nous devons principalement avoir en veue d'obeir a Dieu dans Ie moment present',
demands Pierre . Nicole, Essais de Morale, Vol. 1 (6th edition). Paris: Desprez, p. 117,
1682, and that is for him at the same time the most effective elimination of every
self-interest. Compare also the exact synchronization of religious activities and midita-
tions with the course of the day in Thomas Gouge, Christian Directions, Showing how to
Walk with God All the Day long. London, 1690- demands that were, in this exalted form,
drawn up only for a life specially reserved for this, a monastic way of life.
34. Important contributions in this respect, and for the total context of this self-maintenance
semantics, in H. Ebeling (ed.): SUbjektivitiit und Selbsterhaltung: Beitriige zur Diagnose der
Moderne, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976.
35. See Dieter Henrich, 'Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie.' in Ebeling, op. cit.,
pp.97-143.
36. Compare, in this respect, the Programm des Lexikons Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Otto
Brunner/Werner Conze/Reinhart Koselleck, eds.) in Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1972, Klett, pp.
XIII-XXVII. As theory a purely historical premise functions here: that nearly all essential
concepts of the old-European tradition have basically changed since the middle of the
eighteenth century, and that temporalization was an essential characteristic of this trans-
formation, next to democratization, politicization, and ideologization. Compare also Ar-
thur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Cambridge:
Mass.: Harvard U.P., pp. 242ff., 1936, reprinted 1950; Margaret T. Hodgen, Early
Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn-
sylvania Press, pp. 433ff., 1964; Jacob, La Logique du Vivant: Une Histoire de
[,HerMite, Paris: Gallimard, 1970: Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft der fruhen
Neuzeit, Festgabe Carl Schmitt, Berlin: Duncke und Humboldt, pp. 551-566, 1968;
Reinhardt Koselleck: 'Neuzeit': Zur Semantik moderner Bewegungsbegriff, in: Studien
zum Beginn der modernen Welt. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 264-299, 1977; Wolf Lepe-
nies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte, Miinchen: Hanser, 1976. In all these and many other
TEMPORALIZATION OF COMPLEXITY 111
works, temporalization is analyzed well and in many ways, but nevertheless only brought to
the fore as a fact, albeit an all-pervading historical overall fact. The formula 'temporaliza-
tion of complexity' should offer starting points as to how to transcend this theoretically.
37. Compare Niklas Luhmann, 'Differentiation of Society.' Canadian Journal of Sociology 2,
29-53, 1977.
38. Compare Jacques LeGoff, 'Temps de l'Eglise et Temps du Marchand.' Annales E.S. C. 15,
417-433, 1960.
Simulation of large-scale systems by
aggregation
Herbert A. Simon
Two kinds of difficulties stand in the way of effective simulation of macro-
social systems: system mechanisms may be unknown, or known only im-
perfectly; and the number of system elements and their interactions may be
too great for available computing facilities to handle. This paper is con-
cerned mainly with methods for dealing with the latter problem, system
complexity; but first I must make some preliminary comments on ignorance
of system mechanisms.
1. Modeling the unknown
Predicting economic fluctuations and predicting the weather have both
proved to be very difficult tasks, even when the predictor has at his disposal
large modern electronic computers. However, the root of the difficulty is
different in the two cases, and consequently we might entertain quite
different expectations as to how far accuracy could be improved by provid-
ing the predictor with computers that are one hundred times as large and
one hundred times as fast as the ones he has now. My confident prediction
(made without a computer) is that progress in computer hardware will
produce a much greater improvement in weather prediction than in the
prediction of economic fluctuations.
In the case of weather prediction, the fundamental physical laws of the
atmosphere are fairly well understood. There are, of course, some areas of
ignorance - for example, in the theory of turbulent flow - but even in these
areas 'ignorance' often means that the mathematical and computational
problems are intractible, rather than that understanding is lacking of the
physical forces at work. The greatest barrier, however, to the effective use
of models of the atmosphere for weather prediction is the coarseness of the
model grid, a coarseness that is imposed partly by the coarseness of the grid
of observations but mainly by limitations on the numbers of interactions
that can be handled in real time on existing computing facilities. Whether
easing the computing limitations would allow the weatherman to predict
114
H. A. SIMON
the exact times and severities of thunderstorms in Pittsburgh I do not know,
but it would certainly improve the accuracy of both his short-term and his
long-term forecasts.
Since World War II, modeling of the economic system has progressed
from three-equation models, well within the capabilities of desk calcula-
tors, to models containing dozens of equations and requiring the help of the
largest computers for their computation. It is a matter of debate whether
there has been a corresponding increase in the accuracy of economic
forecasts. Nor is there any widespread confidence that a further increase in
computing power will help matters very much.
The accuracy of model forecasts is limited mainly by the accuracy of the
equations describing economic mechanisms that go into the models. Not
only is our knowledge of those equations very inexact, but we are faced with
serious methodological and practical problems in improving them. Many of
the coefficients in the equations purport to describe how economic agents
form their expectations, and how they use these expectations about un-
certain events to make decisions. Human behavior under uncertainty is not
well understood, partly because there is no 'one right way' for the rational
man to make his decisions when their outcomes depend on the decisions of
others who are faced with the same uncertainty. Correct description of the
system probably even requires learning equations, for modes of behavior in
the face of uncertainty probably change with a society's long-term ex-
perience.
We should not expect a model that contains the wrong equations to make
the right predictions, no matter how numerous the equations or how large
and fast the computer. Hence, we should not expect miracles from model-
ing and simulation where, as in economics, our ignorance of the mech-
anisms is extensive. However, even in the face of such ignorance, I do not
counsel despair. The questions we want to answer about a system do not
always require prediction in detail. If we are interested only in certain
aggregated aspects of its behavior, it may be that 'we can predict those
aggregates by use of an appropriately aggregated model. And our know-
ledge and information may be adequate to supply the mechanisms and
parameters of that simpler model, when it could not supply them for the
detailed model.
While I would be hard pressed to propose a model that would predict the
future populations of each of the large and medium-size cities of the United
States, simple (two-equation) models do exist that predict quite accurately
the size distribution. That is small comfort if our concern is with land
SIMULATION OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS BY AGGREGATION 115
planning for Chicago, but may be comfort enough if we are concerned with
broad national policies to discourage or encourage urban concentration. I
will propose some other examples later where effective solutions to the
modeling problem lie in the direction of intelligent aggregation rather than
purchasing the services of larger computers.
2. Nearly-decomposable systems
In the systems that occur in nature, or are designed by man, not all
components interact strongly with other components. Most such systems
are, in fact, nearly completely decomposable. That is to say, they can be
subdivided into blocks in such a way that all strong interactions occur
among elements in individual blocks, and only weak interactions between
blocks. This kind of hierarchical structure is often recursive, with in-
creasingly weak interactions as we go upward in the hierarchy.
Figure 1 depicts a nearly-completely-decomposable system of three
levels. Strong interactions connect the subsystems A = (1 2 3), B = (4 5),
and C= (6 7 8). Similarly K = (A B) is connected with interactions of
moderate strength, while only weak interactions bind the entire system, S =
(K C).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 x S W M - W W
2 S x S W M W -
3 M S x W M - W
4 M M - x S W W W
5 W M M S x - W W
6 W - - W W x S S
7 - W W W W S x S
8
- W - W W M S x
S = Strong; M = Moderate; W = Weak
Figure 1. A nearly-completely-decomposable system.
Source: Simon (1976: 512)
By means of parentheses, we can summarize the structure of the hierarchy
thus: (1 23)(45))6 7 8))).
116
H. A. SIMON
Nearly complete decomposability is an almost ubiquitous characteristic
of large systems, natural as well as social. The familiar hierarchy from
physics and chemistry of elementary particle-nucleus-atom-molecule is an
example of near-decomposability, as is the hierarchy of protein-cell-tissue-
organism. A social system may be built on the hierarchy of individual-
family-community-state, an economic system on the hierarchy of
department-firm-industry-economy.
It is not accidental that most natural and social systems are hierarchical.
Elsewhere (Simon, 1969, ch. 4) I have outlined the reasons why hierarchy is
so all-pervasive. Suppose that complex systems have had to evolve (as they
have) from simpler components. The time required for the evolution of a
system of n parts, where n is large, will be very long, and will grow
exponentially with n, if all n components have to come together simul-
taneously. However, if the elementary components can combine into small,
stable subsystems, and small sets of those subsystems into larger systems,
and so on, then the expected time of evolution of the entire system will grow
only with log n. Hence, hierarchical systems have an immense evolutionary
advantage over those that are not hierarchical, and we may expect that
almost all of the large systems we observe in the world will have hierarchical
structure - as they do.
What is important and fortunate for our purposes about this state of
affairs is that the dynamic behavior of a nearly-completely-decomposable
system can be analysed without examining simultaneously all of the inter-
actions of the elementary parts (Simon and Ando, 1961). Suppose that
Figure 1 represents the matrix of coefficients of a set of first order linear
differential equations. This matrix can be solved for eight eigenvalues that
represent the eight frequencies of oscillation of the system. Now, if the
coefficients labeled 'Strong,' 'Moderate,' and 'Weak,' respectively, are
separated by an order of magnitude or so, then the will have the
following structure. Two eigenvalues corresponding to high frequencies
will depend mainly on the strong components binding A, one high frequen-
cy eigenvalue on the strong components binding B, and two on the com-
ponents binding C. An intermediate-frequency eigenvalue will depend
mainly on the interactions of A with B; a low-frequency eigenvalue will
depend mainly on the interaction of K with C; and the lowest-frequency
eigenvalue will describe the long-term trend of S as a whole.
In such a structure, the high-frequency eigenvalues can be computed, to a
good approximation, for each separate subsystem, without considering the
(weaker) interactions with the other subsystems. Moreover, the lower-
SIMULATION OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS BY AGGREGATION
117
frequency eigenvalues can be computed on the basis of only aggregated
descriptions of the subsystems, and without detailed knowledge of the
within-subsystem coefficients. Thus, to understand the dynamic behavior
of a system like the one depicted in Figure 1, we need solve only systems of
two or three variables (A, B, C, K and S), and not a system of eight
simultaneous variables. Since computation time for simultaneous relations
increases more than linearly with the number of relations, using the hierar-
chical structure of a system can greatly simplify its analysis. Moreover, if the
system contains symmetries, so that, for example, all the subsystems at the
lowest level are identical or belong to a few species, then computation time
may increase only with the logarithm of the size of the entire system. A
discussion of the application of near-decomposability to the computation of
system behavior will be found in Courtois (1977).
The factorability of the behavior of nearly-decomposable systems can be
understood in the following way. Elements of each subsystem at the lowest
levels of the hierarchy interact strongly at high frequency, hence move
rapidly toward internal equilibrium. At progressively higher levels, inter-
actions among components take place at lower frequencies, hence take
longer to reach equilibrium when the system is disturbed. Thus, when a
hierarchical system is observed over a moderate time span, and with some
maximum frequency of observation, we will observe only the equilibrium
distributions of the smallest components, for their dynamics will be too
rapid to be seen; while the largest components may appear to be stationary,
since the time span of observations is too short to detect aggregate change in
them. Genuine dynamic behavior will be observed only at the intermediate
levels. Altering the frequency and span of observation simply moves the
frequency range of the 'slit' through which dynamics can be observed.
3. The need for simplification
Consider the following, not atypical, modeling problem. We wish to im-
prove the water quality in Lake Erie by reducing eutrophication and algae
production, and we propose to construct a computer model that will allow
us to assess the impact of alternative control measures (Nelson, 1976). This
model will have a large biological component, but an important social one
as well. The criteria of tolerable levels of pollution are social, as are the
driving functions - the movements of urban population, industry, and
agriculture that determine what quantities of pollutants will be produced.
118 H. A. SIMON
One approach is to construct a complex simulation model of the lake and
the adjoining urban and agricultural areas that drain into it- a total area of
some thousands of square miles. We impose on this area a grid, and
construct equations for each cell to estimate phosphate production (on
land) and the metabolic processes of phosphate usage and the growth of
algae (in the lake). The grid will need to be quite fine, for there are
important spot sources of phosphate (e.g., city sewer outfalls and industrial
plants), points of concentration in the lake (e.g., mouths of streams), and
complex currents and wind patterns that redistribute materials over large
distances.
Accurate data on phosphate sources are not easy to come by - for
example, details of agricultural runoff. Nor are the processes of eutro-
phication at all well understood from a biochemical standpoint. Hence the
modeling project, as I have described it, produces an enormous model (tens
of thousands of parameters), containing numerous equations that are sup-
posed to represent poorly understood mechanisms, and incorporating large
numbers of parameters that can only be estimated very approximately. If
the model is conceived as a forecasting tool, so that it operates dynamically
over time, it becomes even larger and more complex. In this case, it must
incorporate not only a description of the existing distribution of urban
population, polluting industry, and agriculture, but also - a much more
difficult matter - a regional socio-econometric model to predict the trends
in this distributional pattern.
If it be said that I have just constructed a straw man ready for burning, I
would answer that I can point to a half dozen current social modeling efforts
conceived just as this one was. One of the best known examples, though it
was not quite on the scale of the one I have described, was the Warld
Dynamics model of the 1972 Club of Rome report (Meadows et aI., 1974).
Application of the notions of near decomposability to the Lake Erie
modeling problem would lead to vast simplification of the task. First, the
long-term changes are sufficiently gradual that a dynamic model is not
needed to deal with them; it would be adequate simply to estimate steady-
state equilibrium under various sets of assumptions about population of the
surrounding area, and to use these equilibria to predict trends. Second, the
dynamics of the eutrophication processes are several orders of magnitude
faster than the other dynamic components of the system. Since these
dynamics are, iiI any event, very poorly understood, they can be replaced by
simple static assumptions that eutrophication varies as some simple func-
SIMULATION OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS BY AGGREGATION
119
tion of phosphate input. (This amounts to aggregating the subsystems at the
lowest level of the hierarchy.)
Third, in the middle and long run, there will be high intercorrelations of
phosphate levels in different parts of the lake, so a fine grid is hardly
necessary (a second level of aggregation). Moreover, the policy instruments
available for ameliorating the situation (e.g. tertiary sewage treatment,
reduction of phosphates in detergents) are sufficiently gross (if powerful) as
to make it futile to model system details that cannot be modified indepen-
dently and in corresponding detail. Finally, ameliorative action can always
be taken on an incremental basis with feedback, so that we do not need
exact predictions of the magnitude of the effects.
I conclude that the social purposes to be archieved by this modeling can
be accomplished with aggregate models of modest size that will not strain
even modest computing capabilities, and that will not pretend to an un-
attainable finesse and accuracy.
This is not an isolated example. In dealing with automotive air pollution,
we are faced with a complex technological system of four major com-
ponents interacting with the socio-economic system that produces and
'consumes' the pollutants. There are the relations between automotive
design and cost and levels of emissions of pollutants. There are the relations
between emission levels and ambient air quality (which depends also, of
course, on levels of non-automotive emission). The latter relations have to
be combined with meteorological data on wind, precipitation and tem-
perature. There are the relations between air quality and health.
As in the earlier example of water pollution, the impact of these
mechanisms depends upon the magnitudes and geographical patterns of the
polluting sources. Predicting accurately the pollution levels in, say, a me-
tropolitan area, would require a most detailed model of the social and
economic structure of that area, of movements of persons and vehicles
within it, and of the dynamics of its change over the coming years. There
seems no reason for confidence that a veridical model can be constructed
for this part of the system. As a further difficulty, information on the
biological effects of pollution is so inexact that it makes no sense to attempt
more than order-of-magnitude estimates. Given this degree of crudeness in
the medical and socio-economic models, there is no point in modeling the
rest of the system in detail (even if it were possible, which it is not).
Modeling here calls for little more than back-of-an-envelope estimates (Air
Quality and Automobile Emission Control, 1974).
120
H. A. SIMON
4. Sensitivity analysis versus prediction
Discussions of simulation of macro-social processes, and the simulation
models themselves, generally place a considerable emphasis upon pre-
diction. The World Dynamics models referred to earlier (Meadows et aI.,
1974) are a good example of this emphasis. These models undertake to
predict, for long spans of future years, the values of substantial numbers of
demographic, economic, social, and environmental variables. I think no
one, including the authors of the models, thinks that we know enough about
the underlying dynamic mechanisms to predict anything but broad trends.
In fact, the lessons we draw from the models are generally qualitative
lessons about the impossibility of sustaining exponential growth indefin-
itely. These lessons can easily be demonstrated, however, with the aid of
much smaller models that are analytically tractible, and hence require no
simulation at all. The mass of detail generated by the world dynamics
models appears to have no practical use and only an illusory appearance of
accuracy.
In general, the emphasis on prediction in macro-social models is a mis-
placed emphasis. Neither do we have the knowledge of socio-economic
mechanisms that would make such prediction possible, nor is it prediction
that we need for policy purposes. Our concern is not to forecast the future
but: (a) to understand the consequences of alternative possible futures, and
(b) to understand which of these possible futures is associated with par-
ticular strategies or policy measures. Moreover, we generally have no
important practical interest in the details of the year-by-year path that leads
to any future state of affairs. We are more concerned with identifying
the region to which the path leads. When this is the case, the method
of comparative statics will make much more efficient use of available
computing resources than will predictive dynamic modeling.
If our interest, for example, is in the relations among world population,
income levels, environmental quality and the drain on resources, perhaps
the most useful procedure is to model the steady state of the system for
different levels of population and income, and under different assumptions,
say, about our energy-producing technology. The computing resource that
would be consumed in predicting the step-by-step course of a dynamic
model can be used instead, in the steady-state model, to carry out sensitivity
analyses and to evaluate alternative population and energy policies. The
sensitivity analyses, by determining which variables in the system are of
critical importance, can permit us to simplify the model further by focussing
SIMULATION OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS BY AGGREGATION 121
on those variables. Whatever computational capacity we recapture through
simplification, we can put to work again by detailing the model along other
dimensions - by introducing a finer regional breakdown of the data, for
example.
There are, of course, situations where prediction is the name of the game.
A business forecasting model is necessarily a dynamic predictive model. In
a large range of cases, however, detailed prediction is neither possible nor
very important. Much more important is an understanding of what are the
key variables in shaping system equilibrium and what policy variables can
have an effect on that equilibrium. In these cases, we are well advised to
devote the computing resources we have available to sensitivity analyses
and policy analysis rather than prediction.
5. Conclusion
A general lesson can be learned from the examples of the two previous
sections of this paper. In simulation of social systems, we are often inter-
ested primarily in aggregative and longer-run effects that can be produced
by aggregative, but perhaps robust, policy manipulations. Near-decom-
posability permits us to ignore the short-term, lower-level dynamicme-
chanisms of complex systems, treating these systems by the method of
comparative statics, and examining the sensitivity of their behavior to
changes in specific exogenous variables and policy variables. Hence, we
may be able to avoid attempting detailed predictions of the temporal paths
of variables under conditions where our ignorance of system mechanisms or
where external 'noise' impinging on the system makes such prediction
infeasible.
No matter how large and fast our computers become, Nature will build
systems too large and complex to be simulated in detail. Hence, the theory
of simulation must always be concerned with computational efficiency. The
exploitation of hierarchy and near decomposability are powerful tools for
achieving such efficiency, and hence exploring the properties of extremely
large social systems.
References
Air Quality and Automobile Emission Control. A Report by the Coordinating Committee on
Air Quality Studies, National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering,
122 H. A. SIMON
Vol. 1, Summary Report, U. S. Government Printing Office, September 1974, ix. 130p.
Courtois, P. J., Decomposability: A Queuing and Computer System Application, New York:
Academic Press, 1977.
Meadows, D., et aI., Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1974.
Nelson, R. J., 'Structure of Complex Systems' in Frederick Suppe and Peter D. Asquith (eds.),
Proceedings of the 1976 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume
2, 523-542, East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association, 1976.
Simon, H. A., and Ando, A., 'Aggregation of Variables in Dynamic Systems', Econometrica
29: 111-138, April 1961.
Simon, H. A., 'How Complex are Complex Systems?' in Frederick Suppe and Peter D.
Asquith (eds.), Proceedings of the 1976 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science
Association, Vol. 2, 507-522, East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association,
1976.
Simon, H. A., The Sciences of the Artificial (Karl Taylor Compton Lectures), Cambridge:
M.LT. Press, Chap. 4, 1969.
Reality-simulation: a feedback loop
Anatol Rapoport
An old dictum in biology asserted that 'ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny';
that is, the embryonic development of the individual organism goes through
the stages of its evolution. More recently, the dictum has been paraphrased
to read 'ontology recapitulates philology'; that is, our conception of what
exists in fact is guided by what exists in our lexicon. More generally, our
language does our thinking for us. So it has been with the venerable
metaphysical categories of Cause and Effect. Since the concept of cause is
fixated by language, causes of events are sought and eventually assigned.
Moreover, the cause-effect relationship is typically conceived as an asym-
metric one. Since the flow of time is unidirectional, causes must precede
effects.
To be sure, philosophers have also invoked teleological causation, where
supposedly some future state of affairs influences the present course of
events. However, since notations of 'foresight' or 'striving' are tacitly
incorporated in teleological causation, there is no conceptual difficulty in
including envisaged future states into the definition of the present state of
the system under consideration. Thereby, teleology as causation directed
from the future to the present is laid to rest. This reduction of 'final' causes
to 'efficient' causes (as Aristotle distinguished them) is, of course, the basis
of cybernetics, which is concerned with the dynamics of systems equipped
with feedback loops, hence with 'reciprocal causation'.
In fact, the metaphysical question about the direction of causality became
obsolete already in classical mathematical physics, where dynamics of
events in the time continuum were formulated in terms of systems of
differential equations rather than by verbal description involving 'causes'
and 'effects'. Nevertheless, events outside of physics do not easily lend
themselves to descriptions in terms of differential equations, from which
the notation of causality has evaporated. So we still speak of causes and
effects and, by force of verbal habits, conceive of the former as preceding
the latter. Thus, the time-honored problem remains. Given a state of
124 A. RAPOPORT
affairs, one searches the past for its causes; or else, one tries to anticipate its
effects and thereby get a glimpse of the future.
Nevertheless, the feedback concept, now incorporated into the lexicon,
has apparently come to stay. So whenever one raises the question about the
effects E produced by a condition C, the question of the reciprocal effect is
raised almost inevitably.
More than a half century ago, the British meteorologist Lewis F.
Richardson developed some mathematical models of arms races. The basic
assumption in these models was that arms races are instigated by reciprocal
fears among rival states whereby each attributes the war preparations of the
other to aggressive intent and its own preparations to the need to forestall
aggression. As a result, the international system is driven by positive
feedback.
Needless to say, Richardson's mathematical models, mostly formulated
as pairs of differential equations with armament levels as dependent
variables, were at best drastic simplifications of the supposed system
dynamics. Richardson went to great length to meet objections on this score
by pointing out that the complexity of a system need not preclude the
possibility of predicting its time course. If one cannot incorporate all the
complexity from the start, one is justified in starting with a highly simplified
idealized model to get one's bearings, as it were, and then going on by
extension and generalization to attain greater realism.
In arguing that the complexity of social phenomena does not necessarily
imply their unpredictability in principle, Richardson, the meteorologist,
invoked an analogy with weather. It is generally difficult to predict at
mospheric events. We can, however, reasonably entertain the conviction
that these events obey known physical laws. The unpredictable aspects of
weather can be blamed on the lack of exhaustive knowledge of initial
conditions and on the limitations of our mathematical prowess. Richardson
says somewhere (although the exact citation escapes me) that if enough
atmospheric data were available on a given day, a small army of mathemati
cians, using numerical methods, after about twenty years of calculation
could work out a fairly accurate prediction of the weather on the following
day. A demonstration would have been impressive but the practical value of
such a 'prediction' would be nil.
This, however, was before the days of high speed computers. Today
rather accurate weather predictions are both possible and practical in the
sense that they can be made before the weather occurs. In fact, global
modeling by means of computer simulation has now become a 'field', and
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP
125
Richardson deserves credit as its prophet.
The philosophical outlook that underlies this field is sometimes called
system theory. This designation is, in some ways, a misnomer, because
'system theory' is not strictly speaking, a theory resting on specific substan-
tive hypotheses from which empirically verifiable assertions are deduced. It
is rather an outlook inspired by the successes of mathematical physics. It
embodies the definition of a system as a circumscribed portion of the
universe represented by a set of variables, a set of 'laws' governing their
dynamic interactions, and the assumption that given these 'laws', a trajec-
tory of the system (a succession of its states, i.e. instantaneous values of the
variables) can be projected. Richardson's faith in the basic predictability of
even very complex events has remained incorporated in the systems
outlook. Difficulties of prediction are conceived as technical difficulties, to
be overcome by progress in methods of data gathering, data processing, and
computation.
1. Physical and non-physical systems
In adopting this point of view, two crucial distinctions between physical and
non-physical systems must be kept in mind. The first distinction concerns
the absence of 'laws' governing the dynamics of non-physical systems
analogous to the well-established laws governing the dynamics of physical
systems. The second distinction concerns the presence in non-physical
systems of feedback loops linking conceptualizations of non-physical
reality with the actual shape that it takes.
First, I want to make clear what I mean by a non-physical system.
Recognition that such systems exist is by no means incompatible with a
'materialistic' outlook, according to which all reality is 'ultimately' physical
reality. One can very well hold on to a metaphysical belief that what we
ascribe to categories like 'mind', 'consciousness', 'psyche' and the like are
but manifestations of patterns of neural impulses taking place within sen-
tient beings, that is to say, behaviour of matter subject to physical laws,
known or yet unknown. What I call a non-physical system is simply a
portion of the world that can be described as a system but not in physical
terms.
A language is a good example of such a system. A language can certainly
be described in terms of its constituent elements (phonemes, morphemes,
etc.) and clearly recognized sequential patterns of these. Moreover, a
126 A.RAPOPORT
language can be described in dynamic terms, since languages evolve, split
into dialects and eventually into 'daughter' languages. Linguists have dis-
covered many types of regularities both in the synchronic structures and in
the evolution of languages. It can be argued that languages could not exist
without a material substrate, namely, living language communities.
Nevertheless, a language cannot be conceived as a physical system, because
it cannot be described in terms of physical variables. An element of a
language, e.g. a phonetic unit, can be so described say by spectral analysis,
just as a single neuron can be described as a physical body. But just as the
physical description of a single neuron (no matter how accurate) sheds
absolutely no light on the behaviour of the organism, of which it is a
constituent unit, so the physical properties of a phonetic unit reflect nothing
about the language in which it is imbedded. As someone has remarked, the
most detailed description of a dollar bill will tell us nothing about the nature
of the American economic system.
2. A handicap - lack of a firm axiomatic base
The gap between the physical substrate of a non-physical system and its
essential aspects is unbridgeable. For this reason, knowledge of physical
laws sheds virtually no light on the structure, dynamics, or evolution of
languages, economic, social, or political systems, in fact of any classes of
phenomena of which behaviour patterns of sentient beings are essential
components. This does not preclude regarding these non-physical systems
as systems, as long as the following facts of life are recognized. Next to
nothing is known about the fundamental set of variables in terms of which
structures or trajectories of such systems can be most fruitfully described,
nor about the 'laws' that govern the interactions among these variables.
Indeed, we cannot say with assurance whether any such laws exist. In other
words, the social scientist's lexicon includes no terms remotely analogous to
the fundamental terms of physical theory such as length, mass, electric
charge, force, or energy. Nor can he rely on any laws analogous to con-
servation of energy, of mass, or of electric charge, or universal gravitation.
There are, to be sure, some empirically established regularities, particu-
larly statistical ones. But these must be established de novo in each separate
context or in time. In short, there is presently no solid foundation on which
an edifice of deduction of the sort that represents mathematicized physical
science can be built. Instead, the systems-oriented social scientist must
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP 127
choose among a multitude of 'models' for each class of social phenomena
with little or no generalization potential. The construction of a cumulative
theory is stymied for lack of a reliable foundation.
There is also a crucial distinction between the way the physicist tests his
understanding of the physical world and the way the social scientist must
test his understanding of the non-physical world. The earliest formulation
of mathematical physics was celestial mechanics, which explains the mo-
tions of a few bodies in space, each interacting substantially only with the
sun and only weakly with each other. This was a 'real life' setting and at the
same time a highly simplified one. Terrestrial physical phenomena were
studied in controlled laboratory situations, not in natural settings. As it
turned out, knowledge of the ways of matter obtained in these controlled
situations sufficed for constructing technological artifacts. It was the suc-
cessful construction of artifacts that attested to the physicists' understand-
ing of the ways of matter, not their power of prediction in natural ter-
restrial settings. No physicist can predict with any accuracy exceeding the
layman's where or when a feather dropped from an airplane will land or
where the next forest fire will occur. The prestige of physics as a tool of
cognition is not diminished by these limitations of its predictive power. It
sufficed for the physical scientist to be able to predict the flight characteris-
tics of an aircraft or the direction and speed of a chemical reaction in a
controlled environment to support both his prestige and his confidence in
the validity of physical laws. On this confidence, the entire scientific en-
terprise rests.
At times, the social scientist also resorts to controlled experiment. How-
ever, even at best, when results of such experiments strongly support some
hypothesis, they cannot be readily interpreted as fundamental laws of
behaviour. At any rate, the social scientist concerned with trajectories of
large social systems has no real laboratory. He has no access to the control
levers of these systems, nor can he even assume that they exist. Thus, the
most powerful tools of physical science are denied to the social scientist.
The deductive apparatus of mathematics cannot be used 'in depth' for lack
of reliable axiomatic foundations. The empirical method is handicapped for
lack of a laboratory, at least one suited to the study of large social systems.
3. The ersatz laboratory
Computer simulation, recently adopted by system-oriented social
128
A. RAPOPORT
scientists, can be regarded as an attempt to circumvent these handicaps. Its
value would be unquestioned if a firm axiomatic base were on hand. For
then simulation would be simply a substitute for mathematical deductions
that cannot be carried out because of their complexity. This is the way
computers are actually used in studying the characteristics of complex
physical systems, for example, in aerodynamics. For the social scientist,
however, computer simulation cannot be merely a substitute for mathema
tical deduction. In fact, computer simulation must serve for the social
scientist as a substitute for a laboratory, but with a difference.
The traditional laboratory experiment answers the questions, 'What will
happen if...', where the 'if part is an actually realizable state of affairs, such
as an arrangement of bodies, a mixture of substances, or conditions im
posed on a living organism. The 'what will happen' part refers to expecta
tions on the basis of what has been actually arranged. Simulation, on the
other hand, answers the question 'What would happen if...' Here the 'if
part represents only a hypothetical state of affairs (often not realizable) and
only hypothesized relations between causes and effects. The 'what would
happen' part refers to expectations on the basis of what has been only
hypothesized. Therefore, although one can expect that simulation will
faithfully display the logical connection between 'if and 'then', one cannot
ascribe a predictive value to the results, because one has no assurance about
the validity of the assumptions.
This much is known to every serious user of simulation; so there is no
need to caution against unjustified conclusions. Dangers to social science lie
elsewhere.
4. The tool is the theory
A story is told of a man who liked to fix things but could use only two tools, a
screwdriver and a file. Whenever he saw a loose screw, he tightened it with
his screwdriver. When he saw a protruding nail, he used his file to make a
groove in the cap of the nail so that he could use his screwdriver to drive it
home.
When Big Science acquired the trappings of Big Business, situations
caricatured by that silly anecdote sometimes became horrendous reality. In
the early 1950's, I published two or three purely formal papers on mathe
matical models of contagion processes, pointing out that the concepts of
contagion need not be limited to the spread of diseases since it can be
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP 129
manifested also in the spread of information, of attitudes, of behaviour
patterns, etc.
Much to my embarassment, a well-known American sociologist hailed
this simple exercise as an important discovery and sold a research project on
'information diffusion' to the U.S. Air Force. The 'theoretical framework'
included a meticulous taxonomy of information spread. Distinctions were
made between 'diffusion' and 'contagion', between 'physical diffusion', as
when leaflets are distributed by air drops and 'social diffusion', as when a
person gives a leaflet to another. Contagion was defined as telling about the
contents of an item of physical diffusion by one person to another. There
was also the ubiquitous definition of the 'amount' of information in a
message, Ph of noise, of redundancy, etc., etc.
This 'theoretical framework' was applied to an 'experiment'. A town was
selected to satisfy certain geographical and demographic criteria. On the
appointed day, some hundreds of thousands of leaflets were dropped on
that town from an airplane. The 'physical diffusion' of the leaflets was
recorded by several observers, one in the airplane, one on a mountain top
on the edge of the town, one on a roof of a tall building, others cruising in
automobiles. To assess 'social diffusion' and 'contagion', a large sample of
the town's population was interviewed. Questions included were 'Did you
see the leaflets dropped?' 'Did you pick up a leaflet?' 'If so, did you give it to
anyone?' 'Did anyone give you a leaflet?' 'What did it say?' etc.
The number twenty-four has in my memory, but 1 don't recall
whether this was the number of people who reported seeing a leaflet or the
number who reported having read it. The original intention was to trace the
spread of information through the population and to test the diffusion and
contagion formulas. Because of the sparse yield of data, this phase of the
project was not carried out. However, the location of the twenty-four
persons who saw or read the leaflet was recorded on the map of the town,
and their spatial distribution was compared with a random distribution by a
Chi-square test.
How often farces of this sort occurred 1 do not know. But anyone who has
followed the extravaganzas of lavishly-funded projects knows that this may
have been an extreme but by no means isolated case. The feedback works as
follows. The natural question 'I have a problem; where can 1 find tools with
which to solve it?' is inverted into 'I've got a tool; where can 1 apply it?' Also
the question 'I want to research a problem; what will it cost, and where can 1
find support?' is inverted to 'I've got some research money; how can 1 spend
it?'
130
A. RAPOPORT
I wish by no means to imply that the inverted form of the ends-means
question is necessarily a perversion that leads to abuses. The search for
areas of application of new methods is an entirely legitimate aspect of the
scientific enterprise. And, of course, the allocation of available research
funds is an unavoidable problem generated by the institutionalization of
organized science. I am only stressing the truism that the inverted form of
ends-means question implies new responsibilities. The first of these is
simply a recognition that the availability of research tools is in itself an
important input in directing the course of research.
There is no denying the fact that at times this feedback effect has been a
powerful driving force in the evolution of science. The mutual stimulation
of physics and mathematics to the benefit of both is the most obvious
example. The same can be said of the feedback linking physical science and
technology. The steam engine probably did for physics at least as much as
physics did for the steam engine. And, of course, the progress of pure
science has been generated by the induction-deduction cycle.
In the social sciences, however, the feedback between research technol-
ogy and research direction should be most carefully monitored for two
reasons. First, research technology fixates the attention of the social
scientist on concepts that can be readily translated into research designs
suitable for the particular technology. Second, fixation of attention on any
set of concepts shapes the scientist's image of reality. It is not enough to
realize that this conceptualization may have missed its mark. The fact is that
in the realm of human affairs a sufficiently widespread image of reality may
become incorporated as part of actual reality - an effect with which the
physical scientist need not concern himself. Whatever the physical scientist
thinks, says, or publishes about the objects of his investigation does not
affect the objects themselves. The situation may be different in social
science.
5. We have a control theory; let's apply it to arms control
By way of example, let us follow the development of a mathematical model
of arms control due tol. V. Gillespie and D. A. Zinnes (1975). The point of
departure is Richardson's mathematical model of an arms race between two
powers, formulated as a pair of linear differential equations:
dxldt = -mx + ay + g (1)
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP
131
dy/dt == bx - ny + h (2)
where x (t) and y (t) are the time courses of the armament levels of power X
and Y respectively in some appropriate units. Constants a and b are mutual
stimulation coefficients; m and n are self-inhibition coefficients; g and hare
constant 'grievance terms' which would instigate rearmament even after
complete disarmament (when x == y == 0).
Elementary analysis shows that if ab <mn, the arms race will stabilize, but
ifab>mn, it will escalate indefinitely, if x (O),y (O),g, andh are all positive.
If these quantities can assume negative values (interpreted as measures of
'good will' in appropriate units, say trade volumes), then the unstable case
can lead to either escalation or disarmament, depending on the initial
conditions.
Richardson's first application of this model was the arms race of 1908-
1913 between the allies (France and Russia) and the Central Powers
(Germany and Austria-Hungary). Four points of the time course of the
combined armament levels were fitted almost perfectly by the sum of
equations (1) and (2), whereby Richardson set a == b, m == n, g == h. Thus,
three free parameters remained, one of which was fixed by the initial
conditions. In sum, four points were fitted by an equation with two free
parameters.
Today this would not be regarded as a dramatic success of a mathematical
model, but in the early 1920's the novelty of the approach made it impres-
sive. At any rate, Richardson was encouraged to develop the model
further. Subsequent applications were made to the German-Soviet race
(1933-1939), the U.S.-Soviet race, and the Arab-Israeli race, whereby the
model was modified and elaborated in various ways, and much effort was
spent in selecting, collecting, normalizing, and interpreting data. The re-
sults were spotty, but reading the literature, one gets the impression of a
cumulatively developing mathematical theory of a social phenomenon,
something quite rare in social science for reasons already mentioned,
namely, the lack of a firm axiomatic foundation of empirically validated
'laws'.
The life-and-death importance of the social phenomenon in question
need not be spelled out. So the idea of 'controlling' the system of which
Richardson'S equations were offered as a model naturally suggested itself
when 'arms control' became a newspaper word. As Richardson himself
pointed out, 'The equations describe only what happens when people do
not stop to think.' That is to say, when the system is driven by its own
132
A. RAPOPORT
endogenous dynamics. Knowledge of this dynamics is prerequisite to
exercising control over the system. So a formulation of a model based on
control theory was a naturally suggested next step. Words dominant in an
area of discourse generate dominant ideas.
In control theory two types of variables are distinguished; system vari-
ables, driven by the dynamics inherent in the system itself, and control
variables, whose time courses are imposed on the system exogenously. The
distinction implies the differentiation between the System and an Actor,
who exercises control over the System. Accordingly, Gillespie and Zinnes
assign to power Y in Richardson's two-power system the role of Actor.
Following the usual notation, the control variable (Y's armament level) is
designated by u, and so Y himself by V. The Actor V now has an objective
function in the form:
T
] = I [x(t), u(t), t] dt.
(3)
The problem is that of minimizing] (by controllingu (t)), which represents a
'cost' to the Actor incurred in the time interval (0, T).
It remains to give] a specific form and to solve the resulting minimization
problem. The form of] chosen by Gillepsie and Zinnes is:
T
] = I ([u(t) - rx(t)]2 + c[(u(t) + x(t)]}dt. (4)
The first term of the integrand reflects the 'cost' of a disparity between the
Actor's armament level, u(t), and a quantity proportional to X's armament
level, x(t). Presumably a discrepancy in either direction is 'costly', being a
disturbance in the 'balance of power', as perceived by V, whereby r is V's
personal parameter that defines his conception of 'balance of power'. The
second term represents V's concern with the total level of armaments,
whereby c reflects the magnitude of this concern.
The formal solution of the control problem yields an armament policy to
be followed by V; that is the shape of u(t) in the interval (0, T). Assuming a
reciprocal action of X on V, reflecting the dependence of V's optimal policy
on X's armament level trajectory, we have u(t) as a function ofx(t), t and of
the parameters:
a (cr+c) c
u* (t) = rx(t) - [l-e (m-ar) (/-1)] - - (5)
2 (m-ar) 2
where m and a have the same meanings as in equation (1) with u substituted
for y, while r, c, and T have the same meanings as in (4).
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP
133
The trajectory x*(t), corresponding to u*(t) is also determined by equa-
tion (5), when the right side of (5) is substituted for y in equation (1).
Equation (5) is a prescription, namely, of an armament policy to be
implemented by one of the participants in an arms race, which, in the light
of the objective function, is regarded as 'optimal'. The solution of equation
(1) with u substituted for y is a prediction, namely, of an armament policy
that will be implemented by the Actor, who in this model is regarded as a
system governed not by an objective function but solely by its own internal
dynamics.
In a moment we will examine the several limitations of this approach.
First, however, let me indicate what are not limitations of the approach. For
example, the specific form of the objective function is not a limitation, since
it was selected here only for illustrative purposes. This objective function
reflects U's concern for the 'balance of power'. Another type of objective
function can be 'plugged' into the model with equal ease. For instance,
Gillespie and Zinnes solve another control problem, where U assumes that
X is planning a 'first strike'. Accordingly, U's objective function .reflects his
concern with having just enough capacity left (after absorbing the first
strike) to destroy whatever capacity X retains after that strike. The solution
follows the same lines as before and also yields a prescription and a
prediction.
Next, the assumption that only one actor exercises control is not a
limitation. The method can be extended to treat the case where both actors
are guided by objective functions. The control problem then becomes a
differential game and its solution a Nash equilibrium point.
Thus, formally speaking, the approach is flexible and provides oppor-
tunities for generalization. The almost certainly crippling limitations of this
approach lie in the impossibility of bridging the gap between the mathema-
tical formalism and reality. Ascribing for the moment some semblance of
validity to Richardson's equations, the control model can be translated into
policy only if it is possible to estimate the parameters that are formally
defined as 'U's perception of its threat to X', 'U's perception of X's fatigue
coefficient' and the like. Just what can the estimation procedures be, and
what 'confidence limits' can be placed on the estimates is not specified.
Further, estimates of probable errors of estimated parameters are indis-
pensable for the exercise of control, because the magnitude of the par-
ameters determine the stability of the system through the direction of the
inequality ab mn.
We have assumed, for the sake of argument, the validity of Richardson's
134 A. RAPOPORT
equations. But evidence for their validity is extremely scanty, being limited
essentially to observations that armament levels during armament races
(expressed either in budgets or in destructive capacities) tend to increase
roughly exponentially. However, quasi-exponential growth is typical of a
great variety of quantities ranging from populations to volumes of scientific
publications. In fact, Taagepera et al. (1975) derived the time course of the
Israel-Egypt arms race of 1950-1970 from a pair of unlinked differential
equations. If that model is valid, it points to independent self-stimulation
of armament levels rather than to mutual stimulation damped by fatigue. In
this model, application of control would have no effect.
Finally, let us grant both the validity of Richardson's equations and the
possibility of estimating the parameters. Consider now the nature of the
solution of the single actor control model, under the conditions (1) c =
and (2) c = very large. The first condition reflects a lack of concern on the
part of V for the total level of armaments (probably not an unrealistic
assumption when the identity of V, who includes the military establishment
of the power represented, is taken into account). Setting c = in (5) we
obtain simply u = rx, and equation (1) becomes:
dxldt = (ar - m)x + g. (6)
If ar > m, x (0) > 0, g > 0, x (t) will increase without bound. Then in what
sense can the system be regarded as 'controlled'?
On the other hand, if c is sufficiently large, then it turns out that for a
sufficiently large value of T (which represents V's 'time horizon') optimal
control implies immediate and unitaleral disarmament on the part of V,
hardly a prescription to be taken seriously by any contemporary participant
in an arms race.
In fact, as is already evident from Richardson's model, the stability or
instability of the system depends not at all on the armament levels at any
time but only on the parameters of mutual stimulation and self-inhibition.
Thus, if control is to be exercised with the view of stabilizing the system, it is
these parameters that must be brought under control.
Why has this rather obvious conclusion been lost sight of? For two
reasons. First, because the formalism of the mathematical apparatus rather
than the substance of the problem has guided the construction of the control
model. Second, because the actor who is to exercise control might possibly
be persuaded to control his armament levels but he can hardly be persuaded
to change his perceptions (which is what the parameters represent.) Thus
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP 135
the model, in assuming the parameters as given, creates a reality in the
minds of the decision-maker who can be persuaded to take the model
seriously. But an actor's perception of reality is a part of social reality. Thus,
the model-reality feedback loop is closed.
6. The model creates a 'reality'
So far we have pictured the mathematical model as an idealization or an
abstraction from reality. In order to justify an elaborate development of the
theory on the basis of such a model, the model-builder must repeatedly
reiterate the tentative nature of his conclusions: if reality is adequately
represented by the model, then the deduced prescriptions or predictions
can be taken seriously. If, however, the link between the model and reality
is difficult or altogether impossible to establish, this reservation in-
creasingly assumes a ritualistic character. It becomes apro forma disclaimer
of a responsibility in small print. This in itself would not necessarily lead to
counterproductive efforts. Mathematical exercises that do not lead to veri-
fiable theories or to implementable decisions can, perhaps, be justified as a
flexing of mathematical muscles or developing habits of rigorous deduction,
which in certain contexts serve the social scientist in good stead.
However, a mismatch between a problem and a model may lead to
something worse than a dead end in which the inapplicability of the model
to the problem becomes apparent. Such a result, although disappointing,
might nevertheless be instructive. More serious than a gap between reality
and model is the tendency of a model to create reality. This tendency is
especially marked when models reach a high degree of complexity as a
result of attempts to make them more 'realistic'.
Computer technology is responsible for the appearance of models of
large-scale social phenomena on levels of complexity far beyond those
where analytic mathematical methods can be applied in the construction of
a theory. Computer simulation may involve hundreds of variables and
parameters. As has already been pointed out, computer simulation is a
substitute for a laboratory where experimentation with real systems is
impossible and where even observations are severely limited, for instance,
with regard to the time scale. Extended contact with the ersatz world of
computer simulation endows that world with a certain aura of reality, not
necessarily in fostering actual delusions but in the sense of shaping the
repertoire of concepts, as these are operationalized in the simulation
model.
136 A. RAPOPORT
The effect is, of course, much older than computer simulation. The
clearest examples of it are found in the realm of geopolitics and of diplo-
military activity. Consider the school of thought in international relations
called 'realistic'. On the descriptive level it singles out power relations
among states as the most important determinants of foreign policies. If the
validity of this assumption is assessed in terms of its explanatory power, it
appears quite adequate in the sense of accounting better for foreign policies
of major powers than other assumptions, for instance, those related to
personalities of principal decision makers and, perhaps, those related to the
ideological content of policies. But the very adequacy of the power game
model of international relations shapes the thinking of policy makers who
aspire to a 'realistic' view of international relations. Thus, the power game
model tends to become self-fulfilling. The actual nature of international
political reality is shaped by the way it is conceived.
With the advent of formalized theories grounded in and nurtured by
simulation techniques, this feedback loop is powerfully reinforced. In the
military sphere, variables of interest to strategists can be relatively easily
operationalized and quantified. Power can be defined in terms of relative
destruction potentials of weapons systems; tactical and strategic advantages
can be defined in terms of space and time variables (logistics). Besides, the
appearance of the mathematical theory of games on the intellectual horizon
has been a shot in the arm to military science just at the time when the
appearance of mega-weapons threatened to make traditional military doc-
trines obsolete. The main theme in the writings of Herman Kahn, for
example, is that 'rationality' can be infused even in such 'bizarre' situations
(to use his own expression) as sequential 'exchanges' of cities used as poker
chips in the game of nuclear strikes and retaliations. Thomas Schelling and
Robert Jervis wrote voluminously on the opportunities for blackmail and
intimidation inherent in the diplo-military 'game', and so on.
While formal game theory did not enter explicitly into these discussions,
the implication of the mathematical techniques developed in that theory
have not been neglected. It is noteworthy that the American military
establishment has given generous support to game-theoretic research since
the early 1950's. The applicability of the differential game model mention-
ed above to problems of arms control may be extremely questionable. But
the relevance of similar models to concrete military problems is apparent.
For instance, a class of differential games called pursuit-evasion games can
be used as quite realistic models in the design of ICBM'S programmed to
evade ABM's, which are programmed to intercept them. The associated
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP
137
mathematical problems are enormously complex, but the availability of
computer simulation removes the obstacles to their solution. Once math-
ematical solutions are available, development of hardware becomes pos-
sible. Once a new, more sophisticated weapons system appears on the
horizon as a clear possibility, its development n ~ deployment by the
potential enemy must be assumed, since a fundamental tenet of military
wisdom is the assumption that whatever the enemy can do to improve his
position he will do (something every good chess player takes for granted.)
Moreover, the same mode of reasoning is ascribed to the enemy, so that the
compulsions reinforce each other via mutually confirming assumptions.
Again, merely conceivable reality becomes actuality.
Thus, as computer simulation broadened the mathematical horizon, the
new vistas provided a basis for ever more sophisticated military technology.
The complexity of the technology provides challenging problems in asses-
sing the relative power and strategic advantages of states or blocs of states
vis-a- vis each other. These assessments, in turn, guide 'realistically'-
oriented foreign policies. The point is that the very complexity of these
problems endows this mode of thinking with an aura of 'reality', because the
expertise required to solve the problems posed (assessment of relative
power positions, optimization of strategies as well as of bargaining lever-
ages, etc.) is, in a sense, very 'real' expertise, resting on genuinely scientific
considerations involving physics, logistics, etc.
Nevertheless, at the very base of this ideational superstructure, internally
consistent as it may be, is a 'reality' that is generated entirely in the minds of
men, the 'reality' of sovereign states, the 'reality' of power oriented securi-
ty, the 'reality' of the power struggle as a prime mover of conflicts of
interest. Again at the risk of redundancy I must emphasize that the empiri-
cal validity of this 'reality' is not being challenged here. Rather attention is
called to its genesis. The 'reality' of the power struggle stems from its
acceptance. The acceptance is self-perpetuating, because it is a prerequisite
for participation in decision making based on it. In this way, the image of the
world in terms of power relations and its attendant dominant conceptual-
izations remain relatively invariant over generations of cadres of both
specialists in international relations and of decision-makers.
138
A. RAPOPORT
7. The double-edged sword again
In the military and geopolitical spheres, the simulation-reality feedback
loop may well lead to disastrous consequences. In other spheres, its long-
term effects are less, clear. A large area of application of simulation is
so-called global modeling or futuristics. The motivating impetus to this
activity has been, in a way, opposite to that associated with diplo-military
strategy. The point of departure (at least in normative futuristics) is a model
of cooperative enterprise rather than a power game. Normative global
models posit objective functions that reflect a concern with some aspects of
human welfare rather than with power relations. Nevertheless, the 'reality'
generated by global models, like that generated by military and geopolitical
models, is also a product of particular operationalizations and quantifica-
tions, namely of what are thought to be the relevant components of global
dynamics on the one hand and of human welfare on the other.
This delineation of the conceptual repertoire by the available tools of
analysis is, of course, inevitable, because of the nature of the tools. A
computer 'understands' only the language of hard variables and of explicitly
defined functional relations. Initially, the translation of intuited concepts
into hard variables is performed by the model-builders. The particular
operationalizations may have been conceived as provisional or tentative,
just as hypotheses are conceived as tentative, pending confirmation. How-
ever, whereas hypotheses may be discarded or modified in the process of
realizing the simulations, say by comparing the resulting trajectories with
historical segments of them, the conceptual repertoire, which represents a
large investment of intellectual effort, tends to be firmed, especially as the
descriptive aspects of the model are improved. The very technique of
simulation, whereby alternative hypotheses (or 'scenarios') serve as inputs,
induces a commitment to particular operationalizations of initial concepts
by sheer repetition. Whatever enters habitually into one's mental proces-
ses, especially when it becomes fixated by rigorous definitions (as it must be
in computer simulation) eventually appears 'real'.
Now I am not prepared to say whether the particular images of global
reality that are generated by global modeling are conducive to good or poor
policy recommendations. This question can be answered only in the light of
experience with implemented policies, which are still far beyond the politi-
cal horizon. Speculations on this theme, however, cannot do any harm.
Problems associated with normative (as distinguished from purely des-
criptive) global modeling are of two kinds: those of translating intuited
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP 139
conceptions of human welfare into manipulable variables and those of
finding ways of manipulating the variables. The latter problems, as has just
been said, are aggravated by formidable political obstacles. Solutions of
some of the former class of problems are in some cases easy, in others
difficult. It is easy to agree on the indispensability of some minimal food
supply per capita as a component in any reasonable definition of human
welfare. When it comes to more abstract concepts like 'standard of living',
'security' or, as some would include, 'self-realization' or 'human dignity',
the advancement of more or less arbitrary, sometimes strongly culturally
conditioned standards of evaluation is unavoidable. Once these standards
have been selected and thus the problems of simulation have been relegated
to the technical level (gathering data, choosing functional relations, pro-
gramming), the simulation-reality feedback cycle is started.
A prime objective of normative modeling is to design a way of comparing
one trajectory with another on a scale of preference. Objective compari-
sons are possible only with respect to quantities. After a possibly huge
amount of effort has been spent in getting a basis of objective comparison
(alternative trajectories), motivation to revise the underlying operationali-
zations becomes understandably low. One is wary about undermining the
'objective' results.
Ethical relativists make a great deal out of this bias. The extremists
among them deny altogether the existence of a common denominator of
human values and so turn a jaundiced eye on any effort to develop norm-
ative global models. Far apart as this position is from that ofthe enthusiastic
builder of normative models, one who believes in his particular indices of
'the quality of life', compounded of food, shelter, education, security,
freedom, and pollution (the latter with a negative sign), both positions
assume that human values are fixed. The only difference between the
'absolute' ethical relativist and the believer in universal human values is
that for the former values are rigidly tied to particular cultural patterns
while for the latter they are inherent in human nature.
8. Contribution to shared values
To my way of thinking, v ~ l u s originate and are modified in essential ways
by activity. Moreover, organized and cooperative activity aimed at well-
defined goals is conducive to the development of common values among the
actors. In this sense, perhaps, the simulation-reality feedback loop could
140 A. RAPOPORT
conceivably play a positive role. Imagine for a moment that global coop-
eration is somehow initiated to realize some very special goals on which
universal agreement is relatively easy to achieve. Improvement of health
levels or increasing global food supplies come to mind as examples. Strate-
gies are guided by projected trajectories of indices read off simulation
outputs. Evaluation of strategies is based on indices actually achieved.
These indices, then, which originally were more or less arbitrary quantifi-
cations of intuited values, assume the role o 'real' values in virtue of being
reinforced - the well-known psychological transformation of means to
ends.
Generally speaking, this transformation is fraught with danger; it often
leads to fetishization of indices, such as the identification of 'degree of
democracy' with percent voter turnout or 'national security' with the size of
the arsenal. Aside from such perversions, however, expressing values by
indices promotes an agreement on values by a sort of carry-over from
agreement on their concretization. And in many situations it is not the
content of values but the extent to which they are shared that matters.
Let me illustrate. A large area in the theory of games is concerned not
with the problem of finding optimal strategies, that is, not with the problem
of conducting a conflict 'rationally' from the point of view of each partici-
pant separately but rather with the problem offinding a collectively rational
resolution of the conflict. One direction in the theory of n-person games has
been developed along these lines. For instance, the Shapley Value (and its
various generalizations) of an n-person game is essentially an allotment of
payoffs that reflects the average potential contributions of each player to all
possible coalitions that he might join. Other approaches suggest arbitration
schemes based on axiomatically formulated standards of 'fairness'.
Now in order to achieve any of these solutions, it is necessary to ascertain
each player's utilities associated with the various outcomes of the game. In
some arbitration schemes, the utilities are represented as points in n
dimensional space, and the solution is determined by minimizing the 'dis-
tance' of the so called 'utopia point', which is generally outside the feasible
set of payoffs, to the feasible set. This arbitration scheme, therefore, pre-
supposes not only assumptions regarding the cardinal utilities associated
with the outcomes but also a choice of a particular metric on the payoff
space.
Clearly, all these assumptions and a choice of metric are virtually impos-
sible to validate by a practical empirical procedure. So from the point of
view of currently paradigmatic scientific epistemology, they are not rooted
REALITY-SIMULATION: A FEEDBACK LOOP
141
in 'objective reality'. Let us assume, however, that the problem of conflict
resolution becomes so pressing in a given context that some procedure of
the sort mentioned is agreed upon by the participants in the conflict.
Thereupon, conflict resolution becomes a technical problem. Procedures
must be designed to estimate cardinal utilities and, perhaps, the 'distances'
between the points of the payoff space. Computer simulation may be
adopted as a tool to deal with these problems. Preoccupation with the
technical details will create a 'reality' in the minds of the participants. Here
the lack of a verifiable 'objective basis' of this 'reality' is irrelevant. The
important thing is that a particular conceptualization of reality is shared.
Therein lies the crucial distinction between physical and social reality
mentioned repeatedly in this paper. Physical reality, at least as it is presently
conceptualized in scientific epistemology, is rooted in 'what actually is'. As
Ludwig Wittgenstein said, 'Die Welt is alles was der Fall ist.' Large areas of
social reality are rooted in what people conceive it to be and in nothing else.
Simulation of social processes, as it is practiced today, contributes to the
fixation of a self-affirming reality. We have seen that this feedback may
have unfortunate or even disastrous consequences in some contexts. In
other contexts it may have salubrious consequences, especially where
shared 'reality', even if it is divorced from an objective basis, is a pre-
requisite for constructive cooperative effort.
References
Gillespie, J. V. and D. A. Zinnes, 'Progressions in Mathematical Models of International
Conflict: Synthese 31: 289-321, 1975.
Richardson, L. F., Arms and Insecurity, Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960.
Taagepera, R., G. M. Shiffler, R. T. Perkins, and D. L. Wagner, 'Soviet-American and
Israel-Arab Arms Races and the Richardson Model.' General Systems 20: 151-158, 1975.
Disciplinary prestige and the accuracy of social
predictions as a deviation-amplifying
feedback*
Richard L. Henshel
The idea that the accuracy of scientific predictions influences the prestige of
the discipline which issues them will occasion no surprise.
l
What may be
much more provocative is the idea that, in the social sciences at least, a
discipline's prestige may influence its predictive power - in not one but
several ways. We shall try to spell out some ofthese 'prestige loops' because
they are of theoretical interest to the sociology and philosophy of science,
they seem to pose some serious dilemmas in social research, they may be of
great long-range importance for social planning, and not least because they
are radical departures from the accepted views about scientific prediction.
We are concerned here with a 'feedback loop' which incorporates as
variables the prestige of a discipline and its predictive accuracy.2 The
'prestige loop' begins with a prediction from a source identified with a
particular discipline. The prestige of the discipline affects via one of several
paths the accuracy of the prediction. And this degree of accuracy, in turn,
acts upon the prestige of the predictor and his discipline. Schematically:
Prediction-mechanisms based on prestige-accuracy of the prediction-
alterations in prestige. Our principal task in the following pages will be to
examine the several mechanisms by which the loop can be completed,
particularly the connection between prestige and predictive accuracy. We
take for granted the possibility of an influence of predictive power on
disciplinary prestige, and will emphasize the little discussed influence of
prestige on predictive power. As will be seen there are several means by
which such influence may be exerted. We concentrate on the loop as a
whole - even inventing the neologism 'prestige loop' - because the closed
nature of the loop heightens its potential importance. Each individual
increment of influence extended on predictive power by changes in disci-
* Robert Merton provided the initial stimulus for a paper on this subject. Peter Archibald and
John Gartrell provided perceptive comments on a draft. The investigation was aided by a grant
from Canada Council. This article originally appeared in Futures, April, 1975, Vol. 7, pages
92-106. Reprinted with permission of IPC Science and Technology Press.
144 R. L. HENSHEL
plinary prestige may be small, but in most of the models presented here all
of the relational signs are positive, so that once a threshold is passed,
'deviation-amplification' can occur through several 'trips' around a feed-
back loop, and make small incremental changes cumulatively important. In
the language of cybernetics, deviation-amplifying mutual causal feedback
may be encountered.
3
1. Prestige loops through dispersion of the disciplinary
perspective
In a broad sense, prestige and predictive accuracy interact through the
degree to which a discipline's perspectives become embodied in the social
arrangements and cultural assumptions of a given society. Biderman treats
the relationship explicitly at several points. Using economics as his principal
example, he notes that 'Work in a science is facilitated when institutional
arrangements [ofthe science's subject-matter] take forms that accord with
the postulates and conceptual apparatus of the science. The influences of a
science on institutions and social behavior increases such accord. The
process can continue to where fine details of the social order have been
arranged in accordance with prescriptive implications derived from the
science'.4 In other words a discipline with sufficient prestige can eventually
shape the institutional forms of its subject-matter, and so far pervade the
thinking on the subject that many of its postulates appear obvious a priori. 5
With respect to economics, 'the formal science itself is a powerful influence
upon the way in which major contemporary social institutions are organized
and carry on their business'.
6
Such a situation has at least two possible consequences of interest to us.
First, it tends to make meaningful data easily available, with obvious
implications for scientific development. Both the abundance and the ac-
curacy of data should increase when science becomes only one user among
many. 'The life of the society produces data that accord directly with the
models of ~ o n o m i s with regard to units, processes, and relationships,
precisely because these models are the ones used to guide and rationalize so
much of social activity'.
7
Second, the criteria by which an event is evaluated
in society becomes, unconsciously, quite close to the mode of thinking of
the scientist, so that the predictive validity of his instruments becomes
increasingly easy to demonstrate. For example, if an employer un-
consciously uses virtually the same standards to determine whether a new
employee has 'fitted in well' as did the personality tester who examined
DISCIPLINARY PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL PREDICI'IONS 145
him, then the test and criterion situations are influenced by the same
systems of thought. It should not be surprising if in such a case the predictive
validity of the personnel measure is quite high.
8
In fact this is a criticism of
personnel testing (as well as psychiatric diagnosis, and ability grouping in
schools), but it is an unavoidable consequence of the adoption of specific
scientific paradigms by the larger society. The above considerations are
reflected in the accompanying illustration (Figure 1).
Influence _
institutional !orms
and thinking

Figure 1. Prestige loops through dispersion of disciplinary perspective. 'Reprinted with per-
mission from Futures, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 92-106.'
As a specific case in point we may consider the prestige loop involving
intelligence testing. On the one hand, the effects of knowledge by teachers
of children's test results has been the subject of extended debate.
9
But the
effects if the children themselves learn of their test scores seems incontest-
able. The intelligence test scores become, in effect, self-fulfilling proph-
ecies, which influence effectiveness in school by altering the self-con-
fidence, and self-image, ofthe children. 10 Similar effects ensue from placing
children in different 'tracks' or 'streams' in spite of efforts to conceal their
meaning from the children. II
Although the finding is important in itself, it is significant for the present
discussion because the self-fulfilling phenomenon leads to the creation of
spurious 'predictive validation' for intelligence tests. The details, outlined
in Figure 2, are as follows: An intelligence test can be thought of as
predictive as well as descriptive, in the sense that persons' scores on other
kinds of tests (e.g. grades in school) should be related to their 'I.O.' scores.
One of the ways that has been used to establish the validity of an intel-
ligence test is in fact to see how well it predicts the distribution of scores on
146
R. L. HENSHEL
these other tests. This is known as predictive or criterion-related validation.
But if the testees learn of their '1.0.' scores, this often leads to changes in
self-image (for instance, self-confidence), which will itself affect their fu-
ture grades. But when the intelligence test scores are compared with future
school grades, all that can be seen is that the former are reasonably good
predictors of the latter. This is hardly surprising in the situation just out-
lined since the intelligence scores apparently enter causally into the later
scores. But although the validation produced by this means is spurious, it
has nevertheless tended to enhance the prestige of intelligence testing with
school administrators and educators. When the next cohort of children
arrives, parents and teachers may pay even greater attention to the '1.0.'
score and its effects on the child may be correspondingly greater. This, in
turn, causes a stronger confirmation of validity and so on.
JQ. scor.
"pr.didions"
+
Alt.rotions
in s.lf-imag.
Spurious predic-
t ~ validation
Figure 2. Prestige loops in intelligence testing.
+

'Reprinted with permission from Futures, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 92-106.'
The influence of a disciplinary perspective may affect the accuracy of the
perspective through its impact upon aspects of self-conception other than
intelligence. Hartung describes the facile adoption of social science ex-
planations by deviants to justify their behaviors as 'inevitable under the
circumstances.'12 A delinquent may argue that he was the seventh child in
the family, from a broken home, illegitimate, ... The point is not that such
explanations have no merit per se, but that they can become a part of the
understandings of members of the culture and thus exert an influence
independent of their essential correctness. Thus a person may just as easily
excuse his behavior by reference to 'bad blood' - in a culture in which such
ideas are believed - as by reference to, e.g., cultural deprivation. Once such
ideas are widely understood they may acquire a viability which can disre-
DISCIPLINARY PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL PREDICTIONS
147
gard their initial invalidity. 'Bad blood,' for instance, has no validity what-
soever, but if people believe in it their behavior may be correspondingly
influenced. Thus armed with an excuse for a tempting behavior ('irresistible
forces beyond my control') the behavior is indulged with increasing fre-
quency.
Sophisticated philosophical analyses have, to be sure, long distinguished
between fatalism (the subject's view, above) and determinism. 13 But such
philosophical distinctions do not deter individuals from adopting con-
venient 'scientific' rationalizations. The influence of a belief upon personal
behavior is well known; what needs considerably greater attention is the
way in which the influence of a disciplinary perspective upon actors' self-
concepts can in turn seemingly validate the perspective itself. As more
people follow the 'inevitable' paths prescribed in vulgarized versions of the
discipline's perspective, the more accurate the general predictions of that
perspective seem to be. And the more surveys confirm the correctness of
the perspective the more confident its spokesmen become. It is a deviation-
amplifying circuit whose limitations are perhaps best approached in terms
of the communication networks through which such ideas are diffused.
Of even greater potential significance, but far more elusive, are theories
which propose that accounts of 'human nature' may become self-fulfilling if
widely accepted. Richard LaPiere has argued that Freud's image of man has
become, in America at least, a self-fulfilling prophecy.14 Widespread ac-
ceptance of the Freudian orientation has, he claims, led to its unconscious
adoption in thinking and behavior to such an extent that it becomes true
because it is believed. An older, similar analysis by Seeley makes the point
succinctly in speaking of the impact of Freudian and Frommian theories. 15
'What shall we say of the relation between these scientific descriptions of human nature and
the political events that followed upon them?
Here, of course, we can only speculate. My impression is that such scientific description' exerts
a marked influence upon events. I am not unimpressed by the evidence in support of .. the
power of a man's self-picture to procure radical alteration in the organization of forces within
the personality ... I am not concerned here to demonstrate, and it could not in the present state
of our science be demonstrated, that publication of Freud's descriptions of human nature
served (in part) to call out in human nature precisely what he had described, and on a grand
scale. Neither can I say for Fromm that his view will do the like, though I think it not unlikely.'
Such possibilities are virtually impossible to demonstrate (or refute), but
their potential for exciting prestige loops of the most pernicious kind cannot
be ignored. In brief, such a loop would be composed of: (1) a frame of
reference for human nature with associated general predictions, (2) wide-
148
R. L. HENSHEL
spread acceptance of the view and the predictions, (3) corresponding
changes in thinking and behavior, (4) observations by the experts that
people do indeed conform to the model proposed, (5) heightened prestige
and authoritativeness of the viewpoint, (6) greater popular acceptance of
the view and (7) more changes in thinking and behavior ...
As a case in point, we might consider the impact of changes in views of
man's rationality on cultural practices and, perhaps, on the phenomenon of
rationality itself. Modern philosophical skepticism about the power of
reason began with British empiricism and accelerated after Kant's critiques.
Attacks on man's rationality attained new prominence with the advent of
'scientific' statements of mental determinism (racial, biological, geogra-
phic, economic) in the nineteenth century. With the advent of Freud, social
science as a whole has increasingly presented a model of man as much less
rational than the educated view of scarcely one hundred years ago.
16
Today,
virtually all texts present a picture of men guided by essentially irrational or
non-rational considerations even when they believe they are behaving
rationally.
As such models become dominant in modern thought they may ex-
tinguish socio-cultural mechanisms which hold in check the actual way of
emotions, ideologies, and stereotypes, or which enhance patterns of ration-
ality. One such mechanism can be used as illustration: a growing belief in
the impotence of rational argument. It is said that people do not change
their minds because of rational discussion, that reasons do not convince.
Although some confirming evidence exists, it is not on a scale which would
sustain such a sweeping proposition. But if academicians and others despair
more readily today of convincing others by rational argument, if they are
convinced of the futility of rational persuasion, then a decline in rational
challenges and appeals to reason will lead to a situation where indeed there
is heavy reliance on such factors as selective perception and selective
exposure. And if persons become used to obtaining their viewpoints in this
way, they may in reality tend toward the very irrationality the model
describes.
To summarize, publically accepted summaries of data may produce new
confirmatory evidence, and dissemination of a scientific perspective may
lead to its confirmation. In Biderman's terms, disciplinary influence on
common cultural assumptions may lead to an apparent increase in the
lIccuracy of the field's perspective. And this may in turn enhance the
prestige of the field.
With respect to limitations on an irrationality loop, the high value that
DISCIPLINARY PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL PREDICfIONS 149
science places on originality should seemingly indicate that eventually a
counter-vailing perspective will arise. There is today a small but expanding
intellectual movement to return to a modified view of men as essentially
'rational' - if only their often peculiar beliefs and values are taken into
account. 17
In addition to mere limitations on deviation-amplifying tendencies there
also exists the possibility of prestige loops with 'negative feedback;' that is,
with built-in mechanisms which inhibit the growth of prestige and accuracy.
We encounter such circumstances when we turn our attention away from
general predictions and examine forecasts or concrete predictions about
specific events. It is here that the particular nature of social reality provides
for two different kinds of prestige loop.
2. Long-term prestige loops under self-altering prophecies
In an earlier paper the term 'self-altering prophecy' was introduced to refer
collectively to the traditional categories of self-fulfilling prophecy and
self-defeating prophecy. IS
Although commonly employed in substantive theory, such prophecies
are also of considerable methodological interest insofar as they refer to
consequences of predictions by social science itself.19 Few social scientists
have considered the probable consequences that confident social predic-
tions would have if pronounced as the findings of 'Science'. It seems quite
possible that the self-altering prophecy of the present would be relatively
insignificant alongside those generated by a mature, self-confident social
science; in fact, the self-altering aspect might become the most important
single factor in the realization or defeat of forecasts about certain sectors of
the society. Diebold, for instance, foresees a period in which we will
repeatedly go into overreaction after crisis prophecies by scientists - pro-
phecies, that is, may become not only self-defeating but so extremely
self-defeating that the polar opposite social or physical problem comes to
pass. 20 Thus, for example, overreaction to a predicted teacher surplus might
be so drastic as to lead to a teacher shortage. (Of course Diebold hopes that
his own prophecy can be the exception, becoming merely self-defeating in
moderation. ) Yet when casting about for discussions of this problem under
a mature social science we are limited to some excellent 'scenarios' from
social science fiction, e.g. that of Asimov.
21
Not to disparage Asimov's
insights, it is paradoxical that sociologists themselves have contributed so
150 R. L. HENSHEL
little. In the present discussion we restrict ourselves to alterations of future
states brought about by publicized forecasts from social scientists.
Examinations of the consequences of the existence of self-altering pro-
phecies for social science have barely explored the problem. The examina-
tions have invariably concentrated on the effects of single predictions, but
the long-range consequences of considering a train of self-altering pro-
hecies in social science may be even more striking. Consider a situation in
which sociology has improved to a point where it is widely listened to.
Various motives will influence the degree to which people continue to do in
the face of prediction what they otherwise would have done. The majority
(or those with power) may move to defeat a given prediction, they may do
nothing, or they may move to fulfill it. If these possibilities are considered
on a time-scale longer than that of a single prediction, several very strange
outcomes can be generated.
Figure 3 presents a model of certain possible public reactions to social
prediction. When a statement is made, there is typically no reaction if it is
not deemed alterable, important, and credible. (Its credibility will be in-
fluenced by the credibility of its source, as all social influence research
assures us. This will become important.) If it does pass these criteria
22
people may act to improve or hurt its chances - that is, to take concerted or
individualistic actions which are cumulatively self-fulfilling or self-defeat-
ing. These actions, in turn, can affect the accuracy of the prediction, leading
to greater or lesser prestige for the predictor. When the predictor makes his
next prediction, its credibility will be partially a result of the accuracy of his
previous prophecy.
If the predictions of social scientists are heeded and generally become
self-defeating, social science should eventually decline in respect. Predic-
tions will no longer be listened to, so fewer will be suicidal, and their
accuracy should therefore rise. But when this occurs social-science prestige
might also rise again, leading to a new wave of self-defeating predictions,
and so on. We can call this the 'oscillation' possibility.23
If, on the other hand, social science predictions generally become self-
fulfilling, we must anticipate a different course. Where before we had a
cyclical possibility we have now an intensifying or 'multiplier' effect. The
more self-fulfilment the stronger the faith in social science, and the stronger
the latter the more self-fulfilling prophecies occur. See Figure 3. This loop is
very likely taking place today within the limited field of election polling.
Although recent studies by Mendelsohn and Crespi have shown that
notions of 'bandwagon' and 'underdog' election effects from polls are
DISCIPLINARY PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL PREDICTIONS 151
greatly over-rated in terms of actual importance, it has also become in-
creasingly clear that, in the United States at least, the size of monetary
contributions to political parties or individual candidates is highly sensitive
to pre-election polls. We can thus see an instance of a prestige loop for
individual prophecies with a built-in multiplier effect. Poll predictions of
victory or defeat result in increased or decreased cash flow to the party
Alt..-ation in
prl'd ktion 's
probability

MIt-fulfilling or
setf-dei.atlng ,usual-
ly the-form.r
Individualistic
etlon condition I
yH
AIt.ratlon ,n
pr.dlctor
prHtige
)
Noaction taken ... 1 no
j
no
no
no
Figure 3. Prestige loops for specific predictions.
'Reprinted with permission form Futures, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 92-106.'
coffers, creating or denying opportunities for advertising and staffing.
Election returns reflect these disparities, enhancing the prestige of the
polling process (in America). In the next election, even greater attention is
accorded the polls, with correspondingly greater effects on the financial
condition of the candidates, and so forth. See Figure 4.
Alternatively, of course, there could be no strong trends toward either
self-fulfillment or self-defeat. But we are left with some very odd con-
clusions indeed - odd at least from the standpoint of the physical-sciences
model of prediction which is still employed so widely. Sjoberg and Nett
suggest one intriguing possibility: 'the most effective forecaster might be a
man who was right 60 or 70 percent of the time. Then his forecasts probably
152 R. L. HENSHEL
Pre-election poll
Figure 4. Election poll loop.
'Reprinted with permission from Futures, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 92-106.'
wouldn't be affected by people acting upon them.'24 But this would apply
only in cases in which no guidance on the probable reactions of an
'audience' was available. In the more frequent case in which certain very
minimal predictions about reactivity can be made, the direction of self-
alteration (Le. whether the tendency will be toward self-fulfilment or
self-defeat) can be forecast.
Let us assume that the source of the basic prediction can also predict
whether the principal reaction will be individualistic (selfish) or concerted.
(For example, in Merton's example of a bank run, selfish actions of individ-
ual depositors bring about what no one wants, yet no one can afford to
remain aloof. In other situations united action may be possible.) If the
source can also predict whether the base prediction will be viewed favorably
or unfavorably - whether the predicted state will be seen as desirable or
undesirable - then the direction of reactivity can be ascertained.
25
A
four-fold table (Table 1) is created by combining degree of collusion with
desirability of the base prediction. Only in the case of concerted action on
undesirable predictions is self-defeat more likely than self-fulfillment. Why
a self-fulfilling tendency should be found for the undesirable-selfish cell can
be accounted for by the theory developed in Hamblin. 26
3. Some limitations
There are clear indications that the self-altering aspect of social prediction
has pronounced limitations. People may not react at all to a particular
prophecy. Or, their reactions may counter-balance each other, and nUllify
any self-altering tendency. Thus there may be lack of consensus on desira-
DISCIPLINARY PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL PREDICfIONS 153
Table 1. Self-altering tendencies by degree of collusion and desirability.
Predicted state Predicted state
desirable undesirable
Concerted action Se If-fulfilling Self-defeating
predominant tendency tendency
Selfish action Self-fulfilling Self-fulfilling
predominant tendency tendency
bility or lack of consistency in degree of collusion - e.g. a mixture of
concerted (self-defeating) and individualistic (self-fulfilling) activities. Fi-
nally, even if there are clear-cut self-altering actions in a specific direction,
these may not be of sufficient importance to appreciably alter the predicted
outcome. 27Jt is precisely these limitations on the self-altering properties of
any single prophecy which makes consideration of a sequence of predictions
- and the potential provided by the deviation-amplifying mechanism of the
prestige loop - so important.
4. Implications
Many years ago, Merton pointed in the direction pursued by this analysis.
'The repute of applied social science, as of any other intellectual resource, is in part a product
of its accomplishments. This is an interlocking system, in which social status and utilization
interact endlessly. Not only does utilization affect esteem but esteem also affects utilization. '28
This is an excellent early formulation, which even points to the feedback
aspects before Maruyama's analysis of deviation-amplifying loops. But its
implications have not been properly appreciated.
We are dealing with a situation in which research and theory of several
distinct areas have not been integrated. Research on personal influence has
repeatedly confirmed the importance of source prestige, expertise, and
trustworthiness on the credibility of a communication.
29
Why this should
exclude the believability of social predictions is obviously unclear. For
decades social scientists have documented innumerable instances of self-
altering prophecies, including those made by social science itself. Yet the
implications of a continuing train of self-altering prophecies has not re-
154 R. L. HENSHEL
ceived attention, despite the development of interest in cybernetic systems
and deviation-amplifying feedback.
For some time now, observers of the reactive nature of social prophecy
have predicted that social science will eventually employ the self-altering
phenomenon to further objectives favored by the social scientist.
30
Either through Machiavellian or humanitarian motives, social scientists
can withold or generate predictions which themselves have some bearing on
future reality. Seeley advances an argument advocating such action.
31
As
Wrong points out, the extreme conclusion would be that social forecasts are
inevitably political.
32
To these possibilities a new potentiality must be
added. The existence of self-alteration in prediction about social phenome-
na, and especially the existence of prestige loops associated with these
predictions, implies that the social sciences can conceivably alter their own
accuracy and prestige by a judicious selection, or withholding, of predictions.
Consider the following. Under collusive, mass reaction, people will work
for predicted states they approve of and against those they detest. Under an
assumption of cohesive, concerted reaction, then, a discipline could in-
crease its predictive accuracy by forecasting futures which people find
appealing, or by hedging unpleasant forecasts with numerous conditions -
in expectation of efforts to defeat the latter. It seems scarcely necessary to
point out the truly severe limitations on such a 'bootstrap' operation, but on
the other hand we know very little about the basis for public acclaim.
The conceptions invoked by the idea of a prestige loop are astonishing to
many and, to some extent, disturbing. In the foregoing passages we have
tried to extend the concept of the prestige loop to its furthest limits. But
such relationships as truly exist are empirical, not logical, and the es-
tablishment of their possibility is only one research step in the explication of
the phenomena. Although a few prestige loops have already received
empirical study, these have been only tangentially related to social science
predictions.
33
Although these scattered findings leave little doubt that some
loop-like phenomena exist, explication must await more directly focused
investigations. In addition, tangential issues need further elaboration.
When scientists predict, who knows of the predictions? What positions in
society do the consumers of scientific prediction occupy? Which groups in
society evaluate the prestige of the sciences, and what criteria do they use?
And which groups in society are in a position to influence the training,
recruitment, and funding of scientists? A growing literature on the social
uses of science can become relevant to the issues presented here. The
concept of the prestige loop opensa great many new questions.
DISCIPLINARY PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL PREDICfIONS 155
Notes
1. The commonsense quality of these statements notwithstanding, it is true that the exact
linkage is an empirical question. See, e.g. Robert K. Merton and Paul Hatt, 'Election poll
forecasts and public images of social science', Public Opinion Quarterly 13, (Summer):
185-222, 1949.
2. We delay describing disciplinary prestige until later in the paper. By speaking of 'predic-
tion' we unfortunately risk considerable semantic confusion; there is no unanimity of
meaning among writers. (See Karl Schuessler, 'Continuities in social prediction', in Her-
bert L. Costner (ed.), Sociological Methodology, 1971, New York: Jossey-Bass, 1971,
especially pp. 303-304.) Some would restrict the term to invariant cause and effect
sequences, others to extrapolations from past and present states; some would eliminate
recurring regularities if the relationships are concomitant. We will here adopt the restricted
sense that prediction helps clarify what the future may be like. This usage still embraces a
wide assortment of statements. A ground-breaking effort to distinguish modes of predic-
tion in social science can be found in Daniel Bell, 'Twelve modes of prediction - a
preliminary sorting of approaches in the social sciences.' Daedalus 93, (Summer): 845-
880,1964.
3. See Magoroh Maruyama, 'The second cybernetics: deviation-amplifying mutual causal
processes' American Scientist 51, 164-179, 1963, and Walter Buckley, Sociology and
Modem Systems Theory, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
4. Albert D. Biderman, 'On the influence, affluence, and congruence of phenomena in the
social sciences.' The American Sociologist 4 (May): 128-130, 1969. Quote is from page
130.
5. For why this should be so, see Chap. 10 of Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (enlarged edition), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
6. Biderman, Op. cit. p. 129.
7. Ibid.
8. For a discussion of predictive validity, see G. C. Helmstadter, Research Concepts in
Human Behavior, New York: Meredith Corporation, 301-304 and p. 307, 1970.
9. See the controversy over Rosenthal's 'Pygmalion in the classroom' reviewed in Doris
Entwistle and Murray Webster, Jr., 'Status factors in Expectation raising.' Sociology of
Education 46, (Winter) 1973.
10. See David A. Goslin, The Search for Ability: Standardized Testing in Social Perspective,
New York: Russell-Sage, 1963, as well as the numerous sources he cites.
11. Glen H. Elder, Jr., 'Life opportunity and personality: some consequences of stratified
secondary education in Great Britain.' Sociology of Education 38, (Spring): 173-202,
1965.
12. Frank E. Hartung, 'A vocabulary of motives for law violations' in Frank E. Hartung,
Crime, Law, and Society, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 62-83, 1965.
13. See for instance Adolf Grunbaum, 'Historical determinism, social activism, and predic-
tions in the social sciences.' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 236-240, 1956,
and Richard Peters, 'Destiny and determinism' The Listener (July 4): 16-17,1957.
14. Richard LaPiere, The Freudian Ethic, New York: Dual, Sloan and Pearce, 1959.
15. John R. Seeley, 'Social science in social action.' Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science 17, (February): 84-89, 1951. Quoted are pp. 88-89, emphasis mine.
16. The decline of belief in man's reason is reviewed in Gunter W. Remmling, Road to
Suspicion: A Study of Modem Mentality and the Sociology of Knowledge, New York:
Appleton-Century-Croft, 1967.
17. See, e.g. Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970.
18. Richard L. Henshel and Leslie W. Kennedy, 'Self-altering prophecies: consequences for
156 R. L. HENSHEL
the feasibility of social prediction.' General Systems 18 (annual) 119-126, 1973. The
traditional terms are covered in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(revised edition), Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957.
19. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
20. John Diebold, 'The world and doomsday fads' New York Times (February 25) 1973.
21. Isaac Asimov, Foundation, New York: Avon, 1966. The trilogy of which this is a part has
received numerous special awards in the science fiction community.
22. Occasionally, only credibility may be required for self-alteration; Figure 3 is thus con-
servative on the frequency ofreactions to prophecy. Figure 3 follows Henshel and Ken-
nedy (op. cit.).
23. See Richard L. Henshel, 'Sociology and prediction', The American Sociologist 6,
(August): 213-220, 1971, especially page 214. Of course only unconditional predictions
always lose prestige if defeated. So-called 'if-then' predictions (conditional) lose prestige
only if defeated with the stated preconditions extant. Also, loss of prestige is an empirical
question; where public knowledge of the prediction is low, or its association with sociology
unrecognized, a prestige loss is by no means automatic. See for the latter, Merton and Hatt,
op. cit.
24. Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social Research, N ew York: Harper,
312, 1968. Emphasis mine.
25. Unavoidably we are skirting questions about the consensual or conflict nature of society.
Thus it may be that not all persons need be impressed for social science to increase its
effects, nor that all would have to be disillusioned for its influence over events to wane. So
also cases of'pleasant' and 'unpleasant' predictions would have reference to some particIar
audience. We refer the reader to the excellent discussion of decision- making and the future
in Wendell Bell and James A. Mau, 'Images ofthe future: theory and research strategy' in
J. McKinney and E. Tiryakian (eds.), Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Develop-
ment, New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, pp. 205-234, 1970.
26. Robert L. Hamblin, 'Group integration during a crisis' ,Human Relations 11,67-78,1958.
27. The desire to permit recognition of minor alterations in outcome was another reason why
Henshel and Kennedy (op. cit.) adopted the 'self-altering' terminology. For instance, the
exact proportions of votc;:s obtained by two candidates can be altered by a prediction
without the prediction being either self-fulfilling, or self-defeating.
28. Robert K. Merton, 'The role of applied social science in the formulation of policy: A
research memorandum.' Philosophy of Science 16, (July): 161-181, 1949. See p. 164.
29. Arthur R. Cohen, Attitude Change and Social Influence, New York: Basic Books, 1964.
30. See Robert Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology, New York: Free Press, 1970; Donald N.
Michael, 'Social engineering and the future of the environment' American Psychologist 22,
(November) 888-892, 1967; Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, (London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961; Hans H. Toch, 'The perception of future events: Case
studies in social perception' Public Opinion Quarterly 22, (August): 57-66, 1958; and
Eleanor P. Wolf, 'Research data as an element in decision-making' Social Problems 6,
(Winter): 362-366, 1958.
31. Seeley, op. cit., 85-86.
32. Dennis H. Wrong, 'On thinking about the future.' The American Sociologist 9, (February):
26-31, 1974. See p. 29.
33. The existence of prestige loops outside of social science prediction has been confirmed in
small group experiments. A common thread through these studies is a loop in which
prestige leads to centrality in a group, which leads in turn to high predictive power, which
leads to higher prestige. See R. Chowdhry and Theodore Newcomb, 'The relative abilities
of leaders and non-leaders to estimate opinions oftheir own groups.' Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology 47, 51-57, 1952; Terence Hopkins, The Exercize of Influence,
DISCIPLINARY PRESTIGE AND SOCIAL PREDICTIONS 157
Totowa, New Jersey: Bedminster Press, 1964; and G. A. Talland, 'The assessment of
group opinion by leaders and their influence on its formation'. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology 49, 431-434, 1954.
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and E. Tiryakian (eds.), Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Development, New York:
Appleton-Century-Croft, 205-234, 1973.
Biderman, A. D., 'On the influence, affluence and congruence of phenomena in the social
sciences.' The American Sociologist 4, pp. 128-130, 1969.
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1967.
Chowdhry, R. and T. Newcomb, 'The relative abilities ofleaders and non-leaders to estimate
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