30/1/2014

Submarines in Southeast Asia: Proliferation, Not a Race | The Diplomat

Submarines in Southeast Asia: Proliferation, Not a Race

ASEAN countries are looking to bolster their submarine fleets, but this is not an arms race.
By Koh Swee Lean Collin January 30, 2014

In early January this y ear, V ietnam formally joined the Southeast Asian submarine club with its first Russianbuilt Kilo-class submarine christened the Hanoi. Not too long ago, Jakarta ex pressed interest in acquiring the Image Credit: REUTERS/Edgar Su same model of submarines from Russia or more boats from South Korea, ostensibly to augment the incoming new fleet of three SS-209 boats purchased from South Korea back in August 201 2. Just recently in Nov ember 201 3, Singapore contracted German shipbuilder Thy ssenKrupp to dev elop the Ty pe-21 8SG, the first of two boats slated to enter serv ice in 2020. Other Southeast Asian countries hav e ev inced interest in acquiring an undersea warfighting capability , but were prev ented from doing so largely because of budgetary constraints. In the case of Thailand, ev en though no submarines were bought after the German offer of second-hand Ty pe-206A boats lapsed in March 201 2, the Roy al Thai Nav y has reportedly constructed submarine basing support and training facilities in anticipation of future acquisitions. The Philippine Nav y has been ey eing submarines but for now, decided to prioritize the use of limited funds to beef up surface and nav al av iation forces, with antisubmarine warfare capabilities tipped as the nex t major focus to substitute for a submarine capability . A Subm arine Race in Southeast Asia? This recent spate of submarine acquisitions being implemented or planned has characterized Southeast Asian nav al modernization efforts to date, which could lead to observ ers highlighting the rev iv al of a submarine race in the region after the bout of submarine purchases made in the 1 990s to early -2000s. A superficial surv ey of open remarks by the regions defense and nav al planners seemed to allude to this. For ex ample, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Y usgiantoro reportedly remarked that the submarine purchase, among other defense equipment, is designed to signal Jakartas commitment towards Indonesian defense modernization so that we can keep up with ASEAN members. Bangkok referred to the submarine programs of neighboring Southeast Asian nav ies when it emphasized the need for submarines as part of the country s nav al capabilities. Howev er, technical and geopolitical indications point to neither the ex istence of a submarine race nor the prospectiv e emergence of such a phenomenon in the foreseeable future. Any negativ e effects of submarine proliferation in Southeast Asia appear to be at least counterbalanced by rising trends of regional cooperation in the submarine field. Key Patterns in Subm arine Capabilities While there are ev ident efforts among regional submarine operators to look bey ond a mere fleet-in-being force to create a more effectiv e and sustainable force to guard their national waters, there are no indications of a rapid ex pansion of submarine forces. The V ietnamese submarine force will number six boats by 201 6 while the Indonesians will muster three new submarines around the same time, whereas the ex isting pair of West German-built Ty pe-209s will most likely be decommissioned. With the progressiv e phasing out of the ageing Challenger-class boats by then, Singapore will most likely hav e just two Archerhttp://thediplomat.com/2014/01/submarines-in-southeast-asia-proliferation-not-a-race/?allpages=yes 1/4

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Submarines in Southeast Asia: Proliferation, Not a Race | The Diplomat

class submarines in serv ice before the first Ty pe-21 8SG is inducted. In short, the number of submarines in serv ice throughout Southeast Asia will remain more or less stable within the nex t decade, with new boats supplanting old ones for ex isting submarine users while any ex pansion will take place ov er a significant span of time, primarily dependent on the countries economic health. There is also no indication of a qualitativ e submarine race. When Singapore became the first Southeast Asian nav y to introduce submarines with the air-independent propulsion (AIP), designed to prolong the underwater endurance of conv entional submarines with reduced need for snorkeling, the consequent submarine buy s of the other regional nav ies did not include that capability in response. The only area where there is some catching up with the Joneses has been submerged-launch anti-ship missiles. The Roy al Malay sian Nav y s Scorpene-class submarines touted the regions first such capability in the form of SM-39 Ex ocet, followed by V ietnam with the Klub-S, while Indonesias intent to purchase Kilo boats from Russia is intricately linked to a similar capability . In fact, new conv entional submarines on the global market are ty pically offered with submerged-launch anti-ship missiles as an optional part of the entire sales package. This is an international trend in contemporary proliferation of submarine technologies, by no means unique to Southeast Asia. Nav ies in the Northeast and South Asian sub-regions hav e in fact long possessed such a capability . Submarine-launched cruisemissiles (SLCM) for land attack purposes, howev er, represent a wholly different ballgame. Such weapons are potentially destabilizing, especially when launched from a platform as stealthy as a submarine, since they can project offensiv e firepower at standoff ranges deep into another country s territory . It is noteworthy that whereas other major nav ies in the region hav e either acquired or ex plored the SLCM option, at present no Southeast Asian nav y is seriously considering this capability . Another point is that none of the ASEAN member states is partner to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which restricts proliferation of missiles (and associated technologies) with a 500-kilogram pay load out to a minimum range of 300 kilometers. It is not y et ascertained whether the Kilo boats, which Indonesia is reportedly keen to purchase, will be armed with SLCM, such as the Klub-S land-attack v ariant. Scant information has emerged thus far regarding the capabilities of the Ty pe-21 8SG. Nev ertheless, SLCM is unlikely to appear on the future wish-lists of Southeast Asian nav ies unless serious ev olution of geopolitical circumstances compels the introduction of such a weapon into the region. For now and the foreseeable future, AIP and submerged-launch anti-ship missiles constitute key submarine capability patterns in Southeast Asia. T he Geopolitical Underpinnings Perhaps more crucial is that a submarine race embody ing the classical, arms-tension spiral consequences emerging within a political v oid looks unlikely . The geopolitical env ironment in Southeast Asia has nev er been as benign as it has ov er the past decade or so. The region was once fraught with maritime territorial and sov ereignty disputes, but since the early 2000s, Southeast Asian countries hav e amicably resolv ed most of the pressing maritime disputes through international law proceedings. The Sipadan and Ligitan Islands and the Pedra Branca islet disputes are ex amples. Maritime boundary issues are also addressed bilaterally , for instance the agreement reached in 201 1 between Indonesia and V ietnam to jointly determine common fishing corridors in their ov erlapping ex clusiv e economic zones (EEZs). Bilateral technical working groups continue to discuss outstanding maritime boundary issues, as seen in the case of Indonesia and Singapore in the Singapore Strait, and between Malay sia and Singapore concerning the post-2008 International Court of Justice v erdict on the Pedra Branca. The v arious General Border Committees established back in the early y ears of ASEAN continue to be activ e in addressing common bilateral border issues, including areas of territorial contention and EEZ jurisdictional problems. Since the last reported nav al incident in the disputed Ambalat offshore oil block in the Sulawesi Sea between the Indonesian and Malay sian nav al patrols in 2009, there had been no other reported instances of close encounters among Southeast Asian nav ies in disputed maritime zones. This tranquil situation looks set to persist, especially giv en that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has reiterated in recent y ears its commitment towards a community , a geopolitical construct that env isions refrain from the threat or use of force against fellow ASEAN member states. Moreov er, in the contex t of regional uncertainties arising from ongoing geopolitical problems, for instance disputes in the East and South China Seas, ASEAN striv es to retain its relev ance as the driv er of the regional security architecture. The threat or
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Submarines in Southeast Asia: Proliferation, Not a Race | The Diplomat

use of force among ASEAN member states would be regarded as antithetical to this objectiv e. Rising T rends of Concord Ov er Discord While submarines feature prominently within the ov erall scheme of Southeast Asian nav al modernization efforts, often ov erlooked is the recent intensification of cooperation among regional nav ies. Indonesia and Singapore established a submarine rescue and cooperation agreement back in 201 2, followed by an equiv alent pact between Singapore and V ietnam in 201 3. These bilateral efforts augment ex isting multilateral arrangements in the region, such as Ex ercise Pacific Reach a multinational submarine rescue ex ercise since 2000 and the Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC) which first began in 2001 as a platform designed to promote cooperation and mutual trust among submarine operators and aspiring ones in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Considering the operationally sensitiv e nature of submarine operations, these gradual, incremental steps are noteworthy . They can facilitate the creation of wider multilateral participation and institutionalized cooperativ e arrangements in the future, modelling on foreign ex amples such as the NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMERWG). With more submarine operators entering the scene, which means more submarines roaming the waters of Southeast Asia, the risk of underwater accidents is also multiplied. This calls for a further conceptualization of regional submarine rescue cooperation. Prospects for Further Subm arine Cooperation Because submarine operations are much more hazardous for nav al serv icemen, a rescue capability is necessary . The recent mishap rev olv ing around the Indian Nav y submarine INS Sindhurakshak highlighted the necessity of a submarine rescue capability which is, howev er, ex pensiv e to obtain, operate and maintain. Rudimentary submarine rescue capabilities, such as a basic div ing bell lowered by the rescue v essel onto the submarine escape hatch, are limited by sea conditions and depth. Modern submarine rescue techniques encompass the use of more robust equipment such as a mobile div ing bell, or more commonly deep-submergence rescue v ehicles (DSRV s) essentially mini-submarines designed to mate with the submarine in distress and transport submariners to the rescue ship. DSRV s and their operations are more complex to handle than div ing bells. The entire package the mother ship and its DSRV pay load, trained personnel and supporting infrastructure altogether may entail costs bey ond the reach of many regional nav ies budgets. To date, in Southeast Asia only Singapore operates a DSRV -ty pe submarine rescue capability . Malay sia has in recent y ears ex pressed the intent to acquire a similar capability but is apparently prev ented from proceeding with procurement due to a lack of funds. Nonetheless, the bilateral agreements reached with Indonesia and V ietnam indicated intra-regional attempts to share nav al ex pertise and resources, at least until more submarine-operating regional nav ies acquire their own submarine rescue capabilities. The role of ex tra-regional nav ies cannot be discounted, giv en that the Australian, Chinese, Japanese, South Korean and U.S. nav al forces all possess full-fledged submarine rescue capabilities. An Asia-Pacific submarine rescue framework, perhaps emulating NATOs SMERWG, can be established on the basis of ex isting arrangements such as Pacific Reach and APSC. This is an interim arrangement after all, since activ ating and deploy ing a submarine rescue capability from ov erseas foreign bases requires time and colossal logistical efforts. The ideal would be multiple submarine-operating nav ies in the region mustering their own rescue capabilities and pooling them together under an institutionalized framework. Howev er, taking into account the budgetary constraints faced by nav ies in Southeast Asia, sharing of submarine rescue capacity will remain the way to go. Final T houghts Because of the persistent interest in submarines, in no small part influenced by the outstanding requirements to fill env isaged capacity shortfalls, submarines look set to remain on the wish-lists of v arious Southeast Asian nav ies. This proliferation pattern will continue in the foreseeable future. But to label this as a submarine race, in v iew of the technical and geopolitical trends observ ed so far in Southeast Asia as well as ev ident growth in inter-nav y submarine rescue cooperation, may be a mischaracterization of what is more likely a concerted driv e by Southeast Asian nav ies to achiev e balanced nav al force capabilities.
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30/1/2014

Submarines in Southeast Asia: Proliferation, Not a Race | The Diplomat

Koh Sw ee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His primary research interests cover naval modernization in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia.

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