INTRODUCTION

Chapter 43: KNOWLEDGE

K
NOWLEDGE, like being, is a term of
comprehensive scope. Its comprehensive-
ness is, in a way, correlative with that of being.
The only thing which cannot be an object of
knowledge or opinion, \vhich cannot be
thought about in any way except negatively, is
that which has no being of any sort-in short,
nothing. Not all things may be knowable to
us, but even the skeptic who severely limits or
completely doubts man's po\ver to know is usu-
ally willing to admit that things beyond
man's knowledge are in themselves kno\v-
able. Everyone except Berkeley would agree
that the surfaces of bodies which we cannot
see are not, for that reason, in themselves in-
visible.
The consideration of knowledge extends,
therefore, to all things knowable, to all kil1ds of
kno\vers, to all the modes of knowledge, and all
the methods of knowing. So extensive an array
of topics exceeds the possibility of treatment in
a single chapter and requires this chapter to be
related to many others.
The Cross-References which follow the Ref-
erences indicate the other chapters which deal
with particulars we cannot consider here. For
exalnple, the nature of history, science, philos-
ophy, and theology, and their distinction froIn
one another, are treated in the chapters de-
voted to those subjects. So, too, the chapters on
metaphysics, mathematics, physics, mechanics,
and medicine deal with the characteristics and
relations of these special sciences. The psycho-
logical factors in knovving-the faculties of
sense and mind, of memory and imagination,
the nature of experience and reasoning-also
have their own chapters. Still other chapters
deal \vith the logical elements of kno\vledge,
such as idea and judgment, definition, hypoth-
esis, principle, induction, and reasoning, logic
and dialectic.
880
THE which Locke sets himself in his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding is often
taken to include the basic questions about
knowledge. I-lis purpose, he tells us, is "to in-
quire into the original, certainty, and extent
human knowledge, together with the grounds
and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." Two
other matters, not explicitly mentioned bY;'
IJocke in his opening pages, assume central im-
portance in the fourth book of his essay. One is
the question about the nature of kno\vledge it-
self. The other concerns the kinds of knowledge.
It may be thought that certain questions are
prior to these and all others. Is kno\vledge pos-
sible? Can we know anything? The man tne
skeptic challenges is one \vho thinks that know ..
edge is attainable and \vho may even claim
possess knowledge of some sort. But the issue
between the skeptic and his adversaries cannot
be simply fonnulated. Its formulation depends
in part upon the meaning given kno\vledge an
the various things with which it is son1etimes
contrasted, such as belief and or igno-
rance and error. It also depends in part on the
meaningoftruthand probability. It \vould see
therefore, that some consideration of the natu
of kno\vledge should precede the examination
of the claims concerning kno\vledge which pro"
voke skeptical denials.
The theory of kno\vledge is a field of many"
disputes. Most of the major varieties of doc..
trine or analysis are represented in the tradition
of the great books. But the fact that knowledge
involves a relationship between a knower and a
known seems to go unquestioned. WilliamJames
expresses this insight, perhaps more dogmatic..
ally than some would allow, in the statement
that knowledge "is a thoroughgoing dualism.
It supposes two elements, mind kno\ving and
thing kno\vn ... Neither gets out of itself or
into the other, neither in any 'ivay is the other,
CHAPTER 43: KNOvVLEDGE 881
ither makes the other. They just stand face to provides the likeness through which knowledge
ce in a common-world"andone simply knows, occurs; and thus, Aquinas writes, "the idea of
is kno\vn unto, its counterpart." This re- the thing understood is in the one \vho under-
ains true even when attention is turned to the stands." The lover, on the other hand, is "in-
cial case of knowledge about knowledge or clined to the thing itself, as existing in itself."
e knower knowing himself. The mind's ex- He seeks to be united with it directly. The no-
ination of itself simply makes the mind an bility or baseness of the object kno\vn does not
ject to be known as well a knower. affect the kno\ver as the character of the object
This suggests a second pOint about the na- loved affects the lover. This understanding of
re of knowledge \vhich seems to be undis- the difference between knowledge and love leads
ted. Ifknowledgerelatesaknower toaknown, Aquinas to say that "to love God is better than
en what is somehow possessed when a person to kno\v God; but, on the contrary, to knovl
aims to have knowledge, is the object known. corporeal things is better than to love them."
does not seem possible for anyone to say that The principle of likeness bet\veen knower and
e knows something without meaning that he known does not go undisputed. On the con-
s that thing in mind. "Some sort of signal," trary, the opposite vie\vs here form one of the
fies writes, "must be given by the thing to basic issues about the nature of knowledge. The
emind's brain, or the kno\ving \vill not oc- issue is whether the thing known is actually
r-we find as a matter of fact that the mere present to the knower, existing in the mind or
existence of -a thing outside the brain is not a consciousness exactly as it exists in itself; or
sufficient cause for our knowing it: it must strike whether the thing is represented in the mind
the brain in some way, as well as be there, to be by a likeness of itself, through which the mind
known." What is not in any \vay present to or knows it. In this vie\v, the mode of existence of
presented in the mind is not known in any of the thing outside the mind is different from the
ne various senses of the \vord "kno\v." What way in which its representative exists in the
he mind cannot reach to and somehow grasp mind.
cannot be known. The words which are com- Berkeley, at one extreme, identifies being and
mon synonyms for knowing-"apprehending" being known. "As to what is said of the absolute
and "comprehending"-convey this sense that existence of unthinking things \vithout any re-
Knowledge somehow takes hold of and surrounds lation to their being perceived, that seems per-
its object. fecdy unintelligible," he writes. "Their esse is
That kno\vledge is a kind of possession occa- percipi, nor is it possible they should have any
sions the comparisons \vhich have been made existence, out of the minds or thinking things
between knowledge and love. The ancients ob- \vhich perceive them."
served that likeness and union are involved in At the other extreme are those like Kant for
both. Plato, for example, suggests in the Sym- whom the thing in itself is unknowable pre-
fosium that both the kno\ver and the lover cisely because there can be no resemblance be-
strive to become one with their object. "Love t\veen the phenomenal order of objects repre-
is also a philosopher," Diotima tells Socrates, sented under the conditions of experience and
and, as "a lover of \visdom," the philosopher the noumenal order of the unconditioned. "All
is also a lover. conceptions of things in themselves," he writes,
With regard to some objects, love and kno\vl- "must be referred to intuitions, and with us
edge are almost inseparable. To kno\v them is to men these can never be other than sensible, and
love them. But this does not hold for all ob- hence can never enable us to know objects as
jeets, nor does the inseparability of knowledge things in themselves but only as appearances.
and love in certain cases prevent their analyti- ... The unconditioned," he adds, "can never
cal distinction in all. Like is knovvn by like, but be found in this chain of appearances."
unlikes attract each other. Furthermore, ac- In between these extremes there are those
cording to one theory of knowledge, expounded who agree that things exist apart from being
by Aquinas, the knower is satisfied to possess known \vithout ceasing to be knowable, but
an image of the thing to be kno\vn. This image who nevertheless differ \vith respect to whether
'II-IE GREAT IDEA.S
CHAPTER 43: ,KNOvVLEDGE
882
the thing exists in reality in the same 'Nay that
it-exists in the mind. The several forms of ideal-
ism and realism, distinguished in the chapter on
IDEA, mark the range of traditional differences
in the discussion of this difficult problem.
FOR ANY THEORY of what knowledge is there is
a distinction between knowledge and ignorance
---, bet\veen having or not having something in
mind. Nor does anyone confuse ignorance and
error.- The n1ind in error claims to kno\v that of
which, in fact, it is ignorant. This, as Socrates
points out in the Meno, makes it easier to teach
a person aware of his ignorance than a person in
error; for the latter, supposing himself to know,
resists the teacher.I-Ience getting a person to
acknowledge ignorance is often the indispens-
able first step in teaching.
But though the difference between knowl-
edge and ignorance and that betweenignorance
and error seems to be commonly understood,
it does not follow that everybody siluilarIy agrees
upon the difference between knowledge ander-
ror.Thismuch is agreed, that to know .is to
possess the truth about something, whereas to
err is to be deceived by falsity mistaken for
truth. The disagreement of the philosophers be-
gins, ho\vever, \vhen the meaning of truth and
falsi ty is exan1ined.
Truth is one thing for those,vho insist upon
some similarity between the thing known. and
that by \vhichit is known or represented in the
mind. It is another for those \vho think that
knowledge can be gained without the mediation
of images or representations. In the first case,
truth will consist in some kind of correspond-
ence between what the mind thinks or under-
stands and the reality it tries to know. In the
other, truth will be equivalent to consistency
among the mind's own ideas.
The examination of this fundamental dis-
agreement is reserved for the chapter onTRUTH.
Here the identification of kno\ving with having
the truth calls for the consideration of another
distinction, first made by Plato. In his language,
as in that of Aristotle and others, it is the differ-
ence between knowledge and opinion. Some-
times, as with Locke, a silnilar distinction is
made in terms of knovlledge and judgment;
sometimes it is made in terms of knowledge and
belief; sometimes in terms of adequate and
inadequate, or certain and probable, kno
edge.
The difference bet\veenthese opposites, un:-
like that between kno,vledge and error,rsno
matter of truthand falsity. There is such a thing'
as "right opinion," according to Socrates, a
it is "not less useful than knowledge." (1on-
sidering the truth so far as it affects action.
Socrates claims that the man \vith right
"will be just as good a guide if he thinks the
truth, as he ,vhokno\vs the truth." The differ-
ence between right opinion and knowledge
here expressed by the contrast betvveen thewouus
"thinks" and "knows." It does not consist
the truth of the conclusion, but in the way t
conclusion has been reached or is held-by
mind.
The trouble with right opinion as comparea
\vith knowledge, Socrates explains, is that it
lacks stability and permanence. Right opini0I18
are useful "while they abide with us ... }jut
they run a\vay out of the human soul ana
do not remain long, and therefore they are
not of much value until they are fastened
the tie of the cause"-Of, in other words, u
til they are fixed in the mind by thereasoI1s
on which they are grounded.
are bound," Socrates declares, "they haver
nature of kno\vledge and. a they are aD
ing."
At this point in his conversation "vith Me
Socrates makes the unusual confession that "th
are not many things which I profess to kno
but this is most certainly one of them," nam
that "knowledge differs from true opinion.'
rnay be that Socrates claims to know so Iit
because he regards knowledge as involving
much more than simply having the truth,
the man of right opinion has it. In addition
having the truth, knowledge consists in seei
the reason why it is true.
This criterion can be interpreted to mean t
a proposition "vhieh is neither self-evident
demonstrated expresses opinion rather t
knowledge. Even when it happens to be tr
the opinion is qualified by some degree ofdo
or some estimate of probability and coun
probability. In contrast, when the mind has
quate grounds for its judgment, \vhen it kn
that it knows and why, it has the certainty
kno\vledge.
For some writers, such as Plato, certitude is
inseparable from knowledge as truth is. To
eak of "a false knowledge as well as a true"
eros to him impossible; and "uncertain kno\vl-
ge" is as self-contradictory a phrase as "false
owledge."
Others use the word "knowledge" more loose-
.,. to cover .both adequate and inadequate
no\vledge, the probable as ,veIl as the certain.
hey make a distinction within the sphere of
o\vledge that is equivalent to the distinction
etween knowledge and opinion.
Spinoza, for example,. distinguishes three
'nds of kno\Vledge. He groups the perception
individual things through the bodily senses,
bich he calls "knowledge from vague experi-
ee," with knowledge "from signs" \vhich de-
nds on ideas forn1ed by the memory andim-
ination. "These t\vo 'Nays of. looking at
ings," he writes, "I shall hereafter call knowl-
ge ofthe first kind-opinion or imagination."
contrast, that which is derived "from our
ssessing COlnmon notions and adequate ideas
the properties of things,;' he calls "reason
d knowledge of the second kind."
The third kind, vvhich he calls "intuitive
ce," is that sort of knowing which "advances
om an adequate idea of certain attributes. of
od to the adequatekno\vledge of the essence
f things." Knowledge of the second and third
kinds, he maintains, "is necessarily true." That
there can be falsity in the first kind, and only
there, indicates that it is not genuinely knowl-
edge at all, but what other writers would insist
upon calling "opinion."
The several meanings of the word "belief"
are determined by these distinctions. Son1etimes
Beliefis associated with opinion, sometimes with
knovvledge, and sOlnetimes it is regarded as an
intermediate state of mind. Butin,any ofthese
meanings belief stands in contrast to rnake- be-
tieve, and this contrast has a bearing on knowl-
edge and opinion as well. To kno\v or to opine
puts the mind in some Telation to the real or
actual rather than the merely possible, and sub-
jeets it to the criteria of truth and falsity
fanciful or imaginary belongs to the realm of
the possible (or even the impossible) and the
mind in imagining is fancy-free---'free from
the restraints and restrictions of truth and
reality.
883
in its most extreme' form takes
the position rhat there is nothing true or false.
But even those \vho, like 11ontaigne,deny cer-
titude with respect to everything except mat-
ters of religious faith, do not go this far.
In his Apology for Raimond de Sebondehe
concedes that if opinions are weighed as .luore
or less probable, their truth or falsity is implied
-at least as being the limitvvhich an increasing
probability or improbability approaches. Refer-
ring to ancient skeptics of the Acadelnic school,
he comments on the fact that they
edged "some things to be more likely than
ers" -as, for example, that sno\v is \vhite rather
than black. The more extreme skeptics, the
Pyrrhonians, he points out, were bolder and
also more consistent. They refused to incline
to\vardoneproposition lnore than to\vard an-
other, for to do so, lYfontaigne deelares,is to
recognize "some more' apparent truth in this
than in that." Howcanmen"suffer themselves,"
he asks, "to incline to and be swayedbyproba-
bility, if they know not the truth itself? How
should they kno\v the similitude ofthatwhereof
they do not know the essence?"
In this respect Montaigne's o\vn skepticism
tends to be of the more maderate variety, since,
in the realm of action at least, he would admit
the need for judgments of probability. But in
all other respects, he takes a firm skeptical stand
that nothing is self-evident, nothing has been
proved. The contradictory of everything has
been asserted or argued by someone.. " Men can
have no principles," he writes, "if not revealed
to them by the Divini ty; of all, the rest, the be-
ginning, the middle, and the end are notlling
but dream and ... Every human presup-
position and every declaration has as much au-
thori ty, one as another.... 'rhe persuasion of
certainty is a certain testirnony of folly and ex-
treme uncertainty."
The skeptical extreme is represented in the
great books only through references to it for
the purpose of refutation. Aristotle in theMeta-
physics, for example, reportsthe position ofthose
who say that all propositions are true or that all
propositions are false, and who therefore deny
the' principle of contradiction and with it the
distinction bet\veen true and false. But if all
propositions are true, then the proposition
"Soinepropositions are false" is also true; if
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 43: KNOWLEDGE 884
all propositions are false, the proposition "All
propositions are false" is also false. The skeptic
may reply, of course, that he is not checked by
arguments \vhich try to make him contradict
himself, for he does not mind contradicting him-
self. To this there is only one ans,ver, \vhich is
not to argue with the skeptic any further.
From the skeptic's point of vie,v his position
is irrefutable so long as he does not alIo\v him-
self to accept any of the standards by which
refutation can be effected. From his opponent's
point of view complete skepticism isself-refut-
ingbecause if the skeptic says anything definite
at all, he appears to have some kno"rledge or at
least to hold one opinion in preference to an-
other. His only choice is to remain silent. If he
insists upon making statements in defiance of
self-contradiction, his opponent can do nothing
but walk a\vay.
"It may seem a very extravagant attempt of
the skeptics to destroy reason by argument and
ratiocination," Bume writes, "yet this is the
grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes."
I-Ie has in mind the excessive skepticism, or Pyr-
rhonisnl, from which he tries to distinguish a
nlitigated and beneficial form of skepticism. Re-
ferring to Berkeley's arguments against the in-
dependent reality of matter or bodies, Hume
says their effect is skeptical, despite Berkeley's
professed intention to the contrary. That his
arguments are skeptical "appears from this,
that they admit ofno answer and produce no con-
viction. Their only effect is to cause that momen-
tary amazement and irresolution .and confu-
sion, which is the result of skepticism."
I-Iere and elsewhere, as in his comment on
Descartes' skeptical method of doubting every-
thing which can be doubted, Hume does not
seem to think that excessive skepticism is refut-
able or even false. But it is in1practical. "The
great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive
principles of skepticism," he says, "is action,
Ind employment, and the occupations of life."
Extreme skepticism becomes untenable in
thought the mOlnent thought must face the
choices of life and take some responsibility for
action.
There is, ho\vever, "a more mitigated skepti-
cism or academical philosophy ,vhich may be
both durable and useful." This, according to
Hume, consists in becoming "sensible of the
strange infirmities of human unoerstafi1r1ifrC\'
and consequently in "the limitation
quiries to such subj ects as are best
the narro\v capacity ofJluman understanrlir,f'i'
His own vie\v of the extent and
human kno,vledge seems to him to C:XC::mOltjFt,
such mitigated skepticisln in n.npr'1I't'tr.....
only objects with respect to
tion is possible are quantity and number.
ematics has the certitude of kno\vledge,
deals only with relations between
with \vhat I-Iun1e calls "matters of fact
istence." Such matters "are evidently
ble of demonstration." This is the
"moral certainty," which is not a
tainty, but only a degree of pn)balbIl1tv
ficient for action. Probabilities are the
experimental reasoning or inquiry
ters of fact can achieve. If probability
acteristic of opinion rather than
then \ve can have nothing better than
concerning real existences.
DIAl\tfETRICAL opposite to the
skepticism would have to be a rf.-,..nrt"Y\nt-.c"""'
placed no obj ects beyond the reach of
knowledge, \vhich made no distinction
degrees of knowability and admitted
titude in all matters. Like excessive
this extreme is not a position actually
the great books. All the great thinkers
considered the problem of hun1an KnO\vled
have set limits to man's capacity for know,lecf
They have placed certain objects
power to apprehend at all, or have ritc'f-tr'\l'T1'1tC'f,
between those which he can apprehend
inadequate fashion, but cannot
They have indicated other objects r,-,.r'\r"... ntr
\vhich his grasp is adequate and
They all adopt a "mitigated ,J ...
use Hume's phrase-if this can be
avoiding the extremes of saying that
knowable at all and that everything is
knowable. But they differ in the criteria
en1ploy to set the limits of knowledge
distinguish between the areas of
probability. Consequently they differ
determination of the knowability
types of objects, such as God or the
substance or cause, Inatter or spirit, the
the ideal, the self or the thing in itself.
For example, Plato and Aristotle agree that
owledge must be separated from opinion and
en appeal to certain common principles in
aking that separation; but they do not define
e scope of kno,vledge in the same way, as is
dicated by their disagreement about the kno\v-
ility of sensible things. Nor do Descartes
d Locke, Bacon and Spinoza, Hume and
ant agree about the knowability of God or of
e soul or about the conditions any object
st meet in order to be knowable. All alike
oceed from a desire to be critical. Each criti-
es what other men have proposed as kno\vl-
ge and each proposes a new method by which
e.. pursuit of knowledge will be safeguarded
Om illusory hopes or endless controversy.
In this last respect the moderns depart most
dically from their mediaeval and ancient pred-
essors. At all times men have been interested
examining knowledge itself as \vell as in ex-
ising their powers to know. But in the earlier
llase of the tradition knowledge about .knowl-
cfge does not seem to take precedence over all
ther inquiries or to be prerequisite to them.
n the contrary, the ancients proceed as if the
dy ofkno,vledge necessarily presupposed the
istence of knowledge. With them the exam-
ation takes place because the mind is essen-
any reflexive rather than for reasons of self-
'ticism. But beginning with Descartes' Dis-
urse on the Method, in which a method of uni-
rsal doubt is proposed to clear the ground be-
re the foundations of the sciences can be laid,
e< consideration of knowing is put before any
empt to know.
Sometimes, as \vith Descartes and Bacon, the
phasis is upon a new method which "rill at
st establish knowledge on a firm footing or ad-
ance learning. Sometimes, as with Locke and
ume, attention is given first ofall to the facul-
yof understanding itself.
"If \ve can find out," says Locke, "ho\v far
He understanding can extend its views, how
<If it has faculties to attain certainty, and in
hat cases it can only judge and guess, we may
rn to content ourselves with what is attain-
Ie by us in this state.... When we know our
wn strength, we shall the better know what to
ndertake with hopes of success; and \vhen we
ave well surveyed the po\vers ofour o,vn Ininds,
d made some estimate of what we may expect
885
froin theIn, we shall not be inclined either to sit
still, and not set our thoughts to work at all, in
despair of knowing anything; nor, on the oth-
er side, question everything, and disclaim all
knowledge, because some things are not to be
understood. "
Hume also proposes that a study ofhuman un-
derstanding precede everything else, to "sho\v
from an exact analysis of its powers and capac"
ity" what subjects it is or is not fitted to in-
vestigate. "There is a truth and falsehood in all
propositions on this subject which lie not be-
yond the compass of human understanding."
No one can doubt that a science of the mind-
or knowledge about kno\ving-is possible un-
less he entertains "such a skepticismas is entirely
subversive of all speculations, and even action."
Disagreeing with the principles of Locke and
Bume, as ,veIl as with their conclusions, Kant
does approve the priority they give to the ques-
tion of the possibility of knowing certain ob...
jects. To proceed otherwise, as Kant charges
most other philosophers \vith doing, is dogma-
tism. The use of the word "critique" in the ti tIe
of Kant's three major works signifies his inten-
tion to construct a critical philosophy which
does not presume that "it is possible to achieve
anything in metaphysic without a previous crit...
icism of pure reason." He does not object to
\vhat he calls "the dogmatical procedure of rea-
son" in the development of science, but only
after reason's self-criticism has determined just
how far reason can go. For Kant, as for Bacon,
dogmatism and skepticism are the opposite ex-
cesses which only a critical method can avoid.
THESE T\VO different approaches to the theory
of knowledge seem to result in different con-
clusions concerning the nature and scope of hu-
man kno\vledge. Those who begin with the es'"
tablished sciences and merely inquire into their
foundations and methods, appear to end with
unqualified confidence in man's ability to know.
Those who make the inquiry into the founda-
tions and methods of science a necessary prepa-
ration for the development of the sciences, tend
for the most part to set narrower boundaries to
the area ofvalid knowledge. The two approaches
also affect the way in which the various kinds of
knowledge are distinguished and compared.
There are two sorts of comparison involved
THE GREAT IDEi\S
886
in the classification of kinds of knowledge. One
is a comparisonofhuman knowledge withdivine,
or with angelic knowledge and the knowledge
of brute animals. The is a cOluparison of
the parts or modes of human kno\vledge accord-
ing to such criteria as the objects to be known,
the faculties engaged in the process of knowing,
and the manner of their operation. Though
made separately, those two comparisonsaresel-
dam independent of one another. As the nature
of man is conceived in relation to other beings,
superior or inferior to himself, his faculties ,vill
be rated accordingly, and his po\ver as a knower
'\rvill suggest the methods or means available to
him for knowing.
Aquinas, for example, attributestolnan the
kind of knowledge appropriate to his station in
the hierarchy of beings. Man is superior to the
brutes because he has a faculty of reason in ad-
dition to the faculties of sense and imagination
which he shares with them... Man is inferior. to
purely spiritual beings-the angels and God__
because, since he is corporeal, hisintellect can-
not function independently of his bodily senses
and imagination. Unlike the angels and God, he
is not a purely intellectual being.
Accordingly, the essential characteristics of
human knowledge are, first, that it is .always
both sensitive and intellectual, never merely
as with the brutes or pure in-
tellectual intuition as with the angels; second,
thatits appropriate obj ect is the physical world
ofsensible, material things, with respect towhich
the senses enable man to kno'v the existence of
individuals,.while the intellectapprehends their
universal natures; and, finally, that the \vay in
which the human mind knows the natures of
things is abstractive and discursive, for the in-
tellect draws its concepts from sense and imagi-
nationand proceeds therefrombymeansojudg-
ment and .reasoning.
This analysis denies innate ideas. It denies
man's power to apprehend ideas intuitively or
to use, them intuitively in the apprehension,of
things. It can find no place fora distinction be-
tween a priori and. a posterioriknowledge, .. since
sense-perception and rational activity contrib-
ute elements to every act of knowing. Itaflirms
that knowledge is primarily. of real existence,
not of the relations bet\veenideas; but it does
not limit. human knowledge to the. changing
temporal things ofthe material universe.Tl1'
these are the objects man is able to kno\v
greatest adequacy, he can also kno\vsome
of the existence and nature of immateria
eternal beings.
Yet, according to Aquinas, even ,vhen
knovvledge rises above the realm of
able things, it is obtained by the same/nat
processes and involves the cooperationof
senses "vith reason. The theologian does'ib.
ever, distinguish sharply between knowle
gained through man's own efforts andikn.
edge received through divine revelation. III
dition to all knowledge acquired by the nat:
exercise ofhis faculties, man may
by the supernatural gift of knowledge-....th
dam of a faith surpassing reason:
The foregoing summary illustrates,inith
of one great doctrine, the connection be
an analysis of the kinds of kno\vledge
theory of the nature and faculties of ma.l1iii
lation to all other things. There is no poi
this analysis \vhich is not disputed bysom
-by Plato or Augustine, Descartes,Sp
or Locke, by HUlne, .Kant, or Williamy
There are Inany points on which others ag
not only Aristotle and Bacon, but evenA
tine, Descartes, and Locke.
These agreements or disagreementsabou
kinds ofknowledge, or thescopeofhumankn
edge, its faculties, and its methods, selda
cur or are.intelligible except in the wider
text of agreementsand init
ogy and metaphysics, psychology and!
I-Ience most of the rnatters considered unde
heading "kinds of knowledge"receivesp
consideration in other chapters. Thee
References should enable the reader to exa
the presuppositions or context of the mat
assembled here.
THE CULT OF IGNORANCE receives
tention in the tradition of the great
those who, like Rousseau, glorify the
of the primitives, or who satirize
often admixed with human
hIes attending the advance of .a.'"'".A. ...............
seriously question the ancient
men by nature desire to know. Nor
ally doubted that knowledge is
possession contributes to the
CHAPTER.43: KNOWLEDGE 881
the welfare of the state; that its pursuit by trary position, however, does not admit the
individual and its dissemination in a soci- special value ofcontemplation or the separation
should be facilitated by education, by the of truth from utility. To those who say that
port and freedom of scholars and scientists, "the contemplation of truth is more dignified
by every device which can assist men in and exalted than any utility or extent of ef-
municating what they knovv to one an- fects," Francis Bacon replies that "truth and
er. utility are perfectly identical, and. the effects
ut kno\vledge is not valued by all for the are .more of value as pledges of truth than from
e reason. That knowledge is useful to the the benefit they confer on men."
ductive artist, to the statesman, to the legis- Hovv knowledge andaction are related is one
r, and to the individualin the conduct of question; how knowledge itself is divided into
life, seems to be assumed in discussions of the speculative and practical is, quite another.
applications of science in the various arts, Bacon, for example, insistsl1pon the necessity
the consideration of statecraft, and in .. the of distinguishing the speculative.and practical
lysis of virtue. In this last connection,the branchesofnatural philosophy-concerned with
blem is. not whether kn;owledge. is morally "the search after causes and the ppoduction of
ful, but whether knowledge of good and evil effects." Unlike Aristotleaqd Kant he does not
Identical with virtue so that sin and vice re- use the word "practical" for the kind of knowl-
It from error or ignorance. edge which is contained in suchsciences ,1's ethics
If there is a negative opinion here, it consists or politics, but only for the applied sciences or
saying that knowledge is not enough. To technology. Ethics and politics fall under what
ow is not to do. SOlllething more than knovvl- he calls "civil philosophy."
ge is required foracting well. Despite thesedifferenFes in language, the way
the more radical dispute about the value of in which Bacon divides the whole sphere of
owledge concerns the goodness knowledge closely resembles Aristotle's tripar-
its own sake, without any regard to its tech- tite classification of the sciences as theoretic,
al or moral utility. Is the contemplation of productive (or technical), and practical (or
e truth an ultimate end, or does the goodness moral); and, no less, a similar threefold division
knowledge always consist in its power to ef- by Kant. But Kant and Aristotle (and, it should
t results in the mastery of nature and the be added, Aquinas) give a more elaborate analy-
idance of conduct? The utility of knowledge sis of these three types of knowledge, especially
seldom denied by those who make speculative with regard to the principles appropriate to
lsdom and theoretic science good in them- each, the nature of the judgments and reasoning
lves, even the highest goods, quite apart from by which they are developed, and the character
use to which they maybe put. The con- and criteria of their truth.
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
PAGE
The nature ofknowledge: the relation between knower and known; the issue concerning
the representative or intentional character of knowledge 890
Man's natural desire and power to know 891
Principles of knowledge 892
Knowledge in relation to other states of mind
4a. Knowledge and truth: the differentiation of knowledge, error, and ignorance
4b. Knowledge, belief, and opinion: their relation or distinction 893
4C. The distinction between knowledge and fancy or imagination 894
4d. Knowledge and love
889 CHAPTER 43: KNOWLEDGE
PAGH
6d. The classification of knowledge according to the degrees of assent 907
(I) The distinction between certain and. probable knowledge
(2) The types of certainty and the degrees of probability 908
(3) The distinction bet\veen adequate and inadequate, or perfect and im-
perfect knowledge
6e. The classification of knowledge according to the end or aim of the knowing
(I) The distinction between theoretic and practical kno\vledge: knowing for
the sake of knowledge and for the sake of action or production
(2) The types of practical knowledge: the use of kno\vledge in production and
in the direction of conduct; technical and moral knowledge 909
8b. The moral use of knowledge and the moral value of knowledge 912
(I) The knowledge of good and evil: the relation of knowledge to virtue and sin
(2) Knowledge as a condition of voluntariness in conduct 913
(3) Knowledge in relation to prudence and continence 914
(4) The possession or pursuit of knowledge as a good or satisfaction: its relation
to pleasure and pain; its contri bution to happiness
Bc. The political use of knowledge: the knowledge requisite for the statesman,
legislator, or citizen 915
communication of knowledge 916
9a. The means and methods of communicating knowledge
9b. The value of the dissemination of knowledge: freedom of discussion 91 7
growth of human knowledge: the history of man's progress and failures in the
pursuit of knowledge
F of human with other kinds of knowledge
'la. Human and divine knowledge
'lb. Human and angelic knowledge 910
'lc. Kno\vledge in this life compared with knowledge in the state of innocence and
knowledge hereafter
'ld. The knowledge of men and brutes 91 I
use and value of knowledge
8a. The technical use of knowledge in the sphere of production: the applications of
science in art
THE GREAT IDEAS
5. The extent or limits of human knowledge
sa. The knowable, the unknowable, and the unknown: the knowability of
objects
(I) God as an object of knowledge
(2) Matter and the immaterial as objects of knowledge
(3) Cause and substance as objects of knowledge
(4) The infinite and the individual as objects of knowledge
(5) The past and the future as objects of knowledge
(6) The self and the thing in itself as objects of knowledge
Sb. The distinction between what is more knowable in itself and what is
knowable to us
sc. Dogmatism, skepticism, and the critical attitude with respect to the
certainty, and finality of human knowledge
5d. The method of universal doubtas prerequisite to kno\vledge: God's 2"O()Q(leSS
as the assurance of the veracity of our faculties
sc.Knowledge about knowledge as the source of criteria for evaluating claims
kno\vledge
6. The kinds of knowledge
6a. The classification of knowledge according to diversity of objects
(I) Being and becoming, the intelligible and the sensible, the necessary
the contingent, the eternal and the temporal, the immaterial and
material as objects of kno\vledge
(2) Knowledge of natures or kinds distinguished from knowledge of
(3) Knowledge of matters of fact or real existence distinguished from
edge of our ideas or of the relations between them
(4) Knowledge in relation to the distinction between the phenomenal and
noumenal, the sensible and supra-sensible
6b. The classification of knowledge according to the faculties involved in .,..n.".... r"n.,..
(I) Sensitive knowledge: sense-perception as knowledge; judgments of
tion and judgments of experience
(2) Memory as knowledge
(3) Rational or intellectual knowledge
(4) Knowledge in relation to the faculties of understanding, judgment, and
reason; and to the work of intuition, imagination, and understanding
6c. The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of ITn/'"\1:I71Inn-
(I) Vision, contemplation, or intuitive knowledge distinguished from discursive
knowledge
(2) The distinction between immediate and mediated judgments: induction
reasoning, principles and conclusions
(3) The doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence: the distinction between innate
and acquired knowledge
(4) The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge: the
scendental, or speculative, and the empirical
(S) The distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge:
based on sense or reason distinguished from knowledge by faith
through grace and inspiration
888
THEGREAT IDEAS
REFERENCES
1. The nature of knowledge: the relation be-
tween knower and known; the issue con-
cerning the representative or intentional
character of knowledge
7 PLATO: Cratylus, 113e-114a,e / Phaedrus, 124e-
126e esp 126a-e / Meno, 179d-183a esp 180a-b,
182e-183a; 188d-l89b / Phaedo, 228a-230d;
231b-232b / Republic, BK III, 333b-d; BK V,
37lb-373e; BK VI-VII, 383d-398e esp BK VII,
/ Timaeus, 476b / 515d-
517b; 521d-522b; 538d-541a / Seventh Letter,
80ge-B10d
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH7 [6
b
I-6] :11a; [7
b
22-8
a
I2] 12e-13a; CH 8 [Il
a
20-39] 16b-e /
Interpretation, CH I [I6a4-9] 25a / Topics, BK
IV, CH I [I2I
a
I-6] 168d; CH 4 [124bI5-r9] 173c;
[I24b27-34] 173c-d; BK VI, CH 5 [I43
a
9-I2]
196e; CH 6 [I4SaI2-18] 198d; CH 8 [I46a37-b9]
200b-e; CH 12 [I49b3-23] 203d-204a / Physics,
BK VII, CH .3 [247br-248a6] 330b-d / Meta-
physics, BK v, ClI IS [I02Ia27-b3] 542e-d; BK IX,
ClI 6 [r048bI8-34] 574a-c; CH 9 [Io5Ia22-34]
577b-c; BK X, CH I [I053a32-b3] 580a; BK XII,
CH 7 [I072bI4-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 605a-d;
BK XIII, CH 10 [I087aIO-2S] 619c / Soul, BK I,
CH 5 [40gbI8-4Ila7] 639c-641a; BK II, CH 2
[414a4-14] 644a-b; CH 5 [416b32-4I7a2] 647b;
2. Man's natural desire and .power to know
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 125b-e / Theaetetus,,535b-c
/ Sophist, 557e-d / Seventh Letter, 810b-e
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BKVII, CH 3 [247bI-24'8a
9] 330b-d / Nletaphysics, BK I, CHI [980R22-
28] 499a / Soul, BK III, CH 4 [429aI8-20] 661c;
CH 5 [4.3
0aI
4-15] 662e
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH I [I 355
a
;J 4-17]
594b
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, 13K 1[921-934]
12b-e; BK IV [1-9] 44a-b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 2, t06d
14 PLUTARCH: Pericles,
18 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions,BK X, par 10 73d... 74a
/ City of God, BK XI, CH 27, 337d-338a
19 AQUINAS : SumrnaTheologica, PART I, Q12,
A I, ANS SOc-SIc; A 2, ANS and REP I 51c-52c;
AA 3-'6 52c-56a;A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; AlI,
ANS and REP 3 59d-60d; A 12 GOd-6le; Q 14,
A2, REP 3 76d-77d; A 10, REP I 83d-84e; Q 18,
A 2, ANS and REP I lOSe-106b; Q 26, A 2, ANS
150e-151a; Q 54, A 4287b-288a; Q 60, A 2,
ANS 311a-d; Q 61, A 2, REP 3 Q 62,
A I, ANS 317d-31Be; Q 75, A2,ANS 379c-380e;
Q78, A I, ANsand REP 3 407b-409a; Q79 413d-
427a; Q84, AA 1-3 440d-444d; Q88, A I, REP 2
469a-471e; Q 117, A I 595d-597c; PART I-:-II,
Q.3, A8, ANS 628d-62ge; Q22, A I, REP I 720d-
721e
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50,
A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; PART III, Q 10, A 4, REP I
771b-772a; Q II, A I, ANS and REP 1,772b-
773a; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A I, ANS and REP
2,15 102Se-1032b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVI [112-120]
3gb; PURGATORY, XVIII 149-60] 80b-e; xx
[I24]-XXI [75] 84e-8Sd; PARADISE, IV [115]-
V [12] 11ld-ll2b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 63a; 77a; 78d-80a
25MoNTAIGNE: Essays, 244d-246a; S03b-d;5l7b-
S19a
31 DESCARTES : Objectons and Replies, 124b-125b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, DEF 3 373b; AXIOM 2
373d; PART IV, PROP 20-28 43la-c; PART V,
PROP 25-26 458d-459a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH IX,
SECT 7 139a-b
35 BERKELEY: lIuman Knowledge,INTRO, SECT 3
405b-c; SECT l0S 433b-e
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 236b-238a
to 2 CHApTER 43: KNOWLEDGE -891
AA 5-6 79a-8le esp A 5,REP 2-3 6, 40 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par
REP I,380a-81e; A 882e-83b;_A 9, REP 2 I46-e-I4755e:.56a; par 343110d-llla / Philoso-
83b-d; A I2,ANs85d;;.86d; A IS, REP I 89b- phyof History,INTRo,160e-161a
90b; Q IS, A I, ANS 91b-92a; Q 16, A 2 95e- 53 JAMES: Psychology, 128a.,129a; 140b-143b;
9Gb; Q 17, A 3, ANS 102d-103e; QI8, A4, ANS l53b-154a; l76a-184a esp 176a-l78a, 179b-
and REP 2 107d-l08c; Q 19, A 3, REP 6 110b- 180a; 194b-196b esp 196a-b; 213a-239a passim,
llle; Q 27, A I, ANS an.d REP 2 153b-154b; A2, esp 213b-214a, 219a-b, 223a-b, 228a;;.b, 232b-
ANS and REP2.154c-155b;AJ, ANs155e-156a; 238b; 258b-259b; 307a-311a esp307a-308a,
A 4, ANS and REP 2 156b-d;Q 28, A 4, REP I 30ga; 325a-327a esp326a-b [fn I]; 450a-451b;
160e-161d; Q 34, A I, REP 2-3185b-187b; A 2, 454a-455a; 469a-b;.851b-852a
REP I 187b-188a;A 3, ANS Q 54,
A I,REP 3285a-d; A2, ANS and REP 2 285d-
, 286e; QQ 55-57 288d-300b; Q58,A 2 301b-d;
Q 59, A 2.307e-308b; Q60,A 2, ANs311a-d; Q
75, A I, REP 2378b-379c;Q 78, A I, ANS and
REP 3 407b-409a; A 3, ANS 410a-411d;"A 4,
ANS and REP 2 411d-413d; Q82, A J, ANS and
REP I 433e-434e;Q 84 440b-451b; Q85, A I,
REP 3 451e-453c.; A 2 453d..455b; A" 3,REPI,4
455b-4S7a; A4 457a-d; A 5, REP -3 457d-458d;
A 8, REP 3 460b-461 b; Q 86,A I,. ANS 461e-
462a; Q 87, A I 465a-466e;Q 88,. A I, REP 2
469a-471e; Q 89, A2, ANS and REP 2 4.75a-d;
A 6, ANS and REP 2 478b-d; PART I-II, Q 28,
A I, REP 3 740b-741a
20 AQUINAS: Summa -Theologica, PART I-II, Q 50,
A 5, REP I lOb-d; Q 51, A I, REP 2 12b-13e;
PART III SUPPL, Q 82, A3 971a-972d; Q 92, A I
l025c-l032b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d; PART II,
162e; PART IV, 261a; 262a-b
28 HARVEY; On Animal Generation, 332b-333e
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII 18b-25a passim, esp
24a-e; XIV, 29b-e; 30e-d / Meditations, III,
82b-87a passim; VI, 99a-b / Objections and
Replies, 108b-109d; AXIOM V131d-132a; 137a;
219b-e
31 SPINOZA; EthicS,PART I, AXIOM 4,6 355d;
PROP 3-31 366c-367a; PART II, PROP 7
375a-c; PROP II-I3377b-378e; PROP 17,
SCHOL 381b-d
3.5 LOCKE: Human Understanding,BK II, CH XXX,
SECT 2 238b-e; CH XXXI, SECT 2 239b-d; CH
XXXII, SECT 8 244d; SECT 14-16 245e-246b;
BK IV, CH I 307a-30gb; CH IV, SECT 1-12
323d-326d; SECT 18 328d-329a;cH XUI 363e-
364b; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT 8
377b-d
35 BERKELEY: Human KnouJledge, SECT 1-91
413a-431a esp SECT 2-4 413b-414a, SECT 8-9
414c-d, SECT 25-33 417d-419a, SECT 48-49
422a-b, SECT 56 423e-d, SECT 86-91 42ge-
431a; SECT 135-142 440a-441e; ,SECT 147-148
442b-d
35 I-IUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
118, S04d
42 K.ANT: Pure Reason, 7b-d; 12e-d [fn I]; 14a-b;
15d-16e; 22a,c; 23a-24a; 34a-35b; 55a-56c;
88b-9Id; 99a-101b; 10ld-102a;109d-110d;
11Sb-e; 121a-123b; 125b [fn I] / Practical Rea-
son, 292d [fn I]; 307d-310e / Judgement, 550a-
55la,c; 604b-e; 612e-d
[417aI7-2I] 647d; [4I8a2-,-6] 648e-d; BK
CH 2 [425bI7-26] 657d-658a; CH 3 [427aI6-
659c-d; CH 4 661b-662e; CH 5 [430aI4-16] 66
[43oa20-22] 662d; CH 7 [43IaI--8] 663e; CH
664b-d' / Memory and Re1niniscence, CH
[45oa25-45IaI9] 691a-692b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CHI I [II39a6- I
387e
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [26-1
44b-45e; [722-817] 53d-54d
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-4
Third Ennead, TR VIII,CH 6, 132a; CH 8,13
133b; CH 9, 134a-b / Fifth Ennead, TR I,C
210b-C;TR III, CH 4-5 2l7b-218e; CHIb
221b-224b; TR V, CH 1-2228b-229d; TR I
CH 7 249b-c / Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 36-
339c-342c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 11-
74a-81a esp par 17 75e-d, par 19 76a-
par 22-24 76d-77e, par 27-28 78b-d / City
God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b / Christian Doctri
BK II, CH .38, 654e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q3, A
REP I 16a-d; Q 5, A 4, REP I 25d,-26c; Q8, A
REP .3 36b-37e; Q 12, A I, REP 4 SOc-SIc; A
51c-52c; A 4, ANS and REP I 53b-54e; AA 9
58b-59d; Q 13, A 7, ANS and REP 6 68d-70
Q 14, A I, ANS and REP 3 75d-76c; A2 76d-77
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers the passages referred to. For in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 IS the number of the volume In the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in53 JAMES :Psychology,116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half ofpage 116 and ends in the .lower half ofpage I 19. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand sideof the page, the letters e and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. Forexample, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164e, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH
SECT) are sometilnes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE are to.book, chapter; and verse. When the KingJames
and Douay verSIons dIffer In tItle of books or In the numbenng of chapters ot verses, the IZing
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows.; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is disctlssed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. '
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
890
THE GREAT IDEi\S
CHAPTER 43: KNOWLEDGE
892
(2. Man's natural desire andpower to know.)
39 SMITH: Wealth of. Nations, BK v, 335b-c
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 130b; l5ld
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, l57b-
158a
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [354-517] lla-14b;
[522-601] 15a-16b; [1765-1784] 42b
48 MELVILLE: lvfoby Dick, 4b-5a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 522b-525a esp 524b-525a;
711b-712b; 729a-730a; 85lb-852a
54 FREUD: .Origin and Development of Psycho-
Analysis,16b
3. Principles of knowledge
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228a-230c I Republic, BK Ill,
333b-d; BK IV, 350d-35lb; BK VI-VII, 383d-
398c I Theaetetus, 544d-547c I Seventh Letter,
809c-8l0d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, CH 19
136a-137a,e I Physics, BK I, CH I 259a-b; GlI 5
[I88
b
26-I89
a
9] 264b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH
I 499a-500b; BK V, CH I [IOI.3aI4-23] 533b;
CH 6 [IOI6bI8-25] 537b I Soul, BK II, CH 2
[4I3aII-I3] 643a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 [II39
b2
5-34]
388e; CH 6 389d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [690-700]
ge; BK IV [469-521] 50b:..5la
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par I 1a-b; BK
IV, par 25 25e; BK v, par 4 27d-28a; BK x.' par
65 87d-88a; BK XIII, par 46 123a-c I Ctty of
God, BK VIII, CH 4-7 266d-269d; CH 9-10
270d-27ld; BK x, CH 2 299d-300a; BK XI,
CH 7 326a-c; CH 24-25 335e-336d; CH 27-2 9
337b-339b; BK XIX, cn 18 523a-b I Christian
Doctrine, BK I, Gn 37-40 635b-636a,e; BK II,
cn 7 638d,..63ge; BK III, CH 37, 674a-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q2, A I,
ANS and REP 1,3 IOd-11d; QIS 91b-94a passim,
esp A3, ANS 93b-94a; Q18, A2, ANS 105e-106b;
Q 84, AA 4-6 444d-449a; Q 85, A3 455b-457a;
Q 88, A 3, REP I 472e-473a; Q 105, A 3 540e-
54lb; PART I-II, Q I, A 4, REP 2 6l2a-6l3a;
A 5, ANS 613a-614a .
20 AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologtca, PART I-II, Q 50,
A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; Q 51, A I, ANS l2b-13c;
PART III, Q II, A 6, REP 3 775d-776b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVIII
[49-60] 80b-c; PARADISE, IV [28-48] lIla
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 285e-286a
28 HARVEY: On Anin1al Generation, 332a-335e
esp 333d-334d .
30 BACON: AdzJancement of Learntng, 39d-40a;
58b I lVOVU11'l Organum, BK I, APH 14 107d-
l08a; APH 39-40 lOge
31 DESCARTES: Rules, I 1a-2a; IV, 5e-d; 6d; VI,
8d-9a; VIII, l3e-d I Discourse, PART IV 51b-
54b I Meditations, II 77d-81d / Objections and
Replies, 224b,d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-40 386b-
388b
35 LOCKE: Human
SECT 23, 120a; BK II, CH I
esp SECT 1-8 l21a-123a, SECT
CH VII, SECT 10 133a-b; CH IX,
SECT 2 l4la-c; CH!\';X, SECT 8 .l...,. .. .....
XII l47b-148d; CH XIV, SECT
XVII, SECT 22-CH XVIII, SECT I
CH XVIII, SECT 6 174c-d; cn
202c-203a; CH XXV, SECT
217a; BK III, CH I, SECT 5
2,3 305a-b; BK IV, CH I,
308c-309d; CH II, SECT 7-8
SECT 1-2 3l3a; CH VII 337a-344d
337a, SECT 10-II, 339b-340a;
358e-360a; SECT 15 363a-b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge,
4 405c-d; SECT 25 412a,c; SECT
SECT 25-33 4l7d-419a; SECT 89
35 Hur>.IE: Human Understanding,
457b esp DIV 13-14 455d-456b;
49 471e-d; DIV 61, 477e
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338e-339b
42 KANT: Pure Reason,
67d-68a / Practical Reason, 343a I
492c-d; 5l7d [En 2];
570b-572b; 577b; 578a-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right,
lOa
53 JAMES: Psychology, 213b-214a;
3l5a-319a esp 3l7b-3l8a; 360a;
esp 453b-454a, 455a-457a;
54 FREUD: Ego and Id, 700a-701d
4. Knowledge in relation to other
mind
4a.Knowledge and truth: the
of error, and
7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b / l'vfeno,
esp l80d, 181d, 182e-d; l88e-189b
20ld-202d I Gorgias, 256b I ... vv"v",,,... ,
368c-373c; BK VI-VII,
447b-d; 450b-c; 457e-d
I Theaetetus, 535e-,536a;
557e-558b / Laws, BK IX, 748a
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II,
89b I Posterior Analytics, BK
18] 103a; CH 16-18 109b-llle
CH 9 [I47aI6-2I] 201a-b;
202a; CH 14 [I5
Ia
32 -
b
3]
BK II, CH I 511b,d-5l2b;
25-29] 53lc; [IOI2
a
l-I7]
CH 29 546d-547a; BK
550a,c; BK IX, CH 10
eH 10 [I075b20-24] 606c / Soul,
[427aI 6-
b
6] 659c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH
391d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH I
594c-d
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder,
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV
50b-Sla
2 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 5 110b-c
8.AuGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 10 73d-
74a; par .. 19 76a-b; BK XII, par 5 100a-b I
-Christian Doctrine, BK I, CH 36 634d-635b;
BK II, CH 38, 654c
gAQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A I,
REP 1-2 3b-4a; Q 2, A I, ANS and REP 1,,3 10d-
lId; Q 13, A 12, REP 3 74e-75b; Q 14, A 8,
REP 3 82e-83b; A 9, REP I 83b-d; A 12, ANS
and REP 3 85d-86d; A IS, REP 3 89b-90b;
QQ 16-17 94b-l04b; Q 54, A 2, ANS and REP 2
285d-286e; A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A I, REP 2
295a-d; Q 58, A .5 303c-304e; Q 59, A 2, REP 3
'307e-308b; Q 60, A I, REP 3 310b-31Ia; Q 79,
A 9, REP 3-4 422b-423d; Q 84, A 6, REP I
447e-449a; A 7, REP 3 449b-450b; Q 85, A I,
REP I 451c-453c; A 2, ANS 453d-455b; A 6
458d-459c; A 7, ANS 45ge-460b; Q 88, A 3,
REP I 472e-473a; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a-478b;
Q 94, A 4 505a-506a; Q 101, A I, REP 2 522e-
523a; Q 117, A I, A.NS 595d-59o/,c; J>ART I-II,
Q22, A 2, ANS 721c-722e
P.AQUINAS: Sunl1na Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93,
A 2, ANS 216c-217b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92 , A3,
REP 8 1034b-l037e
1 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [115]-
V [I2] 111d-112b
3HOBBEs: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-60a;
78a-d
MONTAIGNE: Essays, 150d-151a; 238e-d
BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 39--45
10ge-l lOb
I.DESCARTES: Rules, I-II la-3b; XII, 24a-e I
Discourse, PART IV, 52a I Meditations, I 75a-
77e; IV 89a-93a / Objections and Replies,
12-6a-b; 168b-d
SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 43, SCHOL
388d-389b
PASCAL: Pensees, 263221a-b; 327 231a-b I
Vacuum, 358b
?LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH v
329a-331b esp SECT 8-9 330d-331a; CH VI,
SECT 16 336d; CH xx, SECT I, 388d
KANT: Pure Reason, 224a-e
HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 7a; INTRO,
par I 9a; PART II, par 140, 52e-54a
JAMES: Psychology, l4la-142a
FREUD: General Introduction, 560e-561a /
New Introductory Lectures, 879c-d
:Knowledge, belief, and opinion: their re-
lation or distinction
THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 353d-
354b
PLATO: Cratylus, 113c-114a,c I Phaedrus, 125a-
126e I Sy'nposium, 163b / Meno, 188b-189a /
Gorgias, 256b-257a / Republic, BK IV, 354d-
355a; BK V, 370c-373c; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c;
BK X, 430d-431d / Timaeus, 447b.. d; 450b-c;
457c-d / Theaetetus, 531a-532a; 534a; 536b-
549d / Sophist, 559c-561d / Philebus, 632d-
635a
893
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [8a35-bI4] 13b-e
/ Prior Analytics, BK I,CH 13 [32b4-23] 48b-dl
Po.' terior BK I, CH 2 [7Ib8-I6] 97d-
9Sa; CH 33 121b-122a,c I Topics, BK IV, CH I
[I2I
a
20-26] 169a-b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH
4 [Io08b27-32] 528b; BK VII, CH 15 [I039b3I-
I04oa8] 563d-564a; IX, GH 10 577c-578a,c
I Soul, BK III, CH 3 [427aI6-428b9] 659c-660d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [I094bI2-28]
339d-340a; BK III, CH 2 [III2a7-8] 357d; BK
VI, CH 3 [II39
bI
4-I8] 388b; CH .5 [II40333-b4]
389b; [II4ob25-28] 389c; CH 9 [I I 42332-bI 6]
391c-d passim; CH 10 392b-c; BK VII, CH 3
[II46b23-34] 396d-397a I Rhetoric, BK II, CH
25 [I402bI3-1403317] 652b-653a
10 HIPPOCRATES: The Law, par 4 144d
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-d
17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR IX, CH 7 249b-c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par I la-b; BK
VI, par 5--S 36b-37c / City of God, BK XXII,
CH 4-5 588b-590a; CH 7 591c-d / Christian
Doctrine, BK I, CH 40 636a,c; BK II, CH 7
638d-639c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I,A 8,
REP 2 7c-8d; Q 12, A 7, ANS and REP 2-3 56a-
57b; A 13, REP 3 61e-62b; Q 14, A 15, REP 3
89b-90b; Q 16, A 8 99d-l00d; Q 57, A 3, ANS
297b-298a; Q 79, A 9, REP 3-4 422b-423d;
Q 108, A 7, REP 2 560b-561a; PART I-II, Q 17,
A 6, ANS 690b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 51,
A3 14b-15a; Q 53, A I, ANS 19d-21a; Q57, A2,
REP 3 36a-37b; Q 67, A 3 83b-84d; Q 77, A 2,
REP 3 145d-147c; PART II-II, Q I, AA 4-5 382c-
384b; Q 2 390d-400b; Q 4, A I
PART III, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, XX [67-
148] 137b-138b esp [88-93] l37c
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA
29 92b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 58d-59a; 65b-
66c; PART III, 241c-242a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 98b-99a; 150c-
ISla; 238e-23ge; 240c-246a; 258e-26le; 267c-
268a; 271b-273b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333e-d;
335a-b
30 BAcoN: Adt'allcement ofLearning, 16a-b; 95d-
96a
31 DESCARTES: Rules, II-III 2a-5a / Discourse
PART VI, 64a-d / Meditations, 72b,d; I 75a
77c; V, 95b-96a I 'Objections< 'and Replies
123a-d; 167a-d; 2l8e-d; 226d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-
372d; PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b;
PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d
32 MILTON: Areopagitica, 406a-b
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 99 191a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT
2-5 93b-94d; BK I, CH III, SECT 23-25 l19b-
120d; BK IV, CH I, SECT 2 307a; CH II, SECT 14,
312b; CH VI, SECT I3335e-d; CH XIV-XV
THE GREAT IDEAS
895
31 DESCARTES: Rules, II 2a-3b; VIII, 12a-14a;
XII, 22b-c / Meditations, IV,90a-b/ Objections
and Replies, 112a-d; 215a-b
31 SPINOZA:Ethics, PART I, PROP 30 366c-d;
APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART II, AXIOM 5 373d
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [544-57
6
]
187a-b; BK VII [109-IJo] 219b-220a; BK VIII
[114-
1
3] 234b-235a; [179-214] 236a-b / Sam-
son Agonistes [60-67] 340b-341a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 263 221a-b
35 LOCKE: HU1nan Understanding, INTRO, SECT
3-7 93d-95c; BK II, CH I, SECT r-8 121a-123a;
SECT 24 127b-c; CH II, SECT 3 128b-c; CH VII,
SECT 10 133a-b; CH XIV, SECT26 160c-d CH xv
SECT II 165a-b; CH XXII, SECT 9
CH XXIII 204a-214b passim; CH XXXI, SECT
6-
1
3 240d-243b; CH XXXII, SECT 24 247c-d;
BK III, CH III, SECT 15-18 258b-259c; CH VI
268b-283a passim; BK IV, CH III 3I3a-323d;
CH VI, SECT 4-16 331d-336d oassimCH VIII
SECT 9 347d-348a; CH X, I; 354a-c;
CH XII, SECT 7-13 360b-362d; CH XVI, SECT
12 370b-371a; CH XVII, SECT 9-10 377d-378aj
SECT 23 380b-c; CH XVIII, SECT 7 383b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
2-3 405b-c; SECT 81 428c-d; SECT 89 430b-c
35 HUME: HU1nan Understanding, SECT I, DIV
7-
10
453c-455b; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b-c
SECT VIII, DIV 62, 478c; SECT IX, DIV 84:
488b [fn I]; SECT XII 503c-509d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 159a-c; 308c-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 19d-20c;117b-
l18a; 120c-121a; 175b [fn I]; 215d-216c;
224a-c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals,
281c-282d; 285a-287d / Practical Reason
292a-c; 296a-d; 30gb; 337a-c; 354d-355d
/ Judgement, 465a-c; 564a-c; 599d-600d;
604a-b
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [672-675] 18a; PART II
[11,441-'452] 278b
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 366a-b
53 JAMES: Ps,ycllology, 1I6a-11gb esp 117b, 119b;
122b; 656b-657a; 822b
54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 383b-c
5a(1) God as an object of knowledge
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33 :12-23 / Deuteron-
omy, 34:10 / I Chronicles, 28:9-(D) I Parali-
pomenon, 28:9 / fob, 11:7-9; 26:14; 36:
26
;
3
8
:
1
-4
2
:
6
/ Psalms, 19:1-4; 46:10; 83:18; 100:3
--(D) Psalms, 18:1-5; 45:11; 82:19; 99:3 /
Prover.bs, 2:5 / Ecclesiastes, 3:11; 8:16-17; Ir:S
/ [salah, 1r:9; 49:22-26; 60:I6-(D) Isaias,
Ir:9; 49:
22
-
2
.6; 60:16 / Jeremiah, 24:7; 31:34
-(D) jeremlas, 24:7; 31:34 / Ezekiel, 6:9-
10,13-1 4; 28:22-26-(D) Ezechiel, 6:9-10,13-
14; 28:22-26 / Hosea, 2:20; 6:2-3,6-(D)
Osee, 2:20; 6:3,6
ApOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 8:1-4; 9:
1
3-
16; 13 a-9-(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 8:1-:-4;
9:
1
3-
16
; 13:1-9 / II Maccabees, 7:28-,..-(D)
OT, II Machabees, 7:28
CHAPTER 43; KNOWLEDGE
Q 86, A I,REP 2 184a-d; PART II-II, Q 23, A 6,
REP I 487a-d; Q 27, A 4 523c-524a
21DANTE: Divine CoInedy, PURGATORY, XVII
[1--75J 78c-79b; PARADISE, IV [115]-V [12]
I11d-112b; XXVI [25-36] 146a; XXVIII (88-
114] 149c-150a
26 SHAKESPEARE: Love's Labour's Lost, ACT IV,
SC III [289-365] 271c-272a
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 227b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II,AX10M 3 373d;
PROP 4
8
-49 391a-394d; PART v, PROP 24-33
458d-460c; PROP 34, COROL 460d;PROP 35-37
460d-461c; PROP 42 463b-d
33PASCAL: Geolnetrical Demonstration, 440a
The extent or limits of human knowledge
. The knowable, the unknowable, and the
unknown: the knowability of certain
objects
7 PLATO: ,Men, 179d-183a esp 180a I Parmen-
ides, 489d-491a; 492a-S04c esp 495b-c, 504c;
507c-d; S09d-S10b esp SlOb; 511c-d / Theaete-
tus, 544c-547c I Sophist, 560a-b
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 3 [!6bI9-26]
25d-26a / Physics, BK II, CH 4 [I97
a
5-7] 273a
/ Metaphysz"cs, BKI, CH 2 [982a3o_b3] 500c:..d;
BK VI, CH 2 548c-549c; BK VII, CH 10 [
I0
36a
9-12] 559c; CH 15 563c-564c
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH 5 [644b
21-64S
a
5] 168c-d
2 EPICTETUS: Discour$es, BK II, CH 20 164c-
166c
7 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead,' TR III 215d-226c
esp CH 13 223d-224b
8 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 1-6 1a.;.2c
/ City ofGod, BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XII, CH 7
346c-d; BK XXI, ClI 5 563d-564d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q3, A4,
REP 2 16d-17c; Q 5, A 2, ANS 24b-25a;Q 12,
A I SOc-SIc; Q 14, A 3, ANS 77d-78b; A 10,
ANS and REP 4 83d-84c; Q 16, A 3 96b-d; Q50,
A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 55, A I, REP 2 289a-d;
Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 79, A 3 416a-
417a; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; Q 87 464d-
468d passim
oAQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 10,
A 3 769d-771b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A I
l025c-1032b
1 DANTE: Divine C01nedy, HELL, VII [61-9
6
]
10b-c; PURGATORY, III [16-451 56a-b; PARA-
DISE, XIX [22-99] 135b-136a; XXI [73-102]
139a-b
5 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 98b-99a; 238c-
239c; 246a-261c passim; 271 b-273a; 291b-
294b; 439c-440a
7SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC I [5
6
-
88
]
47c-d
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 363d-364a;
389b; 492c
oBAcoN: Advancement of Learning, 2c-:-4c;
96d-97b / Novum Organum, BK I, APH I 107a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 17, COROL 3
PROP 17, SCHOL-PROP 18 381b-382b; PRo
384a.,.b; PROP 40, SCHOLl 387b-388a;PROP'
389b-390a; PROP 49, SCH?L 391d-394d passi
PART V, PROP 34 46Qc-d
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK V [95-'-128] 1770
178a; BK VIII [179-197] 236a-b
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 82-86 186b-189a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CR x.x.
238a-239b; BK IV,CH IV, SECT 1-12 323
326d passim, esp SECT 1-3 323d-324c; S}:CT
328d-329a; CHV, SECT 7-8 330b-d
35 BERKELEY: HU1J1an KnotlJledge, SECT 29-30
418c; SECT 33 419a; SECT 36 419c:..d; SECT 82
428d-429a;' SECT 84 429b-c; SECT 86 429c-d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT V, D
39-40 466c-467c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 345c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 173b-174a I ]udgeme
528c-529c; 532b-d; 575b-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of l-listory, PAR.TI,22
221a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 639a-641a;
659a-660b
4d. Knowledge and love
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 126a-129d /
164d-165b; 167a-d
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR Ill, CH 2 10
Third Ennead, TR v, CH 3, 102a-b; CH 7,10'
/ Sixth Ennead, TR VII, CH 34-35 338b-3
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK I, par 1-6'la
BK x, par 33-35 79d-80c; par 38 81a; BK
par 3 89d-90a / City of God, BK VIII; CH 4
267c-268b; CH 8-10 270a-271d; BK x, C
300b-301a; BK XI, CH 7 326a-c; CH25
336b-339b; BK XIV, CH 28 397a-d / Chris
Doctrine, BK I, CH 36-4 634d-636a,c;BK
CH 7 638d-639c; CH 38, 654c; CH 41
656a-d I
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q I,
REP 3 6b-7a; A 8, REP 2 7c-8d; Q8, A3,'R
36b-37c; Q 12, A 6, ANS 55b-56a; A 7, R
56a-57b; Q 14, A 15, REP I 89b-90b; Q 16,
ANS 94b-95c; A 4 esp ANS and REP 1-2 9
Q23, A 4 135a-d; Q27, AA 3-5 155c-157c;
A 4, ANS 160c-161d; Q 30, A 2, REP 2 1
16gb; Q 35, A 2, ANS 189d-190d; Q 36,
ANS and REP 4-5 192a-194c; Q 37 197c-2
Q 59, A2 307c-308b; Q 60, A I, REP 3.31
311a; A 2 311a-d; A 3, ANS and REP 3 31
312b; A 5, REP 5313b-314c; Q 64, A I,
334a-335c;Q 78, A I, ANS and REP 3 4
409a; Q 82, A 3, ANS and REP 3 433c-434
87, A I, REP I 465a-466c; Q 93, AA 7-8 4
500c; PART I-II, Q I, A 8 615a-c; Q3, A4 6
626b; Q 22, A 2, ANS 721c-722c; Q 27,
737d-738c; Q 28, A I esp REP 3 740b.. 1
A 2, ANS and REP 2 741a-742a; A 3, ANS
REP 1 742a-d; A REP 2 742d-743c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II,
A 5, REP I 10b-d; Q 66, A 6, REP I 80c:'
894
(4. Knowledge in relation to other states oj mind.
4b. Knowledge, belief, and opinion: their
relation or distinction.)
364b-366c esp CH xv, SECT 1-3 365a-d; CH XVI,
SECT 14 371b-c; CHXVII, SECT 2 371d-372b;
SECT 14-,..24 378c-380d passim; CH XVIII-XIX
380d-388d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-
463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30
461d-462b; SECT VI, 469d [fnI]
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 165a-b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335d-336a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 2a-4a,c; 228c-d;240b-
243c / Judgement, 601d-607c esp 601d-602a,
603a-b,603d-604b, 604d-606d
43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF 1a-7dpas-
sim; INTRO, par 1 9a; PART II, par 132, 46b-c;
PART III, par 147 55d-56a; par 316 104c; ADDI-
TIONS, I 115a-d
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK I, 11a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 636a-638bpassim
54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661c-
662a / New Introductory Lectures, 881d"882b
4c. The distinction between knowledge and
fancy or imagination
7 PLATO: Ion, 142a:"148a,c / Republic, BK VI-
VII, 383d-389c; BK X, 427c-431d ,esp 430b-
431b / Sophist, 577a-b /Laws, BK IV, 684b-c
/ SetJenth Letter, 809b-810b
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul" BK III, eH 3659c-661b
14 PLUTARCH: Coriolanus, 191d-192b
,18 AUGUSTINE: Conftssions, BK III, par 10-1I 15b-
16a
19 AQUINAS: SU1n1na Theologica, PART I,Q' 12,
A 3, ANS and REP 3 52c"53b; A I I, REP I 59d-
60d; A 13, ANsand REP 2 61c-62h;Q 17, A 2,
REP 2 102a-d; Q 54, A 5 288a-d;Q 57, A I,
REP 2295a-d; Q 78, A4, ANS 411d-413d; Q84,
A2, REP 1 442b-443c; A 6, REP 1......2 447c-449a;
A 7, REP2 449b-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b-45lb;
Q 93, A6, REP 4 496h-498a; PART I-II, Q 17,
A 7, REP 3 690d-692a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
Q 70, A 2, REP 3 896a-897d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVII
[13-45] 78c-79a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 335a-c
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 189d-
193c; PART II, 205a-209d; 273c-278a; 326c-
331a
30 BACON: Advancement ofLearning, 32d;33c-d;
38d-39b; 55a-d / Novum Organum, BK I, APH
15 108a; APH 60 112c-113a / New Atlantis, 203a
31 DESCARTES : Rules, III, 4a-b; VIII, 13a; 14b;
XIV, 29b-31c / Discourse, PART IV, 53b; 54a-b
/ l'vfeditations, I, 75d-76c; II, 79a-81d;III,
82d-86a; VI 96b-l03d passim,esp 96b-d /
Objections and Replies, 122c-d; 136d-137a;
212a; 218c.,.d; 219b-c
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 43: KNOvVLEDGE 896
(Sa. The knowable, the unknowable, and the un..
known: the knowability oj certain objects.
Sa( 1) God as an object oj knowledge.)
NEW TESTAMENT: John, 1:1-5,18; 14:7-11 ; 17:25-
26 / Acts, 17:22-31 / Romans, 1:18-21; I 1:33-
36 / I Corinthians, 2:16; 8:1-7; 15:34 / II
Corinthians, 4:6 / Ephesians, 1:17; 3 :2-5 /
Colossians, 1:9-15 / I Timothy, 6:14-16 /
Hebrews, 8:11; 11:3 /1John, 4:7-21
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b
5 EURIPIDES: Helen [II37-IISO] 309a
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 447c
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b28-
983aII] SOla-b; BK XII, CH 8 [1074bl'-14]604d-
60Sa
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, S3b-c / Coriola-
nus, 191d-192b
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR VIII, CH 9, 133d-
134b / Fifth Ennead,TR I, CH I 208a-c; TR III,
CH 13-14, 224a-c; TR V, CH 6 231b-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X, par 7-38
73a-81a; par 65 87d-88a; BK XIII, par 17-19
IISa-d / City of God, BK VIII, CH 10 271a-d;
BK XI, CH 2 323a-c; BK XXII, CH 29 614b-616d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A I
A 7, REP I 7a-c; Q 2, AA 1-2 10d-12c;
Q 3, A 3, REP 1 16a-d; A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; A 5
17c-18b; QQ 12-13 SOb-7Sb; Q 32 175d-180d;
Q 42, A 2, REP 1,4 225d-227a; Q S0, A 2, ANS
270a-272a; Q56, A 3 294a-d; Q 57, A 5 299b-
3001:;); Q 84, A 5 446c..44Vc; A 7, REP 3 449b-
4S0b; Q 86, A 2, REP 1 462a-463a; Q 88, A 2,
REP 4 471c-472c; A 3' 472c-473a; Q 89, A 2,
REP 3 475a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 93,
A2 216c-217b; PART III, Q 9, A 3, REP 3 765b-
766b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1 1025c-l032b
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, III [16-
45] 56a-b; PARADISE, II [37-45] 108a; IV [28-
48] lIla; XIX [22-99] 135b-136a; xx [13-148]
138a-b; XXI [73-102] 139a-b; XXXIII [46- 145]
156c-157d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 54b-c; 78d-79a;
PART II, 162a-163b; PART IV, 271b-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 98b-99a; 208c-209c;
212a-d; 238c-239c; 246a-257d passim
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 17b-
20a; 38a; 45a-46a; 95d-l0ld esp 96d-97b,
99c-100a
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV 51b-54b pas-
sim / Meditations, 69b-d; 74a,c; III 81d-89a;
IV, 8gb; V 93a-96a / Objections and Replies,
l08a-114c; 120c-d; 121a-123a; 127b-c; POSTU-
LATE V 131b-c; PROP I-III 132b-133a; 211c-
212a; 213a; 213d-214a; 215b-c; 227b-c
31 SPINOZA: E.thics, PART I, PROP II, SCHOL 358d-
359b; PART II, PROP 1-2 373d-374a; PROP 47
390c-391a; PART V, PROP 24-32 458d-460b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VII [19-13] 219b-
220a; BK VIn [114-13] 234b-235a / Samson
Agonistes [60-62] 340b-341a; [293-325] 346a-b
33 PASCAL: Pensees,
esp 233-241
34 NE\VTON: Principles, BK III, .... ",,>.,
370b-371a
35 LOCKE: llunzan Understanding,
SECT 12, 107c-d; cil III, SECT
BK II, CH XVII, SECT I
172b-c; CH XXIII, SECT
passim; BK III, CH VI, SECT II
CH X 349c-354c passim
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge,
SECT 146-156 442a-444d
35 H UME: Hunzan Understanding,
456b; SECT XI 497b-503c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, ..
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 33a-d; I "?In-II .... _'I
153c; 177b-179c; 186d-187a; IYUH-I'4"/.n
223d; 239a-c; 241d-242c /
291a-292c; 348b-352c / Intro. LVlt'tap'!ZVStC
lvforaIs, 384a,c / Judgen1ent,
589c; 603b-607c esp 606d-607c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History,
160b; PART IV, 349h-350a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, .lYl:10I\.IIh'
BK XV, 630d-631c
5a(2) Matter and the immaterial as
knowledge
7 PLATO: Ti,naeus, 456a-458a
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH 7
/ Meteorology, BK IV, CH 12
Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [99Ia8-II]
VII, CH 10 [1036a2-12] 559b-c; BK
[1046b7-IS] 571c-d / Soul, BK I, CH
2S-
b
I9] 632b-d
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK 1
4b-5a; [418-448] 6b-c
17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIII, CH
/ Second Ennead, TR IV, CH 10
54c-55b; TR V, CH 4-5 59c-60c
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XI-XII
/ City of God, BK XI, CH 3 323d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,
8d-9c; Q 12, AI, REP 2 SOc-SIc; A
51c-52c; Q 13, A 12, REP 3
A II 84c-85c; Q IS, A3, REP 3-4
A5, REP 3 97c-98b; Q29, A2, REP
Q 54, A 4, ANS and REP 2
291d-294d; Q 57, AA 1-2 295a-297a;
REP 3 388c-391a; Q 84, A 7, ANS
449b-450b; Q 85, A 1 451c-453c; Q
ANS and REP 3-4 461c-462a; A 2, REP I
463a; A 3 463b-d; Q 87, A I, ANS
Q 88 468d-473a; Q 89, A 2 475a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART
A I, REP 2 772b-773a; Q 12, A I, REP
777b; PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A I, ANS
12 1025c-l032b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART III, 172a-d;
269c-270c
30 BACON: Advancenzent of Learning,
43d-44c
DESCARTES: Meditations, 74a,c; I-II 75a-81d
II, 81b-c / Objections and Replies, 120b-c;
POSTULATE II 131a; 152b,d-155d
PASCAL: Pensees, 72, 184a-'"b
LOCKE: Hurt1an Understanding, BK II, CH XV,
SECT II 165a-b; CH XXIII 204a-214b passim,
esp SECT 5 205a-b, SECT IS 208c-d, SECT 29
211d-212a; BK III, CH VI, SECT 11,-12 271b-
272b; CH XI, SECT 23 305a-b; BK IV, CH III,
SECT 6 313c-315b; SECT 9-17 315c-317c pas-
sim, esp SECT 17 317c; SECT 23-27 320a-322a;
CH VI, SECT 14 335d-336b; CH X, SECT 19
354a-c; CH XI, SECT 12 357c-d; CH XVI, SECT
12 370b-371a
BERKELEY: Human Knoufledge, SECT 16-20
416a-417a; SECT 25-27 417d-418b; SECT 86-89
429c-430c esp SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 135-148
440a-442d
Hll1nan Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
123 506a
SMITH: TVealth of Nations, BK V, 336b-c
KANT: Pure Reason, 186b-d / Practical Reason,
319c-321b / Judgement, 603a-d
Cause and substance as objects of know1-
edge
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 4 [I9
6b
S-7]
273a / lvfetaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [983aS-IO] 501b;
BK III, CH 2 [996aI8-b26] 514d-515b; CH 4
[999U24-29] S18a; eH 6 [IOOJ
a
S'-17] 'S21d-
522a,c; BK VII, CH 15 563c-564c; BK XI, CH 2
[I060
b
20-23] 588d; BK XII, CH 10 618c-619a,c
ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK II, CH
6 [742bI7-3S] 283d-284a
LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK V [526-
533] 67d-68a; BK VI [73-7111 89c-d
COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the HeatJenly
Spheres, 505a-506a
PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH II 348b-c
AQUINAS: Sum1na Theologica, PART I, Q 12,
A8, ANS 57b-58b; Q 19, A 5, REP 2 112d-113c;
Q29, A I, REP I,] 162a-163b; Q 56, A I, REP 2
292a-d; Q 57, A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 77, A I,
REP 7 399c-401b; Q 84, A 7, ANS 449b-450b;
Q 86, A I, ANS 461c-462a
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 49,
A2, REP 3 2b-4a
DANTE: Divine C01nedy, PURGATORY, III [24-
45] 56a-b; XVIII [49-60] 80b-c
f-IOBBES: Leviathan" PART I, 78a-80c; PART IV,
271c-272c
MONTAIGNE: Essays, 271 b-272c; 497d-498a
BACON: Advance1nent of Learning, 45a-46a /
Novurn Organum, BK II, APR 2 137b-c / New
Atlantis, 210d
DESCARTES: IV, 90a-b / Objec-
tions andReplies, 108a-112a; 209c-210b; 211 b-c;
215a-b
SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 3-4 355b; AXIOM
355d; PROP 8, scnOL 2 356d-357d; PROP 10
r'.--.'- .... l .. I.'I.L"- 369b-372d; PART IV, PREF,
897
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 184-241 205a-217b passim,
esp 233-241 213b-217b
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL,
371h-372a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III,
SECT 19 117c-d; BK II, CH XIII, SECT 17-20
152a-d; CH XXI, SECT 1-6 178b-180a; CH XXIII
204a-214b passim, esp SECT 2 204b-c, SECT 5
205a-b, SECT IS 208c-d, SECT 28-29 211 b-
212a; CH XXV, SECT II-CH XXVI, SECT 2
217a-d; CH XXXI, SECT 6-13 240d-243b; CH
XXXII, SECT 24 247c-d; BK III, cH III, SECT
15'-18 258b-259c; CH VI 268b-283a passim,
esp SECT 7-10 270b-271b; CH IX, SECT 11-17
287d-290a; CH XI, SECT 19-25 304b-306c esp
SECT 22 30Sa; BK IV, CH III, SECT 9-17 315c-
317c; SECT 24-29 320c-323a esp SECT 29 322c-
323a; CH IV, SECT 12 326c-d; CH VI, SECT 4-16
331d-336d; CH VIII, SECT 9347d-348a; CH XII,
SECT 9-12 360d-362c; CH XVI, SECT 12, 370b-c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 101-'-102
432c-433a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT III, DIV
I8-SECT VIII, DIV 74 457c-484c passim;
SECT XI, DIV l0S 498d-499a; DIV 115 503b-c;
SECT XII, DIV 127 507b-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15a-b; 17c-d; 46d-47c;
57c-d; 58d-59b; 63d-64a; 76c-83b esp 81b-
83b; 86c-d; 95a-d; 99a-l00d esp 100c-d; 110b;
133a; 140b,d-145c; 171a-172c; 214b,d [fn I] /
Fund. Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 267d-268a;
285c-286a / Practical Reason, 294c-295d;
302a-d; 313b-314d / Judgement, 550a-551a,c;
556b-c; 557c-558b; 564a-c; 574a-b; 584c-d;
611d-613a,c
45 FOURIER: Theory of fleat, 169a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 563a-b;
EPILOGUE I, 646c-647b passim; 650b-c; EPI-
LOGUE II, 693c; 694d-695c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 89b-90a; 885b-886a
5a(4) The infinite and the individual as objects
of knowledge
7 PLATO: Philebus, 610d-617d
8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [2
b
6-37] 6c-7a /
Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 31 120a-c /
Physics, BK I, CH 4 [I87
b
7-I4] 262d; CH 5
[189US-7] 264b-c; CH 6 [I89UII-19] 264c; BK
III, CH 6 [207UZI-3I] 285c-d; BK VII, CII 3
[247
b
3-7] 330b / Metaphysics, BK II, CH 2
[994
bI
7-30] 513a-b; BK III, CH 4 [999U24-29]
518a; CH 6 [Io03aS-'17] 521d-522a,c; BK VII,
CH 10 [I036a2-7] 559b-c; CH IS 563c-564c;
BK XI, CH 2 [I060
b
20-23] 588d; BK XIII, CH
10 618c-619a,c
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [I3S6b28-3S]
596b-c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithn1etic, BK I, 812a
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VI, CH 3 311c-
312b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VII, par 20-21
49d-50a; BK XII, par 3-6 99d-l00c
THE GREAT IDEAS
899
Q 12, A I, ,ANS and REP 250c-51c;AA 7';'8 S6a-
58b; Q I362b-75b passim; Q50, A2,ANS 270a-
272a; Q.85, A 3 455b-457a; A 8 460b-461b;
Q 88, A I, REP 469a-471c
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV 51b-54b /
Meditations, 69b-d; II 77d-81dpassin1; IV,
8gb; V 93a-96a / Objections and Replies,
POSTULATE II 131a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 47, 390c-d
42 KANT: Judgement, 601d
5c. Dogmatism, skepticism, and the critical
attitude with respect to the extent, cer-
tainty, and finality of human knowledge
7 PLATO: Euthydelnus 65a-84a,c. /. Cratylus,
86b-d / lv/ena, 179b-180b / Apology,203a /
Phaedo, 236c-238a / Timaeus, 447b-d /
Theaetetus, 521d-526b
8, .Analytics, BK I, CH 13
[3
2
+-23] 48b-d/Posterior Analytics, BK I,
CH I [7
Ia26
]-CH 2 [72b4] 97c-99a; CH 6 102b-
103c; CH 33 121b-122a,c / HeavensBK II
CH 5 [287b29--288a3] 379b-c / and
.Corruption, BK I, CH 2 [3I6aS-I4] 411c-d /
Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5-6 528c-531c; BK X,
CH I [I053a3I-b3JS80a; CH 6 [I057a7-II] 584b;
BK XI, CH 6 [I062
b
I2-I063bI 4] 590d-592a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK 1, CH 3
339d-340a; CH 7 [I098a20_b2] 343c-d0 BK II
b ..' . ., ,
CH 2 [II03267II04a9] 349b-c;.BK VI,CH 3
388b-c
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [4
6
9-5
21
]
50b-51a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses,. BK II, CH 17 158d-
16la; CH 20 164c-166c; BK III, CH 2, 177c-178bo
ell 21 193d.,.195a '
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 1932b-c /
City of God, BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
19 AQUINAS: Sumn1a Theologica, PART I,Q I, A I
3b-4a; A 5, ANS and REP I Sc,,6a; .Q 84, A I,
ANS 440d-442a; Q 85, A 2, ANS 453d-455b;
Q 86, AA 1-3 461c-463d; Q 87, A I 465a-466c.
Q 88, A I 469a-471c ' ,
20 AQUINAS: SU1nma Thealogica, PART I-II, Q
6
4,
AA 3-468b-70a; PART Q 4, A 8 409a-d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 65c; PART IV,
267a-b
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BKJU,
197b-200a "
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 208a-294,b esp
240c-246a, 253c-254a, 257d-264a, 269d-279c,
285c-294b; 308c-d; 318a-319b; 439c-440a;
497b-S02c; 516b-524a
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREP, lc-2a
28 HARVEY: /
On Animal Generation, 411c-d
30 BAcoN: Advancelnent o/Learning, 13a-c; 15a-
17b lSd-16b; 47d-48d; 57d-58b I Novum
PREP, l05a-l06d; HI< I, APR 37
109b-c; APH 67 115d-116a; APE 75 118b-d;
APH 95 126b-c; APH 126 134b
to 5c CHAPTER 43:KNOWLEDGE
12 AURELIUS : Medita!ons, HK XI,SECT I; 302a
17 PLOTINUS: ThirdEnnead, TR IX, CH 3, 137c-d
f Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 2 159d-160b /
Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH r-8 215d-220d
18 AUGUSTINE: .. c;onftssions,BK x, par 7 73a ; par
21-
2
5 76c-77d; parAI / Citx,oj God,
BK XI, CH 26 336d-337b
19 AQUINAS: SUlnrna Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 2, REP 1,3 76d-77d; Q 56,A I 292a-d; Q 7
8
,
A 4, REP2 411d-413d; Q 87 464d-468d; Q 88,
A I, REP I 469a-471c; A 2, REP 3 471c-472c;
Q 89, A 2, ANS 475a-d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 332b
30 BACON: Advancenlent of Learning, 88c-89b
31 DESCARTES: lvleditations, II 77d-81d esp
81 b-c / Objections and Replies, POSTULATE II
131a; 209d-210a; 215b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 19-30 382b-
383c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CHIX,
SECT 2-3 349a-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality,., 362c
42,KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-4a,cesp Ib-d; 7d-8b;
9a-IOb; 12c-d [fn I]; 32a-c; 49c-SOc; 51b-c;
55a-56c; 120c-129c; 200c-204c / Fund. Prine
Metaphysic. oj Morals, 281c-282d; 285a-287d
esp 285c-286a I Practical Reason, 292a-293b;
307d-310c;. 311d-314d; 327d-329a; 331c.-
337a,c; 337a-c / Judgement, 465a-c; 497a-
498b; 574b-577a; 594d {fn I]; 599d-6dOd
6 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right" PART I, par 35
21a-b; par 44 23c; ADDITIONS, 22 120c-d /
Philosophy of History, PART I, 257d-258a
8 MELVILLE: MobyDick, 370b-371b
War EPILOGUE 688b-c
3 TAMES: Psychology, 121a-125b; 177b-178a;
191a-197a esp 196a-197a; 213a-238b esp
213b-217a, 223b-224a, 227b-228b, 232b-
233b; 471b-472b
FREUD: Unconscious, 428a-430c esp 429c-430c
/ Civilization and Its Discontents,767d-768d
The distinction betvcl"een what is more
knowable in itself and ",nat is more
knowable to us
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analvtics, BK II CH 23
b - ... ... . ,
[68 3
0
-36J90c / Posterior Analytics, HK I, CH 2
[7Ib28-72a6J 98b-c / Topics, HK VI,CH 4
[I4Ia26--I42a22] 194c-195c; BK VIII, .. CH I
[I5S
b
35-I S
6a
7] 211d-212a / Physics, BK"I, CH I
259a-b;, CH 5 CH 7
265b-c /Generation andCorrup-
tlon, BK I, CH 3 [3I8bI3-319a2] 415b-d /
Metaphysics, HK II, CH I [993(l30 - bII ]S11b,d;
BK VII, CH 3 [1029a35-bI2] 552al Soul, HK II,
eH 2 [4I3aII-I9J 643a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 4. [I095bI-4] 340c
,9 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica,PART I, Q I, A5,
REP 1-2 5c-6a; A 9 8d-9c;Q 2, A I, ANS 10d-
lId; A 2, ANS and REP 2-3 11d-12c; Q 3, A 3,
REP I 16a-d; Q 10, AI, ANS and
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesan BK 1,3
354a-c
7 PLATO: Critias, 479d / Theaetetus,
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 9 28a-29dy'i... _
oryand Rert1iniscencetF CH 1 [449
b
3-29] 690a-c
9 ARr"STOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 19 [139214_
I393a8] 640b-c
10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics, par 1 19a-b
Epidemics, BK III, SECT III, par 16
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [713-755] 230a-231a
14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 1a-b / Pericles, 129a
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK IV, 7gb
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK X,. par 23-
2
4
77a-c; BK XI, par 17-41 93b-99b /Christiall
Doctrine, BK II, CH 30 651c-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 13 86d-88c; A IS, REP 3 89b-90b;Q57, A3
297b-298a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP 5 4110.-
413d; Q 79, A 6, ANS and REP 2419b-420d.;
86, A4 463d-464d; Q89, A3, REP 3 475d-476c;
A 7, REP 3 478d-479c
20 AQUINAS: Sumrna Theologica, PART III,QI2
A I, REP 3 776c-777b '
22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK IV, STANZA
56 95b-96a; STANZA 136-154 106a-108b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53c-S4a; 6Sb-c
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41c-d; 439c-440a
30 BACON: Advancert1ent of Learning, 13d-14a;
54c-5Sa
31 DESCARTES :' Objections and Replies, 259a-
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PROP 62, SG
443c-d; PROP 66, DEMONST 444c
35 LOCKE: IIun1an Understanding, BK II,CH
SECT 12 165b-c; BK IV, CH XI, SECT 11357
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT
420d-421a; SECT 105 433b-c
35 HUME: HUlnanUnderstanding, SECT VI 4
470d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c / Social f!i
tract, BK IV, 428a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88a-c; 96b,
413b-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 234d / judgenu!nt, 579
S80a; 583d-584c
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 277c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 155
181b-d; 190a-b
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [57-585] 16a; PA
[8591-863] 20gb
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 366b
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 42a; 59d-
166a,c; 231d'-233b esp 233a-b; 242b-24
Descent of Man, 287d
51 TOLSTOY: rVar and Peace, BK XIII, 584d-58
EPILOGUE II, 685a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 852b
54 FREUD: Interpretatz'on of Drea1ns, 387a,c
5a(6) The self and the thing in itself as {)
jects of knowledge
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH 6 (43ob21-26)6
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 27,133a..
898
(Sa. The knowable, the unknowable, and the un-
known: the knowability of certain obJects.
Sa(4) The infinite and the individual as
objects of knowledge.) "
19 AQUINAS: Sunlma Thealogica, PART I, Q 3,
A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 12, A I, REP 2 SOc-SIc; A 7,
ANS 56a-57b; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 14, AA
11-12 84c-86d; Q15, A 3, REP 4 93b-94a; Q22,
A2, ANS and REP I 128d-130d; Q29, A I, REP 1
162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; Q 30, A 4
170c-171b; Q 32 175d-180d; Q 56, A I, REP 2
292a-d; Q57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 84, A 7, ANS
and REP I 449b-450b; Q 86, AA 1-3 461c-463d;
Q 89, A 4, ANS 476c-477a; PARTI-II, Q14, A 6,
REP 3 680c-681a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 10,
A 3 769d-771b; Q Il,AI,REP 3 ],72b-773a;
Q 12, A I, REP 3 776c-777b;PART. IIISUPPL,
Q 92, A I, REP 12 1025c-1032b
23 HOBBES: Leiliathan, PART I, 54b-c; PART IV,
262b
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a..;333b
31 ,DESCARTES: Meditations, III, 86a-d; 88c-89a
/ Objections and Replies, 112a-d; 121d-122b;
169a; 211c-d; 212c-213a;213d-214a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics,PART II,PROP 10, SCHOL
376d-377a; PROP 3-31 385a-c
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 233 213b-
216a / Geo1netrical Demonstration, 435a.,.b
35 LOCKE: /-1unlan [lnderstanding, BK II, CH XIII,
SECT 4 149b;cH XIV, SECT 26:-31 160c-162a
passin1; CIl xv, SECT 2-3 162c.,.d;SECT 12
165b-c; CIl XVI, SECT 8 167c;CH XVII 167d-
174a esp SECT IS 171b-172a; C:.E:I XXIII, SECT
31 212b-c; SECT 33-34 212d-213b; CH XXIX,
SECT 15-16 237a-238a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 2
40Sb
46 :rIEGEL: Philosophy ofHistory, PART II, 278a-b
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [1810-1815] 43a
51 TOLSTOY: War andPeace,BK xv, 631a-c;
EPILOGUE II, 693c-694d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 312a; 631a
5a(S) The past and the future as objects of
knowledge
OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 27 :1 / Ecclesiastes,
6:12; 8:6-7; 9:11-12; II:2,6-(D) Ecclesiastes,
7:1; 8:6-7;9:11-12; 11:2,6
ApOCRYPHA: Wisdom ojSolo1non, 8:8-(D) OT,
Book of Wisdom, 8:8
NEW TESTAMENT: James, 4:I3-I4-(D) James,
4: 13-15
5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [463-512]
103c-d; 113c / Ajax [1419--1421]
155c
5 EURIPIDES: Medea [1415-1419] 224c fAlcestis
[1159-1163] 247c / Helen [1688-1692] 314c /
Andromache, [1284-"-1288] 326c / Bacchantes
[1388--1392] 3S2a,c
6a(2) Knowledge of natures or kinds distin-
guished from knowledge of individuals
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 24
116b-118a; CH 31 120a-c; BK II, Clf 19 [IOO
a
I4-
b
3
] 136d / Physics, BK I, CH 5 [188b26-189a9]
264b-c I Metaphysics, BK I, CH I [980b25-98Ib
13] 499b-500a; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b4]
S18a-b; CH 6 [Io03a5-.I7] 521d-522a,c; BK VII,
CH 10 [I035b35-1036a8] 559b-c;cH IS 563c-
564c; BK eH 2 [1060
b
20-23] 588d; BK XIII,
CH 10 618c-619a,c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 6 389d; CH 7
[II4Ia20-34] 390a-b; [II4IbI4-20] 390c-d; CH
II [II43a32-b5] 392d-393a; BK X,CH 9 [118o
b
13-23] 435b-c I Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [I356b
28-35] 596b-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A2,
REP 2 4a-c; Q 12, A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 14,
A II 84c-8Sc; A 12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 15, A 3,
REP 4 93b-94a; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q
29, A I, REP I 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-
164b; Q 30, A 4 170c-171b; Q 55, A I, REP 3
289a-d; A3, REP 2 291a-d; Q 56, A I, REP 2
292a-d; Q 57, A 2 295d-297a; Q 59, A I, REP I
306c-307b; Q 75, A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 76,
A 2, REP 4 388c-391a; Q 79, A 5, REP 2 418c-
419b; A 6, ANS and REP 2 419b-420d; Q 84,
A 7, ANS and REP I 449b-450b; Q 85, A I
451c-453c; A 2, REP 2 453d-455b; A 3 45Sb-
457a; Q 86, A I 461c-462a; AA 3-4 463b-464d;
Q 89, A 4476c-477a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Ineologica, PART III, Q II,
A I,REP 3 772b-773a
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APlf 1-9
137a-140c
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 167c-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-39 386b-
387a; PROP 44, COROL 2-PROP 46 390a-c
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH
XXXII, SECT 6-8 244b-d; BK III, CH III, SECT
7-9 2SSd-256c; CH VI, SECT 32-'"33 277c-278c;
BK IV, CH IV, SECT 5--8 324d-325c; CH VII,
SECT 9 338d-339b
35 HUME: llunzan Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
I32509a-d
900 THE GREAT IDEA.. S Sc to Oa(l,
(5. The extent or limits oj human .5c. 5d. The method of universal as prereq.
Dogmatism, skepticism, and the crtttcal uisite to knowledge: God s goodness as
attitude with respect to the extent, cer- the assurance of the veracity of our facuI.
tainty, and finality of human knowledge.) ties
D
31 DESCARTES: Rules, 2a-3b / Discours.e 41a-
31 DESCARTES: Rules, IV, 5a-d I zscourse, PART
II 44c-48b I Meditations, 72b,d; I 75a-77c; 67a,c esp PART II 44c-48b, PART IV 51b-S4b /
d R r 168b d lvfeditations, 72b,d; I 75a-77c; III, 82b-a-
III, 83b-84a I Objections an ep zes, -; IV, 89b-c; V, 95b-96a I (]bjections and Replies:
272a-c b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, DEF 4 373b; PROP 37- 119c; 123a-d; 124b-125 ; POSTULATE VII 131c;
134b-c; 142c; 143c; 162a; 167a-c; 206a-c;
33 3
8r
-3
8
5 238b-239a; 432 207b; 215c-d; 226d-227a; 229c-d; 237b-
248a; 434-435 248a-251a / Vacuum, 355a- 238b; 239a-240a; 242c-244c; 245c
35 LOCKE: Fluman Understanding, BK II, cn
358b b d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO 93a- XXVII, SECT 13 223 - ; BK IV, CH IX, SECT
95d esp SECT 4-7 94a-95c; BK I, ClI III, SECT 3 349b-c l d
28b
35 BERKELEY: Human Know e ge, INTRO, SECT'
24 120a-c; BK II, CH II, SECT 3 1 -c; CH XV, oJ
SECT II 165a-b; ClI XXIII, SECT 12-13 207a- 405b-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XII, DIV
208b; SECT 36 213c-d; BK III, ClI VI, SECT 1-9 b
116, 503d-504a; DIV 120 505 ; DIV 129-130
268b-271a esp SECT 9 270d-271a; BK IV, CH III,
SECT 22-30 319c-323c esp SECT. 22 319c-320a; 508a-d
CHVI, SECT 4-
16
331d-336d passim; CHX, SECT 53 JAMES: Psychology, 881b
19 354a-c; CH XII, SECT 9-
1
3 360d-362d; CH 5e. Knowledge about knowledge as the source
XIV, SECT 1-2 364b-c; CH XVII, SECT 9-
10
of criteria for evaluating claims to
377d-378a knowledge
35
BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
86
88 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO
3-4 405b-d; SECT 17 409d-410a; SECT -
429c-430b; SECT 101-102 432c-433a; SECT 133 93a-95d esp SECT 4-7 94a-95c; BK IV, CH III,
SECT 22 319c-320a
439c-440a d 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 4-
35 HUME: Human Understan ing, SECT I, DIV
458 - 40Sc-d; SECT 17 409d-410a
7-10 453c-455b; SECT IV, DIV 20-21 a-c, 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV."'-
DIV 26 460b-c; SECT IV, DIV 28--SECT V, DIV 3
8
I
6 477
10 453c-455b; SECT II, DIV 17 457a-b; SECT
460d-466c passim; SECT VII, DIV 0, a;
SECT XII 503c-509d esp DIV 129-13 508a-d VII, DIV 49-53 471c-474b esp DIV 49 471c-d
19 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-12d esp 1b-d, 8c-9a;
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 1a-4a,c; 15c-16c; a- 55a-56c., 99a-101b; 121a-123b / PracticaZ
22a,c; 101d-102a; 129c-130a; 133c-134d;
146a-149d; 157d; 187c-188b; 193a-b; 196b- Reason, 292d-293b; 294a-b; 307d-310c; 331a-
197c. 218d-227a esp 221c-222b; 248d-250a,c 332d
I Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253c.;d; 6. The kinds of knowledge
277d-279d I Practical Reason, 292d-293b;
295b-d; 311d-313d; 320c-321b; 331a-332d; 6a. The classification of knowledge according
335b-c; 336d-337a,c I Judgement, 492c-d; to diversity of objects
567c-568a 6a( 1) Being and becoming, the intelligible a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103d-104a; NUMBER the sensible, the necessary and the co
37, 119b-120b tingent, the eternal and the.temporal., t
43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b immaterial and the materlal as obJec
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 121c-d; 126a-b of knowledge
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 7a; INTRO, 7 PLATO: Cratylus, 86b-d; 113c-114a,c I Pita
par 3
1
19c-20a drus, 125a-126c I S1!mposiun'l, 167a-d I Pltaea
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART I [656- 675] 17b-18a; J d I
[1064-1067] 26b; [1810-
181
5] 43a; [1868-25] 223d-232d esp 223d-225a, 228b-232
44b
-48b esp [194
8
-
1
9
6
3] 46a-b, [1968-1979] public, BK III, 333b-334b; BK v,
6 ] 372a-373b; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c I Tzma
46b-47a, [2011-2022] 47b-48a; [4343--43 2 447b-d; 457b-458a / Theaetetus, 521d-52
107a-b M b D k 78 b 250b; 257a; 534d-536b I Sophist, 565a-569a esp 568a-S
48 MELVILLE: 0 y zc, a-; I Statesman, 595a-c I Philebus, 610d-61
276a-b 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / Seventh Let
49 DARvVIN: Descent of Man, 253d
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 195a 8 Categories, CH 5 [43ro-bI918
53 JAMES: Psychology, 881b [b 14
54 F
REUD: New l.ntroductory Lectures,828b-c; I Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 13 3
2
4-
2
3
b I Posterior Analytics, BK I, en 2 [7
IbS
873d-884d passim, esp 874d-875a, 878d-880 , 97d-98a; CH 4 [73a2I-b30] 100a-lOla; CH
883d-884a
a(l) to 6a(2) CHAPTER 43: KNO\VLEDGE 901
102b-104b; CH 30 119d; CH 33 121b-122a,c / 35 LOCKE: llU11'lan Understanding, BK II, CH
Physics, BK II, CH 2 270a-271a; CH 7 [I98a22- XXIII, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15-37 208c-214b;
31] 275b-c I Heavens, BK III, CH I [298bI3- BK ,IV, CH III, SECT 9-17 315c-317c passim,
24] 390a-b; CH 7 [306aIO-I2] 397b /Meta- esp SECT 17 317c; SECT 23-27 320a-322a pas-
physics, BK I, CH 5 [986b25-987aI] 504d-50Sa; sim; cH VI, SECT 5-16 332b-336d passin1; eH
CH 6 [987a29-bI8] 505b-d; CH 8 [989b2I-990a XI, SECT 1-12 354c-357d passim, esp SECT 12
8] 507d-508a; BK II, CHI 511b,d-512b; CH 3 357c-d; CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-371a
[995aI5-20] 513d; BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b4] 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25-27
518a-b; BK IV, CH 5-6 528c-531c; BK VI, CH I 417d-418b;SECT 135-142 440a-441c; SECT 148
547b,d-548c; BK VII, CH 15 [I039b3I-I040a8] 442b-d
563d-564a; BK IX, CH 10 577c-578a,c; BK X, 39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK V, 336b-c
CH I [Io53a3I-b3] 580a; CH 6 [I057a7-II] 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16a-b; 113c-115a / ]udge-
5840; BK XI, CH 2 588a-S89a; CH6 [1662
b
I2- ment, 551a-552c
I063bI4] 590d-592a; CH 7 [I063
b
36]-CH 8 48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 120a-b
[I065a6] 592b-593b; BK XII, CH I [I069a30-b2] 51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK IX, 365a-b
598b-c / Soul, BK I, CH I [403a25-bI9] 632b-d
I Memory and Reminiscence, CH I [449b30-
45oalo] 690c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Anilnals, BK I, CH 5 [644b
2I--645a5] 168c-d / Ethics, BK VI, CH I [II39
a
3'-13] 387b-d; CH 3 [II39bI9-25] 388b-c I
Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [I357aI4-b2I] 596d-S97c
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I, 811a-812a
14 PLUTARCH: .,"J:arcellus, 252b-c
17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR V, CH I, 228c-
229c; TR IX, CH 7 249b-c I Sixth Ennead,
TR VII, CH 36 339c-d
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 3-5 27c-
28c; BK VI, par 6 36c-d; BK VII, par 23 50b-c;
BK x, par 8-11 73b-74b; BK XII, par 5 100a-b
I City of God, BK VIII, elI 6 268d-269c;
CH 10 271a-d; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b / Chris-
tian Doctrine, BK I, CH 8 626c-627a; BK II,
CH 27-39 650a-655b esp CH 27 650a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A I,
REP 2 3b-4a; A 9 8d-9c; Q 2, AA 1-2 10d-12c;
Q5, A2, ANS 24b-25a; Q 10, A I, ANS 40d-41d;
Q12, A4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c; AA 8-10 57b-
59d; Q 13, A 12, REP 3 74c-75b; Q 14, A 13,
ANS and REP 3 86d-88c; Q 16, A I, REP 2
94b-95c.; Q54, A 4, ANS and REP 2 287b-288a;
QQ 56-57 291d-300b; Q 79, A 9 422b-42:3d;
QQ 84-88 440b-473a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 66,
A5 79b-80c; Q84, A I, REP 3 174b-175a; Q 93,
A 2 216c-217b; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d;
PART II-II, Q 9, A 2 424b-425a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49d
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 291b-294b
30 BACON: AdtJancement ofLearning, 40a-c; 41b-
42a; 43d-44c
1 DESCARTES: Rules, II 2a.,.3b; XII, 21 b-c / Dis-
course, PART IV, 53b / Meditations, II 77d-81d
esp 81b-c; V 93a-96a passim / Objectio/1s and
Replies, 122b-c; POSTULATE II 131a; 218c-d;
219b-c
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, DEF 8 355c; PROP 7
356c; PROP 8, SCHOL 2 3S6d-357d; PART II,
PROP 10, SCHOL 376d-377a; PROP 24-45
383c-390b
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72, 184a-b
903
31 DESCARTES :Discourse,PART IV, 53b I Medi-
tations, 1 75a-77epassim; n,8Qe-81d; III,
83d-84a; VI 96b-l03d passim I Objections and
Replies, 119d-120c; 124d-125a; POSTULATE 1-
III 130d-131a; AXIOM.V 131d-132a;162d_
165d; 211a-b; 211d-212a; 228c-230c; 231a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics,. PART II, AXIOM 4'-5 373d;
PROP 11-13 377b-378c; POSTULA.TE 5
38
0b;
PROP 14-
1
7 380c-381d; PROP 19 382b-c; PROP
22-29 383b-385a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE. III 270b-
271a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BE::. II, CH IX,
SECT 8-10 139b-140b; BK III, CH VI, SECT 9
270d-271a; BK IV, CH II, SECT 14 312b-d; CH
III, SECT 14 316b-d; SECT 21 319c;CH XI
354c-358c
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT r
405a-b; SECT 18 416b-e; SECT 25-33 417d-
419a passim; SECT 135-142 440a-441c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 108a-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRight, PART III, par 227
74b-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 450a-471aesp 453a-459b,
469a-b, 470b-471a; 502a-525a passim, esp
503a-505b, SOBa; 564a- b
6b(2) Memory as knOWledge
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK II, CH 4 [IUb24-3I]
156d-157a; BK IV, CH.4 [I25h+-14J 174e /
Metaphysics, BK I, CH I [9Soa28-98IaI] 499a-b
/ Memory and Reminiscence, CH I [449bI ]-CH 2
[45
2aI
3] 690a-693d
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 25-TR
IV, CH 9 154d-163a passim; TR VI, eH 3 190b-
191e
18 AUGUSTINE: COnfessions, BK x, par 12-3
8
74h-81a / Christian Doctrine, 13K II, CH 9
640c-d; BK IV, CH 5, 677b-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 54
A 5 288a-d; Q 7
8
, A 4, AN$and REP 5 411d-
413d; Q79, AA 6-7 419b-421e; Q89, A6, REP I
478b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica,PART I-II, Q 51,
A 3 14b-15a; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, REP 4
896a-897d
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [34-4
2
]
112c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I,50b-c;53a-S4a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, III, 4c-d; VII, 10b-c; XI
17b-18b; XII IBb-25a passim / Meditations, v,
9Sd-96a / Objections and Replies, 12Sa-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP IS, SCHOL
382a-b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III,
SECT 21 118b-119a; BK II, CH X, SECT 2 141b-e;
BK IV, CH I, SECT 8-9 308b-309b; CH XI,
SECT II 357b-e; CH XVI, SECT 1-2 366d-
367a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 145a; 421a-422a passim;
424b-427a; 450a-451 b
CHAPTER.43: KNOvVLEDGE
to 6b(2)
BARISTOTLE: Posterior. Analytics, .BRiIl, CH'19
f99b20-100b5] 136a-d I" Topics, BK II, CH 8
fII4aI8-26] 159d-160a / Physics, BK I, CH 5
[I88
b
26-
I8
9
a
9J .264b-c I Heavens, BK III,
CH 7 [3
06a1
-I81397b-e ,/,Metaphysics, BK I,
CH I [980a20_b24] 499a; .. 499d-
50Da; BKIV,CH;. 5 [I009bl-17J
[IoIo
b
I-rOll
a
2]530a_C;BK XI, CH 6 [I062b34-
I063
a
9J S91a-b; CH 7 Soul,
BK II, CH 5 647b-648d;BK III, CH 2 657d-
65ge
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation .of Animals, BK I, CH
23 [73
Ia
3o-
b
S] 271e-d I Ethics, BKI,CH 7
[I098a.35-bSJ 343d-344a;BKII, CH 9 [II09b20-
2313SSc; BK VI, CH 8 [II42aI2-3I] 391b-e; BK
VII, CH3 [I I 47
a2
5-I:>I9J 397c-398a
HIPPOCRATES: Surgery, par I 70b
LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [379-
52IJ 49a-Sla
EPICTETUS: Discourses,BKI, CH 6, ll0e-l11e
PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252b-e
PLOTINUS : First Ennead, TR I, CH 6-7 3c-4a /
Fourth Ennead, TR III, .CH 23153d-154b; CH
26, 155c; TR IV, CH 23-25 J6ge-171b; TR VI,
CH 1-2 189b-190b / Fifth Ennead, TR v, CH I,
228c-229c; TR IX, CH 7' 249b-c /Sixth En-
nead, TR III, eH 18, 291a-b
AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK III, par 10-1I
15b-16a; BK IV, par 15-17 23a-e; BK x, par
8-11 73b-74b / Christian Doctrine, BKU,
CH 27-30 650a-651d
AQuINAs: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5,
4, REP I 25d-26c; Q 12, A4, ANS and REP 3
3b-54c; Q 14, A I, ANS 75d-76c; A2, ANS and
REP I 76d-77d; A 6,"REP I 80a-81e; A II, ANS
and REP 1--2 84c-85e; A12, ANS 85d-86d; Q 16,
'4 2 95c-96b; Q 17, A 2 102a-d; A 3, ANS 102d-
03e; Q 18, A2, ANS and REP 1 lOSc-106b; A3,
NS 106b-107e; Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 57, A I,
EP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS 295d-297a; Q 59, A I,
REP I 306c-307b;Q 75, A 3, ANS and 2
380c-381 b; A 5, ANS 382a-383h;. Q .7
6
, A 2,
EP 4 388c-391a; Q 77, A5, REP 3 403d-404c; Q
8, A I, ANs 407b-409a; AA 3-4 410a-413d;
79, A 3, ANS and REP 1-2416a-417a; A 6,
NS and REP 1-2 419b-420d;Q 84, A I, ANS
nd REP 2 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443e;
4, ANS and REP 2 444d-446b; A 6 447e-
49a; Q 85, A 1, ANS and REP 1,3 451c-453c;
2 453d-455b; A 3, ANS4S5b-457a; A 6,
Ns 458d-459c; Q 86, A I, ANS and REP 2,4
lc-462a; A3 463b-d; Q87, A3, REP 3 467b-
68a
QUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III SUPPL,
82, AA 3-4 971a-974e
ANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, IV [28-
] lIla
BBES: Leviathan, PART I, 49a-d
ONTAIGNE: Essays,285c-286a
ARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-33Se
ACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 4
1
109c-d;
API! 50 I11b; BK II, APH 40 170c-173d
THE GREAT IDEAS 6a(3) to I)
902. . in to 6b. The classification of
(6 ,The classification of.'knowledge accord g if to the faculties involved 1n kno
w
1..n
a. diversity of objects. 6a(2) Knowletfge t 7 Po'., Phaedo 224a-232d esp 2.24a.-.2
k d. d t uishedfrom - LAT " 38
natures or :n s tS tng 228b-232d / Republic, BK VI-VII, 3d"3
edge of individuals.) x 431c-d
218d / ]udfYement, , , A I .
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 211c- " 8 ARISTOTLE: PosterIOr na BK II, OIl
572a-b; 572d-574b . 312a 199bH-IOOb3] 136b-d / TOPICS, BK IV, C
53 JAMES: Psychology, 305a-312a esp 309a- [
12
5"25-33] 174b / PhySICS, Br:: I, CII.s [r
f fact or real ex- 26-I 89
a
9] 264b-c / MetaphysIcs, BK 1,
6a(3) Knowled?e .of om knowledge [98oa28-982aI] 499a-500b; BK III, CII 4!
istence dlSUO
g
UlfS he r1 ns between 24-bS] 518a-b / Soul, BK II, eH 5 [4
I
7
b1
7
of our ideas or 0 t e re atto 8b
64 -c
them . 8 17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR I, CH 7 3d-
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologlca, PART 4, Fourth Ennead, TR IV, 13 164d-165b;
A I REP I 440d-442a; Q 85, A 2 453d- d VI CII 2 189d-190b / Fifth Ennead, 'FR
23 HO'BBEs: Leviathan, PART I, 65c; 71C-
I
2-3 216b-217b; TR v, CH I, 228c-2
35 LOCKE: Human Understandmg, BK I,. CH .' CII 7 231d-232b; TR IX, CH 7 249b-c / S
SECT 15-
16
98d-99c; SECT Ennead, TR III, CII 18; 291a-b
CH v, SECT 12 266d-267a, SECT 14 T 18 AUGUSTINE: ConfeSSIOns, BK III,
CH VI, SECT 43--5
1
280c-283a esp SEC . 15b-16a; BK X, par 8-3
8
73b-81a / CIty of
280c
L
d;BK IV, CH I, SECT 1-7 CH BK VIII, CH 6-7 268d-269d; BK XI, ell
II 309b-313a passim, esp SECT 14 312?- IV 323a-d; BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b / Chr
III, 313a-323d esp SECT 29.322c-323a, C - d: Doctrine, BK I, CH 12 627c-d; BK II, CH 2
SECT 1-12 passIm; SECT 18 328 650a-655b esp CH 27 650a; BK IV, CH 5, 67
329a; CH SECT 6-8 CII 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,.
I 33Sc-d; SECT 16 336d, CH IX 349a '. CH A3 52c-53b; A4, ANS and REP 3 53b-54c,
354<:"358c esp SECT I3-I4357d-358c, 8 A I ANS 75d-76c; A 2, REP I 76d-77d;
XII, SECT 6-
1
3 360a-362d; CH XVII, SECT A 2: ANS and REPI 105c-106b; A3, ANs
377b-d. .... -20 107c; Q 85, A I, ANS
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologzca, PARTf-II,
41
6b-417a . SECT 23
417b
,.e . ... . A3'"REP 3 8b-9a; PART I1-'II, Q 8, A
' J' d'g SECT IV 458a- ,
35 I-IuME: Human Unuerstan tn '...... . . . 2b' 417a-d
463d esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 3 23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 71.
SECT V, DIV 34-3
8
, 464b-466c; SECT IX 4 2 30 BACON: Advancement of Learmng, 32d:
488c esp DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XII, DIV 131-
1
3 31 DESCARTES: Rules, XIV, / Medl
508d-509d. VI 96b-103d passim / ObJectzons and
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of RIght, PREP, 5c-6a / 119d-120c; 124d"125a; POSTULATE
Philosophy ofHistory, PART IV, 354b b' 131a; AXIOM V 131d-132a; 136d-137a,
53 JAMES: Psychology, 157b-161a esp 158b-159 , 162d-165d; 2Ild-212a; 217c-d;
301b-304b passim; 453a-b; 867a-89qa esp 219b-c; 228c-229c; 229d-23,Oc
868b-869a, 879b-882a, 886a, 889a-b 31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 10376
. . . . . he distinction PROP 40, SCHOL 2-PROP 44 3.88a-390a
6a(4) Knowledge In relation t d thenoum- 35 LOCKE' Human Understandmg, BK IV
between the an. ensible 309b-3i3a passim, esp SECT 14 312b
enal the senslble an supra S '. . T 2-5 313a-c' CH IX, SECT 2
' . b 3d'37b-d' III, SEC ,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 25c-26a; 27 -3 .' d: CH XI, SECT 13-
1
4 357d-358c . ,
53b-59b; 93c-99a esp94b-95a, 96a-97b, 97. 35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, IN1RO,
98c; 101b-l08a,c esp 106b-107b;; 117b-118a: 405a-b; SECT 18 416b-c;. SECT 27
418a
120C-121d; 153a-157d; 46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRIght, PART III,
193a-b; 224a-230c / Fund. Prm. Metap ly d 74b-d
Morals, 253a-d; 264d; 281c-282d; 53 JAMES: Psychology, 144b-145a;
/ Practical Reason, 291a-296desp 319C: 157b-161a, 167b; 450a-451b; 453a-4
307d-314d esp 307d-308b, 310d-311 .' '. _ 453b, 455a
. 328a-329a;331a-332d; 337a-c, 348a
340c-341c; 349b-355d /lntra. Meta- 6b(1) Sensitive knowledge: sense-pe
3.42. p M' 'ls 383c-d 390b I jud.gement, as kno"\\Tledge; judgments of pe
phySIC of ora" . 8b' f . e
465a-c' 474b-475d esp 474d [fn I]; 497a-49 : and judgments 0 expertenc
500c-d'; 501d-502a; 506d-507a; 510b-:; 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 231c-23
541a-542a; 543a; 543c-544c; 564a-c, 570,. public, UK VI-VII, 383d-398c esp BK
572b; 574b-577a; 578d-579a; 387a, 387d-388a, BK VII, 389b, 392
587d-588a; 596c-598b; 599d-600d, 603a b, Timaeus, 447b/ Theaetetus, 517b-
603d-606d esp 603d-604b, 606a-d 521d-526d, 533a-536a
53 TU\fES: Psychology, 233a-234b