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To what extent do public attitudes influence the conduct of foreign policy makers in practice?

To what extent do public attitudes influence the conduct of foreign policy makers in practice? The effect of public attitudes and opinion on foreign policy makers has long been debated in foreign policy analysis. When we take an initial look we can find a large number of examples of public opinion affecting foreign policy, such as Roosevelts retreat under public pressure from his quarantine proposal in 1937,1 or of public opinion having no effect, such as Tony Blair declaring war on Iraq without the majority of the British publics support.2 It is therefore necessary to combine case studies with foreign policy analysis theory. This essay will first analyse briefly the ability of public opinion to affect governments, and then evaluate the potential for public opinion to affect foreign policy within the three main approaches to the study of foreign policy: rational, political, and psychological. Throughout the essay I will also be referring to the media as it is impossible to discuss public opinion without acknowledging the role of the media in either shaping public opinion, or acting as the voice of public opinion. Before applying any theory to the question, it is important that we first explore public opinion itself. The consensus among many foreign policy analysts is that there is a hierarchy of knowledge or attentiveness within the public, although the overall mood is apathy or indifference: Kriesberg 1. 2. 3. 4. The informed The aware The unaware Almond The official policy leadership The policy and opinion elites The attentive public The general public The opinion makers The attentive public The mass public 3 Rosenau

Leigh, M. Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976) p.xv 2 Robinson, P. The Role of Media and Public Opinion, in Foreign Policy ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.172. 3 Table taken from Leigh, p.4

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To what extent do public attitudes influence the conduct of foreign policy makers in practice?

Almonds general public, Kriesbergs unaware and aware but not informed, and Rosenaus mass public make up anywhere between 75% to 90% of the public, and are ...given to mood rather than structured opinion, to emotion rather than intellect, and to oscillation rather than stability.4 From this, we can see that it is only a very small part of the public that is able to form intelligent opinions and is more inclined toward participation. Leigh suggests that there are a number of conditions about an issue that dictate public involvement in decision making, such as time pressure and intrusion into daily life.5 With the advent of modern media and the CNN Effect in the 1990s, time pressure has increased and this makes it harder for public opinion to be properly canvassed by foreign policy makers, reducing its influence. This then suggests that the pressure able to be applied to foreign policy makers by the public is not as great as it first appears, and that a large portion of the public is able to be either influenced or educated to hold certain opinions. Their oscillatory nature is confirmed by Lewis who reported that there was a significant proportion of the British public who could be won over to either side of the debate about the invasion of Iraq before the 2003 war.6 The Rational Actor Model (Model 1) was developed from the International Relations theory of realism. It assumes states to be the main actors, and events in the global arena to be acts of unified governments. A state will evaluate the threats and opportunities that it faces, and will seek to maximise the value of the opportunities and minimise the risk of the threats. The resulting policies are therefore a rational outcome of this evaluation.7 All the opportunities/threats exist at the international level, and that is the level at which the state evaluates its goals and objectives, alternatives, and consequences.8 Thus, due to its shared assumptions with realism about the nature of the state and the distinction between domestic and international issues, the Rational Actor Model
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See note ^3 Leigh, p.8-10 6 Lewis, J. Television, Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: The Case of Britain, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol.16 no.3 (2004), p.298 7 Allison, G. The Cuban Missile Crisis, in Foreign Policy ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.275-276 8 Allison, G. And Zelikow, P. Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Longman, 1999), p.16-23

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To what extent do public attitudes influence the conduct of foreign policy makers in practice?

asserts that public attitudes will have no effect on foreign policy; it is the strategic interests at the global level of the state that are the influential factors. While Model 1 believes the state to be a unified actor with no domestic influences, the psychological/behavioural approach believes that individual personality and group dynamics have a large influence on foreign policy. Scholars developed the concept of operational code after studying leader personality effects. An operational code is defined by the core political beliefs of the leader about the inevitability of conflict..., the leaders estimation of his or her own power to change events, and so forth...9 Hermann went on to identify six foreign policy orientations, based upon a leaders personality, using the operational code framework and content analysis.10 She identified the need for approval11 and the need for affiliation12 as being able to influence a leaders foreign policy decision making. The source of approval is never discussed, but I posit that it is a balance between approval from other state leaders, ones own political group, and the citizens of ones own state. As the public only form one source of approval, and the need for approval is only one personal characteristic involved in the decision making process, the extent to which public attitudes affect foreign policy makers is likely to be extremely limited. Political approaches to the study of foreign policy provide a middle-ground between the RAM and psychological approaches, accepting that there are domestic factors that affect foreign policy, but not placing as much emphasis on the role of individuals as psychological approaches. They fall into two main categories: structuralists, and pluralists. For structuralists, the ability to influence and control the majority of the publics opinion is a key concept. The theory is that foreign policy, and the conduct of foreign policy makers, is controlled by an elite. An example of this is the high spending of Britain and America on defence budgets, despite the public favouring spending on
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Hudson, V. The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis in Foreign Policy, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.24 10 See note ^9 11 Hermann, M. Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1. (Mar., 1980), p.9 12 Hermann, p.24

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To what extent do public attitudes influence the conduct of foreign policy makers in practice?

healthcare and education. Structuralists argue the large budgets are due to the presence of an elite with vested business, political and bureaucratic interests.13 A policy is formed by the elites, then consent is manufactured either by the way the policy is portrayed, such as the military aspect of President Trumans aid package to Turkey being played down to gain popular support14; or by using the media, as the British and US governments did before the 2003 invasion of Iraq:15 in the run-up to the invasion, 89% of headlines from weekday news bulletins assumed the probable existence of WMDs, and only 11% cast doubts, highlighting the lack of media impartiality and possible control by the elites.16 While this initially indicates that public opinion does not influence foreign policy makers, but rather foreign policy makers control public opinion, it also shows us that foreign policy makers see it necessary to create public support for their policies. A lack of public support therefore constrains the actions of foreign policy makers, until their consent can be manufactured. It is this constraining element that is one of the main tenets of pluralist foreign policy theory. Feasibility [of a policy option] depends on political, economic, and technical conditions but also on the opinion environment.17 Public opinion sets the parameters for foreign policy, not necessarily advocating a particular action or policy, but limiting options, for example: ...during the 1999 air war against Serbia, the Clinton administrations options were limited by the knowledge that political support from sections of the US public... could be lost if troops were killed...18 Furthermore, Bailey says the President ...is the head of a great political party first, the director of foreign affairs second or perhaps third.19 What Bailey is saying is that the Presidents first priority is securing support from the voters at home, with foreign affairs being a secondary or tertiary concern. Putnam builds on this and suggests that states play a two-tier game, where governments seek to satisfy domestic

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Lewis, pp.295-296 Jones, J. The Fifteen Weeks, (New York, 1955), p.162 15 Robinson, p.171 16 Lewis, p.303 17 Leigh, p.11 18 Allison, p.275-276 19 Bailey, T. The Man in the Street, (Gloucester, Mass. Peter Smith, 1964), p.3

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To what extent do public attitudes influence the conduct of foreign policy makers in practice?

pressures while avoiding adverse foreign developments.20 In this model, domestic opinion acts as a constraining element by determining the win-set, the range of possible agreements at the international level that could be ratified domestically. Governments identify their win-set at the domestic level then negotiate at the international level, and an agreement is reached when the winsets of both/all negotiators overlap.21 A classic example of the two-tier game explaining the decision making process is the Falklands War in 1982. Faced with an upcoming election, the British Conservative government needed to increase their public support. When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, of the choices available, recapturing the Falklands achieved the maximum level of domestic approval22 for the minimum level of adverse foreign developments. In order for the pluralist theory to hold, the public must be able to constrain the government through the power of their votes,23 but Miller found no consistent link between public opinion, foreign policy and voting in his 1967 article entitled Voting and Foreign Policy.24 Miller focused on the US elections in 1952, admitting that there were ...possible dangers... of such a limited perspective, but tried to justify his choice by arguing that it was a pertinent year to analyse as ...the election of 1952 also seems to illustrate the chaotic nature of the connection between public opinion on foreign policy and the electoral behaviour of the same public.25 It could be argued that a modern example that agrees with his conclusion is Tony Blairs re-election in 2005. When he declared war on Iraq in 2003, he did not have the majority of the publics support26, yet was still reelected 2 years later, suggesting that the publics opinion on his foreign policy didnt change their voting behaviour. However, once the war started support grew considerably27, which could explain why the voting behaviour wasnt affected by the initial lack of support. I therefore believe that
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Putnam, R. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two -Level Games, International Organization, Vol.42, no.3 (1988), p.434 21 Putnam, p.438 22 Merriman, J. A History of Modern Europe, (W. W. Norton & Co, 2010), p.1182 23 Bailey, pp.3-13 24 Miller, W. Voting and Foreign Policy, in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967), pp.213-230 25 Miller, p.215 26 Lewis, p.298 27 Lewis, p.300

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To what extent do public attitudes influence the conduct of foreign policy makers in practice?

Millers conclusion is not valid, as the period under review was far too narrow, specifically chosen, and too long ago, and the Blair case study is not conclusive enough to support it. In conclusion, the extent to which public attitudes affect foreign policy makers in practice depends largely on the theoretical approach you take. The Rational Actor Model and structuralists argue that domestic attitudes dont affect the decision-making process at all; the former believing that there is a boundary between domestic and international affairs, the latter believing that public attitudes are controlled and manufactured by an elite. Behaviouralists believe that public opinion is just one of many factors that influence an individuals decision-making process, and therefore doesnt have a large effect. Finally, pluralists also believe that public attitudes are one of several influences on decision-making, but place more emphasis on it than behaviouralists. I personally agree with Putnams two-tier game theory: public attitudes may not always advocate a particular policy option, but it will always constrain a policy makers range of options.

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Bibliography Allison, Graham and Peter Zelikow. Essence of Decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Longman, 1999. Bailey, Thomas. The Man in the Street, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964. Hermann, Margaret. Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 7-46. Hudson, Valerie. The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis in Foreign Policy, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, pp.13-34, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Jones, Joseph. The Fifteen Weeks, New York: Harbinger, 1955. Leigh, Michael. Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976. Lewis, Justin. Television, Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: The Case of Britain International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol.16, No.3 (2004), pp.295-310. Merriman, John. A History of Modern Europe, United States of America: W. W. Norton & Co, 2010 Miller, Warren. Voting and Foreign Policy in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau, pp.213-230, London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1967. Putnam, Robert. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games International Organization, Vol.42, No.3 (Summer, 1988), pp.427-460. Robinson, Piers. The Role of Media and Public Opinion in Foreign Policy ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, pp.168-187Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

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