IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.

: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the Manila Standard. He describes himself as a columnist, who incidentally happens to be a lawyer,, had been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society. Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at Bar. The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called controversial case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority. In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two other newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had been commissioned by one of the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDTs counsel, Thus, he speaks of the Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the Dirty Dozen, as unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an anonymous group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their families. The Chief Justice issued an administrative order Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary, to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the pub lic utility, denying the allegations in Jurados column. The Supreme C ourt then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true. HELD: Jurados actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of abuse of rights, one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law. Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials. Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges. The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials)

in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. Reyes vs Bagatsing Political Law Primacy of the Constitution over International Law Retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 meter radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under ou r constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles of international law. www.uberdigests.info ISSUE: Whether or not a constitutional right is being violated by the mayors ordinance. HELD: Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right/s Malaban v Ramento 129 SCRA 359 (1984) FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected. The excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration. Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006 Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880. Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not

espoused by the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance sho ws that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005. Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. 480 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94284, 8 April 1991] Second Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur Facts: On 14 October 1985, Ricardo C. Silverio was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. On 26 January 1988, or more than 2 years after the filing of the Information, the People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold departure Order against Silverio on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings. Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Silverio's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Silverio from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court." Silverio's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988. Silverio's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, the Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990. Issue: Whether the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health." Held: Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text. Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use

all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer. Herein, Silverio is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668) Case Digest Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel document s and enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines? Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED. PHILILIPPINES ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. DRILON FACTS: PASEI recruits male and female for work abroad. They challenge the constitutionality of DO no. 1 of DOLE guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers for discrimination against males or females and for not applying to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills. HELD: Order is valid. It applies only to female contract workers but it does not import a perfect identity if rights among all men and women. It is based on substantial distinctions. Female domestic servants abroad are usually the victims of exploitive working conditions. Distinctions are borne by evidence, there is no such evidence for male workers. It does not narrowly apply to existing conditions; they apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. That it does not apply to all Filipina workers is not an argument of unconstitutionality. Not all of them are similarly situated. What the constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group within an existing class to the prejudice of such a person or group resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group.