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THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.

ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; CASE AT BAR. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE PRESENCE OF NBI AGENTS TO OBSERVE AND LOOK AT WHICH IS IN PLAIN SIGHT IS NOT A SEARCH. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]). 6.ID.; CONSTITUTION; DOES NOT GOVERN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS. The constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. 7.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EVIDENCE PROCURED BY INDIVIDUALS EFFECTED THROUGH PRIVATE SEIZURE, ADMISSIBLE. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication. 8.ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; SELF-SERVING DENIALS, DESERVE NO WEIGHT IN LAW. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Reynaldo B . Tatoy and Abelardo E . Rogacion for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PRONOUNCEMENT OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL SUPREME COURT AND STATE APPELLATE COURTS, DOCTRINAL IN THIS JURISDICTION. Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. 2.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE GUARANTEE AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990). 3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTIES MAY BE INVOKED ONLY AGAINST THE STATE, NOT UPON PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]: 1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions . . . That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the

9.ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE FOR EVIDENCE TO BE BELIEVED. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 10.ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; THINGS WHICH A PERSON POSSESSES ARE PRESUMED OWNED BY HIM; CASE AT BAR. As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment. On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8). LLpr "Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied). "Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987). "He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987). "Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied). "The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).

DECISION

BIDIN, J p: This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation ofSection 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article II and Section 2 (e)(i), Article I of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows: "On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6) "Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation,

"The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987). Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134). Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision. In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit: "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS. "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED. cdphil "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION." (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55) 1.Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Secs. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III). Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

"Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. "Section 3.(1)The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. "(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1 [3], Article III). was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 2d [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971];

Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990). It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. LLpr On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]: "1.This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions . . . ". . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life . . ." (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied). In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that: "(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose

of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served." The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals, (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957). Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said: "The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence *** complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities. "The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action." The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. LLphil Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction. The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it. First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard

operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 1518; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168). It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. cdphil If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62). The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else. Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication. 2.In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]). In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows: "First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder." (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas; Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)

Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (Sec. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus: "Fiscal Formoso: "You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl? "WITNESS: "Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir." (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240) The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced. cdphil 3.Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila; that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10). Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable

value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]). Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93). Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise. LexLib

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment. WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.] PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO PADRIGANO, RUFINO, ROXAS, MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

"3.That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969; "4.That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthus L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu. "5.That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management; "6.That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike; "7.That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacanang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd

L. S. Osorio & P. B. Castillon and J . C . Espinas & Associates for petitioners. Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J p: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union. composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration. The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties

shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: 'NO LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacanang demonstration will be held the following morning; and "8.That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9.50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'" (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.). Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on M[arch 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'" (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.). In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.). After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.). Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on

Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.). In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.). Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.). In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.). At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.). On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.). Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar. (1)In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2 (2)The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles." 3 In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5 (3)The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7 (4)The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. (5)While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11 The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17 II The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against and tested by the foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein private

respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers vis-avis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further indignities. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employeesfrom 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19

the "duty . . . to observe regular working hours." The strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage a mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground. The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.). The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua nonof an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional. III The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers

expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three." We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such a common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22 Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank employees . 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24 As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved. On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day. IV Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor . . ." Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.

V It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against selfincrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 27 Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by a mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity, to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise, these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best and dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28 VI The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29 The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned. It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 11 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10 day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.) It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf of such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. 29But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved. It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the

constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30 It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30 Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo 30 reiterated this principle and added that "Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. It is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceeding any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flow of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdictional nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower courts for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.) 30

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would be an unreasoning adherence to "procedural niceties," which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be accorded supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm, which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has been demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights. If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clashes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in the instant case of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm, is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record. The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms . . ." On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30 thus: "As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not 'newly discovered,' as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its. rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision, the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the partiesbut may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R., No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila

Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. . . . (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578)." (italics supplied.) To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert and competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of the human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 filed his motion for reconsideration on September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late, considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday. Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30 stated: "As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, L-14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, 'technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.' (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never 'sacrifice the ends of justice.' While 'procedural laws are no other than technicalities' to view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance with which courts have been organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization of the administration of the law and of justice. (Ibid., p. 128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language of Justice Felix, to 'a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice.' (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they 'should give way to the realities of the situation.' (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point, promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, L-24288, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was

partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure 'are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense'; but are intended 'to help secure substantial justice.' (Ibid., p. 843) . . ." 30 Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed, and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employees participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage. The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities. Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder: "The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty. ". . . The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

". . . The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us. ". . . In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected. ". . . But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31 The case at bar is worse. Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police. It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and simple selfishness, if not greed.

"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances. xxx xxx xxx "The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of selforganization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. it is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 [1941]). . . . xxx xxx xxx "In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act." (Italics supplied.) 33 If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1)setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and (2)directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until reinstated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service. With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter . . . to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled: "It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act . . .). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]). xxx xxx xxx

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-29646. November 10, 1978.]

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegasof Manila on March 27, 1968. 2 City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

Angel C . Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C . Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner. Sotero H . Laurel for respondents.

"AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." 3 Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. cdrep Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5 On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6637 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6 In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and void:

DECISION

FERNANDEZ, J p: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of which reads: "Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968. (SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA Judge" 1

1)As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation; 2)As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe' any standard to guide and/or limit the action of

the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers: 3)It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7 On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.8 Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17, 1968: 9 "I. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION. II. RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. III. RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION." Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature. cdll

The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10 In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled. It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13 The trial court did not commit the errors assigned. LLpr WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 15574. September 17, 1919.] SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner, vs. JOAQUIN NATIVIDA D, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.

must often be had in certain districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27; New Orleans Gas Co. vs. Louisiana Light Co. [1885], 115 U. S., 650.) 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. None of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. 8.ID., ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The public domain or the common property or resources of the people of the State may be so regulated or distributed as to limit the use to its citizens. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The limitation of employment in the construction of public works by, or for, a state or a municipality to citizens of the United States or of a State is permitted. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Our local experience and our peculiar local conditions, often of controlling effect, have caused the executive branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the sanction of the judicial branch, to take a firm stand with reference to the presence of undesirable foreigners. The Government has thus assumed to act for the all sufficient and primitive reasons of the benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its dominion. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Common carriers which, in the Philippines as in the United States and other countries, are affected with a public interest, can only be permitted to use the public waters, deemed a part of the national domain and open to public use, as a privilege, and under such conditions as to the Legislature may seem wise. 12.ID.; CONSTRUCTION; PUBLIC POLICY. The judiciary, alive to the dictates of the national welfare, can properly incline the 'scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. 13.ID.; ID., PRESUMPTION. All the presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law, and without good and strong reasons a court should not attempt to nullify the action of the Legislature. 14.ID.; ID.; ID. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. 15.ID.; COMMERCE; UNITED STATES COASTWISE TRADE. The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by the Constitution, includes the power to nationalize ships built and owned in the United States by registries and enrollments and the recording of the muniments of title of American vessels. 16.ID.; ID.; ID. Under the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792, and February 18, 1793 (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305) in case of alienation to a foreigner, all the privileges .of an American bottom were ipso facto forfeited. No vessel in which a foreigner was directly or indirectly interested could lawfully be registered as a vessel of the United States.

Ross & Lawrence for petitioner. Attorney-General Paredes for respondent.

SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PHILIPPINE BILL OF RIGHTS; CONSTRUCTION. The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the Philippine Islands have been used in the same sense as like provisions found in the United States Constitution. 2.ID.; ID.; FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; ALIENS. The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The word "person" found in the Fourteenth Amendment and in the first sentence of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights includes aliens. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Private corporations are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Statutes which have attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens to engage in any kind of business to earn their living have been held unconstitutional, while other statutes denying certain rights to aliens have been held constitutional 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER. Neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view,

17.ID.; ID.; ID. The Act of Congress of May 28, 1895 (29 Stat. at L., 188) extended the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States to corporations created under the laws of any of the states thereof. This law made it possible for a domestic corporation to obtain the registry or enrollment of its vessels even though some stock of the corporation was owned by aliens. 18.ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE COASTWISE TRADE; ACT No. 2761, VALIDITY. The history of the different laws which have concerned the Philippine coastwise trade is set out in the opinion. The last Act on the subject, No. 2761, has returned to the restrictive idea of the original Customs Administrative Act which in turn was merely a reflection of the statutory language of the first American Congress. 19.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building. 20.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The Philippine Legislature made up entirely of Filipinos, representing the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of their rights, acting under practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has desired for these Islands safety from foreign interlopers, the use of the common property exclusively by its citizens and the citizens of the United States, and protection for the common good of the people. 21.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, limiting certificates of the Philippine registry to vessels of domestic ownership vested in some one or more of the following classes of persons: (a) citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, is authorized by the Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, with its specific delegation of authority to the Government of the Philippine Islands to regulate the transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places therein, and by the grant by the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power to the Philippine Legislature. 22.ID.; ID, ID.; ID. While the plaintiff, a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, yet Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as the plaintiff the right to register vessels in the Philippine coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but falls within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power. 23.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Act No. 2761 does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, providing "that no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." 24.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Act No. 2761 is held to be valid and constitutional.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J p: A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The Attorney-General, acting as counsel for respondent, demurs to the petition on the general ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. While the facts are thus admitted, and while, moreover, the pertinent provisions of law are clear and understandable, and interpretative American jurisprudence is found in abundance, yet the issue submitted is not lightly to be resolved. The question, flatly presented, is, whether Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid or, more directly stated, whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders. FACTS. Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross. The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stock- holders ofSmith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.

LAW. The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, repealing the Shipping Act of April 30, 1906, but reenacting a portion of section 3 of this Law, and still in force, provides in its section 1: "That until Congress shall have authorized the registry as vessels of the United States of vessels owned in the Philippine Islands, the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized to adopt, from time to time, and enforce regulations governing the transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places in the Philippine Archipelago." (35 Stat. at L., 70; Section 3912, U. S. Comp. Stat. [1916]; 7 Pub. Laws, 364.) The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, still in force, provides in sections 3, (first paragraph, first sentence), 6, 7, 8, 10, and 31, as follows:

"Sec. 3.That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." . . . "SEC. 6.That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue in force and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified herein, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative authority herein provided or by Act of Congress of the United States. "SEC. 7.That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit. "This power shall specifically extend with the limitation herein provided as to the tariff to all laws relating to revenue and taxation in effect in the Philippines. "SEC. 8.That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted to the Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act." "SEC. 10.That while this Act provides that the Philippine government shall have the authority to enact a tariff law the trade relations between the islands and the United States shall continue to be governed exclusively by laws of the Congress of the United States: Provided, That tariff acts or acts amendatory to the tariff of the Philippine Islands shall not become law until they shall receive the approval of the President of the United States, nor shall any act of the Philippine Legislature affecting immigration or the currency or coinage laws of the Philippines become a law until it has been approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That the President shall approve or disapprove any act mentioned in the foregoing proviso within six months from and after its enactment and submission for his approval, and if not disapproved within such time it shall become a law the same as if it had been specifically approved." "SEC. 31.That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the Philippines not in conflict with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby continued in force and effect." (39 Stat at L., 546.) On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first section of this law amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code to read as follows: "SEC. 1172.Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued

for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. " 'Domestic ownership,' as used in this section, means ownership vested in some one or more of the following classes of persons: (a) Citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of both, created under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of the Philippine Islands, provides some duly authorized officer thereof, or the managing agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands. "Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under existing law, shall likewise be deemed a vessel of domestic ownership so long as there shall not be any change in the ownership thereof nor any transfer of stock of the companies or corporations owning such vessel to persons not included under the last preceding paragraph." Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the Administrative Code to read as follows: "SEC. 1176.Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code. "The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its owner, master, crew, or passengers in order to ascertain whether the vessel is engaged in legitimate trade and is entitled to have or retain the certificate of Philippine register." "SEC. 1202.Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board vessels. No Philippine vessel operating in the coastwise trade or on the high seas shall be permitted to have on board more than one master or one mate and one engineer who are not citizens of the United States or of the Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses under section one thousand one hundred and ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of the United States or of the Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the crew of such vessel. Any such vessel which fails to comply with the terms of this section shall be required to pay an additional tonnage tax of fifty centavos per net ton per month during the continuance of said failure."

ISSUES. Predicated on these facts and provisions of law, the issues as above stated recur, namely, whether Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid in whole or in part whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coast- wise trade to corporations having alien stockholders. OPINION. 1.Considered from a positive standpoint, there can exist no measure of doubt as to the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact Act No. 2761. The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, with its specific delegation of authority to the Government of the Philippine Islands to regulate the transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places therein, the liberal construction given to the provisions of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by the courts, and the grant by the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power to the Philippine Legislature, are certainly superabundant authority for such a law. While the Act of the local legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the Act of Congress regulating the coasting trade of the Continental United States, yet the general rule that only such laws of the United States have force in the Philippines as are expressly extended thereto, and the abnegation of power by Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands would leave no starting point for convincing argument. As a matter of fact, counsel for petitioner does not assail legislative action from this direction. (See U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; Sinnot vs. Davenport [1859] 22 How., 227.) 2.It is from the negative, prohibitory standpoint that counsel argues against the constitutionality of Act No. 2761. The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of the Philippine Bill, repeated again in the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights as set forth in the Jones Law, provides "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law the company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use. The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the Philippine Islands have been used in the same sense as like provisions found in the United States Constitution. While the "due process of law and equal protection of the laws" clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights is couched in slightly different words than the corresponding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the first should be interpreted and given the same force and effect as the latter. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S., 470, U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7.) The meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has been announced in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Even at the expense of restating

what is so well known, these basic principles must again be set down in order to serve as the basis of this decision. The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33.) Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. (Santa Clara County vs. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. [1886], 118 U. S., 394; Pembina Mining Co. vs. Pennsylvania [1888], 125 U. S., 181; Covington &; L. Turnpike Road Co. vs. Sandford [1896], 164 U. S., 578.) Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection. (Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150.) Examples of laws held unconstitutional because of unlawful discrimination against aliens could be cited. Generally, these decisions relate to statutes which had attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens to engage in ordinary kinds of business to earn their living. (State vs. Montgomery [1900], 94 Maine, 192, peddling but see Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass., 262; Templar vs. Board of Examiners of Barbers [1902], 131 Mich., 254, barbers; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S 356, discrimination against Chinese ; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33; In re Parrott [1880], 1 Fed., 481; Fraser vs McConway & Torley Co. [1897], 82 Fed., 257, Juniata Limestone Co. vs. Fagley [1898], 187 Penn., 193, all relating to the employment of aliens by private corporations.)

A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation, some of whose members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws. Like all beneficent propositions, deeper research discloses provisos. Examples of a denial of rights to aliens notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment could be cited. (Tragesser vs. Gray [1890], 73 Md., 250, licenses to sell spirituous liquors denied to persons not citizens of the United States; Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 19.~ Mass., 262, excluding aliens from the right to peddle; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138, prohibiting the killing of any wild bird or animal by any unnaturalized foreign-born resident; Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442, discriminating in favor of citizens with reference to the taking for private use of the common property in fish and oysters found in the public waters of the State; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U. S., 175, and Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195, limiting employment on public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States.) One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, that neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its 'police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its

resources and add to its wealth and prosperity- From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27; New Orleans Gas Co. vs. Louisiana Light Co. [1885], 115 U. S., 650.) This is the same police power which the United States Supreme Court says "extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people." (Bacon vs. Walker [1907], 204 U-. S., 311.) For quite similar reasons, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. (U. S. vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil., 85; Churchill and Tait vs. Raferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.l Another notable exception permits of the regulation or distribution of the public domain or the common property or resources of the people of the State, so that the use may be limited to its citizens. (Ex Parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442; McCready vs. Virginia [1876], 94 U. S., 391; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.) Still another exception permits of the limitation of employment in the construction of public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States or of the State. (Atkin vs. Kansas [1903], 191 U. S., 207; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U.' S., 175; Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195.) Even as to classification, it is admitted that a State may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented; the question is a practical one, dependent upon experience. (Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.) To justify that portion of Act No. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the exceptions here mentioned. This must be done, moreover, having particularly in mind what is so often of controlling effect in this jurisdiction our local experience and our peculiar local conditions. To recall a few facts in geography, within the confines of Philippine jurisdictional limits are found more than three thousand islands. Literally, and absolutely, steamship lines are, for an Insular territory thus situated, the arteries of commerce. If one be severed, the life-blood of the nation is lost. If on the other hand these arteries are protected, then the security of the country and the promotion of the general welfare is sustained. Time and again, with such conditions confronting it, has the executive branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the sanction of the judicial branch, taken a firm stand with reference to the presence of undesirable foreigners. The Government has thus assumed to act for the all-sufficient and primitive reason of the benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the selfpreservation and integrity of its dominion. (In re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Forbes vs. Chuoco, Tiaco and Crossfield [1910], 16 Phil., 534; 228 U. S., ;549; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41. ) Boats owned by foreigners, particularly by such solid and reputable firms as the instant claimant, might indeed traverse the waters of the Philippines for ages without doing any particular harm. Again, some evil-minded foreigner might very easily take advantage of such lavish hospitality to chart Philippine waters, to obtain

valuable information for unfriendly foreign powers, to stir up insurrection, or to prejudice Filipino or American commerce. Moreover, under the Spanish portion of Philippine law, the waters within the domestic jurisdiction are deemed part of the national domain, open to public use. (Book II, Tit. IV, Ch. I, Civil Code; Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866. arts. 1. 2. 3.) Common carriers which in the Philippines as in the United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected with a public interest," can only be permitted to use these public waters as a privilege and under such conditions as to the representatives of the people may seem wise. (See De Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541.) In Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ([1913], 232 U. S., 138), a case hereinbefore mentioned, Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court said: "This statute makes it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to kill any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or property, and 'to that end' makes it unlawful for such foreign-born person to own or be possessed of a shotgun or rifle; with a penalty of $25 and a forfeiture of the gun or guns. The plaintiff in error was found guilty and was sentenced to pay the above mentioned fine. The judgment was affirmed on successive appeals. (231 Pa., 46; 79 Atl., 928.) He brings the case to this court on the ground that the statute is contrary to the 14th Amendment and also is in contravention of the treaty between the United States and Italy, to which latter country the plaintiff in error belongs. "Under the 14th Amendment the objection is twofold; unjustifiably depriving the alien of property, and discrimination against such aliens as a class. But the former really depends upon the latter, since it hardly can be disputed that if the lawful object, the protection of wild life (Geer vs. Connecticut, 161 U. S., 519; 40 L. ed., 793; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 600), warrants the discrimination, the means adopted for making it effective also might be adopted. . . . "The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we start with the general consideration that a state may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one, dependent upon experience. . . . "The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for the law that resident unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent. (Barrett vs. Indiana, 229 U. S., 26, 29; 57 L. ed., 1050, 1052; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 692.)

"Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on which this court ought to be very slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong in its facti. (Adams vs. Milwaukee, 228 U. S., 572, 583; 57 L. ed., 971, 977; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 610.) If we might trust popular speech in some states it was right; but it is enough that this court has no such knowledge of local conditions as to be able to say that it was manifestly wrong. . . . "Judgment affirmed." We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the-due process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision. This opinion might well be brought to a close at this point. It occurs to us, however, that the legislative history of the United States and the Philippine Islands, and, probably, the legislative history of other countries, if we were to take the time to search it out, might disclose similar attempts at restriction on the right to enter the coastwise trade, and might thus furnish valuable aid by which to ascertain and, if possible, effectuate legislative intention.

such transfer a citizen of and resident within the United States, . . . every such vessel with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the cargo found on board her, shall be forfeited." In case of alienation to a foreigner, Chief Justice Marshall said that all the privileges of an American bottom were ipso facto forfeited. (U. S. vs. Willings and Francis [1807], 4 Cranch, 48.) Even as late as 1873, the Attorney-General of the United States was of the opinion that under the provisions of the Act of December 31, 1792 no vessel in which a foreigner is directly or indirectly interested can lawfully be registered as a vessel of the United States. (14 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U. S.], 340.) These laws continued in force without contest, although possibly the Act of March 3, 1825, may have affected them until amended by the Act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at L., 188) which extended the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States to corporations created under the laws of any of the states thereof. The law, as amended, made possible the deduction that a vessel belonging to a domestic corporation was entitled to registry or enrollment even though some stock of the company be owned by aliens. The right of ownership of stock in a corporation was thereafter distinct from the right to hold the property by the corporation. (Humphreys vs. McKissock [1890], 140 U. S., 304; Queen vs. Arnaud [1846], 9 Q. B., 806; 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U. S.], 188.) On American occupation of the Philippines, the new government found a substantive law in operation in the Islands with a civil law history which it wisely continued in force. Article fifteen of the Spanish Code of Commerce permitted any foreigner to engage in Philippine trade if he had legal capacity to do so under the laws of his nation. When the Philippine Commission came to enact the Customs Administrative Act (No. 355) in 1902, it returned to the old American policy of limiting the protection and flag of the United States to vessels owned by citizens of the United States or by native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 117.) Two years later, the same body reverted to the existing Congressional law by permitting certificates to be issued to a citizen of the United States or to a corporation or company created under the laws of the United States or of any state thereof or of the Philippine Islands. (Act No. 1235, sec. 3. ) The two administrative codes repeated the same provision with the necessary amplification of inclusion of citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Adm. Code of 1916, sec. 1345; Adm. Code of 1917, sec. 1172). And now Act No. 2761 has returned to the restrictive idea of the original Customs Administrative Act which in turn was merely a reflection of the statutory language of the first American Congress. Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the right to a certificate of Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical as a first reading would make them appear. Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building. This, without doubt, has, likewise, been the intention of the United States Congress in passing navigation or tariff laws on different occasions. The object of such a law, the United States Supreme Court once said, was to encourage American trade, navigation, and ship-building by giving American shipowners exclusive privileges. ( Old Dominion Steamship Co. vs. Virginia [1905], 198 U. S., 299; Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 139.)

3.The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by the Constitution, includes the power to nationalize ships built and owned in the United States by registries and enrollments, and the recording of the muniments of title of American vessels. The Congress "may encourage or it may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it may regulate in any way it may see fit between these two extremes." (U. S. vs. Craig [1886], 28 Fed., 795; Gibbons vs. Ogden [1824], 9 Wheat., 1; The Passenger Cases [1849], 7 How., 283.) Acting within the purview of such power, the first Congress of the United States had not been long convened before it enacted on September 1, 1789, "An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes." Section 1 of this law provided that for any ship or vessel to obtain the benefits of American registry, it must belong wholly to a citizen or citizens of the United States "and no other." (1 Stat. at L., 55.) That Act was shortly after repealed, but the same idea was carried into the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792 and February 18, 179.3. (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305.) Section 4 of the Act of 1792 provided that in order to obtain the registry of any vessel, an oath shall be taken and subscribed by the owner, or by one of the owners thereof, before the officer authorized to make such registry, declaring, "that there is no subject or citizen of any foreign prince or state, directly or indirectly, by way of trust, confidence, or otherwise, interested in such vessel, or in the profits or issues thereof." Section 32 of the Act of 1793 even went so far as to say "that if any licensed ship or vessel shall be transferred to any person who is not at the time of

In the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Gibbons vs. Ogden ([1824], 9 Wheat., 1) is found the following: "Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges. a contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners, in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise that this whole system is projected." The United States Congress in assuming its grave responsibility of legislating wisely for a new country did so imbued with a spirit of Americanism. Domestic navigation and trade, it decreed, could only be carried on by citizens of the United States. If the representatives of the American people acted in this patriotic manner to advance the national policy, and if their action was accepted without protest in the courts, who can say that they did not enact such beneficial laws under the all-pervading police power, with the prime motive of safeguarding the country and of promoting its prosperity? Quite similarly, the Philippine Legislature made up entirely of Filipinos, representing the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of their rights, acting under practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has desired for these Islands safety from foreign interlopers, the use of the common property exclusively by its citizens and the citizens of the United States, and protection for the common good of the people. Who can say, therefore, especially can a court, that with all the facts and circumstances affecting the Filipino people before it, the Philippine Legislature has erred in the enactment of Act No. 2761? Surely, the members of the judiciary are not expected to live apart from active life, in monastic seclusion amidst dusty tomes and ancient records, but, as keen spectators of passing events and alive to the dictates of the general the national welfare, can incline the scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. All the presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law and without good and strong reasons, courts should not attempt to nullify the action of the Legislature. "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission (Legislature), we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law." (In re Guaria [1913], 24 Phil., 36; U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1.) That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect.

With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are clearly of the opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining a certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine Islands, and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916. No treaty right is relied upon. Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional. The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997.] HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTSASSOCIATION, respondents.

cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is deprivation of property without due process of law. Petition denied.

SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PPA-AO NO. 04-92; DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THE PRE-EVALUATION CANCELLATION OF THE HARBORPILOTS' LICENSES IS WHAT PRIMARILY MAKES THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER UNREASONABLE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM; IT CONSTITUTES DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been canceled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is this preevaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. 2.ID.; ID.; AN UNNECESSARY ENACTMENT; SINCE THE LAW ADDS NOTHING NEW OR SUBSTANTIAL IT MUST BE STRUCK DOWN. The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a "surplusage" and, therefore an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.

The Solicitor General for petitioners. Manuel E. Valenzuela and Jesus P. Amparo for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS July 15, 1992, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92, limiting the term of Appointment of harbor pilots to one (1) year subject to renewal or cancellation by the authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance. Respondents, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by the Department Secretary that the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body. Respondents appealed to the Office of the President which ordered the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of the administrative order. However, the Office of the President through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court ruled that herein petitioners have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating PPA AO No. 04-92 including its implementing memoranda. The trial court also declared the administrative order null and void and permanently enjoined its implementation. Hence, herein petitioners elevated the case to the Court on certiorari. The Supreme Court ruled that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in utter disregard of respondent's right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court held that the provision limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their retirement. Renewal of the license is now dependent on a rigid evaluation of performance which is conducted only after the license has been canceled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is the "pre-evaluation"

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:

In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92) limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents' right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law? The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA's charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, 1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on March 21, 1985, which embodied the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses 3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance 4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself 5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. 6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor. Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 7 on July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services." This was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance." On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body." Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 8 which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment ofharbor pilots viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: 9 safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and, (2) Criteria for Evaluation: 10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC. On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services. On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. 11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section. 6 of P.D. No .857, mandating it "to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district." On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:

"The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more. than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional area." (Emphasis supplied) Finally, as regards the alleged "absence of ample prior consultation" before the issuance of the administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with "relevant Government agencies." Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National Economic Development Agency,

the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order. Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment: 12 "WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this court hereby rules that: 1.Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders; 2.PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void; 3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders. No costs. SO ORDERED." The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 13 Thus, abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of theharbor pilots. Consequently, any "withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari. After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.: "SEC. 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . ." In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." 14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction. prLL Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, 15 where it declared that "(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times 16 before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots'examinations," was not consulted, 17 the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. 18 Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. 19 Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be "withdrawn or shortened" by observing the constitutional mandate of

due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law. There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that "(t)he exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process." 20 He merely expressed the opinion that "(i)n the limited context of this case PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that "PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise byharbor pilots of their profession." As will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but also superfluous. Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards." 21 A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. 22 Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but fiveexaminations, each followed by actual training and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed: "Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be aharbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (3) For chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots." Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, "(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal " It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPAAO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a "surplusage" 23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down. Finally, respondents' insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial court's finding of animosity between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan, including cases which have reached this Court cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities. WHEREFORE the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. Cdpr SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 149927. March 30, 2004.] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Under then Minister ERNESTO R. MACEDA; and Former Government Officials CATALINO MACARAIG, FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, ANGEL C. ALCALA, BEN MALAYANG, ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, MARIANO Z. VALERA and ROMULO SAN JUAN, petitioners, vs. ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PEDRO DEL CONCHA, and ALEJANDRO and RUFO DE GUZMAN, respondents.

'1.Declaring that the cancellation of License No. 33 was done without jurisdiction and in gross violation of the Constitutional right of the petitioners against deprivation of their property rights without due process of law and is hereby set aside. '2.Declaring that the petitioners right to continue the exploitation of the marble deposits in the area covered by License No. 33 is maintained for the duration of the period of its life of twenty-five (25) years, less three (3) years of continuous operation before License No. 33 was cancelled, unless sooner terminated for violation of any of the conditions specified therein, with due process. '3.Making the Writ of preliminary injunction and the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued as permanent. '4.Ordering the cancellation of the bond filed by the Petitioners in the sum of 1 Million.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p: A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the May 29, 2001 Decision 2 and the September 6, 2001 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 46878. The CA disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto." 4 The questioned Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, trial court's Decision, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: The CA narrated the facts as follows: "The four (4) petitioners, namely, Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual, Dr. Pedro De la Concha, Alejandro De La Concha, and Rufo De Guzman, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial '5.Allowing the petitioners to present evidence in support of the damages they claim to have suffered from, as a consequence of the summary cancellation of License No. 33 pursuant to the agreement of the parties on such dates as may be set by the Court; and '6.Denying for lack of merit the motions for contempt, it appearing that actuations of the respondents were not contumacious and intended to delay the proceedings or undermine the integrity of the Court. 'No pronouncement yet as to costs.' " 5 The Facts

quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range. "Having succeeded in discovering said marble deposits, and as a result of their tedious efforts and substantial expenses, the petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. xxx xxx xxx "After compliance with numerous required conditions, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. xxx xxx xxx "Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by him through his letter to ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986 for the reasons stated therein. Because of the aforesaid cancellation, the original petition was filed and later substituted by the petitioners AMENDED PETITION dated August 21, 1991 to assail the same. xxx xxx xxx

be covered by the four separate applications of respondents was 400 hectares. Finally, according to the RTC, Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law; as such, it violated Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioners asked whether PD 463 or the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 had been violated by the award of the 330.3062 hectares to respondents in accordance with Proclamation No. 2204. They also questioned the validity of the cancellation of respondents Quarry License/Permit (QLP) No. 33. Ruling of the Court of Appeals Sustaining the trial court in toto, the CA held that the grant of the quarry license covering 330.3062 hectares to respondents was authorized by law, because the license was embraced by four (4) separate applications each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation under Presidential Decree No. 463 that a quarry license should cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province was supplanted by Republic Act No. 7942, 7 which increased the mining areas allowed under PD 463. It also ruled that the cancellation of respondents' license without notice and hearing was tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. It added that under the clause in the Constitution dealing with the non-impairment of obligations and contracts, respondents' license must be respected by the State. AHDaET Hence, this Petition. 8 Issues Petitioners submit the following issues for the Courts consideration:

"Also after due hearing, the prayer for injunctive relief was granted in the Order of this Court dated February 28, 1992. Accordingly, the corresponding preliminary writs were issued after the petitioners filed their injunction bond in the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00). xxx xxx xxx

"(1)[W]hether or not QLP No. 33 was issued in blatant contravention of Section 69, P.D. No. 463; and (2) whether or not Proclamation No. 84 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is valid. The corollary issue is whether or not the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law applies to Proclamation No. 84" 9 The Courts Ruling

"On September 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the herein questioned decision." 6 The trial court ruled that the privilege granted under respondents' license had already ripened into a property right, which was protected under the due process clause of the Constitution. Such right was supposedly violated when the license was cancelled without notice and hearing. The cancellation was said to be unjustified, because the area that could

The Petition has merit. First Issue: Validity of License

Respondents contend that the Petition has no legal basis, because PD 463 has already been repealed. 10 In effect, they ask for the dismissal of the Petition on the ground of mootness. "xxx xxx xxx PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through licenses, concessions or leases. 11 While these arrangements were provided under the 1935 12 and the 1973 13 Constitutions, they have been omitted by Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 14 With the shift of constitutional policy toward "full control and supervision of the State" over natural resources, the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr. 15 declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to or violative of the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution. The said provisions dealt with the lease of mining claims; quarry permits or licenses covering privately owned or public lands; and other related provisions on lease, licenses and permits. RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional mandate. It has repealed or amended all laws, executive orders, presidential decrees, rules and regulations or parts thereof that are inconsistent with any of its provisions. 16 It is relevant to state, however, that Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to a "license, concession or lease" granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. 17 As noted in Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission 18 emphasized the intent to apply the said constitutional provision prospectively. While RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it nonetheless respects previously issued valid and existing licenses, as follows: "SECTION 5.Mineral Reservations. When the national interest so requires, such as when there is a need to preserve strategic raw materials for industries critical to national development, or certain minerals for scientific, cultural or ecological value, the President may establish mineral reservations upon the recommendation of the Director through the Secretary. Mining operations in existing mineral reservations and such other reservations as may thereafter be established, shall be undertaken by the Department or through a contractor: Provided, That a small scale-mining cooperative covered by Republic Act No. 7076 shall be given preferential right to apply for a small-scale mining agreement for a maximum aggregate area of twenty-five percent (25%) of such mineral reservation, subject to valid existing mining/quarrying rights as provided under Section 112 Chapter XX hereof. All submerged lands within the contiguous zone and in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines are hereby declared to be mineral reservations. "SECTION 7.Periodic Review of Existing Mineral Reservations. The Secretary shall periodically review existing mineral reservations for the purpose of determining whether their continued existence is consistent with the national interest, and upon his recommendation, the President may, by proclamation, alter or modify the boundaries thereof or revert the same to the public domain without prejudice to prior existing rights. "SECTION 18.Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to any existing rights or reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in public or private lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators." "SECTION 19.Areas Closed to Mining Applications. Mineral agreement or financial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed: (a)In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by the government agency concerned; (b)Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and historic sites, bridges, highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams or other infrastructure projects, public or private works including plantations or valuable crops, except upon written consent of the government agency or private entity concerned; (c)In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights; (d)In areas expressly prohibited by law; (e)In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with prior consent of the small-scale miners, in which case a royalty payment upon the utilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties, said royalty

forming a trust fund for the socioeconomic development of the community concerned; and (f)Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law and in areas expressly prohibited under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws. "SECTION 112.Non-impairment of Existing Mining/ Quarrying Rights. All valid and existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, mineral production-sharing agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not be impaired, and shall be recognized by the Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share in mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said provisions: Provided, further, That no renewal of mining lease contracts shall be made after the expiration of its term: Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. "SECTION 113.Recognition of Valid and Existing Mining Claims and Lease/Quarry Application. Holders of valid and existing mining claims, lease/quarry applications shall be given preferential rights to enter into any mode of mineral agreement with the government within two (2) years from the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing this Act. (Italics supplied) Section 3(p) of RA 7942 defines an existing mining/quarrying right as "a valid and subsisting mining claim or permit or quarry permit or any mining lease contract or agreement covering a mineralized area granted/issued under pertinent mining laws." Consequently, determining whether the license of respondents falls under this definition would be relevant to fixing their entitlement to the rights and/or preferences under RA 7942. Hence, the present Petition has not been mooted.

Petitioners submit that the license clearly contravenes Section 69 of PD 463, because it exceeds the maximum area that may be granted. This incipient violation, according to them, renders the license void ab initio. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the license was validly granted, because it was covered by four separate applications for areas of 81 hectares each. The license in question, QLP No. 33, 19 is dated August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The terms of the license allowed the corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from a 330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license is, however, subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the time it was granted; as well as to the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 20 By the same token, Proclamation No. 2204 which awarded to Rosemoor the right of development, exploitation, and utilization of the mineral site expressly cautioned that the grant was subject to "existing policies, laws, rules and regulations." 21 The license was thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463, which reads: "Section 69.Maximum Area of Quarry License Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof, a quarry license shall cover an area of not more than one hundred (100) hectares in any one province and not more than one thousand (1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines." (Italics supplied) The language of PD 463 is clear. It states in categorical and mandatory terms that a quarry license, like that of respondents, should cover a maximum of 100 hectares in any given province. This law neither provides any exception nor makes any reference to the number of applications for a license. Section 69 of PD 463 must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Where the law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 22 Moreover, the lower courts' ruling is evidently inconsistent with the fact that QLP No. 33 was issued solely in the name of Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, rather than in the names of the four individual stockholders who are respondents herein. It likewise brushes aside a basic postulate that a corporation has a separate personality from that of its stockholders. 23 The interpretation adopted by the lower courts is contrary to the purpose of Section 69 of PD 463. Such intent to limit, without qualification, the area of a quarrylicense strictly to 100 hectares in any one province is shown by the opening proviso that reads: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof . . . The mandatory nature of the provision is also underscored by the use of the word shall. Hence, in the application of the 100-hectare-per-

province limit, no regard is given to the size or the number of mining claims under Section 14, which we quote: "SECTION 14.Size of Mining Claim. For purposes of registration of a mining claim under this Decree, the Philippine territory and its shelf are hereby divided into meridional blocks or quadrangles of one-half minute (1/2) of latitude and longitude, each block or quadrangle containing area of eighty-one (81) hectares, more or less. "A mining claim shall cover one such block although a lesser area may be allowed if warranted by attendant circumstances, such as geographical and other justifiable considerations as may be determined by the Director: Provided, That in no case shall the locator be allowed to register twice the area allowed for lease under Section 43 hereof." (Italics supplied) Clearly, the intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license may cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law. Second Issue: Validity of Proclamation No. 84 Petitioners also argue that the license was validly declared a nullity and consequently withdrawn or terminated. In a letter dated September 15, 1986, respondents were informed by then Minister Ernesto M. Maceda that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason, they added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national Park. They also contend that Section 74 of PD 463 would not apply, because Minister Macedas letter did not cancel or revoke QLP No. 33, but merely declared the latters nullity. They further argue that respondents waived notice and hearing in their application for the license. On the other hand, respondents submit that, as provided for in Section 74 of PD 463, their right to due process was violated when their license was cancelled without notice and hearing. They likewise contend that Proclamation No. 84 is not valid for the following reasons: 1) it violates the clause on the non-impairment of contracts; 2) it is an ex post facto law and/or a bill of attainder; and 3) it was issued by the President after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

This Court ruled on the nature of a natural resource exploration permit, which was akin to the present respondents license, in Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, 24 which held: ". . . As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare." 25

This same ruling had been made earlier in Tan v. Director of Forestry 26 with regard to a timber license, a pronouncement that was reiterated in Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 27 the pertinent portion of which reads: ". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]." 28 (Italics supplied) In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents' license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. 29 Respondents themselves acknowledge this condition of the grant under paragraph 7 of QLP No. 33, which we quote: "7.This permit/license may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when, in his opinion public

interests so requireor, upon failure of the permittee/licensee to comply with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as with the terms and conditions specified herein; Provided, That if a permit/license is cancelled, or otherwise terminated, the permittee/licensee shall be liable for all unpaid rentals and royalties due up to the time of the termination or cancellation of the permit/license[.]" 30 (Italics supplied) The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of all mineral resources. That determination was based on policy considerations formally enunciated in the letter dated September 15, 1986, issued by then Minister Maceda and, subsequently, by the President through Proclamation No. 84. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice it to say that while the cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the director of mines and geo-sciences, the latter is subject to the former's control as the department head. We also stress the clear prerogative of the Executive Department in the evaluation and the consequent cancellation of licenses in the process of its formulation of policies with regard to their utilization. Courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion without any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. 31 Moreover, granting that respondents' license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. 32 The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources. 33 This Regalian doctrine is an exercise of its sovereign power as owner of lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the nation, the mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset. 34 Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. As pointed out earlier, respondents' license is not a contract to which the protection accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend. 35 Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed with public welfare. 36 As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 37 We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a "legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." 38 Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity 39 is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder. Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. There are six recognized instances when a law is considered as such: 1) it criminalizes and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the law and that was innocent when it was done; 2) it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when it was committed; 3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater than that imposed by the law annexed to the

crime when it was committed; 4) it alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony than that required by the law at the time of the commission of the offense; 5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered lawful when it was done; and 6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or an acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty. 40 Proclamation No. 84 does not fall under any of the enumerated categories; hence, it is not an ex post facto law. ITcCaS It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. 41 Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents' license, is clearly not penal in character. Finally, it is stressed that at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. 42 Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power "until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution." The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. 43 WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby GRANTED and the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 158793. June 8, 2006.] JAMES MIRASOL, RICHARD SANTIAGO, and LUZON MOTORCYCLISTS FEDERATION, INC., petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICWORKS AND HIGHWA YS and TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.

c.Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). 2.Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities. 3.Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. 4.On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting petitioners' application for preliminary injunction. On July 16, 2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court, conditioned upon petitioners' filing of cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with. 5.On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways). 6.Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their] Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision. 7.Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated June 16, 2003. 3

DECISION

CARPIO, J p: This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse the Decision dated 10 March 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 147, Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-034, as well as the RTC's Order dated 16 June 2003 which denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners assert that Department of Public Works andHighways' (DPWH) Department Order No. 74 (DO 74), Department Order No. 215 (DO 215), and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) violate Republic Act No. 2000 (RA 2000) or the Limited Access Highway Act. Petitioners also seek to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1) 2 unconstitutional. Antecedent Facts The facts are not in dispute. As summarized by the Solicitor General, the facts are as follows: 1.On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01-034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957: a.DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; b.DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;

Hence, this petition. The RTC's Ruling The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision dated 10 March 2003 reads: WHEREFORE, [t]he Petition is denied/dismissed insofar as petitioners seek to declare null and void ab initio DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993, Administrative Order No. 1, and Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated by the DPWH thru the TRB, the presumed validity thereof not having been overcome; but the petition is granted insofar as DPWH Department Order No. 123 is concerned, declaring the same to be invalid for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. SO ORDERED. 4 The Issues

Petitioners are mistaken. As the RTC correctly stated, the Order dated 28 June 2001 was not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues. It is a provisional remedy, which merely serves to preserve the status quountil the court could hear the merits of the case. 6 Thus, Section 9 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the issuance of a final injunction to confirm the preliminary injunction should the court during trial determine that the acts complained of deserve to be permanently enjoined. A preliminary injunction is a mere adjunct, an ancillary remedy which exists only as an incident of the main proceeding. 7 Validity of DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB Regulations Petitioners claim that DO 74, 8 DO 215, 9 and the TRB's Rules and Regulations issued under them violate the provisions of RA 2000. They contend that the two issuances unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in Section 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways. Petitioners assert that the DPWH's regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or central dividing sections. They claim that the DPWH is only allowed to re-design the physical structure of toll ways, and not to determine "who or what can be qualified as toll way users." 10 Section 4 of RA 2000 11 reads:

Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution: 1.WHETHER THE RTC'S DECISION IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA; 2.WHETHER DO 74, DO 215 AND THE TRB REGULATIONS CONTRAVENE RA 2000; AND CIETDc 3.WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 5 The Ruling of the Court The petition is partly meritorious. Whether the RTC's Decision Dismissing Petitioners' Case is Barred by Res Judicata Petitioners rely on the RTC's Order dated 28 June 2001, which granted their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Since respondents did not appeal from that Order, petitioners argue that the Order became "a final judgment" on the issues. Petitioners conclude that the RTC erred when it subsequently dismissed their petition in its Decision dated 10 March 2003. SEC. 4.Design of limited access facility. The Department of Public Works and Communications is authorized to so design any limited access facility and to so regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for which such facility is intended; and its determination of such design shall be final. In this connection, it is authorized to divide and separate any limited access facility into separate roadways by the construction of raised curbings, central dividing sections, or other physical separations, or by designating such separate roadways by signs, markers, stripes, and the proper lane for such traffic by appropriate signs, markers, stripes and other devices. No person, shall have any right of ingress or egress to, from or across limited access facilities to or from abutting lands, except at such designated points at which access may be permitted, upon such terms and conditions as may be specified from time to time. (Emphasis supplied) On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways. The pertinent provisions of AO 1 read: SUBJECT:Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Limited Access Highways

By virtue of the authority granted the Secretary [of] Public Works and Communications under Section 3 of R.A. 2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, the following rules and regulations governing limited access highways are hereby promulgated for the guidance of all concerned: xxx xxx xxx Section 3 On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to: xxx xxx xxx (h)Drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized); xxx xxx xxx 12 (Emphasis supplied) On 5 April 1993, Acting Secretary Edmundo V. Mir of the Department of Public Works and Highways issued DO 74: SUBJECT:Declaration of the North Luzon Expressway from Balintawak to Tabang and the South Luzon Expressway from Nichols to Alabang as Limited Access Facilities Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street especially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, air or view by reason of the fact that their proper[t]y abuts upon such limited access facility or for any other reason. Such highways or streets may be parkways, from which trucks, buses, and other commerical [sic] vehicles shall be excluded; or they may be free ways open to use by all customary forms of street and highway traffic." Section 3 of the same Act authorizes the Department of Public Works and Communications (now Department of Public Works and Highways) "to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited access facilities for public use wherever it is of the

opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special facilities." Therefore, by virtue of the authority granted above, the Department of Public Works and Highways hereby designates and declares the Balintawak to Tabang Sections of the North Luzon Expressway, and the Nichols to Alabang Sections of the South Luzon Expressways, to be LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES subject to such rules and regulations that may be imposed by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).

In view thereof, the National Capital Region (NCR) of this Department is hereby ordered, after consultation with the TRB and in coordination with the Philippine National Police (PNP), to close all illegal openings along the said Limited Access Highways/Facilities. In this connection, the NCR is instructed to organize its own enforcement and security group for the purpose of assuring the continued closure of the right-of-way fences and the implementation of the rules and regulations that may be imposed by the DPWH thru the TRB. This Order shall take effect immediately. 13 On 25 June 1998, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued DO 215: SUBJECT:Declaration of the R-1 Expressway, from Seaside drive to Zapote, C-5 Link Expressway, from Zapote to Noveleta, of the Manila Cavite Toll Expressway as Limited Access Facility. Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street especially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, air or view by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited access facility or for any other reason. Such highways or streets may be parkways, from which trucks, buses, and other commercial vehicles shall be excluded; or they may be free ways open to use by all customary forms of street and highway traffic."

Section 3 of the same Act authorizes the Department of Public Works and Communications (now Department of Public Works and Highways) "to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited access facilities for public use wherever it is of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special facilities." Therefore, by virtue of the authority granted above, the Department of Public Works and Highways hereby designates and declares the R-1 Expressway, C-5 Link Expressway and the R-1 Extension Expressway Sections of the Manila Cavite Toll Expressway to be LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES subject to such rules and regulations that may be imposed by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). In view thereof, the National Capital Region (NCR) of this Department is hereby ordered, after consultation with the TRB and in coordination with the Philippine National Police (PNP), to close all illegal openings along the said Limited Access Highways/Facilities. In this connection, the NCR is instructed to organize its own enforcement and security group for the purpose of assuring the continued closure of the right-of-way fences and the implementation of the rules and regulations that may be imposed by the DPWH thru the TRB. This Order shall take effect immediately. 14 The RTC held that Section 4 of RA 2000 expressly authorized the DPWH to design limited access facilities and to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to serve the traffic for which such facilities are intended. According to the RTC, such authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit logically includes the determination of who and what can and cannot be permitted entry or access into the limited access facilities. Thus, the RTC concluded that AO 1, DO 74, and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities, which ban motorcycles' entry or access to the limited access facilities, are not inconsistent with RA 2000. ESDHCa RA 2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, was approved on 22 June 1957. Section 4 of RA 2000 provides that "[t]he Department of PublicWorks and Communications is authorized to so design any limited access facility and to so regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for which such facility is intended." The RTC construed this authorization to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities to apply to the Departmentof Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The RTC's ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH derived its authority from its predecessor, the Department of Public Works and Communications, which

is expressly authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities under Section 4 of RA 2000. However, such assumption fails to consider the evolution of the Department of Public Works and Communications. Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, approved on 10 March 1917, there were only seven executive departments, namely: theDepartment of the Interior, the Department of Finance, the Department of Justice, the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, the Department of PublicWorks and Communications, the Department of Public Instruction, and the Department of Labor. 15 On 20 June 1964, Republic Act No. 4136 16 created the Land Transportation Commission under the Department of Public Works and Communications. Later, the Department of Public Works and Communications was restructured into the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. On 16 May 1974, Presidential Decree No. 458 (PD 458) separated the Bureau of Public Highways from the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and created it as a department to be known as Department of Public Highways. Under Section 3 of PD 458, the Department of Public Highways is "responsible for developing and implementing programs on the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and airport runways." With the amendment of the 1973 Philippine Constitution in 1976, resulting in the shift in the form of government, national agencies were renamed from Departments to Ministries. Thus, the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications became the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. On 23 July 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546 (EO 546), creating a Ministry of Public Works and a Ministry of Transportation and Communications. 17 Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works assumed the public works functions of the Ministry ofPublic Works, Transportation and Communications. The functions of the Ministry of Public Works were the "construction, maintenance and repair of portworks, harbor facilities, lighthouses, navigational aids, shore protection works, airport buildings and associated facilities, public buildings and school buildings, monuments and other related structures, as well as undertaking harbor and river dredging works, reclamation of foreshore and swampland areas, water supply, and flood control and drainage works." 18 On the other hand, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications became the "primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the executive branch of the government in the promotion, development, and regulation of a dependable and coordinated network of transportation and communication systems." 19 The functions of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications were:

a.Coordinate and supervise all activities of the Ministry relative to transportation and communications; b.Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an integrated and comprehensive transportation and communications system at the national, regional and local levels; c.Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communication, and for this purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether government or private, whose development programs include transportation and communications as an integral part to participate and assist in the preparation and implementation of such programs; d.Regulate, whenever necessary, activities relative to transportation and communications and prescribe and collect fees in the exercise of such power; e.Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communications research and development programs of the government in coordination with other institutions concerned; and f.Perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Executive Order. 20 (Emphasis supplied) On 27 July 1981, then President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 710 (EO 710), which merged the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Highways for "greater simplicity and economy in operations." 21 The restructured agency became known as the Ministry of Public Works and Highways. Under Section 1 of EO 710 the functions of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Highways 22 were transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and Highways. Upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987, the former Ministry of Public Works and Highways became the Department of Public Works andHighways (DPWH) and the former Ministry of Transportation and Communications became the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). DPWH issued DO 74 and DO 215 declaring certain expressways as limited access facilities on 5 April 1993 and 25 June 1998, respectively. Later, the TRB, under the DPWH, issued the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities. However, on 23 July 1979, long before these department orders and regulations were issued, the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications was divided into two agencies the Ministry

of Public Works and theMinistry of Transportation and Communications by virtue of EO 546. The question is, which of these two agencies is now authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities? 23 Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH) assumed the public works functions of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. On the other hand, among the functions of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation and Communications [DOTC]) were to (1) formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an integrated and comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional, and local levels; and (2) regulate, whenever necessary, activities relative to transportation and communications and prescribe and collect fees in the exercise of such power. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.

Even under Executive Order No. 125 (EO 125) 24 and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125A), 25 which further reorganized the DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation is clearly with the DOTC. 26 Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the TRB 27 cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are likewise void. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are Unconstitutional DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong issued DO 123 on 18 July 2001. DO 123 reads in part: SUBJECT:Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Limited Access Highways By virtue of the authority granted the Secretary of Public Works and Highways under Section 3 of R.A. 2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, the following

revised rules and regulations governing limited access highways are hereby promulgated for the guidance of all concerned: 1.Administrative Order No. 1 dated February 19, 1968, issued by the Secretary of the then Department of Public Works and Communications, is hereby amended by deleting the word "motorcycles" mentioned in Section 3(h) thereof. Therefore, motorcycles are hereby allowed to operate inside the toll roads and limited access highways, subject to the following: a.Motorcycles shall have an engine displacement of at least 400 cubic centimeters (cc) provided that: xxx xxx xxx 28 (Emphasis supplied) The RTC's Decision dated 10 March 2003 declared DO 123 unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause by allowing only motorcycles with at least 400 cubic centimeters engine displacement to use the toll ways. The RTC reasoned that the creation of a distinction within the class of motorcycles was not based on real differences. cTCEIS We need not pass upon the constitutionality of the classification of motorcycles under DO 123. As previously discussed, the DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it. On the other hand, the assailed portion of AO 1 states: Section 3.On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to: xxx xxx xxx (h)Drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized); xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners assail the DPWH's failure to provide "scientific" and "objective" data on the danger of having motorcycles plying our highways. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. Petitioners belabor the fact that there are studies that provide proof that motorcycles are safe modes of transport. They also claim that AO 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport. Finally, petitioners argue that AO 1 violates their right to travel. Petitioners' arguments do not convince us. We emphasize that the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1 on 19 February 1968. Section 3 of RA 2000 29authorized the issuance of the guidelines. In contrast, DPWH issued DO 74, DO 215 and DO 123 after EO 546 devolved to the DOTC the authority to regulate limited access highways. We now discuss the constitutionality of AO 1. Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. 30 They benefit from the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. 31 These two precepts place a heavy burden upon any party assailing governmental regulations. The burden of proving unconstitutionality rests on such party. 32 The burden becomes heavier when the police power is at issue. The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. 33 The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers. 34 The tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness. 35 What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of reasonableness exists, 36 for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. 37 We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose for which a toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate the rules. Consider Section 3(g) of AO 1, which prohibits the conduct of rallies inside toll ways. 38 The regulation affects the right to peaceably assemble. The exercise of police power involves restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself. Thus, the test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on constitutional rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.

None of the rules outlined in AO 1 strikes us as arbitrary and capricious. The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the petitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. 39 Arguably, prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways. However, the means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. 40 Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the governmental regulation. Arguments based on what is "best" are arguments reserved for the Legislature's discussion. Judicial intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in this case to be so. Neither do we find AO 1 oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners' right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. 41 Several cheap, accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one's scooter, bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way. Petitioners' reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced. Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies to support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise of police power must first be conclusively justified by research. The yardstick has always been simply whether the government's act is reasonable and not oppressive. 42 The use of "reason" in this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and capricious government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no government will be able to act in situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be tied up conducting studies. A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law. 43 Petitioners' attempt to seek redress from the motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal protection must fail. Petitioners' contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is not prohibited. 44 A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. As explained by Chief Justice Fernando inBautista v. Juinio: 45

. . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical is analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the nonmotorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models. 46 We find that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Moreover, we take note that the Philippines is home to a host of unique motorized modes of transport ranging from modified hand-carts (kuliglig) to bicycle "sidecars" outfitted with a motor. To follow petitioners' argument to its logical conclusion would open up toll ways to all these contraptions. Both safety and traffic considerations militate against any ruling that would bring about such a nightmare. TEAICc Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly deprive them of their right to travel. We are not persuaded.

A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it. The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation. Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them alone. Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver's license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A driver's license issued by the LTO merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or operate any form of transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles. WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We MODIFY the Decision dated 10 March 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 147, Makati City and its Order dated 16 June 2003 in Civil Case No. 01-034. We declare VOID Department Order Nos. 74, 215, and 123 of the Department of Public Works and Highways, and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board. We declare VALID Administrative Order No. 1 of the Department of PublicWorks and Communications. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 77372. April 29, 1988.] LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MUNGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTO C. BLAS, JR., ELPIDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents.

of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT COVER RULES AND REGULATIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY. This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. 5.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS MUST NOT BE ISSUED ARBITRARILY. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. 6.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RESOLUTION NO. 105 ISSUED BY THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY AND A VIOLATION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-pledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students.

Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; P.D. NO. 223; PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION; DECISION, ORDER OR RESOLUTION APPEALABLE TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS. What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). 3.ID.; B.P. BLG 129; EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS OVER FINAL ORDER OR RULING OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES IN EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS; "QUASI-JUDICIAL," DEFINED. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi- judicial adjudication would mean a determination

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J p: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips or the like three (3) days before the date of examination? These are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591, * declaring null and void the Order dated October 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in

Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled "Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission." The records show the following undisputed facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: "No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day. "Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission." 1 On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petition was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13, 1987, to wit: "WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the order dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for

want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No costs in this instance. cdrep SO ORDERED." 2 Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are coequal bodies. Thus it held "That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each other's acts." 3 To strengthen its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being co-equal bodies. After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case, We rule in favor of the petitioner. The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagrees with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go to the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy to take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. As already mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide for the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court.Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7 What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit: "In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion: 'The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers." 10 Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office" of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case,

a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held: " . . . , We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might ran the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of First Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended)." 12(Emphasis supplied.) In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 1 3 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered. In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides: "SEC. 9.Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (3)Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except

those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." The contention is devoid of merit. cdrep In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasijudicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi- judicialadjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation. 14 This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16 As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in said case, We said: "We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a 'final order' which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx "We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a ' final order' reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal be from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied) 17

One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus: "The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial . . . boards' whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, 'to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts,' that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions." 19 Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement: "The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolutions or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC." 2 0 In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. LexLib

Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it. Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . . . . 21 The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22 Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court: "The term 'liberty' means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and give to them their highest enjoyment." 23 Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of

instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,24 regarding academic freedom, to wit: . . . It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion." Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. LLjur In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-38429. June 30, 1988.] CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch II, and the CITY OF BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.

SECTION 1 It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets. cdrep SECTION 2 Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court. If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation.

Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners. The City Legal Officer for respondents-appellees.

DECISION SECTION 3 This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval." GANCAYCO, J p: At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below: "ORDINANCE 640 ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET. xxx xxx xxx Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that: Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel, managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30, 1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.1 Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969 by the court a quo enjoining the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing Ordinance No. 640. 4 On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973, the respondent court rendered its decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads: "IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of the respondents and against the petitioners, as follows: 1.Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided, however, that the fine for a single offense shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act No. 523; 2.Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and

3.Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED." 7 Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which was denied in a resolution of the said court dated November 10, 1973. 9 Hence, this petition. Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states: "Sec. 15.General powers and duties of the Board. Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: xxx xxx xxx "(n)To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other performances and places of amusements . . . xxx xxx xxx Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied inSection 15 (nn) of the cited law, which provides: "(nn)To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two hundred peso fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense."

We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters, theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is this: does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City? This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local government with the operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to these places. Previous decisions of this Court involved the power to impose license fees upon businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters to increase the price of their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to be invalid for these impositions were considered as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation which the cities have no power to exact, 11 Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised. llcd While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to public exhibitions or performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order, enforce the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was considered not to be within the scope of any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held therein that the power of regulation of public exhibitions and places of amusement within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority to interfere with the price of admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission. In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibitingfirst run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power. Still in another case, 16 the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting admission of two or more persons in moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with public health, public safety, and the general welfare. The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now

invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 18 Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.

enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 20 The methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded by the legislative department. 21 We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. 22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the pernicious practice of movie operators and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal price for their admission tickets along with the adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the interest of the City in the furtherance of the prosperity, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its inhabitants. There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances. Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to lessen the economic burden of parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the petitioners. Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of their age children cannot fully grasp the

In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 19 this Court held: "The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power. Inasmuch as the same generally entails a curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which are protected and even guaranteed by the Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights the police power measure must be reasonable. In other words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only and only to the extent that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare." What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640? A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in question was passed shows that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into account the complaints of parents that for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially burdensome. cdll The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre, in all probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to share in the joys of their elders, but that considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and twelve cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the admission prices with respect to them ought to be reduced." 19a We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought to be attained by the

nuances of such entertainment as adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is justifiable. In fact, by the very claim of respondent that movies and the like are attractive nuisances, it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board passed the subject ordinance. How can the municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is some truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public good and the general welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in school or be in their homes. Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house and theater operators cannot be compelled to exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be dictated by public demand and those which are restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share in the joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial court, there will be a dearth of wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy. There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States which upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere in this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar. LibLex A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. 23 Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. 24 So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing the right of property. 25 In Collister vs. Hayman, 26 it was held: "The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a public interest, was without a franchise to accommodate the public, and they had the right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other business, subject to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute. Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from the state, and hence under obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the business year in and year out, the proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful

complaint. They can charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the performance is going on. They can make it a part of the contract and condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The proprietors, in the control of their business, may regulate the terms of admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged to buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of the parties meet upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to perform it."

In Tyson and Bro.- United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton, 27 the United States Supreme Court held: ". . . . And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite as certainly, its activities are not such that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the point of view of an emergency. "The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be more nearly, and with better reason, assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for residence purposes; although in importance it fails below such an interest in the proportion that food and shelter are of more moment than amusement or instruction. As we have shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or clothing, or the rental charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in respect of amusements and entertainment . . ." We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts. In this jurisdiction, legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods, commodities and drugs during periods of emergency, 28 limiting the net profits of public utility 29 as well as regulating rentals of residential apartments for a limited period, 30 as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety,

economic security and the general welfare of the people. And these laws cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause. However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense could these businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. 31 People of all ages flock to movie houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and relaxation. The government realizing their importance has seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie industry. 32 Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational values cannot be underestimated. Even police measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in order to safeguard public health and safety. llcd Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. 33 A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. 36 Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This may be the rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. 38 Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 133640. November 25, 2005.] RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE'S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OFHEALTH, respondent.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

SYLLABUS 1.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE MAKING POWER; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, WHEN VALID; CASE AT BAR. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. . . . The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. 2.ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; CLASSIFICATION, WHEN REASONABLE. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class. 3.ID.; ID.; INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; POLICE POWER; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . . The Court finds that the

[G.R. No. 133661. November 25, 2005.] DOCTORS' BLOOD CENTER, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, respondent.

[G.R. No. 139147. November 25, 2005.] RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE'S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OFHEALTH, respondent.

Adviento Mallonga Adviento Law Offices for petitioners.

National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State's police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PREVAILS OVER RIGHTS TO CONTRACT AND PROPERTY. [I]n the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, settled is the rule that the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation. Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. 5.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CONTEMPT; PRESUPPOSES A CONTUMACIOUS ATTITUDE, A FLOUTING OR ARROGANT BELLIGERENCE IN DEFIANCE OF THE COURT. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court. There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same. 6.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; ALL REASONABLE DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.

Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the "National Blood Services Act of 1994," and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. G.R. No. 133640, 1 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health" and G.R. No. 133661, 2 entitled "Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health" are petitions for certiorari and mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners' license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB). cdtai 2006 The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998. 3 G.R. No. 139147, 4 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health," on the other hand, is a petition to show cause why respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court. This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999. 5 Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question. HcaDIA The facts of the case are as follows: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondentSecretary of the Department of Health (DOH). 6

DECISION

AZCUNA, J p:

Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides: "Section 7.Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary." Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides: "Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety." 8 Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services. Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled "An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories." The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with blood banks through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980's, financial difficulties constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks. 9 Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when the dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusionassociated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy outlining certain principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for transfusion.10

In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and tertiary depending on the services they provided. The standards were adjusted according to this classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according to classification level. The new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist. 11 In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee that will implement the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils. AEIcTD In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled "An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes" was introduced in the Senate. 12 Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently consolidated. 13 In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System." It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4% were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospitalbased blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there were only twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the country. Hence, with these numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are those who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary. 14

It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. 15

Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of this arrangement, many of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. Since they need the money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and social history are about three times much safer than blood from paid donors. 16 What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does not matter to them where the blood comes from. 17 On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH. The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary ofHealth their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank," docketed as G.R. No. 133640. On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order. 18 In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds: 19 1.The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of the law;

2.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state; and, THSaEC 3.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before this Court entitled "Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health," docketed as G.R. No. 133661. 20 This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640. 21 Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the following questions 22 for resolution: 1.Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power? 2.Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process? 3.Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts? 4.With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to deliver the same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare? On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the Court. 23 On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining order. 24 In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power,

can close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando Mercado. The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below: Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood banks. So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states: "ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH." I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System." This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang. Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very heart of my amendment which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man. xxx xxx xxx The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say? Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is. TcIaHC Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered. Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit and engages in the buying and selling of blood or its components. Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President. xxx xxx xxx Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health. In recommendation No. 4, he says: "The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a twoyear period will give the Department of Health enough time to build up government's capability to provide an adequate supply of blood for the needs of the nation . . . the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity." Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get volunteers who would donate blood. . . If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because it will protect their profit. In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national voluntary blood program. It has been said here in this report, and I quote:

"Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment for his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there could be others where there are no tests available yet. A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his expenses. Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them. Because there is no existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with many unethical practices.

Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS. We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it . . . For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding. The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe blood and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the patient to buy blood. Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will be no blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never work because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it, and the Government must do it." 26 On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts "that will ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners' blood banks." 27 On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that "blood banks are closed or will be closed." According to respondent Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of

The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated blood was sold was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They were protecting their profits. 25 The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue: xxx xxx xxx Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of povertystricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who, unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical history. They will lie about when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting. ACDTcE This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood will now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this buying and selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.

the commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO. 28 On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public respondent's willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondent's act constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of justice. 29Petitioners added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating, among others, that "this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on government blood banks." 30 Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health announced in a press conference during the Blood Donor's Week that commercial blood banks are "illegal and dangerous" and that they "are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that their commercial interest is more important than the lives of the people." These were all posted in bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical and health centers. 31 In respondent Secretary's Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by the department ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the Court's issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998. 32 Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was "to promote the importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood banks." 33 In doing so, he was merely performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood donation program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be promoted through public education, promotion in schools, professional education, establishment of blood services network, and walking blood donors. DaCEIc Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid donor promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance than the commercial businesses of petitioners. 34

On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time. 35 The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. 36 In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on August 9, 1999. In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that "blood donation is a humanitarian act" and "blood transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than those allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12." 37 Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder: I WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; II WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; III WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;

IV WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY; V WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and, VI WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE. cIADaC As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.

blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretaryof Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. 40 The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states: "SEC. 11.Rules and Regulations. The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof . . . " This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body's authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation. Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 "based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety." This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. 41 In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof: "SECTION 2.Declaration of Policy In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the state: a)to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act; CIAacS

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. 38 Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. 39 Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of publichealth by providing a safe and adequate supply of

b)to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity; c)to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and blood products; d)to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the commercial sale of blood; e)to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal system; f)to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit collection of blood; g)to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe supply of blood; h)to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and nongovernmental entities; i)to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis; j)to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units and blood banks/centers in the Philippines;

k)to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and banking of blood; and, l)to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases." Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law. 42 What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class. 43 Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening. 44 The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place. 45 Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks. AaSTIH

We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system. Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception. Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of police power. The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State's police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 46

seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public. The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State's police power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. 47 It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious. Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should be outside the domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid classification. 48 Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution. CIcEHS As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. 49 Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 50 settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation. Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to

In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may

time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 51 This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian Relations 52 where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers. 53 That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon. 54 Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent Secretary of Health's explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court. 55 There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same. In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. 56 Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine. 57

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows: 1.In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED. cIACaT 2.In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 166494. June 29, 2007.] CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., doing business under the name and style "Carlos Superdrug", ELSIE M. CANO, doing business under the name and style "Advance Drug", Dr. SIMPLICIO L. YAP, JR., doing business under the name and style "City Pharmacy", MELVIN S. DELA SERNA, doing business under the name and style "Botica dela Serna", and LEYTE SERV-WELL CORP., doing business under the name and style "Leyte Serv-Well Drugstore", petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH), DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF), DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), respondents.

SEC. 4.Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a)the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens; xxx xxx xxx The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. 4 On May 28, 2004, the DSWD approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9257, Rule VI, Article 8 of which states: Article 8.Tax Deduction of Establishments. The establishment may claim the discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4 Discounts for Establishments;5 Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities[,] 6 and Sections 10 7 and 11 8 Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance (DOF). 9 DSITEH On July 10, 2004, in reference to the query of the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines (DSAP) concerning the meaning of a tax deduction under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the DOF, through Director IV Ma. Lourdes B. Recente, clarified as follows:

DECISION

AZCUNA, J p: This is a petition 1 for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, 2 otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003". Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand, include the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) which have been specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores' compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments. The antecedents are as follows: On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, 3 was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4 (a) of the Act states:

1)The difference between the Tax Credit (under the Old Senior Citizens Act) and Tax Deduction (under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act). 1.1.The provision of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432 (the old Senior Citizens Act) grants twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicines anywhere in the country, the costs of which may be claimed by the private establishments concerned as tax credit. Effectively, a tax credit is a peso-for-peso deduction from a taxpayer's tax liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such establishment has granted to a senior citizen. The establishment recovers the full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and hence, the government shoulders 100% of the discounts granted. It must be noted, however, that conceptually, a tax credit scheme under the Philippine tax system, necessitates that prior payments of taxes have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due. The tax credit scheme under R.A. No. 7432 is, therefore, inapplicable since no tax payments have previously occurred. 1.2.The provision under R.A. No. 9257, on the other hand, provides that the establishment concerned may claim the discounts under Section 4 (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction from gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Under this scheme, the establishment concerned is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing for its tax liability, the amount of discounts granted to senior citizens. Effectively, the government loses in terms of foregone revenues an amount equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the government. This will be an amount equivalent to 32% of the twenty percent (20%) discounts so granted. The establishment shoulders the remaining portion of the granted discounts.

It may be necessary to note that while the burden on [the] government is slightly diminished in terms of its percentage share on the discounts granted to senior citizens, the number of potential establishments that may claim tax deductions, have however, been broadened. Aside from the establishments that may claim tax credits under the old law, more establishments were added under the new law such as: establishments providing medical and dental services, diagnostic and laboratory services, including professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, operators of domestic air and sea transport services, public railways and skyways and bus transport services. cDaEAS A simple illustration might help amplify the points discussed above, as follows: Tax DeductionTax Credit Gross Salesx x x x x xx x x x x x Less: Cost of goods soldx x x x xx x x x x Net Salesx x x x x xx x x x x x Less: Operating Expenses: Tax Deduction on Discountsx x x x-Other deductions:x x x xx x x x Net Taxable Incomex x x x xx x x x x Tax Duex x xx x x Less: Tax Credit--x x Net Tax Due--x x

As shown above, under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount. 10 Meanwhile, on October 1, 2004, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 171 or the Policies and Guidelines to Implement the Relevant Provisions of Republic Act 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" 11 was issued by the DOH, providing the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 177 12 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated that "[t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens". Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act based on the following grounds: 13 1)The law is confiscatory because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; 2)It violates the equal protection clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) enshrined in our Constitution which states that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal protection of the laws;" and 3)The 20% discount on medicines violates the constitutional guarantee in Article XIII, Section 11 that makes "essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost." 14 Petitioners assert that Section 4 (a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

Examining petitioners' arguments, it is apparent that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a reimbursement mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law 15 to reduce the income prior to the application of the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. 16 Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. 17 This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. TIcAaH Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. 18 A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation. 19 Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. 20 The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides:

SEC. 2.Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows: SECTION 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with these constitutional principles the following are the declared policies of this Act: xxx xxx xxx (f)To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership. 21 DAEIHT To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. 22 Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." 23 It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." 24

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare. 25 Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. 26 Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. 27 In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction. cIDHSC To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According to the latter, it acquires Norvascfrom the distributors at P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores.28 Petitioners' computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from gross income, 29 the amount of income derived from all sources before deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here, petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which should not be the case. An income statement, showing an accounting of petitioners' sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on the amount of the discount. Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch

as pricing is a property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition. The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. 30 Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. 31

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. IDEScC No costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.] WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, respondent.

SEC. 1.Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. SEC. 2.Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 3.Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. aDECHI SEC. 4.Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. SEC. 5.Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled. SEC. 6.Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed. SEC. 7.Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval. Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992. Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.

DECISION

TINGA, J p: With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality. CcaASE In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition. This Petition 2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance). I. The facts are as follows: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. 4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City ofManila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. 6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours. DACTSa On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention 7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and motels in Manila. 8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in MetroManila. 9 On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff. 11 ADTCaI On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. 13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. 14 On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. 15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional. During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. 16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. 17

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." 18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef. ITSCED The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. 20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 21 Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4) (iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power: [To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. 22 The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18 (kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus: "to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense. 23 Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. acIHDA The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. 24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that

admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila,liberty is regulated by law. TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25 In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.

parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests". 33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit. 34 American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that: "The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them." 36 An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren, 37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function". 38 HacADE Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. 39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame. III.

II. We must address the threshold issue of petitioners' standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights. aTcSID Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, 26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. 27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. 28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. 29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright. 30 Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance. 31 For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, 32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third

To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40 Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens. ESDHCa The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 41 The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause. A. Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. 42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. 43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, 44 movie theaters, 45 gas stations 46 and cockpits. 47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation's legal system, its use has rarely been denied.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism. ETDHaC Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the coequal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day. B. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. 48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. cAaTED

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process". Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. 49Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. 50

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application. C. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. 51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right". 52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. aITECA A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender 53and legitimacy. 54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, 55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. 57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. 58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. 59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access 63 and interstate travel. 64

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. HEaCcD Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others. D. The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus: Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." [ 65 ] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. [ 66 ] The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty". It said: While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the

individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 67 [Citations omitted] DHSaCA It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers'". 68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-enscene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected 69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes: The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated: Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free. Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfeaccorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. 70 SDIaHE

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose to pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

E. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. 71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 72 Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. 73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. 74 Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. 75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subjects them without exception to the unjustified prohibition. The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, 76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis

wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. IDCcEa The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. IV. We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However wellintentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. 77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. 78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests. 79 To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. 80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented. EcHIDT

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law. 81 Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.] JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Agarin Verzola Hermoso & Layasen Law Offices, Saguisag Carao & Associates, Jose B. Flaminiano and Fortun Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents.

branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. CADHcI 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN LAW IS CHALLENGED. The onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." 3.ID.; ID.; PLUNDER LAW; CONTAINS WELL-DEFINED PARAMETERS. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; TERMS USED; ABSENCE OF STATUTORY DEFINITION THEREOF DOES NOT RENDER LAW VOID; POPULAR MEANING GENERALLY APPLIED. Petitioner bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word

SYNOPSIS The Court affirmed the constitutionality of RA 7080, otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659. The Plunder Law contained ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Indeed, it can be understood that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in the Plunder Law. Petitioner bewailed the failure of the law to provide statutory definitions of the terms used. The Court, however, ruled that the same will not render the law void and the words of the statute will be interpreted in their ordinary acceptation. Hence, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is misplaced. That the Plunder Law requires only proof of pattern of the criminal acts showing unlawful scheme, the Court ruled that the same does not do away with the requirement of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth.

SYLLABUS 1.POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATION; PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. The whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one

we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Further, that Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WORDS "COMBINATION," "SERIES" AND "PATTERN"; ELUCIDATED. When the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 of the Plunder Law. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; "VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS" DOCTRINE; NOT APPLICABLE. Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning

as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.

7.ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION IN SEC. 4 THAT ONLY PROOF OF PATTERN OF CRIMINAL ACTS SHOWING UNLAWFUL SCHEME IS REQUIRED; DOES NOT DO AWAY WITH PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ELUCIDATED. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of

acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00. A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "PATTERN," NOT AN ELEMENT OF CRIME AND DOES NOT AFFECT SEC. 4 PROVIDING FOR RULE OF EVIDENCE. Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder"; and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder . . . It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause. And implicit in that section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved. DCcIaE 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; A CRIME MALUM IN SE. We agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says . . . "The legislative

declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts." 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLUNDER LAW, UPHELD. Petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it. Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office. These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p: JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of

rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to selfpreservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance. The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element ofmens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder: SECTION 1.. . . . (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1)Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2)By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned; (3)By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (4)By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5)By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (6)By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. SECTION 2.Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires illgotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised

Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied). SECTION 4.Rule of Evidence. For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied). On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a", "b", and "c" to give the accused the opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner

submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality. In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded. Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." 5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the

instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1.That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; 2.That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and, 3.That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of

at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed: "The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows: That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph EjercitoEstrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows: (a)by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000.000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE

'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; (b)by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000.000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No 7171, by himself and/orin connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (emphasis supplied). (c)by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00) RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d)by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLEPCI BANK." We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. aCSEcA Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; 6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. 8 The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series": Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991 REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also? REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series. REP. ISIDRO: Series. REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two. REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration. REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice. REP. ISIDRO: Not twice? REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice but combination, two acts. REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that's it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act. REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah. REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two. REP. GARCIA:

A series. REP. ISIDRO: That's not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba? REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So . .. REP. GARCIA:

REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different? REP. GARCIA: Yes. SEN. TAADA: Two different. REP. ISIDRO:

Series. One after the other eh di . . . Two different acts. SEN. TAADA: REP. GARCIA: So that would fall under the term "series?" For example, ha . . . REP. GARCIA: REP. ISIDRO: Series, oo. Now a series, meaning, repetition . . . REP. ISIDRO: DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989 Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations . . . SENATOR MACEDA: REP. GARCIA: Its not . . . Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series. REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination? In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TAADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this. THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be . . . . SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more. SENATOR TAADA: Accepted, Mr. President . . . . THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more. SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President. Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 . . . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. 11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured

by common understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. ESCacI Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'' 14 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.'' 19 In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'' 21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety. Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris 24

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally disfavored. 26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27 In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage. The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan 28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation

against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted. In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses. The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in: . . . or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, . . . (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended). It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4.Rule of Evidence. For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990 MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense. MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him? MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (emphasis supplied). It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the

prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00. 31 A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth. The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts. DaHISE Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder"; and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of? ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law? ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law? ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law . . . . JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said i do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder? ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4. JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4? ATTY. AGABIN:

Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32

of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733: SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 33 However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner: SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases? SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . . 34 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. IaECcH Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal: SEC. 4.Rule of Evidence For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder . . . . It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7.Separability of Provisions. If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved. As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime

circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly thatmens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35 Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray: 36 The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se 37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it. Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentless]y contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical

and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 162777. August 31, 2004.] FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA, in her capacity as Acting Director IV, National Capital Judicial Region, Commission on Elections, and the SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

two showed petitioner endorsing the clothes of 96 North. One more billboard was set up along Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the game and amusement parlors of GBox. On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko. On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, on January 29, 2004, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter dated February 23, 2004, this time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules. The COMELEC answered petitioner's request by issuing another letter, dated February 27, 2004, wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of anex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth. Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police power? Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC, he concludes. This Court takes a contrary view. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. 1 To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals? A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office,

DECISION

AZCUNA, J p: In this petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, Francisco I. Chavez stands as a taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004. The assailed provision is, as follows: Section 32.All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and image for 96 North, a clothing company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation and another corporation involved in the amusement and video games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the plastic products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other

to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v. COMELEC, 2 wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time "for campaigning or other political purposes," except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." This Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty line. Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities included under this definition are: (1)Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate; (2)Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (3)Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office; (4)Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or (5)Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate. 3 (emphasis ours) It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If

the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning: HCSEcI Sec. 80.Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period . . . 4 Article IX(C)(4) of the Constitution provides: Sec. 4.The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Neither is Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. 5 Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be

activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. 6 Furthermore, this Court notes that the very contracts entered into by petitioner provide that the endorser's photograph and image shall be utilized in whatever form, mode and manner "in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law;" 7 and in whatever form, mode and manner not contrary to law and norms of decency," 8 and "in whatever form, mode and manner in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law." 9 Petitioner also claims that Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 is in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code. 10 A close scrutiny of this rationale, however, demonstrates its lack of persuasiveness. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case. Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. 11 Moreover, by regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its

duty under the law. Under Sections 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act, all election propaganda are subject to the supervision and regulation by the COMELEC: SECTION 3. Lawful Election Propaganda. Election propaganda, whether on television, cable television radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties observance of truth in advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). For the purpose of this Act, lawful election propaganda shall include: 3.1.Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the size of which does not exceed eight and one half inches in width and fourteen inches in length; 3.2.Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular political party or candidate for public office; 3.3.Cloth, paper or cardboard posters whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two (2) feet by three (3) feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; DaIACS 3.4.Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media: Provided, That the advertisements shall follow the requirements set forth in Section 4 of this Act; and 3.5.All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code or this Act.

xxx xxx xxx SECTION 13.Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules; Election Offenses. The COMELEC shall promulgate and furnish all political parties and candidates and the mass media entities the rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act, consistent with the criteria established in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and Section 86 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority of this Section shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in at least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation. Prior to effectivity of said rules and regulations, no political advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate or political party shall be published or broadcast through mass media. Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to implement this Act shall be an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid because of overbreadth. A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 12 The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the continued display of a person's propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image. There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is declared valid and constitutional. The prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 63915. April 24, 1985.] LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES "OF A PUBLIC NATURE" OR "OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY," A REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS; UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150) It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY OF UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL DECREES DOES NOT AFFECT THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN ENFORCED OR IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THEIR PUBLICATION. The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . . .that an all inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification: 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT NEED NOT BE CONFINED TO THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. But such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is to be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree, or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IN ART. 2 CIVIL CODE DOES NOT HAVE THE JUDICIAL FORCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. The Chief Justice's qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or

Lorenzo M. Taada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, Mabini Legal Aid Committee for petitioners Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PETITIONERS TO FILE MANDAMUS TO COMPEL PUBLICATION, RECOGNIZED. The subject of the petition is to compel the performance of a public duty and petitioners maintain they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. The right sought to be enforced by petitioners is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 2 CIVIL CODE DOES NOT PRECLUDE PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE EVEN IF THE LAW ITSELF PROVIDES FOR DATE OF ITS EFFECTIVITY. That publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates is correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the

executive act of a general application. He is not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; TO DECLARE UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT WOULD RESULT IN UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES. Nor does the Chief Justice agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in his opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. He finds himself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES, PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; NECESSARY PURSUANT TO THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstanced and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedure. The Court had consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation," (People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. L-11003, August 31, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras) citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents. especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties." Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith." 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT "ONLY LAWS WHICH ARE SILENT AS TO THEIR EFFECTIVITY DATE NEED TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY," UNTENABLE. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided," i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that had been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect (only) one year (not 15 days) after such publication." To sustain respondents misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not

necessary for their effectivity" would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE; RETROACTIVITY IN EFFECTIVITY DATE NOT ALLOWED WHERE IT WILL RUN COUNTER TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR DESTROY VESTED RIGHTS. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. When a date effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., separate opinion: 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE NOT ESSENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVITY FOR EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS. The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. 2.ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION MAY BE MADE ELSEWHERE THAN IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided." Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. 3.ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT 638 CANNOT NULLIFY OR RESTRICT OPERATION OF A STATUTE WITH A PROVISION AS TO ITS EFFECTIVITY. Not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, Commonwealth Act No. 638 does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand

on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume the role.

DECISION

d]Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 15611588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 18311832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 18531858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244. e]Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457-471, 474492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611-647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. f]Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123. g]Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360-378, 380-433, 436-439. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: Cdpr "SEC. 3.Petition for Mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant."

ESCOLIN, J p: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: a]Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847. b]Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248-251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964, 997, 1149-1178, 1180-1278. c]General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]." Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said: Cdpr "We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error.' "No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character." The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed

be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

"Art. 2.Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, . . ." The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: "Section 1.There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. . . ."

The clear object of the above quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. cdphil Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion genrica de leyes, se comprenden tambin los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad." 5 The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette . . ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6 It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7 : "In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents."

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: LLjur "The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court. Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . . . that an allinclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be,

it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby." The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately." WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. SO ORDERED.

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